WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.600 --> 00:00:07.400 The Team House with your hosts, Jack Murphy and David Park. 2 00:00:11.919 --> 00:00:15.279 Hello everybody, and welcome to the Teamhouse. I am David Park. 3 00:00:15.400 --> 00:00:20.280 This is Jack Murphy. We are here episode one with 4 00:00:20.399 --> 00:00:24.199 a very special guest, the former director of Counterintelligence at 5 00:00:24.199 --> 00:00:28.600 the CIA, Jim Olsen. Jim has written a couple of 6 00:00:28.640 --> 00:00:32.320 phenomenal books, the one that will kind of talk about tonight. 7 00:00:32.320 --> 00:00:34.159 In addition, well we'll talk about both of them tonight. 8 00:00:34.320 --> 00:00:35.799 But one is to Catch a Spy and the other 9 00:00:35.799 --> 00:00:36.719 one is fair Play. 10 00:00:36.799 --> 00:00:38.679 Right, Yes, that's right. 11 00:00:38.759 --> 00:00:44.759 Fair play about the like the ethical issues in an espionage. 12 00:00:46.039 --> 00:00:50.679 We we really appreciate you being here with us nide Jim. 13 00:00:50.200 --> 00:00:52.079 But you're most welcome. It is a pleasure to be here. 14 00:00:52.119 --> 00:00:54.240 There's nothing like better than talking about spying. 15 00:00:55.280 --> 00:00:59.560 Yeah, that's and and I mean you honestly have a 16 00:00:59.640 --> 00:01:01.640 spot verse by career. 17 00:01:03.719 --> 00:01:06.599 Yes, I spent a lot of time on counterintelligence, so 18 00:01:07.680 --> 00:01:12.439 I would call myself a spy catcher. And I found 19 00:01:12.439 --> 00:01:16.200 nothing more rewarding of my career than tracking down American 20 00:01:16.239 --> 00:01:19.040 traders and bringing to justice. And I had the opportunity 21 00:01:19.079 --> 00:01:21.680 to be involved in several such operations. 22 00:01:22.239 --> 00:01:23.599 Yeah, we'll talk about those. 23 00:01:23.599 --> 00:01:26.120 We'll talk about some of the some of the bigger 24 00:01:27.159 --> 00:01:29.560 operations you've been in, and also just some of the 25 00:01:29.640 --> 00:01:34.400 threats that America has faced and is currently facing. Because 26 00:01:35.200 --> 00:01:41.359 I'll tell you, Stephen King has nothing on you. This 27 00:01:41.519 --> 00:01:45.599 book is terrifying. It's terrifying. 28 00:01:47.719 --> 00:01:50.040 Yeah. I reacted the same way when I was writing it. 29 00:01:50.359 --> 00:01:56.439 This scary stuff. Yeah, because our country is really a peril. 30 00:01:56.799 --> 00:02:01.760 We face multiple threats from foreign intelligence services, and I 31 00:02:01.799 --> 00:02:05.239 believe that we are not taking that threat seriously enough. 32 00:02:05.719 --> 00:02:07.879 We need to do a lot more. So. I make 33 00:02:07.920 --> 00:02:12.240 the point quite frankly openly in my book that we're 34 00:02:12.240 --> 00:02:14.680 losing the counter intelligence war. That's got to change. 35 00:02:14.960 --> 00:02:15.879 Yeah, and we will. 36 00:02:15.919 --> 00:02:18.199 We will definitely talk about some ways that we're losing 37 00:02:18.240 --> 00:02:21.000 that as we get into it, because especially like with 38 00:02:21.080 --> 00:02:24.680 some things with China, like they're they're they're terrifying implications there, 39 00:02:24.719 --> 00:02:28.639 but also Russia and Cuba, which was really surprising to me. 40 00:02:28.840 --> 00:02:32.919 I mean, we've had on like uh Mark Polymeroopolis and 41 00:02:32.960 --> 00:02:34.879 some other people have had you know, who have been 42 00:02:34.919 --> 00:02:38.240 affected by their policies. But you talk about what a 43 00:02:38.599 --> 00:02:43.439 what a high degree of professionalism they operate with the Cubans. 44 00:02:43.599 --> 00:02:48.960 Yes, Yeah, that's right. They're kind of my nemesis throughout 45 00:02:48.960 --> 00:02:52.800 my career. I have no love for Cuban Intelligence Service. 46 00:02:53.520 --> 00:02:56.240 They did a lot of harm to us. They're still very, 47 00:02:56.319 --> 00:03:00.199 very actively operating against the United States, so I don't 48 00:03:00.240 --> 00:03:02.840 to have any reservations at all about ranking them as 49 00:03:03.680 --> 00:03:07.240 now the number three threat to our country security in 50 00:03:07.280 --> 00:03:08.280 terms of espionage. 51 00:03:08.520 --> 00:03:12.280 Yeah, it's fascinating and we'll get into all that. One 52 00:03:12.319 --> 00:03:14.000 of the things we like to do though, on this 53 00:03:14.080 --> 00:03:16.400 show is always start from the very beginning. So can 54 00:03:16.439 --> 00:03:18.719 you tell us a little bit about your origin story, 55 00:03:18.759 --> 00:03:20.840 how did you grow up, and how did that lead 56 00:03:20.919 --> 00:03:23.280 you eventually to the CIA. 57 00:03:24.800 --> 00:03:29.759 It's a very unlikely story. I was raised in a 58 00:03:29.800 --> 00:03:34.599 small town in Iowa. I didn't think at all about 59 00:03:34.639 --> 00:03:39.039 international affairs. We joked among ourselves out in Iowa. Unless 60 00:03:39.039 --> 00:03:42.199 it affected the price of corn, we weren't all that interested. 61 00:03:44.120 --> 00:03:47.120 But when I went off to college at the University 62 00:03:47.159 --> 00:03:50.479 of Iowa to study mathematics and economics, I began to 63 00:03:50.520 --> 00:03:52.439 develop a little bit more of a sense of what 64 00:03:52.560 --> 00:03:54.919 was going on in the world. It was the height 65 00:03:54.960 --> 00:03:59.919 of the Cold War. I was at university in the 66 00:04:00.159 --> 00:04:04.159 and Ristal crisis went on, so that definitely focuses I 67 00:04:04.240 --> 00:04:08.680 was also preparing to become a United States Navy officer, 68 00:04:09.280 --> 00:04:12.719 so I was beginning to think of my of myself 69 00:04:12.759 --> 00:04:17.360 in terms of national security and national defense. I then 70 00:04:17.800 --> 00:04:21.319 took a commission in the Navy. When I graduated, served 71 00:04:21.360 --> 00:04:24.759 aboard guided miss or destroyers and frigates. Really loved it. 72 00:04:24.759 --> 00:04:28.839 It kind of reinforce a sense of service to country, 73 00:04:29.439 --> 00:04:33.879 but it was still very unformed. I didn't know exactly 74 00:04:33.920 --> 00:04:37.360 what direction that would take. I did know that I 75 00:04:37.399 --> 00:04:39.600 wanted to go back to my home state of Iowa. 76 00:04:40.480 --> 00:04:43.959 So I left the Navy after about four years and 77 00:04:44.199 --> 00:04:47.959 applied for law school the University of i was accepted, 78 00:04:48.800 --> 00:04:51.720 and that was my dream at the time. I wanted 79 00:04:51.759 --> 00:04:53.959 to get my law degree in practice law in a 80 00:04:54.040 --> 00:04:58.560 small county seat town in Iowa, serve my community, finalize 81 00:04:58.600 --> 00:05:02.079 Iowa girls, settled down, a family, not a bad life. 82 00:05:02.160 --> 00:05:05.759 I thought that would be a good way to serve 83 00:05:05.800 --> 00:05:09.439 my community. But of course that was not the way 84 00:05:09.480 --> 00:05:12.120 it turned out, because in my last year of law school, 85 00:05:13.040 --> 00:05:16.600 I received this mysterious phone call out of the blue, 86 00:05:17.600 --> 00:05:20.959 mister Olson, we think we have a career opportunity that 87 00:05:21.040 --> 00:05:23.199 might be of interest to you. And that was a 88 00:05:23.199 --> 00:05:25.879 CIA call and they had spotted me. They had found 89 00:05:25.879 --> 00:05:29.160 me somehow out there in the middle of Iowa, and 90 00:05:29.160 --> 00:05:32.600 that was the beginning of a lengthy process of secret 91 00:05:32.600 --> 00:05:37.199 trips to Washington and interviews, meetings in safe houses, eventually 92 00:05:37.240 --> 00:05:40.759 leading to an offer to join the sei's clandestine Service. 93 00:05:41.160 --> 00:05:44.000 What kind of funny I remember distinctly as I was 94 00:05:44.680 --> 00:05:47.759 packing up in Iowa to go off to this SEAI place, 95 00:05:47.800 --> 00:05:50.720 whatever it was. I was determined that I would do 96 00:05:50.759 --> 00:05:52.759 it for only a couple of years, and then I 97 00:05:52.800 --> 00:05:55.399 guaranteed myself. Jim, after two or three years, you are 98 00:05:55.439 --> 00:05:58.879 going back to Iowa and pursuing that Richard Gimat. Of 99 00:05:58.879 --> 00:06:02.079 course it did work out that way, because it did 100 00:06:02.240 --> 00:06:06.240 take long to realize that the CIA was where I belonged. 101 00:06:06.800 --> 00:06:10.199 I found it just incredibly fulfilling, and so I ended 102 00:06:10.279 --> 00:06:12.120 up spending thirty one years there. 103 00:06:14.199 --> 00:06:16.319 What year was that that you were recruited, Jim, that 104 00:06:16.360 --> 00:06:17.360 you started the record. 105 00:06:17.160 --> 00:06:19.800 Was recruited by the CIA as I was coming out 106 00:06:19.800 --> 00:06:21.639 of law school in sixty nine. 107 00:06:21.920 --> 00:06:26.639 Okay, so tail end of the Vietnam War, getting there, 108 00:06:27.480 --> 00:06:29.199 still very much in the Cold War. 109 00:06:30.079 --> 00:06:33.560 Very much a Cold War period. That's our focus. We 110 00:06:33.600 --> 00:06:37.480 all thought about that and when I joined the CIA, 111 00:06:38.120 --> 00:06:41.920 I wanted to do my part above all, like most 112 00:06:41.920 --> 00:06:45.879 of the other recruits at that time, in fighting Soviet Communism, 113 00:06:46.560 --> 00:06:51.319 in protecting our values from the expansionist Soviet regime. 114 00:06:52.439 --> 00:06:55.439 So what was your training like at that time? 115 00:06:55.439 --> 00:06:57.920 And then I'd love to hear about your first job, 116 00:06:58.759 --> 00:07:00.839 you know, when you finally dip your feet into this world. 117 00:07:01.279 --> 00:07:05.319 Yeah, the training was awesome, Jack. You know, it's not 118 00:07:05.680 --> 00:07:08.800 much different now than it was back then, but most 119 00:07:08.800 --> 00:07:11.560 of it took place down at this undercover base that 120 00:07:11.639 --> 00:07:15.120 we call the farm. And out at the farm, we 121 00:07:15.240 --> 00:07:19.079 learned the art of intelligence, as we called it. We 122 00:07:19.160 --> 00:07:25.079 learned the recruitment cycle. We learned about detecting and defeating surveillance. 123 00:07:25.600 --> 00:07:28.600 We learned about all the different spy gadgets that we used. 124 00:07:28.879 --> 00:07:31.959 We also went through a fair amount of paramilitary training 125 00:07:32.839 --> 00:07:35.839 because it was assumed that many of us would in 126 00:07:35.879 --> 00:07:40.000 fact have, at some point in our career need for 127 00:07:40.839 --> 00:07:46.959 paramilitary skills. Most of us in my class, with owning 128 00:07:47.000 --> 00:07:51.279 maybe one or two exceptions, were former military officers, so 129 00:07:51.759 --> 00:07:55.439 doing the paramilitary training was quite natural for us. And 130 00:07:55.439 --> 00:07:59.079 in that era, of course, we expected to be going 131 00:07:59.199 --> 00:08:03.800 to Llaos, Vietnam or somewhere else in Southeast Asia. And 132 00:08:03.879 --> 00:08:08.120 I remember when I was completing training down at the farm, 133 00:08:08.800 --> 00:08:11.360 when headquarters came down, I assume I'm on my way 134 00:08:11.360 --> 00:08:15.680 to Vietnam or to Laos, because first of all, I 135 00:08:15.800 --> 00:08:18.639 was a former military officer. That was a big plus. 136 00:08:19.439 --> 00:08:24.480 I spoke good French already, which would be valuable in 137 00:08:24.560 --> 00:08:29.680 Southeast Asia, allows Vietnam, Cambodia. I was still single, and 138 00:08:29.720 --> 00:08:32.519 so I thought, listen, this is a lot. I'm going 139 00:08:32.600 --> 00:08:37.320 to be going to Vietnam or Laos as most of 140 00:08:37.320 --> 00:08:41.600 my classmates did. And when the CI came down and 141 00:08:42.360 --> 00:08:46.480 chose me for a different assignment, I was feeling some 142 00:08:46.720 --> 00:08:50.200 guilt that I wasn't going to be out doing my 143 00:08:50.879 --> 00:08:54.080 duty on the front lines as my classmates were. And 144 00:08:54.120 --> 00:08:58.399 when I lost classmates in Laos and in Vietnam, that 145 00:08:58.519 --> 00:09:02.600 guilt was compounded. The CIA had reasons for wanting to 146 00:09:02.639 --> 00:09:06.399 send me where it did, so I don't regret that 147 00:09:06.919 --> 00:09:09.799 I did my duty as best I could. But the 148 00:09:09.879 --> 00:09:12.399 kind of people will recruit want to be where the 149 00:09:12.440 --> 00:09:16.039 action is right, and the current generation of CI officers 150 00:09:16.440 --> 00:09:19.600 wanted to be in Afghanistan. They wanted to be in Iraq. 151 00:09:19.879 --> 00:09:22.200 If you don't have that in your resume. You know, 152 00:09:22.320 --> 00:09:25.240 you have a little bit of a sense of shirky, right, 153 00:09:25.320 --> 00:09:29.519 and so we had no problem finding volunteers to go 154 00:09:29.559 --> 00:09:31.159 out to those hotspots. 155 00:09:31.720 --> 00:09:34.840 Right now, Before you went to the farm, you were 156 00:09:34.879 --> 00:09:36.840 an intern for a while, right, because there was a 157 00:09:36.840 --> 00:09:39.639 formative I thought that in your book you mentioned that 158 00:09:39.679 --> 00:09:42.759 this was actually kind of a formative part of your 159 00:09:42.799 --> 00:09:43.879 CIA vision. 160 00:09:44.519 --> 00:09:49.679 Yeah. Yeah, you've done your homework day. Yeah. I described 161 00:09:49.720 --> 00:09:53.399 that in my first book, fair Play. My training out 162 00:09:53.440 --> 00:09:55.679 of the farm wasn't going to start for a couple 163 00:09:55.639 --> 00:09:59.960 of months after I arrived at the CIA, so I 164 00:10:00.000 --> 00:10:04.519 I needed an interim assignment, and not knowing any better, 165 00:10:05.519 --> 00:10:10.279 I took an interim assignment in the counter Intelligence staff 166 00:10:11.200 --> 00:10:14.519 and it was really interesting work because my assignment was 167 00:10:14.559 --> 00:10:19.360 to update a study that the counter intelligence staff had 168 00:10:19.399 --> 00:10:25.639 done on the Rhoda Kappel, which was the the Russian 169 00:10:25.759 --> 00:10:31.919 networks in German occupied Europe during World War Two, and 170 00:10:32.600 --> 00:10:35.879 NSA at the time was finally, all those years later, 171 00:10:36.440 --> 00:10:40.720 breaking some of the traffic between the center in Moscow 172 00:10:41.519 --> 00:10:46.919 and their operatives out in occupied Europe. They were communicating, 173 00:10:46.960 --> 00:10:54.360 of course, via clandestine radios. I found it absolutely amazing 174 00:10:55.320 --> 00:10:58.879 to read the first person at CI headquarters as these 175 00:10:58.879 --> 00:11:04.360 transcripts came in from and to say, the drama, the tension, 176 00:11:05.039 --> 00:11:09.399 the actual patriotism of these Russian spies throughout Europe, putting 177 00:11:09.440 --> 00:11:13.039 their lives on the line to communicate intelligence. My job 178 00:11:13.159 --> 00:11:17.240 was to incorporate what we were learning about these Russian 179 00:11:17.320 --> 00:11:21.759 networks of the Rhoda capella into the previous study. And 180 00:11:21.879 --> 00:11:24.879 I worked pretty hard on that, and I thought I 181 00:11:24.879 --> 00:11:28.279 had done a pretty good job, and in fact some 182 00:11:28.360 --> 00:11:33.039 of my supervisors did also. So they said, as I 183 00:11:33.080 --> 00:11:36.360 was getting ready to leave the counter Intelligence staff to 184 00:11:36.879 --> 00:11:39.639 start my training down at the farm gym, you've done 185 00:11:39.639 --> 00:11:42.120 a good job here and we want you to get 186 00:11:42.159 --> 00:11:46.440 the appropriate recognition. And so we've arranged a meeting, a 187 00:11:46.440 --> 00:11:51.159 farewell meeting for you with the man himself, and by 188 00:11:51.200 --> 00:11:54.000 the man himself. Of course, they met the chief of 189 00:11:54.000 --> 00:12:00.200 the counter Intelligence Staff, a legendary James Jesus Angleton. And 190 00:12:00.200 --> 00:12:03.919 on the appointed day, I showed up to see a 191 00:12:04.000 --> 00:12:08.279 corridor at ciad quarters. I went into the outer office. 192 00:12:08.799 --> 00:12:12.639 You didn't go into the presence without being briefed on 193 00:12:12.679 --> 00:12:15.639 how to comport yourself. So all of his attendants are 194 00:12:15.639 --> 00:12:18.440 telling me how to behave. When I got there, I'm 195 00:12:18.480 --> 00:12:23.240 getting pretty nervous. So finally they said, okay, go on in, 196 00:12:24.120 --> 00:12:26.960 and so they opened the door and I kind of 197 00:12:27.000 --> 00:12:30.000 walked in. They had told me that it would be 198 00:12:30.039 --> 00:12:32.960 a dark room, and in fact it was. He had 199 00:12:32.960 --> 00:12:36.440 big black curtains, he had just one desk lamp and 200 00:12:36.480 --> 00:12:40.440 these awl these eyes looking at at me, and the 201 00:12:40.519 --> 00:12:44.600 big haze of smoke because he was a chain smoker. 202 00:12:45.519 --> 00:12:48.320 And they had told me standing at attention in front 203 00:12:48.320 --> 00:12:52.080 of his desk, he might not speak, So just launch 204 00:12:52.200 --> 00:12:57.080 into your grief on Euroticapella study. I did that, and 205 00:12:57.200 --> 00:13:00.519 I'm going I'm feeling pretty good about myself. Was flowing 206 00:13:00.559 --> 00:13:04.360 pretty well. I said, this is going pretty well. He 207 00:13:04.399 --> 00:13:08.720 cannot fail to be impressed by my ci acumen at 208 00:13:08.720 --> 00:13:11.600 this very early stage in my career, not at all. 209 00:13:12.480 --> 00:13:15.919 Because at a certain point he stopped me. He looked 210 00:13:15.960 --> 00:13:19.559 me in the eye and he said, mister Olsen, don't 211 00:13:19.600 --> 00:13:23.919 you realize that the rood A Capella was nothing more 212 00:13:23.960 --> 00:13:28.879 than a German controlled deception operation? And that took me back, 213 00:13:31.200 --> 00:13:38.440 and I realized then, as arrogantism might have seen that 214 00:13:38.919 --> 00:13:43.159 this great mind, this counterintelligence genius, had really lost touch 215 00:13:43.240 --> 00:13:47.399 with reality, because that made no sense at all. I 216 00:13:47.720 --> 00:13:50.240 had dug deeply into the road of Capella. I knew 217 00:13:50.320 --> 00:13:53.720 it wasn't German controlled, but that was his thesis. He 218 00:13:53.759 --> 00:13:59.480 saw conspiracies everywhere. He was a double fake expert, and 219 00:13:59.559 --> 00:14:04.159 so he rudely dismissed me, said that I had wasted 220 00:14:04.200 --> 00:14:07.840 his time, I had wasted the CI staff's time by 221 00:14:07.879 --> 00:14:12.159 coming up with these totally erroneous conclusions. I go out 222 00:14:12.200 --> 00:14:14.639 to the outer office. Everybody, how did you go? How 223 00:14:14.639 --> 00:14:19.559 to go? And I'm crushed. And as I'm walking down 224 00:14:19.639 --> 00:14:25.000 the corridor afterwards, I honestly was saying to myself, you know, Jim, 225 00:14:25.159 --> 00:14:27.440 you had such high hopes for this career, and what 226 00:14:27.559 --> 00:14:31.120 a shame because it has ended before it even started. 227 00:14:31.399 --> 00:14:35.000 There's no way you're going to survive that kind of 228 00:14:35.279 --> 00:14:39.559 a chewing out by the most powerful man in the CIA. 229 00:14:40.360 --> 00:14:45.440 So I said to myself, if by some miracle, this 230 00:14:46.240 --> 00:14:50.399 CIA career survives, which I doubt, I don't know what 231 00:14:50.519 --> 00:14:53.559 direction don't take me, but I know one thing. I 232 00:14:53.600 --> 00:14:57.799 will never ever again go anywhere near counterintelligence, which is 233 00:14:58.120 --> 00:15:01.480 pretty ironic, isn't. Because I ended up being number seven 234 00:15:01.519 --> 00:15:05.279 in the chain of counter intelligence chiefs at the CIA 235 00:15:05.360 --> 00:15:07.480 later on in my career, and. 236 00:15:07.679 --> 00:15:11.000 It's interesting because you probably didn't know it at that time, 237 00:15:11.080 --> 00:15:15.600 but later you realize how much damage Angleton had actually done, 238 00:15:15.840 --> 00:15:18.679 not only to the CIA, but to the field of 239 00:15:18.799 --> 00:15:20.360 counterintelligence in general. 240 00:15:20.440 --> 00:15:25.399 Right, Yeah, that's exactly right, Dave. That's the legacy of 241 00:15:25.679 --> 00:15:29.320 James E's and Angleton continued for many, many years after 242 00:15:29.399 --> 00:15:34.159 he was finally forced out. He discredited counter intelligence and discipline. 243 00:15:34.679 --> 00:15:38.159 He made it useless for the twenty years that he 244 00:15:38.320 --> 00:15:41.480 was the chief from nineteen fifty four to nineteen seventy 245 00:15:41.519 --> 00:15:45.399 four because he was chasing fantoms. He did not allow 246 00:15:45.480 --> 00:15:49.519 us to run any Russian operations because he was too 247 00:15:49.519 --> 00:15:54.799 smart to fall into the KGB's machinations. So we had 248 00:15:54.840 --> 00:15:58.799 no volunteers, we had no walk ins, we had no recruitments, 249 00:15:58.960 --> 00:16:03.080 we had no Russian off rations. During those twenty critical 250 00:16:03.279 --> 00:16:07.600 years of the Cold War. He lost so much it 251 00:16:07.720 --> 00:16:11.120 was a disaster. And it was only after we finally 252 00:16:11.159 --> 00:16:15.120 got rid of him and at the end of nineteen 253 00:16:16.039 --> 00:16:20.480 seventy six that we were able slowly to try to 254 00:16:20.519 --> 00:16:25.720 get back into real counter intelligence operations, running operations against 255 00:16:25.759 --> 00:16:31.480 the Russians. He had destroyed our Russian operational program for 256 00:16:31.559 --> 00:16:35.480 all those years, and I can forget that. But even 257 00:16:35.519 --> 00:16:40.320 after he left, the reputation of count intelligence was so tainted, 258 00:16:41.559 --> 00:16:45.679 it was so out of vogue for anybody to go 259 00:16:45.679 --> 00:16:49.399 into count intelligence that we had trouble attracting good people 260 00:16:49.440 --> 00:16:53.360 to go into counter intelligence. That persisted for many, many years, and. 261 00:16:53.360 --> 00:16:58.039 At the same time, there actually were moles at CIA 262 00:16:58.120 --> 00:17:02.600 and other governmental institutions. Correct me if I'm wrong, Jim, 263 00:17:03.000 --> 00:17:05.519 We're not being sust out because of this. 264 00:17:06.160 --> 00:17:11.119 That's right. Counterintelligence was use. It was worse than useless 265 00:17:11.160 --> 00:17:16.880 because it was preventing us from doing real counterintelligence. You know, 266 00:17:16.960 --> 00:17:19.799 some people said that Angleton could not have harmed us 267 00:17:19.799 --> 00:17:23.680 more if he'd been a Russian agent because he paralyzes, 268 00:17:24.839 --> 00:17:30.200 and we were not able to overcome that until much later. 269 00:17:30.240 --> 00:17:32.599 I would say that we really were only able to 270 00:17:32.640 --> 00:17:38.480 rehabilitate counter intelligence at the CIA in the late nineteen eighties, 271 00:17:38.880 --> 00:17:41.160 when we finally began to get our act together and 272 00:17:41.200 --> 00:17:42.359 good people went into it. 273 00:17:43.400 --> 00:17:46.279 So let's just rewind a little bit. 274 00:17:47.279 --> 00:17:50.880 Your first job at CIA, after the farm, you said 275 00:17:50.920 --> 00:17:53.559 you didn't get sent the layouts like you expected to. 276 00:17:54.640 --> 00:17:58.480 Where did you end up Jim. 277 00:17:57.359 --> 00:18:00.079 We're not going to talk about that, really, you can't that. 278 00:18:00.279 --> 00:18:02.279 You're sort of secrecy on that one to this day. 279 00:18:02.319 --> 00:18:03.680 We're not going to talk about that one. 280 00:18:03.920 --> 00:18:08.559 Okay, all right, fair enough. Second position after. 281 00:18:08.400 --> 00:18:12.240 That position, okay, after that first one, which I'm not 282 00:18:12.279 --> 00:18:15.880 talking about. I was selected for what we call the 283 00:18:15.920 --> 00:18:20.880 pipeline to go to Moscow. And the pipeline is this 284 00:18:21.519 --> 00:18:28.559 lengthy training period, preparation period for going into a deep 285 00:18:28.599 --> 00:18:32.119 cover assignment in Moscow. And I can tell you that 286 00:18:32.240 --> 00:18:34.160 for all of us in the CIO, that was the 287 00:18:34.240 --> 00:18:37.599 dream assignment. We all wanted to go to Moscow. They 288 00:18:37.680 --> 00:18:44.160 were the main enemy. That's where the real critical action was. 289 00:18:44.759 --> 00:18:47.519 So to be selected for assignment to Moscow was a 290 00:18:47.519 --> 00:18:50.880 tremendous honor, and the competition to get there was fierce. 291 00:18:51.519 --> 00:18:54.359 So I was very, very grateful that I had had 292 00:18:54.920 --> 00:18:57.880 the opportunity to be selected for that assignment. You go 293 00:18:57.960 --> 00:19:02.279 through a rigorous selection program. Your spouse also has to 294 00:19:02.359 --> 00:19:06.079 qualify and she has to go through the same kind 295 00:19:06.119 --> 00:19:10.279 of scrutiny. You train together as a husband and wife team, 296 00:19:10.559 --> 00:19:14.160 and the training is very tough. A lot of couples 297 00:19:14.240 --> 00:19:19.400 don't make it. It's stressful, beyond words, we put our 298 00:19:19.480 --> 00:19:22.160 people who are going to Moscow into what we call 299 00:19:22.319 --> 00:19:26.960 the Moscow rules, even in Washington, DC, which means we 300 00:19:27.039 --> 00:19:30.359 put you into an apartment that is bugged, we put 301 00:19:30.400 --> 00:19:34.440 you under surveillance, we harass you, we require you to 302 00:19:34.480 --> 00:19:38.160 do operational acts under surveillance and get away with it. 303 00:19:38.640 --> 00:19:41.960 So we try to recreate as best we can the 304 00:19:42.000 --> 00:19:46.319 real environment of Moscow. And of course it depending on 305 00:19:46.359 --> 00:19:51.279 your language ability. If you don't already have Russian, which 306 00:19:51.319 --> 00:19:54.720 I happen to have had, is going to be part 307 00:19:54.839 --> 00:19:56.880 of your preparation period that you're going to get some 308 00:19:56.920 --> 00:20:01.480 addition intensive Russian language training. My wife had to start 309 00:20:01.480 --> 00:20:03.880 from scratch. I already had a pretty good hit start, 310 00:20:04.480 --> 00:20:08.079 but to see I perfected my Russian as part of 311 00:20:08.119 --> 00:20:12.240 my pipeline experience around. 312 00:20:11.920 --> 00:20:14.480 What year was this, Jim, where you started the pipeline. 313 00:20:15.200 --> 00:20:19.400 I started the pipeline in seventy six and came out 314 00:20:19.400 --> 00:20:24.559 of the pipeline in seventy eight fully trained and linguistically 315 00:20:24.599 --> 00:20:26.039 qualified for the assignment. 316 00:20:26.480 --> 00:20:30.279 So just out of curiosity, was it when was she? 317 00:20:30.799 --> 00:20:32.920 Were you there about the same time as Marty Peterson? 318 00:20:34.319 --> 00:20:38.319 Just after Marty Okay, yeah, Marty Peterson is a good 319 00:20:38.319 --> 00:20:42.680 friend of mine. We were involved together in the Dry 320 00:20:42.720 --> 00:20:46.119 Gone operation. I was at the headquarters end of it. 321 00:20:47.799 --> 00:20:50.440 Marty was, of course the field operator. 322 00:20:51.039 --> 00:20:52.480 We've had Marty on the show before. 323 00:20:52.559 --> 00:20:56.920 She's great, She is terrific, a real hero of mine, 324 00:20:57.240 --> 00:21:02.039 a great personal friend. We did a podcast together on 325 00:21:02.079 --> 00:21:06.920 the Trygone case. And a side note to Marty Peterson 326 00:21:07.000 --> 00:21:12.440 is that her husband, John was a good friend and 327 00:21:12.519 --> 00:21:15.960 classmate of mine down at the farm and John was 328 00:21:16.000 --> 00:21:18.920 one of those who, like so many of my classmates, 329 00:21:19.240 --> 00:21:23.519 went to Wouse and was killed there. So Marty was 330 00:21:23.559 --> 00:21:26.960 a CIA widow when she came to us and said 331 00:21:27.000 --> 00:21:31.559 that she wanted to honor John's memory by becoming a 332 00:21:31.599 --> 00:21:36.079 CIA case officer. And I remember looking at Marty and saying, Marty, 333 00:21:36.200 --> 00:21:40.599 you know, we don't do that, nothing against you, but 334 00:21:40.720 --> 00:21:43.440 you are a woman, and we are not going to 335 00:21:43.640 --> 00:21:47.440 send women case officers out to an assignment like Moscow. 336 00:21:47.880 --> 00:21:52.240 And Marty kind of said, well, yes you are, and 337 00:21:52.319 --> 00:21:56.240 she was right, and she sold us on the concept 338 00:21:57.000 --> 00:22:03.960 of sending her out to under deep cover because we knew, 339 00:22:04.079 --> 00:22:09.279 all of us how chauvinistic the KGB was. They did 340 00:22:09.400 --> 00:22:15.160 not use women for high risk operations. They assumed we 341 00:22:15.240 --> 00:22:19.960 didn't either. So the concept was, I think a brilliant one. 342 00:22:20.440 --> 00:22:25.519 Let's send Mosque Marty through the pipeline, Let's teach her Russian. 343 00:22:26.400 --> 00:22:30.759 Let's bury her inside the embassy under official cover in 344 00:22:30.920 --> 00:22:34.680 Moscow in the hope that the KGB will ignore her, 345 00:22:34.960 --> 00:22:39.119 they will dismiss her because she's a woman. And so 346 00:22:39.279 --> 00:22:43.200 Marty goes out to Moscow. Her first task for us, 347 00:22:43.279 --> 00:22:47.559 of course, is to do what we call probes, and 348 00:22:47.599 --> 00:22:51.200 so Marty went on these probes just to test whether 349 00:22:51.359 --> 00:22:54.240 or not the KGB was paying any attention to her 350 00:22:54.319 --> 00:22:57.119 or not. I was back at the headquarters following all 351 00:22:57.119 --> 00:23:01.119 of this. We needed to get someone black, free of 352 00:23:01.160 --> 00:23:05.200 surveillance to handle try gone Okarodnick, this great news source 353 00:23:05.240 --> 00:23:09.279 we had, and Marty reported back, I'm not getting surveillance. 354 00:23:09.960 --> 00:23:15.079 They're not there. I'm doing my probes. I'm pushing them, 355 00:23:15.119 --> 00:23:19.000 I'm getting provocative and they're not responding. I am not 356 00:23:19.160 --> 00:23:23.200 under surveillance. I am black. And you know, there was 357 00:23:23.240 --> 00:23:27.240 a mindset back at headquarters one that I regret I 358 00:23:27.359 --> 00:23:29.839 was not part of that group, but there were some 359 00:23:29.920 --> 00:23:32.799 senior people back at the headquarters said Marty's reporting no 360 00:23:32.839 --> 00:23:38.039 surveillance but yeah, okay, she's just not seen. So they 361 00:23:38.160 --> 00:23:42.279 were still very chauvinist, and they were dismissing Marty as 362 00:23:42.359 --> 00:23:45.279 the professional that she was. But those of us who 363 00:23:45.279 --> 00:23:48.680 had worked with Marty, who had participated in their training 364 00:23:48.720 --> 00:23:52.240 with her, knew how good she was, how professional was, 365 00:23:52.559 --> 00:23:55.200 and so we were able to prevail. And she turned 366 00:23:55.200 --> 00:23:58.839 out to be a brilliant handler of try Gone. Her 367 00:23:58.880 --> 00:24:01.000 trade craft was impeccable, and. 368 00:24:01.240 --> 00:24:04.279 Her cover was she was a secretary, right, that was 369 00:24:04.319 --> 00:24:07.279 her cover. And everyone they called they called her party Marty, 370 00:24:07.480 --> 00:24:07.960 and that that. 371 00:24:08.000 --> 00:24:12.960 Was her party. Martin old, you know, present yourself as 372 00:24:13.039 --> 00:24:18.400 kind of a frivolous bachelorette out time, not a serious person, 373 00:24:19.079 --> 00:24:21.960 and she told it off perfectly perfect. Now, as you know, 374 00:24:22.119 --> 00:24:26.400 Marty did get ambushed, no fault of her own. Trygon 375 00:24:26.640 --> 00:24:29.680 was betrayed from within by someone else, and so she 376 00:24:29.920 --> 00:24:34.799 was declared persona and grata. When she came back to Washington, 377 00:24:35.359 --> 00:24:39.240 she became a trainer in the pipeline, and so my 378 00:24:39.359 --> 00:24:42.480 wife Meredith, who was in the pipeline at the time, 379 00:24:43.000 --> 00:24:48.440 really benefited from Marty's encouragement. Marty as a role model. 380 00:24:49.559 --> 00:24:53.920 Marty's experience in Moscow so Meredith was really a great 381 00:24:54.200 --> 00:24:59.200 beneficiary of of Marty's expertise, and of course in the 382 00:24:59.240 --> 00:25:01.960 process we be game very close frames. 383 00:25:02.279 --> 00:25:05.000 You know, you mentioned that that, you know, we really 384 00:25:05.119 --> 00:25:08.799 suffered against the Russians from a counter intelligence perspective at 385 00:25:08.799 --> 00:25:12.279 that time, from what you know about trygand and maybe 386 00:25:12.279 --> 00:25:14.720 you guys, maybe none of this has ever come to light, 387 00:25:15.720 --> 00:25:19.839 but do you feel that if our stance towards Russian 388 00:25:20.279 --> 00:25:24.039 you know, for towards counter intelligence more penetrations, that that 389 00:25:24.160 --> 00:25:25.880 might have gone differently, that we would have had some 390 00:25:26.319 --> 00:25:27.200 awareness of it. 391 00:25:28.119 --> 00:25:31.480 I think that's a good point, Dave, because our counterintelligence 392 00:25:31.759 --> 00:25:35.039 was very, very weak at the time, and I think 393 00:25:35.039 --> 00:25:36.720 if it had been better, we might have done a 394 00:25:36.799 --> 00:25:40.680 better job of screening someone like Kloro Kutcher out or 395 00:25:40.720 --> 00:25:44.759 identifying his betrayal earlier on. So I don't dismiss that 396 00:25:44.880 --> 00:25:49.039 as a possibility as well, where counter intelligence was very, 397 00:25:49.160 --> 00:25:52.279 very incompetent at that time and so people like Kutcher 398 00:25:52.640 --> 00:25:55.200 were able to get away with it. You know, what 399 00:25:55.319 --> 00:26:01.680 happened after after we got rid of Ngleton, beginning in 400 00:26:01.720 --> 00:26:05.839 seventy seven with Trigon, was that we discovered, hey, we're 401 00:26:05.880 --> 00:26:10.519 pretty good at this. We can recruit Russians. And so 402 00:26:11.319 --> 00:26:14.519 with Angleton out of the way, the big naysayer, we 403 00:26:14.599 --> 00:26:20.359 started building an inventory of assets inside Russia that we 404 00:26:20.359 --> 00:26:23.920 could only have dreamed about. And it really reinforced our 405 00:26:24.000 --> 00:26:28.039 mind that what a loss those previous tony years have 406 00:26:28.119 --> 00:26:31.240 been because we could have had sources. And we started 407 00:26:31.240 --> 00:26:34.720 building all of these recruitments and sending them back to 408 00:26:34.839 --> 00:26:40.279 Russia to Moscow, and we had penetration, sometimes multiple penetrations 409 00:26:40.319 --> 00:26:44.279 of every real organization in Russia. We cared about KGB, 410 00:26:44.839 --> 00:26:49.960 gru Ministry of Defense, Foreign Ministry, and those were the 411 00:26:50.000 --> 00:26:54.240 glory days of CI operations in Moscow. We call them 412 00:26:54.279 --> 00:27:00.119 the golden years of Moscow station operations and Meriton Mire 413 00:27:00.200 --> 00:27:03.720 during those years, and it was pretty exciting, and our 414 00:27:03.799 --> 00:27:11.880 country was benefiting from these unprecedented penetrations throughout the Soviet government. 415 00:27:12.640 --> 00:27:13.599 Really good stuff. 416 00:27:13.960 --> 00:27:19.359 Yeah, Yeah, it's fascinating, and you know it's it's it's 417 00:27:19.480 --> 00:27:22.680 tough too, because there's so many things that I want 418 00:27:22.720 --> 00:27:25.039 to I want to mention about your book right now, 419 00:27:25.079 --> 00:27:27.240 but I don't want to take us out of chronological order, 420 00:27:27.279 --> 00:27:30.799 because so much of what we discovered about spies in 421 00:27:30.799 --> 00:27:33.200 our own country have to do with with a more 422 00:27:33.279 --> 00:27:39.480 open stance towards Russian walk ins, towards recruiting Russians, And 423 00:27:39.640 --> 00:27:42.000 we'll get to that. Like I said, I want to 424 00:27:42.079 --> 00:27:45.960 jump ahead, but uh so from so when you were 425 00:27:46.000 --> 00:27:48.319 in Russia, what was your experience there? 426 00:27:50.160 --> 00:27:55.759 Well, my experience was that I was handling assets. I 427 00:27:55.960 --> 00:28:00.400 was a case officer. We had all of these Bians 428 00:28:00.920 --> 00:28:04.200 who were risking their lives by cooperating secretly with us, 429 00:28:05.039 --> 00:28:07.599 and we had to handle it. Many of them wanted 430 00:28:07.599 --> 00:28:12.440 to be met personally, so my job was to defeat 431 00:28:12.519 --> 00:28:18.000 KGB surveillance. MERITMI were under constant KGB surveillance, so our 432 00:28:18.079 --> 00:28:21.160 job was to be able to evade that surveillance, to 433 00:28:21.240 --> 00:28:26.319 break it when necessary, also use some high tech methodologies 434 00:28:26.799 --> 00:28:30.200 to get free of surveillance and not let the KGB 435 00:28:30.359 --> 00:28:32.720 know you were even out of pocket, so they think 436 00:28:32.759 --> 00:28:36.359 they've got you here, but you're not there. You use 437 00:28:36.480 --> 00:28:39.240 high tech to get out, you go do your operational 438 00:28:39.279 --> 00:28:42.559 act black and then you slip back in close the 439 00:28:42.599 --> 00:28:44.799 loop and they never knew you were going. So that 440 00:28:44.920 --> 00:28:47.599 was kind of the ultimate. But there were many times 441 00:28:47.680 --> 00:28:52.359 when I had to force the issue. We rarely got 442 00:28:53.880 --> 00:28:58.440 automatic any kind of free breaks. Occasionally there might be 443 00:28:58.480 --> 00:29:01.599 a vip in down and they take teams off us 444 00:29:01.599 --> 00:29:04.160 and put them on someone else. We couldn't count on that. 445 00:29:04.839 --> 00:29:07.559 The whole job was to be studying our surveillance constantly 446 00:29:08.000 --> 00:29:11.279 and looking for ways that we could break free of 447 00:29:11.359 --> 00:29:16.000 surveillance to go handle these Russian agents. Disguise played a 448 00:29:16.039 --> 00:29:18.680 big part in that. I don't know if you've read 449 00:29:19.640 --> 00:29:24.960 the John Amndez book The Moscow Rules, but I'm in 450 00:29:25.039 --> 00:29:29.440 that book as someone who used disguise effectively to carry 451 00:29:29.440 --> 00:29:34.200 out operations in Moscow. Our disguise technology something that all 452 00:29:34.240 --> 00:29:36.680 Americas can be proud of if they can see how 453 00:29:36.720 --> 00:29:41.440 good it is. We used it very, very effectively against 454 00:29:41.480 --> 00:29:42.039 the KGB. 455 00:29:42.599 --> 00:29:45.079 Yeah, and you're not just talking about throwing on a 456 00:29:45.079 --> 00:29:47.599 ball cap now. 457 00:29:47.920 --> 00:29:55.920 I'm talking about very sophisticated, high tech technology of disguise 458 00:29:56.039 --> 00:30:01.440 and of course changing your appearance completely, in my case, 459 00:30:01.640 --> 00:30:04.319 making me look like a Russian, giving me slaving features. 460 00:30:04.680 --> 00:30:09.720 Yeah, it's amazing, good stuff. Were the Russians? 461 00:30:09.839 --> 00:30:12.960 Were they discreet or were they just like you're at 462 00:30:13.000 --> 00:30:15.440 the embassy, so we're following you, and you know we're 463 00:30:15.440 --> 00:30:15.960 following you. 464 00:30:17.519 --> 00:30:22.480 Their surveillance. I think buying large was very professional. They 465 00:30:22.519 --> 00:30:27.119 took great pride in their work. They did not like 466 00:30:27.200 --> 00:30:32.160 to be embarrassed, so we took them very, very seriously. 467 00:30:32.640 --> 00:30:35.759 They were not easy to beat. They put a lot 468 00:30:35.759 --> 00:30:40.920 of resources on us. They would have large teams devoted 469 00:30:40.920 --> 00:30:46.519 to each of us, multiple vehicles. They changed their team members, 470 00:30:46.640 --> 00:30:51.480 their license plates, their other distinguishing characteristics very frequently to 471 00:30:51.519 --> 00:30:55.000 make as hard to get a fix on them. In fact, 472 00:30:55.039 --> 00:30:56.960 Mary and I read that if we had not had 473 00:30:57.000 --> 00:31:00.480 all the training in the States that we did before 474 00:31:00.519 --> 00:31:03.480 we went to Moscow, we would never have seen them. 475 00:31:03.480 --> 00:31:07.519 They were that good. They were very, very professional, so 476 00:31:07.599 --> 00:31:10.720 beating them was not that easy. So our job was 477 00:31:10.720 --> 00:31:13.759 to be better than they were, and fortunately we were. 478 00:31:14.519 --> 00:31:19.680 Did you ever have any moments in Russia where, like 479 00:31:19.720 --> 00:31:22.599 I remember with Trygone, there was an instance where a 480 00:31:22.640 --> 00:31:25.200 case officer met with him personally in a park. 481 00:31:25.319 --> 00:31:25.480 Yes. 482 00:31:26.039 --> 00:31:28.440 Did you ever have meetings like that with assets? 483 00:31:29.200 --> 00:31:34.039 Yes? I did. I had human meetings, personal meetings in Moscow. 484 00:31:34.839 --> 00:31:36.920 Could you describe, I mean, as far as you're able 485 00:31:36.960 --> 00:31:39.359 to even with if you can't identify who they are, 486 00:31:39.400 --> 00:31:41.599 you know, what it was like to meet them in person? 487 00:31:42.960 --> 00:31:49.759 Yeah, I can't just specify which operations they were for example, hypothetically, 488 00:31:50.279 --> 00:31:53.680 it might have been a KGB officer who was cooperating 489 00:31:53.720 --> 00:31:57.640 secretly with us and he wanted to be met in person. 490 00:31:58.200 --> 00:32:01.799 He didn't trust dead drops. He wanted to make certain 491 00:32:01.880 --> 00:32:05.160 that the exchange of materials was secure hand to hand. 492 00:32:06.079 --> 00:32:10.799 So our job was to get people black to go 493 00:32:10.839 --> 00:32:14.599 out and meet him, and I did that more than once. 494 00:32:16.079 --> 00:32:19.119 And there were other cases where I also was involved 495 00:32:19.160 --> 00:32:23.079 in operations where I had to get pre of surveillance 496 00:32:23.759 --> 00:32:27.839 one way or the other. It was pretty tense stuff 497 00:32:28.480 --> 00:32:32.400 to go out and meet a KGB officer on the streets. 498 00:32:33.200 --> 00:32:37.079 The consequences of getting caught would have been bad for 499 00:32:37.720 --> 00:32:40.799 him as well as for me, and I had to 500 00:32:40.799 --> 00:32:43.799 be able to count on his professionalism to make certain 501 00:32:43.799 --> 00:32:47.359 that he didn't bring surveillance to that meeting himself. So 502 00:32:47.400 --> 00:32:50.440 a lot of trust in both directions. I trusted him, 503 00:32:50.839 --> 00:32:54.640 he trusted me for the security of that meeting, and 504 00:32:54.680 --> 00:32:59.640 he would pass over the documents the discs at that time. 505 00:33:00.119 --> 00:33:03.079 My job was to get them safely back to the station. 506 00:33:03.799 --> 00:33:07.799 Wow, that's amazing. I mean I can't even imagine working 507 00:33:07.839 --> 00:33:09.559 in such a high threat environment. Yeah, I mean, this 508 00:33:09.640 --> 00:33:12.119 is like the super Bowl of espionage. Right, Moscow. 509 00:33:13.319 --> 00:33:19.440 I think that's accurate. You were very aware of the 510 00:33:19.480 --> 00:33:24.400 consequences of making mistake. Now, the margin for error was 511 00:33:25.119 --> 00:33:28.880 pretty close to zero, because human lives were at stake, 512 00:33:30.039 --> 00:33:33.000 and we took that very seriously. All of us in Moscow, 513 00:33:33.119 --> 00:33:38.519 all of US case officers, knew that these Russians were 514 00:33:38.720 --> 00:33:41.720 risking their lives by cooperating with us, and we had 515 00:33:41.759 --> 00:33:47.359 not only a professional responsibility, but a moral responsibility to 516 00:33:47.480 --> 00:33:51.119 make absolutely certain that nothing that we did would in 517 00:33:51.160 --> 00:33:55.640 any way risk their lives. Yeah, you had a very 518 00:33:56.599 --> 00:34:02.480 heavy sense of responsibility. We all were very aware of that. 519 00:34:03.920 --> 00:34:10.039 A lot of pressure, a lot of stress, and you 520 00:34:10.079 --> 00:34:12.760 have to learn how to live with that. Yeah. 521 00:34:13.760 --> 00:34:16.000 Yeah, I mean, and Ashley traygon I kind of brought 522 00:34:16.039 --> 00:34:19.880 that home, you know, in terms of the danger to 523 00:34:20.480 --> 00:34:21.960 the actual asset or Asian. 524 00:34:22.719 --> 00:34:26.599 Sure. Yeah, I asked Marty. And Marty was a great 525 00:34:26.639 --> 00:34:31.920 example of someone who felt deeply that responsibility that she 526 00:34:32.039 --> 00:34:35.679 had for this man. She was much more concerned about 527 00:34:36.039 --> 00:34:41.159 his welfare, his safety than she was for her own. Yeah. Yeah, 528 00:34:41.480 --> 00:34:44.639 and I think we all felt that way. I remember 529 00:34:45.519 --> 00:34:50.239 when I was back at headquarters. It was a Saturday morning. 530 00:34:51.159 --> 00:34:54.400 I was getting toward the end of the pipeline. I 531 00:34:54.440 --> 00:34:57.199 had gone into headquarters to read in on the operations 532 00:34:57.800 --> 00:35:00.800 because we could not predict in advance which ones we'd 533 00:35:00.800 --> 00:35:05.119 be able to handle or be required to handle. It 534 00:35:05.119 --> 00:35:07.280 really was a function of who could get free of surveillance. 535 00:35:07.960 --> 00:35:11.599 And the cable came in from Moscow, an overnight cable 536 00:35:12.480 --> 00:35:17.280 that try Gone had not appeared at the meeting, but 537 00:35:17.559 --> 00:35:22.760 Marty had been ambushed. I'll never forget that morning walking 538 00:35:22.840 --> 00:35:29.320 into the USSR desk, and everybody was there, the entire staff, 539 00:35:30.119 --> 00:35:34.239 and it is no exaggeration to say they were all crying. 540 00:35:35.679 --> 00:35:40.719 They were all crying. Not for Marty so much, although 541 00:35:40.880 --> 00:35:43.880 we were very concerned about her, but we knew that 542 00:35:43.920 --> 00:35:48.559 Marty had diplomatic community and she would be expelled and 543 00:35:48.599 --> 00:35:52.400 she would eventually be safe back in the United States. The 544 00:35:52.480 --> 00:35:56.840 emotion was for try Gone because we knew that if 545 00:35:56.880 --> 00:36:00.719 Marty had been ambushed, that they had try Gone, that 546 00:36:00.800 --> 00:36:02.800 they knew when and where that dead drop was to 547 00:36:02.840 --> 00:36:06.079 take place. Otherwise he could not have set up the ambush. 548 00:36:07.159 --> 00:36:12.639 And that's where we were so deeply affected by losing 549 00:36:12.679 --> 00:36:18.360 this man who had done such valiant service for our country, 550 00:36:18.559 --> 00:36:20.920 and to know what his fate had been in the 551 00:36:20.920 --> 00:36:22.280 hands of the KGB. 552 00:36:22.599 --> 00:36:25.360 And folks who are watching tonight, if you're interested in 553 00:36:25.480 --> 00:36:28.360 our interview with Marty Peterson his episode one and three, 554 00:36:28.519 --> 00:36:31.199 I highly highly recommend that everyone go take a look 555 00:36:31.239 --> 00:36:34.960 at it and try gone. Of course, bit down on 556 00:36:35.000 --> 00:36:38.360 a suicide pill that the CIA revived pen Cat when 557 00:36:38.360 --> 00:36:42.639 he was compromised again, not because it was Marty's fault, 558 00:36:42.719 --> 00:36:45.039 but there was. I mean, Jim, you're you're the expert here. 559 00:36:45.039 --> 00:36:48.079 Do you want to say how that came about? 560 00:36:49.360 --> 00:36:53.239 But Trygon knew what he was going to face if 561 00:36:53.280 --> 00:36:58.679 the KGB captured him. He knew that he would be interrogated. 562 00:36:58.719 --> 00:37:01.719 He knew he would be tortured. He knew he would 563 00:37:01.760 --> 00:37:03.880 have to reveal everything that he had done on our 564 00:37:03.920 --> 00:37:08.039 behalf under torture and negate a out of its value. 565 00:37:08.159 --> 00:37:11.199 He didn't want that, but he also knew that he 566 00:37:11.239 --> 00:37:14.320 would then be taken to the basement of Lebyanka, put 567 00:37:14.360 --> 00:37:16.480 on his knees, and a bullet fired through the back 568 00:37:16.480 --> 00:37:21.920 of his head. And to preclude that from happening, he 569 00:37:21.960 --> 00:37:25.880 pleaded with us, give me an l give me a 570 00:37:25.960 --> 00:37:29.800 lethal device, so that if I see the KGB closing 571 00:37:29.840 --> 00:37:34.519 in on me, I can avoid all of that by 572 00:37:34.599 --> 00:37:39.440 committing suicide. And it was agreed that he would have 573 00:37:39.519 --> 00:37:45.360 his L in a pin. And when he was captured 574 00:37:45.360 --> 00:37:51.079 by the KGB and he was being interrogated, he said, 575 00:37:51.559 --> 00:37:55.679 I will confess. I will write out a confession. I 576 00:37:55.719 --> 00:37:59.039 will tell you everything that I did. Could you hand 577 00:37:59.079 --> 00:38:03.039 me my pin from my coach Jack and the KGB, 578 00:38:03.559 --> 00:38:07.400 not suspecting anything and happy that he was about to 579 00:38:07.440 --> 00:38:11.079 confess everything, handed him his pen. He bit off the 580 00:38:11.119 --> 00:38:16.199 tip and he was instantly dead because the poison acted instantaneously, 581 00:38:18.079 --> 00:38:22.199 and the KGB was of course furious. And we know 582 00:38:22.320 --> 00:38:26.599 that all future spies who were arrested in Moscow were 583 00:38:26.679 --> 00:38:32.679 instantly immobilized. Their heads were held firmly to be prevented 584 00:38:32.719 --> 00:38:35.199 from using an L themselves. 585 00:38:35.880 --> 00:38:39.519 Yeah, Marty had mentioned it when like that, that she 586 00:38:39.599 --> 00:38:41.480 had a pen or something on her, and they like went, 587 00:38:42.000 --> 00:38:44.119 they went trying to get it away from her. 588 00:38:44.400 --> 00:38:48.920 Yea, And they were interrogating Marti. They put everything out 589 00:38:48.960 --> 00:38:51.760 on the table that she had in her possession, including 590 00:38:51.760 --> 00:38:55.280 a pin. They were afraid to touch it because they 591 00:38:55.320 --> 00:38:57.800 didn't know what the heck that pin was. It was not, 592 00:38:57.960 --> 00:39:00.840 in fact a L, it was not a weapon, but 593 00:39:01.199 --> 00:39:03.159 they were very very wary. 594 00:39:02.960 --> 00:39:07.079 So Jim after Russia, like, how did your Russia to 595 00:39:07.119 --> 00:39:10.679 our wind end up? If there was anything else notable 596 00:39:11.039 --> 00:39:13.159 that you can or want to talk about from that time, 597 00:39:13.199 --> 00:39:13.920 we'd love to hear it. 598 00:39:14.119 --> 00:39:16.480 Yeah, or we can move to the next phase. 599 00:39:16.760 --> 00:39:19.360 Now. There are a couple of highlights that you now 600 00:39:19.360 --> 00:39:21.360 that you bring them update that I would like to 601 00:39:21.519 --> 00:39:25.719 please point out about my time in Moscow. One was 602 00:39:25.840 --> 00:39:33.320 the handling and exfiltration successful a tiltration of Victor Shamoff, 603 00:39:34.199 --> 00:39:36.320 and I had a part in that. I met shame 604 00:39:36.360 --> 00:39:39.320 Off on the streets of Moscow and was involved in 605 00:39:39.360 --> 00:39:43.239 the expiltration. It's the first time we'd ever successfully efiltrated 606 00:39:43.599 --> 00:39:48.000 someone from inside the Soviet Union, and this case was 607 00:39:48.000 --> 00:39:53.440 particularly significant because we not only got shame Off out safely, 608 00:39:54.000 --> 00:39:57.239 we also got out his wife and their five year 609 00:39:57.280 --> 00:40:01.760 old daughter. So that was quite an operation, quite an 610 00:40:01.800 --> 00:40:04.440 operational feed, if I can say so. We were very 611 00:40:04.519 --> 00:40:09.599 very proud of that. Another operation that I would want 612 00:40:09.599 --> 00:40:14.000 to highlight would be the cable tapping operation that I 613 00:40:14.079 --> 00:40:19.159 was personally involved in. The Russians had a secret underground 614 00:40:19.199 --> 00:40:25.480 cable system for their top secret communications underneath Moscow and 615 00:40:25.599 --> 00:40:31.400 I trained on that markup in the United States before 616 00:40:31.440 --> 00:40:34.599 I went to Moscow. I was selected as a candidate 617 00:40:34.920 --> 00:40:37.320 to carry out the operation when I got to Moscow, 618 00:40:38.159 --> 00:40:40.840 and in fact, I was chosen to be the first 619 00:40:40.880 --> 00:40:44.360 person to go down the man hole. I visited the 620 00:40:44.400 --> 00:40:48.159 site twice. The second time went down the manhole and 621 00:40:48.360 --> 00:40:50.760 did what I was trained to do. And that was 622 00:40:50.800 --> 00:40:55.000 a pretty dicey operation. I don't want to only dramatize it, 623 00:40:55.079 --> 00:40:58.159 but the fact is, if I've been caught down that hole, 624 00:40:59.280 --> 00:41:00.559 a chance I would to come. 625 00:41:00.440 --> 00:41:00.920 Back, right. 626 00:41:02.599 --> 00:41:05.719 It was like a like an induction tap or something 627 00:41:06.000 --> 00:41:06.960 with a tape recorder. 628 00:41:07.199 --> 00:41:10.760 Uh yeah, good, good for you. Yeah, it was an 629 00:41:10.760 --> 00:41:16.559 induction tap, which was breakthrough technology at the time, and 630 00:41:17.440 --> 00:41:21.119 it first became publicly known in the Sawntag and Drew 631 00:41:21.159 --> 00:41:25.159 book on our tapping. 632 00:41:24.800 --> 00:41:27.440 Of unders underwater. 633 00:41:26.960 --> 00:41:29.800 Sea cables, you know, in their book Blind Man's Bluff. 634 00:41:30.079 --> 00:41:32.679 We were unhappy that that came out, but yeah, this 635 00:41:32.800 --> 00:41:35.440 was a genious technology because we did not have to 636 00:41:35.480 --> 00:41:41.079 penetrate the protective core of the cable, which would have 637 00:41:41.119 --> 00:41:46.079 been detectable. So that was the remarkable technology. I was 638 00:41:46.119 --> 00:41:51.199 given Intelligence Medal of Merit for that operation. But this 639 00:41:51.239 --> 00:41:53.599 is not false modesty. I didn't think I deserved it. 640 00:41:54.280 --> 00:41:55.840 I just did what I was trained to do. 641 00:41:56.400 --> 00:41:56.960 That's great. 642 00:41:56.960 --> 00:42:03.039 People who deserved the metals were thesations, the people who 643 00:42:03.079 --> 00:42:08.360 had the audacity and their creativity even to conceive of 644 00:42:08.400 --> 00:42:11.079 an operation like that, and think about it from a 645 00:42:11.079 --> 00:42:15.920 technical standpoint, how do you get that much data out 646 00:42:15.960 --> 00:42:21.239 of a hole underneath Moscow safely back to CI headquarters 647 00:42:21.639 --> 00:42:26.480 without being picked up by Russian SIG. It was a 648 00:42:27.079 --> 00:42:28.559 remarkable achievement. 649 00:42:29.079 --> 00:42:31.119 Well, that was going to be my next question, Jim, 650 00:42:31.159 --> 00:42:34.760 because I mean the undersea cables initially anyway, they were 651 00:42:35.039 --> 00:42:38.800 analog cassettes that they that they recorded. That is that 652 00:42:38.840 --> 00:42:42.840 what you were installing in this case. I don't want 653 00:42:42.840 --> 00:42:46.559 to go there, okay, but I mean that. 654 00:42:45.960 --> 00:42:49.079 I can confirm I can't confirm that it was analog 655 00:42:49.159 --> 00:42:52.079 technology should not have to break the skin of the 656 00:42:52.119 --> 00:42:55.280 cable to be able to read the communications. And there 657 00:42:55.280 --> 00:42:59.800 were multiple cables down there, and so we we tapped 658 00:42:59.840 --> 00:43:00.880 more than one of them. 659 00:43:00.840 --> 00:43:03.679 Because I mean, I guess the point I was getting 660 00:43:03.679 --> 00:43:06.639 too is that you know, obviously the spool runs out 661 00:43:06.639 --> 00:43:08.039 of tape eventually, Yeah, and. 662 00:43:08.039 --> 00:43:11.559 Somebody has to go back down there or like replace them. Yes, 663 00:43:11.679 --> 00:43:13.880 it's one thing when you're diving. It's a totally different 664 00:43:13.920 --> 00:43:15.679 thing when you're like walking through the streets and mastit. 665 00:43:15.800 --> 00:43:16.000 Yeah. 666 00:43:16.079 --> 00:43:18.800 Yeah, And it's another thing having solid state hard drives 667 00:43:18.840 --> 00:43:22.199 today versus what you guys had in the nineteen seventies. 668 00:43:22.280 --> 00:43:24.719 Yeah. Well, the front end of that operation was pretty impressive, 669 00:43:24.800 --> 00:43:30.239 wasn't Because from our satellites, we watched that cable line 670 00:43:30.280 --> 00:43:33.559 being built. Oh wow, watch, we watched the trenching, we 671 00:43:33.719 --> 00:43:36.679 watched the cable schools being rolled up. We saw them 672 00:43:37.320 --> 00:43:40.599 building the man hole covers at certain intervals. So we 673 00:43:40.599 --> 00:43:43.519 were able to build a precise mock up because we 674 00:43:43.599 --> 00:43:46.840 knew exactly from our satellite imagy and what that looked like. 675 00:43:47.519 --> 00:43:50.639 So when I went out to the manhole cover, it 676 00:43:50.760 --> 00:43:52.880 was no mystery to me. I knew exactly what I 677 00:43:52.920 --> 00:43:57.199 was going to find when I got there. Yeah, that's 678 00:43:57.519 --> 00:44:03.639 pretty remarkable. Yeah, hands off to our engineers. That's amazing. 679 00:44:05.199 --> 00:44:07.719 Anything else, I mean, I'm sure there are tons of 680 00:44:07.760 --> 00:44:11.920 notable things in Moscow, But are there any other highlights 681 00:44:11.920 --> 00:44:14.679 that you'd like to pick out for us or do 682 00:44:14.719 --> 00:44:15.199 you want to. 683 00:44:15.840 --> 00:44:19.280 I think I think Dave the overall highlight from that 684 00:44:19.400 --> 00:44:24.679 period in Moscow was the intelligence that the CI is 685 00:44:24.760 --> 00:44:29.039 providing to our policymakers back in Washington. Because of all 686 00:44:29.159 --> 00:44:35.079 these sources that we had. It was beyond our wildest 687 00:44:35.199 --> 00:44:37.639 dreams that we would ever be able to have that 688 00:44:37.760 --> 00:44:42.440 kind of access into the criminal into the inner circles 689 00:44:42.840 --> 00:44:45.000 of the KGB and the g r U and the 690 00:44:45.039 --> 00:44:50.599 Defense Ministry. Yeah, we we served our country quite admirably 691 00:44:50.719 --> 00:44:54.199 during those years at a critical time in the Cold War, right, 692 00:44:54.719 --> 00:44:58.639 and getting intelligence to the President and to other senior 693 00:44:58.679 --> 00:45:01.440 policymakers are something all of a sudden the CI, I 694 00:45:01.480 --> 00:45:02.719 think we're rightfully proud of. 695 00:45:03.280 --> 00:45:06.639 Well, yeah, and for people who weren't, who maybe a 696 00:45:06.679 --> 00:45:09.360 little bit younger like I was, you know, in. 697 00:45:11.400 --> 00:45:13.239 You know, elementary and junior high at that time. 698 00:45:13.320 --> 00:45:15.519 And I mean when you talk about the Cold War, 699 00:45:15.920 --> 00:45:18.719 like we're talking about an existential threat. 700 00:45:18.760 --> 00:45:21.880 When we would do bond drills waiting for the Russian 701 00:45:22.000 --> 00:45:24.159 nukes to hit, you know, all the kids in the 702 00:45:24.159 --> 00:45:26.320 school would go down to the shelter during one of 703 00:45:26.400 --> 00:45:26.960 these drills. 704 00:45:27.159 --> 00:45:31.639 That was that was sort of you know, the existential 705 00:45:31.679 --> 00:45:34.119 threat that the Soviet Union posed at that point in time. 706 00:45:34.960 --> 00:45:37.400 Yeah, we all knew that that's why we signed up 707 00:45:37.400 --> 00:45:42.800 in the first place, right right, and we knew that 708 00:45:42.840 --> 00:45:46.199 they had the power to destroy as many times over. 709 00:45:46.519 --> 00:45:49.800 It wasn't a game, right, it was life and death 710 00:45:50.559 --> 00:45:55.039 and we were on the front lines of that historic battle. 711 00:45:56.559 --> 00:45:59.639 That's incredible. It's incredible. 712 00:46:01.480 --> 00:46:03.480 So d I think it's trying to hit us up 713 00:46:03.880 --> 00:46:05.800 that this is the time where we're supposed to plug 714 00:46:05.800 --> 00:46:09.199 our Patreon below. If you guys want to support the stream, 715 00:46:09.480 --> 00:46:12.719 we really appreciate it. There's a link right below you 716 00:46:12.760 --> 00:46:16.159 can get access to bonus segments and clips and you 717 00:46:16.199 --> 00:46:19.400 can get the show at free if you'd like to listen. 718 00:46:19.199 --> 00:46:21.840 And you can buy us some lafroy or you know, 719 00:46:22.000 --> 00:46:24.159 keep us in whatever, whatever you know. 720 00:46:24.639 --> 00:46:28.840 So back back to our guests, Jim, what's up next? 721 00:46:30.559 --> 00:46:33.519 Yeah, Jim, you, I'm sorry. 722 00:46:33.559 --> 00:46:35.480 I'm just gonna say that because we're not because this 723 00:46:35.559 --> 00:46:37.719 is so much about counterintelligence and we want to know 724 00:46:37.760 --> 00:46:40.360 about you. I'm going to rely on, like I have 725 00:46:40.440 --> 00:46:44.400 a lot of your personal anecdotes from the book, but 726 00:46:44.679 --> 00:46:46.440 I'm going to rely on you to sort of help 727 00:46:46.519 --> 00:46:47.840 us drive along through your story. 728 00:46:47.920 --> 00:46:48.119 Yeah. 729 00:46:48.639 --> 00:46:52.599 Oh, guys, get this. I'm telling you read this book. 730 00:46:52.679 --> 00:46:56.960 You will not It will open your eyes. I mean, 731 00:46:57.800 --> 00:46:59.880 it'll probably keep you up at night, it'll make you 732 00:47:00.039 --> 00:47:06.719 little paranoid, but it is a phenomenal need compelling. I 733 00:47:06.719 --> 00:47:09.719 can't recommend it high enough. Check it out. And then 734 00:47:09.719 --> 00:47:13.280 if you were interested in the ethics of spine, it's 735 00:47:13.280 --> 00:47:16.960 in the description how to catch a spy, It's in 736 00:47:17.000 --> 00:47:18.239 the description, and. 737 00:47:19.840 --> 00:47:24.360 Yeah, the moral dilemma of spying. Yeah, So what was 738 00:47:24.400 --> 00:47:27.559 the next assignment then, Jim? After Moscow? I mean, you 739 00:47:27.599 --> 00:47:30.000 came back. It sounds like you were highly successful there, 740 00:47:30.199 --> 00:47:34.519 proved that you could operate as a spy in denied territory. 741 00:47:34.599 --> 00:47:36.480 I mean, so you had you had your bona fides 742 00:47:36.719 --> 00:47:37.920 at this point. 743 00:47:38.119 --> 00:47:41.800 Yes, and I wanted to continue working against the Soviet Union, 744 00:47:42.800 --> 00:47:45.480 and one of the best places to do that throughout 745 00:47:45.519 --> 00:47:48.920 the Cold War was Vienna. A lot of people don't 746 00:47:48.960 --> 00:47:53.679 realize it is the major venues of Cold War espionage 747 00:47:54.039 --> 00:47:59.400 were Vienna and Berlin. So I applied for a position 748 00:47:59.599 --> 00:48:03.400 as the chief of Soviet operations in our station in 749 00:48:03.519 --> 00:48:07.599 Vienna and was selected for that assignment. So Meredth and 750 00:48:07.679 --> 00:48:10.599 I made a quick trip back to Washington to learn German, 751 00:48:11.239 --> 00:48:14.239 and we were force fed in German because we didn't 752 00:48:14.239 --> 00:48:16.760 have any German up to that point, and then it 753 00:48:16.800 --> 00:48:22.199 went out to Vienna. We loved Vienna because it was 754 00:48:22.760 --> 00:48:27.239 where the East met the West. It was a real battleground. 755 00:48:28.159 --> 00:48:31.039 We were nose to nose with the KGB on the 756 00:48:31.039 --> 00:48:35.079 streets of Vienna. All major intelligence services in the world 757 00:48:35.119 --> 00:48:42.239 were there, so it was very, very exciting, lively place 758 00:48:42.320 --> 00:48:46.679 to be. Vienna was where the action was, so our 759 00:48:46.800 --> 00:48:50.679 job was to monitor what the Russians were doing in Vienna. 760 00:48:51.800 --> 00:48:54.960 The Russians were meeting a large number of their American 761 00:48:55.239 --> 00:49:01.000 assets in Vienna. They felt safe there during their occupation 762 00:49:01.159 --> 00:49:05.920 after World War Two. In Vienna, they had built an infrastructure, 763 00:49:06.599 --> 00:49:08.880 so they had a lot of resources there which they 764 00:49:09.199 --> 00:49:16.880 used much later, and the Austrians were neutral. Their counterintelligence 765 00:49:17.079 --> 00:49:20.519 was frankly not well developed, so we all felt very 766 00:49:20.559 --> 00:49:24.440 comfortable working there. In fact, the Austrians kind of were 767 00:49:24.639 --> 00:49:27.840 happy to look the other way if we didn't embarrass 768 00:49:27.880 --> 00:49:32.599 them too much. They were content to let us go 769 00:49:32.639 --> 00:49:34.559 out on the streets of Vienna and do our thing, 770 00:49:34.719 --> 00:49:37.480 and we did. We were all over the streets of Vienna. 771 00:49:37.519 --> 00:49:42.280 So I loved being in Vienna working against the Russians, 772 00:49:42.840 --> 00:49:47.280 and in fact, when our assignment there was up Mareth 773 00:49:47.320 --> 00:49:52.280 and I were sent back to Washington. I became a 774 00:49:52.400 --> 00:49:58.159 chief of internal operations Soviet operations, East European operations for 775 00:49:58.280 --> 00:50:01.159 the CI back at headquarters, which was a good job. 776 00:50:02.079 --> 00:50:04.039 And I did that for a while and then I 777 00:50:04.039 --> 00:50:08.559 remember one day I'm sitting in my desk at Langley 778 00:50:08.599 --> 00:50:11.840 and I get a call from the Deputy director for Operations, 779 00:50:11.960 --> 00:50:15.440 the chief of the CI Clandessein Service Acrust, the old 780 00:50:15.519 --> 00:50:20.360 pro and he called me up, very gruff, Jim, get 781 00:50:20.440 --> 00:50:23.519 up here, okay. On my way shop to the seventh floor. 782 00:50:24.119 --> 00:50:29.199 So I walk in and without any introduction, he said, Jim, 783 00:50:29.480 --> 00:50:33.400 we're sending you to Vienna. I thought he'd misspoken because 784 00:50:33.440 --> 00:50:36.639 I just come back from Vienna. But he wanted me 785 00:50:36.719 --> 00:50:41.639 to go back to Vienna to build a counterintelligence program there. 786 00:50:42.199 --> 00:50:45.320 We didn't really have one. And he was tired of 787 00:50:45.360 --> 00:50:49.320 seeing that the Russians were meeting all of these Americans, 788 00:50:49.880 --> 00:50:52.480 all of the double agents, all over the cases that 789 00:50:52.519 --> 00:50:55.840 were compromised in Vienna. They had a field day. They 790 00:50:55.880 --> 00:51:00.199 owned Vienna, and his mandate to me was go and 791 00:51:00.320 --> 00:51:04.559 take possession of Vienna. And that meant to build a 792 00:51:04.679 --> 00:51:09.039 counterintelligence capability on a scale that we'd never done it before. 793 00:51:10.000 --> 00:51:12.239 And he told me this is going to cost a 794 00:51:12.280 --> 00:51:15.880 lot of money, and I'm aware of that. So he said, Jim, 795 00:51:15.920 --> 00:51:18.719 how much do you want? And I'm thinking quickly. I 796 00:51:18.760 --> 00:51:21.599 knew Vienna, I knew what the real estate there, I 797 00:51:21.679 --> 00:51:24.719 knew what the costs would be. It's an expensive city. 798 00:51:25.199 --> 00:51:27.719 So I gave him a number that I thought was outrageous, 799 00:51:28.039 --> 00:51:32.039 completely out of balance. He's in bad and eye. He said, 800 00:51:32.039 --> 00:51:34.639 you got it, and when you need more, come and 801 00:51:34.679 --> 00:51:38.079 see me. So that's how it started. And my job 802 00:51:38.199 --> 00:51:40.519 was to build a team and to go out and 803 00:51:40.599 --> 00:51:44.199 to take it to the Russians. And we did, and 804 00:51:44.480 --> 00:51:50.119 it was pretty momentous for us to go and to 805 00:51:51.000 --> 00:51:54.719 beat the Russians on what they had considered their private 806 00:51:54.800 --> 00:51:59.719 territory for many, many years. We did such a good job. 807 00:52:00.079 --> 00:52:04.119 I think in UH Encounter Intelligence Indianna that it was 808 00:52:04.159 --> 00:52:07.199 almost inevitable that my next assignment was going to be 809 00:52:07.280 --> 00:52:11.320 back at headquarters as a chief of counter intelligence. Mike 810 00:52:11.360 --> 00:52:15.800 wanted to go elsewhere. I had always dreamed of an 811 00:52:15.800 --> 00:52:19.679 exodi African assignment. I was kind of penciled in for 812 00:52:19.800 --> 00:52:23.920 Conchasa and we were running our warning goal out of Conchasta. 813 00:52:23.960 --> 00:52:27.199 That would have been a great assignment. I also was 814 00:52:27.360 --> 00:52:29.599 being considered for Tel Aviv, which I thought would be 815 00:52:30.079 --> 00:52:33.000 a great place to be. So I was excited about 816 00:52:33.039 --> 00:52:38.079 those two options. But Headquarters, in his wisdom, said nope, Jim, 817 00:52:38.119 --> 00:52:40.480 you're coming back and you're gonna You're gonna build a 818 00:52:41.360 --> 00:52:46.719 counter intelligence center with Ted Price's help, Ted Price's leadership 819 00:52:47.039 --> 00:52:48.760 back at Headquarters, and that's what they did. 820 00:52:50.440 --> 00:52:50.639 Good. 821 00:52:50.960 --> 00:52:52.719 I was just gonna ask who was the d d O, 822 00:52:52.880 --> 00:52:55.760 the gruff, salty DdO that called you in. 823 00:52:55.800 --> 00:52:57.840 I mean, he must be out by now. 824 00:52:58.519 --> 00:53:01.920 Claire George, Oh, Claire George Clark to Lorge, one of 825 00:53:01.960 --> 00:53:05.719 the old barons, one of the cowboys. We called him 826 00:53:06.639 --> 00:53:11.159 a great character, a great operator, and someone I admired greatly. 827 00:53:12.400 --> 00:53:15.679 Claire and his you would have trouble in the CIA 828 00:53:15.960 --> 00:53:16.119 or in. 829 00:53:16.079 --> 00:53:21.000 The United States government today because they were anything but 830 00:53:21.039 --> 00:53:24.119 politically correct. You. 831 00:53:24.480 --> 00:53:28.199 You know, you had a couple of the stories from 832 00:53:28.199 --> 00:53:31.239 the inner A couple of the cases were your personal 833 00:53:31.280 --> 00:53:34.360 experiences in Vienna. Because for people who don't know, like 834 00:53:34.480 --> 00:53:36.599 a vast majority of this book is just about the 835 00:53:36.599 --> 00:53:39.840 counter intelligence, it's wages against this, it's about your ten commandments, 836 00:53:39.880 --> 00:53:43.840 of counterintelligence. It's a number of case studies, but there 837 00:53:43.840 --> 00:53:47.079 are a couple. Can you tell us a little bit 838 00:53:47.199 --> 00:53:52.960 about about the young Marine sergeant Clayton loan Tree who 839 00:53:53.000 --> 00:53:54.039 approached you in Vienna. 840 00:53:54.480 --> 00:53:58.159 I'll be happy to Clayton Loan Tree was one of 841 00:53:58.199 --> 00:54:01.800 the marine security guards in our embassy. They do a 842 00:54:01.800 --> 00:54:06.800 wonderful job. He had previously served in Moscow as the 843 00:54:06.800 --> 00:54:12.239 marine security guard. Mareth and I were at the ambassador's 844 00:54:12.320 --> 00:54:16.559 Christmas party in Vienna in December of nineteen eighty six, 845 00:54:17.760 --> 00:54:21.199 and all the embassy staff had been invited. It was 846 00:54:21.239 --> 00:54:25.719 a great party. The ambassador was Ronald Louder, the son 847 00:54:26.000 --> 00:54:30.119 of a Stay Louder, the cosmetics magnet. Very wealthy people. 848 00:54:31.599 --> 00:54:36.639 Ron and his wife entertained lavishly, a great party, having 849 00:54:36.679 --> 00:54:39.440 a wonderful time. Mareth and I were really enjoying ourselves. 850 00:54:40.320 --> 00:54:43.480 But toward the end of the evening, as I'm in 851 00:54:43.480 --> 00:54:46.880 this one conversation group, I noticed out of the corner 852 00:54:46.880 --> 00:54:50.039 of my eye that this young man, who I recognized 853 00:54:50.079 --> 00:54:54.599 as one of our marine security guards, was watching me intently, 854 00:54:56.360 --> 00:54:59.119 and as I moved on my way toward the next 855 00:54:59.119 --> 00:55:04.440 conversational group, he came over and intercepted me. He was 856 00:55:04.960 --> 00:55:09.079 visibly shaking. I thought he was having some kind of 857 00:55:09.119 --> 00:55:12.360 a breakdown, some kind of an episode. So I took 858 00:55:12.440 --> 00:55:15.400 him around the corner, out of sight of the rest 859 00:55:15.440 --> 00:55:19.119 of the party, and finally he was able to tell 860 00:55:19.159 --> 00:55:25.440 me that he knew who I was. In other words, 861 00:55:25.519 --> 00:55:28.440 he was telling me that he knew I was the 862 00:55:28.480 --> 00:55:34.159 CIA undercover chief of station in Vienna. And that got 863 00:55:34.159 --> 00:55:37.000 my attention because he shouldn't have known that. When he 864 00:55:37.039 --> 00:55:40.639 said they told me who you are, that could only 865 00:55:40.679 --> 00:55:45.079 mean the KGB. So I knew we had a problem, 866 00:55:45.360 --> 00:55:49.280 and I arranged to meet with him the next day 867 00:55:49.320 --> 00:55:54.159 outside the embassy, and Clayton Loan Tree began to tell 868 00:55:54.239 --> 00:55:57.320 us his story. It didn't take long to get to 869 00:55:57.360 --> 00:56:02.440 the bottom of it. When he was in he was 870 00:56:02.599 --> 00:56:11.320 seduced by what we call a swallow, a KGB seduction specialist, 871 00:56:11.639 --> 00:56:17.480 young women who were trained to lure Americans into unauthorized 872 00:56:17.480 --> 00:56:21.599 sexual relationships so that they can compromise them and then 873 00:56:21.960 --> 00:56:25.440 put pressure on them. And Clayton Loan Tree was an 874 00:56:25.440 --> 00:56:30.280 easy mark. He was a native American. He had never 875 00:56:30.360 --> 00:56:37.159 had a successful, emotionally satisfying relationship with a woman, and 876 00:56:37.199 --> 00:56:39.960 so in Violetta as her name was working as a 877 00:56:40.039 --> 00:56:44.039 secretary in the US embassy, began to flirt with them. 878 00:56:44.079 --> 00:56:50.840 He was a goner, and she eventually seduced him, and 879 00:56:50.880 --> 00:56:57.400 once they became intimate, she introduced him to her uncle, Sasha, 880 00:56:58.440 --> 00:57:02.840 a KGB officer obviously who closed the deal, and Loan 881 00:57:02.880 --> 00:57:05.760 Tree was in over his head. He wanted to do 882 00:57:05.840 --> 00:57:10.159 what he could for Violetta by cooperating, and so he 883 00:57:10.199 --> 00:57:15.239 started working with the KGB in Moscow. He then was 884 00:57:15.280 --> 00:57:19.239 transferred to Vienna as his next assignment. I think the 885 00:57:19.320 --> 00:57:24.320 KGB probably asked him to request Vienna because Vienna was 886 00:57:24.480 --> 00:57:29.280 a great post for them to have a spy in, 887 00:57:30.199 --> 00:57:31.960 and a marine can do a lot of damage. They 888 00:57:31.960 --> 00:57:36.079 have access to all of our spaces, and Loan Tree 889 00:57:36.400 --> 00:57:39.280 was under a lot of pressure. The KGB was using 890 00:57:39.320 --> 00:57:42.760 a very heavy hand against him. In Vienna. They wanted 891 00:57:42.840 --> 00:57:46.719 to do more and more. They wanted physical access to 892 00:57:46.719 --> 00:57:49.320 our embassy. They wanted to get into the Ambassador's office, 893 00:57:49.679 --> 00:57:53.760 into the CI spaces, into the communications center, and Loan 894 00:57:53.800 --> 00:57:55.400 Tree was going to be the way to do that. 895 00:57:56.480 --> 00:58:00.760 US Marines would sometimes be the only American building a night, 896 00:58:01.480 --> 00:58:05.000 so he could have let in a whole KGB technical team. 897 00:58:05.480 --> 00:58:12.119 So the worst case was a very, very damaging So 898 00:58:12.159 --> 00:58:14.679 we talked to him. We couldn't trust him to be 899 00:58:14.719 --> 00:58:16.760 telling us the whole truth. He told us that he'd 900 00:58:16.800 --> 00:58:20.679 never gotten that far. He came to me because he 901 00:58:20.760 --> 00:58:27.679 wanted out, He was scared. He wanted to work with 902 00:58:27.760 --> 00:58:32.360 us as a double agent. In other words, he wanted 903 00:58:32.400 --> 00:58:36.400 to continue meeting with the KGB in Vienna, but from 904 00:58:36.480 --> 00:58:40.400 now on, of course under our control. And ordinarily I 905 00:58:40.400 --> 00:58:44.480 would have found that very very attractive, as it's clear 906 00:58:44.559 --> 00:58:48.920 from what I wrote in To Catch a Spy. I 907 00:58:48.960 --> 00:58:52.480 love double agent operations and I would have done it here, 908 00:58:52.679 --> 00:58:58.599 except that Clayton Longtree was emotionally fragile. It was apparent 909 00:58:58.639 --> 00:59:01.679 to us from the beginning that he was still very 910 00:59:01.880 --> 00:59:05.199 emotionally attached to via letter, so we would never have 911 00:59:05.320 --> 00:59:09.079 the control that we would need for successful double agent operation. 912 00:59:10.360 --> 00:59:16.480 And secondly, he was not equipped to carry off the 913 00:59:16.519 --> 00:59:21.239 fiction of being cooperative with the KGB. He wouldn't be 914 00:59:21.800 --> 00:59:25.199 enough of an actor to do that convincingly, so we 915 00:59:25.280 --> 00:59:28.039 had to rule that out. And once we ruled out 916 00:59:28.079 --> 00:59:31.519 a double agent role for him, we had no alternative 917 00:59:31.559 --> 00:59:35.360 but to turn him over to the Naval Investigative Service 918 00:59:35.440 --> 00:59:41.119 now called NCIS for arrest and prosecution. I testified at 919 00:59:41.119 --> 00:59:46.280 his court martial and Quantico he's the only Marine ever 920 00:59:46.360 --> 00:59:50.360 to have been charged with espionage treason. So the Marine 921 00:59:50.400 --> 00:59:55.800 Corps through the book adding thirty years, and we then 922 00:59:56.199 --> 00:59:59.280 debriefed him fully and it turned out that he had 923 00:59:59.280 --> 01:00:03.440 not done damage. They had not gotten that far with him. 924 01:00:03.599 --> 01:00:07.400 He was very repentant about what he had done, so 925 01:00:07.480 --> 01:00:11.559 I felt that he deserves some leniency, and we did 926 01:00:11.639 --> 01:00:15.400 end up petitioning the court. So he only spent about 927 01:00:15.800 --> 01:00:19.679 nine years in prison for what he had done, so 928 01:00:19.760 --> 01:00:25.760 the sentence was reduced significantly. Clayton long Tree when he 929 01:00:25.800 --> 01:00:28.400 got out, you know, the first thing he did he 930 01:00:28.519 --> 01:00:32.639 sent a wedding proposal to Violetta. He refused to believe 931 01:00:32.639 --> 01:00:35.480 that she said him up, which we knew, of course, 932 01:00:35.719 --> 01:00:42.000 that she had done. Violetta declined the wedding proposal. She 933 01:00:42.039 --> 01:00:47.360 had moved on. But Clayton was was heartbroken because he 934 01:00:47.840 --> 01:00:50.280 truly believed that what they had was real. So that 935 01:00:50.320 --> 01:00:57.559 was quite a potentially damaging case. But and reality was 936 01:00:57.639 --> 01:00:59.239 not nearly as bad as it might have been. 937 01:01:00.880 --> 01:01:03.639 And then the other case, I think that you mentioned 938 01:01:03.679 --> 01:01:06.960 the vienna that you received a call from marine guard 939 01:01:07.679 --> 01:01:09.960 about a walk in and it was a Latino looking 940 01:01:09.960 --> 01:01:12.000 gentleman sitting in the wedding air with. 941 01:01:12.039 --> 01:01:14.840 A a young woman who you thought might be his daughter. 942 01:01:15.599 --> 01:01:21.400 Yes, yes, that's right, Dave. I was at home on 943 01:01:21.440 --> 01:01:23.880 the weekend, and of course we'd arrange with the marine 944 01:01:23.880 --> 01:01:27.960 guards who were on duty over the weekend that if 945 01:01:27.960 --> 01:01:31.239 the walk in showed up, they should call one of us, 946 01:01:31.519 --> 01:01:34.440 and they had a parole that they would use. So 947 01:01:34.519 --> 01:01:38.280 I got a call at home on that weekend afternoon 948 01:01:38.960 --> 01:01:42.159 and from the marine guard. He used the pro to 949 01:01:42.159 --> 01:01:45.559 indicate that there was a walk in. I drove into 950 01:01:45.599 --> 01:01:50.480 the embassy and as I'm walking past the entrance up 951 01:01:50.480 --> 01:01:55.079 towards the marine desk, I noticed this Latino looking gentleman 952 01:01:56.119 --> 01:01:59.320 with a girl, a young lady, and that's right, I 953 01:01:59.320 --> 01:02:02.599 thought she was his daughter. It's about the age that 954 01:02:03.119 --> 01:02:05.719 made sense to me. I go up to the marine 955 01:02:05.760 --> 01:02:08.840 I said, corporate, what do we have here? He handed 956 01:02:08.880 --> 01:02:15.719 me two official Cuban passports. I go down to the 957 01:02:15.960 --> 01:02:21.280 vestibule to speak to this this Cuban, and it turns 958 01:02:21.320 --> 01:02:26.400 out that this was not his daughter, his teenage mistress. 959 01:02:27.639 --> 01:02:32.599 He had been the DGI, the Cuban intelligence head of station, 960 01:02:32.960 --> 01:02:39.079 the resident in Prague. He and his girlfriend on the run. 961 01:02:40.000 --> 01:02:43.920 They had left Prague, they'd driven down to Vienna, and 962 01:02:43.960 --> 01:02:50.159 they wanted a life together in the United States. The 963 01:02:50.199 --> 01:02:56.840 defector's name was Aspiaga, and he had left a wife 964 01:02:56.920 --> 01:02:59.880 and family behind in Prague. They weren't part of the deal. 965 01:03:00.719 --> 01:03:04.079 I didn't speak in Spanish at that time, didn't learn 966 01:03:04.119 --> 01:03:08.559 Spanish until later, so we're having trouble communicating. The only 967 01:03:08.639 --> 01:03:12.280 language we had in common was Russian, and his Russian 968 01:03:12.440 --> 01:03:16.480 was not very good. So he was having trouble making 969 01:03:16.559 --> 01:03:20.639 himself understood. He was getting frustrated, so finally emotion for 970 01:03:20.760 --> 01:03:23.400 me to come closer to him, and he whispered in 971 01:03:23.440 --> 01:03:28.199 my ear the names of several undercover CI officers who 972 01:03:28.199 --> 01:03:32.760 had served in Havana named I knew, so I realized, 973 01:03:33.400 --> 01:03:38.639 this person is probably bonified. He's probably what he claims 974 01:03:38.639 --> 01:03:42.679 to be, a senior DGI officer. So we put him 975 01:03:42.719 --> 01:03:44.880 in a safe house. I called in one of my 976 01:03:45.239 --> 01:03:48.559 Spanish speaking officers and we had him on a plane 977 01:03:48.719 --> 01:03:51.719 with his girlfriend to the United States the next day. 978 01:03:52.440 --> 01:03:56.400 Ospiaga turned out to be an incredible source for us, 979 01:03:56.840 --> 01:04:00.239 the first real inside book that we'd ever had had 980 01:04:00.400 --> 01:04:04.079 of the CUBANDGI, and the look that he gave us 981 01:04:04.760 --> 01:04:08.519 was a shock because he told us some things that 982 01:04:08.559 --> 01:04:11.920 we hadn't known before. He told us that the former 983 01:04:12.000 --> 01:04:16.559 CIA case officer, Philip Aging, had been working for the 984 01:04:16.599 --> 01:04:19.639 Cubans for many years and had been paid over a 985 01:04:19.679 --> 01:04:23.599 million dollars. But he also told us, and this was 986 01:04:23.719 --> 01:04:27.360 shattering to me and to all of us, that all 987 01:04:27.480 --> 01:04:32.800 thirty eight of the recruitments that we CI thought we'd 988 01:04:32.840 --> 01:04:36.760 made of Cubans, including on Island, were controlled by the DGI. 989 01:04:37.920 --> 01:04:42.679 They were all doubles. They owned us, they had duped us, 990 01:04:43.320 --> 01:04:46.719 they had beaten us. And that's something that sticks on 991 01:04:46.760 --> 01:04:49.639 my goal to this day, that we were so gullible, 992 01:04:50.159 --> 01:04:53.719 that our counter intelligence was so weak that they could 993 01:04:53.760 --> 01:04:57.760 do that to us. It was one of the worst 994 01:04:57.840 --> 01:05:01.039 days in my CI career when we heard that the 995 01:05:01.079 --> 01:05:02.599 Cubans had carried that off. 996 01:05:02.639 --> 01:05:06.239 Against this It's also interesting because you make the point, 997 01:05:06.360 --> 01:05:10.039 like you said earlier, that that like people don't want 998 01:05:10.119 --> 01:05:13.119 CI around, and it's for reasons like that, because when 999 01:05:13.119 --> 01:05:17.119 they're successful, everybody else looks bad. You know that that 1000 01:05:17.320 --> 01:05:20.840 all these recruitments that people had gotten wards for, probably 1001 01:05:20.840 --> 01:05:24.159 gotten promotions for. Probably they were all fake. They're all 1002 01:05:24.199 --> 01:05:25.239 fake recruitments. 1003 01:05:25.519 --> 01:05:27.960 Yeah, that's a good point, Dave, and one that I 1004 01:05:28.000 --> 01:05:33.119 think accounts for why we had allowed the Cubans to 1005 01:05:33.199 --> 01:05:36.960 run all these doubles against this. Counter Intelligence, as I said, 1006 01:05:37.239 --> 01:05:42.360 was inexcusably weak. During those years. The components did their 1007 01:05:42.400 --> 01:05:47.320 own so called counter intelligence, and they wanted these operations 1008 01:05:47.360 --> 01:05:50.519 to be good because people had made their careers out 1009 01:05:50.519 --> 01:05:53.800 of recruiting Cubans people in the Latin American Division, and 1010 01:05:53.880 --> 01:05:56.280 they didn't want any counter intelligence people coming to them 1011 01:05:56.280 --> 01:05:59.559 and saying, you know, we're looking into that case and 1012 01:05:59.599 --> 01:06:02.639 there's some problems with it. You know, first of all, 1013 01:06:02.760 --> 01:06:07.880 there's not much production. Secondly, the polygraph really had some 1014 01:06:08.000 --> 01:06:12.320 issues associated with it. Also, the vibes just don't look 1015 01:06:12.320 --> 01:06:18.119 good in this case. All those warning signals, which were significant, 1016 01:06:18.559 --> 01:06:23.000 were disregarded because they wanted those cases to be good, right. 1017 01:06:23.880 --> 01:06:25.840 They wanted to have They wanted to be able to 1018 01:06:25.840 --> 01:06:28.920 go up to the seventh floor and tell CI management, 1019 01:06:29.199 --> 01:06:33.199 we've got thirty eight agents that we're running against the Cubans. 1020 01:06:35.000 --> 01:06:38.639 So that was a major contributor when we set up 1021 01:06:38.639 --> 01:06:42.920 the counter Intelligence Center. We told the components, hey, listen, 1022 01:06:43.719 --> 01:06:46.599 this is a new era of counter intelligence, and you're 1023 01:06:46.599 --> 01:06:49.639 not going to police yourselves. We're going to send people 1024 01:06:49.639 --> 01:06:52.519 who are working for us in the counter Intelligence Center, 1025 01:06:53.400 --> 01:06:57.519 who are objective, who aren't beholden to you, to go 1026 01:06:57.599 --> 01:06:59.599 in and look at your cases. Oh no you're not, 1027 01:07:00.079 --> 01:07:05.239 No you're not. We don't want that kind of outside scrutiny, compartmentation, reasons, 1028 01:07:05.440 --> 01:07:08.079 you don't know our culture. Well, the fact is they 1029 01:07:08.119 --> 01:07:11.119 didn't want anybody looking over their shoulders. And when we 1030 01:07:11.239 --> 01:07:14.800 got in, when we got into those area divisions, had 1031 01:07:14.800 --> 01:07:18.119 to overcome a lot of resistance because the old hands, 1032 01:07:18.639 --> 01:07:22.119 the people who ran these area divisions, didn't want independent ci. 1033 01:07:22.800 --> 01:07:26.159 They wanted to continue doing it themselves. We had to 1034 01:07:26.199 --> 01:07:28.480 break down that resistance. I had to go to the 1035 01:07:28.480 --> 01:07:32.280 seventh floor and tell the seventh floor, listen, we want 1036 01:07:32.320 --> 01:07:36.960 to do oversight. We want to do independent count intelligence 1037 01:07:37.000 --> 01:07:40.360 scrutiny of the operations in this division. That won't name 1038 01:07:40.440 --> 01:07:42.960 the division, but there were more than one who were 1039 01:07:43.000 --> 01:07:46.199 resisting us, trying to stiff arm us, not letting us 1040 01:07:46.239 --> 01:07:49.760 get access to their cases. We can't do our job 1041 01:07:49.960 --> 01:07:54.000 unless we overruled It didn't make me very popular. But 1042 01:07:54.880 --> 01:07:59.559 the seventh floor INCLU the director said, Okay, you've got it. 1043 01:07:59.599 --> 01:08:01.519 You've got the access you need, and if you have 1044 01:08:01.559 --> 01:08:03.960 any more trouble with them, let me know. So we 1045 01:08:04.000 --> 01:08:08.840 got into the case. What did we find? Junk? Worthless 1046 01:08:08.840 --> 01:08:12.440 cases They were running just for the sake of running operations. 1047 01:08:12.639 --> 01:08:14.800 So we had to weed all that out to give 1048 01:08:14.840 --> 01:08:17.399 it to the junk. We found other cases that were 1049 01:08:17.399 --> 01:08:20.800 doubled against us. It was a nightmare, but we cleaned 1050 01:08:20.800 --> 01:08:23.399 the house and it was long overdue. 1051 01:08:23.840 --> 01:08:25.800 It's like the original form of cat fishing. 1052 01:08:25.960 --> 01:08:28.800 It's so good, it looks so good that you just 1053 01:08:28.920 --> 01:08:30.479 wanted to be true in your north. 1054 01:08:30.439 --> 01:08:33.760 All in the professional incentive is to rack up numbers. Right, 1055 01:08:33.800 --> 01:08:35.119 we're running all these assets. 1056 01:08:35.279 --> 01:08:39.239 Yeah, and of course what was overlooked was they weren't 1057 01:08:39.239 --> 01:08:42.319 producing anything, right, We weren't getting any real intelligence. 1058 01:08:42.560 --> 01:08:46.439 We're getting up and not only that, in the case 1059 01:08:46.439 --> 01:08:51.399 of the Cubans, anything that was Cuban was a valid target. 1060 01:08:51.560 --> 01:08:53.880 You know, you could be a circus performer, you could 1061 01:08:53.880 --> 01:08:57.760 be a hotel clerk, didn't make any difference. 1062 01:08:57.800 --> 01:09:02.000 If you were Cuban. You were meant to be a valatar. Right, 1063 01:09:02.199 --> 01:09:08.159 So they recruited junk, worthless people with no access. They 1064 01:09:08.159 --> 01:09:12.760 allowed themselves to be beguiled into the belief that as 1065 01:09:12.800 --> 01:09:16.439 these people were trained to do by the DGI. Okay, 1066 01:09:16.600 --> 01:09:19.760 when you're danging yourself, let them think that you are 1067 01:09:19.800 --> 01:09:23.840 on the verge of getting something that's worthwhile you got 1068 01:09:23.880 --> 01:09:26.920 a neighbor who works in the Cuban military was talking 1069 01:09:27.000 --> 01:09:29.720 too much, or you're in line for a job in 1070 01:09:29.720 --> 01:09:33.239 this ministry. Of course, it never panned out. We never 1071 01:09:33.239 --> 01:09:38.680 got any intelligence from right, disgraceful something that any good 1072 01:09:38.720 --> 01:09:41.199 counter intelligence officer should be ashamed of that I was 1073 01:09:41.239 --> 01:09:41.760 ashamed of it. 1074 01:09:43.600 --> 01:09:46.520 Yeah, yeah, I mean, and there are a lot of 1075 01:09:46.560 --> 01:09:49.199 personal like I mean, there's like a lot of personal 1076 01:09:49.239 --> 01:09:52.159 refleshing insight in this too. Can you tell us, because 1077 01:09:52.159 --> 01:09:53.720 we've talked about the Russians, can you tell us a 1078 01:09:53.720 --> 01:09:56.359 little bit about the Chinese? And I don't know how 1079 01:09:56.439 --> 01:09:59.239 much they were in that sphere because we've heard about 1080 01:09:59.239 --> 01:10:02.319 the Russians and the Cubans. Were the Chinese very acted 1081 01:10:02.399 --> 01:10:03.680 during that period of time. 1082 01:10:04.840 --> 01:10:07.960 They were, but they weren't our major threat at that time. 1083 01:10:08.119 --> 01:10:12.279 Of course, it was all Russia throughout most of the 1084 01:10:12.279 --> 01:10:17.920 Cold War. China didn't really emerge as a major espionage 1085 01:10:17.920 --> 01:10:21.439 threat in the United States until later. I would say, 1086 01:10:22.880 --> 01:10:27.119 beginning in the early nineteen nineties, we recognize we have 1087 01:10:27.159 --> 01:10:32.079 a problem. The Chinese are very aggressive, They are very good. 1088 01:10:32.920 --> 01:10:37.800 They are infiltrating the United States. They are stealing our technology, 1089 01:10:38.119 --> 01:10:43.319 they're hacking into our databases. So very quickly we came 1090 01:10:43.359 --> 01:10:47.239 to realize we got a major new threat on our hands. 1091 01:10:48.000 --> 01:10:53.039 The Cuban MSS, or the Cuban or the Chinese MSS, 1092 01:10:53.279 --> 01:10:58.239 and the Chinese PLA. They're formidable adversaries and they're flooding 1093 01:10:58.680 --> 01:11:02.039 resources in the United States. So I would say by 1094 01:11:02.159 --> 01:11:11.239 the end of the nineteen nineties, China had emerged as 1095 01:11:11.319 --> 01:11:15.439 our number one a national security threat. What they were 1096 01:11:15.439 --> 01:11:19.800 doing was several magnitudes greater than what the Russians were doing. 1097 01:11:20.119 --> 01:11:23.319 The Russians did not go away. Their level of espionage 1098 01:11:23.319 --> 01:11:26.760 against the United States stayed very high. Putin was obsessed 1099 01:11:26.760 --> 01:11:30.159 with the United States, but we had a good reason 1100 01:11:30.199 --> 01:11:33.960 to believe that what the Chinese were doing was unprecedented. 1101 01:11:34.680 --> 01:11:39.439 It was massive, it was pervasive. Their number one target 1102 01:11:39.560 --> 01:11:43.840 was to get our technology, particularly military technology, but not exclusively. 1103 01:11:44.680 --> 01:11:50.000 And I came to realize before I left ACTIY duty 1104 01:11:50.720 --> 01:11:54.920 that China is now the number one national security the 1105 01:11:55.039 --> 01:11:58.600 United States, and that has been compounded over and over 1106 01:11:58.640 --> 01:12:03.239 again since I left, and my courses at the Bush School, 1107 01:12:03.600 --> 01:12:07.920 my intelligence classes, I tell our students that China is 1108 01:12:07.960 --> 01:12:11.359 going to loom very large in their counter intelligence careers 1109 01:12:11.840 --> 01:12:14.560 because they are the name of the game, they are 1110 01:12:14.680 --> 01:12:17.439 the threat. I make a point in the book that 1111 01:12:17.960 --> 01:12:21.000 if I could start my CI career all over again, 1112 01:12:21.039 --> 01:12:24.079 and I'd love to, I would try to get into 1113 01:12:24.079 --> 01:12:28.159 the CI's China program. I would learn Mandarin, I would 1114 01:12:28.199 --> 01:12:32.199 become a China count intelligence specialist, because that's the future. 1115 01:12:32.840 --> 01:12:37.039 That's the future. What they're doing is outrageous and we 1116 01:12:37.159 --> 01:12:38.560 need to do a lot more to stop them. 1117 01:12:39.199 --> 01:12:42.359 As what are in jim As a counterintelligence professional, did 1118 01:12:42.359 --> 01:12:47.039 you ever experience any frustration in trying to approach the 1119 01:12:47.119 --> 01:12:49.560 problem of Chinese espionage? Because at the time, in the 1120 01:12:49.680 --> 01:12:53.960 nineteen nineties particularly, we're trying to integrate China into the 1121 01:12:54.000 --> 01:12:58.279 global economy, We're setting up all these trade arrangements. There 1122 01:12:58.359 --> 01:13:01.359 was even some rose our glasses on with a lot 1123 01:13:01.399 --> 01:13:05.159 of people who thought that China would democratize eventually. And 1124 01:13:05.439 --> 01:13:09.359 I have read that some of the espionage cases were 1125 01:13:09.439 --> 01:13:11.520 kind of ignored. 1126 01:13:11.720 --> 01:13:12.680 Swept under the rug. 1127 01:13:13.600 --> 01:13:15.640 It wasn't something we wanted to deal with at that time, 1128 01:13:15.680 --> 01:13:17.479 and I was wondering if you encountered any of that. 1129 01:13:18.479 --> 01:13:21.439 I counted out a lot, and that was a problem. Jack. 1130 01:13:21.520 --> 01:13:25.079 I think there's still a bit of a problem in 1131 01:13:25.119 --> 01:13:28.880 that area. The Chinese have been given a pass or 1132 01:13:28.920 --> 01:13:32.199 too often we have not held them accountable enough for 1133 01:13:32.319 --> 01:13:35.680 what they're doing when we catch them a slap on 1134 01:13:35.720 --> 01:13:39.279 the wrist. Maybe we do have some prosecutions, but it 1135 01:13:39.399 --> 01:13:42.000 is small compared to the enormity of what they're doing here. 1136 01:13:42.239 --> 01:13:44.119 They're an awful lot of people in I State's government. 1137 01:13:44.560 --> 01:13:48.279 We don't want to embarrass the Chinese. They don't want 1138 01:13:48.319 --> 01:13:53.439 to call them out. They don't want to change the 1139 01:13:54.680 --> 01:13:57.520 pattern of business that we have with them. And you've 1140 01:13:57.520 --> 01:14:03.720 seen it when policymakers that proposed tariffs on Chinese products, 1141 01:14:04.359 --> 01:14:06.520 there's a hue and crime. Can't do that. It's going 1142 01:14:06.520 --> 01:14:09.720 to raise the price. Americans like those cheap Chinese products 1143 01:14:09.720 --> 01:14:12.920 coming in. They own so much of our DBTS. You know, 1144 01:14:13.359 --> 01:14:16.760 if we irritate the Chinese, they could call in some 1145 01:14:16.840 --> 01:14:20.840 of that DBTS and that could be disastrous. So we're 1146 01:14:20.880 --> 01:14:24.560 not holding them nearly accountable enough for the enormity of 1147 01:14:24.560 --> 01:14:32.239 what they're doing. And I remember during the Olympics and 1148 01:14:32.920 --> 01:14:36.000 in Beijing, one of the big races, one of the 1149 01:14:36.039 --> 01:14:40.600 long distance races, was being held in Tinaman Square and 1150 01:14:40.800 --> 01:14:44.119 NBC at broadcasting this. Mary and I are watching all this, 1151 01:14:44.800 --> 01:14:48.039 and we say to ourselves, there's no way that NBC 1152 01:14:48.319 --> 01:14:52.800 couldnt mission what happened to tinam And Square in nineteen 1153 01:14:52.840 --> 01:14:56.439 eighty nine. And they're talking about the fact that we 1154 01:14:56.479 --> 01:15:01.279 are participating in the Olympics from that location, not a word, 1155 01:15:01.960 --> 01:15:05.760 you know, you don't want to embarrass the Chinese nonsense, 1156 01:15:06.399 --> 01:15:11.319 you know. I found it very disturbing that the Justice 1157 01:15:11.319 --> 01:15:16.159 Department canceled what was called the China Initiative. Chinese Initiative 1158 01:15:16.279 --> 01:15:21.000 was established to put more focus on Chinese espionage, particularly 1159 01:15:21.079 --> 01:15:24.399 their theft or technology. And I was involved in a 1160 01:15:24.399 --> 01:15:27.319 couple of cases as an expert witness where that was 1161 01:15:27.359 --> 01:15:31.399 paying off, where the additional attention was leading to some 1162 01:15:31.560 --> 01:15:35.439 arrests and prosecutions. I don't know what we're thinking when 1163 01:15:35.520 --> 01:15:39.399 we back off from something like that which was paying dividends. 1164 01:15:39.600 --> 01:15:41.600 And of course the excuse that was given was is 1165 01:15:41.680 --> 01:15:47.960 that the China Initiative was focusing heavily on ethnic Chinese 1166 01:15:49.159 --> 01:15:53.479 Chinese Americans, And that's true to some extent, and we 1167 01:15:53.520 --> 01:15:57.840 don't want to racially profile, but as counter intelligence professionals, 1168 01:15:57.840 --> 01:16:00.920 whether in the CI or the FBI, we would be 1169 01:16:01.000 --> 01:16:03.840 remiss if we ignored the reality of how they target. 1170 01:16:04.199 --> 01:16:08.680 They go after ethnic Chinese, right, that's their targeted preference, 1171 01:16:09.279 --> 01:16:13.479 finding Chinese Americans who are in key positions, who might 1172 01:16:13.520 --> 01:16:18.960 have some residual affinity for things China, some affection for 1173 01:16:19.319 --> 01:16:22.760 mother China. They share a language, they might even have 1174 01:16:22.840 --> 01:16:27.000 relatives still living back in China, so that makes it 1175 01:16:27.039 --> 01:16:30.199 a very attractive target. The Chinese don't miss that opportunity, 1176 01:16:30.600 --> 01:16:34.479 right because by no means there's bloosy. We've seen the 1177 01:16:34.560 --> 01:16:40.119 Chinese intelligence services get increasingly brazen and they're going after 1178 01:16:40.680 --> 01:16:43.760 non ethnic Chinese now more and more as well. But 1179 01:16:43.880 --> 01:16:46.359 all things considered, when they have an option, they're going 1180 01:16:46.399 --> 01:16:49.600 to target ethnic Chinese first and foremost. 1181 01:16:49.800 --> 01:16:52.239 And in a lot of cases because you like you 1182 01:16:52.319 --> 01:16:55.319 like with the Thousand Talents program, like it is their 1183 01:16:55.439 --> 01:16:58.479 plan to get these people over here, get in to school, 1184 01:16:58.479 --> 01:17:02.479 get them into advance technical fields, and feel them through 1185 01:17:02.680 --> 01:17:07.439 and and basically, I mean basically, if they have family 1186 01:17:07.479 --> 01:17:12.079 back in China, they're as good as an agent that there. 1187 01:17:12.159 --> 01:17:16.119 They don't have a choice. They're they're going to do it. 1188 01:17:16.119 --> 01:17:18.840 Biing goes yeah or Dave, you're right on with that. 1189 01:17:18.840 --> 01:17:22.439 That's a that's a mechanism and the Chinese have discovered 1190 01:17:22.439 --> 01:17:26.439 and have been exploiting for years. If they send over 1191 01:17:26.640 --> 01:17:30.560 a bright young Chinese student to the United States, it's 1192 01:17:30.560 --> 01:17:35.560 generally going to be an engineering probably something with military application. 1193 01:17:37.039 --> 01:17:41.319 That's that student gets his or her master's degree in 1194 01:17:41.760 --> 01:17:47.800 electrical engineering or a computer science or aeronautical engineering, whatever 1195 01:17:47.840 --> 01:17:52.199 it is. If that person can get sponsorship from an 1196 01:17:52.239 --> 01:17:55.920 American high tech company, which is hard to do because 1197 01:17:55.960 --> 01:18:00.479 they're all short in hiring engineers, they can get sponsorship, 1198 01:18:00.520 --> 01:18:04.479 they get a green card, they get PR status and 1199 01:18:04.600 --> 01:18:09.600 five years of PR status, entitles of the citizenship and 1200 01:18:09.640 --> 01:18:15.079 five years of citizenship. They are eligible for code word 1201 01:18:15.640 --> 01:18:19.960 top secret US government security clients. So that is something 1202 01:18:20.000 --> 01:18:24.159 that requires patients. But any intelligence service worthy of the 1203 01:18:24.239 --> 01:18:28.640 name would identify that as a channel to get their 1204 01:18:28.680 --> 01:18:32.880 people emplaced in US high technology companies with US citizenship 1205 01:18:33.279 --> 01:18:37.439 and clearances, or in the government directly or in the 1206 01:18:37.520 --> 01:18:41.760 national labs. It's a gold mine for an intelligence service, 1207 01:18:41.800 --> 01:18:43.039 and they certainly don't ignore that. 1208 01:18:43.119 --> 01:18:49.279 And this isn't just this is what was truly terrifying 1209 01:18:49.520 --> 01:18:53.640 about your book is you know, the Russian espionage was 1210 01:18:53.680 --> 01:18:57.840 one thing, the Cuban espionage is another thing, but your 1211 01:18:57.840 --> 01:19:00.680 first section on China, where they are number one competitor 1212 01:19:01.439 --> 01:19:07.960 and Russia is a distant second. And the amount of technology, basically, 1213 01:19:08.000 --> 01:19:11.640 if we've created the United States military technology and information 1214 01:19:11.720 --> 01:19:14.880 technology whatever, if we've created it, they have it that 1215 01:19:15.039 --> 01:19:17.079 we are no longer ahead of them in any kind 1216 01:19:17.079 --> 01:19:20.199 of arms race. They have basically everything we do, and 1217 01:19:20.239 --> 01:19:22.760 it continues to walk out the door on a regular basis. 1218 01:19:23.800 --> 01:19:26.920 That's exactly right, Dave. In fact, there is not a 1219 01:19:27.079 --> 01:19:34.760 significant piece of Chinese military technology is not based completely 1220 01:19:35.279 --> 01:19:40.039 or heavily on stolen American technology. They discovered a long 1221 01:19:40.039 --> 01:19:43.039 time ago that it's a lot cheaper and a lot 1222 01:19:43.159 --> 01:19:48.359 faster for them to steal Western technology and specifically American 1223 01:19:48.399 --> 01:19:52.680 technology than to do the R and D themselves. And 1224 01:19:52.720 --> 01:19:54.760 there are, after everything they can get their hands on. 1225 01:19:55.760 --> 01:19:58.439 It doesn't have to be military technology. If it's more 1226 01:19:58.479 --> 01:20:02.199 advanced than what they have they go after it. It 1227 01:20:02.279 --> 01:20:06.640 might be industrial technology, it might be civilian aviation, it 1228 01:20:06.720 --> 01:20:11.279 might be medical technology, it might be agricultural technology. Their 1229 01:20:11.279 --> 01:20:16.840 appetites are voracious and they are very very successful. But 1230 01:20:17.079 --> 01:20:18.800 of course the number one target is going to be 1231 01:20:18.840 --> 01:20:22.800 anything that's going to strengthen the PLA, strengthened the militarily. 1232 01:20:23.399 --> 01:20:26.159 You probably noticed, as I did not, all that long ago, 1233 01:20:26.199 --> 01:20:30.880 at a big airfare in Shanghai, the Chinese unveiled their 1234 01:20:30.920 --> 01:20:34.920 new UA V, a Mandaria vehicle, and those of us 1235 01:20:34.960 --> 01:20:36.600 who have been around for a while looked at that 1236 01:20:36.800 --> 01:20:42.479 Chinese UAV. That's the predator. Of course, the spinning image 1237 01:20:42.840 --> 01:20:44.319 of the US predator. 1238 01:20:46.039 --> 01:20:49.399 The J twenty, it looks just very eerily similar to 1239 01:20:49.439 --> 01:20:50.239 the F twenty two. 1240 01:20:51.199 --> 01:20:54.840 You bet absolutely, And you mentioned. 1241 01:20:54.479 --> 01:20:57.560 I mean, we're like, they're the world leader when it 1242 01:20:57.600 --> 01:21:03.399 comes to nano technology now right because of a. 1243 01:21:01.039 --> 01:21:04.720 A recruitment of a non Chinese American. 1244 01:21:05.239 --> 01:21:09.439 Yes, yes, yeah, they're ahead of us. It shouldn't be 1245 01:21:09.479 --> 01:21:13.239 that way. We should be the world leader in all 1246 01:21:13.279 --> 01:21:18.520 aspects of natotechnology or computer science. But for whatever reason, 1247 01:21:19.119 --> 01:21:26.039 they're beating us. Their offensive cyber is overwhelming our cyber defences, 1248 01:21:27.960 --> 01:21:30.000 and we got to we've got to put more resources 1249 01:21:30.039 --> 01:21:36.840 into it. They are everywhere. They're in classified databases, they 1250 01:21:36.840 --> 01:21:40.319 are in all of our high tech companies, they're in 1251 01:21:40.359 --> 01:21:45.520 the national labs h they're in our electrical grid. You know, 1252 01:21:45.560 --> 01:21:49.000 the Deputy Director of NSA testified before Congress that we 1253 01:21:49.079 --> 01:21:52.800 know they're there. We know they are solved malware which 1254 01:21:52.800 --> 01:21:56.560 they can activate at some point of their choosing in 1255 01:21:56.600 --> 01:21:59.520 the future. We've got it. We know they're in the Internet. 1256 01:22:00.359 --> 01:22:04.000 We know we can bring that down, presumably at some 1257 01:22:04.079 --> 01:22:08.520 point in the future. So you've got to put a 1258 01:22:08.520 --> 01:22:11.560 lot more into cyber I tell my students here at 1259 01:22:11.600 --> 01:22:15.000 the Bush School we're going into intelligence careers. If you 1260 01:22:15.039 --> 01:22:18.800 want to have a successful intelligence career today, you need 1261 01:22:18.840 --> 01:22:22.760 to develop expertise in one or more of the following fields. 1262 01:22:23.079 --> 01:22:26.520 First of all, you've got to know China. You've got 1263 01:22:26.560 --> 01:22:31.159 to know how the Chinese intelligence services operate. Secondly, you've 1264 01:22:31.199 --> 01:22:36.880 got to have a grounding and financial intelligence, because if 1265 01:22:36.920 --> 01:22:39.760 you can get into their money flows, you can bring 1266 01:22:39.800 --> 01:22:43.000 them down. So for I now, natural intelligence is a 1267 01:22:43.199 --> 01:22:45.880 rapidly growing area. And then of course the third area 1268 01:22:45.920 --> 01:22:51.960 is cyber You've got to develop expertise in in cyber technology. 1269 01:22:52.199 --> 01:22:55.039 So our students are doing that, and they're not going 1270 01:22:55.079 --> 01:22:58.560 to be the programmers themselves, but they're going to be managers. 1271 01:22:58.840 --> 01:23:01.600 They're going to be the policy people who understand what 1272 01:23:01.680 --> 01:23:05.720 the threat is and understand how to dedicate the appropriate 1273 01:23:06.000 --> 01:23:06.960 resources to it. 1274 01:23:07.319 --> 01:23:10.119 No, it's it's truly terrifying because not only from a 1275 01:23:10.199 --> 01:23:13.760 military aspect in terms of military power that we've done 1276 01:23:13.800 --> 01:23:15.760 all the research and that now and they have all 1277 01:23:15.760 --> 01:23:20.399 our technology, but but they essentially have the off switch 1278 01:23:20.640 --> 01:23:24.239 two to everything. Basically, they're in all of our companies 1279 01:23:24.479 --> 01:23:29.039 and into the systems that there's really almost no way 1280 01:23:29.039 --> 01:23:30.800 to get them out right. 1281 01:23:31.279 --> 01:23:33.680 You know what one of the major venues of the 1282 01:23:33.800 --> 01:23:37.680 Chinese spionized the United States his day, it's the college campus, 1283 01:23:38.720 --> 01:23:43.039 the United States college campus. They are going after our 1284 01:23:43.079 --> 01:23:48.319 professors and they are putting our students in place. The 1285 01:23:48.439 --> 01:23:53.439 thousand Talents program is insidious. Charles Lieber is a great 1286 01:23:53.479 --> 01:23:57.680 example of that. They are able to insinuate themselves into 1287 01:23:58.079 --> 01:24:02.319 a very sensitive area. To recruit him was very lucrative 1288 01:24:02.319 --> 01:24:05.079 for him, but he had to conceal the extent that 1289 01:24:05.119 --> 01:24:09.439 he was cooperating with the Chinese setting up a laboratory 1290 01:24:09.479 --> 01:24:14.239 for them. Thank good as we got him. But Charles Lieber, 1291 01:24:14.520 --> 01:24:17.159 I think is just the tip of the iceberg, and 1292 01:24:17.199 --> 01:24:21.199 the Chinese are going after or targeting a lot of 1293 01:24:21.239 --> 01:24:26.000 professors on college campuses the United States as we speak. 1294 01:24:26.600 --> 01:24:30.159 And that's not just with with like. 1295 01:24:31.720 --> 01:24:34.279 A the technical. 1296 01:24:35.239 --> 01:24:40.159 Espionage, but that's also I feel fomenting, not necessarily like 1297 01:24:40.680 --> 01:24:43.760 a cultural war, but definitely trying to play both sides 1298 01:24:43.760 --> 01:24:46.640 against each other, trying to because they they have been 1299 01:24:47.279 --> 01:24:50.199 they've been well them and the Russians also, but they've 1300 01:24:50.199 --> 01:24:52.800 been like throwing both the left and the right these 1301 01:24:52.840 --> 01:24:55.079 fake bones to get everybody riled up. 1302 01:24:55.119 --> 01:24:59.640 Correct, that's correct, That's exactly right, and that's a standard 1303 01:24:59.640 --> 01:25:05.680 ploy that they utilize. In my home state of Iowa. 1304 01:25:06.479 --> 01:25:09.359 This was brought home not too long ago when Chinese 1305 01:25:09.399 --> 01:25:13.239 were actually caught out in a cornfield in the middle 1306 01:25:13.319 --> 01:25:18.159 of Iowa digging up hybrid corn seats because those hybrids 1307 01:25:18.239 --> 01:25:21.199 were more advanced, had better yield than they think the 1308 01:25:21.279 --> 01:25:25.640 Chinese were doing, and so they were stealing our seed 1309 01:25:25.720 --> 01:25:28.359 right from the field to send back to China so 1310 01:25:28.399 --> 01:25:33.640 that they could grow it and replicate it. They are 1311 01:25:33.720 --> 01:25:36.119 absolutely shameless what they go after. 1312 01:25:37.039 --> 01:25:37.079 You. 1313 01:25:37.119 --> 01:25:40.199 Now, the United States, to its credit, shut down the 1314 01:25:40.399 --> 01:25:44.079 Chinese consulate in Houston, just next door to where I am, 1315 01:25:44.720 --> 01:25:48.119 because we knew that the Chinese intelligence services in Houston 1316 01:25:48.800 --> 01:25:54.279 were having a field day going after NASA, going after 1317 01:25:54.800 --> 01:26:01.880 oil and gas, going after M. D. Anderson for medical technology. 1318 01:26:02.560 --> 01:26:05.359 So we shut him down, and that was a wake 1319 01:26:05.439 --> 01:26:07.600 up call that I'm certain glad we did that. 1320 01:26:08.279 --> 01:26:11.640 Jeff, in your experience, with your background and what you 1321 01:26:11.760 --> 01:26:14.640 see now and obviously teaching, you always learn. 1322 01:26:15.159 --> 01:26:16.359 But during the. 1323 01:26:16.279 --> 01:26:21.000 Cold War, would we have taken a Russian teenager or 1324 01:26:21.119 --> 01:26:24.800 Russian adult and put him in one of our national laboratories. 1325 01:26:26.239 --> 01:26:28.359 I don't think we would have, Dave, I don't think 1326 01:26:28.399 --> 01:26:33.239 that was part of our philosophy of operating, and we 1327 01:26:33.359 --> 01:26:38.119 called young people like that futures. The other hand, the 1328 01:26:38.239 --> 01:26:42.640 Chinese and the Russians have been very effective at recruiting futures. 1329 01:26:43.960 --> 01:26:46.000 They will recruit a young American who doesn't have any 1330 01:26:46.000 --> 01:26:51.520 current access, and they will direct that person and compensate 1331 01:26:51.600 --> 01:26:55.840 that person and hope that that person can eventually maneuver 1332 01:26:56.000 --> 01:27:00.840 himself or herself into a position of access. Glendulfi Schreiver 1333 01:27:00.960 --> 01:27:03.199 is a good example of that. He was recruited as 1334 01:27:03.239 --> 01:27:05.920 a student with no access. They paid him a lot 1335 01:27:05.920 --> 01:27:09.239 of money to go back to the United States and 1336 01:27:09.279 --> 01:27:13.640 to apply for the State Department or for the CIA 1337 01:27:14.279 --> 01:27:18.520 to become an asset or Chinese intelligence. The Russians have 1338 01:27:18.600 --> 01:27:22.720 done the same thing. You know, they recruit young Americans 1339 01:27:22.760 --> 01:27:26.479 who don't have access. Students, for example, they get back 1340 01:27:26.720 --> 01:27:31.359 and study Russian and apply for a government job. And 1341 01:27:31.399 --> 01:27:34.720 when you're there, then we will compensate you royally. And 1342 01:27:34.760 --> 01:27:38.319 they established that relationship early on. They groomed these people. 1343 01:27:39.359 --> 01:27:43.319 We don't do that. We don't recruit futures. We don't 1344 01:27:43.359 --> 01:27:47.680 recruit young people who we hope can be steered into 1345 01:27:48.000 --> 01:27:50.800 future positions of access. We want people to have access. 1346 01:27:50.880 --> 01:27:55.000 Now, do you think that that is for ethical reasons 1347 01:27:55.119 --> 01:27:58.920 or do you think that America in general, and particularly 1348 01:27:59.479 --> 01:28:03.720 in our government, where everything flips so often, we just 1349 01:28:03.800 --> 01:28:07.079 don't have the long view of intelligence that other countries do. 1350 01:28:07.920 --> 01:28:09.560 Yeah, there may be a little bit of that, but 1351 01:28:09.640 --> 01:28:13.479 I think we've just decided that it's not efficient. Yeah, 1352 01:28:13.960 --> 01:28:18.239 it's not cost effective because most of these young people, 1353 01:28:18.760 --> 01:28:21.920 even with guidance, they're not going to successfully end up 1354 01:28:21.960 --> 01:28:25.840 in a position of access or stay oil to their 1355 01:28:25.920 --> 01:28:29.319 intelligence sponsors. So we've decided that we've got better things 1356 01:28:29.359 --> 01:28:33.119 to go after, more likely to be productive for us, 1357 01:28:33.479 --> 01:28:36.800 and to waste time and energy on a young person 1358 01:28:37.279 --> 01:28:39.159 who's only a future Jim. 1359 01:28:39.960 --> 01:28:42.800 For the public out there watching this, I was wondering 1360 01:28:42.840 --> 01:28:45.760 if you could recommend some literature on Chinese espionage, Like, 1361 01:28:45.960 --> 01:28:49.199 who do you like that's out there, Matthew Brazil or 1362 01:28:49.199 --> 01:28:53.399 Michael Pillsbury? Are there some experts that you would recommend 1363 01:28:53.399 --> 01:28:53.920 people read. 1364 01:28:54.680 --> 01:28:59.560 I definitely recommend Pillsbury. I think I think what he 1365 01:28:59.600 --> 01:29:04.800 wrote is brilliant. Uh More, specifically on Chinese espionage, I 1366 01:29:04.840 --> 01:29:10.279 think the best book that you can read is one 1367 01:29:10.479 --> 01:29:21.279 on the case. I think that's very instructive. I'll think 1368 01:29:21.319 --> 01:29:24.399 some more. Maybe you can post it on Yeah. 1369 01:29:24.439 --> 01:29:26.960 I'm just curious because it is a very dense subject 1370 01:29:27.079 --> 01:29:29.199 and it's something that, as you point out, a lot 1371 01:29:29.199 --> 01:29:33.039 of people out there should probably get smart on with they. 1372 01:29:33.039 --> 01:29:35.760 Might want to read to catch you spy, Yes, with 1373 01:29:36.640 --> 01:29:37.439 you have to read. 1374 01:29:37.560 --> 01:29:41.359 Well first chapters on China and some case studies. 1375 01:29:41.479 --> 01:29:49.079 Yeah, no, it's it's I mean, uh like just I 1376 01:29:49.119 --> 01:29:51.560 mean there's just kind of a quick list. I don't 1377 01:29:51.560 --> 01:29:53.199 know if you guys can see that they're not highlighted, 1378 01:29:53.359 --> 01:29:56.000 but just a quick list of some of the names. 1379 01:29:56.079 --> 01:30:00.760 But but the Chinese have just been destroying at this 1380 01:30:00.920 --> 01:30:05.279 and and they're almost untouchable. And you know, especially in 1381 01:30:05.319 --> 01:30:09.319 our country where we we do want to be fair 1382 01:30:09.520 --> 01:30:13.439 and we don't want to, you know, have the appearance 1383 01:30:13.600 --> 01:30:18.520 of profiling. How do you go after an enemy that 1384 01:30:18.680 --> 01:30:21.880 is that is ethnically different, And. 1385 01:30:21.880 --> 01:30:23.800 I would, I would take it a step further than that. 1386 01:30:23.840 --> 01:30:27.520 Even Dave, the Chinese government knows this is a pressure 1387 01:30:27.560 --> 01:30:29.880 point and they play can come after us and say, 1388 01:30:30.319 --> 01:30:34.199 you America, you're racings, right, We're going after our spies, right, 1389 01:30:34.239 --> 01:30:35.520 and we feel bad about that? 1390 01:30:35.640 --> 01:30:35.760 Right? 1391 01:30:37.640 --> 01:30:40.119 Yeah, Well, let me, for what it's worth tell you 1392 01:30:40.479 --> 01:30:45.399 Jim Olson's recipe for please improvement our counter intelligence against Chinese. 1393 01:30:46.680 --> 01:30:50.039 First of all, we've got to upgrade our cyber defenses 1394 01:30:50.920 --> 01:30:53.800 because they're hacking will now we've got to we've got 1395 01:30:53.840 --> 01:30:58.000 to stop that. Secondly, we've got to find ways to 1396 01:30:58.039 --> 01:31:03.439 penetrate the intelligence services. We should be recruiting Chinese intelligence officers. 1397 01:31:04.000 --> 01:31:08.000 The best counter intelligence is penetration. So we need to 1398 01:31:08.039 --> 01:31:11.279 reach out to more Chinese intelligence officers, typically the ones 1399 01:31:11.279 --> 01:31:14.000 who are accessible to us here in the United States, 1400 01:31:14.359 --> 01:31:17.399 go after them very very aggressively, get in their face, 1401 01:31:18.159 --> 01:31:21.079 let them know that we are open for business. We've 1402 01:31:21.079 --> 01:31:24.720 got deep pockets, and we can make a deal. Hang 1403 01:31:24.760 --> 01:31:28.600 out the shingle, let them know that we are very 1404 01:31:28.640 --> 01:31:32.079 eager to recruit them. And then the next thing we 1405 01:31:32.119 --> 01:31:36.479 need to do is double agent operations. That's the second 1406 01:31:36.520 --> 01:31:39.640 problem of being offensive, which is one of my counter 1407 01:31:39.640 --> 01:31:45.720 intelligence commandments. We should be absolutely flooding the Chinese with 1408 01:31:45.760 --> 01:31:50.399 double agents. If anybody's interested, you might want to look 1409 01:31:50.439 --> 01:31:55.319 at the Jandulum shoecase out of Cincinnati, because that was 1410 01:31:55.359 --> 01:32:00.000 a brilliant FBI double agent operation against an MSS office 1411 01:32:00.760 --> 01:32:03.640 and this person was convicted. It's the first time that 1412 01:32:03.680 --> 01:32:07.439 we've ever been able to convict a serving MSS staff officer, 1413 01:32:08.039 --> 01:32:12.359 so it was groundbreaking. And what the FBI did in 1414 01:32:12.399 --> 01:32:17.920 that case was a textbook a double agent operation, brilliantly 1415 01:32:17.960 --> 01:32:21.399 conceived and executed. So I would recommend that anybody's interested 1416 01:32:21.920 --> 01:32:23.079 want to look into that case. 1417 01:32:24.199 --> 01:32:27.520 Yeah, I mean, you know you you like you mentioned 1418 01:32:27.680 --> 01:32:31.560 the h the China Initiative and it being shut down 1419 01:32:31.560 --> 01:32:33.840 by the DOJ and a lot of a lot of 1420 01:32:33.840 --> 01:32:37.359 the reason was because it looked bad, right, it looked 1421 01:32:37.439 --> 01:32:44.560 bad targeting Chinese, you know, Americans or Chinese naturalized you know, Chinese, 1422 01:32:44.680 --> 01:32:48.720 you know American, you know, and it's it's kind of like, well, 1423 01:32:48.720 --> 01:32:49.920 it's hard not to look bad. 1424 01:32:50.600 --> 01:32:54.640 Sure, yeah, it doesn't make counterintelligence sense. I remember going 1425 01:32:54.680 --> 01:32:58.159 out and briefing some of our high tech partners for 1426 01:32:58.279 --> 01:33:04.760 the CIA Corporate America invaluable contributions to the intelligence community, 1427 01:33:04.840 --> 01:33:07.560 and I was briefing him on the Chinese counter intelligence threat. 1428 01:33:08.159 --> 01:33:11.680 And I looked at this one company and the hundreds 1429 01:33:11.720 --> 01:33:15.399 of ethnic Chinese engineers that they had, and I'm going 1430 01:33:15.439 --> 01:33:19.920 to ask a very politically incorrect question, what do you 1431 01:33:19.960 --> 01:33:23.520 do to monitor those ethnic Chinese? Because you know they're 1432 01:33:23.520 --> 01:33:27.680 being targeted? And this chief of security out there, a 1433 01:33:27.720 --> 01:33:31.439 friend of mine, former counter intelligence officer, said, jem, I 1434 01:33:31.479 --> 01:33:34.680 know exactly what you're saying, but what would you have us? 1435 01:33:34.800 --> 01:33:39.159 Do we need engineers and we go to the best 1436 01:33:39.239 --> 01:33:43.960 American universities looking for engineers, what do we find? We 1437 01:33:44.039 --> 01:33:48.359 find ethnic Chinese? So there's no choice. And I said 1438 01:33:48.399 --> 01:33:51.720 to him, well, all right, how many of the ethnic 1439 01:33:51.800 --> 01:33:57.840 Chinese working at your company who have access to our programs, 1440 01:33:58.119 --> 01:34:02.479 clearances to our sense the programs CIA programs or other 1441 01:34:02.560 --> 01:34:08.039 d D programs were born in the mainland, he said 1442 01:34:08.079 --> 01:34:13.159 about half. So I said, you know, what are we 1443 01:34:13.199 --> 01:34:17.119 going to do? That is a counter intelligence nightmare, But 1444 01:34:17.279 --> 01:34:20.119 he said, we are very limited and what we can 1445 01:34:20.159 --> 01:34:25.760 do because it would be dismissed as racial profiling. Now, 1446 01:34:25.800 --> 01:34:30.079 don't get me started in Wine and win Oe actually 1447 01:34:30.079 --> 01:34:33.920 graduated from Texas A and M. And he's never reconvicted 1448 01:34:33.960 --> 01:34:38.640 of anything. So I'm not saying anything. But when win 1449 01:34:38.720 --> 01:34:44.920 Hoe was subjects of prosecution, as soon as he raised 1450 01:34:44.920 --> 01:34:49.159 the racial profiling card, he was home free. Right, he 1451 01:34:49.319 --> 01:34:52.800 was free and he was never prosecuted. He actually sued 1452 01:34:52.800 --> 01:34:56.000 the United States government for racial profiling. Right. 1453 01:34:57.319 --> 01:35:02.760 It's uh yeah, it's it's scary. It's frustrating because it's 1454 01:35:02.760 --> 01:35:04.439 almost like, what's the point because we're not going to 1455 01:35:04.520 --> 01:35:06.319 do anything about it. I mean, and I know that 1456 01:35:06.359 --> 01:35:10.000 our our CIA counter intelligence people are FBI counter intelligent. 1457 01:35:10.279 --> 01:35:12.199 I know they are working as hard as they can. 1458 01:35:12.319 --> 01:35:16.119 They they must be completely frustrated. 1459 01:35:15.640 --> 01:35:16.079 In these suits. 1460 01:35:16.199 --> 01:35:18.279 It's the same thing on the on the cyber warfare 1461 01:35:18.439 --> 01:35:22.960 or cyber intelligence even aspect of it, that the Chinese 1462 01:35:22.960 --> 01:35:27.000 have consistently penetrated our systems they've hacked our systems, and 1463 01:35:27.079 --> 01:35:30.920 through through experience they have shown they have tested us, 1464 01:35:31.000 --> 01:35:33.560 and we have demonstrated back to them that we won't 1465 01:35:33.560 --> 01:35:35.520 do a damn thing in retaliation. 1466 01:35:36.039 --> 01:35:38.079 So they can just take they can steal. 1467 01:35:37.880 --> 01:35:39.600 All of our data, they can hack into all of 1468 01:35:39.600 --> 01:35:41.680 our systems, and we won't do shit about it. 1469 01:35:42.159 --> 01:35:46.079 Sure, yeah, that's true. It's so very one sided. You know, 1470 01:35:46.119 --> 01:35:49.720 they've got a large intelligence presence in the United States, 1471 01:35:50.439 --> 01:35:53.800 with the United Nations, with the embassy, with the consulates. 1472 01:35:54.359 --> 01:35:57.000 We are very limited in the number of people that 1473 01:35:57.119 --> 01:35:59.960 we CIA can get into China, and even when they 1474 01:36:00.119 --> 01:36:02.800 get there. If you think it was hard to operate 1475 01:36:02.960 --> 01:36:06.079 in Moscow during the Cold War when I was there, 1476 01:36:06.439 --> 01:36:09.880 with the suffocating surveillance, we were all under think about 1477 01:36:10.000 --> 01:36:13.119 how it would be to operate in downtown Beijing today, 1478 01:36:13.720 --> 01:36:17.119 or any city in China with the unlimited resources they 1479 01:36:17.159 --> 01:36:21.600 throw against us, with cameras everywhere, with sensors, with drones, 1480 01:36:21.960 --> 01:36:27.159 with observation posts. It's a counter intelligence challenge unlike anything 1481 01:36:27.159 --> 01:36:30.359 we faced before. Now that doesn't mean we can't do it, 1482 01:36:30.960 --> 01:36:34.399 and I would hope and believe that we are doing it, 1483 01:36:34.840 --> 01:36:38.920 but it's never been harder. So they make it make 1484 01:36:39.000 --> 01:36:42.720 life very difficult for us to operate back there, whereas 1485 01:36:42.720 --> 01:36:47.560 in the United States they have pretty much carte blanche. 1486 01:36:48.720 --> 01:36:51.920 The FBI, as good as they are, as committed as 1487 01:36:51.920 --> 01:36:55.760 they are, as professional as they are, honestly are overwhelmed 1488 01:36:56.800 --> 01:36:59.600 by the number of Chinese cases that are coming away. 1489 01:37:00.159 --> 01:37:04.520 Array had been very outspoken and pointing that out that 1490 01:37:04.640 --> 01:37:08.000 the Chinese are killing us, that they are the number 1491 01:37:08.039 --> 01:37:08.479 one threat. 1492 01:37:08.800 --> 01:37:13.880 Yeah, Jim, real quick to kind of get back to 1493 01:37:13.960 --> 01:37:15.640 the book a little bit, because I want to give 1494 01:37:15.680 --> 01:37:20.520 people a little insight into into the delicious treat that 1495 01:37:20.560 --> 01:37:22.960 they will be getting when they do order this book 1496 01:37:23.119 --> 01:37:30.479 and read it. You have the Ten Commandments of counter Intelligence. Yes, 1497 01:37:32.359 --> 01:37:35.159 and and what I really like about that is because 1498 01:37:35.199 --> 01:37:38.199 you state what it is, you give a description of it, 1499 01:37:38.680 --> 01:37:43.319 and then and then you uh sort of show how 1500 01:37:43.359 --> 01:37:46.680 that how that plays out. Can you let me get 1501 01:37:46.680 --> 01:37:47.000 to it real? 1502 01:37:47.000 --> 01:37:51.760 Okay? Can you tell us what they are? So Commandment 1503 01:37:51.800 --> 01:37:54.399 number one, uh be offensive? 1504 01:37:55.079 --> 01:37:59.800 Yes? Yeah. The Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence the result of 1505 01:38:00.279 --> 01:38:03.880 my years of experience and counter intelligence, and I learned 1506 01:38:03.920 --> 01:38:06.720 some things I think that I wanted to share with 1507 01:38:07.479 --> 01:38:12.399 other counter intelligence professionals, maybe even future counter intelligence professionals 1508 01:38:13.000 --> 01:38:14.920 ways that I think we can do our job better. 1509 01:38:16.159 --> 01:38:18.600 And the first commandment may be the most important that 1510 01:38:18.680 --> 01:38:22.840 I refer to it already, That is, be offensive. US 1511 01:38:22.880 --> 01:38:27.119 counter intelligence is too passive. It's too defensive. You know, 1512 01:38:27.159 --> 01:38:31.199 we're sitting back, we're hunkering down, We're looking for things 1513 01:38:31.239 --> 01:38:33.239 to come our way. We've got to do a better 1514 01:38:33.319 --> 01:38:35.960 job than that. We've got to take the action to them. 1515 01:38:36.319 --> 01:38:38.960 We got to hit in a hard and we're going 1516 01:38:39.000 --> 01:38:42.720 to do that, I believe through a better effort of 1517 01:38:43.119 --> 01:38:48.439 recruiting their intelligence officers and also by sending double agents 1518 01:38:48.520 --> 01:38:51.560 their way. So that's the two prongs that I was 1519 01:38:51.640 --> 01:38:55.800 referring to, penetrations and double agent operations. If we do 1520 01:38:55.840 --> 01:38:59.399 a better job of offensive counter intelligence against the Chinese, 1521 01:38:59.439 --> 01:39:01.600 we can tell the scale back in our favor. 1522 01:39:03.439 --> 01:39:06.399 Commandment two, Honor your professionals. 1523 01:39:06.960 --> 01:39:10.479 Honor our professionals is very important. We talked about this also. 1524 01:39:12.000 --> 01:39:16.000 We count intelligence professionals have not been respected. We've not 1525 01:39:16.119 --> 01:39:21.520 been treated as the full professional colleagues that we should be. 1526 01:39:22.840 --> 01:39:28.720 We're inconvenient, were unpopular. You know, I refer to counter 1527 01:39:28.760 --> 01:39:33.159 intelligence professionals as the skunk at the garden party. When 1528 01:39:33.199 --> 01:39:37.239 we show up. It's not pleasant. We don't bring good news. 1529 01:39:37.640 --> 01:39:40.680 There's our job is to point out which the threats 1530 01:39:40.680 --> 01:39:44.199 are and how you're vulnerable and how your operations may 1531 01:39:44.199 --> 01:39:48.359 be flawed. They don't want to hear that. We've got 1532 01:39:48.399 --> 01:39:51.359 to treat our counter intelligence people better. We've got to 1533 01:39:51.399 --> 01:39:57.399 recruit them from the top ranks of the different agencies. 1534 01:39:57.720 --> 01:40:00.640 We've got to promote them. We've got to recognize them. 1535 01:40:00.680 --> 01:40:04.159 We've got to give them awards. We've got to appreciate 1536 01:40:04.159 --> 01:40:10.880 what they do. They basically are underappreciated professional category and 1537 01:40:10.920 --> 01:40:11.840 that needs to change. 1538 01:40:11.960 --> 01:40:12.880 This is an adult show. 1539 01:40:12.920 --> 01:40:17.720 You can say that they get shot upon, like yeah, 1540 01:40:17.800 --> 01:40:20.399 and you know, I mean honestly, reading this and I'll 1541 01:40:20.399 --> 01:40:24.560 tell you, like, reading this made me realize, like I've 1542 01:40:24.680 --> 01:40:28.279 never not, you know, not respected somebody because they're in 1543 01:40:28.359 --> 01:40:31.560 counter intelligence. But this book gave me a true appreciation 1544 01:40:32.159 --> 01:40:35.239 for what that is. Because I can see where people 1545 01:40:35.359 --> 01:40:37.680 might accuse you of being chicken little. But but the 1546 01:40:37.680 --> 01:40:41.159 thing is is that all the cases in here had 1547 01:40:41.199 --> 01:40:43.520 indicators that were ignored. 1548 01:40:44.319 --> 01:40:48.720 Sure, yeah, and you need good counterintelligence professionals to be 1549 01:40:48.800 --> 01:40:52.680 on the job and to pick up on those indicators. 1550 01:40:53.159 --> 01:40:57.920 And quite too often these cases, these indicators have been missed. Yeah, 1551 01:40:57.920 --> 01:41:01.000 when you go back, Dave and Jack and look at 1552 01:41:01.039 --> 01:41:04.520 all the cases that we know about, all the Americans 1553 01:41:04.560 --> 01:41:08.439 will be traders when you do the damage says, and 1554 01:41:08.479 --> 01:41:11.840 you go back and talk to people. In every case 1555 01:41:11.880 --> 01:41:15.680 I can think of, people saw something, they saw anomalies, 1556 01:41:16.479 --> 01:41:20.239 they saw things that were questionable in the behavior, the attitude, changes, 1557 01:41:20.840 --> 01:41:25.239 the lifestyles, the finances of these people, but they didn't 1558 01:41:25.239 --> 01:41:29.199 speak up or those signs were missed because the worn't 1559 01:41:29.199 --> 01:41:33.880 counter intelligence security people there to see what was going on. So, yeah, 1560 01:41:33.920 --> 01:41:35.720 we need to do a much better job with that. 1561 01:41:35.720 --> 01:41:37.760 That's been a recurring problem. 1562 01:41:38.000 --> 01:41:40.920 I actually And one of the things that you're that 1563 01:41:40.960 --> 01:41:43.439 you're you know, like you're reflective, ab out and forthright 1564 01:41:43.439 --> 01:41:46.399 in this book is that you said even I'm guilty 1565 01:41:46.439 --> 01:41:49.920 of that because you happen to be friends with a 1566 01:41:49.960 --> 01:41:51.279 relatively famous person. 1567 01:41:52.399 --> 01:41:55.600 Uh, mister Ames, right. 1568 01:41:57.119 --> 01:42:07.600 Yeah. Yeah, that's a ainful topic because I didn't live 1569 01:42:07.680 --> 01:42:12.239 up to my responsibility sufficiently, and I will take full 1570 01:42:12.239 --> 01:42:16.439 blame for that. I've known Rick since nineteen seventy six. 1571 01:42:18.279 --> 01:42:23.359 I knew he was a substandard performer. I knew he 1572 01:42:23.399 --> 01:42:31.119 was abusing alcohol. I should have gone to security. Early on, 1573 01:42:32.079 --> 01:42:35.319 I said, listen, there may not be anything to it, 1574 01:42:36.279 --> 01:42:39.439 but I've got concerns about the suitability of this officer. 1575 01:42:41.760 --> 01:42:44.880 But I didn't do it, and you know I didn't 1576 01:42:44.920 --> 01:42:49.560 do it because it was countercultural for us to rent 1577 01:42:49.600 --> 01:42:52.840 out a colleague. And you'll see that in any close 1578 01:42:52.920 --> 01:42:58.079 knit group. You both saw it in your careers. You 1579 01:42:58.319 --> 01:43:01.800 don't want to make life difficult for a colleague and 1580 01:43:01.840 --> 01:43:07.159 friend that are one of us. You just don't call 1581 01:43:07.199 --> 01:43:11.239 him out on it, and that's a mistake. We've got 1582 01:43:11.279 --> 01:43:15.720 to change that culture. We got to make it acceptable 1583 01:43:15.840 --> 01:43:20.119 to go forward when we see something. But it's a 1584 01:43:20.239 --> 01:43:25.439 tough nut to crack because we are close knit. We 1585 01:43:25.479 --> 01:43:30.079 are bonded as colleagues when you share a mission, when 1586 01:43:30.119 --> 01:43:33.800 you share some risk in your careers, and you both 1587 01:43:33.920 --> 01:43:36.199 know as well as I do what I'm talking about. 1588 01:43:37.520 --> 01:43:42.319 You have a special closeness that you feel with these 1589 01:43:42.479 --> 01:43:47.039 people who worked and risk their lives beside you. You're 1590 01:43:47.079 --> 01:43:48.960 not going to go forward when you see something wrong. 1591 01:43:50.239 --> 01:43:51.239 It's just a fact. 1592 01:43:51.800 --> 01:43:55.880 I think we also have a tendency to make excuses 1593 01:43:56.039 --> 01:43:58.840 for people that we are close to. We don't see 1594 01:43:58.840 --> 01:44:01.359 it in the same life that we would if it 1595 01:44:01.359 --> 01:44:02.239 were somebody who. 1596 01:44:02.600 --> 01:44:04.479 He has a drinking problem. But he's a good dude. 1597 01:44:04.560 --> 01:44:05.279 He's a good dude. 1598 01:44:05.319 --> 01:44:08.119 Yeah, I mean, and we I mean we do this 1599 01:44:08.159 --> 01:44:10.199 with family, We do this for friends, We do it 1600 01:44:10.439 --> 01:44:13.279 with people that work close to It's a natural human 1601 01:44:13.359 --> 01:44:15.079 tendency to make excuses for them. 1602 01:44:15.520 --> 01:44:18.640 It's so easy to do, isn't it to rationalize those 1603 01:44:18.640 --> 01:44:21.359 concerns away. And also you can tell yourself, you know, 1604 01:44:21.439 --> 01:44:25.840 it's not my job. It's not my job to react 1605 01:44:25.880 --> 01:44:29.439 to these telltale signs that they see. Well, it is 1606 01:44:29.479 --> 01:44:33.319 your job. I think anybody who has classified access United 1607 01:44:33.319 --> 01:44:36.960 States government has the responsibility to come forward when you 1608 01:44:37.039 --> 01:44:42.239 see something. But that's a work in progress. D i 1609 01:44:42.359 --> 01:44:46.520 A I think leads the pack. They have training programs 1610 01:44:46.520 --> 01:44:51.359 for their people where they acquaint them to how to 1611 01:44:51.760 --> 01:44:54.800 report something when they see it, and it's paid off. 1612 01:44:55.920 --> 01:44:58.319 You can even do it anonymously if you want. We 1613 01:44:58.359 --> 01:45:02.760 can protect your anonymity. But people have gone to the 1614 01:45:02.880 --> 01:45:07.960 security and counter intelligence people of DIDA and they have 1615 01:45:08.920 --> 01:45:13.319 enabled them to start investigations. Anna Montes is a perfect 1616 01:45:13.359 --> 01:45:19.199 case in point. It was an alert coworker who said, 1617 01:45:19.399 --> 01:45:25.319 you know, something just doesn't smell right. About Anna, and 1618 01:45:25.359 --> 01:45:28.079 I'm going to go to the counter intelligence people. I 1619 01:45:28.279 --> 01:45:32.399 just make my instinctive reaction to her known to them 1620 01:45:33.279 --> 01:45:37.079 and put it in the hands of the professionals. Let 1621 01:45:37.119 --> 01:45:40.000 them move forward, and they can do it discreetly. They 1622 01:45:40.000 --> 01:45:44.920 can protect her long term professional equities if she's innocent. 1623 01:45:46.279 --> 01:45:49.960 But she wasn't. She inspired for the Cubans for years, 1624 01:45:50.960 --> 01:45:54.399 and that goodness that person came forward, because Anna Montes 1625 01:45:54.600 --> 01:45:57.199 would probably be retiring about now with all kinds of 1626 01:45:57.199 --> 01:46:00.359 medals and awards and have been working for the China 1627 01:46:00.439 --> 01:46:04.079 for the Cubans all those years, not having been caught. 1628 01:46:04.439 --> 01:46:07.239 And and it's not as if her coworker was she 1629 01:46:07.399 --> 01:46:12.439 was Montana. She was not shy about her anti American 1630 01:46:12.479 --> 01:46:15.279 pro Cuban views, which she was. 1631 01:46:15.560 --> 01:46:19.880 She was blatant about it. Uh, And people knew it, 1632 01:46:22.439 --> 01:46:26.920 but nobody really went to the right people express those concerns. 1633 01:46:27.399 --> 01:46:31.199 And then again, uh, you know, we are people that 1634 01:46:31.920 --> 01:46:34.760 have freedom of speech. You just work for the government. 1635 01:46:35.159 --> 01:46:37.319 You can have a difference of opinion with our government 1636 01:46:37.760 --> 01:46:41.279 in a given country. H And so she was not 1637 01:46:41.399 --> 01:46:45.720 alone in expressing some sympathy for the Cuban revolution and 1638 01:46:45.760 --> 01:46:47.920 the Cuban people. There were a lot of people in 1639 01:46:47.960 --> 01:46:51.720 our own government were soft on Cuban right that in 1640 01:46:51.760 --> 01:46:56.920 itself would not have been disqualifying or grounds for dismissal, 1641 01:46:57.640 --> 01:47:02.680 but it should have problems. Did a closer look. Thank goodness, 1642 01:47:02.720 --> 01:47:03.439 that's what happened. 1643 01:47:04.439 --> 01:47:07.359 We have a few viewer questions I'd love to get into, 1644 01:47:07.479 --> 01:47:10.159 but before that, there's something I really I got to 1645 01:47:10.199 --> 01:47:12.479 ask you since we have you here, is about this 1646 01:47:12.600 --> 01:47:15.399 theory out there about the so called fourth man, that 1647 01:47:15.479 --> 01:47:18.079 there were these three traders Edward. 1648 01:47:17.920 --> 01:47:20.960 Lee, Howard, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hansen at FBI. 1649 01:47:21.479 --> 01:47:23.640 There's this theory out there that there was a fourth 1650 01:47:24.119 --> 01:47:28.359 unidentified mole at CIA. And you are that you are 1651 01:47:28.479 --> 01:47:31.039 the subject matter expert, so I would really love to 1652 01:47:31.079 --> 01:47:34.920 hear your thoughts. You got Robert Bears Bob Bear's book there. 1653 01:47:35.520 --> 01:47:38.159 Yeah, Bob Bear's book is on my desk, and I 1654 01:47:38.279 --> 01:47:41.479 talked to Bob Bear a lot about this. I mentioned 1655 01:47:41.520 --> 01:47:45.479 in the book a couple of times. I'm a believer, 1656 01:47:47.840 --> 01:47:51.159 a believer I have come to believe that there is 1657 01:47:51.199 --> 01:47:54.560 a fourth man who has not been on coverage yet. 1658 01:47:55.520 --> 01:48:02.760 And Bob Bear points his finger pretty squarely ut at 1659 01:48:02.800 --> 01:48:10.319 a suspect. So yeah, I'm glad Bob wrote that book. Yeah, 1660 01:48:11.520 --> 01:48:15.039 it took a lot of research on his part. You 1661 01:48:15.119 --> 01:48:19.239 probably know Bob. He comes from similar backgrounds to two 1662 01:48:19.279 --> 01:48:27.359 of you. He is a bulldog. He is tough, ruthless. 1663 01:48:27.760 --> 01:48:29.680 When he's got a hold of something, he's not gonna 1664 01:48:29.720 --> 01:48:33.119 let it go. And way back, a long time ago, 1665 01:48:33.680 --> 01:48:38.279 they talked to me about his Fourth Man theory and 1666 01:48:38.319 --> 01:48:45.119 I listened respectfully, patiently. Milk Bearden in his book The 1667 01:48:45.199 --> 01:48:50.520 Main Enemy also raised the prospect of the Fourth Man. 1668 01:48:50.960 --> 01:48:55.359 In other words, if you look at Ames, if you 1669 01:48:55.520 --> 01:48:59.000 look at Edward E. Howard, if you look at Jim Nicholson, 1670 01:48:59.720 --> 01:49:03.199 all who will be traders from within the CIA. There 1671 01:49:03.239 --> 01:49:08.560 are things that we lost, assets that we lost. They 1672 01:49:08.560 --> 01:49:13.600 cannot be attributed to any of them. So who did it? 1673 01:49:15.279 --> 01:49:19.479 And I believe it was the fourth Man. I would 1674 01:49:19.520 --> 01:49:23.680 like nothing better see the fourth Man brought to justice. 1675 01:49:24.520 --> 01:49:27.880 There's no statute of limitations in my mind for someone 1676 01:49:27.920 --> 01:49:29.000 who portrays our country. 1677 01:49:29.439 --> 01:49:33.520 Yeah, and we will have Milt on this summer. We'll 1678 01:49:33.560 --> 01:49:35.960 be able to discuss that with him a little bit. O. 1679 01:49:36.319 --> 01:49:42.600 Mel Beard. Oh, he's terrific. Yeah, he'll be a great interview. Yeah, 1680 01:49:42.640 --> 01:49:46.560 and he Milt Knife talked about Bear's book and about 1681 01:49:46.560 --> 01:49:51.560 the fourth Man theory, and he's a He's a very 1682 01:49:51.560 --> 01:49:57.359 interesting person and very knowledgeable and a great interviews. He's 1683 01:49:57.479 --> 01:50:01.239 very very colorful and outspoken. I think the world of 1684 01:50:01.279 --> 01:50:04.199 Milk a real pro We work very closely together. 1685 01:50:04.560 --> 01:50:07.960 I'm going to get through some some of our viewers 1686 01:50:08.000 --> 01:50:08.680 have questions. 1687 01:50:08.720 --> 01:50:09.840 I'll try to get through here. 1688 01:50:11.000 --> 01:50:13.960 Kjam asks while serving in the Soviet Union, was the 1689 01:50:14.000 --> 01:50:17.680 CIA primarily focused on developing assets or were they also 1690 01:50:17.800 --> 01:50:23.000 monitoring audiologues or opportunists and positions of authority, perhaps like 1691 01:50:23.079 --> 01:50:24.039 Putin as well. 1692 01:50:26.199 --> 01:50:30.359 Now, the reality of our presence in Moscow was that 1693 01:50:30.399 --> 01:50:36.079 we could not do active recruitment operations there. We were 1694 01:50:36.119 --> 01:50:40.520 so covered by the KGB that we could not have 1695 01:50:40.600 --> 01:50:46.760 any meaningful contact, even assessment contact with targets there. We 1696 01:50:46.760 --> 01:50:50.479 were dependent on the people who were recruited outside Russia, 1697 01:50:51.279 --> 01:50:56.000 Russian intelligence officers, Russian diplomats, other Russian so we could 1698 01:50:56.039 --> 01:50:59.960 get our hands on outside the country well we had access, 1699 01:51:00.520 --> 01:51:04.640 and then prepare them, train them to send them back 1700 01:51:04.680 --> 01:51:08.840 to Moscow. So our job was not to do the 1701 01:51:08.880 --> 01:51:12.800 classic recruitment cycle, we couldn't really do that in Moscow, 1702 01:51:13.560 --> 01:51:18.439 but to handle the recruited sources, including people who have 1703 01:51:18.479 --> 01:51:23.079 been recruited outside. Now, that is not one hundred percent accurate, 1704 01:51:23.159 --> 01:51:27.439 because there were some people who were able to make 1705 01:51:27.479 --> 01:51:32.920 contact with us inside Russia, inside Moscow, and that we 1706 01:51:32.920 --> 01:51:37.880 were then able to recruit and handle without that external component. 1707 01:51:39.960 --> 01:51:43.800 One real good example of that is Adolf Tokunchhov, a 1708 01:51:43.880 --> 01:51:47.560 billion dollar spy. We didn't recruit him outside the country. 1709 01:51:48.399 --> 01:51:53.199 It came to us in Moscow volunteered in services. But 1710 01:51:53.239 --> 01:51:57.920 that's really more of an exception than the rule. Shame off, 1711 01:51:58.279 --> 01:52:02.079 shame off. Who I worked witherly was someone who also 1712 01:52:02.279 --> 01:52:07.960 who was not technically to recruited outside Russia, although he 1713 01:52:08.039 --> 01:52:12.239 did approach one of our people in another Eastern European country, 1714 01:52:12.920 --> 01:52:16.920 but he was basically an internal volunteer. 1715 01:52:17.039 --> 01:52:19.640 You know, And I don't think like sometimes it's hard 1716 01:52:19.680 --> 01:52:22.479 to have an appreciation for what the what's going on 1717 01:52:22.560 --> 01:52:24.319 with these people when they do approach you, because if 1718 01:52:24.359 --> 01:52:28.359 an American gets caught, they'll get arrested. In a lot 1719 01:52:28.359 --> 01:52:30.760 of these countries, they get caught, they're going to get executed. 1720 01:52:31.319 --> 01:52:35.039 Yes, yeah, the penalty for espionage in Russia is almost 1721 01:52:35.119 --> 01:52:45.279 always execution. Ames killed many many Russians yeah, I betrayed 1722 01:52:45.279 --> 01:52:48.399 their identity. I don't know how I can live with himself, 1723 01:52:49.279 --> 01:52:52.560 you know, not only betrayed our country. He's a murderer. 1724 01:52:53.039 --> 01:52:55.600 I feel the same way about Edward le Howard to 1725 01:52:55.640 --> 01:53:01.399 a lesser extent. Yeah, that's true. There's a disparity and 1726 01:53:01.439 --> 01:53:06.119 the risks that we face. Those people are risking their lives. 1727 01:53:06.880 --> 01:53:10.920 And let me tell you what were so heartening for 1728 01:53:10.960 --> 01:53:15.079 me as a CI officer operating in Moscow handling some 1729 01:53:15.119 --> 01:53:20.159 of these people. So many of them came our way 1730 01:53:21.479 --> 01:53:28.880 for physiological reasons. They were people who saw how the 1731 01:53:28.960 --> 01:53:34.000 Russian system, the Soviet regime was oppressing their own people, 1732 01:53:35.520 --> 01:53:41.479 was denying their own people basic rights, strangling their economy, 1733 01:53:42.840 --> 01:53:46.359 and they wanted to strike back against that, and they 1734 01:53:46.399 --> 01:53:49.079 courageously decided that one way that they could do that, 1735 01:53:49.920 --> 01:53:53.279 but by secretly working with the CIA. I have tremendous 1736 01:53:53.319 --> 01:53:56.520 respect for those people. Some of the people I handled 1737 01:53:57.840 --> 01:54:02.399 categorically refused to accept any money from US because that 1738 01:54:02.520 --> 01:54:07.439 would team the purity of their motivation. They were doing 1739 01:54:07.479 --> 01:54:11.960 what they were doing because they loved Russia. They wanted 1740 01:54:11.960 --> 01:54:16.640 to see Russia return to a democratic process. They wanted 1741 01:54:16.640 --> 01:54:21.359 the Russian people to be liberated from that terrible communist 1742 01:54:21.359 --> 01:54:26.319 system that they were living under. Those people I respected tremendously, 1743 01:54:27.079 --> 01:54:33.000 and to lose them was particularly painful because they were 1744 01:54:33.000 --> 01:54:37.680 doing what they were doing for a very, very noble reason. 1745 01:54:38.560 --> 01:54:40.600 I won't reject Russians who come to us because they 1746 01:54:40.600 --> 01:54:44.479 want the money. If they give us the intelligence, they 1747 01:54:44.520 --> 01:54:47.800 earn it, and I'm happy to pay it to them. 1748 01:54:48.199 --> 01:54:50.239 In fact, if you have a Russian who is venal, 1749 01:54:51.720 --> 01:54:55.199 who wants to do espionage on our behalf for money, 1750 01:54:55.439 --> 01:54:59.079 those are the easiest recruitment you ever make, because if 1751 01:54:59.079 --> 01:55:01.479 you can buy them, it's just question negotiating the price. 1752 01:55:02.479 --> 01:55:08.920 So those are easy. Those all aren't always nice people, right, 1753 01:55:09.319 --> 01:55:14.039 They're quite often fairly sleazy people. You deal with some 1754 01:55:14.079 --> 01:55:16.039 people in this business that you would not want to 1755 01:55:16.039 --> 01:55:20.720 befriend under any other circumstances. But we owe them respect 1756 01:55:21.039 --> 01:55:24.560 because they're helping our country, right and even if their 1757 01:55:24.600 --> 01:55:29.720 motive is impure in our eyes, we're still going to 1758 01:55:29.760 --> 01:55:33.880 protect it. We're still going to appreciate what they do 1759 01:55:33.960 --> 01:55:34.319 for us. 1760 01:55:35.119 --> 01:55:38.399 Brad asks is. I think we've talked about this a bit. 1761 01:55:38.840 --> 01:55:41.319 Is China the new Russia Cuba in terms of how 1762 01:55:41.319 --> 01:55:43.279 hard it is to collect human intelligence. 1763 01:55:44.000 --> 01:55:50.600 Absolutely, Yeah, squared multiplied many times over. 1764 01:55:51.439 --> 01:55:52.720 K jam asks. 1765 01:55:53.279 --> 01:55:56.239 I remember watching former CIA agents in the eighties on 1766 01:55:56.319 --> 01:56:00.199 Phil Donahues speaking out against covert ops, and I believe 1767 01:56:00.159 --> 01:56:04.239 if there were eventual changes at the CIA, was that 1768 01:56:04.279 --> 01:56:08.800 important or still controversial. Maybe maybe he's referring to Iran Contra, 1769 01:56:08.880 --> 01:56:12.920 but I'm not sure what you think, Jim. 1770 01:56:13.359 --> 01:56:17.920 Yeah, we had, particularly in the eighties, turncoats, some people 1771 01:56:17.960 --> 01:56:22.279 from inside who went rogue, who didntnounced what we were doing. 1772 01:56:23.359 --> 01:56:28.159 Philip Aigy is a good example of that. I regret 1773 01:56:28.199 --> 01:56:33.720 that they reacted to some of the legitimate abuses that 1774 01:56:33.840 --> 01:56:39.640 we've been involved in Iran Contra. A he needed a 1775 01:56:39.680 --> 01:56:44.479 lot of people, some of our patronage of right wing dictators. 1776 01:56:46.000 --> 01:56:50.319 Some of the things that we did that raised ethical 1777 01:56:50.359 --> 01:56:52.920 issues that I point out in my first book, fair 1778 01:56:53.039 --> 01:56:56.840 Play Turned. Some people against us couldn't accept what we 1779 01:56:56.840 --> 01:57:01.279 were doing, but they had no right to speak up, 1780 01:57:01.960 --> 01:57:05.680 to betray secrets, to reveal our operations. So I have 1781 01:57:05.800 --> 01:57:09.199 contempt for those people. I hate makers of any kind 1782 01:57:09.680 --> 01:57:13.039 because there are channels where they can express their descent, 1783 01:57:13.560 --> 01:57:16.840 but they cannot take it upon themselves to betray our 1784 01:57:16.880 --> 01:57:22.800 personnel and our operations. AG betrayed every CI case officer 1785 01:57:22.800 --> 01:57:29.600 he knew about, ruining careers, putting him in danger. There's 1786 01:57:29.640 --> 01:57:34.600 no excuse for that. Jim Nicholson did the same thing. 1787 01:57:33.840 --> 01:57:37.439 He was on the faculty down at the farm, so 1788 01:57:37.479 --> 01:57:40.000 he knew the identity of all of our junior case 1789 01:57:40.039 --> 01:57:43.960 officers being trained down there, So he was compromising their 1790 01:57:44.000 --> 01:57:45.920 covers even before they got to the field. 1791 01:57:46.079 --> 01:57:49.640 Right, he compromised like like a year's worth of agents. 1792 01:57:49.720 --> 01:57:54.000 Right, he did. Despicable. Jim Nicholson is one of my 1793 01:57:54.079 --> 01:57:58.239 case studies, but he's beneath contempt in my eyes. 1794 01:57:59.119 --> 01:58:02.399 And then there was also the was it the chief 1795 01:58:02.399 --> 01:58:05.199 of station who was killed in Athens after his identity 1796 01:58:05.279 --> 01:58:07.560 was leaked by Yeah. 1797 01:58:07.399 --> 01:58:12.800 That's the welch. Yeah, after he was outed in AG's book. 1798 01:58:13.680 --> 01:58:16.920 A short time later he was killed by terrorists on 1799 01:58:16.960 --> 01:58:21.439 the streets of Athens. And I put that, I put 1800 01:58:21.479 --> 01:58:29.239 that to the discredit of of of a G. So, yeah, 1801 01:58:29.399 --> 01:58:35.439 it's horrible. Uh. Well, James President Bush was very aware 1802 01:58:35.439 --> 01:58:40.119 of that operation, and when he lectured in my classes 1803 01:58:40.600 --> 01:58:42.680 at the Bush Pool, he always brought that case up, 1804 01:58:43.079 --> 01:58:46.880 and he always teared up because he felt deeply the 1805 01:58:46.960 --> 01:58:49.439 loss of CI officers who fell in the land of 1806 01:58:49.520 --> 01:58:53.079 duty like I was, particularly those who were killed because 1807 01:58:53.119 --> 01:58:56.079 of trader treasures like like like a. 1808 01:58:56.159 --> 01:59:00.319 G uh Mohammad says, I had the pleasure sure of 1809 01:59:00.359 --> 01:59:06.319 meeting mister Olsen at w T A m U absolutely 1810 01:59:06.359 --> 01:59:10.840 life changing. A question if I could reading unrestricted warfare 1811 01:59:10.880 --> 01:59:16.800 by China's intelligence and the not Russian Russian hack, how 1812 01:59:16.800 --> 01:59:20.279 do we develop cybersecurity offensive talent here in America. 1813 01:59:23.079 --> 01:59:25.439 I think we've got the raw material. I mean, so 1814 01:59:25.439 --> 01:59:31.000 many young Americans are very skilled in computers, so I 1815 01:59:31.039 --> 01:59:34.560 think we need to go out and recruit the brightest 1816 01:59:35.079 --> 01:59:37.800 from that crowd that we can. I find young men 1817 01:59:37.840 --> 01:59:41.479 and women who have a particular talent for cyber with 1818 01:59:41.560 --> 01:59:45.880 computer science degrees, who have shown a knack for hacking 1819 01:59:46.399 --> 01:59:51.760 in their own rights, sign them up and subject them 1820 01:59:51.800 --> 01:59:57.560 to a really intense training program. Make them world class hackers. 1821 01:59:58.359 --> 02:00:02.760 You know, I want, I want us to be more 1822 02:00:02.760 --> 02:00:05.399 offensive against the Chinese than they are against us. 1823 02:00:05.560 --> 02:00:05.840 Yeah. 1824 02:00:07.560 --> 02:00:10.000 You know, it's interesting because when you look at like 1825 02:00:10.520 --> 02:00:14.000 these ransomware gangs in Russia like Kanti and Yuk, and 1826 02:00:14.039 --> 02:00:17.279 then you look at the Chinese, Well, the Chinese hackers 1827 02:00:17.279 --> 02:00:20.720 are are are a lot of those persistent threats are 1828 02:00:21.399 --> 02:00:23.680 part of the Chinese government, even though they say they're not. 1829 02:00:24.600 --> 02:00:28.399 But it's almost like America sort of needs to kind 1830 02:00:28.399 --> 02:00:30.600 of let the gloves off and go back to the 1831 02:00:30.600 --> 02:00:34.239 idea of privateers with you know, in the sense of, 1832 02:00:34.840 --> 02:00:37.800 you know, these kids get arrested when they hack, when 1833 02:00:37.840 --> 02:00:38.680 they hack anything. 1834 02:00:39.039 --> 02:00:40.479 It's like, let them. 1835 02:00:40.359 --> 02:00:42.600 Form their own groups and do whatever they want against 1836 02:00:42.640 --> 02:00:44.960 Russian and China as long as it doesn't you know, 1837 02:00:45.319 --> 02:00:48.680 because that's what with these ransomware groups. They're not allowed 1838 02:00:48.680 --> 02:00:51.399 to touch anything in Russia or part of the Russian Federation. 1839 02:00:52.199 --> 02:00:54.359 You know, they're not allowed to do that. But its 1840 02:00:54.399 --> 02:00:58.439 hands off legal wise, as long as they're you know, 1841 02:00:58.560 --> 02:01:01.680 operating against you know, other nations. 1842 02:01:02.199 --> 02:01:05.520 I like that you're thinking like a CI officer, Dave, 1843 02:01:05.600 --> 02:01:07.840 and I hope the right people are listening and it 1844 02:01:07.880 --> 02:01:08.800 can implement. 1845 02:01:08.520 --> 02:01:10.359 Some of that. 1846 02:01:10.359 --> 02:01:12.399 That's a good approach, I mean, a good approach. 1847 02:01:12.600 --> 02:01:14.880 We had privateers before, right, I mean, I wouldn't do 1848 02:01:14.920 --> 02:01:16.439 that and use letters of mark. 1849 02:01:16.600 --> 02:01:24.199 Yeah exactly, Andrew says on a letter note. He's asking you, Jim, 1850 02:01:24.600 --> 02:01:26.680 did he ever get to meet the guy in the 1851 02:01:26.680 --> 02:01:29.720 CIA who decided to put a microphone inside a cat, 1852 02:01:29.800 --> 02:01:31.359 the so called acoustic kitty. 1853 02:01:33.800 --> 02:01:38.119 I was very familiar with that operation. Yeah, I thought 1854 02:01:38.119 --> 02:01:40.560 it was brilliant. I thought it was brilliant for your 1855 02:01:40.880 --> 02:01:44.359 your audience is not familiar with acoustic kitty. We know 1856 02:01:44.720 --> 02:01:50.560 that from surveillance, from observation that this high priority target 1857 02:01:50.600 --> 02:01:55.079 group quite often made in a conference room and we 1858 02:01:55.079 --> 02:01:58.800 could see through the window and we saw that they 1859 02:01:58.880 --> 02:02:01.800 had a pet cat at that quite often was in 1860 02:02:01.840 --> 02:02:06.920 the room when these probably probably sensitive conversations was going on. 1861 02:02:07.800 --> 02:02:14.319 And so the CIA kidnapped the cats, cat napped cap 1862 02:02:16.000 --> 02:02:24.479 and performed ah an operation to insert a listening device 1863 02:02:24.920 --> 02:02:27.760 into the cat underneath the fur so it wouldn't be detected, 1864 02:02:28.520 --> 02:02:34.800 and acoustic kitty, uh sitting in on those meetings could 1865 02:02:35.199 --> 02:02:38.640 broadcast to our listening post outside what was going on. 1866 02:02:40.439 --> 02:02:40.800 I liked. 1867 02:02:40.920 --> 02:02:42.279 I liked the creativity of. 1868 02:02:42.720 --> 02:02:43.640 Did it actually work? 1869 02:02:43.760 --> 02:02:48.560 Jim? I can't comment on that. Bob Gates talks about 1870 02:02:48.600 --> 02:02:53.159 him a lot, and he hints that there was a payoff, 1871 02:02:54.760 --> 02:02:55.199 because I. 1872 02:02:55.119 --> 02:02:57.119 Mean the story I think that, like if you if 1873 02:02:57.119 --> 02:02:59.760 you google this and try to read what's on like Wikipedia, 1874 02:03:00.159 --> 02:03:02.640 the story is like they did a test run and 1875 02:03:02.720 --> 02:03:05.079 the cat immediately just wandered out of the park end 1876 02:03:05.079 --> 02:03:06.319 of the road and was hit by a car, and 1877 02:03:06.359 --> 02:03:08.239 that was kind of like the end of it. 1878 02:03:08.439 --> 02:03:14.239 Yeah, well that's possible, but I can't say that the 1879 02:03:14.319 --> 02:03:18.000 concept of the operation, some of the implication was not apocryph. 1880 02:03:17.840 --> 02:03:21.000 So there is a there is a bit more. 1881 02:03:21.600 --> 02:03:24.199 There's a kernel of truths that maybe more than a colonel. 1882 02:03:23.960 --> 02:03:25.479 A bit, a bit more to the story. 1883 02:03:26.680 --> 02:03:30.479 We missed one of Andrews' questions to what extent might 1884 02:03:30.600 --> 02:03:34.119 have Anglton been grasping after the signs that the Walker 1885 02:03:34.199 --> 02:03:37.680 ring had been at Heck compromised us communications. 1886 02:03:39.880 --> 02:03:44.520 Yeah, well, Walker was doing his dirty when Angleton was 1887 02:03:45.520 --> 02:03:51.079 writing Supreme at the agency. Walker is another great example 1888 02:03:51.199 --> 02:03:53.199 of someone who should have been caught a lot earlier. 1889 02:03:54.279 --> 02:04:04.000 He was very flamboyantly showing off his unexplainable wealth. He 1890 02:04:04.199 --> 02:04:09.880 was recruiting subordinates, recruited his own family is his strange 1891 02:04:09.920 --> 02:04:14.039 wife actually came forward at some point to denounce him, 1892 02:04:14.039 --> 02:04:20.680 but she was dismissed as an alcoholic, embittered spouse x 1893 02:04:20.720 --> 02:04:24.319 spouse not taken seriously. So he got away with it 1894 02:04:24.399 --> 02:04:27.359 for a long longer than you should have. And I'll 1895 02:04:27.359 --> 02:04:30.880 put that I'll put that on Angleton's doorstep. If my 1896 02:04:31.039 --> 02:04:35.560 counter intelligence had been better, I think we might have 1897 02:04:35.600 --> 02:04:39.920 done a better job of detecting Walker a lot earlier. 1898 02:04:40.199 --> 02:04:44.920 Johnny Walker, he did a lot of damage. I was 1899 02:04:44.920 --> 02:04:48.439 in the Navy myself. I'm familiar with the kW seven, 1900 02:04:48.479 --> 02:04:51.199 the kW twenty six, and for him to give them 1901 02:04:51.239 --> 02:04:57.479 the key list for our coding machines was it would 1902 02:04:57.520 --> 02:05:01.960 have been devastating because and only Kalugan makes a point 1903 02:05:01.960 --> 02:05:05.840 of this. Only Kalugan handled Walker, and he said during 1904 02:05:05.880 --> 02:05:09.640 that period, that lengthy period, thanks to Johnny Walker, the 1905 02:05:09.760 --> 02:05:15.840 KGB could decrypt all of the encrypted communications of the 1906 02:05:15.920 --> 02:05:18.680 United States Navy during those years. 1907 02:05:20.119 --> 02:05:25.560 Last question here my peers early twenties. I guess my 1908 02:05:25.640 --> 02:05:29.720 peers in the early twenties are inundated with ideology, critique 1909 02:05:29.760 --> 02:05:34.119 of the Chinese state, with buzzwords like racism or imperialism. 1910 02:05:34.479 --> 02:05:37.319 How do you approach young people about this issue pragmatically? 1911 02:05:39.079 --> 02:05:41.520 Yeah, you know, it's not that hard. Jack. Of course, 1912 02:05:41.520 --> 02:05:44.039 I'm in an a privileged position here because we select 1913 02:05:44.079 --> 02:05:47.880 our students at the Bushel School so carefully. They are 1914 02:05:48.319 --> 02:05:52.920 highly motivated, very patriotic, very idealistic. So that's not a 1915 02:05:52.960 --> 02:05:55.800 good cross section. But there are a lot of young 1916 02:05:55.840 --> 02:05:59.399 people out there who are thinking straight, who don't buy 1917 02:05:59.439 --> 02:06:05.399 any of this idiological indoctrination, who love our country, who 1918 02:06:05.439 --> 02:06:08.840 want to serve our country, and so they should step forward. 1919 02:06:09.199 --> 02:06:12.000 They should not be deterred by any of that, They 1920 02:06:12.000 --> 02:06:15.600 should not allow themselves to be brainwashed, and they should 1921 02:06:15.600 --> 02:06:20.159 find a way to prepare themselves for a very meaningful career. 1922 02:06:20.920 --> 02:06:24.279 And I hope some of those people listening will pursue 1923 02:06:25.000 --> 02:06:30.680 this call to serve our country because it is indescribably 1924 02:06:30.720 --> 02:06:35.680 rewarding to be able to serve our country. You both 1925 02:06:35.720 --> 02:06:39.079 did that in your way. I had the honor of 1926 02:06:39.079 --> 02:06:43.079 doing that myself. You know, it's not all about money, 1927 02:06:43.960 --> 02:06:46.920 it's not all about power, it's not all about prestige 1928 02:06:47.000 --> 02:06:50.279 and status. There are a lot more important things in life, 1929 02:06:50.760 --> 02:06:53.439 and what could be more honorable, more meaningful at the 1930 02:06:53.560 --> 02:06:58.039 end of the day than serving our country. So I 1931 02:06:58.239 --> 02:07:01.119 urge young people to take a really good look at 1932 02:07:01.119 --> 02:07:05.800 the military, at law enforcement, and in my case specifically 1933 02:07:05.920 --> 02:07:09.880 the intelligence community, and find your niche find a way 1934 02:07:09.880 --> 02:07:17.039 to become involved. We're all hiring and you'll never regret it. 1935 02:07:19.279 --> 02:07:22.439 You go on one night feeling good about which you 1936 02:07:22.520 --> 02:07:25.960 did not everybody can say that now. I've got nothing 1937 02:07:26.000 --> 02:07:31.000 against corporate America. Our country needs good corporate executives, our 1938 02:07:31.039 --> 02:07:35.079 economy needs good corporate executives. But for me and for 1939 02:07:35.199 --> 02:07:38.000 most of the students that I deal with, a career 1940 02:07:38.039 --> 02:07:42.159 in corporate America would never be fulfilling. You would not 1941 02:07:42.239 --> 02:07:45.960 be serving something you truly believe it. You're not making 1942 02:07:46.000 --> 02:07:49.600 a difference in an area that you care about. So 1943 02:07:50.079 --> 02:07:52.680 I think all of us who were there now you 1944 02:07:52.760 --> 02:07:59.680 can confirm this in your own careers feel privileged to 1945 02:07:59.720 --> 02:08:01.960 have had the opportunity to serve the way we did. 1946 02:08:02.680 --> 02:08:05.479 I hope there are some young people out there. I 1947 02:08:05.520 --> 02:08:10.319 hope to look at graduate programs or service in the military, 1948 02:08:10.960 --> 02:08:15.079 service in law enforcement, any level. I'll put in a pitch. 1949 02:08:15.600 --> 02:08:18.680 I may for the Bush Bull of Texan and University, 1950 02:08:18.720 --> 02:08:23.039 because we are designed specifically to prepare high quality young 1951 02:08:23.079 --> 02:08:27.520 men and women for meaningful careers in the United States 1952 02:08:27.600 --> 02:08:31.600 intelligence community. We do other things here too, diplomacy, law enforcement, 1953 02:08:31.680 --> 02:08:36.479 international organizations, but our intelligence studies program is something we're 1954 02:08:36.560 --> 02:08:37.119 very proud of. 1955 02:08:39.319 --> 02:08:42.279 I have one final question, and I promise we'll wrap 1956 02:08:42.319 --> 02:08:45.800 things up. Jim Isaac asks has there been any more 1957 02:08:45.880 --> 02:08:49.359 proof of Russian interference of the twenty sixteen election. Is 1958 02:08:49.399 --> 02:08:51.760 there anything that could have been done to prevent it, 1959 02:08:51.920 --> 02:08:53.640 or at least less than the damage. 1960 02:08:55.119 --> 02:08:58.359 Yeah, I don't think that I've ever seen any convincing 1961 02:08:58.399 --> 02:09:03.880 evidence there was particularly meaningful significant I don't think it 1962 02:09:04.000 --> 02:09:07.680 changed any votes. Sure, they were playing around with some 1963 02:09:07.720 --> 02:09:12.000 of those websites, some of that social media, they were 1964 02:09:12.039 --> 02:09:14.479 tinkering with it, but I don't think it had any 1965 02:09:14.520 --> 02:09:19.239 real impact. And I've never seen any real evidence that 1966 02:09:19.319 --> 02:09:24.399 there was this monster plot to steer the election one 1967 02:09:24.399 --> 02:09:26.720 way or the other. I think a lot of that 1968 02:09:26.840 --> 02:09:34.680 was concocted. I think it was something that was totally inappropriate, 1969 02:09:35.640 --> 02:09:40.520 verging on illegal to have fabricated. If it was fabricated, 1970 02:09:41.039 --> 02:09:44.880 some of that some of the most lurid accusations against 1971 02:09:45.199 --> 02:09:49.600 against Russia. I don't put anything past Putin Voted is 1972 02:09:49.640 --> 02:09:52.199 someone I followed since the nineteen eighties. I know what 1973 02:09:52.239 --> 02:09:55.800 he's capable of. He is a vicious man with no 1974 02:09:55.840 --> 02:09:58.560 scruples whatsoever. You just look at what he's doing in 1975 02:09:59.159 --> 02:10:06.279 Ukraine now, unspeakably cruel. But no, I don't think he 1976 02:10:07.000 --> 02:10:12.760 had any kind of a massive role in our elections, certainly, 1977 02:10:12.760 --> 02:10:13.079 hope not. 1978 02:10:14.560 --> 02:10:17.159 Yeah, the Iranians were also trying to influence that. They 1979 02:10:17.159 --> 02:10:18.520 didn't make much headway either. 1980 02:10:18.560 --> 02:10:24.039 Correct. Our system, I think is good. I think it's 1981 02:10:24.079 --> 02:10:29.000 basically secure. We can always tighten it up. We can 1982 02:10:29.039 --> 02:10:32.039 do what we can to prevent any kind of fraud, 1983 02:10:33.640 --> 02:10:38.119 cheating in the elections. That's not American. But I believe 1984 02:10:38.119 --> 02:10:42.199 in our democracy. I believe in our institutions, and I 1985 02:10:42.239 --> 02:10:48.000 think that our elections are basically secure and that we 1986 02:10:48.119 --> 02:10:51.520 do a pretty good job of policing them. We can 1987 02:10:51.560 --> 02:10:56.359 always do better. We have to close some loopholes, perhaps, 1988 02:10:57.039 --> 02:11:03.720 but it's not a massive violation of our democratic principles 1989 02:11:03.880 --> 02:11:06.000 what we've seen here so far. That's my opinion. 1990 02:11:06.720 --> 02:11:08.359 Scott. Also, do we have another. 1991 02:11:11.319 --> 02:11:19.159 Let's see here, Scott, Oh, okay, last one for real 1992 02:11:19.199 --> 02:11:21.800 this time I promised. How did you How did your 1993 02:11:21.880 --> 02:11:26.239 law degree impact your decision making during your CIA career. 1994 02:11:27.079 --> 02:11:33.600 That's a good question. I never really used my legal 1995 02:11:34.399 --> 02:11:38.479 experience on the job. I was not recruited by the 1996 02:11:38.520 --> 02:11:42.760 CI as a lawyer, but in my training class at 1997 02:11:42.760 --> 02:11:45.920 twenty five down at the farm, eight of us had 1998 02:11:45.960 --> 02:11:50.159 law degrees, and that meant that the CI recognized the 1999 02:11:50.319 --> 02:11:54.520 value of the legal training that we received. And I 2000 02:11:54.560 --> 02:11:58.720 did not specifically apply my knowledge of the law, but 2001 02:11:58.840 --> 02:12:01.640 things I learned at laws school, I think we're valuable 2002 02:12:01.640 --> 02:12:06.399 to me. The critical thinking, the ability to sort through 2003 02:12:06.439 --> 02:12:09.760 a lot of data and extract what was relevant, the 2004 02:12:10.560 --> 02:12:15.000 advocacy skills. I think we're things that I could use. 2005 02:12:15.039 --> 02:12:19.159 So I didn't end up practicing law as I had 2006 02:12:19.199 --> 02:12:22.560 originally intended, but I don't regret having gone to law school. 2007 02:12:23.520 --> 02:12:25.920 I'll tell young people today that if you want a 2008 02:12:25.960 --> 02:12:29.359 career in intelligence, law school is not the best path 2009 02:12:29.399 --> 02:12:32.600 to get there because you do a lot of coursework 2010 02:12:32.640 --> 02:12:37.479 that's totally irrelevant. Now there are graduate programs that are 2011 02:12:37.600 --> 02:12:41.520 much more designed to prepare you specifically for a career 2012 02:12:41.800 --> 02:12:45.119 in national security. That's the direction I would go. They 2013 02:12:45.159 --> 02:12:48.199 didn't really exist in my day. But when I went 2014 02:12:48.199 --> 02:12:51.520 to law school, I wasn't thinking national security. I was 2015 02:12:51.560 --> 02:12:56.119 thinking serving my community as a small down lawyer. If 2016 02:12:56.319 --> 02:13:00.239 CI had not come calling, i'd probably be practicing law 2017 02:13:00.239 --> 02:13:02.800 in Clinton. I what today because they were making the 2018 02:13:02.800 --> 02:13:06.159 best offer. They would have been a good life. And 2019 02:13:06.279 --> 02:13:09.520 I was heading to Clinton because they offered me a 2020 02:13:10.039 --> 02:13:13.359 paid membership in the Clinton Country Club. If I went 2021 02:13:13.399 --> 02:13:17.079 to Clinton, a nice little county seat town on the 2022 02:13:17.119 --> 02:13:20.680 Mississippi River. It would have been nice. I could have 2023 02:13:20.680 --> 02:13:26.560 had a good life. I certainly don't would never trade 2024 02:13:26.560 --> 02:13:29.600 places with my law school colleagues who went into the 2025 02:13:29.680 --> 02:13:32.399 practice of law. I'm sure it was fine for them. 2026 02:13:32.560 --> 02:13:39.359 It's very important, but what I did was far, far 2027 02:13:39.399 --> 02:13:42.560 above and beyond what I ever would have dreamed. I'd 2028 02:13:42.560 --> 02:13:46.720 love the CIA, but I will say that is rewarding 2029 02:13:47.119 --> 02:13:50.039 as the CIA career was. I think what I'm doing 2030 02:13:50.079 --> 02:13:54.359 now and working with the next generation of intelligence officers, 2031 02:13:54.720 --> 02:13:58.840 next generation of spycatchers, next generation of FBI special agents, 2032 02:13:59.319 --> 02:14:02.359 is even more of I told Meredith the other day 2033 02:14:02.399 --> 02:14:06.079 and that I think what we are doing here has 2034 02:14:06.159 --> 02:14:10.119 more long term impact for our country that our services 2035 02:14:10.159 --> 02:14:14.239 the CIA. I'm very sincere about that. I can't give 2036 02:14:14.279 --> 02:14:19.520 you any numbers, but no, I agree. I wish school 2037 02:14:19.920 --> 02:14:24.000 Bush School is doing its part and sending young men 2038 02:14:24.039 --> 02:14:25.560 and women in the intelligence community. 2039 02:14:26.319 --> 02:14:27.920 Yeah, I want to. I want to, if you don't mind. 2040 02:14:28.000 --> 02:14:30.079 I know we've kept you really long, but I would 2041 02:14:30.159 --> 02:14:33.000 like to end this interview with one quick story from 2042 02:14:33.079 --> 02:14:35.399 your book, if you would, because you know you paint 2043 02:14:35.439 --> 02:14:38.399 this picture of Angleton and what he did to counterintelligence 2044 02:14:38.439 --> 02:14:40.800 at the time, where he had all these kind of 2045 02:14:41.279 --> 02:14:44.920 weird theories and stuff like that, and that that environment 2046 02:14:45.239 --> 02:14:47.199 was kind of filtering down. Can you tell us about 2047 02:14:47.239 --> 02:14:51.239 the counterintelligence officer that worked in the vault. 2048 02:14:52.720 --> 02:14:59.119 Yeah, yeah, that's a good case because it's illustrave of 2049 02:14:59.560 --> 02:15:01.680 what have happened to people. You know, one of my 2050 02:15:02.560 --> 02:15:07.239 ten comme admascount intelligence. Don't stay too long because if 2051 02:15:07.279 --> 02:15:16.560 you live constantly in that world of illusion, deception, manipulation, conspiracy, 2052 02:15:17.359 --> 02:15:22.760 double thinking, it can play tricks on your mind. That's 2053 02:15:22.800 --> 02:15:27.439 what happened to Angleton in twenty years. He lost touch 2054 02:15:27.600 --> 02:15:32.199 with reality. He went off the deep end. And this 2055 02:15:32.279 --> 02:15:37.399 person that we're talking about was one of what we 2056 02:15:37.479 --> 02:15:43.119 call the fundamentalists. They were the true believers. They were 2057 02:15:43.159 --> 02:15:46.800 the people who surrounded Angleton and who were like minded. 2058 02:15:47.279 --> 02:15:52.760 They'd been infected by the same disease of a conspiracy 2059 02:15:53.560 --> 02:15:58.640 and the double think. And this person I used to 2060 02:15:58.680 --> 02:16:04.359 see him go through this big vault door in the 2061 02:16:04.359 --> 02:16:08.760 morning and look around, make certain odes watching, and then 2062 02:16:08.800 --> 02:16:12.600 spin the dial and then pull this big vault door 2063 02:16:12.640 --> 02:16:19.520 open and disappear inside clank. And I'm thinking to myself, 2064 02:16:20.399 --> 02:16:23.720 what are they doing in there? What's he doing in there? 2065 02:16:25.039 --> 02:16:29.319 How did they even breathe in there? And what I 2066 02:16:29.399 --> 02:16:35.360 know now what he was doing was his life's work. 2067 02:16:36.760 --> 02:16:42.760 He was doing endless research, counter intelligence, probing to prove 2068 02:16:43.600 --> 02:16:48.719 that Angleton was the most that Angleton was the trader, 2069 02:16:49.440 --> 02:16:58.840 which was crazy, totally irresponsible, unwarranted, unjustified. Angleton did a 2070 02:16:58.920 --> 02:17:02.479 lot of damage, said I, but he was no Russian Bold. 2071 02:17:03.559 --> 02:17:05.840 But anyway, that was the conclusion that this. 2072 02:17:06.159 --> 02:17:08.600 When I read that, I imagine him and his vault 2073 02:17:08.680 --> 02:17:14.520 with like st all the dots connected, because you said 2074 02:17:14.559 --> 02:17:18.760 like he presented like a twenty five point summary of his. 2075 02:17:21.040 --> 02:17:24.600 He produced his opus, the ci opus that actually went 2076 02:17:24.639 --> 02:17:29.479 up to the seventh floor with his proof that Angleton 2077 02:17:29.559 --> 02:17:33.319 is the trader, and of course it was dismissed for 2078 02:17:33.440 --> 02:17:40.840 the ludicrous proposition that it was, but he believed it incredible, 2079 02:17:41.760 --> 02:17:45.000 And there were people among the fundamentals who believe the 2080 02:17:45.040 --> 02:17:49.319 craziest things. And I'm not I'm not going to give 2081 02:17:49.319 --> 02:17:55.360 the FBI a pass either, because that same mindset was 2082 02:17:55.440 --> 02:18:00.719 true with Jae Garruver. So all those years we had 2083 02:18:02.799 --> 02:18:07.200 James's Angleton writing supreme at the CIA, and Angleton or 2084 02:18:07.399 --> 02:18:11.479 and Hoover over at the FBI with the same kind 2085 02:18:11.600 --> 02:18:13.879 of totally out of. 2086 02:18:13.840 --> 02:18:17.920 Touch without entrenched bureaucrats with a conspiratorial worldview. 2087 02:18:18.120 --> 02:18:21.479 Very dangerous and the disservice they did to our country 2088 02:18:21.520 --> 02:18:27.639 cannot be exaggerated. Yeah. We uh, we suffered as a 2089 02:18:27.680 --> 02:18:32.639 country because of their narrowness, their inability to see the 2090 02:18:32.680 --> 02:18:35.719 real threats and to do something about the real threats. 2091 02:18:35.799 --> 02:18:39.000 Yeah. So, folks, I hope you'll go out and check it. 2092 02:18:39.479 --> 02:18:42.360 Check out the books to Catch a Spy and fair play. 2093 02:18:42.639 --> 02:18:46.639 By our guest here tonight, Jim Wilson, former CIA head 2094 02:18:46.639 --> 02:18:47.719 of Counterintelligence. 2095 02:18:47.920 --> 02:18:50.159 We really appreciate your time, Jim. This has been an 2096 02:18:50.200 --> 02:18:55.120 awesome interview. Yeah, we we did everybody by the Scott, 2097 02:18:55.120 --> 02:18:56.040 I thank. 2098 02:18:55.920 --> 02:19:00.760 You, Jack. I'm sorry, thank you, Dave appreciate it. Uh. 2099 02:19:00.799 --> 02:19:02.799 We need to recruit some people to go out and 2100 02:19:02.840 --> 02:19:03.959 catch some more spice warts. 2101 02:19:04.159 --> 02:19:04.559 That's right. 2102 02:19:04.600 --> 02:19:06.600 Hey, Scott, we know you asked the question. Sorry, we 2103 02:19:06.799 --> 02:19:08.680 don't want to keep from anymore. But the answer to 2104 02:19:08.680 --> 02:19:11.440 your question about the indicators are in this They're in 2105 02:19:11.520 --> 02:19:16.360 the book. But I'm telling you, folks, read this book. 2106 02:19:16.440 --> 02:19:20.680 It will open your eyes. It's it's truly amazing. 2107 02:19:20.360 --> 02:19:23.239 And next week, next Friday, we'll be here with former 2108 02:19:23.399 --> 02:19:25.520 Delta Force operator Dale Comstock. 2109 02:19:25.959 --> 02:19:30.559 So it's gotta be a thank you very much for 2110 02:19:30.639 --> 02:19:31.280 joining us tonight. 2111 02:19:31.280 --> 02:20:02.840 I have a good night too, assas