WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.320 --> 00:00:03.200 Hey, Carl here, we're on a mission to find new 2 00:00:03.240 --> 00:00:05.919 fans of the show. I mean, where else can you 3 00:00:05.960 --> 00:00:10.240 get real life comedy and horror in one podcast. You 4 00:00:10.279 --> 00:00:13.000 can do your part by leaving us a review on iTunes, 5 00:00:13.039 --> 00:00:16.719 Spotify or wherever you get Security this Week. Also, you 6 00:00:16.719 --> 00:00:19.079 can get an ad free feed by becoming a five 7 00:00:19.120 --> 00:00:22.039 dollars a month patron. Go to Patreon dot Security this 8 00:00:22.079 --> 00:00:25.359 week dot com and sign up, and don't forget discord. 9 00:00:25.600 --> 00:00:28.519 Discord dot Security this week dot com. Lots of good 10 00:00:28.559 --> 00:00:32.280 stuff happening there. Yeah, I think that's it. So on 11 00:00:32.359 --> 00:00:35.479 with the podcast. So I'm at the gym a couple 12 00:00:35.520 --> 00:00:39.280 of days ago and there's this lady on the exercise 13 00:00:39.359 --> 00:00:42.439 bike and she's wearing a helmet on the exercise bike. 14 00:00:42.600 --> 00:00:44.520 So I put on a lifejacket and got on the 15 00:00:44.560 --> 00:00:56.439 rowing machine next to her. Hey, it's been a couple 16 00:00:56.479 --> 00:00:58.200 of weeks since we talked to you. Welcome back to 17 00:00:58.200 --> 00:01:01.439 Security this week. I'm Carl Franklin's the Flat and Patrick Hines. 18 00:01:02.000 --> 00:01:03.960 So we're going to try to catch up by doing 19 00:01:04.040 --> 00:01:07.239 last week's stories and last last week's stories. 20 00:01:07.319 --> 00:01:08.079 Three hour show. 21 00:01:08.959 --> 00:01:12.640 Yeah, starting with last last week's stories, but in conclusion, 22 00:01:12.959 --> 00:01:15.200 you might conclude at the end of these stories that 23 00:01:16.200 --> 00:01:20.159 we are kind of becoming obsolete because they're coming so 24 00:01:20.480 --> 00:01:22.599 fast that you won't have time to patch. 25 00:01:23.319 --> 00:01:26.239 Right, just beyond twenty four to seven security this moment, 26 00:01:26.480 --> 00:01:29.560 just to lead your own system security right now. 27 00:01:30.079 --> 00:01:34.840 All right, let's start with this Indian Express story, no warning, 28 00:01:34.920 --> 00:01:39.760 no confirmation, how an AI agent deleted a startups critical data. 29 00:01:39.920 --> 00:01:42.319 I know, I know, it's stupidity. 30 00:01:43.920 --> 00:01:47.599 Pad CAAC problems exists between keyboard and chair. Yeah, this 31 00:01:47.719 --> 00:01:51.920 is total stupidity. This is basically giving agency to agents 32 00:01:52.040 --> 00:01:54.319 and giving them access to things that they shouldn't have 33 00:01:54.400 --> 00:01:57.319 access to, something we've been warning people against. 34 00:01:58.040 --> 00:02:03.400 If we've been developing between us probably seventy years. Okay, yeah, 35 00:02:03.400 --> 00:02:06.439 I think you're probably right. Yeah, And I don't edit 36 00:02:06.879 --> 00:02:08.120 in production, do you? 37 00:02:08.800 --> 00:02:09.080 I know? 38 00:02:09.360 --> 00:02:13.719 Now, why would you give AI access to productions? There 39 00:02:13.759 --> 00:02:16.360 was a story back. I think it was a couple 40 00:02:16.360 --> 00:02:18.560 of months ago. Actually it was about a month ago 41 00:02:18.599 --> 00:02:22.159 that Amazon was down one of their systems. It wasn't 42 00:02:22.159 --> 00:02:24.960 a primary system, it was an important system, and it's 43 00:02:25.000 --> 00:02:27.599 because somebody pointed an AI agent at it and had 44 00:02:27.599 --> 00:02:29.639 it do an update, and it decided I'm going to 45 00:02:29.639 --> 00:02:32.240 delete it. First and start fresh. It was down for 46 00:02:32.240 --> 00:02:33.159 twelve hours. 47 00:02:33.439 --> 00:02:34.000 That makes sense. 48 00:02:34.039 --> 00:02:34.639 Oh my god. 49 00:02:34.759 --> 00:02:37.919 So this is a this is a bone headed mistake. 50 00:02:38.120 --> 00:02:40.439 That is, it could only be done by somebody who 51 00:02:40.520 --> 00:02:42.400 really doesn't get development. I don't know. 52 00:02:42.560 --> 00:02:45.360 Sometimes you just can't trust AI. So my wife and 53 00:02:45.360 --> 00:02:47.960 I retimes, Yeah, I know, my wife and I, you 54 00:02:47.960 --> 00:02:48.680 can't trust AI. 55 00:02:48.719 --> 00:02:50.759 That's the moral of the story. 56 00:02:51.000 --> 00:02:54.599 We're looking, we're looking to make to get our deck 57 00:02:54.800 --> 00:02:56.520 in our deck. Our porch is falling apart. So my 58 00:02:56.520 --> 00:02:58.680 wife took a picture of the porch and put it 59 00:02:58.759 --> 00:03:01.520 up in AI. And there's six columns on the porch, 60 00:03:01.599 --> 00:03:04.280 six pillars holding the every foot. She wanted to take 61 00:03:04.319 --> 00:03:06.319 the third one out. So I put the picture up 62 00:03:06.360 --> 00:03:08.479 there and I said, hey, can you label these from 63 00:03:08.560 --> 00:03:11.319 left to right one through six. I'd like to take 64 00:03:11.360 --> 00:03:13.240 the third one out, just so it knows which one 65 00:03:13.240 --> 00:03:16.599 the third one was, right. So it labeled them one 66 00:03:16.639 --> 00:03:18.840 through six and took the third one out. Just the 67 00:03:18.840 --> 00:03:23.400 third one had no label. All the restroom were labeled 68 00:03:23.560 --> 00:03:25.400 except for that third one. It took the label out 69 00:03:25.400 --> 00:03:27.360 and I was like, I don't even know what to 70 00:03:27.360 --> 00:03:27.680 do with you. 71 00:03:27.719 --> 00:03:28.800 I'm just get two. 72 00:03:28.639 --> 00:03:29.280 Ballons of milk. 73 00:03:29.319 --> 00:03:30.759 And if they have eggs, get a dozen. 74 00:03:31.240 --> 00:03:32.520 It did it go? 75 00:03:32.680 --> 00:03:35.759 But it was so close My wife and I just 76 00:03:35.759 --> 00:03:40.159 looked at it and went like what never mind. Yeah, 77 00:03:40.199 --> 00:03:41.080 so it's all good. 78 00:03:41.639 --> 00:03:45.879 Yeah, so right now, AI must be curated by people 79 00:03:45.960 --> 00:03:49.560 who are smart enough to know when it's incorrect. 80 00:03:49.639 --> 00:03:53.039 Yep. You shouldn't let AI access to things that you 81 00:03:53.039 --> 00:03:57.879 wouldn't let a a average high school student touch. Or 82 00:03:57.919 --> 00:04:00.719 a chime production is something touch. 83 00:04:00.960 --> 00:04:02.360 A child with a high IQ. 84 00:04:02.759 --> 00:04:03.479 Yeah, there you go. 85 00:04:03.719 --> 00:04:05.840 Yeah, I work at a high school. 86 00:04:05.840 --> 00:04:07.879 It's like that. Most most of them are pretty high IQs. 87 00:04:07.960 --> 00:04:08.199 Yeah. 88 00:04:08.360 --> 00:04:09.719 Even they don't edit production. 89 00:04:09.919 --> 00:04:12.599 Yeah, they don't get access to Bank of America's production. 90 00:04:13.240 --> 00:04:18.319 Yeah. Yeah. So this is pocket Os right is the 91 00:04:18.360 --> 00:04:22.639 company Texas based car rental business, and the incident reportedly 92 00:04:22.639 --> 00:04:25.639 took place over the weekend. When it's autonomous AI tool 93 00:04:25.680 --> 00:04:28.879 erase the database and all backups in nine seconds. 94 00:04:29.000 --> 00:04:30.959 Well, at least it gets points for efficiency. 95 00:04:31.920 --> 00:04:33.920 I mean, here's what I will tell you though. At 96 00:04:33.959 --> 00:04:37.319 some point, somebody's gonna have a bad quarter, somebody's gonna 97 00:04:37.360 --> 00:04:39.560 get random word, somebody's gonna have something bad that happens, 98 00:04:39.680 --> 00:04:41.120 and they're just gonna go, oh, you know what, AI 99 00:04:41.199 --> 00:04:43.639 did it. We lost all our stuff because of AI. 100 00:04:43.839 --> 00:04:45.560 Right, I think that makes them look better. 101 00:04:45.920 --> 00:04:49.439 I don't know at this point. Maybe it does where 102 00:04:49.480 --> 00:04:52.279 they're like, oh that darn AI as opposed to yeah, 103 00:04:52.279 --> 00:04:54.360 we didn't put the proper security things in place to 104 00:04:54.399 --> 00:04:55.600 not get ransomword. 105 00:04:55.439 --> 00:04:59.360 Right, So bonus points if you can name the coding 106 00:04:59.399 --> 00:05:02.959 agent that oh oh oh. And now Dwayne's reading the 107 00:05:03.040 --> 00:05:04.040 article more carefully. 108 00:05:04.160 --> 00:05:06.319 I'm I'm frantically reading through the article. 109 00:05:06.399 --> 00:05:07.959 It was cursor, It was cursor. 110 00:05:08.199 --> 00:05:08.920 Was it cursor? 111 00:05:09.040 --> 00:05:11.519 It was running. It was running on Claude Opus four 112 00:05:11.560 --> 00:05:13.959 point six, which is widely known as. 113 00:05:13.920 --> 00:05:16.120 Oh see, that's the problem. Opus four to seven's out. 114 00:05:16.120 --> 00:05:17.199 I mean, what are you guys doing? 115 00:05:18.639 --> 00:05:21.000 I said last week it was the most advanced and 116 00:05:21.000 --> 00:05:23.560 capable model for coding. Apparently, according to. 117 00:05:23.439 --> 00:05:26.720 This article, I mean, it leads in deletions. Here's the deal, though, 118 00:05:26.839 --> 00:05:30.839 I honestly I don't use Opus for coding. Opus as 119 00:05:30.839 --> 00:05:33.319 great as a deep thinker and a planner. Yeah, I 120 00:05:33.399 --> 00:05:37.279 usually use Codex yeah for coding, So sonic listen, I'd 121 00:05:37.279 --> 00:05:39.120 say pocket os coding's in the name. 122 00:05:39.439 --> 00:05:40.839 Yeah, you gotta Claude's on. 123 00:05:40.920 --> 00:05:41.319 It is good. 124 00:05:41.360 --> 00:05:43.480 You got to use the proper model for the proper. 125 00:05:43.160 --> 00:05:45.439 Thing, Claude so on, it's really good for what I. 126 00:05:45.439 --> 00:05:46.560 Do, Claud's on, it's awesome. 127 00:05:46.839 --> 00:05:47.040 Yeah. 128 00:05:47.040 --> 00:05:48.600 And even if you were to do like an opus 129 00:05:48.639 --> 00:05:50.959 planning layer where it does some really deep dive planning 130 00:05:50.959 --> 00:05:53.439 but doesn't write any code, but then you use a 131 00:05:53.680 --> 00:05:56.839 sonnet to do all the code writing and then maybe 132 00:05:56.879 --> 00:06:00.000 a codex as your tester and testing layer, that's probably 133 00:06:00.040 --> 00:06:01.759 will be way more stable than just open. 134 00:06:01.800 --> 00:06:05.360 You'd still never let it touch production directly. 135 00:06:05.519 --> 00:06:08.240 Oh heck no, yeah, absolutely no, it's. 136 00:06:08.040 --> 00:06:11.160 The fundamental takeaway here. I agree with you, but that's 137 00:06:11.199 --> 00:06:12.079 the fundamental takeaway. 138 00:06:12.079 --> 00:06:14.079 All right. I love the I love the stories where 139 00:06:14.079 --> 00:06:16.560 we get to wag our finger at people that are. 140 00:06:17.560 --> 00:06:18.959 Again, isn't that redundant? 141 00:06:18.959 --> 00:06:21.920 Isn't that just a little isn't that just the stories? 142 00:06:23.319 --> 00:06:24.519 Yeah? 143 00:06:24.560 --> 00:06:27.120 All right, Duane, why don't you take this one about Kelp, 144 00:06:28.519 --> 00:06:29.519 the Kelp. 145 00:06:30.199 --> 00:06:32.319 My favorite Beatles albums Kelp, and. 146 00:06:32.240 --> 00:06:36.759 It's fantastic ride and whatever. No, this is a DeFi hack, 147 00:06:37.759 --> 00:06:40.480 so you'll see the start with the headline for those 148 00:06:40.519 --> 00:06:42.240 of you. All right, all right, let's start with the 149 00:06:42.240 --> 00:06:46.879 headline Hackers target DeFi Protocol KELP DAO and a massive 150 00:06:46.920 --> 00:06:48.519 three hundred million dollar xploit. 151 00:06:48.680 --> 00:06:50.000 Yeah. 152 00:06:50.399 --> 00:06:53.639 So here's typically for those of you who haven't gone 153 00:06:53.639 --> 00:06:57.800 into blockchain contracts and how it all works. If you 154 00:06:57.959 --> 00:07:02.000 make well, obviously, the the chain is indelible, right, it's immutable, 155 00:07:02.079 --> 00:07:04.639 it can't be changed. So if I make a transaction, 156 00:07:04.759 --> 00:07:08.079 it's read only right when it gets to the chain. 157 00:07:08.800 --> 00:07:11.160 But when it gets approved, it has to be approved 158 00:07:11.279 --> 00:07:14.160 typically by multiple notes, a majority of the notes, right, 159 00:07:14.680 --> 00:07:17.040 and and each contract is different as to what that 160 00:07:17.079 --> 00:07:19.600 looks like, but call it a majority, right, So one 161 00:07:19.759 --> 00:07:22.879 percent plus one? Yeah, on this security this week, two 162 00:07:22.920 --> 00:07:23.680 of us out of three. 163 00:07:23.759 --> 00:07:26.079 Does that mean everybody who uses the blockchain has the 164 00:07:26.199 --> 00:07:27.800 vote on all these transactions? 165 00:07:27.839 --> 00:07:30.439 So? No, it, Like I said, that's where it depends. 166 00:07:30.600 --> 00:07:35.120 Sometimes there's trusted nodes, because what you don't want is, hey, 167 00:07:35.199 --> 00:07:38.439 let's put a million different random you know, vms up there, 168 00:07:39.160 --> 00:07:41.120 and they get they get a vote, and now I 169 00:07:41.160 --> 00:07:42.160 can tell them how to vote. 170 00:07:42.160 --> 00:07:44.800 Supposedly the government tried to do that early on in blockchain. 171 00:07:45.000 --> 00:07:47.040 Yeah, I know, well they I supposedly they tried to 172 00:07:47.040 --> 00:07:48.800 do it with onion routing as well, And I don't 173 00:07:48.800 --> 00:07:50.120 think any of that's actually real. 174 00:07:50.040 --> 00:07:52.160 But only onion routing that happens in this house is 175 00:07:52.199 --> 00:07:55.600 in my kitchen when I'm cooking, especially French onion soup. 176 00:07:56.079 --> 00:07:59.639 Mm. So it's a majority. 177 00:07:59.759 --> 00:08:00.680 What is onion routing? 178 00:08:00.759 --> 00:08:04.920 Tore network so yeah, tour network so oh okay, yeah. 179 00:08:04.959 --> 00:08:09.120 So anyways, so it's a majority, or it's trusted nodes 180 00:08:09.120 --> 00:08:11.079 that vote, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And that's 181 00:08:11.079 --> 00:08:13.360 why a lot of it is considered quite you know, 182 00:08:13.600 --> 00:08:17.319 quite reasonable, quite trustworthy, right, where a majority of us 183 00:08:17.399 --> 00:08:19.319 have to say, yes, this is an actual like I'm 184 00:08:19.360 --> 00:08:21.439 Scarity this week, right, the story of us. Two of 185 00:08:21.519 --> 00:08:22.519 us have to say, you know what, this is a 186 00:08:22.519 --> 00:08:24.720 great story for us to put it on the show. 187 00:08:25.279 --> 00:08:27.560 You guys can decide whether all of us are wrong 188 00:08:27.680 --> 00:08:32.240 or not, but needless to say often, yeah, often often 189 00:08:32.440 --> 00:08:36.200 that we're wrong, but needs say in this particular case, 190 00:08:36.320 --> 00:08:40.320 that was all working fine. And in this particular, in 191 00:08:40.360 --> 00:08:45.720 this particular issue, there was a restake of eth where 192 00:08:45.759 --> 00:08:48.600 you could not only have it on this particular chain, 193 00:08:49.120 --> 00:08:51.399 but it could go cross chain. So I could say, oh, 194 00:08:51.440 --> 00:08:53.720 we're restaking it on chain A, but let's move it 195 00:08:53.720 --> 00:08:54.320 over to change. 196 00:08:54.360 --> 00:08:59.240 So those who aren't Crypto Bros. So Ether. Ethereum is 197 00:08:59.240 --> 00:09:01.840 a very prominent coin and one of the things you 198 00:09:01.879 --> 00:09:03.919 can do is stake it. So that means if you 199 00:09:03.960 --> 00:09:06.399 have one hundred coins, congratulations, there's a lot of money. 200 00:09:06.960 --> 00:09:09.360 You can take those coins and stake them and earn 201 00:09:09.440 --> 00:09:12.279 a percentage back. And it is a way to to 202 00:09:12.679 --> 00:09:18.519 have people put skin in the game and earn earn credits, 203 00:09:18.639 --> 00:09:22.480 earn crypto without having to have their machine pollute and. 204 00:09:22.960 --> 00:09:24.480 Like selling shares or something. 205 00:09:24.519 --> 00:09:29.159 It's almost like getting interest on your investment. Yep, it's 206 00:09:29.200 --> 00:09:31.399 more like that, I have a thousand eths, so I'll 207 00:09:31.440 --> 00:09:35.080 get a couple of eighth a month, so interest if 208 00:09:35.080 --> 00:09:35.759 I stake it. 209 00:09:35.799 --> 00:09:37.799 Is there any risk in staking your. 210 00:09:37.600 --> 00:09:40.960 Eth Yes, because when you stake it, you can't unstake it. 211 00:09:41.080 --> 00:09:43.759 You can't sell it after unstaking it for like seven 212 00:09:43.840 --> 00:09:46.759 days or something like that. So there's a cooling off period. 213 00:09:46.799 --> 00:09:49.159 So when you stake it, it's not liquid. You can't 214 00:09:49.200 --> 00:09:50.480 just unstake it and sell it. 215 00:09:50.600 --> 00:09:50.960 I see. 216 00:09:51.080 --> 00:09:54.879 So if Ethereum tanks in the next two days. 217 00:09:54.559 --> 00:09:55.120 You're stuck. 218 00:09:55.480 --> 00:09:56.480 You're stuck. Yeah. 219 00:09:56.799 --> 00:09:58.600 I don't know what the period was, and I'm sure 220 00:09:58.639 --> 00:10:02.399 it's changed. So this is them manipulating that staking and 221 00:10:02.440 --> 00:10:04.120 restaking process. 222 00:10:04.480 --> 00:10:07.240 Yeah, and in this particular case, they wanted to give 223 00:10:07.279 --> 00:10:10.120 the users the ability to use multiple chains, right, not 224 00:10:10.240 --> 00:10:13.080 just a single chain. So there's a message that goes 225 00:10:13.120 --> 00:10:13.639 back and forth. 226 00:10:13.679 --> 00:10:16.840 So wait a minute, what was they the hackers this? 227 00:10:17.080 --> 00:10:17.279 Yeah? 228 00:10:17.360 --> 00:10:20.919 No, no, no, no, this is your your KELP d O 229 00:10:21.240 --> 00:10:25.679 and KELP is crypto exchange, a crypto exchange, okay, yeah, 230 00:10:25.759 --> 00:10:27.200 call it a crypto exchange, all right. 231 00:10:27.240 --> 00:10:29.559 So these are the guys that were doing the bad stuff. 232 00:10:29.840 --> 00:10:31.759 No, these are the guys who are do the normal stuff. 233 00:10:31.799 --> 00:10:34.200 This is like coinbase, this is like like whatever, Like 234 00:10:34.240 --> 00:10:37.399 we have their system. Yeah, we have customers who log 235 00:10:37.480 --> 00:10:39.679 in and they have ETH and they they stake it 236 00:10:39.720 --> 00:10:43.240 and restake it and do whatever and whatever. Right, the 237 00:10:43.320 --> 00:10:47.480 bad guys, what they did is the when you try 238 00:10:47.519 --> 00:10:49.960 and stake that ETH and either move it around to 239 00:10:50.080 --> 00:10:54.879 different chains. The bad guys actually targeted the messaging system 240 00:10:55.279 --> 00:10:59.159 between chains. Remember the chain he for it to get 241 00:10:59.200 --> 00:11:01.080 on the chain and for its to be a valid transaction, 242 00:11:01.240 --> 00:11:04.600 a majority have to agree and be that chain is 243 00:11:04.679 --> 00:11:07.240 read only. But when it moves from chain to chain, 244 00:11:07.720 --> 00:11:10.240 in this particular case, there's a message that comes in 245 00:11:10.240 --> 00:11:11.720 and says, hey, by the way, I'm going to take 246 00:11:11.759 --> 00:11:14.360 this steak deep. Then we're going to keep it on 247 00:11:14.360 --> 00:11:15.879 this chain over here for a little while, and then 248 00:11:15.879 --> 00:11:16.519 we'll move it back. 249 00:11:16.720 --> 00:11:18.559 Does that literally mean it's off the chain? 250 00:11:18.879 --> 00:11:22.039 I remember the early days of cryptocurrency and some very 251 00:11:22.480 --> 00:11:24.919 smart people that Patrick and I both know, and you 252 00:11:24.919 --> 00:11:28.240 probably know who I'm talking about, said this is so great. 253 00:11:28.320 --> 00:11:32.480 You can't hack it. It's like stone solid. And I 254 00:11:32.639 --> 00:11:36.879 was like, oh, yeah, sure, based on something that's digital 255 00:11:37.440 --> 00:11:42.120 that exists nowhere except in some computer somewhere. And you're 256 00:11:42.159 --> 00:11:44.720 telling me that it's not hackable. Come on. 257 00:11:44.960 --> 00:11:49.360 So it's like communism. It sounds great, it just doesn't 258 00:11:49.360 --> 00:11:53.759 work in real life now. I mean, cryptos blockchain has 259 00:11:53.799 --> 00:11:56.519 some real powerful things, but the problem is the implementation. 260 00:11:56.600 --> 00:11:59.919 And as we'll see when Dwayne explains or we explain, 261 00:12:01.120 --> 00:12:04.240 there was an implementation detail that was kind of a 262 00:12:04.279 --> 00:12:08.440 convenience that was arranged that was exploited, correct Wing. 263 00:12:08.759 --> 00:12:12.279 Yeah, absolutely, you're right, Patrick. So just so we're completely 264 00:12:12.320 --> 00:12:17.480 clear on how this all works, the KELP DAO is 265 00:12:17.559 --> 00:12:21.879 a restaking protocol for DI for DeFi, so that could 266 00:12:21.879 --> 00:12:29.759 be used by any exchange. Right. The restaking ether is 267 00:12:29.960 --> 00:12:33.799 KELP sort of what they call a liquid restaking token. 268 00:12:33.840 --> 00:12:35.600 So it's a token that can move from chain to chain. 269 00:12:36.120 --> 00:12:41.080 They're using a messaging protocol called Layer zero. Now Layer 270 00:12:41.240 --> 00:12:45.559 zero is a cross chain messaging bridge protocol used by KELP. 271 00:12:45.919 --> 00:12:47.919 So I don't want I didn't want to go into 272 00:12:47.960 --> 00:12:49.639 too much detail, but now that we're asking a little 273 00:12:49.639 --> 00:12:52.039 bit more questions, I wanted to make sure like everybody 274 00:12:52.120 --> 00:12:53.639 kind of understands what's going on. So we have a 275 00:12:53.679 --> 00:12:59.120 protocol that's handling a liquid token. That liquid token can 276 00:12:59.240 --> 00:13:01.960 move from chain the chain based on a message that 277 00:13:02.000 --> 00:13:03.360 comes in. Does that make sense? 278 00:13:03.399 --> 00:13:04.559 And what makes it liquid? 279 00:13:05.279 --> 00:13:07.519 So that what makes it liquid, my gas would be 280 00:13:07.639 --> 00:13:10.639 is because it can actually move around and it's not indelible. 281 00:13:10.679 --> 00:13:11.919 But I'd have to dig into that. 282 00:13:12.960 --> 00:13:13.840 Maybe it can change. 283 00:13:13.879 --> 00:13:18.559 So but more really on the hack. The hack is 284 00:13:18.639 --> 00:13:22.559 at that layer zero, that cross chain messaging. Right, So 285 00:13:22.679 --> 00:13:26.120 getting a token on the chain, getting a token approved 286 00:13:26.200 --> 00:13:30.799 obviously majority and all that good stuff. But getting a 287 00:13:30.840 --> 00:13:34.600 token to move from chain to chain only required one 288 00:13:34.679 --> 00:13:38.639 verifyer and there so one person sent a message in saying, oh, 289 00:13:38.679 --> 00:13:42.600 by the way, I have three hundred million dollars worth 290 00:13:42.679 --> 00:13:46.480 of restake teth put it on the chain and I 291 00:13:46.600 --> 00:13:49.759 verify it. All the chains were like, yeah, sure, that's cool, awesome, 292 00:13:49.840 --> 00:13:50.320 let's do that. 293 00:13:50.399 --> 00:13:52.639 Who verifies it? I do, Oh okay, thank you. 294 00:13:52.720 --> 00:13:55.320 Yeah it's me I verified it or my buddy Patrick 295 00:13:55.440 --> 00:13:55.840 verified it. 296 00:13:55.879 --> 00:13:57.799 And I'm like, oh okay. That's the problem. That's the 297 00:13:57.840 --> 00:14:00.679 part that's where they violated the i'm directive. 298 00:14:00.960 --> 00:14:02.679 So they got there wasn't a man in the middle 299 00:14:02.720 --> 00:14:05.679 kind of attack where they got into the exchange of messages. 300 00:14:06.039 --> 00:14:09.519 Now you can issue these messages, like if you're participating 301 00:14:09.559 --> 00:14:11.759 in the change, generally you have the ability to issue 302 00:14:11.759 --> 00:14:16.000 some of these messages. There's even with ethereum and that 303 00:14:16.039 --> 00:14:18.679 sort of stuff. If you're a node that can make 304 00:14:19.840 --> 00:14:22.879 you know that yes, this is a valid transaction. Lots 305 00:14:22.879 --> 00:14:27.440 of times when we were doing when you remember mining crypto, 306 00:14:27.720 --> 00:14:30.840 sure right, there were different ways to mind crypto. One 307 00:14:30.919 --> 00:14:33.440 was trying to solve a mathematical problem. There's another way 308 00:14:33.440 --> 00:14:36.120 where you could have spent your CPU cycles, which was 309 00:14:36.159 --> 00:14:39.879 I'm going to spend CPU cycles in verifying transactions, right 310 00:14:39.919 --> 00:14:42.159 and become part of the network. So you could be 311 00:14:42.159 --> 00:14:45.200 a node that verifies transactions. Yeah, and I listen, I've 312 00:14:45.200 --> 00:14:47.120 done this in a while. But I know with eth, 313 00:14:47.200 --> 00:14:49.360 for example, if you had I think it was thirty 314 00:14:49.399 --> 00:14:54.679 thousand dollars worth eth a in a wallet, you could 315 00:14:54.679 --> 00:14:58.559 then be a verification node. If you staked your ETH 316 00:14:58.679 --> 00:15:01.000 in that node and said, yeah, I stake my thirty 317 00:15:01.000 --> 00:15:05.320 grand to say, yeah, we're making these transactions appropriately, you'd 318 00:15:05.360 --> 00:15:08.159 earn ETH on that, and you'd earn ETH for doing 319 00:15:08.159 --> 00:15:09.879 the verifications and that sort of stuff. So it was 320 00:15:10.000 --> 00:15:12.759 it was when mining really wasn't viable anymore, but you 321 00:15:12.759 --> 00:15:15.200 could still verify transactions. 322 00:15:14.600 --> 00:15:16.519 In the days of mining crypto are over. 323 00:15:16.960 --> 00:15:21.679 Yeah, pretty much. I mean yeah for the normal household user, yes, 324 00:15:22.080 --> 00:15:25.320 I would say that you just don't have the amount 325 00:15:25.360 --> 00:15:30.559 of compute and electricity to really mine anything. And there 326 00:15:30.559 --> 00:15:32.559 are still, i mean there are still some minable tokens, 327 00:15:32.840 --> 00:15:36.679 but you're not getting much for them. Okay, So just 328 00:15:36.720 --> 00:15:39.200 so we're all sort of clear on this process, KELP 329 00:15:39.279 --> 00:15:43.679 dio is a DeFi restaking protocol, not an exchange the 330 00:15:43.799 --> 00:15:46.639 stolen asset, the thing that they created out of thin air, 331 00:15:46.759 --> 00:15:48.840 although is an all crypto kind of created out of 332 00:15:48.840 --> 00:15:53.200 thin air. Is this restaked eth or rs eth KELP 333 00:15:53.399 --> 00:15:58.399 liquid restaking tokens that's what that is. And the failure 334 00:15:58.440 --> 00:16:02.440 here happened in layer zero with that cross cross bridge 335 00:16:02.639 --> 00:16:06.919 messaging communications right where they just required one of one verifier, 336 00:16:06.919 --> 00:16:08.639 which is a no good. 337 00:16:09.039 --> 00:16:11.720 And so these hackers got away with or did they 338 00:16:11.720 --> 00:16:14.279 get caught this three hundred million dollars. 339 00:16:14.279 --> 00:16:18.200 For three hundred million dollars of eth that didn't actually exist. 340 00:16:19.200 --> 00:16:21.039 I don't know that they actually got caught. It doesn't 341 00:16:21.039 --> 00:16:21.840 say in the article here. 342 00:16:22.159 --> 00:16:22.360 Hmm. 343 00:16:22.519 --> 00:16:27.480 Okay, they basically didn't steal it from someone. They conjured it, yeah, 344 00:16:28.080 --> 00:16:30.120 out of thin thinner air. 345 00:16:29.919 --> 00:16:31.759 All right, But it's not like they cashed it in 346 00:16:31.799 --> 00:16:33.519 and fled the country or it might. 347 00:16:33.399 --> 00:16:36.519 Have Yeah, no, no, no, no, okay, they say they say 348 00:16:36.559 --> 00:16:38.559 the attack has been attributed to North Korea as a 349 00:16:38.639 --> 00:16:43.519 Lazarith group, but nobody's arresting them and it's not like right, 350 00:16:43.679 --> 00:16:46.559 so all right, some of the money was actually well, 351 00:16:46.679 --> 00:16:48.159 well here you go, some of the money was actually 352 00:16:48.240 --> 00:16:52.279 seized and frozen about thirty thousand eighth of it roughly 353 00:16:52.480 --> 00:16:55.519 seventy one million, so not as much as it was taking. 354 00:16:55.600 --> 00:16:58.159 Okay, all right, this is a real quick one. I 355 00:16:58.200 --> 00:17:00.919 brought this up on dot net rocks. It's a Windows 356 00:17:00.919 --> 00:17:05.039 Defender Performance Tool. It's a Windows application also a dot 357 00:17:05.079 --> 00:17:10.359 net application that monitors Windows Defender ETW events and visualizes 358 00:17:10.400 --> 00:17:14.519 scan durations in real time using a bar chart. And 359 00:17:14.559 --> 00:17:17.599 it can also visualize snapshots. And you know, I only 360 00:17:17.640 --> 00:17:20.599 mention it because there's a lot of people now and 361 00:17:20.599 --> 00:17:22.480 a lot of friends of ours that just you know, 362 00:17:22.519 --> 00:17:24.599 they sit behind their Windows machine and they're like, gee, 363 00:17:24.640 --> 00:17:26.680 I wonder if I'm getting hacked. You know, there's not 364 00:17:26.799 --> 00:17:30.000 really there's Windows Defender pops up and says, you know, 365 00:17:30.000 --> 00:17:33.400 if there's a threat or something like that. But generally 366 00:17:33.519 --> 00:17:36.920 we don't look into the inner workings of our machines 367 00:17:37.039 --> 00:17:41.000 and you know, what applications are running in what could 368 00:17:41.000 --> 00:17:43.119 be a problem in all this kind of stuff. So 369 00:17:43.160 --> 00:17:45.240 this is a good thing just to run. If you've 370 00:17:45.240 --> 00:17:47.680 got some extra screen space, throw it. 371 00:17:47.720 --> 00:17:49.519 Up there if you're interested in this kind of thing. 372 00:17:49.640 --> 00:17:51.440 If you're interested in this kind of thing. So I 373 00:17:51.440 --> 00:17:53.039 don't want to be labor it, but that's it. I 374 00:17:53.119 --> 00:17:54.240 just I'll put a link to that. 375 00:17:54.279 --> 00:17:56.599 Bo didn't you guys see who the two developers are. 376 00:17:56.519 --> 00:17:58.039 On us probably interviewed them. 377 00:17:58.119 --> 00:18:02.039 Oh, Alexander and Claude. 378 00:18:02.799 --> 00:18:04.279 I think you're going to start to see a lot 379 00:18:04.319 --> 00:18:07.119 more of this. I've seen a lot of githubs attributed 380 00:18:07.440 --> 00:18:10.799 to claud Code as the only developer now right, we're 381 00:18:10.839 --> 00:18:13.400 the only developer doing any pushing any whatever is Claude 382 00:18:13.480 --> 00:18:15.519 to where I think we'll see a lot of these 383 00:18:15.519 --> 00:18:17.440 little tools. I mean, shoot, a lot of us have 384 00:18:17.480 --> 00:18:19.440 had these ideas, right right, Hey, wouldn't it be cool 385 00:18:19.440 --> 00:18:20.880 if I had this little thing that did this thing? 386 00:18:21.279 --> 00:18:21.680 Right now? 387 00:18:21.720 --> 00:18:22.839 You can get cloud code to create it? 388 00:18:22.839 --> 00:18:23.559 So cool. 389 00:18:23.599 --> 00:18:24.279 He's a good example. 390 00:18:24.240 --> 00:18:26.279 You know that guy who did that thing at that 391 00:18:26.319 --> 00:18:26.960 place at the time. 392 00:18:27.039 --> 00:18:28.640 I remember, all right, who wants to take the CEA 393 00:18:28.680 --> 00:18:32.440 panel story? Oh, c panel start with the headline please. 394 00:18:32.240 --> 00:18:34.960 C panel for those of you know you know what 395 00:18:35.079 --> 00:18:39.279 sea panel is critical C panel and WHM bug exploited 396 00:18:39.319 --> 00:18:43.799 as a zero day POC now available. POC is now available. 397 00:18:44.079 --> 00:18:46.920 I mean I should say it in that proof of concepts. 398 00:18:46.920 --> 00:18:50.000 In other words, there's a there's a tool that somebody 399 00:18:50.039 --> 00:18:52.799 has written to do to do the exploit, to do 400 00:18:52.839 --> 00:18:54.200 the deed, to do the deed. 401 00:18:54.119 --> 00:18:54.960