Speaker 1: Hey, everybody, ladies and gentlemen, brothers and sisters, comrades and friends.
Speaker 1: We're back with another episode of History Impossible. This one
Speaker 1: another special and the first installment in something that I
Speaker 1: don't really have a name for yet. Like I said
Speaker 1: in the notes for this episode, the Grad School Files
Speaker 1: just sounds like a bad Netflix show or something I
Speaker 1: don't really have a name yet. But this is the
Speaker 1: first installment of my attempt at adapting my academic papers
Speaker 1: that I've been writing into at least somewhat entertaining podcast form.
Speaker 1: Before we get into that, I want to give a
Speaker 1: quick shout out to my executive producer level supporters over
Speaker 1: on Patreon, that is John Andre Sather and Mike Maylebin.
Speaker 1: You guys are as always awesome and do so much
Speaker 1: to help keep the lights on here. And if the
Speaker 1: rest of you listening would like to also pitch in
Speaker 1: and help out supporting the show, head over to Patreon
Speaker 1: dot com slash History Impossible, or head over to Historympossible
Speaker 1: dot substack dot com and become a paid subscriber there.
Speaker 1: Every little bit helps. I really cannot stress that enough.
Speaker 1: As well as just promoting the show as best you
Speaker 1: can to people who might be interested, especially when the
Speaker 1: episodes have to do with events that are related to
Speaker 1: current events. Really that seems to capture a lot of
Speaker 1: folks imagination. So please spread the word about History Impossible.
Speaker 1: Go on Reddit. People seem to be always asking for
Speaker 1: recommendations there, So if you're a re dditor and you
Speaker 1: like the show, give it a shout out on any
Speaker 1: of those subreddits out there. But yes, so this was
Speaker 1: a quick one in a lot of ways, even though
Speaker 1: it's longer I think than a lot of average podcast
Speaker 1: episodes out there. But it's a quick one compared to
Speaker 1: what I usually get into with this show. In this case,
Speaker 1: we are going to be looking at the Arab Revolt
Speaker 1: of nineteen thirty six to nineteen thirty nine. As I
Speaker 1: did in the paper that this is based on a
Speaker 1: lot of stuff might seem familiar because a lot of
Speaker 1: it is from material that I used in previous episodes
Speaker 1: of History Impossible and expands upon it. There's a lot
Speaker 1: of really good, interesting details in there. Though I think
Speaker 1: I gave a pretty decent overview of the revolt and
Speaker 1: why it was so important to a kind of nebulous concept,
Speaker 1: but one that I find very interesting that I haven't.
Speaker 1: I've talked about it a little bit in one way
Speaker 1: or another, but never in this straightforward theoretical way. I
Speaker 1: guess about collective identity and historical memory and its role
Speaker 1: in forming those identities, and I think there's really no
Speaker 1: better example in modern history, at least than that of
Speaker 1: the Israeli Palestinian conflict, as well as the role of
Speaker 1: the British Empire in that. There's other examples, of course,
Speaker 1: and I do mention one or two in this episode,
Speaker 1: but this one, I think is the one that is
Speaker 1: most recognizable to people. So it's in some ways the
Speaker 1: best way to discuss the subject of historical memory and
Speaker 1: collective identities. So with all of that said, let's get
Speaker 1: into some impossible history. Well, let me tell you what
Speaker 1: you would have seen and heard. If we're not being
Speaker 1: pleasant listening, if you're at lunch, or if you have
Speaker 1: no appetite, now it is a good time to switch
Speaker 1: off the radio.
Speaker 2: An ancestor of mine main chaine that if you eliminate
Speaker 2: the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, arimation musten banjiant to
Speaker 2: that you general, one who knows that I'm going needs
Speaker 2: by a thousand year. I wish I could say tonight
Speaker 2: that a lasting peace is inside. I don't see the
Speaker 2: amounting dream. I seeing a laughing night. Moore, I a flock.
Speaker 1: If we care were issued to kill, if we care
Speaker 1: for agued to kill.
Speaker 2: Some say the world.
Speaker 1: Will end empire.
Speaker 2: Some say an I, from what I've tasted of desire,
Speaker 2: I hold of those with favre. But if it had
Speaker 2: to perish twice, I think I know him of of
Speaker 2: hate to say that the destruction ice is also great,
Speaker 2: and look sufficed.
Speaker 1: This. You are now in the flush of victory, and
Speaker 1: we remain under the spirit of being defeated, in downtrodden.
Speaker 1: So both of us are under abnormal conditions. I consider
Speaker 1: you just as abnormal as we are. You were not
Speaker 1: considering the future. You were only considering the present, and
Speaker 1: we are not considering the distant future, only our presence suffering.
Speaker 1: Musa Alami, the Jews, Christians and Muslims are like three bewildered,
Speaker 1: disconsolate children at a party. We don't want ja, we
Speaker 1: don't want honey, we don't want cake, we want jelly,
Speaker 1: Alas there is no jelly. Edward Keith Roach, the gathering
Speaker 1: at the Beayrout Department in the spring of nineteen thirty
Speaker 1: nine was full of high spirits. The members of the
Speaker 1: Arab Higher Committee were celebrating. After three years of boycotts, protests,
Speaker 1: fighting and suffering, they had extracted the greatest victory in
Speaker 1: the history of their nationalist movement, concessions from the British Empire.
Speaker 1: This victory was not just over their imperial oppressors, it
Speaker 1: was a setback for their nationalist rivals, the Zionists, who
Speaker 1: up until this moment had seemed to have the world
Speaker 1: on their side. But with the release of the document
Speaker 1: that came to be known as the McDonald White Paper,
Speaker 1: all that had changed Jewish immigration to Palestine not only
Speaker 1: would cease, but it and all immigration would be placed
Speaker 1: under the jurisdiction of Arab leadership over the course of
Speaker 1: a few years, with true Palestinian statehood promised in writing
Speaker 1: to occur after that. However, one man was not smiling.
Speaker 1: In fact, the founder and leader of the Committee, the
Speaker 1: Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Jaja min Al Husseini, was firmly
Speaker 1: opposed to the proposal, despite it being a victory for
Speaker 1: his cause by most metrics imaginable dissenting from the near
Speaker 1: consensus on the White Paper's qualities. This disagreement became a
Speaker 1: feature of the still gestating Arab national identity that had
Speaker 1: placed Palestine and its nationhood at its center. A few
Speaker 1: weeks later, one of the most prominent Zionists in the world,
Speaker 1: High Invitesmen, gave an address to the English Zionist Federation.
Speaker 1: In this address, Wetzmen responded to the White Paper by
Speaker 1: calling it quote the death sentence of the Jewish National
Speaker 1: Home unquote. Continuing, Wetzmen pledged not to quote conclude on
Speaker 1: a sad note unquote, and that quote, we will carry
Speaker 1: on our work. It is an old tradition of ours,
Speaker 1: and no amount of obstacles will deter us from our purpose.
Speaker 1: And he concluded by claiming, quote, I do not believe
Speaker 1: that very soon there will be a revulsion of feeling,
Speaker 1: and that these temporary necessities will disappear unquote, and that quote.
Speaker 1: Long before the Balfour Declaration, God had decreed that our
Speaker 1: destiny is bound up with Palestine. And against this decree
Speaker 1: all decrees of humans, however mighty, they may appear to themselves,
Speaker 1: and at the time are as not they will blow
Speaker 1: away like chaff before the wind. The British Empire, meanwhile,
Speaker 1: had been attempting to thread the needle of the Palestinian
Speaker 1: Mandate for over two decades by this point, trying to
Speaker 1: strike a balance between the competing nationalist interests of the
Speaker 1: Arabs and the Zionists, all while coping with the rise
Speaker 1: of an aggressive Nazi Germany in Europe. They were also
Speaker 1: coming to terms with their once globe spanning empire going
Speaker 1: into decline, something on which they were intent to see
Speaker 1: done with their dignity as a nation intact. Two years earlier,
Speaker 1: in nineteen thirty seven, a document reporting the results of
Speaker 1: what was known as the Peo Commission made this clear,
Speaker 1: pledging that quote the British people will not flinch from
Speaker 1: the task of continuing to govern Palestine under the Mandate
Speaker 1: if they are in honor bound to do so unquote.
Speaker 1: Seeing colonial holdings as progressing towards self government, a frequently
Speaker 1: stated goal in the Holy Land, was part of the
Speaker 1: growing sense and what it would turn out to be
Speaker 1: post hawk justification that the quote demise of the Empire
Speaker 1: marked the fulfillment rather than the renunciation of Britain's imperial mission.
Speaker 1: According to the historian A. J. Stockwell, there was also
Speaker 1: a longstanding undercurrent of Christian Zionism, informing much of the
Speaker 1: decision making that was in play. This was seen most
Speaker 1: dramatically when British Army officer Orda Wingate stated, quote, there
Speaker 1: is only one important book on the subject of Zionism,
Speaker 1: the Bible, and I have read it thoroughly unquote. This attitude,
Speaker 1: while not wholly representative of the British imperial authorities in
Speaker 1: the Palestinian Mandate, would still loom pretty large as a
Speaker 1: motivating factor alongside their more geopolitical concerns. This confluence of
Speaker 1: motives ultimately what led to the British Empire to attempt
Speaker 1: their balancing act behind the scenes. Little did they know
Speaker 1: that in their efforts to placate their Arab enemies and
Speaker 1: cushion the fall of their alien empire, while some of
Speaker 1: them also attempted to fulfill their own sense of mission
Speaker 1: via their Christian Zionism, they had managed to make themselves
Speaker 1: an enemy of everyone. The Arab revolt of nineteen thirty
Speaker 1: six in nineteen thirty nine has done relatively little to
Speaker 1: arouse the historical imagination, either among the populace or even
Speaker 1: among historians studying the long running conflict in the Holy Land.
Speaker 1: In both the Arabic speaking and English speaking worlds, it
Speaker 1: has been overshadowed by other events in the conflict's history.
Speaker 1: As writer, historian and friend of the podcast or In
Speaker 1: Kessler explains, quote, no single general interest account has yet
Speaker 1: been written of this formative but forgotten insurgency unquote, apart
Speaker 1: from about three books written in English since the mid
Speaker 1: nineteen nineties, a single book written in Hebrew, and very
Speaker 1: little work written in Arabic. This historiographic neglect is due
Speaker 1: to many reasons, most of which go beyond the scope
Speaker 1: of this special episode and the paper from which it's derived,
Speaker 1: but it is usually overshadowed, it being the Arab revolt
Speaker 1: by the official formation of the State of Israel in
Speaker 1: nineteen forty eight, known to Arab nationalists as the Nakba
Speaker 1: or catastrophe, marking it as a foundational date in the
Speaker 1: Arab nationalist historical memory. Quoting the Syrian academic Constantine Zurak,
Speaker 1: historian Gilbert Ascar explains that the Nakba took on a
Speaker 1: greater significance than other events because it was quote not
Speaker 1: a mere setback or a simple transitory misfortune, but a
Speaker 1: catastrophe in every sense of the word, a calamitous ordeal
Speaker 1: of among the most difficult that the Arabs have undergone
Speaker 1: in the course of a long history full of ordeals
Speaker 1: and calamities. This appears to be a sufficient explanation for
Speaker 1: how large the Nakba looms in the historical memory. However,
Speaker 1: according to Mustapha Caaba, a deeper reason that the Arab
Speaker 1: revolt has been quote completely overshadowed by the memory of
Speaker 1: the Nagma unquote is because quote dealing with nineteen thirty
Speaker 1: six to nineteen thirty nine requires more soul searching quote.
Speaker 1: This is in part because the Arab volt's outcome came
Speaker 1: to represent one of the greatest failures of Arab nationalism,
Speaker 1: paving the way for the future Nakba, making it an
Speaker 1: inglorious event in their history that their leadership brought upon themselves.
Speaker 1: As Kaba explains, quote, it resulted in a self inflicted
Speaker 1: wound that weakened Palestinian ability to cope with future challenges unquote. Similarly,
Speaker 1: the Zionist would frequently invoke nineteen forty eight as a
Speaker 1: historically definitional event in their history in defending his new
Speaker 1: state's war with the Arab states and against accusations of
Speaker 1: quote unwanted in transigence unquote. Chiam Weitzman would write in
Speaker 1: nineteen forty eight that quote for treat would be fatal quote,
Speaker 1: and that quote independence is never given to a people.
Speaker 1: It has to be earned, and having been earned, it
Speaker 1: has to be defended quote. Weitzmann, like many who echoed
Speaker 1: him in the years and decades that followed, was mistaken
Speaker 1: if he believed that the idea of Zionis statehood needing
Speaker 1: to be earned as opposed to negotiated, was borne by
Speaker 1: the struggles of nineteen forty eight. The Arab revolt of
Speaker 1: nineteen thirty six. In nineteen thirty nine was thus significant
Speaker 1: for multiple reasons in the history of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Overtly,
Speaker 1: it was a conflict between a semi unified front of
Speaker 1: Arab nationalists and the British authorities of Mandatory Palestine, with
Speaker 1: the Zionists both taking part and getting caught in the crossfire,
Speaker 1: drawing them further into the conflict and deepening the divides
Speaker 1: that already existed and continued to exist in the region
Speaker 1: between these three factions. Less obviously, however, it was a
Speaker 1: conflict that served as a logical endpoint in the formation
Speaker 1: of these different groups, very identities that came to define
Speaker 1: them in the years that followed. This was thanks in
Speaker 1: large part to the historical memory that revolt itself and
Speaker 1: what its outcomes represented. Therefore, it is important for us
Speaker 1: to ask to what extent were the respective identities of
Speaker 1: the Arab nationalists, the Zionists, and the British Empire the
Speaker 1: events of the Arab Revolt. The short answer is to
Speaker 1: a significant extent. When examining the events of the revolt themselves,
Speaker 1: combined with the contemporaneous observations and later reflections of those
Speaker 1: involved and the three factions involved, it is clear that
Speaker 1: each major power involved in the revolt largely developed and
Speaker 1: even in some cases finalized, their collective identities visa vis
Speaker 1: the revolt's events, turning the revolt itself into a powerful
Speaker 1: example of historical memory that informed future behavior, including that
Speaker 1: of the State of Israel and the Arab nationalist movements
Speaker 1: that opposed it. Historical memory and the formation of identity,
Speaker 1: thanks to its invocation of a collective past, social memory
Speaker 1: is tied tightly to the creation of communities and nations.
Speaker 1: This is the basis for historical memory. As Jeffrey Cubitt observes, quote,
Speaker 1: the past takes mental shape by being viewed as the
Speaker 1: breeding and testing ground of today's social collectivities, which are
Speaker 1: themselves interpreted by the same token as the possessors of
Speaker 1: an organic durability rooted in the deep continuities of an
Speaker 1: earlier history. Now, some might understandably assume that historical memory
Speaker 1: begins after some time is passed, similar to the regular
Speaker 1: individual memories that populate our minds. However, this is not
Speaker 1: the case, as Cubit notes, with the obvious exceptions of
Speaker 1: events that likely never happened in the first place. Quote,
Speaker 1: the memory of an event or of a historical experience
Speaker 1: begins with the event or experience itself, while a consensus
Speaker 1: on the contents of an event can never be reached
Speaker 1: through objective measures. I mean, this is history, after all,
Speaker 1: It's not exactly a hard science. This does very little
Speaker 1: to prevent the events in question from taking on significance
Speaker 1: in the minds of those who experience them firsthand. We're
Speaker 1: talking about national myth here, both in this particular case
Speaker 1: but broadly speaking as well. Now, in fact, this lack
Speaker 1: of consensus is why historical memory is so powerful. Now,
Speaker 1: counterintuitive as it might seem, this lack of consensus, in fact,
Speaker 1: is why historical memory is so powerful. Interpretations of the
Speaker 1: events themselves lies in the eye of the beholder. Like
Speaker 1: I was basically saying, just a moment ago, which is
Speaker 1: subject to all kinds of bias, preconceived notions and political
Speaker 1: concerns of the moment. Now, these biases, notions, and concerns
Speaker 1: affect people at all times. So it is obvious that
Speaker 1: events which take on greater meaning with time become meaningful
Speaker 1: almost immediately upon their occurrence, though it by no means
Speaker 1: is always the case, Cubid explains, quote, the establishment of
Speaker 1: this status as potential objects of memory can be more
Speaker 1: or less instantaneous. Whether or not this status is conferred
Speaker 1: immediately following the event or years later is less relevant
Speaker 1: than the power that such memory possesses to change or
Speaker 1: even create a new collective identity, i e. A community
Speaker 1: based largely on imagined kinship through shared experiences. As Benedict
Speaker 1: Anderson and writes, this identity is built on imagined kinship
Speaker 1: because quote, the members of even the smallest nation will
Speaker 1: never know most of their fellow members meet them or
Speaker 1: even hear of them. Yet in the minds of each
Speaker 1: lives the image of their communion. Anderson also persuasively argues
Speaker 1: that this collective identity quote is imagined as a community because,
Speaker 1: regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail
Speaker 1: in each the nation is always conceived as a deep,
Speaker 1: horizontal comradeship. The power of the imagined community comes from
Speaker 1: the historical memory, and this historical memory can form just
Speaker 1: as the event that created that memory is happening. As
Speaker 1: Jeffrey Cubit explains, Quote, the ways in which an event
Speaker 1: or collective experience is registered in public and private consciousness
Speaker 1: at the time of its occurrence and during the period
Speaker 1: when it is still in living memory exert a powerful,
Speaker 1: though not necessarily a determining influence on the meanings it
Speaker 1: may later be invested with.
Speaker 2: Quote.
Speaker 1: The past, even the immediate past, is indeed a laboratory,
Speaker 1: and from the laboratory emerges the compounds that we recognize
Speaker 1: as shared identities. This laboratory breeding and testing ground of
Speaker 1: today's social collectivities, to use Cuba's words again, can be
Speaker 1: seen through a variety of historical events, often violent ones,
Speaker 1: that provide evidence of collective suffering. We've seen that in
Speaker 1: a lot of episodes of history impossible, particularly the ones
Speaker 1: that concern Israel and Palestine, but also the ones that
Speaker 1: concern places like Yugoslavia and its own constituent identities. And indeed,
Speaker 1: as Jeffrey Cubitt explains, quote, civil wars, national des feats,
Speaker 1: foreign occupations, with their accompanying experiences of resistance and collaboration,
Speaker 1: genocidal atrocities, episodes of state sponsored terror produce ruptures, conflicts,
Speaker 1: and insecurities within society at large and within the lives
Speaker 1: of countless individuals unquote. However, even though violence often plays
Speaker 1: a role in this process of identity formation, I mean again,
Speaker 1: this is history. A lot of history is built on violence,
Speaker 1: if not most of it, at least the history that
Speaker 1: gets written about. But that's a whole other story. Even
Speaker 1: though violence does play a part, though, like I was saying,
Speaker 1: it is not always framed in a negative light. Sometimes
Speaker 1: the social memory is one of overcoming impossible odds to
Speaker 1: achieve greatness or even quote unquote mirror survival. Good examples
Speaker 1: of that include a lot of the histories of the Holocaust,
Speaker 1: as well as those of anybody who survived the genocide.
Speaker 1: Sometimes the framing reflects a desire to justify investments of capital, time, effort,
Speaker 1: or even lives. These different manifestations of historical memory, and
Speaker 1: certainly others, can be seen in various examples across human history.
Speaker 1: Like I was saying, and this includes everything, not just
Speaker 1: the examples I gave, but also ones like the dropping
Speaker 1: of the atomic bombs on Japan or the conclusion of
Speaker 1: the American Civil War, which are examples given by Jeffrey
Speaker 1: Cubitt when he's talking about historical memory. However, I believe
Speaker 1: among the most pointed examples of identity formation via historical memory,
Speaker 1: and most relevant to this special episode that we're doing,
Speaker 1: are those of the Arab nationalists, the Zionists, and the
Speaker 1: British Empire. During the Arab Revolt of nineteen thirty six
Speaker 1: to nineteen thirty nine, all three factions developed and constructed
Speaker 1: their identities around their relationship to Empire and connections to
Speaker 1: a particular place, that is, the Holy Land. This was
Speaker 1: even recognized in the years leading up to the revols itself,
Speaker 1: with the journalist Neil McNeil observing in The New York
Speaker 1: Times in July fifth, nineteen thirty one, and I was
Speaker 1: actually able to look at this issue of the newspaper.
Speaker 1: I was able to find a digital copy of it.
Speaker 1: That the factions quote conflicting elements make their conflicting claims,
Speaker 1: each backed by an extensive propaganda that disputes everything put
Speaker 1: forth by the rival organizations, while insisting on its own
Speaker 1: as alone, just and fair. While both the Arab nationalists
Speaker 1: and the Zionists' relationships to Empire were those of opposition
Speaker 1: in the interest of particular national self determination, the British
Speaker 1: relationship to Empire was one of maintenance. These are the
Speaker 1: waning days speak of the British Empire, or at least
Speaker 1: of the dominance of the British Empire, were only a
Speaker 1: couple decades removed from the era of decolonization. So at
Speaker 1: this point the British relationship to Empire was, like I said,
Speaker 1: one of maintenance. Their notion of maintenance was particularly tied
Speaker 1: to their imperial self concept, but broadly speaking, all three
Speaker 1: factions relationships to Empire were determined by their own particular
Speaker 1: connections to the land that would become Israel. These connections
Speaker 1: were both internal and external, with the former manifesting and
Speaker 1: spiritual and religious connections and the latter being more secular
Speaker 1: and political in nature. These connections would be forged and
Speaker 1: strengthened through the historical memory that was created by the
Speaker 1: collective experiences that occurred during the Arab v of nineteen
Speaker 1: thirty six to nineteen thirty nine. In the most generalized
Speaker 1: framing possible, the Arab nationalist's historical memory would be one
Speaker 1: characterized by notions of suffering and humiliation, which led to
Speaker 1: a fractured identity that would ultimately be defined in significant
Speaker 1: part by the revolt's primary leaderships lethal obsession with Jews
Speaker 1: as a people. The Zionist's historical memory would be one
Speaker 1: of overcoming impossible odds in the face of existential destruction,
Speaker 1: both from their Arab rivals and more to the point,
Speaker 1: from the growing threat of Nazi Germany and Europe, which
Speaker 1: would lead to a more unified identity that would be
Speaker 1: defined by a sense of being isolated and without meaningful allies.
Speaker 1: And finally, the British Empire's historical memory of the Arab
Speaker 1: Revolt would be defined as one of imperial failure thanks
Speaker 1: to their inability to force really a compromise between either
Speaker 1: the Zionists or the Arab nationalists who would continue their
Speaker 1: agitation and even violent revolt against colonial authority. This would
Speaker 1: manifest in a desire to justify their imperial investments, which
Speaker 1: included not just untold amounts of money and thousands of
Speaker 1: lives by the revolt's end, by framing their presence and
Speaker 1: thus their identity as one of peacekeeper, guide and the builder,
Speaker 1: the shepherd maybe of new nations. This identity would be
Speaker 1: further complicated by the ever present existence of the Christian
Speaker 1: Zionist beliefs held by many colonial authorities and British politicians
Speaker 1: involved in colonial affairs. It is to this complex relationship
Speaker 1: within the British Empire that we now turn for the
Speaker 1: first part of our deeper examination into the formation of
Speaker 1: these factions collective identities through the historical memory of the
Speaker 1: Arab Revolt the identity of imperial decline. Some aspects of
Speaker 1: British identity underwent a major transformation in the early years
Speaker 1: of the twentieth century, especially when it became clear that
Speaker 1: their new Palestinian mandate was eventually one from the Ottomans.
Speaker 1: After the First World War ended. However, it began to
Speaker 1: become much clearer almost a year before the Armistice that
Speaker 1: this would be the case. On November ninth, nineteen seventeen,
Speaker 1: five days after it was written, the British press released
Speaker 1: what would become known as the Balfour Declaration, which guaranteed
Speaker 1: quote a national home for the Jewish people unquote, as
Speaker 1: well as the promise that the government would quote use
Speaker 1: their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object.
Speaker 1: Clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice
Speaker 1: the sin and religious rights of existing non Jewish communities
Speaker 1: in Palestine. This pledge from the Declaration marks what is
Speaker 1: often considered to be the official beginning of the British
Speaker 1: Zionist relationship, but in truth, the relationship predated the Declaration
Speaker 1: by many years. Many members of the British government were
Speaker 1: already in support of the idea of a Jewish national home,
Speaker 1: with Winston Churchill proclaiming in nineteen oh eight that quote
Speaker 1: I am in full sympathy with the historical traditional aspirations
Speaker 1: of the Jews. The restoration to them of a center
Speaker 1: of true racial and political integrity would be a tremendous
Speaker 1: event in the history of the world. Lord Balfour himself
Speaker 1: had also developed a Zionist identity in the years leading
Speaker 1: up to nineteen seventeen when he made his declaration. Similar
Speaker 1: to Churchill, he had actually become friends with one of
Speaker 1: the most prolific Zionist advocates, High Invitesman, first meeting the
Speaker 1: future Israeli President in nineteen oh six. Despite his sponsorship
Speaker 1: of a nineteen oh five law that restricted immigration primarily
Speaker 1: of Jews from Eastern Europe. Weismann was a dinner guest
Speaker 1: of Lord Balfour's in nineteen sixteen, and after considering a
Speaker 1: lengthy conversation in which Weismann quote laid out his much
Speaker 1: repeated argument that Zionist and British interests were identical quote,
Speaker 1: Balfour attended a cabinet meeting in which he declared I
Speaker 1: am a Zionist. As described by the celebrated and for
Speaker 1: good reason celebrated historian Tom Segev in his book One
Speaker 1: Palestine Complete, the table had been set for the British
Speaker 1: Zionist alliance. This was also part of a growing trend
Speaker 1: within the British government that was more religious in nature
Speaker 1: than it was political, and one connected to the very
Speaker 1: nature of British identity at that point in history, as
Speaker 1: tom Segev notes, quote Lord Balfour also considered Zionism as
Speaker 1: an inherent part of his Christian faith unquote. This dual
Speaker 1: identity of being both a Christian and a proponent of
Speaker 1: a Jewish national home was both symbolic and representative of
Speaker 1: many British statesmen and officials of the time, both coming
Speaker 1: from a problematic quote belief in the mystical power of
Speaker 1: the Jews unquote end quote biblical romanticism. Also, according to
Speaker 1: tom Segev, another example of this was Wyndham Deeds, the
Speaker 1: Chief Secretary to the British High Commissioner of Mandatory Palestine,
Speaker 1: who believed that it was his Christian duty to quote
Speaker 1: assist in the return of the Jews to the Holy
Speaker 1: Land unquote, in order to quote hasten the second coming
Speaker 1: of the Lord unquote, believing that the quote unwritten compact
Speaker 1: between the British Empire and world Jewry would be part
Speaker 1: of a common effort to bring about world peace. Again,
Speaker 1: to use the words of tom Segev, in order to
Speaker 1: achieve this view that was so common in the British government,
Speaker 1: a tool would be needed. That tool was one of Empire,
Speaker 1: in addition to their Christian romanticism that probably sounds pretty
Speaker 1: familiar to a lot of you listening, at least those
Speaker 1: of you who are familiar with Christian Zionism, or as
Speaker 1: we call it here in the United States, dispensationalism, the
Speaker 1: idea that if the Jews are not in Israel at
Speaker 1: the second Coming of Christ, then Christ and therefore God
Speaker 1: would be displeased, to say the least, the Jews need
Speaker 1: to be in Israel, in other words, in order for
Speaker 1: the faithful to ascend to Heaven at the time of
Speaker 1: the apocalypse. But in addition to that romanticism, to that
Speaker 1: way of looking at things, the British saw and justified
Speaker 1: their backing of what became very aggressive Jewish immigration into
Speaker 1: the Holy Land in imperial terms, playing the dual role
Speaker 1: of Zionist and British official. The famed future First High
Speaker 1: Commissioner for Palestine, Herbert Samuel, would write a memorandum in
Speaker 1: nineteen fifteen advocating for a British imperial conquest of Palestine,
Speaker 1: claiming that it quote would allow Britain once again to
Speaker 1: fulfill its historic calling of bringing civilization to primitive lands.
Speaker 1: To Samuel and others in the British government who had
Speaker 1: the same mindset. Zionism was the goal, and imperialism was
Speaker 1: the tool to achieve that goal. It is also clear
Speaker 1: that this attitude was not exclusive to the Zionist project.
Speaker 1: It was in act the norm of the time. As
Speaker 1: Tom Segev explains, quote, the proposal to seize Palestine accorded
Speaker 1: with the way people in London were thinking.
Speaker 2: At the time.
Speaker 1: When they spoke about the dissillusion of the Ottoman Empire.
Speaker 1: There was a tendency to think of it as a
Speaker 1: large cake. This country would get one slice, that country another.
Speaker 1: The territory the Ottomans were about to lose was considered
Speaker 1: booty to be shared out among the victors of the
Speaker 1: First World War unquote. While circumstances would change over the
Speaker 1: coming decades following the First World War, culminating in the
Speaker 1: events created by the Arab Revolt of nineteen thirty six
Speaker 1: to thirty nine, this imperialist perspective will continue to inform
Speaker 1: British decision making, especially regarding their intentions with the Mandate's
Speaker 1: Arab population that was already living there. In many ways,
Speaker 1: the development of the British relationship with the Arabs of
Speaker 1: the Holy Land ran parallel with that of their relationship
Speaker 1: with the Zionists. British interests in the region as a
Speaker 1: whole long predated the First World War, thanks largely to
Speaker 1: their battles with Napoleon in the early nineteenth century and
Speaker 1: their later alliance with the Ottoman Empire and their occupation
Speaker 1: of Egypt in eighteen eighty two. It was in this
Speaker 1: interest that an attitude of what we would now call
Speaker 1: Orientalism began to develop, and would later inform, at least
Speaker 1: in part, their interactions with the Arabs of the Holy Land.
Speaker 1: Historian Zachary Lachmann notes that this attitude can be seen
Speaker 1: most prominently in the writings of the Earl of Cromer
Speaker 1: Evel and Baring, who was quote widely regarded as a
Speaker 1: leading authority on Egypt and the Orient in general, and
Speaker 1: his views can be fairly taken as representative of much
Speaker 1: of British elite and popular opinion, and who quote established
Speaker 1: what he saw as the unbridgable gap between the logical
Speaker 1: West and the illogical and picturesque East, between the European
Speaker 1: mind and the Oriental mind unquote. This attitude pervaded both
Speaker 1: British imperial policy in the Middle East, and in part
Speaker 1: explains why British pledges toward their Arab allies in nineteen fifteen,
Speaker 1: in a series of documents that have colloquially come to
Speaker 1: be known as the McMahon Correspondence, quote became an outstanding
Speaker 1: bone of contention, quote which the Lebanese author and diplomat
Speaker 1: George and Tonius also called quote the main piece of
Speaker 1: evidence on which the Arabs accused Great Britain of having
Speaker 1: broken faith with them unquote. These letters, which were between
Speaker 1: British Indian Army officer Henry McMahon and the King of Hijaz,
Speaker 1: Hussein Binali, contained promises of territory to be given to
Speaker 1: the Arabs in exchange for their support of the British
Speaker 1: against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, because
Speaker 1: at that point they were enemies. It is important to remember,
Speaker 1: but this territory discussing the McMahon whoseying correspondence eventually went
Speaker 1: to the Jews thanks to the later promise made by
Speaker 1: the Balfour Declaration. This inconsistency, and that's what it was,
Speaker 1: was informed by British orientalism, but it was also imperialist
Speaker 1: hubris in what Tom Segev calls the British quote imperialistic
Speaker 1: arrogance and a powerful sense of cultural superiority unquote. It
Speaker 1: is actually understandable that one might believe that they took
Speaker 1: the concerns of the Zionists more seriously than those of
Speaker 1: the Arabs. The thing is this is only partly true,
Speaker 1: As Segev also points out, quote, the British pretended, and
Speaker 1: perhaps some of them even believed that the establishment of
Speaker 1: a national home for the Jews could be carried out
Speaker 1: without hurting the Arabs unquote. It was this hubris, fueled
Speaker 1: in part by their orientalist interpretations of the Arab quote
Speaker 1: unquote mind as being one of irrationality and in need
Speaker 1: of tempering, that informed British counterinsurgency policy when the Arab
Speaker 1: Revolt of nineteen thirty six to thirty nine actually kicked off.
Speaker 1: In earnest. The British response to the outbreak of violence
Speaker 1: during the Arab Revolt, which began with quote an attack
Speaker 1: on April fifteenth, nineteen thirty six, on a convoy of
Speaker 1: taxis on the Nablist to Tulkarm road, in which the
Speaker 1: assailants murdered two Jewish passengers unquote, was swift and would
Speaker 1: quickly become defined by its brutality. To quote from the
Speaker 1: work of men Matthew Hughes in his paper The Banality
Speaker 1: Brutality British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab
Speaker 1: Revolts in Palestine. In practice and indeed in implicit principle,
Speaker 1: British counterinsurgency was defined by policies of treating all Arabs
Speaker 1: as equally complicit in the violence that broke out across
Speaker 1: the Holy Land during this period. This often came in
Speaker 1: the form of collective punishment techniques, policies that often resulted
Speaker 1: in the mass destruction of property and many deaths. We've
Speaker 1: discussed this before in History Impossible. Some of you listening
Speaker 1: might remember. These were policies very similar to the ones
Speaker 1: that the Nazis made use of in Yugoslavia. As the
Speaker 1: aforementioned Matthew Hughes also explains quote, during army searches, soldiers
Speaker 1: would surround a village. The men and women then divided off,
Speaker 1: held apart from the houses, often in wired cages, while
Speaker 1: soldiers searched and often destroyed everything, burnt grain and poured
Speaker 1: olive oil over household food and effects, with the largest
Speaker 1: destruction occurring during an operation on June sixteenth, nineteen thirty six,
Speaker 1: in which up to two hundred and forty buildings were destroyed.
Speaker 1: These brutal policies also resulted in violence against the villagers themselves,
Speaker 1: like I was hinting at a moment ago, and this
Speaker 1: included sexual violence as well as forms of torture against
Speaker 1: captured combatants. All of this was done to break the
Speaker 1: spirit of the rebels in the revolt, who were fighting
Speaker 1: against the British. However, the cost of doing this was
Speaker 1: ultimately too high for the British Empire, and by nineteen
Speaker 1: thirty nine, the possibility of negotiating a settlement with the
Speaker 1: rebels entered the picture. Because the central issue was Jewish
Speaker 1: immigration into the Mandate. The Peo Commission of nineteen thirty
Speaker 1: six and later the MacDonald White Paper of nineteen thirty
Speaker 1: nine both centered on this topic. The Pew Commission contained
Speaker 1: the first official suggestion of what we would now call
Speaker 1: a two state solution, making it clear that quote the
Speaker 1: problem cannot be solved by giving either the Arabs or
Speaker 1: the Jews all they want quote in the words of
Speaker 1: the Commission themselves. The Commission therefore concluded quote two sovereign
Speaker 1: independent states would be established, the one an Arab state
Speaker 1: consisting of trans Jordan united with that part of Palestine
Speaker 1: which lies to the east and south of a frontier,
Speaker 1: and the other a Jewish state consisting of that part
Speaker 1: of Palestine which lies to the north and west of
Speaker 1: that frontier, quote, as would become quite common at this point.
Speaker 1: This plan was rejected by both the Arab nationalists and
Speaker 1: the Zionists. The McDonald White Paper, which we've talked about
Speaker 1: on this show before as well, made a far less
Speaker 1: conciliatory approach for both sides and placed the question of
Speaker 1: Jewish immigration solely into Arab hands over the course of
Speaker 1: a decade to come. According to the deliberations that were
Speaker 1: made in Parliament on the White Paper, this move was
Speaker 1: based on quote the desire to give the Arab section
Speaker 1: of the population of Palestine an opportunity of putting forward
Speaker 1: their views, such as was enjoyed by the Jewish Agency
Speaker 1: for the other section of the population. Unsurprisingly, the Zionists
Speaker 1: rejected the proposals. But more surprisingly, though less surprisingly to
Speaker 1: those of you who are longtime listeners of this show
Speaker 1: and remember us talking about this in previous episodes, the
Speaker 1: Arab nationalist also rejected this proposal. Both of these episodes
Speaker 1: of the Pyoku Mission and MacDonald White Paper represent the
Speaker 1: British desire to end the violence, violence that arguably they
Speaker 1: helped cultivate, as well as create two states and then
Speaker 1: later one state on their terms, which were influenced by
Speaker 1: both Christian Zionism and Orientalism. This attempt by them to
Speaker 1: balance the scales on their terms was ultimately a failure,
Speaker 1: and with the issuance of the White Paper of nineteen
Speaker 1: thirty nine, it created a greater instability than what previously
Speaker 1: existed by solidifying the push toward radicalism that became more
Speaker 1: endemic within the Zionist movement. No sacrifice will be too precious.
Speaker 1: The Zionist history with the Holy Land is lengthy, diverse,
Speaker 1: and beyond the scope of the original paper that this
Speaker 1: is based on. Plus I have talked about it at
Speaker 1: length in multiple episodes of this podcast, and there are
Speaker 1: plenty of other podcasts that also get into that history
Speaker 1: that are probably more qualified than me to get into
Speaker 1: it anyway, regardless, in order to understand how the Zionist
Speaker 1: identity became significantly formed by the immediate historical memory of
Speaker 1: the Arab Revolt, it is important to briefly explain some
Speaker 1: other similar defining moments in Jewish history in the Palestinian Mandates,
Speaker 1: some of which might sound familiar to a lot of
Speaker 1: you longtime listeners. These, namely, were the riots that broke
Speaker 1: out in nineteen twenty one and then again in nineteen
Speaker 1: twenty nine. The former, known colloquially as the Jaffa Riots,
Speaker 1: resulted in the murder of forty seven Jews, and the latter,
Speaker 1: far more shocking than its violence and brutality, saw the
Speaker 1: murder of one hundred and thirty three Jews. According to
Speaker 1: a parliamentary report on the Colonies, well quote, there is
Speaker 1: no evidence that the nineteen twenty one riots were premeditated, unquote,
Speaker 1: they were among the first events to set the tone
Speaker 1: of understandable defensiveness among the Zionists. The nineteen twenty nine
Speaker 1: riots were not just noteworthy for their viciousness, which has
Speaker 1: been covered at length on this show. We have a
Speaker 1: whole episode back in the third of the Muslim Nazi
Speaker 1: series back in twenty twenty one that talks about nineteen
Speaker 1: twenty nine, and it's pretty clear that their viciousness was
Speaker 1: almost unprecedented and very significant. But these riots were more
Speaker 1: noteworthy for their more directed nature, thanks largely to a
Speaker 1: religious dispute that began between Orthodox Jews and Arab Muslims
Speaker 1: at the Western Wall that had been blown out of
Speaker 1: proportion by mostly just agitating by Arab nationalists and Zionist
Speaker 1: leaders these two riots. These two events, especially the latter,
Speaker 1: saw many Zionist leaders like David Ben Gurion and Rahavem
Speaker 1: Zaivi invoking past programs, including the famous nineteen oh three
Speaker 1: Kitshenev pogram that was often used as a rallying cry
Speaker 1: for the cause of Zionism in the early twentieth century.
Speaker 1: These Zionist leaders invoked them in order to demonstrate that
Speaker 1: the need for a Jewish state was self evident for
Speaker 1: the sake of Jewish safety. The Jews of Palestine had
Speaker 1: already begun to establish self defense forces known as the Haganah,
Speaker 1: and they had their efficacy in defending Jews from being
Speaker 1: accosted at times, but they were still not enough, especially
Speaker 1: when demonstrations and riots increased in frequency and intensity. In addition,
Speaker 1: there was very little that the British authorities could do
Speaker 1: to stop the violence due to a lack of manpower,
Speaker 1: so these events served as very bitter pills to many
Speaker 1: Zionists who thought that their initial alliance with the British
Speaker 1: Empire via the Balfer Declaration would ultimately serve them and
Speaker 1: their mission of obtaining a Jewish national home as well
Speaker 1: as Zionis leader High Invitesmen recalled in its memoirs quote
Speaker 1: I realized at once that they would use this opportunity
Speaker 1: to curtail Jewish immigration into Palestine. This reflection demonstrates that
Speaker 1: the ultimate result of the policies put in place a
Speaker 1: decade later, that is, the curtailing of Jewish immigration into Palestine,
Speaker 1: was already on the Zionist leadership's minds as a possibility
Speaker 1: of what might happen. The bitter pill of what many
Speaker 1: Zionists saw as Britain efficacy in protecting them from the
Speaker 1: violence brought upon them by the Arab nationalists and the
Speaker 1: mandate never truly went away, and in fact, it only
Speaker 1: intensified after the Arab revolt actually broke out in nineteen
Speaker 1: thirty six, which actually began in Earnest with a murder
Speaker 1: of two Jews. According to historian Tom Segev, while quote
Speaker 1: at first, Arab terrorism was directed principally at the British
Speaker 1: unquote Jewish casualties quote became more frequent unquote, resulting in
Speaker 1: greater calls for quote unquote retribution and revenge, which began
Speaker 1: to define the Zionus experience from nineteen thirty six to
Speaker 1: nineteen thirty nine. This contributed to not just a greater
Speaker 1: incentive for the coming cycle of violence between the two factions,
Speaker 1: but also to the growing hostile suspicion of British motives
Speaker 1: when it came to the question of establishing a Jewish
Speaker 1: national home. The sense of an externally driven moral imperative
Speaker 1: was also growing, not even just year by year, but month,
Speaker 1: thanks to the rise of Nazism in Germany and the
Speaker 1: growing persecution of Jews, made most evident by events like
Speaker 1: krishtaal Knacht in nineteen thirty eight, which occurred during the
Speaker 1: Arab Revolt and carried just as much meaning to the
Speaker 1: Mandates Jews as it did for Europe's Jews, and even
Speaker 1: more meaning for the Zionist movement, because again, like most
Speaker 1: programs and violence directed at Jews, it proved the point
Speaker 1: of needing a Jewish national home for self protection. Nevertheless,
Speaker 1: there was not a consensus on how to respond to
Speaker 1: the Arab nationalist violence within the Zionist movement. This was
Speaker 1: thanks to the two most influential groups within the movement,
Speaker 1: the more moderate labor Zionists under David Ben Gurion and
Speaker 1: the more militant Revisionist Zionists under ZIAV Jabetinski. To use
Speaker 1: the words of Tom Segev again. While quote Ben Gurion
Speaker 1: denied feeling the desire for vengeance unquote, the revisionists quote
Speaker 1: argued that restraint would be interpreted as weakness, because if
Speaker 1: the Arabs believed the Jews to be weak, they would
Speaker 1: only increase their violence.
Speaker 2: Quote.
Speaker 1: This split in priorities became increasingly heated, especially after the
Speaker 1: Iragoon militant group associated with the Revisionists began to target
Speaker 1: and kill Arabs quote, causing dozens of deaths unquote, and
Speaker 1: leading Bengurion to call Jabatinsky quote the fascist Satan unquote,
Speaker 1: and to call the revisionist faction no joke quote a
Speaker 1: party of naziso. This acrimonious split would always exist, but
Speaker 1: by May of nineteen thirty nine and the issuance of
Speaker 1: the MacDonald White Paper, it would largely be put aside.
Speaker 1: A new, more unified identity had formed arguably out of
Speaker 1: pure necessity. In the aftermath of the publication of the
Speaker 1: MacDonald White Paper, there was an almost universal uproar in
Speaker 1: the Jewish community of Palestine. In his memoirs, Herbert Samuel
Speaker 1: recalled quote, the Palestine White Paper of nineteen thirty nine
Speaker 1: has aroused the most vehement opposition on the part of
Speaker 1: the Jews in Palestine and in all countries. The reaction
Speaker 1: was one of spectacular violence against the colonial authorities, unmatched
Speaker 1: since the initial outbreak of the Air Revolt itself. While
Speaker 1: there was no consensus on the appropriateness of the violence,
Speaker 1: the Zionists as a group as a whole became much
Speaker 1: more unified in their opposition to the British Empire. This
Speaker 1: could be seen on May eighteenth, nineteen thirty nine, when,
Speaker 1: as described by historian Bruce Hoffman and his excellent book
Speaker 1: Anonymous Soldiers quote a n the oath was taken in
Speaker 1: synagogues and other public gathering places across Palestine, in which
Speaker 1: gatherers pledged quote no sacrifice will be too precious in
Speaker 1: order to set the new policy of the White Paper
Speaker 1: at knought. While David Ben Gurion remained at odds with Jabatinsky,
Speaker 1: and the revisionists. Ideologically at least, he endorsed quote, an
Speaker 1: intensification of efforts to bring Jewish immigrants to Palestine illegally,
Speaker 1: and the Haganau's Jewish self defense Force transformation into a
Speaker 1: full fledged underground army. In the words of Bruce Hoffman. Again,
Speaker 1: things were complicated by the outbreak of World War II
Speaker 1: between Britain and Germany in September nineteen thirty nine, but
Speaker 1: again in the words of Hoffman, quote, it did not
Speaker 1: diminish Zionist opposition to the White Paper quote. This was
Speaker 1: thanks to the growing perception that the Zionists could only
Speaker 1: rely on themselves, even if they they supported the British
Speaker 1: against the Nazis, which they did most of them, at least,
Speaker 1: including the most radical among them like Zaiev Jabatinski. There
Speaker 1: were only a few exceptions, which we'll get to in
Speaker 1: a second, but regardless, there was a relatively unified front
Speaker 1: against the Third Reich within the Zionist community. Now, this
Speaker 1: perception of needing to only rely on themselves was driven
Speaker 1: by the immediate historical memory that had formed during the
Speaker 1: Arab Revolt, building upon the past memories of Jewish helplessness
Speaker 1: during the riots of nineteen twenty one and nineteen twenty nine.
Speaker 1: Thus a new identity had formed, one of resolve to
Speaker 1: achieve the goal of a Jewish national home by any
Speaker 1: means necessary and without the help of anyone but themselves.
Speaker 1: Around this new identity, the previously fractured Yeshiv, that is,
Speaker 1: the Jewish community in Palestine could unify. This unification resulted
Speaker 1: in an increase in revolutionary and thus violent activity both
Speaker 1: during the waning months of the Arab Revolts and many
Speaker 1: years afterward. The rise of the Stern Gang in nineteen
Speaker 1: forty represented the only meaningful split found within the Zionist
Speaker 1: camp thanks to its quote fateful step toward an alliance
Speaker 1: with Italy and Germany unquote during the Second World War.
Speaker 1: To use the words of Bruce Hoffmann again, the Stern Gang,
Speaker 1: which if you didn't pick up on that was a
Speaker 1: radical Zionist group of Jews who sought to seek an
Speaker 1: alliance with Nazi Germany. They were obviously on the more
Speaker 1: extreme end of autonomous Zionist identity and continued to actively
Speaker 1: fight against British colonial forces through acts of terrorism, even
Speaker 1: while the British kept fighting the Nazis during World War II,
Speaker 1: but the rest of the Zionist organizations, while ostensibly allied
Speaker 1: with Britain during their war with the Nazis, remained dedicated
Speaker 1: to forging their own path toward a Jewish national home.
Speaker 1: They just didn't take it as far as the Stern
Speaker 1: Gang did. For it should be pretty obvious reasons. To
Speaker 1: call them the more principled ones in comparison to the
Speaker 1: Stern Gang is a bit of an understatement, especially given
Speaker 1: the Stern Gang's leader, Avraham Stern's, own, for lack of
Speaker 1: a better way of putting it, messionic complex. This was
Speaker 1: made most plain in the less extreme but no less
Speaker 1: radical Irgun, under the command of the controversial Monock and Began,
Speaker 1: who issued a proclamation in nineteen forty four claiming quote
Speaker 1: there can no longer be an armistice between the Jewish
Speaker 1: nation and its youth and a British administration unquote, closing
Speaker 1: with a pledge that quote, our nation is at war
Speaker 1: with this regime and it is a fight to the finish.
Speaker 1: The Irgun then bombed the immigration offices of Haifa, Jerusalem
Speaker 1: and Tel Aviv, quote, striking at the organ of government
Speaker 1: responsible for implementing the nineteen thirty nine white papers restrictive
Speaker 1: immigrants policy. Again in the words of historian Bruce Hoffman, Meanwhile,
Speaker 1: the moderates among the Zionist movement, like high Invitesmen, publicly
Speaker 1: condemned the terrorist actions and approved of the counter terrorist
Speaker 1: efforts to arrest any found responsible. But the directives put
Speaker 1: in place by the Haganah authorities went out of their
Speaker 1: way to ensure the safety of the terrorists themselves in
Speaker 1: an effort to remain independent of British authorities and by
Speaker 1: extension reprisals by them. As Bruce Hoffman explains, the Haganah
Speaker 1: authorities quote sought assurances that the British colonial security forces
Speaker 1: would take no action against any terrorist or suspected terrorist
Speaker 1: without first consulting the Jewish agency, which would be essentially
Speaker 1: a quote unquote blank check for the Zionist authorities to
Speaker 1: quote deal with the terrorists entirely in their own way,
Speaker 1: completely outside the law, and without any vestige of due
Speaker 1: process unquote. The proposal for this was rejected, and again,
Speaker 1: in Hoffman's words, quote, a perceptible chill in the agency's
Speaker 1: relations with the government followed. What this demonstrates is that
Speaker 1: even though there was a range of hostility toward British authorities,
Speaker 1: ranging from wanton terrorism to targeted symbolic attacks on individuals
Speaker 1: to cooperation only on the Zionist terms. There was nevertheless
Speaker 1: a unification in that hostility toward the British Empire only
Speaker 1: made possible by the historical memory of the events of
Speaker 1: the Arab revolt. This sense of unity, however, disparate in
Speaker 1: its own way, became obvious, as Hoffman notes, quote, the
Speaker 1: same attitudes permeated the Yeshuev unquote, with newspapers that formerly
Speaker 1: denounced the terrorist actions now going silent except to denounce
Speaker 1: British applications of the death penalty on Jewish prisoners. By
Speaker 1: the mid nineteen forties, the Zionists could reasonably say that
Speaker 1: for all of their differences, they stood together under one banner. Conversely,
Speaker 1: their Arab nationalist counterparts developed precisely the opposite problem.
Speaker 2: A.
Speaker 1: Struggle for unity, a lethal fixation. While Arab nationalism had
Speaker 1: a checkered history until the early twentieth century, it began
Speaker 1: to take a recognizable shape by the eighteen eighties, when
Speaker 1: most Arabic speaking lands were still under the dominance of
Speaker 1: the Ottoman Empire. As the Arab historian George and Tonius
Speaker 1: observed there was quote a definite progression from the general
Speaker 1: towards the particular from a rhetorical denunciation of Turkish misrule
Speaker 1: to the formulation of a specific program of national aspirations. However,
Speaker 1: the rise of Arab nationalism remained relatively diffuse, especially in
Speaker 1: those early years. As Israeli critic and historian Ilan Papa explains,
Speaker 1: unlike many typical expressions of nationalism that quote appropriate any
Speaker 1: useful historical event that precede them on quote as precursors,
Speaker 1: there were other precursors that included quote the secret societies
Speaker 1: that promoted the teaching of Arabic and the study of
Speaker 1: Arabic history and culture. Quote. It was also a growing
Speaker 1: trend within Islamic academia, particularly at the prestigious Alazar University
Speaker 1: in Cairo, where it had become a feature of the
Speaker 1: teachings of a sheikh named Rashid Rita, who a lot
Speaker 1: of longtime listeners might remember was the teacher of a
Speaker 1: very important figure in this story and one who has
Speaker 1: come up a lot. Hajamin al Husseini will get back
Speaker 1: to him now. Rita's lectures centered on three ideas, three
Speaker 1: core principles essentially, which Ilon Papa, for all of his faults,
Speaker 1: lays out quite comprehensively here quote that Muslim society everywhere
Speaker 1: ought to be very cautious in its encounters with Western culture,
Speaker 1: that it was necessary to return to a distilled form
Speaker 1: of Islamic precepts, sifting out all vestiges of negative Western influence,
Speaker 1: and that the religious undertakes must be tied to the
Speaker 1: political and national struggle. This line of thinking would deeply
Speaker 1: influence Rashid Rita's most infamous student, who we just mentioned,
Speaker 1: and who combined it with his own political and spiritual
Speaker 1: preoccupations as he took on a more active role in
Speaker 1: the cause of Arab nationalism in the Palestinian mandate. Hajamin
Speaker 1: al Husseini was part of one of Palestine's most noble families,
Speaker 1: the Husseinis, who claimed lineage from the prophet Muhammad himself
Speaker 1: for well over a century. By the time of his
Speaker 1: birth in eighteen ninety four, his family had occupied the
Speaker 1: religious position of Mufti in Jerusalem, placing them in charge
Speaker 1: of the community's donated wealth of the Vakfa. Hajamen would
Speaker 1: rise to this position himself in nineteen twenty at the
Speaker 1: recommendation of Herbert Samuel, who would later admit that it
Speaker 1: was the greatest blunder in his career. And while Haaja
Speaker 1: Mien cooperated with the British in the years leading up
Speaker 1: to the Arab Revolt as well as a number of Zionists,
Speaker 1: surprisingly I know he never forgot the teachings that he
Speaker 1: had absorbed during his time studying under Rashid Rita. While
Speaker 1: this helps explain Haja Mean's willingness to work with the British,
Speaker 1: according to historian Orren Kessler and friend of the Show,
Speaker 1: since quote, unusually among Islamic thinkers of the time, Rashid
Speaker 1: Rita favored the British Empire to the Ottoman and imparted
Speaker 1: that sensibility to his student unquote, it also helps explain
Speaker 1: why Haajamen ultimately made the choices that he did when
Speaker 1: the Arab Revolt kicked off in Ernest in nineteen thirty six.
Speaker 1: The Arab revolts beginning can be traced to the actions
Speaker 1: of one man, a Muslim preacher named is al Din
Speaker 1: al Haassam, Assyrian by birth, al Caassam, like Jajamin al Husseini,
Speaker 1: was educated at Al Jar University, but he took a
Speaker 1: more spiritual path than his contemporary's own place polytical one.
Speaker 1: He frequently preached the need for a quote unquote return
Speaker 1: to God, and as European imperial activity in the Middle
Speaker 1: East increased in the early twentieth century, the necessity of jihad.
Speaker 1: This continued into the nineteen thirties, when his activities became
Speaker 1: base in the Palestinian Mandate, and as jihadis rhetoric continued
Speaker 1: to escalate to include Jews as well as the British,
Speaker 1: which quickly turned into violent action. After Alcassam and his
Speaker 1: men killed a Jewish police sergeant on November sixth, nineteen
Speaker 1: thirty five, the Sheik retreated to the forest surrounding Haifa.
Speaker 1: After British authorities caught up to him, a gun battle commenced,
Speaker 1: resulting in Alcassam's death, which quote gave the Arabs moral
Speaker 1: power they had hitherto lacked unquote. To use the words
Speaker 1: of Orrin Kessler again and comparing him to the Zionist
Speaker 1: Ikon Joseph Trumpeldor, who died defending the tel High Settlement
Speaker 1: in nineteen twenty, Tom Segev explained, quote, both men each
Speaker 1: gave their national movements a heroic myth. This sparked the
Speaker 1: beginning of guerrilla operations in the Palestinian Mandate, leading to
Speaker 1: the General Strike and other actions taken in the name
Speaker 1: of the nationalist cause, which became the Arab Revolt. The
Speaker 1: rapidly developing legend also forced Hajajamin al Husseini to pick
Speaker 1: a side. As Israeli historian Zivie Elpeleg explains, quote, more
Speaker 1: than any other individual at the time, it was al
Speaker 1: Cassam who contributed to the process which was to lead
Speaker 1: Hajamen and the Palestinian leadership into confrontation with the British.
Speaker 1: It is more likely than not that Hajamen resented al
Speaker 1: Casam for forcing his hand this way. As longtime listeners
Speaker 1: might remember, up until the Arab Revolt, Hajjamen had been
Speaker 1: trying to balance his relationship with the British and his
Speaker 1: own image in the popular imagination of his fellow Arab
Speaker 1: Natalists and, more to the point, the Palestinian people in general.
Speaker 1: But once the regardless of how you spin it, very
Speaker 1: romantic legend of Alcacam and his death began to form,
Speaker 1: Haja mean quote faced a dilemma un quote, to use
Speaker 1: the words of Zivielpalleg Hajamen ultimately read the room, and
Speaker 1: noting that the growing unrest was signaling a unifying force
Speaker 1: among anyone who considered themselves a Palestinian or Arab nationalist
Speaker 1: in general, or even merely an anti imperialist or anti Zionist,
Speaker 1: he formed an organization known as the Arab Higher Committee
Speaker 1: or HC, placing the various Arab national committees springing up
Speaker 1: all over the Mandate under one umbrella and signaling the
Speaker 1: official beginning, the political beginning, if you will, of the
Speaker 1: Arab Revolt. This is laid out very effectively by Orren
Speaker 1: Kessler in his book Palistine nineteen thirty six. While a
Speaker 1: general strike served as the centerpiece of this unified front,
Speaker 1: the violence that occurred across the country and eventually within
Speaker 1: the organization's purview gave a sign of things to come.
Speaker 1: For all of the Arab unity that was being felt
Speaker 1: during the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, internal tensions began
Speaker 1: to make themselves apparent very quickly. There had already been
Speaker 1: an existing rivalry between the Hussini family and another notable
Speaker 1: Palestinian family known as the Nashashibis, which frequently, if impotently, manifested.
Speaker 1: But there were also more practical frustrations felt by the
Speaker 1: figures in the AGEC, like the Mayor of Jerusalem, Houssein
Speaker 1: Fakrie al Khalidi, who interestingly enough, is the uncle of
Speaker 1: the famous Palestinian activist and writer Rashid Khalidi, the author
Speaker 1: of the One Hundred Years War on Palestine. Hossain Fakri
Speaker 1: al Khaledi had been deported by British authorities of the
Speaker 1: Seychelles after the Arab Hire Committee had been banned along
Speaker 1: with all other national politicals parties, and in a diary
Speaker 1: entry from November of nineteen thirty seven that I was
Speaker 1: able to obtain, Al Khalidi expressed presentment that he had
Speaker 1: quote not received one cable of encouragement neither from Palestine
Speaker 1: or from outside unquote of his prison cell is what
Speaker 1: he's talking about, and quote couldn't Hajamin wire a word
Speaker 1: of sympathy, greeting or encouragement unquote, And one month later
Speaker 1: al Khalidi complained again that Hajamin was completely ambivalent toward
Speaker 1: his and the others suffering at being exiled so far
Speaker 1: from home at the time Hajamin was hiding in Syria,
Speaker 1: and as al Khalidi noted, quote, his family will join
Speaker 1: him sooner or later, and he has money enough to
Speaker 1: keep him and his children going on for years unquote.
Speaker 1: The question of money was a frequent one that came up,
Speaker 1: and for good reason, as we covered in the last
Speaker 1: major episode of the Muslim Nazis in which we talked
Speaker 1: about the immense salary or allows maybe is a better
Speaker 1: word for it, that Hajamin commanded when he was hanging
Speaker 1: out with the Third Reich, but that is another story.
Speaker 1: This frustration fell by al Khalidi was by no means universal,
Speaker 1: and it's worth noting that, but it was arguably representative.
Speaker 1: Though many of the Mufti's opponents had if many of
Speaker 1: you longtime listeners remember, been cowed into silence. Now the
Speaker 1: evidence is circumstantial, but internal violence that had been linked
Speaker 1: to supporters of Haja Meen was plaguing the Arab revolt,
Speaker 1: as historian Tom Segev explains, quote in the name of patriotism.
Speaker 1: That were also threats, intimidations, blackmail, and other forms of hooliganism,
Speaker 1: and at times the rebellions seemed more like a civil
Speaker 1: war than a national uprising. Indeed, the rebellion quickly deteriorated
Speaker 1: into internaceine fighting. This not only plague the revolt and
Speaker 1: whatever unified Pan Arab national identity it implied, it became
Speaker 1: a feature of the revolt and of the Arab nationalist
Speaker 1: movement itself and many of its future incarnations. In fact,
Speaker 1: as Palestinian historian Isa Halleff explains quote, for throughout the
Speaker 1: time of the Arab Higher Committee's belated attempts to encourage
Speaker 1: a semblance of unity in Palestine, infighting and personal conflict
Speaker 1: served to hamper effective national leadership. This infighting would come
Speaker 1: to define the largest blunder made by not just the
Speaker 1: Arab nationalists, but arguably any side in the revolt, and
Speaker 1: it comes from the story that we open this episode with.
Speaker 1: Despite this rapidly deteriorating situation in the Arab nationalist faction,
Speaker 1: the continued violence was wearing on the British, who, after
Speaker 1: the failure of the Peo Commission suggested two Ston partition,
Speaker 1: caved and published the White Paper in nineteen thirty nine, which,
Speaker 1: if you'll recall, proposed to transfer all immigration authority over
Speaker 1: to the Palestinians. During the next ten years. While everyone
Speaker 1: in the Arab Higher Committee, which met in Hajjamin al
Speaker 1: Husseini's Beirut department on the day the White Paper was released,
Speaker 1: was supposedly pleased with the propositions and result of the
Speaker 1: White Paper, it was Haja Mien who remained steadfast in
Speaker 1: his rejection of the proposal. According to Isa Khalaff, it
Speaker 1: quickly became clear that quote, it was not until the
Speaker 1: White Paper had been officially rejected by the Arab Higher
Speaker 1: Committee at the end of May that the political differences
Speaker 1: between the moderates and the Mufti came to the fore unquote,
Speaker 1: according to the recollections of a doctor who was present,
Speaker 1: quoted by Oron Kessler, quote, the sole concern of the
Speaker 1: committee was now concentrated on convincing Hajah that his negative
Speaker 1: stand was extremely detrimental to the Arab cause and was
Speaker 1: serving unintentionally the Zionist cause. Hajamen argued, and eventually some
Speaker 1: of the more radical among the group agreed that the
Speaker 1: paper did not contain enough guarantees to his liking, including
Speaker 1: a provision in the White Paper that still insisted, despite
Speaker 1: turning immigration policy completely over to the Arabs, that the
Speaker 1: new authorities would still guarantee a Jewish national home. While
Speaker 1: Hajajamin al Husseini did not see his rejection as a misstep,
Speaker 1: this was not how many who took part in the
Speaker 1: Arab revolts saw it as Orin Kessler explains, quote nine
Speaker 1: Arabs out of ten welcomed to White Paper, The editor
Speaker 1: of the Palestinian nationalist newspaper philstine reckoned, and anyone rejecting
Speaker 1: it must be quote an Arab ass or an Arab
Speaker 1: trader unquote. While rebel leaders in Damascus said the same
Speaker 1: as other critics, castigating Hajamin for having desecrated the Holy
Speaker 1: Rebellion for his own self as shames unquote. For the
Speaker 1: Mufties part, he never wavered in his conviction that not
Speaker 1: only had he made the correct decision, but that even
Speaker 1: with the olive branches offered in the nineteen thirty nine
Speaker 1: White Paper or even the nineteen thirty seven Peel Commission,
Speaker 1: Britain had quote given Palestine to the Jews unquote, something
Speaker 1: that he wrote in an essay published in nineteen fifty four,
Speaker 1: concluding that quote Palestine fell into the hands of Brittan,
Speaker 1: the exploiter and greedy world jewry quote. Hajja Means's own
Speaker 1: prejudices were not completely post Hawk bitterness, as we've covered
Speaker 1: on this show, or justification for that matter, again, as
Speaker 1: we've covered. By nineteen thirty nine, he had made his
Speaker 1: feelings on Jews as a people very well known. In
Speaker 1: October of nineteen thirty seven, he made a speech titled
Speaker 1: Appeal to All Muslims of the World, which was recorded
Speaker 1: in a pamphlet Maid for propaganda purposes by the Nazis
Speaker 1: a number of years later. In this speech, Hajamin claimed
Speaker 1: that quote there must be good reason unquote for why
Speaker 1: Jews had been oppressed over time, as well as repeating
Speaker 1: the conspiracy theory that quote the Jews were the epicenter
Speaker 1: of the plague of Justinian unquote, and that this quote
Speaker 1: was the reason that the Jews to this day are
Speaker 1: called microbes unquote. This was Haja Means fixation, and it
Speaker 1: was clear that anything that even hinted a conciliation toward
Speaker 1: Jews was unacceptable to him, and he would not tolerate
Speaker 1: it with anyone around him. That was what motivated him
Speaker 1: ultimately to make the decision that he did in that
Speaker 1: Beirut department in nineteen thirty nine. This also explains why,
Speaker 1: in the midst of the Arab Revolt, that Hajamin had
Speaker 1: been placing diplomatic feelers with the new Notahza regime in Germany.
Speaker 1: While his alliance with the Nazis was partly born out
Speaker 1: of necessity, one could argue thanks to his overt opposition
Speaker 1: to the British or in the Arab Revolt, and the
Speaker 1: hostility between the British and the Nazis was growing, his
Speaker 1: alliance with the Nazis was still, as we have covered
Speaker 1: on this show, very willing, very enthusiastic end quote, not
Speaker 1: for want of an alternative that Hajjamen acted as he
Speaker 1: did unquote. To use the words of Ziviel Peleg Again,
Speaker 1: this alliance between Hajjemen and the Third Reich, thanks to
Speaker 1: the outcome of the war, more than for a distrust
Speaker 1: of the new German government in the nineteen thirties, was
Speaker 1: one of the major reasons that Hajamen became discredited as
Speaker 1: a story in Gilbert Atchcar writes quote. Even before the
Speaker 1: nineteen forty eight Knakba utterly discredited him, Hajjamin's reputation had
Speaker 1: reached a low ebb in Arab and Palestinian political circles.
Speaker 1: With the defeat of the Axis powers unquote. This forced
Speaker 1: the memories of Hajamin's reckless decision making during the last
Speaker 1: year of the Arab revolt, particularly with the nineteen thirty
Speaker 1: nine White Paper, to be relived by those who had them,
Speaker 1: that is, those memories. One of Hajamin's early allies, the
Speaker 1: Arab nationalists, Musa Alami quote, eventually recognized the mufties fundamental extremism,
Speaker 1: but by then it was far too late. Haja Mean
Speaker 1: was his tragedy set a close acquaintance unquote. In the
Speaker 1: words of historian Orn Kessler. Ultimately, while some of his
Speaker 1: fellow Arab nationalists had little issue with Haja means anti
Speaker 1: Semitism as far as their own biases went, they hated
Speaker 1: him more for what he did to their movement, which
Speaker 1: had been done thanks to the anti Semitic blind spot
Speaker 1: that he always carried. By the time the consequences of
Speaker 1: Haja Means blind spot became more apparent, the specific issues
Speaker 1: underlying British mandatory authority and Jewish immigration had faded into
Speaker 1: a general state of fear. As George and Tonius observed quote,
Speaker 1: to the Arabs, the problem is now essentially one of
Speaker 1: self preservation. Thanks to Quote, Arab fears of eventual dispossession
Speaker 1: into a certainty. This led, in part, according to Antonius,
Speaker 1: to Quote, an understanding between Arabs, British and Jews increasingly
Speaker 1: difficult to attain. Hajamen and his influence had helped create
Speaker 1: this certainty of eventual dispossession. Therefore, the historical memory of
Speaker 1: the Arab revolt, and namely how it came to be
Speaker 1: defined by the Mufti and his failures due to his
Speaker 1: own bigotries, proved to be the unspoken that fractured the
Speaker 1: Arab nationalists identity, with various factions such as a secular
Speaker 1: PLO and the Islamist Hamas vying for control of the
Speaker 1: movement until the early twenty first century, when the latter,
Speaker 1: that is Hamas finally seized control.
Speaker 2: She who.
Speaker 1: The catalyst of chaos. The Arab Revolt of nineteen thirty
Speaker 1: six to nineteen thirty nine was an event with many
Speaker 1: diverse moving parts and many different figures with their own
Speaker 1: particular agendas that all produced a wide variety of results
Speaker 1: that ultimately paved the way for events that ultimately overshadowed
Speaker 1: the Arab Revolt in the historical record. However, by no
Speaker 1: means that the historical memory of the Arab Revolt diminish,
Speaker 1: especially when we examine how its historical memory shaped the
Speaker 1: identities of the three major factions who took part in it.
Speaker 1: It is clear, based on the evidence available, that the
Speaker 1: respective identities of the Arab Nationalists, the Zionists, and even
Speaker 1: the British Empire were significantly shaped by the events of
Speaker 1: the Arab Revolt. The Arab nationalists fractured identity came about
Speaker 1: thanks to the suffering and humiliation brought about by the
Speaker 1: counterinsurgency tactics used by the British authorities during the revolt itself,
Speaker 1: the intensifying retaliatory strikes from more radical Zionists that escalated
Speaker 1: during and after the revolt, and the shortsighted bigotry motivated
Speaker 1: decision making of the self appointed leadership, which was all
Speaker 1: the more delegitimized by the leadership's alliance with the Nazis
Speaker 1: during World War II. The Zionists more unified and radical
Speaker 1: identity came about thanks to the Arab Revolt, reinforcing the
Speaker 1: belief that had been building for nearly two decades that
Speaker 1: they could not rely on external help from the likes
Speaker 1: of the British or really anyone else out there. The
Speaker 1: historical memory of the revolt and the British authorities proposals
Speaker 1: to end it that the Zionists saw as unacceptable also
Speaker 1: built upon the existential threat that they saw coming from
Speaker 1: Nazi Germany, and this brought all the different factions together
Speaker 1: in a more defensive form that would come to define
Speaker 1: future conflicts and even political radicalism. Finally, the British Empire's
Speaker 1: historical memory would be one of imperial failure of decline,
Speaker 1: which they both sought to avoid by striking a compromise
Speaker 1: and then sought to justify after the fact as a
Speaker 1: peacekeeper and builder of nations. As historian Tom Segev explains, quote,
Speaker 1: the deterioration in Arab Jewish relations was threatening the prestige
Speaker 1: of the entire empire. This small strip of land clearly
Speaker 1: carried a lot of importance for a global spanning empire,
Speaker 1: as unlikely as it might seem. This, combined with the
Speaker 1: lingering presence of Christian Zionism among many colonial officials and
Speaker 1: government representatives, helped define the British self conceptualized identity as
Speaker 1: a peace key being decolonizing force deeper into the twentieth century.
Speaker 1: The identities constructed by the events and outcomes of the
Speaker 1: Arab Revolt are also significant to the broader literature that
Speaker 1: already examines the formation of the State of Israel and
Speaker 1: the origins of the ongoing Israeli Palestinian conflict, for many
Speaker 1: reasons unique to each faction of the revolt. For the
Speaker 1: Arab Nationalists, it supersedes the narratives that Palestinian suffering is
Speaker 1: unique to the experiences of the nineteen forty eight Nakba,
Speaker 1: which both contextualizes a situation that Palestinians have faced for
Speaker 1: over eight decades and acknowledges the full spectrum of agency
Speaker 1: their leadership possessed before the foundation of Israel. For the Zionists,
Speaker 1: the identity formed by the historical memory of the Arab
Speaker 1: re volt surfaces the reactive defensiveness that came to largely
Speaker 1: define the Zionists experience after the Arab Israeli War of
Speaker 1: nineteen forty and reveals its origins as existing a decade earlier. Finally,
Speaker 1: for the British Empire's identity being forged by the historical
Speaker 1: memory of the Arab Revolt, it ultimately questions the imperialist
Speaker 1: narratives of state building and magnanimous diplomatic overtures that dominated
Speaker 1: the discourse during the era of British decolonization in the
Speaker 1: twentieth century. Without the events of the Arab Revolt acting
Speaker 1: as this catalyst, the collective identities of the British Empire,
Speaker 1: the Zionists, and the Arab nationalists would not look the
Speaker 1: same after nineteen thirty nine, much less in the twenty
Speaker 1: first century. While the Zionist project has been in essence completed,
Speaker 1: the British Empire dismantled, and the Arab nationalists more atomized
Speaker 1: and radicalized than ever. The importance of the decisions made
Speaker 1: by the major figures of each faction cannot be exaggerated.
Speaker 1: Nothing is preordained in history, much less one that involves
Speaker 1: the mass movements and displacements of millions of people. But
Speaker 1: it is difficult, very very difficult to envision the same
Speaker 1: outcome occurring if the three competing interests and identities had
Speaker 1: not come together to be formed by the historical memory
Speaker 1: of the Arab Revolt. Hello again, everybody, thank you for
Speaker 1: sticking around. I just want to give a quick shout
Speaker 1: out to the supporters of History Impossible over on Patreon
Speaker 1: who are supporting the show at the comrades and friends
Speaker 1: level are above. That includes Bob Downing, Eric Hodges, Greg Hunter,
Speaker 1: s O Skip A Chaco, Molly Pan, John Pisano, Anna R.
Speaker 1: PJ Raider, Matthew Rice, Emily Schmidt, and of course f you.
Speaker 1: I very much appreciate all of these, you know, kind
Speaker 1: and generous monthly donations. They really do mean a lot.
Speaker 1: They help keep the lights on. Like I like to say,
Speaker 1: it's especially important while I'm you know, doing this grad
Speaker 1: school thing that does seem to be paying off. I'm
Speaker 1: learning a lot, I'm having a good time with it,
Speaker 1: and I'm glad to share with you now, like a
Speaker 1: lot of what I've been working on. If you read
Speaker 1: if you read the History Impossible newsletter or check out
Speaker 1: the posts on Patreon, you you know have already been
Speaker 1: seen that I've been putting a lot of stuff from
Speaker 1: there onto there, so you guys can see it. But
Speaker 1: you know, the medium is the message, and the medium
Speaker 1: in this case is a podcast. So I wanted to,
Speaker 1: you know, make it into something that you guys are
Speaker 1: all used to, and I think I did an okay
Speaker 1: job as difficult as it is to adapt academic writing
Speaker 1: into podcast form, I think, so let me know if
Speaker 1: you think it's a little stilted, of course, but I
Speaker 1: think it worked out. I have a couple more coming
Speaker 1: in the near future, two more specifically of research material
Speaker 1: that I've done. The next one is something that I
Speaker 1: have never really talked about before on this show, so
Speaker 1: I think you'll find it really interesting. I'll be trying
Speaker 1: to pair it with a polemic each episode, like I
Speaker 1: did with this one. This one is a nice sort
Speaker 1: of factual addendum to my question of genocide episode. I
Speaker 1: guess maybe just thematically. I'm not sure how to put it,
Speaker 1: but yeah, it's they pair together nicely, I think, and
Speaker 1: I'm hoping to do that with each of these episodes
Speaker 1: that are coming out. While I yes, believe it or not,
Speaker 1: I am still working on Muslim Nazis. In fact, we
Speaker 1: are about to get into the writing of that and
Speaker 1: the note taking and the incredible detail that I have
Speaker 1: to unspool. The knotted rope that I have to unspool
Speaker 1: might be a better way of putting in it, because
Speaker 1: we're going back to Yugoslavia. It is very confusing, but
Speaker 1: I do think this episode that I'm working on will
Speaker 1: I don't know. I feel the most confident about it
Speaker 1: that I have compared to most other episodes I've done,
Speaker 1: just because I think we're finally getting into the meat
Speaker 1: of that story. We're finally going back to where we
Speaker 1: started the entire series with so many years ago. So anyway,
Speaker 1: with all that said, thank you again for listening and
Speaker 1: for sticking with me all these years, for those of
Speaker 1: you who have been here all the time, and welcome
Speaker 1: to all of you newcomers. I mean, I love having
Speaker 1: you here here bring you feedback from you via email
Speaker 1: or direct message or whatever. So thank you again for listening,
Speaker 1: and stay tuned for the next episode of History Impossible.