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<v Speaker 1>Have you ever felt like you're just drowning in information,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, trying to get a grip on some complex topic,

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<v Speaker 1>especially with everything being so digital these days. Maybe you're

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<v Speaker 1>prepping for a big meeting, or just trying to understand

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<v Speaker 1>something new that well everyone else seems to get. It

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<v Speaker 1>could feel pretty overwhelming. Well, you're definitely in the right place,

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<v Speaker 1>because today's deep dive we're cutting through all that noise.

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<v Speaker 1>We're going to explore the really fascinating, always changing world

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<v Speaker 1>of information security. Our mission basically to give you a

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<v Speaker 1>straightforward but still really thorough understanding core principles, how it

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<v Speaker 1>works in the real world, and why it's just so

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<v Speaker 1>critical in our lives. We're going to strip away the jargon,

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<v Speaker 1>get to the you know, the crucial stuff, maybe throwing

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<v Speaker 1>a few surprising facts too, and guiding us our main sources.

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<v Speaker 1>Foundations of Information Security A straightforward introduction by doctor Jason Andres.

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<v Speaker 1>This guy is not just an author, he's a real

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<v Speaker 1>seasoned security pro researcher, been writing about this stuff for

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<v Speaker 1>like over a decade, and his book is known for

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<v Speaker 1>being so super clear, not overly technical, perfect for really

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<v Speaker 1>getting a handle on this. So okay, let's dive in.

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<v Speaker 1>If someone's trying to wrap their head around information security,

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<v Speaker 1>like where do we even begin? What are we actually

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<v Speaker 1>trying to protect?

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<v Speaker 2>That's the fundamental question right at its heart, information security

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<v Speaker 2>is about protecting information and the systems that handle that information.

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<v Speaker 2>If you look at US law, the formal definition is

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<v Speaker 2>something like protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification,

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<v Speaker 2>or destruction. But really it boils down to preventing misuse,

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<v Speaker 2>any kind of misuse, whether someone means to or not,

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<v Speaker 2>making sure only the right people or systems can touch

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<v Speaker 2>the data in the right ways.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, that definition really frames it, but it makes you wonder.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, in the real world, can anything ever be

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<v Speaker 1>perfectly secure? It feels like this constant battle.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a great point, and yeah, there's this built in tension.

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<v Speaker 2>There's a famous quote from Eugene Spafford, a big name

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<v Speaker 2>in security. He said something like, the only truly secure

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<v Speaker 2>system is one that is powered off, cast in a

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<v Speaker 2>block of concrete, and sealed in a lead lined room

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<v Speaker 2>with armed guards. And even then I have my doubts.

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<v Speaker 2>It perfectly captures that trade off. You know, the more

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<v Speaker 2>security you pile on the less usable or productive things

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<v Speaker 2>tend to get. So the key insight really is that

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<v Speaker 2>it's a balancing act. The cost of protecting something shouldn't

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<v Speaker 2>be more than what that thing is actually worth. Like

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<v Speaker 2>you wouldn't spend a billion dollars guarding a cookie recipe.

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<v Speaker 1>That makes total sense. This idea of trade offs are there,

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<v Speaker 1>Like models or frameworks, people used to think about these

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<v Speaker 1>different facets of security. I think I've heard of the

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<v Speaker 1>CIA triad. Ah.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, the CIA triad absolutely foundational. It stands for confidentiality, integrity,

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<v Speaker 2>and availability. So confidentiality that's about keeping data secret, protecting

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<v Speaker 2>it from unauthorized eyes your atmpion for.

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<v Speaker 1>Example, right or accidentally sending that email attachment to the wrong.

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<v Speaker 2>Person exactly, that's a confidentiality breach. Then there's integrity. This

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<v Speaker 2>is about preventing unauthorized changes to data and just as important,

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<v Speaker 2>being able to undo unwanted authorized changes. Think about altered

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<v Speaker 2>medical test results leading to the wrong treatment. That's a

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<v Speaker 2>catastrophic integrity failure.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow.

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<v Speaker 2>And finally, availability just making sure you can actually get

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<v Speaker 2>to your data when you need it. This could be

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<v Speaker 2>disrupted by anything from a simple power outage to a

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<v Speaker 2>malicious denial of service attack a DOS attack.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay. Confidentiality, integrity availability CIA seems like a really solid

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<v Speaker 1>way to break it down. Are there other angles, though,

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<v Speaker 1>other dimensions security pros think about beyond just those three?

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<v Speaker 2>Definitely, the CIA triad is like the starting point, but

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<v Speaker 2>some models go deeper. There's one called the Parkian hexad

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<v Speaker 2>from Don Parker. It keeps CIA but adds three more principles.

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<v Speaker 2>Possession or control, basically keeping physical or logical control over

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<v Speaker 2>your stuff. Then authenticity, This is making sure data really

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<v Speaker 2>came from who it says it came from, usually enforced

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<v Speaker 2>with things like digital signatures okay, which leads directly to

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<v Speaker 2>non repudiation. If you digitally signed something, you can't later say, oh,

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<v Speaker 2>that wasn't me, like a real signature on a contract.

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<v Speaker 2>And the last one is utility. The data has to

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<v Speaker 2>be well, useful, valid, and usable for what it's supposed

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<v Speaker 2>to do. The real power of these models isn't just

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<v Speaker 2>listing things. It's giving us a solid framework to think

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<v Speaker 2>through those trade offs consistently across all these different dimensions.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, so we've got these models, we understand what aspects

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<v Speaker 1>of information we're protecting, but what are we protecting from

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<v Speaker 1>when things go wrong? What are these attacks actually do?

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<v Speaker 1>What kind of damage are we talking about?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, attacks generally cause damage in a few main ways,

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<v Speaker 2>hitting those aspects we just talked about. First, you've got interruption.

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<v Speaker 2>This basically makes something unusable or unavailable, like that doss

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<v Speaker 2>attack taking down your email server can't access it. Then

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<v Speaker 2>there's modification, tampering with something, messing with its integrity, maybe

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<v Speaker 2>changing it config file to mess up a service or worse,

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<v Speaker 2>expose confidential data.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay.

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<v Speaker 2>And lastly, fabrication. This is creating fake stuff, fake data,

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<v Speaker 2>fake processes, like inserting bogus information into a database, or

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<v Speaker 2>maybe generating tons of fake network traffic to cause an

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<v Speaker 2>availability problem.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, Interruption, modification, fabrication, right, got it. So, knowing what

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<v Speaker 1>we're guarding and the kinds of threats, how do organizations

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<v Speaker 1>actually start defending themselves? How do you manage all this risk?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, effective defense really starts with a structured process. It's

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<v Speaker 2>usually a five step risk management cycle. First, you identify

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<v Speaker 2>critical information what absolutely needs protecting. For a software company,

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<v Speaker 2>maybe it's their source code. Second, you analyze threats who

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<v Speaker 2>are what could harm that information? Insiders, cyber criminals, nation states. Third,

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<v Speaker 2>analyze vulnerabilities. Where are the weaknesses in your current defenses?

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<v Speaker 2>Maybe uh, weak access controls on that source code repository. Fourth,

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<v Speaker 2>u assess risks. Now, a risk is really a threat

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<v Speaker 2>combined with a vulnerability. So that database holding customer data,

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<v Speaker 2>if it doesn't have redundancy, that's a big risk to

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<v Speaker 2>availability if the main one fails. And finally step five

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<v Speaker 2>apply countermeasures. These are the security controls you put in

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<v Speaker 2>place to actually reduce those risks.

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<v Speaker 1>You found countermeasures the controls, right, So once the risks

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<v Speaker 1>are known, what do these controls actually look like? What

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<v Speaker 1>are the main types?

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<v Speaker 2>Good question? They generally fall into three buckets. First, physical controls.

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<v Speaker 2>These protect the actual physical environment, think fences, locks, security guards,

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<v Speaker 2>even making sure the server room has good air conditioning.

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<v Speaker 2>These are absolutely vital. Why so vital because if someone

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<v Speaker 2>can just walk in and physically take your servers, while

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<v Speaker 2>all your fancy software security doesn't mean much does it?

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<v Speaker 1>Good? Point? Okay? Physical? What else? Second?

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<v Speaker 2>Logical controls. These are the technical measures firewalls, intrusion detection systems,

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<v Speaker 2>access control lists on files, all the tech stuff. And Third,

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<v Speaker 2>administrative controls. These are the rules policies, procedures, things like

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<v Speaker 2>password complexity rules, mandatory security training, or even just as

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<v Speaker 2>sign saying turn off the coffee pot. Okay, but here's

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<v Speaker 2>the thing about administrative controls, and this is crucial. They

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<v Speaker 2>are worse than useless if they're not enforced. They just

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<v Speaker 2>create this false sense of security. Oh, we have a

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<v Speaker 2>policy for that, but if nobody follows.

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<v Speaker 1>It, right, it's just words on paper, okay, physical, logical, administrative. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>it sounds like we're building layers here, which makes me

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<v Speaker 1>think of defense and depth. I hear that term a lot.

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<v Speaker 2>What's that about defense and depth? Yeah, it's a core principle.

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<v Speaker 2>The idea isn't just piling on more security. It's about

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<v Speaker 2>layering different kinds of security controls. So if one layer

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<v Speaker 2>fails or an attacker gets past it, there's another layer waiting.

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<v Speaker 2>It buys you time basically time to detect the attack,

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<v Speaker 2>time to respond. Can you give you example, sure, think

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<v Speaker 2>about password strength. An eight character all lowercase password like

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<v Speaker 2>my password, an attacker might crack that in I don't

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<v Speaker 2>know hours or weeks. But a ten character password mixed

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<v Speaker 2>case numbers symbols like is un QW three cents that

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<v Speaker 2>could take decades to crack with current tech. That's one layer.

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<v Speaker 2>But defense in depth also tackles problems like manual synchronization.

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<v Speaker 2>That's just using the same password everywhere. If once it

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<v Speaker 2>gets breached, boom, attackers try that password on your bank,

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<v Speaker 2>your email.

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<v Speaker 1>Ah, yeah, guilty is charged.

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<v Speaker 2>Sometimes we all are but using different strong passwords plus

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<v Speaker 2>maybe MFA. That's layering defenses.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, layers make sense, but you know, even with the

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<v Speaker 1>best layers, breaches happen. So if an attack does get through,

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<v Speaker 1>what's the game plan? What does a good incident response

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<v Speaker 1>look like?

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, you have to assume something will eventually get through.

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<v Speaker 2>No defense is perfect, So effective incident response is critical

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<v Speaker 2>and it has distinct femins. And honestly, most important phase

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<v Speaker 2>is preparation, doing the work before anything happens. Policies, training, documentation, running.

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<v Speaker 1>Drills so you're not scrambling mid crisis exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>You don't want to be figuring out who to call

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<v Speaker 2>while the building's metaphorical fire alarm is going off. After

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<v Speaker 2>prep comes detection and analysis that something's wrong. Often security

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<v Speaker 2>tools flag things and then figuring out, okay, is this

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<v Speaker 2>a real incident or a false alarm that takes human

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<v Speaker 2>judgment combined with automation. Then you move into containment, eradication,

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<v Speaker 2>and recovery basically, stop the bleeding, clean up the mess,

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<v Speaker 2>and get things back online safely. And finally, and this

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<v Speaker 2>is key post incident activity, the post mortem, not to

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<v Speaker 2>point fingers, but to learn what went wrong? How can

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<v Speaker 2>we do better next time? How can we prevent this

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<v Speaker 2>specific thing?

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<v Speaker 1>Again? That learning part seems crucial. Okay, shifting gears a bit.

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<v Speaker 1>It feels like so much as security boils down to

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<v Speaker 1>who gets in, who has access, how do we differentiate

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<v Speaker 1>between just like saying who you are and proving who

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<v Speaker 1>you are, identification versus authentication.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that's a really important distinction. Identification is simply claiming

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<v Speaker 2>an identity, me saying I'm Bob, or a computer saying

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<v Speaker 2>I'm server X. Identity verification is a step beyond like

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<v Speaker 2>showing your driver's license. It provides some evidence, but authentication

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<v Speaker 2>is the actual process of verifying that against some trusted

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<v Speaker 2>credential or factor.

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<v Speaker 1>And why is that verification so critical?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, consider this identity thieves stole something like sixteen point

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<v Speaker 2>eight billion dollars from US consumers back in twenty seventeen.

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<v Speaker 2>A huge chimp of that was because the activities involved

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<v Speaker 2>didn't require strong authentication. It's easy to claim to be someone.

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<v Speaker 2>Proving it is harder, and that's where security lies.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so how do we prove it? What are these

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<v Speaker 1>factors of authentication? Passwords are one, obviously, but what else?

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<v Speaker 2>Right? Passwords fall under the First factor? Something you know,

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<v Speaker 2>like a password, a PI in a secret question. Often

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<v Speaker 2>the weakest because people choose bad ones or reuse them.

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<v Speaker 2>Second factor, something you are. Biometrics, fingerprints, iris, scans, facial recognition.

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<v Speaker 2>These are stronger in some ways, but they have issues

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<v Speaker 2>like what well, they can sometimes be forged, and more importantly,

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<v Speaker 2>if your biometric data gets stolen, say your fingerprints, you

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<v Speaker 2>can't just change your fingerprints like you change a password.

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<v Speaker 2>Remember that big OPM breach In twenty fifteen, five point

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<v Speaker 2>six million the US federal employees have their fingerprint stolen.

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<v Speaker 2>Makes re enrolling them pretty tricky.

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<v Speaker 1>Ray, Wow, Yeah, I didn't think about that. Okay, what's next?

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<v Speaker 2>Third factor? Something you have a physical object like your

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<v Speaker 2>ATM card, a hardware token that generates those little codes

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<v Speaker 2>that change every minute, or even your smartphone getting a

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<v Speaker 2>push notification. Then there's something you do, which is more

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<v Speaker 2>about behavioral biometrics like your unique signature or typing pattern.

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<v Speaker 2>And finally, where you are using your location as a factor.

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<v Speaker 1>So five factors and putting them together.

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<v Speaker 2>That's multi factor authentication MFA, or often two factor authentication

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<v Speaker 2>two FA, using two or more different factors like your

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<v Speaker 2>ATM cards something you have, plus your pin something you know,

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<v Speaker 2>much stronger than just one factor alone.

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<v Speaker 1>Makes sense. Now I've heard the term mutual authentication. What's

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<v Speaker 1>that about and why does it matter? Ah?

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<v Speaker 2>Mutual authentication that's where both sides prove their identity to

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<v Speaker 2>each other, not just you proving yourself to the server,

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<v Speaker 2>but the server also proving itself to you.

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<v Speaker 1>Why is that necessary?

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<v Speaker 2>It's crucial for preventing man in the middle attacks. If

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<v Speaker 2>only you authenticate, an attacker could potentially sit between you

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<v Speaker 2>and the real server, pretending to be the server to

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<v Speaker 2>you and pretending to be you to the server. They

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<v Speaker 2>intercept everything.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh okay, like an imposter relaying messages exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Mutual authentication helps shut that down by making sure both

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<v Speaker 2>ends are talking to who they think they're talking to.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, so we've authenticated someone, we know who they are,

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<v Speaker 1>But how do we control what they can actually do

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<v Speaker 1>once they're in. That's access control precisely.

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<v Speaker 2>Access controls determine who or what gets to access which resources,

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<v Speaker 2>and what actions they're allowed to perform read, write, delete,

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<v Speaker 2>execute whatever. A really common way to implement this is

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<v Speaker 2>using access control lists or acls. You see these all

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<v Speaker 2>the time and file systems like.

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<v Speaker 1>On Linux or Mac. When you do elslie those RVX.

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<v Speaker 2>Permissions exactly that read write, execute permissions assigned to the owner,

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<v Speaker 2>a group and everyone else. That's a classic ACL. But

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<v Speaker 2>acls aren't perfect. They can suffer from something called the

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<v Speaker 2>confused deputy problem. But what now the confused deputy? Imagine

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<v Speaker 2>you have a powerful system processed the deputy that has

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<v Speaker 2>lots of permissions. An attacker with fewer permissions might trick

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<v Speaker 2>that deputy into performing an action on their behalf using

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<v Speaker 2>the deputy's higher privileges.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, I think I get it. Tricking the powerful.

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<v Speaker 2>Assistant, right, And this vulnerability is often exploited in things

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<v Speaker 2>like cross site request forgery CSRF or clickjacking. These are

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<v Speaker 2>attacks that trick your browser, acting as a sort of

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<v Speaker 2>deputy for you, into doing things on websites you're logged

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<v Speaker 2>into without you realizing it, like making a purchase or

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<v Speaker 2>changing your password just by you clicking a disguised link

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<v Speaker 2>or button.

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<v Speaker 1>Yikes. Okay, so digital access is complex. What about just

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<v Speaker 1>physical access? Blocks on doors? Seems basic but probably still.

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<v Speaker 2>Important, absolutely fundamental. Physical access controls are all about regulating

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<v Speaker 2>who can physically get near the systems or data. A

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<v Speaker 2>really common problem here is tailgating are sometimes called piggybacking.

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<v Speaker 2>Someone just follows an authorized person through a secure door

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<v Speaker 2>without badging in themselves.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, holding the door open for someone exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>It relies on politeness. Solutions range from strict policies and

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<v Speaker 2>having guards watch entrances to physical barriers like turnstiles that

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<v Speaker 2>only let one person through per valid credential. Think about

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<v Speaker 2>airport security. That's a massive, complex system of layered physical

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<v Speaker 2>access controls, checking IDs, scanning bags, controlling movement between zones,

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<v Speaker 2>all to manage physical access.

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<v Speaker 1>True. Okay, so beyond the tech and the physical, there's

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<v Speaker 1>this whole layer of rules and regulations laws. What exactly

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<v Speaker 1>is compliance in security and why is it such a

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<v Speaker 1>big deal?

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<v Speaker 2>Compliance, simply put, is just sticking to the rules, But

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<v Speaker 2>the rules can come from different places. You've got regulatory compliance,

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<v Speaker 2>which means rules mandated by law. Think FISMA for US

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<v Speaker 2>federal agencies, HYPATH for healthcare information, or FEDBRAM for cloud

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<v Speaker 2>providers wanting government contracts. FEDRAM is interesting. It gives a

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<v Speaker 2>single authority to operate an ATO, but the security bar

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<v Speaker 2>is incredibly high.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so legal requirements. What else?

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<v Speaker 2>Then there's industry compliance. These aren't laws, but standards set

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<v Speaker 2>by industry bodies. PCFID DSS. The Payment Card Industry Data

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<v Speaker 2>Security Standard is the big one here. If you want

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<v Speaker 2>to process credit cards, you have to comply or you

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<v Speaker 2>face massive fines or even get cut off from processing payments.

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<v Speaker 2>Huge business impact, so high stakes either way, definitely, and

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<v Speaker 2>breaches really drive this home. Look at the twenty seventeen

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<v Speaker 2>Equifex breach data for one hundred and forty seven million

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<v Speaker 2>Americans stolen why an unpatched vulnerability and Apache struts two

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<v Speaker 2>and inadequate controls. That mess really underscored accountability and led

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<v Speaker 2>to breach disclosure laws popping up in all fifty US

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<v Speaker 2>states by twenty eighteen. So compliance isn't just about ticking

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<v Speaker 2>boxes to avoid fines. It's about demonstrating you're taking security seriously,

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<v Speaker 2>building trust and ultimately being more resilient.

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<v Speaker 1>And if a client's demand sticking to rules, how do

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<v Speaker 1>organizations prove they're doing it? What role do audit to play?

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<v Speaker 2>Audits are key for account of bile. An audit is

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<v Speaker 2>basically a methodical checkup, examining records, interviewing people, testing controls

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<v Speaker 2>to verify that you are in fact complying with those laws, regulations,

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<v Speaker 2>or standards. Some auditing bodies have real teeth. The Business

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<v Speaker 2>Software Alliance the BSA audits companies for software license compliance.

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<v Speaker 2>If they find unlicensed software, settlements can hit two hundred

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<v Speaker 2>and fifty thousand dollars per instance, and they even offer

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<v Speaker 2>rewards up to a million bucks for whistleblowers.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow, serious business it is.

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<v Speaker 2>But here's a critical insight about auditing. A lot of

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<v Speaker 2>it relies on logs, records of who did what when,

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<v Speaker 2>But just collecting logs is useless if no one ever

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<v Speaker 2>looks at them. Regular review is essential for logs to

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<v Speaker 2>have any value for accountability or security.

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<v Speaker 1>Makes sense, Log it and look at it. Okay, let's

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<v Speaker 1>sing back to people. We often hear people are the

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<v Speaker 1>weakest link. How do attackers actually exploit as humans?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah? The human element is a huge target. Attackers who

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<v Speaker 2>focus on this are called social engineers. They gather intelligence

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<v Speaker 2>in two main ways. Human or human intelligence comes from

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<v Speaker 2>talking to people, maybe direct scams, maybe just subtle questioning,

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<v Speaker 2>building rapport an osent. Open source intelligence comes from publicly

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<v Speaker 2>available information, job postings, revealing tech used, social media posts,

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<v Speaker 2>public records, even hidden data in files like GPS coordinates

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<v Speaker 2>embedded in photos that's called exif data, so that.

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<v Speaker 1>They build a profile from public scraps exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And there are powerful tools things like showdown that scans

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<v Speaker 2>the Internet for connected devices or Maltago that visualizes relationships

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<v Speaker 2>between data points that help attackers gather and connect massive

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<v Speaker 2>amounts of this ocent to find vulnerabilities or craft targeted attacks.

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<v Speaker 1>That's kind of scary. So what specific kinds of social

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<v Speaker 1>engineering attack should people really watch out for?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, there are a few classic techniques. Pretexting is a

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<v Speaker 2>big one. The attacker creates a believable scenario, often pretending

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<v Speaker 2>to be someone trustworthy. Maybe it support maybe a vendor

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<v Speaker 2>to trick you into giving up info or doing something like.

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<v Speaker 1>I need your password to fix your account, right.

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<v Speaker 2>Or maybe something more subtle. Then there's phishing using email,

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<v Speaker 2>text messages sometimes spend calls to trick you into clicking

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<v Speaker 2>malicious links, opening infected attachments, or entering credentials on fake

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<v Speaker 2>websites that look real. Browsers are getting better at warning us,

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<v Speaker 2>but it's still incredibly common and effective.

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<v Speaker 1>I get those emails all the time.

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<v Speaker 2>We all do. And don't forget tailgating, which we mentioned

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<v Speaker 2>with physical access. That's also a social engineering tactic, relying

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<v Speaker 2>on someone's politeness or inattention to bypass a physical control.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so if people are the target, how do we

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<v Speaker 1>make them less vulnerable? What goes into good security awareness

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<v Speaker 1>training that actually sticks?

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<v Speaker 2>Effective training is absolutely crucial. It needs to cover several

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<v Speaker 2>key areas. Password hygiene is fundamental, Teaching people why strong,

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<v Speaker 2>unique passwords matter and the risks of reusing them, Instilling

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<v Speaker 2>a healthy sense of skepticism, a trust but verify mindset.

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<v Speaker 2>Encourage people if something seems weird or too good to

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<v Speaker 2>be true, don't just click or comply, check with the

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<v Speaker 2>security team or the supposed center through a different channel.

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<v Speaker 2>Good advice training on safe network usage is vital too,

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<v Speaker 2>Explaining the dangers of unsecured public Wi Fi like in

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<v Speaker 2>coffee shops or hotels, and why using a VPN is important.

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<v Speaker 2>When accessing work resources from outside the office network, people

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<v Speaker 2>need to know how to spot malware, red flags, weird

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<v Speaker 2>email attachments like ex files, maybe even ZP or PDF,

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<v Speaker 2>sometimes links hidden behind URL shorteners, website addresses that are

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<v Speaker 2>slightly misspelled, apps from unofficial stores.

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<v Speaker 1>Write the basics.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, and clear rules around using personal equipment for work,

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<v Speaker 2>bring your own device or BYOD policies, Plus simple things

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<v Speaker 2>like a clean desk policy. Don't leave sensitive papers lying around.

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<v Speaker 2>But here's the real key. The training has to be engaging.

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<v Speaker 2>Nobody learns from a dry, fifty page policy document sent

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<v Speaker 2>once a year. Make it interactive, quizzes, videos, posters, maybe

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<v Speaker 2>even little giveaways for participation. Make it memorable, make it regular.

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<v Speaker 2>That's how you build a strong human firewall.

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<v Speaker 1>Engaging just informing. Got it okay? It Shift to the

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<v Speaker 1>really technical stuff. Cryptography. How does this sort of secret

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<v Speaker 1>coding protect our data today?

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<v Speaker 2>Cryptography is basically the science of scrambling information so only

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<v Speaker 2>authorized parties can understand it. It protects both confidentiality, keeping

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<v Speaker 2>its secret and integrity, ensuring it hasn't been tampered with.

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<v Speaker 2>Its history is fascinating from ancient methods like the Caesar cipher,

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<v Speaker 2>just shifting letters like ROT thirteen up to complex machines

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<v Speaker 2>like the German Enigma in World War.

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<v Speaker 1>Two, which is famously broken.

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<v Speaker 2>Right and partly because it's security relied on keeping the

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<v Speaker 2>machines designed secret, what we call security through obscurity, which

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<v Speaker 2>is generally a bad idea. Modern crypto algorithms are the opposite.

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<v Speaker 2>They're usually public knowledge, heavily scrutinized by experts worldwide. Their

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<v Speaker 2>strength comes from relying on really hard mathematical problems, one

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<v Speaker 2>way problems, things that are easy to do one way,

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<v Speaker 2>like multiplying two huge prime numbers, but incredibly difficult to reverse,

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<v Speaker 2>like factoring the result back into the original primes.

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<v Speaker 1>So based on hardmath, what are the main types of

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<v Speaker 1>encryption we use now?

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<v Speaker 2>Broadly? There are two main families. Symmetric key cryptography uses

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<v Speaker 2>the same secret key for both encryption and decryption. Algorithms

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<v Speaker 2>like AES Advanced Encryption Standard are the modern workhorses here.

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<v Speaker 1>Strong fast, Look the challenges.

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<v Speaker 2>Sharing that single key securely. If you and I want

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<v Speaker 2>to communicate using symmetric encryption, how do I get the

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<v Speaker 2>secret key to you without someone intercepting it. That's the key.

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<v Speaker 1>Exchange problem, right, So what's the alternative.

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<v Speaker 2>That's asymmetric key cryptography, also known as public key cryptography.

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<v Speaker 2>This is really clever. It uses a pair of keys,

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<v Speaker 2>a public key that you can share with anyone and

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<v Speaker 2>a private key that you keep absolutely secret. Data encrypted

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<v Speaker 2>with the public key can only be decrypted with the

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<v Speaker 2>corresponding private key. This concept came about in the mid

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<v Speaker 2>seventies from Diffie and Hellman, and PGP uses this yep,

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<v Speaker 2>pretty good privacy. PGP is a famous example. Phil Zimmerman,

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<v Speaker 2>its creator, even got into legal trouble back in the

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<v Speaker 2>nineties because the US government considered strong crypto like PGP

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<v Speaker 2>to be munitions and restricted its export. Shows how powerful

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<v Speaker 2>this tech was considered even then.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow. Okay, so symmetric and asymmetric encryption. What about hashes

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<v Speaker 1>and digital signatures? Are they related?

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<v Speaker 2>They are related to crypto, but serve different purposes. Hash

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<v Speaker 2>functions are sometimes called keyless cryptography. They take an input

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<v Speaker 2>any data and produce a fixed sized string of characters

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<v Speaker 2>the hash or message digest. It's like a unique fingerprint.

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<v Speaker 1>For the data. You can't get the original data back

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<v Speaker 1>from the hash.

419
00:22:33.799 --> 00:22:36.200
<v Speaker 2>No, it's a one Way Street. But if any part

420
00:22:36.279 --> 00:22:39.160
<v Speaker 2>of the original data changes, the hash changes completely. So

421
00:22:39.200 --> 00:22:43.200
<v Speaker 2>they're fantastic for verifying data integrity. Did this file download correctly?

422
00:22:43.279 --> 00:22:45.640
<v Speaker 2>Has this document been tampered with? You check the hash.

423
00:22:46.000 --> 00:22:48.279
<v Speaker 2>We used to use mt five, but found ways to

424
00:22:48.359 --> 00:22:51.680
<v Speaker 2>create collisions different inputs making the same hash, So now

425
00:22:51.720 --> 00:22:54.680
<v Speaker 2>we use stronger ones like SAHA two or SAHA three.

426
00:22:54.920 --> 00:22:58.039
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so hashing is for integrity. What about signatures?

427
00:22:58.400 --> 00:23:02.640
<v Speaker 2>Digital signatures use a symmetric cryptography that public private key pair,

428
00:23:03.359 --> 00:23:07.279
<v Speaker 2>but for authenticity and non repudiation. Essentially, you use your

429
00:23:07.319 --> 00:23:11.079
<v Speaker 2>private key to sign a message or document. Anyone can

430
00:23:11.119 --> 00:23:13.319
<v Speaker 2>then use your public key to verify that the signature

431
00:23:13.440 --> 00:23:15.680
<v Speaker 2>is valid and that the message hasn't been changed since

432
00:23:15.720 --> 00:23:18.799
<v Speaker 2>it was signed. And because only you have your private key,

433
00:23:18.960 --> 00:23:21.720
<v Speaker 2>it proves you sent it. You can't repudiate it later.

434
00:23:21.799 --> 00:23:23.799
<v Speaker 1>And how do we know whose public key is whose?

435
00:23:24.200 --> 00:23:28.519
<v Speaker 2>That's where certificates and certificate authorities CAAs come in. A

436
00:23:28.519 --> 00:23:31.960
<v Speaker 2>certificate binds a public key to an identity like a

437
00:23:32.000 --> 00:23:35.000
<v Speaker 2>person or a website, and it's digitally signed by a

438
00:23:35.000 --> 00:23:39.200
<v Speaker 2>trusted CAA. This whole system of CAA's certificates and keys

439
00:23:39.240 --> 00:23:42.240
<v Speaker 2>is called a Public Key Infrastructure or PKI. It's the

440
00:23:42.319 --> 00:23:44.079
<v Speaker 2>trust framework for much of the Internet.

441
00:23:44.240 --> 00:23:46.480
<v Speaker 1>Got it? That makes sense. So we have all these

442
00:23:46.480 --> 00:23:49.200
<v Speaker 1>crypto tools, how do we apply them? Data seems vulnerable,

443
00:23:49.200 --> 00:23:51.480
<v Speaker 1>whether it's just sitting on a hard drive or flying across.

444
00:23:51.160 --> 00:23:54.480
<v Speaker 2>The internet exactly. We need to protect data in different states.

445
00:23:54.880 --> 00:23:57.400
<v Speaker 2>Data at rest is data that's stored on hard drives,

446
00:23:57.519 --> 00:24:01.519
<v Speaker 2>USB sticks, databases. We protect this with encryption, full disc

447
00:24:01.640 --> 00:24:05.640
<v Speaker 2>encryption tools like vercrypt, BitLocker on Windows, dmcrypt on Linux,

448
00:24:05.720 --> 00:24:08.480
<v Speaker 2>encrypt everything on the drive. Remember that story about the

449
00:24:08.519 --> 00:24:11.839
<v Speaker 2>Heathrow Airport USB drive found on the street in twenty seventeen.

450
00:24:12.359 --> 00:24:15.880
<v Speaker 2>It had security details for the Queen Airport patrol routes,

451
00:24:16.160 --> 00:24:19.519
<v Speaker 2>all unencrypted. A simple encryption step could have prevented a

452
00:24:19.559 --> 00:24:20.759
<v Speaker 2>massive security scare.

453
00:24:20.880 --> 00:24:23.759
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, that's a sobering example. What about data moving around?

454
00:24:23.839 --> 00:24:26.920
<v Speaker 2>That's data in motion, data traveling across networks. Here, we

455
00:24:26.960 --> 00:24:29.599
<v Speaker 2>can encrypt the data itself before sending, or we can

456
00:24:29.680 --> 00:24:32.920
<v Speaker 2>encrypt the entire connection. You see this with ssltls, the

457
00:24:32.960 --> 00:24:36.200
<v Speaker 2>little padlock in your browser securing website connections, or with

458
00:24:36.319 --> 00:24:40.799
<v Speaker 2>virtual private networks VPNs like IPsec or ssl VPNs. VPNs

459
00:24:40.839 --> 00:24:43.880
<v Speaker 2>create an encrypted tunnel between your device and a remote network,

460
00:24:43.920 --> 00:24:46.880
<v Speaker 2>protecting all the traffic inside essential for remote work or

461
00:24:46.960 --> 00:24:49.079
<v Speaker 2>using untrusted networks like public Wi Fi.

462
00:24:49.240 --> 00:24:52.319
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so encrypting data at rest and in motion. What

463
00:24:52.319 --> 00:24:54.640
<v Speaker 1>about the networks themselves? They must be huge targets. How

464
00:24:54.640 --> 00:24:55.720
<v Speaker 1>do we secure the plumbing?

465
00:24:55.960 --> 00:25:01.160
<v Speaker 2>Network security is critical. It involves a couple of main strategy. First,

466
00:25:01.400 --> 00:25:05.440
<v Speaker 2>secure network design. This means things like network segmentation, dividing

467
00:25:05.480 --> 00:25:08.880
<v Speaker 2>your network into smaller, isolated zones or subnets, so if

468
00:25:08.920 --> 00:25:11.839
<v Speaker 2>one part gets compromised, the damage doesn't easily.

469
00:25:11.480 --> 00:25:13.440
<v Speaker 1>Spread, like putting walls between departments.

470
00:25:13.599 --> 00:25:17.160
<v Speaker 2>Kind of yeah. It also involves creating choke points places

471
00:25:17.160 --> 00:25:20.160
<v Speaker 2>like routers and firewalls, where you can inspect and control

472
00:25:20.200 --> 00:25:25.119
<v Speaker 2>traffic moving between segments, and building in redundancy, backup internet connections,

473
00:25:25.200 --> 00:25:29.160
<v Speaker 2>backup paths so the network stays available even if something fails.

474
00:25:29.599 --> 00:25:32.680
<v Speaker 2>Think about that Internet shutdown in Cameroon in twenty seventeen,

475
00:25:32.799 --> 00:25:36.400
<v Speaker 2>ninety three days offline because of civil unrest, cutting connections,

476
00:25:36.759 --> 00:25:38.920
<v Speaker 2>redundancy and resilient design matter.

477
00:25:38.960 --> 00:25:42.240
<v Speaker 1>Okay, design is one part. What about the tools firewalls? Right?

478
00:25:42.599 --> 00:25:45.519
<v Speaker 2>Firewalls are fundamental. They act like traffic cops. At the

479
00:25:45.599 --> 00:25:48.720
<v Speaker 2>edge of your network or between segments. They range from

480
00:25:48.759 --> 00:25:52.279
<v Speaker 2>basic packet filtering looking at addresses and ports, to more

481
00:25:52.319 --> 00:25:57.599
<v Speaker 2>advanced stateful packet inspection tracking connections to deep packet inspection

482
00:25:58.200 --> 00:26:02.240
<v Speaker 2>actually looking inside the data packs. DPI is powerful, but

483
00:26:02.359 --> 00:26:06.799
<v Speaker 2>raises privacy concerns. We also use demilitarized zones DMZs. This

484
00:26:06.920 --> 00:26:10.279
<v Speaker 2>is usually a separate network segment sitting true two firewalls.

485
00:26:10.799 --> 00:26:13.640
<v Speaker 2>You put your public facing servers there, like your web server.

486
00:26:14.119 --> 00:26:17.039
<v Speaker 2>It's accessible from the Internet, but isolated from your internal networks.

487
00:26:17.039 --> 00:26:18.480
<v Speaker 1>Got above or zone exactly.

488
00:26:18.880 --> 00:26:22.839
<v Speaker 2>Then you have intrusion detention systems idss. These watch network

489
00:26:22.839 --> 00:26:26.319
<v Speaker 2>traffic for suspicious activity that can be signature based, looking

490
00:26:26.319 --> 00:26:29.799
<v Speaker 2>for known attack patterns like specific malware, or anomaly based

491
00:26:30.079 --> 00:26:33.279
<v Speaker 2>looking for unusual behavior that deviates from a baseline normal.

492
00:26:33.680 --> 00:26:37.119
<v Speaker 2>Anomaly detection can catch new attacks, but sometimes generates more

493
00:26:37.119 --> 00:26:38.279
<v Speaker 2>false alarms.

494
00:26:37.920 --> 00:26:40.759
<v Speaker 1>So watching the traffic. What else helps secure.

495
00:26:40.400 --> 00:26:44.440
<v Speaker 2>Networks using VPNs again to secure traffic over untrusted networks,

496
00:26:44.640 --> 00:26:47.680
<v Speaker 2>promoting the use of secure protocols SSH instead of telnet

497
00:26:47.720 --> 00:26:51.400
<v Speaker 2>for remote log in, SFTP instead of FTP for file transfer.

498
00:26:51.640 --> 00:26:55.720
<v Speaker 2>Those older protocols send data, including passwords in plaintext. Being

499
00:26:55.799 --> 00:26:59.519
<v Speaker 2>vigilant about wireless security is huge too. Rogue access points,

500
00:26:59.559 --> 00:27:01.880
<v Speaker 2>fake wide I find networks set up by attackers are

501
00:27:01.880 --> 00:27:05.480
<v Speaker 2>a common threat, and security pros use various network security tools.

502
00:27:05.640 --> 00:27:08.720
<v Speaker 2>Sniffers like TCP dump or wire shark let you capture

503
00:27:08.720 --> 00:27:12.400
<v Speaker 2>and analyze raw network traffic. Wireless spanners like kismet help

504
00:27:12.440 --> 00:27:16.000
<v Speaker 2>find Wi Fi networks, and sometimes defenders set up honeypots.

505
00:27:16.359 --> 00:27:19.400
<v Speaker 2>These are decoy systems designed to look attractive to attackers.

506
00:27:19.559 --> 00:27:21.599
<v Speaker 2>They lure them in, let them probe around so the

507
00:27:21.640 --> 00:27:25.039
<v Speaker 2>defenders can study their techniques and tools without risking real systems.

508
00:27:25.119 --> 00:27:30.279
<v Speaker 1>Honeypots cool, okay. Moving up the stack, the operating system itself, Windows, Linux,

509
00:27:30.359 --> 00:27:33.559
<v Speaker 1>make OS. That's the foundation for everything we run. How

510
00:27:33.559 --> 00:27:34.519
<v Speaker 1>do we lock that down?

511
00:27:34.799 --> 00:27:39.200
<v Speaker 2>Securing the OS is called operating system hardening. The goal

512
00:27:39.400 --> 00:27:42.880
<v Speaker 2>is to reduce the attack surface, shrink the number of

513
00:27:42.920 --> 00:27:46.160
<v Speaker 2>ways an attacker could potentially get in or cause harm.

514
00:27:46.680 --> 00:27:50.279
<v Speaker 2>This involves several steps, Removing any software or services that

515
00:27:50.319 --> 00:27:55.039
<v Speaker 2>aren't absolutely necessary, changing default user names and passwords a

516
00:27:55.160 --> 00:27:59.599
<v Speaker 2>really big one. Applying the principle of least privilege, users

517
00:27:59.640 --> 00:28:03.079
<v Speaker 2>and processes should only have the absolute minimum permissions they

518
00:28:03.119 --> 00:28:06.279
<v Speaker 2>need to do their job. If malware infects a user

519
00:28:06.319 --> 00:28:09.440
<v Speaker 2>account with limited privileges, it can do far less damage

520
00:28:09.519 --> 00:28:11.599
<v Speaker 2>than if it infects an administrator account.

521
00:28:11.680 --> 00:28:14.759
<v Speaker 1>That seems like common sense, but probably hard to implement perfectly.

522
00:28:14.839 --> 00:28:17.359
<v Speaker 2>It can be. There's often a trade off with convenience.

523
00:28:17.599 --> 00:28:20.799
<v Speaker 2>It's also interesting. Historically the mindset around this differed a

524
00:28:20.799 --> 00:28:24.240
<v Speaker 2>bit between Windows environments and Unix Linix environments, though things

525
00:28:24.279 --> 00:28:27.480
<v Speaker 2>are converging more now. Other hardening steps include keeping the

526
00:28:27.480 --> 00:28:32.039
<v Speaker 2>OS and applications constantly updated and patched, enabling logging and auditing,

527
00:28:32.079 --> 00:28:34.799
<v Speaker 2>and reviewing those logs. Like we said before, what about.

528
00:28:34.559 --> 00:28:37.480
<v Speaker 1>Protecting against malware specifically? On the OS level?

529
00:28:37.720 --> 00:28:41.200
<v Speaker 2>Anti malware tools are essential, of course. They use signatures

530
00:28:41.240 --> 00:28:44.559
<v Speaker 2>of known malware or heuristics and anomaly detection to spot

531
00:28:44.599 --> 00:28:49.119
<v Speaker 2>suspicious behavior, but modern oees also have built in defenses.

532
00:28:49.359 --> 00:28:53.640
<v Speaker 2>Executable space protection sometimes called DP or xd bit, prevents

533
00:28:53.680 --> 00:28:55.960
<v Speaker 2>code from running in memory areas where it shouldn't, like

534
00:28:56.079 --> 00:29:01.000
<v Speaker 2>data segments, and addressed space layout randomization as makes it

535
00:29:01.039 --> 00:29:03.960
<v Speaker 2>harder for attackers to predict where system components are loaded

536
00:29:03.960 --> 00:29:07.599
<v Speaker 2>in memory. Both of these help block common buffer overflow attacks,

537
00:29:07.640 --> 00:29:10.319
<v Speaker 2>where attackers try to overwrite memory to run their own code,

538
00:29:10.920 --> 00:29:13.759
<v Speaker 2>host based firewalls, and IDs tools running directly on the

539
00:29:13.759 --> 00:29:15.359
<v Speaker 2>machine add yet another layer.

540
00:29:15.519 --> 00:29:18.279
<v Speaker 1>Are there tools to check how well in OS is hardened?

541
00:29:18.440 --> 00:29:22.799
<v Speaker 2>Absolutely? Vulnerability scanners like NMP or openbas can scan systems

542
00:29:22.839 --> 00:29:26.400
<v Speaker 2>for known weaknesses, and exploit frameworks like messploate contain tools

543
00:29:26.440 --> 00:29:29.279
<v Speaker 2>to actually test those vulnerabilities. Security pros use these to

544
00:29:29.279 --> 00:29:30.720
<v Speaker 2>find holes before the bad guys do.

545
00:29:31.000 --> 00:29:37.519
<v Speaker 1>Okay, OS hardening crucial, But now everything's smart phones, watches, TVs, fridges,

546
00:29:37.599 --> 00:29:40.319
<v Speaker 1>light bulbs. Are these creating whole new security headaches?

547
00:29:40.480 --> 00:29:45.319
<v Speaker 2>Oh? Absolutely? Mobile devices imduing systems, Internet of things, IoT devices.

548
00:29:45.319 --> 00:29:48.759
<v Speaker 2>They're everywhere, often overlooked from a security perspective, and a

549
00:29:48.799 --> 00:29:54.160
<v Speaker 2>compromise can have really serious consequences. Take mobile devices, smartphones, tablets.

550
00:29:54.759 --> 00:29:58.839
<v Speaker 2>Companies use Mobile device management MDM solutions sometimes called EMM

551
00:29:58.960 --> 00:30:02.519
<v Speaker 2>or UEM to manage fleets of devices, whether their company

552
00:30:02.519 --> 00:30:06.880
<v Speaker 2>owned or employee owned byd These systems can enforce policies,

553
00:30:07.000 --> 00:30:10.279
<v Speaker 2>push updates, even remotely wipe a lost or stolen phone.

554
00:30:10.319 --> 00:30:12.720
<v Speaker 1>What are the big risks with phones? Users?

555
00:30:12.799 --> 00:30:15.400
<v Speaker 2>Jail braking on iOS or rooting on the Android their

556
00:30:15.400 --> 00:30:18.480
<v Speaker 2>phones removes built in security restrictions, making them more vulnerable,

557
00:30:18.640 --> 00:30:21.559
<v Speaker 2>and malicious apps are a constant threat, even sometimes sneaking

558
00:30:21.559 --> 00:30:24.119
<v Speaker 2>into official app stores. There was a case in twenty

559
00:30:24.160 --> 00:30:27.720
<v Speaker 2>eighteen where fake cryptocurrency apps on Google Play scammed users.

560
00:30:27.799 --> 00:30:30.039
<v Speaker 1>Okay, phones are one thing. What about embedded devices?

561
00:30:30.200 --> 00:30:34.119
<v Speaker 2>Embedded devices are basically small computers built into other things,

562
00:30:34.359 --> 00:30:37.880
<v Speaker 2>usually performing a specific function. Think the controller in a

563
00:30:37.920 --> 00:30:41.559
<v Speaker 2>car wash, an insulin pump, the complex network of computers

564
00:30:41.599 --> 00:30:45.319
<v Speaker 2>and CANbus in your car. The impact of compromising these

565
00:30:45.359 --> 00:30:49.359
<v Speaker 2>can be huge. Remember stucksnet that was malware specifically designed

566
00:30:49.359 --> 00:30:52.519
<v Speaker 2>to damage Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges by messing with their

567
00:30:52.519 --> 00:30:56.559
<v Speaker 2>embedded controllers. Or the twenty fifteen hack where researchers remotely

568
00:30:56.559 --> 00:30:59.160
<v Speaker 2>took control of a jeep chero key driving down the

569
00:30:59.240 --> 00:31:02.519
<v Speaker 2>highway by excit evloiding its embedded systems. That's terrifying, it is,

570
00:31:02.799 --> 00:31:05.039
<v Speaker 2>and a major challenge with embedded systems is that they're

571
00:31:05.119 --> 00:31:08.039
<v Speaker 2>often very difficult or even impossible to update or patch

572
00:31:08.079 --> 00:31:11.279
<v Speaker 2>once they're deployed, so vulnerabilities can linger for years.

573
00:31:11.440 --> 00:31:15.279
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so embedded is tricky. What about IoT smart homes,

574
00:31:15.279 --> 00:31:15.720
<v Speaker 1>et cetera.

575
00:31:16.160 --> 00:31:19.799
<v Speaker 2>IoT devices are things like smart cameras, smart locks, smart

576
00:31:19.839 --> 00:31:22.680
<v Speaker 2>light bulbs, devices connected to the Internet, often without a

577
00:31:22.720 --> 00:31:26.599
<v Speaker 2>full fledged operating system like a computer or phone. Security

578
00:31:26.640 --> 00:31:29.039
<v Speaker 2>here is often an afterthought if it's thought of at all.

579
00:31:29.880 --> 00:31:32.079
<v Speaker 2>There's a lack of transparency. You often don't know what

580
00:31:32.160 --> 00:31:34.240
<v Speaker 2>dated the device is collecting or where it's sending it,

581
00:31:34.799 --> 00:31:37.559
<v Speaker 2>and the sheer number of these devices creates a massive risk.

582
00:31:37.920 --> 00:31:41.880
<v Speaker 2>Remember the Mirri botnet in twenty sixteen. It enslaved hundreds

583
00:31:41.920 --> 00:31:45.319
<v Speaker 2>of thousands of insecure IoT devices, mostly cameras and routers,

584
00:31:45.599 --> 00:31:48.960
<v Speaker 2>and use them to launch enormous distributed denial of service

585
00:31:49.039 --> 00:31:52.200
<v Speaker 2>DETOS attacks, including one that hit one point two terabits

586
00:31:52.240 --> 00:31:56.160
<v Speaker 2>per second. Overwhelming These cheap, numerous devices are a huge

587
00:31:56.200 --> 00:31:57.319
<v Speaker 2>growing attack surface.

588
00:31:57.400 --> 00:32:00.480
<v Speaker 1>Wow, okay, that covers devices. What about the actuals software,

589
00:32:00.480 --> 00:32:02.799
<v Speaker 1>the applications we use every day? They must be prime

590
00:32:02.839 --> 00:32:03.920
<v Speaker 1>targets too. Oh.

591
00:32:03.960 --> 00:32:07.440
<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, applications are where a lot of the action happens.

592
00:32:07.720 --> 00:32:10.960
<v Speaker 2>Think about the target breach back in twenty thirteen that

593
00:32:11.119 --> 00:32:13.759
<v Speaker 2>started with credentials stolen from a third party vendor their

594
00:32:13.880 --> 00:32:16.920
<v Speaker 2>HVAC provider believe it or not, likely via phishing, but

595
00:32:17.319 --> 00:32:20.240
<v Speaker 2>the attackers were able to move from that vendor's access

596
00:32:20.279 --> 00:32:23.240
<v Speaker 2>point into target's main network and eventually to the point

597
00:32:23.279 --> 00:32:27.119
<v Speaker 2>of sale systems because of poor network segmentation and crucially

598
00:32:27.200 --> 00:32:30.799
<v Speaker 2>weak application level security controls. It's a classic case study.

599
00:32:31.240 --> 00:32:33.799
<v Speaker 1>So how do vulnerabilities get into applications in the first place?

600
00:32:34.279 --> 00:32:35.680
<v Speaker 1>During development? Often?

601
00:32:35.839 --> 00:32:39.319
<v Speaker 2>Yes, there are common types of flaws introduced during coding.

602
00:32:40.319 --> 00:32:43.599
<v Speaker 2>Buffer overflows are a classic trying to stuff more data

603
00:32:43.640 --> 00:32:46.880
<v Speaker 2>into a memory buffer than it can hold, potentially overwriting

604
00:32:46.920 --> 00:32:50.920
<v Speaker 2>adjacent memory with malicious code, like putting ten pounds of

605
00:32:50.920 --> 00:32:54.400
<v Speaker 2>potatoes in an eight pounds sack. Race conditions happen when

606
00:32:54.400 --> 00:32:56.799
<v Speaker 2>the security or correctness of the code depends on the

607
00:32:56.880 --> 00:33:00.720
<v Speaker 2>unpredictable timing of events. Input validation attack occur when the

608
00:33:00.720 --> 00:33:04.200
<v Speaker 2>application doesn't properly check or sanitize data coming from users.

609
00:33:04.599 --> 00:33:07.920
<v Speaker 2>This can lead to various issues like attackers manipulating memory.

610
00:33:08.599 --> 00:33:12.039
<v Speaker 2>We also see authentication attacks using weak or default passwords,

611
00:33:12.240 --> 00:33:15.400
<v Speaker 2>sometimes even hard coding passwords directly into the application code

612
00:33:15.440 --> 00:33:19.000
<v Speaker 2>a terrible practice, or performing authentication checks only on the

613
00:33:19.000 --> 00:33:22.359
<v Speaker 2>client side where they can be easily bypassed. Plus authorization

614
00:33:22.440 --> 00:33:26.079
<v Speaker 2>attacks getting access you shouldn't have, and cryptographic attacks using

615
00:33:26.079 --> 00:33:27.359
<v Speaker 2>weak or flawed encryption.

616
00:33:27.720 --> 00:33:31.400
<v Speaker 1>What about web applications in databases specifically, they seem critical.

617
00:33:31.319 --> 00:33:34.279
<v Speaker 2>Huge targets for web apps. You have client side attacks

618
00:33:34.319 --> 00:33:38.319
<v Speaker 2>like cross site scripting XSS, which injects malicious scripts into

619
00:33:38.319 --> 00:33:42.039
<v Speaker 2>websites that then run in other users browsers, or CSRF

620
00:33:42.039 --> 00:33:45.720
<v Speaker 2>and clickchecking, which we talked about earlier, tricking users into actions.

621
00:33:45.960 --> 00:33:50.400
<v Speaker 2>Browsers have defenses, but these persist. Then server side attacks again,

622
00:33:50.680 --> 00:33:53.200
<v Speaker 2>lack of input validation is a killer. It can lead

623
00:33:53.240 --> 00:33:56.519
<v Speaker 2>to things like directory traversal attacks, where an attacker tricks

624
00:33:56.519 --> 00:33:59.279
<v Speaker 2>the web server into letting them access files outside the webroot,

625
00:33:59.599 --> 00:34:03.000
<v Speaker 2>maybe the sensitive files like et cetera pass route on Linux,

626
00:34:03.359 --> 00:34:06.759
<v Speaker 2>Leaving behind old test files. Debugging code or having weak

627
00:34:06.799 --> 00:34:11.159
<v Speaker 2>file permissions are also common server side issues and databases

628
00:34:11.199 --> 00:34:15.400
<v Speaker 2>are gold mines. Vulnerabilities include things like allowing unauthenticated access,

629
00:34:15.480 --> 00:34:18.519
<v Speaker 2>letting attackers run arbitrary code on the database server, often

630
00:34:18.599 --> 00:34:21.800
<v Speaker 2>via SQL injection and other import validation failure, or finding

631
00:34:21.800 --> 00:34:24.599
<v Speaker 2>ways to escalate their privileges once they have basic access.

632
00:34:24.800 --> 00:34:27.199
<v Speaker 1>So many ways things can go wrong in software. Are

633
00:34:27.199 --> 00:34:28.800
<v Speaker 1>there tools to find these flaws?

634
00:34:29.079 --> 00:34:32.679
<v Speaker 2>Yes, lots of tools. Network sniffers like wireshark can help

635
00:34:32.719 --> 00:34:36.199
<v Speaker 2>analyze the traffic going to and from an application. Web

636
00:34:36.239 --> 00:34:40.559
<v Speaker 2>analysis tools like the o waspsz apppe project can automatically

637
00:34:40.679 --> 00:34:44.639
<v Speaker 2>crawl spider a web server looking for common vulnerabilities, though

638
00:34:44.719 --> 00:34:49.039
<v Speaker 2>they can sometimes produce false positives. And then there are fuzzers.

639
00:34:49.480 --> 00:34:52.719
<v Speaker 2>Fuzzing is a really interesting technique pioneered back in the

640
00:34:52.800 --> 00:34:56.800
<v Speaker 2>late eighties by Barton Miller. You basically throw tons of invalid,

641
00:34:56.960 --> 00:35:01.039
<v Speaker 2>unexpected or random data at an application's inputs and see

642
00:35:01.079 --> 00:35:04.039
<v Speaker 2>if it crashes or behaves strangely. It's a powerful way

643
00:35:04.079 --> 00:35:07.679
<v Speaker 2>to uncover hitting bugs and vulnerabilities that manual testing might miss.

644
00:35:08.000 --> 00:35:12.440
<v Speaker 1>Fuzzing. Okay, so we've built all these defenses, physical, logical, administrative,

645
00:35:12.639 --> 00:35:15.039
<v Speaker 1>We've hardened the OS, secured the network, looked at apps.

646
00:35:15.119 --> 00:35:16.920
<v Speaker 1>How do we actually know if it's all working? How

647
00:35:16.920 --> 00:35:18.199
<v Speaker 1>do we assess the security?

648
00:35:18.360 --> 00:35:21.480
<v Speaker 2>That's the million dollar question? Right assessment is key. One

649
00:35:21.480 --> 00:35:25.880
<v Speaker 2>common approach is vulnerability assessment. This typically uses automated scanning tools,

650
00:35:26.000 --> 00:35:29.639
<v Speaker 2>commercial ones like Qualities, open source ones like openbas Even

651
00:35:29.760 --> 00:35:32.840
<v Speaker 2>end map has scripting capabilities for this. They scan systems

652
00:35:32.840 --> 00:35:35.599
<v Speaker 2>looking for known vulnerabilities based on signatures.

653
00:35:35.280 --> 00:35:36.800
<v Speaker 1>Just looking for known problems.

654
00:35:36.480 --> 00:35:39.679
<v Speaker 2>Mostly yes, but scans can be done in different ways.

655
00:35:40.039 --> 00:35:43.800
<v Speaker 2>An authenticated scan uses logging credentials provided by the system owner.

656
00:35:44.199 --> 00:35:46.400
<v Speaker 2>This allows the scanner to log in and get a

657
00:35:46.480 --> 00:35:50.320
<v Speaker 2>much deeper, more accurate view from the inside, seeing installed

658
00:35:50.400 --> 00:35:54.519
<v Speaker 2>software versions, patch levels, configurations much better than just probing

659
00:35:54.519 --> 00:35:57.719
<v Speaker 2>from the outside. There are also agented scans where you

660
00:35:57.800 --> 00:36:00.639
<v Speaker 2>install a small software agent on each computer and it

661
00:36:00.679 --> 00:36:05.199
<v Speaker 2>reports back vulnerabilities automatically, and specialized application scanning tools like

662
00:36:05.239 --> 00:36:09.159
<v Speaker 2>bropsuite focus specifically on finding flaws in web applications.

663
00:36:09.400 --> 00:36:12.960
<v Speaker 1>Does assessment get tricky with new tact like cloud or virtualization?

664
00:36:13.360 --> 00:36:17.039
<v Speaker 2>Oh? Definitely. Assessing security in the cloud depends heavily on

665
00:36:17.079 --> 00:36:20.960
<v Speaker 2>the service model. With IHAH infrastructure as a service, you

666
00:36:21.079 --> 00:36:23.639
<v Speaker 2>manage the OS and apps so you can scan those,

667
00:36:23.719 --> 00:36:26.320
<v Speaker 2>but the underlying network might be restricted by the provider.

668
00:36:27.079 --> 00:36:30.960
<v Speaker 2>With payass platform or SaaS software, you have much less

669
00:36:31.000 --> 00:36:34.320
<v Speaker 2>visibility and control, so assessment relies more on the provider's

670
00:36:34.320 --> 00:36:40.519
<v Speaker 2>attestations and audits. Virtualization also adds complexity. Scanning lots of vms,

671
00:36:40.599 --> 00:36:44.079
<v Speaker 2>virtual machines or containers requires tools that understand that environment

672
00:36:44.239 --> 00:36:47.199
<v Speaker 2>and can handle the dynamic nature of virtual infrastructure.

673
00:36:47.440 --> 00:36:51.119
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so vulnerability scans find known weaknesses. Yeah, how is

674
00:36:51.159 --> 00:36:54.840
<v Speaker 1>penetration testing different. Is it just like a more aggressive scan.

675
00:36:55.400 --> 00:36:57.079
<v Speaker 2>That's a great way to think about the difference. A

676
00:36:57.159 --> 00:37:01.000
<v Speaker 2>vulnerability scan is mostly automated looking for known flaws. A

677
00:37:01.079 --> 00:37:04.519
<v Speaker 2>penetration test or pentist or ethical hacking is often more

678
00:37:04.559 --> 00:37:07.320
<v Speaker 2>manual and goes a step further. It tries to actually

679
00:37:07.320 --> 00:37:10.519
<v Speaker 2>exploit the vulnerabilities found, mimicking what a real attacker would do.

680
00:37:11.000 --> 00:37:14.079
<v Speaker 2>It's often framed as a red team the attacker's testers

681
00:37:14.159 --> 00:37:16.199
<v Speaker 2>versus a blue team that defenders exercise.

682
00:37:16.360 --> 00:37:18.760
<v Speaker 1>So how does a pentist actually work? What's the process?

683
00:37:18.880 --> 00:37:22.960
<v Speaker 2>It typically follows a methodology first scoping. This is crucial

684
00:37:23.119 --> 00:37:26.039
<v Speaker 2>defining the rules of engagement. What systems are in scope,

685
00:37:26.079 --> 00:37:29.079
<v Speaker 2>what techniques are allowed, what are the goals. It's important

686
00:37:29.119 --> 00:37:32.039
<v Speaker 2>that the scope is realistic. Artificially locking things down just

687
00:37:32.079 --> 00:37:35.280
<v Speaker 2>before the test doesn't give you a true picture. For instance,

688
00:37:35.519 --> 00:37:39.559
<v Speaker 2>sometimes clients say no chaining of attacks, but real attackers

689
00:37:39.800 --> 00:37:42.639
<v Speaker 2>do chain exploits together, so that limits.

690
00:37:42.280 --> 00:37:44.239
<v Speaker 1>Realism makes sense. Keep it real right.

691
00:37:44.599 --> 00:37:50.519
<v Speaker 2>Then comes reconnaissance, gathering info, discovery, standing, finding vulnerabilities, exploitation,

692
00:37:50.800 --> 00:37:54.199
<v Speaker 2>trying to break in or gain control, and finally reporting,

693
00:37:54.440 --> 00:37:59.239
<v Speaker 2>documenting findings, impact and recommendations. Tests can be black box

694
00:37:59.519 --> 00:38:04.280
<v Speaker 2>testers at zero prior information, whitebox testers get full information

695
00:38:04.679 --> 00:38:07.559
<v Speaker 2>network diagram, source code, or gray box somewhere in between,

696
00:38:07.639 --> 00:38:10.519
<v Speaker 2>maybe user level credentials. And they can be internal testing

697
00:38:10.519 --> 00:38:13.119
<v Speaker 2>from inside the network or external testing from the internet.

698
00:38:13.199 --> 00:38:15.320
<v Speaker 1>What kinds of things do they target? All sorts?

699
00:38:15.440 --> 00:38:19.320
<v Speaker 2>Network infrastructure, specific web applications, using static analysis, looking at

700
00:38:19.360 --> 00:38:23.519
<v Speaker 2>code or dynamic analysis, interacting with the running app, wireless networks,

701
00:38:23.679 --> 00:38:27.760
<v Speaker 2>even physical penetration testing trying to bypass locks, tailgate access

702
00:38:27.760 --> 00:38:31.079
<v Speaker 2>restricted areas, and related to pen testing is the whole

703
00:38:31.119 --> 00:38:32.840
<v Speaker 2>concept of bug bounty.

704
00:38:32.519 --> 00:38:36.920
<v Speaker 1>Programs ah yeah, where companies pay hackers to find flaws exactly.

705
00:38:37.119 --> 00:38:41.280
<v Speaker 2>Platforms like hacker one, bug crowd SINAC connect organizations with

706
00:38:41.320 --> 00:38:45.480
<v Speaker 2>thousands of independent security researchers. The researchers look for vulnerabilities

707
00:38:45.480 --> 00:38:48.559
<v Speaker 2>within a defined scope, report them responsibly, and if the

708
00:38:48.599 --> 00:38:52.079
<v Speaker 2>company validates the finding, the researcher gets a reward of bounty.

709
00:38:52.639 --> 00:38:54.840
<v Speaker 2>These bounties can range from just a T shirt or

710
00:38:54.880 --> 00:38:59.079
<v Speaker 2>a thank you note up to serious money. Google, for example,

711
00:38:59.079 --> 00:39:01.519
<v Speaker 2>has offered over all one hundred thousand dollars for critical

712
00:39:01.559 --> 00:39:05.280
<v Speaker 2>bugs found in their pixel phones. It's essentially crowdsourced continuous

713
00:39:05.320 --> 00:39:05.920
<v Speaker 2>pen testing.

714
00:39:06.239 --> 00:39:08.840
<v Speaker 1>That's pretty cool. So okay, we do scans, we do pentists,

715
00:39:08.880 --> 00:39:10.760
<v Speaker 1>maybe run a bug bounty. After all that, can we

716
00:39:10.800 --> 00:39:11.960
<v Speaker 1>finally say we're secure?

717
00:39:12.159 --> 00:39:16.039
<v Speaker 2>Ah? The ultimate question, and the realistic answer is no.

718
00:39:16.480 --> 00:39:20.480
<v Speaker 2>There's really no such thing as being perfectly secure. Assessments,

719
00:39:20.519 --> 00:39:24.360
<v Speaker 2>whether stands or pentists, are just snapshots in time. You

720
00:39:24.440 --> 00:39:27.280
<v Speaker 2>might be secure today against the threats and vulnerabilities we

721
00:39:27.320 --> 00:39:30.639
<v Speaker 2>know about today, but secure today doesn't mean secure tomorrow.

722
00:39:30.719 --> 00:39:34.519
<v Speaker 2>What Because the attack surface is constantly changing. New software

723
00:39:34.559 --> 00:39:38.760
<v Speaker 2>is deployed, configurations change, New vulnerabilities are discovered in existing systems.

724
00:39:38.800 --> 00:39:42.800
<v Speaker 2>Attackers develop new techniques. It's a moving target. Plus, fixing

725
00:39:42.840 --> 00:39:47.639
<v Speaker 2>security holes costs time, money, resources. Development teams have deadlines,

726
00:39:47.679 --> 00:39:51.519
<v Speaker 2>businesses have priorities. Sometimes fixing a low risk vulnerability might

727
00:39:51.559 --> 00:39:54.239
<v Speaker 2>get deprioritized in favor of shipping a new feature. It's

728
00:39:54.280 --> 00:39:57.559
<v Speaker 2>a constant balancing act. So the real goal isn't achieving

729
00:39:57.559 --> 00:40:01.280
<v Speaker 2>some mythical state of perfect security. The goal continuous improvement,

730
00:40:01.719 --> 00:40:06.000
<v Speaker 2>understanding your risks, patching vulnerabilities, improving defenses, learning from incidents,

731
00:40:06.119 --> 00:40:09.440
<v Speaker 2>and constantly adapting to that ever evolving threat landscape. It

732
00:40:09.480 --> 00:40:10.800
<v Speaker 2>truly is a journey, not a.

733
00:40:10.679 --> 00:40:15.679
<v Speaker 1>Destination, continuous improvement, not perfection. That feels like a really

734
00:40:15.719 --> 00:40:19.519
<v Speaker 1>important takeaway. So, after this whole journey, what does this

735
00:40:19.599 --> 00:40:21.719
<v Speaker 1>all mean for you the listener?

736
00:40:21.840 --> 00:40:23.920
<v Speaker 2>Well, we've covered a lot of ground, haven't we. From

737
00:40:23.920 --> 00:40:27.679
<v Speaker 2>those foundational models like the CIA triad, through the different

738
00:40:27.760 --> 00:40:31.039
<v Speaker 2>kinds of controls, physical logical admin diving into the human

739
00:40:31.079 --> 00:40:35.519
<v Speaker 2>element and social engineering, exploring the power of cryptography, hardening systems,

740
00:40:35.559 --> 00:40:39.239
<v Speaker 2>and finally assessing our defenses. The key thing to remember,

741
00:40:39.280 --> 00:40:41.840
<v Speaker 2>I think, is that information security isn't just this isolated

742
00:40:41.880 --> 00:40:45.280
<v Speaker 2>technical thing. It's a really dynamic mix of technology, yes,

743
00:40:45.639 --> 00:40:49.480
<v Speaker 2>but also processes human behavior, compliance and just constant vigilance

744
00:40:49.480 --> 00:40:50.079
<v Speaker 2>and adaptation.

745
00:40:50.519 --> 00:40:55.440
<v Speaker 1>And hopefully understand these fundamentals, even at this level, empowers

746
00:40:55.480 --> 00:40:58.599
<v Speaker 1>you to ask smarter questions, maybe make better decisions in

747
00:40:58.639 --> 00:41:01.519
<v Speaker 1>your own digital life, where at work, and just generally

748
00:41:01.519 --> 00:41:04.760
<v Speaker 1>contribute to a more secure future as this landscape keeps

749
00:41:04.840 --> 00:41:07.079
<v Speaker 1>changing around us. So as you go about your day,

750
00:41:07.239 --> 00:41:10.840
<v Speaker 1>here's something to chew on. What single piece of information

751
00:41:11.360 --> 00:41:15.079
<v Speaker 1>do you possess, Maybe something seemingly innocent that if that

752
00:41:15.159 --> 00:41:17.679
<v Speaker 1>attacker combined it with other little details they could find

753
00:41:17.679 --> 00:41:21.119
<v Speaker 1>about you publicly online, could actually create a significant security

754
00:41:21.199 --> 00:41:24.039
<v Speaker 1>risk for you, maybe for your family, maybe for your employer,

755
00:41:24.400 --> 00:41:26.000
<v Speaker 1>And what are you going to do about it
