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Speaker 1: So what the coin bases and others of the world

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have learned, and what the etends and horizons have learned,

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is that, as you know, foresee ability equals liability. And

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so if any of these companies can foresee that a

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simswap is going to result in tens of thousands to

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millions of dollars in losses for a consumer, if they

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can foresee that it's going to happen, they need to

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do something in addition to what they currently have in

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place in regards to preventing that from happening.

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Speaker 2: Therefore, what else can we do? They said?

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Speaker 1: And they said, well, what if we knew the was

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swapped out legitimately or illegitimately, how would we know that?

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What do we need to do going forward?

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Speaker 3: Thanks for listening to carry Letz's Financial Survival Network, your

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solution to today's trying times. For the latest, go to Financial

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Survivalnetwork dot com. Financial Survival Network now more than.

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Speaker 4: Ever, and welcome you are listening to and watching the

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Financial Survival Network. I'm your host, Terry Lutz. We have

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security expert Robert Ceciliano with us. Now, Robert, you've been

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warning people about scams. It seems like most of your

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life and now they're after you. They're trying to scam you, right.

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Speaker 1: Oh then, oh yeah, they have been trying to scam

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me for quite quite a long time. Actually, I've received

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I've received emails from bad guys with my social Security

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number in the body of an email. Hey, security guy,

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here's your social ha ha, with them basically flexing their

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muscles showing me how cool they were and that they

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got one up on me.

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Speaker 2: And you know, like.

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Speaker 1: When I see that, my response is, you know whatever,

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because as far as I'm concerned, everybody's social Security number

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at this point is in the hands of a criminal.

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You know, Like how often asked by consumers, you know,

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shouldy invest in services that you know find my information

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on the dark web? What do you think about that?

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And like, my information is on the dark web? Yardmations

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of the dark web. Your your name, your email address,

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likely your social Security number, your haul address, your phone number,

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your email address, you know.

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Speaker 2: Everything, Like it's it's all on the dark web.

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Speaker 1: Because there's been like one hundred and seventy plus billion

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records compromise at least in the last decade, and all

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of that information, or at least most of it, is

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available on the dark web. So what is a dark

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web scan going to do other than tell you that

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your data is exposed? And what do you do in response?

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How do you react to the information? Basically, the idea

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is to make the data useless to the thief right.

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Speaker 2: And so what does that mean?

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Speaker 1: What does it mean when they have your social What

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does it mean when they have your credit card number?

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Speaker 2: What does it mean when they have your email address?

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Speaker 1: So?

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Speaker 2: Or what does it mean when they have your passwords?

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Speaker 1: Right? And I tell people all the time, don't worry

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about it, but do something about it. So passwords, what

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do you do? You change up your passcodes when you

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find out that specific passwords will compromise, and you find

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and you look through all your various logins to determine

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where that password might have been affected, so you change

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your passcodes. In addition to that, the end all pure

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role for most password breaches is make sure you have

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two factor authentication across all critical websites, because even if

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they have your passcode save for your PayPal account, they

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would need to have your mobile phone in their possession.

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Speaker 2: As long as you have a two factor of authentication enabled, they.

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Speaker 1: Would have to have your mobile phone in their possession

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to be able to get into your PayPal account even

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if they have had your past code. You know. So

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just yesterday I got an alert that somebody's trying to

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update my Instagram account. They want to reset the Instagram

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which means that somebody probably has my email address, which

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is public knowledge, and they probably just did a password reset.

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And to most people, that's going to freak them out.

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For me, you know, I've got two factor authentication. I've

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got upper case lowercase I WAS and characters my passwords,

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and they would need my mobile phone in their possession

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to get into my Instagram account. As far as if

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they had my social Security number, well that's kind of

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a no brainer too. You know, I have identity that

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protection services that monitor my information look for new lives

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of credit being opened up under my name.

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Speaker 2: Addition to that, I have a.

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Speaker 1: Credit freeze across all three major credit bureaus so experience

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transunient equifacts. So if somebody has my social Security number

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their possession and they're trying to open up new lines

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of credit under my name, well good luck. Because any lender,

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any credit card company, any where they go to try

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to process an application for credit, they're going to be

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met with a credit freeze. They're not going to be

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able to see what my credit scores are. Therefore, that lender,

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that credit card company, that bank is going to bump that.

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Speaker 2: Credit check back and say, can't approve this.

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Speaker 1: Loader, this credit card because you have a credit freeze,

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Robert Cisleado slash identity thief, and therefore we can't issue

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this line of credit, this credit card to you. So

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a credit freeze in most cases makes the social security

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number in most cases useless to the thief. And if

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they have my credit card number, right, yeah, they could

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probably make charges to my credit card. Sure, like that's

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not that difficult. Every single time you use your credit card,

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your credit card number over the phone, in person, whatever

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that number, that credit card is at risk.

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Speaker 2: However, I have push notifications or.

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Speaker 1: You pop up notifications via all of my credit card

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numbers and my bank account number. Or what that means

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is every single time there's a charge, every single time

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there's a transaction on my bank account on any of

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my cards, card, present card, not present, international, below or

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above a dollar, you name it, I either get an

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email instantly, a text message instantly, or a pop up

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via one of my credit card or bank mobile apps,

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so I am made aware in real time every single

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time there's a transaction on a card or a bank

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card or a credit card, which doesn't necessarily make those

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digits useless to the thief, but it makes it really

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hard to use any of my credit card or bank

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account account numbers in commerce because I am made aware

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of it in real time, and I can immediately refuew

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those charges, which in most cases should you know, stop

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the bat guy in his tracks and prevent him or

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her from doing any further damage, and then I'll just

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get a new credit card in the mail shortly afterwards.

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Speaker 2: And I've actually, probably in the past three to five years, have.

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Speaker 1: Had to get two or three different new cards as

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a result of those push notifications, you know, in post

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notifications that I set up for my bank card, my

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credit card are different than when the bank of credit

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card company notices charges that are anomalists. Meaning, for example,

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I might use my credit card and gas station in

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Boston and then ten minutes later that card.

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Speaker 2: Is used in Russia.

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Speaker 1: I obviously can't get to Russia in ten minutes, you know, tough,

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that's an anomaly, right, So the credit card companies and

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banks they have anomaly detection technology that recognizes risk, which

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is different than you setting up push notification, so credit cards,

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you know, social cutting numbers, pass codes, it's the dark web.

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It's a matter of making the data useless to the thief.

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Speaker 4: So what about this thing of SIM swapping, which really

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could be used to defeat third party factor ID for

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the people like getting their crypto accounts, their bank accounts,

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all sorts of things. Looks like the carriers are taking

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additional precautions to stop it, but it's a little scary.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, So I'm glad you touched on that because I've

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I've actually been and I still function as an expert

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witness revolving around SIM swapping and someone's you know, crypto account.

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Speaker 2: Being drained, right, And I've seen that unfortunately too many times.

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Speaker 1: And when somebody is targeted, usually the first thing that

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happens is their email is compromised in some way, whether

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they are phished when they don't have two factor authentication, right,

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whether they're phished, or their credentials are exposed or the

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dark lip. You know, so your email addresses relatively public,

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but then your password password singular that's used across multiple

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accounts is highly problematic. Okay, so I'll get to the

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sim aspect of this, but it begins with your email

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being compromised. And so once your email is compromised, once

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the bad guys inside your email A because factor authentication

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B because you use the same past code across multiple

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accounts and that data is in fact exposed to the

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dark Web, the bad guy doesn't necessarily hack into your email.

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They just log in because they have your credentials, because

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your credentials are exposed on the dark web, and you're

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not doing the basic cybersecurity one on one to make

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the data useless to the thief by setting up two

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factor aboutthentdication never using the same passcode twice, which also

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generally means using a password manager, which I do and

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I have for over twenty years, right, And a password

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manager facilitates the process of using a different passcode across

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each account, uppercase lower case numbers and characters, long strong

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passwords that generally aren't easily cracked, or words fond of

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the dictionary, or consecutive strokes across the keyboard, and so forth.

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And so once the email is compromised, bad guys inside

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the email now they just search Coinbase, they search crypto,

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they search binance and so forth, all the crypto exchanges right,

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and once they're inside your email, they see, oh, he

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or she has a coin based account, he or she

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has a finance account and so forth. That's when they

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begin the password reset if possible, from your email, and

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if that doesn't get them in, they realize you have

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two factor authentication.

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Speaker 2: And that's when the simswap process begins.

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Speaker 1: Now, once they're inside your email, they search out AT

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and T, Verizon, Comcast, T Mobile, right, what Mint and

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so on, and they just go down the line in

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regards to all the mobile phone carrier companies to see

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where you have an account, and the next best thing

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for them is to reset the passcode for your telcode,

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so that now they're in your telco. And even if

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that has two factor authentication, they at least have at

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this point enough intelligence because they're inside.

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Speaker 2: Your email that they know who you can use.

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Speaker 1: For crypto, They know who you use as you sell

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carrier and so forth. Now from there, that's when if

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they can't we set any pass codes because of two

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factor authentication, best case scenario, that's when they head out

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to a physical store and then go to generally a

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third party reseller. You know, some guy that has a

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shop at a mall somewhere that you know sells mobile phones,

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and he has access to much of the same tools

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to swap out a SIM as one of the actual carriers,

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you know, the team mobiles at at and ts and

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ribs of the world. That third party reseller has that

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same similar ancess and the problem here, And I've seen this,

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and I've actually commented on this in same swap cases

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in a court of law that like you'll find pockets

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of these third parties resellers where like there's been a

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few different SIM swaps have occurred as a result of

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this particular reseller at that particular location. Why because he

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or she was approached by a scammer and said, hey, listen,

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I'll give you a thousand bucks if you could swap

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out this SIM.

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Speaker 2: He's like, I, okay, you got it.

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Speaker 1: A thousand bucks is a thousand bucks. Yeah, you just

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got one or two of them coming in a week.

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That's you know, four, six, eight, ten, twelve grand a month,

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you know, sure, right.

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Speaker 2: Like that's easy, easy money.

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Speaker 1: And so that reseller generally is the one who's defeating

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whatever security measures that the telcos have in place, and

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it's not just the third party.

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Speaker 2: So in my own research.

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Speaker 1: When it comes to simswaps, in my own research as

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an expert witness, I've reached out to the Verizons and

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the AT and ts and the boost Mobiles and the

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Verizons and so forth as a consumer and made a

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phone call and went in to the actual operations and said, listen,

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I like, if what do I do? Like I lost

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my password to my account and I got this mobile phone,

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I got this iPhone, and I need to swap off

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my sin because like my phone doesn't work anymore, and

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I you know, everything's dead, and you know, what do

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I do it? How do I go about it? He said, well,

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you know generally, like we need to you know, two

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forms of identification. He's like, well, I'm like, well, I've

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got a driver's license. That's all I've got. And but

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you know, beyond that, like I don't have anything else.

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It's like, well, as long as you come in with

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the job relations, we'll.

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Speaker 2: Have no problem.

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Speaker 1: We should be able to do it right right here

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on the spot. Here's the problem with that. You go

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on TikTok right now, you go on Instagram right now,

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you go to any college in America right now, you

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can easily find fake IDs easily, like two for eighty bucks,

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two for eighty bucks.

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Speaker 2: And they're good.

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Speaker 1: They are good quality ideas and the only and I've

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looked at these ideas, like I've handled and played with

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these IDs, but compared up against mine, you know, And

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the only difference in the fake ideas versus the real

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ideas is that there's generally a hologram in the rail eye.

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Then he isn't as good as the one that's the

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fake ID. The fake ideas are a little duller. They're

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just a little duller. Yeah, that's exactly what you need

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dollar Yeah, but the but the but it's but there

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is a hologram there. It's just a little duller. It's

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a little more faint. And that's really it. And so

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your every day Verizon Star employee, he's really not gonna

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be really looking for that or know enough to look

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for that. He may or may not have the experience.

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He may may or may not know the difference. But

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you walk in all you know, frazzle ands all, I did,

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I just need this? And you all, you know, you've

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got to like.

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Speaker 2: You know, clean shiny teeth and good hygiene.

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Speaker 4: So they're on a Friday, go there on a Friday

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before closing, right.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, they're not going to be like, I don't all

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about you like your sketch, I mean you or I

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walk in.

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Speaker 2: We're not gonna be all sketch, you know, right exactly?

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We look like taxpayer? Yeap, gotcha? So is there is

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good news here?

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Speaker 4: Though?

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Speaker 1: Here's the deal, right, all is not lost. The good

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news is that there's a lot you can do. Change

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up all your past codes. Use two factor authentication for everything,

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everything including email. Never use the same pass code twice.

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You do all these different things.

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Speaker 2: Okay.

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Speaker 1: The good news is that the cryptocurrency companies, right the

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bitcoins and so forth, they now have developed relationships with

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the telcos. And what that means is they know if

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you all, if you already have say a coin Base account,

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and your stuff is, how is that coin Base? And

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you're on AT and T, you've got two factor authentication,

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you're doing all the things that you're supposed to do

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at Coinbase to make sure that your crypto isn't hacked.

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And you've tightened up your AT and T account like

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you've got two factor authentication there.

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Speaker 2: But then you're like, you know what, AT and T.

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Speaker 1: Is too expensive, I'm going to go to mid Mobile,

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right because mid Mobile is like a third of the price.

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So the process of setting up at mid Mobile, Coinbase

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knows that you no longer are at AT and T,

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You're at mid Mobile. They have backdoor access and know

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that you've swapped out your SIM to go from AT

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and T to mid Mobile. They know that now, so

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that backdoor access, that relationship that coinbase has with AT

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and T and others is a good thing, and that

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protects Coinbase and it.

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Speaker 2: Protects their users.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, it's getting harder to swap out of SIM for

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the bad guy in it not be detected by the

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coin bases of the world.

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Speaker 4: And I can tell you a personal story. I don't

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want to say what carrier I use and what major

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bank it was, but I had gotten a new phone

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upgrade my iPhone and you know it's an e SIM.

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But when I logged onto that bank the first time,

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it said it appears that you're using a new phone

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or a new SIM. We have to do additional verifications

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and uh, and you know they nailed it because obviously

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it was me, but I saw that they were really

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taking precautions. So I guess there will be some universal

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verification of sims a SIMS as well as physical sims.

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So when someone has a new one and it pops

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up for the account, then they have to go through

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an additional phase of verifications more than one. It was

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two or three. I had to do a couple of

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credit cards, my ADM card, and.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it was. It was extensive. So I didn't seem

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to think, so it's a pot but it's a good thing.

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Speaker 1: And so what what the coin bases and others of

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the world have learned, and what the aten ds and

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horizons I've learned is that, as you know, foresee ability

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equals liability. And so if any of these companies can

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foresee that a SIM swap is going to result in

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tens of thousands to millions of dollars in losses for

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a consumer, if they can foresee that it's going to happen,

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they need to do something in addition to what they

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currently have in place in regards to preventing that from happening. Therefore,

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what else can we do? They said, And they say, well,

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what if we knew the was swapped? Out legitimately or illegitimately,

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how would we know that? What do we need to

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do going forward? And they developed that relationship, they begin

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to shake hands with each other and now they know

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via an API or something to that effect. And so

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that does protect consumers in the end, that does not

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mean that consumers should still sit in their hands and

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do nothing. They still need to engage in all the

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various you know, through virtual authentication, change up your passos

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to San Pasco twice and listened to password bandage RK

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and so on and so forth, at all your various

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critical accounts, including anything related to any finance, crypto and

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everything and anything.

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Speaker 2: And generally you're going.

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Speaker 1: To become a tougher target for the bad guy, and

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they're going to go after the path of leash resistance,

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which is the people who don't have those basics in place.

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Speaker 4: And as we were speaking, I changed my Google password

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because it had been too long, and it sent a

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notification to my phone. I was doing it online on

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my desktop, sent a notification in my phone. Your password's

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just been changed. Was that you yes or no? And

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of course I said yes, So yeah, you can never

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be too careful here, Robert and a friend of mine

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that had happened to in Florida. Coinbase account got drained.

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They tried to drain her bank account but they were

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not able to. But they took twenty eight thousand dollars

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worth of crypto from her account and she had to

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sue them. I didn't hear what happened. I believe it

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was settled out of court and that was that. Hey, well,

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appreciate you coming on telling us about this new emerging

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threat as well as the way that they're after you personally.

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Just tell us where do we find you? How do

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we connect with you on the web?

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Speaker 1: Sure, I am at protect now LLC dot com again

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protect now LLC dot com and I can also be

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found at safer dot me. That's SA sa f R

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dot me or just google Robertslaati.

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Speaker 4: You can't miss me, all right, and the links are

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in the show notes of this interview on Financial Survival

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Network dot com. While you're there, sign up for your

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00:22:41,599 --> 00:22:44,279
free newsletter. You got a lot of valuable info from

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00:22:44,319 --> 00:22:47,640
this and Robert, we'll talk to you again real soon.

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00:22:47,680 --> 00:22:48,680
Thanks for stopping by.

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Speaker 3: Hey, buddy, thanks for listening to carry Lets's Financial Survival Network.

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Your solution to today's trying times. For the latest, go

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00:22:57,839 --> 00:23:03,480
to Financial Survival Network dot com. Financial Survival Network now

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00:23:03,480 --> 00:23:04,319
more than ever