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<v Speaker 1>Get ready.

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<v Speaker 2>So it's still the tenth day of September twenty twenty five,

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<v Speaker 2>allegedly according to that thing we call a calendar on

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<v Speaker 2>a Wednesday, and I'm a little bit late starting, so

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<v Speaker 2>I'm going to get to it as quickly as possible.

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<v Speaker 2>Larry Hancock with us, And this was an unplanned situation

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<v Speaker 2>where I had Mike Swanson and Larry Hancock on on

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<v Speaker 2>the same night, but works out for me because I

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<v Speaker 2>get two hours of a good conversation with two intelligent

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<v Speaker 2>and thoughtful people who are both authors.

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<v Speaker 1>Of course, Larry is a prolific author and.

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<v Speaker 2>Takes up a lot of space on my bookshelf and

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<v Speaker 2>doesn't just take up space, actually is a big part

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<v Speaker 2>of my education and could be yours as well. A

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<v Speaker 2>variety of books, which one should I mention this time? Well,

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<v Speaker 2>I like Nexus for Today. I like someone would have

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<v Speaker 2>talked for today. I like Tipping Point for today. Oh gee,

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<v Speaker 2>I wonder why?

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<v Speaker 1>Oh?

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<v Speaker 2>And The Oswald Puzzle, which is the most recently released

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<v Speaker 2>book as far as I know, unless Larry snuck another

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<v Speaker 2>one in on me, who knows.

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<v Speaker 1>Maybe they'll be a new one soon.

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<v Speaker 2>Unintentional again, probably produced, but that one he co authored

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<v Speaker 2>with David Boylan, and they will both be presenting at

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<v Speaker 2>the Lancer Conference November twenty first to the twenty third.

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<v Speaker 2>This year looks like virtually for one and in person

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<v Speaker 2>for the other. But you know, your experiences may vary

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<v Speaker 2>and stay tuned, but either way the Oswald Puzzle and

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<v Speaker 2>there'll be links in the show notes. See you can

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<v Speaker 2>go follow Larry's stuff at Larry dash Handcock dot com,

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<v Speaker 2>et cetera, et cetera. And I'm sure everybody wants to

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<v Speaker 2>hear what Larry has to say about Charlie Kirk. I'm kidding.

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<v Speaker 2>I'm sure that's not where we need to go right now.

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<v Speaker 2>But political violence, it's not like it's new, That's all

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<v Speaker 2>I'm saying about it, and I sadly predict that it's

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<v Speaker 2>not the end of it.

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<v Speaker 1>One way or another.

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<v Speaker 2>It does seem to be in the American character to

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<v Speaker 2>violently eliminate people that we disagree with. Maybe it's worse

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<v Speaker 2>than other places, maybe it's just better covered here.

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<v Speaker 1>But is it acceptable?

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<v Speaker 2>I'm not asking your political persuasion, you listening to me

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<v Speaker 2>right now, I'm just saying is it acceptable? And reactions

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<v Speaker 2>or whatever, we know this is going to be a

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<v Speaker 2>game now for a while, and the flags are at

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<v Speaker 2>half staff because he was a Trump supporter. But all

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<v Speaker 2>I gotta say is I find the video of them

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<v Speaker 2>being shot and the fact that it was distributed sickening.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's that.

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<v Speaker 2>And this is not a guy I agreed with or

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<v Speaker 2>wanted to join in the prove me wrong debates. But

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<v Speaker 2>is this the way that we react? I guess that's

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<v Speaker 2>an open question for you guys. Meanwhile, there's other controversies

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<v Speaker 2>or controversies out there, and there's certainly the demand for files,

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<v Speaker 2>the promised release of upcoming files, the newly released files.

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<v Speaker 2>What am I talking about? Could be a lot of things.

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<v Speaker 2>We had releases this year alone, MLK, RFK, those assassinations

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<v Speaker 2>from the sixties, in some cases newer stuff released, in

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<v Speaker 2>some cases not so much. Phase one of the Epstein files.

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<v Speaker 2>In that case, nothing new released as far as I

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<v Speaker 2>could tell. But some people believe more to come. And

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<v Speaker 2>isn't that part of the game that well, those of

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<v Speaker 2>us interested in the JFK assassination have been playing for

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<v Speaker 2>what more than sixty years, even if we weren't alive

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<v Speaker 2>for the whole game.

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<v Speaker 1>I wasn't. I'm only in my fifties.

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<v Speaker 2>So yeah, nonetheless, about half of that time, I've definitely

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<v Speaker 2>been engaged with these files and they have evolved anyway,

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<v Speaker 2>Larry Hancock's another guy who's written about that, who has

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<v Speaker 2>observed it, who's been alive longer.

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<v Speaker 1>But you know, does he have a complete handle on

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<v Speaker 1>all this.

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<v Speaker 2>Let's find out, because there's a lot of expectations and

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of possibilities yet to come when it comes

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<v Speaker 2>to the release of many, many files, Larry, and maybe

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<v Speaker 2>we can look back at some of the I don't know,

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<v Speaker 2>the behaviors of the past to predict what we might

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<v Speaker 2>see in the future, or at least to know what

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<v Speaker 2>we should be looking out for. Maybe that's where I

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<v Speaker 2>turn it over to you. But first, how are you tonight, sir?

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<v Speaker 3>Oh, I'm doing fine, Chuck. It's early fall here in Oklahoma.

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<v Speaker 3>It's dry and it's hot and it's brown, and it's

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<v Speaker 3>the time when you begin going ah, maybe I do

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<v Speaker 3>like winter after all. And then in about three months ago,

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<v Speaker 3>wrong about that?

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<v Speaker 1>Well, right?

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<v Speaker 2>The changing of the seasons sometimes more welcome than others,

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<v Speaker 2>and depending on what direction things are going in. But

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<v Speaker 2>speaking of the changing of seasons, you know, there is

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of discussion right right now, in fact, about

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<v Speaker 2>what should be released, what could be released, what people

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<v Speaker 2>are demanding to be released.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know, a lot of.

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<v Speaker 2>This sounds very familiar, regardless of what the controversy is,

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<v Speaker 2>and who might be dead, who might be alive, who

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<v Speaker 2>might be unlived, as they say, who might have been assaulted,

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<v Speaker 2>and what the real history is according to what the

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<v Speaker 2>government collected. Gee, it sounds like I'm dancing around talking

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<v Speaker 2>about a specific here. Wonder why that is? Where should

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<v Speaker 2>we begin with this, Larry? I mean, like I said,

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<v Speaker 2>until the headlines got broken today with a murder in

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<v Speaker 2>real time and the video being distributed, and that being

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<v Speaker 2>of course attached directly to our political agreements and disagreements

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<v Speaker 2>out there.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, it would have might have might have been just.

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<v Speaker 2>Another day of discussing what should be released in what

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<v Speaker 2>shouldn't be So where do we begin and put it

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<v Speaker 2>in context with?

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know.

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<v Speaker 2>Let's go with the thing with the longest standing argument

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<v Speaker 2>over the files I've ever seen, which is the JFK assassination.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I think, Chuck, I think it has to do

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<v Speaker 3>with expectations and things are so radically different in terms

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<v Speaker 3>of expectations as far as quote unquote what's in the files.

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<v Speaker 3>I mean, there's a group of people I think that

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<v Speaker 3>always assume that you know in regard to things, whether

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<v Speaker 3>there covert operations or assassinations or UFOs. They we've kind

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<v Speaker 3>of gotten into a space where people think the government

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<v Speaker 3>knows and it's not sharing with us. So the whole

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<v Speaker 3>quest for file releases is basically to beat them up,

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<v Speaker 3>to tell us what they really know that they're keeping

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<v Speaker 3>from us, And that seems to have become the mantra. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 3>it's like, so if your expectation is really that you

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<v Speaker 3>think the government does know about everything and it's keeping

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<v Speaker 3>it from you, then we get into file releases and

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<v Speaker 3>the president releases them all and we find out that,

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<v Speaker 3>to a large extent, there's nothing new because no, the

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<v Speaker 3>government didn't know and they didn't put it into documents

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<v Speaker 3>and it wasn't sitting there being kept from us. I

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<v Speaker 3>think that's one place to start, is what were your expectations.

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<v Speaker 3>If that was your expectations for file releases, you're generally

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<v Speaker 3>going to be disappointed. Now, on the other hand, there's

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<v Speaker 3>another way to look at it, and another way to

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<v Speaker 3>look at it is to look at these various areas

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<v Speaker 3>and say, well, what have we learned, What have we

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<v Speaker 3>learned outside government files? What have we learned from the

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<v Speaker 3>files that we have seen from the four year releases

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<v Speaker 3>that we've seen, you know, there's a body of work

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<v Speaker 3>already there.

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<v Speaker 1>And then it.

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<v Speaker 3>Becomes kind of interesting because, all right, let's take that

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<v Speaker 3>body of work. You know, what we learned through non

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<v Speaker 3>official channels, side channels, you know, releases of things that

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<v Speaker 3>they made a mistake and they were never supposed to

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<v Speaker 3>be released, notes that were on a document that you

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<v Speaker 3>never know, what did we learn. Let's let's compare that

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<v Speaker 3>body of work with what they released and see if

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<v Speaker 3>there are any differences. You know, did you know did

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<v Speaker 3>they hold something back? Maybe even unknowingly, which is quite

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<v Speaker 3>interesting because that's something that's something we have seen in

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<v Speaker 3>the past. But I think so those are two things.

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<v Speaker 3>What are your expectations. And if your expectations are they're

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<v Speaker 3>suddenly going to share, you know, dish the dirt, whatever

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<v Speaker 3>you want to call it, that's unlikely, okay, because most

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<v Speaker 3>of the things that we look at, if they're truly

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<v Speaker 3>were conspiracies, you know, they worked right, or we would

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<v Speaker 3>already know it. Would have been early knowledge, so they work,

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<v Speaker 3>so things were covered up somewhat effectively. But another thing

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<v Speaker 3>I'd like to point out that's happening in tandem that

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<v Speaker 3>is confusing people is, in addition to the file releases

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<v Speaker 3>which the President authorized and which are bringing out primarily

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<v Speaker 3>things that were already setting at the National Archives that

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<v Speaker 3>are just kind of being flushed into the system and

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<v Speaker 3>which in general, you know, we're sitting there not because

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<v Speaker 3>they were super secret, but because nobody had gotten through

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<v Speaker 3>the process to really release them, because they weren't all

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<v Speaker 3>that important. You know, nobody had done foya is on them.

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<v Speaker 3>They were just sitting there. That's what happened. But there

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<v Speaker 3>are a series of hearings going on with the House

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<v Speaker 3>Oversight Panel, which we've discussed with Representative Luna, that are

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<v Speaker 3>happening in tandem. And the interesting thing about that is

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<v Speaker 3>that's pursuing the attitude that the government knows things that

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<v Speaker 3>they're not sharing with us, and they might even not

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<v Speaker 3>be sharing it with each other. You know, for all

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<v Speaker 3>we know, is there stuff setting out there that didn't

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<v Speaker 3>make it into official government repositories? You know, was it

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<v Speaker 3>interrupted on the way. Are people screwing with the system. Basically,

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<v Speaker 3>you know, there are there whistleblowers that are making reports

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<v Speaker 3>and somehow that's never getting into the system. So I

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<v Speaker 3>think one of the things that's getting confabulated is what's

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<v Speaker 3>going on with the Oversight Committee and the testimony it's

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<v Speaker 3>taken versus the file release and they're two dramatically different things.

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<v Speaker 3>Are we are learning some things from the Oversight Committee, right,

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<v Speaker 3>that is forcing out some information that is far different

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<v Speaker 3>than this file release thing. So a long winded answer

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<v Speaker 3>to say, you know, if you're just kind of on

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<v Speaker 3>the periphery of this stuff, try to keep this segmented

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<v Speaker 3>because it is different.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, another thing to consider here, Larry, in my opinion

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<v Speaker 2>is that the priority, okay, of the bureaucrats and the

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<v Speaker 2>people that were at the heads of these agencies in

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<v Speaker 2>different time periods are going to differ. For instance, the

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<v Speaker 2>people that were basically in charge in nineteen sixty four

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<v Speaker 2>when you had your first you know, release of any

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<v Speaker 2>information from the federal government regarding the Kennedy assassination, even

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<v Speaker 2>if you want to begin with the Warrant Commission, but

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<v Speaker 2>didn't begin with the Warrant Commission. There was already releases

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<v Speaker 2>before that, but let's begin with that as a mark

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<v Speaker 2>in the timeline. Those people are all gone, the bureaucrats,

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<v Speaker 2>the heads of the agencies, they're dead and gone, retired whatever,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, sixty some odd years later, if they're still there, I'm.

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<v Speaker 1>Afraid you know.

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<v Speaker 2>So reality is, the people that are now handling these

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<v Speaker 2>things don't even have the initial context. So, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>does that work in our favor or against us? That's

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<v Speaker 2>something that we're gonna have to considering, you know, posthumously,

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<v Speaker 2>we're gonna have to consider it looking back.

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<v Speaker 1>Did it change things? Because here's the thing again, if

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<v Speaker 1>you have.

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<v Speaker 2>Circumstances where the government collected information but doesn't.

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<v Speaker 1>Know what happened.

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<v Speaker 2>And I've said this before, you know, maybe they did

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<v Speaker 2>an investigation and couldn't come to a reasonable conclusion about aspects.

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<v Speaker 2>Let's not say ultimately because people would be out about that,

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<v Speaker 2>but let's just say they couldn't come to you know,

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<v Speaker 2>they came to many dead ends. They came to circumstances

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<v Speaker 2>where they had to say, look, we have you know,

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<v Speaker 2>contradictory information here, and we can't definitively say exactly this

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<v Speaker 2>or exactly that because the records show one thing here,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, sort of like when you end up with

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<v Speaker 2>people that are in two different places according to official

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<v Speaker 2>records at the same moment. It doesn't mean that you

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<v Speaker 2>have a definitive answer that there were two different people.

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<v Speaker 2>You have various possibilities things like that. And now I'm

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<v Speaker 2>traveling down a road where it sounds like I'm confabulating.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm trying not to, you know, but I.

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<v Speaker 3>Think check think what you're releasing. If they didn't know

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<v Speaker 3>it even back in sixty four, right, if they the

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<v Speaker 3>people that were releasing the documents and over the following years,

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<v Speaker 3>and they didn't know what really might be relevant and

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<v Speaker 3>what might not be real elevant, and if they if

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<v Speaker 3>they didn't classify something as assassination related, then it didn't

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<v Speaker 3>go to the Warren. First of all, it can go

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<v Speaker 3>to the Warren Commission, and second of all, then it

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<v Speaker 3>just stayed in the file somewhere and eventually either got

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<v Speaker 3>sent to Nara or it got shredded, depending upon what

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<v Speaker 3>file hand and lean protocols were. So there could be

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<v Speaker 3>stuff missing that we would think was very important right

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<v Speaker 3>now that they would not have had a clue to. Then. Actually,

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<v Speaker 3>most of the stuff that we really think that's important

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<v Speaker 3>as far as the Kennedy assassination, the Jaya, you know,

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<v Speaker 3>our k assassination. Most of the stuff that we think

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<v Speaker 3>would be important now that we want to see those

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<v Speaker 3>people at the time, it would have had no clue

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<v Speaker 3>that that was even necessarily relevant. So that's another thing

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<v Speaker 3>that you know, a lot of stuff probably never got

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<v Speaker 3>to the National Archives that we would want to see.

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<v Speaker 3>We know from the Heath Memo that the JM wave

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<v Speaker 3>investigation of CIA and Cuban involvement never got anywhere, you know,

251
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<v Speaker 3>So it's it's not going to be released now, right,

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<v Speaker 3>But we wouldn't know that unless we could reverse engineer

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<v Speaker 3>the paper trail. And I think what you and I

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<v Speaker 3>have talked about is the good news to some extent,

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<v Speaker 3>is that we're positioned that we can reverse engineer some

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<v Speaker 3>of the paper trails now and at least ask for

257
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<v Speaker 3>what might be helpful. Now, that's not going to help

258
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<v Speaker 3>any good to ask the President's office, but asking the

259
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<v Speaker 3>House Committee, maybe you're going to get something because they've

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<v Speaker 3>got a channel. Just one of the things that appalls

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<v Speaker 3>me about some of the current hearings is they're collecting information,

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<v Speaker 3>but the people that hold the information aren't in the room.

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<v Speaker 3>So when somebody goes in front of the here the

264
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<v Speaker 3>UFO UAP hearings today and comes up with incidents and

265
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<v Speaker 3>gets the congress people all excited, it's kind of like

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<v Speaker 3>there's nobody in the room to ask like, did you

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<v Speaker 3>guys was this not investigated? Does the Department of Defense

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<v Speaker 3>have something? Does the Air Force have you know, there's

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<v Speaker 3>nobody in the room. So there's this this separation between

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<v Speaker 3>the people that are should be accountable and the people

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<v Speaker 3>that are bringing information.

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<v Speaker 2>To the fore and along with the sort of whether

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<v Speaker 2>intended or unintended misdirection in this labyrinth is and let

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<v Speaker 2>me give you for instance, JM. Wave we know is

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<v Speaker 2>you know what the largest CIA station domestically we had

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<v Speaker 2>at exactly the critical time that would have involved various

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<v Speaker 2>political activists, people that were involved with Cuba, so on

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00:16:52.320 --> 00:16:57.919
<v Speaker 2>and so forth. The CIA's operational individuals all right there

279
00:16:57.960 --> 00:17:04.359
<v Speaker 2>in Florida, Okay, logistically placed perfectly to handle all of

280
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<v Speaker 2>that when it came to all of the Cuban situation,

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<v Speaker 2>et cetera. Well, look, do we know even reliably how

282
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<v Speaker 2>much of the communication and paperwork was actually preserved from

283
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<v Speaker 2>that massive operation, Because it seems to me it was

284
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<v Speaker 2>pretty large, And then other people say to me, you

285
00:17:25.119 --> 00:17:28.200
<v Speaker 2>know what, you're overestimating the size of the thing, And

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<v Speaker 2>I say, well, I don't know. I'm just going along

287
00:17:30.680 --> 00:17:32.880
<v Speaker 2>with what I see here. It does appear to be

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00:17:32.920 --> 00:17:36.839
<v Speaker 2>a pretty large operation. And do we even have a

289
00:17:36.960 --> 00:17:41.880
<v Speaker 2>hint as to you know, a level a percentage, say

290
00:17:42.359 --> 00:17:46.480
<v Speaker 2>of how much of the communication or operational paperwork or

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00:17:47.240 --> 00:17:48.839
<v Speaker 2>anything that would be proof.

292
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<v Speaker 1>Let's just say of you know, financial.

293
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<v Speaker 2>Dealings, different you know, subprojects, whatever. Do we even reliably

294
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<v Speaker 2>know how much of that was deserved and how much

295
00:18:00.920 --> 00:18:05.720
<v Speaker 2>of it might have been just routinely destroyed as part

296
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<v Speaker 2>of it?

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<v Speaker 3>Actually, yeah, actually, actually we do only because my friend

298
00:18:10.680 --> 00:18:13.920
<v Speaker 3>David Boyle and is like so much of a bigger

299
00:18:13.960 --> 00:18:17.079
<v Speaker 3>document geek than I am. For example, we know how

300
00:18:17.160 --> 00:18:21.759
<v Speaker 3>much jam Wave was spending on types of projects, say

301
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<v Speaker 3>in nineteen sixty two, sixty three, so we kind of say, well,

302
00:18:25.640 --> 00:18:29.480
<v Speaker 3>we know how much money they're spending, what files do

303
00:18:29.559 --> 00:18:32.039
<v Speaker 3>we have? And we find we have a lot of

304
00:18:32.119 --> 00:18:38.680
<v Speaker 3>operational files, maritime operational files, you know, so we can say, oh,

305
00:18:39.000 --> 00:18:42.759
<v Speaker 3>at least we have a few hundred a few thousand

306
00:18:43.400 --> 00:18:45.920
<v Speaker 3>operational files on what were they were doing on the

307
00:18:45.960 --> 00:18:51.839
<v Speaker 3>military side. We have none on the propaganda side, which

308
00:18:51.880 --> 00:18:55.160
<v Speaker 3>is kind of interesting because you know, they were spending

309
00:18:55.200 --> 00:18:59.759
<v Speaker 3>as much on propaganda and covert political action as they

310
00:18:59.799 --> 00:19:03.039
<v Speaker 3>were spending on military, and that's none of that's there.

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00:19:03.559 --> 00:19:07.559
<v Speaker 3>It's just flat gone. Uh. And one of one of

312
00:19:07.559 --> 00:19:10.599
<v Speaker 3>the reasons that makes it particularly interesting to us is

313
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<v Speaker 3>that it's very likely where the operational interest in Lee

314
00:19:14.319 --> 00:19:18.799
<v Speaker 3>Harvey Ossell was and that stuff is just just flat gone.

315
00:19:19.920 --> 00:19:25.720
<v Speaker 3>The operational documents for military. Yeah, and for some for

316
00:19:25.759 --> 00:19:28.319
<v Speaker 3>some reason, we have a lot of detail on their

317
00:19:28.359 --> 00:19:37.240
<v Speaker 3>military activities and virtually nothing on political warfare, psychological obligation, propaganda.

318
00:19:37.799 --> 00:19:39.480
<v Speaker 3>So we do have some clues.

319
00:19:40.720 --> 00:19:44.920
<v Speaker 2>Well, it's weird because once again, just like in the

320
00:19:45.039 --> 00:19:49.079
<v Speaker 2>MK Ultra situation, you need a forensic accountant to sit

321
00:19:49.119 --> 00:19:50.680
<v Speaker 2>there and say, okay, we've got receipts.

322
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<v Speaker 1>Now, we got to figure out what it was spent on. Uh.

323
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<v Speaker 2>You know, like, That's what it seems like to me

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00:19:56.119 --> 00:19:58.720
<v Speaker 2>over and over again that if it wasn't for somebody

325
00:19:58.759 --> 00:20:01.680
<v Speaker 2>trying to keep the books straight and account for money.

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<v Speaker 1>You might have the disappearance of all of the proof. Here.

327
00:20:06.440 --> 00:20:10.599
<v Speaker 1>No way to reconstruct these things. And I'm not.

328
00:20:10.559 --> 00:20:13.160
<v Speaker 2>Saying that's the only path. It's only just followed the

329
00:20:13.200 --> 00:20:16.559
<v Speaker 2>money here, which sounds like an oversimplified version of that.

330
00:20:16.640 --> 00:20:17.839
<v Speaker 1>But truth is truth.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, if you see a bunch of you know,

332
00:20:20.920 --> 00:20:24.599
<v Speaker 2>people being employed and then you go, okay, well, where's

333
00:20:24.640 --> 00:20:27.240
<v Speaker 2>what the job they did? And you have no job

334
00:20:27.279 --> 00:20:30.519
<v Speaker 2>for them to be doing. You know, you have no

335
00:20:30.640 --> 00:20:34.559
<v Speaker 2>time cards, you have no base of operations. You wonder, well, gee,

336
00:20:34.559 --> 00:20:37.119
<v Speaker 2>where did the money go? They just paid people to

337
00:20:37.160 --> 00:20:41.440
<v Speaker 2>do nothing. No, that didn't happen, right, So you know,

338
00:20:41.599 --> 00:20:45.559
<v Speaker 2>here we go. I'm again oversimplifying stuff, but it speaks

339
00:20:45.599 --> 00:20:50.160
<v Speaker 2>to where you have certain things that are missing and

340
00:20:50.240 --> 00:20:52.640
<v Speaker 2>some people jump on it and say it's missing. Therefore

341
00:20:52.680 --> 00:20:55.359
<v Speaker 2>they destroyed it. Maybe they did, or maybe it was

342
00:20:55.440 --> 00:20:59.400
<v Speaker 2>sent somewhere else. I mean, that's yet another possibility where

343
00:20:59.440 --> 00:21:01.519
<v Speaker 2>you have things that are sense somewhere else so they

344
00:21:01.559 --> 00:21:08.240
<v Speaker 2>can be overlooked, you know, in another storage facility. Let's say,

345
00:21:09.920 --> 00:21:12.200
<v Speaker 2>you know, and I've seen this with divorces, where you know,

346
00:21:12.319 --> 00:21:15.839
<v Speaker 2>like people turn around go after each other's income and

347
00:21:16.119 --> 00:21:18.279
<v Speaker 2>they find out that you know, okay, yeah, they owned

348
00:21:18.279 --> 00:21:21.319
<v Speaker 2>a business or whatever, but here's where other money was,

349
00:21:22.160 --> 00:21:24.519
<v Speaker 2>and it's not mixed in with their tax returns, you

350
00:21:24.599 --> 00:21:27.640
<v Speaker 2>know what I mean, there's all sorts of ways to

351
00:21:27.680 --> 00:21:31.440
<v Speaker 2>go about this, and yet I don't know if people

352
00:21:31.440 --> 00:21:35.079
<v Speaker 2>appreciate the concept of what you called the negative template,

353
00:21:36.519 --> 00:21:39.559
<v Speaker 2>that yeah, there's stuff that should be here that's missing.

354
00:21:40.039 --> 00:21:42.680
<v Speaker 1>I mean, how do you put that kind of into.

355
00:21:42.519 --> 00:21:47.160
<v Speaker 2>A short summary to explain to people, like how that

356
00:21:47.240 --> 00:21:51.039
<v Speaker 2>works and what's important about that when information is missing.

357
00:21:51.960 --> 00:21:54.319
<v Speaker 2>I know we discussed in our you know, back and

358
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<v Speaker 2>forth texts about the oswalt to a one file which

359
00:21:57.920 --> 00:22:02.039
<v Speaker 2>has evolved over the years, which is a personnel file,

360
00:22:02.319 --> 00:22:04.599
<v Speaker 2>you know, held. Maybe you could explain this a little

361
00:22:04.599 --> 00:22:08.640
<v Speaker 2>bit and give people the proper context to get into

362
00:22:09.119 --> 00:22:11.119
<v Speaker 2>when you see something as missing and you know it

363
00:22:11.160 --> 00:22:14.480
<v Speaker 2>should be there, and how to follow on that.

364
00:22:14.640 --> 00:22:15.880
<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

365
00:22:15.960 --> 00:22:20.799
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, the reverse temple. It's a really important methodology because

366
00:22:20.839 --> 00:22:24.720
<v Speaker 3>it allows you to it gives you clues for what

367
00:22:24.799 --> 00:22:29.759
<v Speaker 3>was happening that most likely someone tried to shield from

368
00:22:29.759 --> 00:22:33.279
<v Speaker 3>the system. I mean, because the system. There are standard

369
00:22:33.279 --> 00:22:37.960
<v Speaker 3>operating practices in any agency and any bureaucracy. You keep

370
00:22:38.000 --> 00:22:41.240
<v Speaker 3>records for a purpose, because it's like any business. If

371
00:22:41.279 --> 00:22:45.680
<v Speaker 3>you don't keep records, nobody knows what's going on. It's inefficient,

372
00:22:45.799 --> 00:22:50.519
<v Speaker 3>you lose money whatever. So there are standard practices for everything,

373
00:22:50.599 --> 00:22:57.000
<v Speaker 3>including covert operations, including everything that JM Wave did, everything

374
00:22:57.039 --> 00:22:59.839
<v Speaker 3>that was going on in Miami there. You know, there

375
00:22:59.880 --> 00:23:04.960
<v Speaker 3>are special practices in regard to Oswol's tool what's called

376
00:23:05.079 --> 00:23:08.519
<v Speaker 3>to A one file, which originally the Army had something

377
00:23:08.559 --> 00:23:12.480
<v Speaker 3>called the DD two to one form which just captured

378
00:23:12.519 --> 00:23:16.240
<v Speaker 3>all the personnel information out of a person. Over time,

379
00:23:16.279 --> 00:23:19.559
<v Speaker 3>other agencies began to adopt it, and it was like

380
00:23:19.799 --> 00:23:22.480
<v Speaker 3>the the file if you wanted to pull it. Selecting

381
00:23:22.519 --> 00:23:24.839
<v Speaker 3>your in high school and this is your permanent record, right,

382
00:23:24.920 --> 00:23:28.720
<v Speaker 3>this is where we collect information about you. So if

383
00:23:28.720 --> 00:23:32.839
<v Speaker 3>anybody and you know, if anybody in the agency, you know,

384
00:23:32.880 --> 00:23:35.519
<v Speaker 3>if your name came up, are you come up in

385
00:23:35.559 --> 00:23:39.240
<v Speaker 3>a discussion and a report whatever, there's a central storage

386
00:23:39.279 --> 00:23:42.720
<v Speaker 3>of information. So one of the things that's been really.

387
00:23:42.599 --> 00:23:43.480
<v Speaker 1>Really fast diary.

388
00:23:43.519 --> 00:23:46.000
<v Speaker 2>A quick snapshot of that might be when I went

389
00:23:46.039 --> 00:23:48.880
<v Speaker 2>to go try and get my father's military record, there's

390
00:23:48.920 --> 00:23:53.000
<v Speaker 2>a top sheet that says when he was inducted, his birthday,

391
00:23:53.119 --> 00:23:56.279
<v Speaker 2>gives him a serial number, talks about his job description,

392
00:23:56.440 --> 00:23:59.400
<v Speaker 2>and that's the top sheet, right, his name, his number,

393
00:24:00.200 --> 00:24:03.039
<v Speaker 2>when you know some dates things like that his birth date,

394
00:24:03.119 --> 00:24:05.960
<v Speaker 2>but also his date of induction, the job he was given.

395
00:24:06.000 --> 00:24:08.359
<v Speaker 1>That's your top sheet. You peel that back.

396
00:24:08.400 --> 00:24:11.119
<v Speaker 2>The next thing is what he's supposed to have done,

397
00:24:11.319 --> 00:24:14.039
<v Speaker 2>you know what I mean, real basic, like a biography,

398
00:24:14.559 --> 00:24:18.160
<v Speaker 2>but point by point. And that was a standard with

399
00:24:18.200 --> 00:24:21.000
<v Speaker 2>the military. Everybody has had one of these at one point,

400
00:24:21.079 --> 00:24:23.519
<v Speaker 2>in physical form for sure. I don't know what the

401
00:24:23.519 --> 00:24:26.480
<v Speaker 2>digital looks like now, but at one point that was

402
00:24:26.519 --> 00:24:31.680
<v Speaker 2>true for everybody, just to keep track of individuals as.

403
00:24:31.559 --> 00:24:34.039
<v Speaker 1>You moved them around. Those files went with them. You

404
00:24:34.079 --> 00:24:35.160
<v Speaker 1>knew who you were dealing with.

405
00:24:35.920 --> 00:24:38.440
<v Speaker 2>Commanding officers could sit there and leave through them and go, Okay,

406
00:24:38.480 --> 00:24:40.880
<v Speaker 2>I've got this guy, he does this. I've got that guy.

407
00:24:40.960 --> 00:24:43.400
<v Speaker 2>He's a tank guy. I've got this guy, he's an

408
00:24:43.400 --> 00:24:46.440
<v Speaker 2>auto mechanic. It doesn't matter what it is. They now

409
00:24:46.480 --> 00:24:49.839
<v Speaker 2>know who they have and what they're dealing with quickly.

410
00:24:50.400 --> 00:24:54.039
<v Speaker 2>And that's where that was based. But the CIA had

411
00:24:54.039 --> 00:24:56.880
<v Speaker 2>its own version of this two a one file that

412
00:24:57.559 --> 00:25:00.039
<v Speaker 2>was semi adopted from that template, right.

413
00:25:01.359 --> 00:25:05.079
<v Speaker 3>And not all that different. I mean, the military record

414
00:25:05.079 --> 00:25:08.319
<v Speaker 3>would have showed your training and your job skills. It

415
00:25:08.359 --> 00:25:12.880
<v Speaker 3>will show your assignments, it will show your security clearances. Okay,

416
00:25:13.519 --> 00:25:17.640
<v Speaker 3>unless you something's really strange and you're going to be

417
00:25:18.079 --> 00:25:20.480
<v Speaker 3>given a clearance for an off the books project. But

418
00:25:20.559 --> 00:25:23.519
<v Speaker 3>that's another story. But yeah, it's very much the same

419
00:25:23.559 --> 00:25:27.599
<v Speaker 3>and the cias in the same boat. Basically, these are

420
00:25:27.640 --> 00:25:34.119
<v Speaker 3>called personality files or you know, basically they are like

421
00:25:34.200 --> 00:25:37.640
<v Speaker 3>a personal record. But for the agency, of course, these

422
00:25:37.680 --> 00:25:42.440
<v Speaker 3>are not necessarily personnel. They're all cosso also called name files,

423
00:25:42.839 --> 00:25:45.680
<v Speaker 3>because you might very well set up a name for

424
00:25:45.839 --> 00:25:48.519
<v Speaker 3>somebody that was not an employee, that was just a

425
00:25:48.559 --> 00:25:53.559
<v Speaker 3>person of interest. For an example, let's take a someone

426
00:25:53.599 --> 00:25:57.799
<v Speaker 3>that you were considering for a mission. Let's say, yeah,

427
00:25:57.920 --> 00:26:02.119
<v Speaker 3>you've been talking to a human exile who has friends

428
00:26:02.160 --> 00:26:07.599
<v Speaker 3>of family in Cuba. Uh, they've they've volunteered to contact

429
00:26:07.680 --> 00:26:12.160
<v Speaker 3>them maintain get information on what's happening in Cuba. So

430
00:26:12.359 --> 00:26:14.640
<v Speaker 3>you start a file on them. You started two O

431
00:26:14.839 --> 00:26:18.240
<v Speaker 3>one and you're going to go through but uh, you know,

432
00:26:18.319 --> 00:26:21.240
<v Speaker 3>you're going to have some background on that family connection.

433
00:26:21.359 --> 00:26:24.039
<v Speaker 3>Who are they really related to? Did we check that out?

434
00:26:24.079 --> 00:26:26.440
<v Speaker 3>Are they lying to us? You know, who are they

435
00:26:26.440 --> 00:26:29.720
<v Speaker 3>really related to? So you're going to sign some information

436
00:26:29.839 --> 00:26:32.599
<v Speaker 3>on that, and then further down the road you might

437
00:26:32.680 --> 00:26:35.759
<v Speaker 3>find that Okay, we're going to take them seriously. So

438
00:26:35.920 --> 00:26:39.880
<v Speaker 3>here's a you know, here's a document where now we're

439
00:26:39.920 --> 00:26:42.720
<v Speaker 3>taking them seriously. We're going to do a p r

440
00:26:42.799 --> 00:26:47.000
<v Speaker 3>Q one, which a personality first level file, you know,

441
00:26:47.119 --> 00:26:50.519
<v Speaker 3>like you just that's the top sheet, like you just said, Chuck.

442
00:26:51.160 --> 00:26:53.440
<v Speaker 3>And but then then we're going to say, all right,

443
00:26:54.799 --> 00:26:57.279
<v Speaker 3>are we going to are we going to screen them?

444
00:26:57.720 --> 00:27:00.440
<v Speaker 3>Are we going to give them a polygraph? And so

445
00:27:00.480 --> 00:27:03.440
<v Speaker 3>there'll be a form on that did they pass. There'll

446
00:27:03.440 --> 00:27:07.480
<v Speaker 3>be a security review form, and then there'll be a

447
00:27:07.480 --> 00:27:10.359
<v Speaker 3>form that says, all right, we're officially considering them for

448
00:27:10.559 --> 00:27:16.279
<v Speaker 3>operational like provisional operational improvement, okay. And then as they

449
00:27:16.319 --> 00:27:18.279
<v Speaker 3>go further down the line, then there would be an

450
00:27:18.319 --> 00:27:22.039
<v Speaker 3>operational improvement for a given mission or a different project.

451
00:27:22.640 --> 00:27:25.759
<v Speaker 3>Generally not for more than six months, and so there's

452
00:27:25.799 --> 00:27:28.440
<v Speaker 3>a whole series of steps that you go through and

453
00:27:28.480 --> 00:27:32.079
<v Speaker 3>that would that becomes visible not just for people that

454
00:27:32.119 --> 00:27:35.319
<v Speaker 3>are employees. And I think that's the big difference between

455
00:27:35.400 --> 00:27:39.119
<v Speaker 3>the agency and a military service or something like that.

456
00:27:39.160 --> 00:27:42.559
<v Speaker 3>The agency's got to keep track of all sorts of

457
00:27:42.599 --> 00:27:46.720
<v Speaker 3>people who are not on the payroll. They're not on

458
00:27:47.039 --> 00:27:51.279
<v Speaker 3>as you know, full time employees, not even as contract employees.

459
00:27:51.680 --> 00:27:55.359
<v Speaker 3>You know their potential or current assets.

460
00:27:56.000 --> 00:27:58.119
<v Speaker 1>So that's yeah, not to slow it down too much.

461
00:27:58.240 --> 00:28:01.200
<v Speaker 2>But let's just say, for instance, there was a guy

462
00:28:01.279 --> 00:28:04.200
<v Speaker 2>who just happens to deal guns. Now, he's not linked

463
00:28:04.200 --> 00:28:06.799
<v Speaker 2>to the agency at all, but he happens to be

464
00:28:06.839 --> 00:28:10.960
<v Speaker 2>in a location or connected to people where it would

465
00:28:10.960 --> 00:28:13.440
<v Speaker 2>be easy for your off the books people to go

466
00:28:13.480 --> 00:28:16.640
<v Speaker 2>ahead and deal with him business wise, go buy guns

467
00:28:16.640 --> 00:28:19.599
<v Speaker 2>from this guy. There might be a person of interest

468
00:28:19.640 --> 00:28:23.079
<v Speaker 2>file on a gun dealer that is Look, this is

469
00:28:23.079 --> 00:28:26.160
<v Speaker 2>a guy who's friendly, keeps his mouth shut, and always

470
00:28:26.160 --> 00:28:26.839
<v Speaker 2>has the kind.

471
00:28:26.720 --> 00:28:28.839
<v Speaker 1>Of weapons we want and whatever.

472
00:28:29.119 --> 00:28:32.960
<v Speaker 2>He's not an employee, he's not an official member of anything,

473
00:28:33.400 --> 00:28:35.200
<v Speaker 2>but he's somebody that we have to deal with, so

474
00:28:35.680 --> 00:28:38.680
<v Speaker 2>I can quickly fill in anybody who goes to deal

475
00:28:38.720 --> 00:28:39.039
<v Speaker 2>with him.

476
00:28:39.400 --> 00:28:40.440
<v Speaker 1>This guy's a gun runner.

477
00:28:41.039 --> 00:28:43.480
<v Speaker 2>This guy will get you machine guns or bazuokas if

478
00:28:43.519 --> 00:28:46.279
<v Speaker 2>you need him. You want the kind of thing that

479
00:28:46.359 --> 00:28:48.759
<v Speaker 2>mounts only to the side of a helicopter, this guy's

480
00:28:48.799 --> 00:28:52.000
<v Speaker 2>got it. You want small arms, no problem, You want untraceable,

481
00:28:52.039 --> 00:28:55.000
<v Speaker 2>no problem. Maybe there might be details like that in

482
00:28:55.039 --> 00:28:58.400
<v Speaker 2>that guy's file, and he's not an official CIA guy,

483
00:28:58.480 --> 00:29:01.640
<v Speaker 2>government guy. Nothing, He's just somebody who is a person

484
00:29:01.680 --> 00:29:05.279
<v Speaker 2>of interest because he might become useful in an operation,

485
00:29:06.119 --> 00:29:09.599
<v Speaker 2>even just for the purchase of weapons. Say, is that

486
00:29:09.720 --> 00:29:10.640
<v Speaker 2>not a possibility?

487
00:29:10.720 --> 00:29:14.079
<v Speaker 3>But another thing that you'll probably find in his file,

488
00:29:14.119 --> 00:29:17.240
<v Speaker 3>in his file in particular as an arrest record, right,

489
00:29:18.559 --> 00:29:25.519
<v Speaker 3>you'll find FBI documents on him. You'll find atf documents

490
00:29:25.559 --> 00:29:31.000
<v Speaker 3>on him. Material from other agencies will go in that file.

491
00:29:31.079 --> 00:29:34.200
<v Speaker 3>But certainly, if there's an arrest, it's going to go

492
00:29:34.240 --> 00:29:36.920
<v Speaker 3>on that top sheet because that's going to be part

493
00:29:36.960 --> 00:29:40.720
<v Speaker 3>of the security background. And so a to A one

494
00:29:40.799 --> 00:29:45.160
<v Speaker 3>file may well contain information from other agencies. In fact

495
00:29:45.200 --> 00:29:48.160
<v Speaker 3>that it should, because one thing about a to A

496
00:29:48.200 --> 00:29:51.000
<v Speaker 3>one file is if it's going to be useful. I mean,

497
00:29:51.039 --> 00:29:53.920
<v Speaker 3>think of it this way. This is a headquarters file.

498
00:29:54.559 --> 00:29:58.839
<v Speaker 3>Anybody can get to it. Now, different areas of CIA

499
00:29:58.920 --> 00:30:01.799
<v Speaker 3>headquarters may have control of it. It might rest in

500
00:30:01.880 --> 00:30:08.279
<v Speaker 3>the Soviet Division or the Western Hemisphere Division. Oswald's was

501
00:30:08.319 --> 00:30:14.640
<v Speaker 3>controlled by security most likely because it originated when he

502
00:30:14.759 --> 00:30:18.799
<v Speaker 3>was overseas and he was a matter of national security

503
00:30:18.839 --> 00:30:21.440
<v Speaker 3>because he was being unreported on when he was in Russia.

504
00:30:22.839 --> 00:30:26.279
<v Speaker 3>But the point is that information has to be current,

505
00:30:26.480 --> 00:30:29.640
<v Speaker 3>or it's not only useless, it can get you in

506
00:30:29.680 --> 00:30:33.480
<v Speaker 3>real trouble obviously, if you're considering this person and you

507
00:30:33.519 --> 00:30:37.480
<v Speaker 3>don't keep current. And so to get back to the

508
00:30:37.599 --> 00:30:39.759
<v Speaker 3>kind of what we're talking about, one of the things

509
00:30:39.799 --> 00:30:43.279
<v Speaker 3>that is very interesting about Oswald's to A one file

510
00:30:43.559 --> 00:30:47.720
<v Speaker 3>is that in the fall of nineteen sixty three, it's

511
00:30:47.759 --> 00:30:54.160
<v Speaker 3>not exactly clear when, but contemporary information is not in

512
00:30:54.240 --> 00:30:59.759
<v Speaker 3>his file. That contemporary information and other information was pulled

513
00:30:59.759 --> 00:31:02.839
<v Speaker 3>out out of his two to one and put into

514
00:31:02.880 --> 00:31:06.920
<v Speaker 3>a separate file that was setting outside the standard to

515
00:31:06.920 --> 00:31:11.319
<v Speaker 3>A one. We only know about this because after the assassination,

516
00:31:12.240 --> 00:31:15.440
<v Speaker 3>as part of the process, it was put back into

517
00:31:15.480 --> 00:31:17.680
<v Speaker 3>the file. It's kind of like, so we know what

518
00:31:17.799 --> 00:31:20.279
<v Speaker 3>was taken out, we know what was put in, and

519
00:31:20.400 --> 00:31:25.319
<v Speaker 3>so it's very strange to find a to A one

520
00:31:25.400 --> 00:31:31.039
<v Speaker 3>file that's got contemporary information not in it. It's particularly

521
00:31:31.079 --> 00:31:34.799
<v Speaker 3>strange because in Oswald's case, when he was in Mexico

522
00:31:34.920 --> 00:31:39.279
<v Speaker 3>City and Mexico City's really excited about this guy who's

523
00:31:39.279 --> 00:31:44.160
<v Speaker 3>been with the Cubans and the Russians and contacts headquarters. Basically,

524
00:31:44.480 --> 00:31:49.160
<v Speaker 3>it's like, we need everything we're concerned. Tell us everything

525
00:31:49.200 --> 00:31:53.240
<v Speaker 3>about this guy. What they get back has no contemporary information.

526
00:31:53.599 --> 00:31:57.079
<v Speaker 3>What they get back says, well, he's in Russia and

527
00:31:57.119 --> 00:31:58.920
<v Speaker 3>it looks like he may be coming back to the

528
00:31:59.000 --> 00:32:03.799
<v Speaker 3>United States. Well, that is wildly out of date, and

529
00:32:04.079 --> 00:32:07.759
<v Speaker 3>actually it's almost like misdirection in a way. But the

530
00:32:07.839 --> 00:32:13.079
<v Speaker 3>fact that that that is definitely a negative template that

531
00:32:13.200 --> 00:32:17.559
<v Speaker 3>says something's going on around Lee Harvey Oswald. That is

532
00:32:18.039 --> 00:32:20.119
<v Speaker 3>not standard operating practice.

533
00:32:20.440 --> 00:32:23.559
<v Speaker 2>So literally, what you're saying is that in nineteen sixty three,

534
00:32:23.599 --> 00:32:25.960
<v Speaker 2>they're saying the most contemporary.

535
00:32:25.279 --> 00:32:28.119
<v Speaker 1>Information we have on this guy is from like nineteen.

536
00:32:27.799 --> 00:32:36.039
<v Speaker 3>Sixty Yeah, yeah, absolutely not well, nineteen sixty one, sixteen one.

537
00:32:36.799 --> 00:32:41.880
<v Speaker 3>But they're especially concerned because they're saying, look, Mexico City

538
00:32:41.960 --> 00:32:45.079
<v Speaker 3>is going here. He's here, he's talking to the Cubans,

539
00:32:45.079 --> 00:32:48.480
<v Speaker 3>he's trying to get into Cuba. He's showing credentials from

540
00:32:48.519 --> 00:32:52.440
<v Speaker 3>the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. You know, obviously it

541
00:32:52.480 --> 00:32:56.039
<v Speaker 3>would be of interest to Mexico, to Mexico City to

542
00:32:56.240 --> 00:33:00.519
<v Speaker 3>know what association's Oswald has with the FPCC. And of

543
00:33:00.559 --> 00:33:04.599
<v Speaker 3>course he's been on radio, he's been on TV. There's

544
00:33:04.960 --> 00:33:09.519
<v Speaker 3>there's a lot of information about the FPCC related to

545
00:33:09.599 --> 00:33:13.000
<v Speaker 3>him that's not going to Mexico City. It's being shielded.

546
00:33:13.039 --> 00:33:16.839
<v Speaker 3>And later it was found that rather than being copied

547
00:33:17.559 --> 00:33:21.599
<v Speaker 3>to his to A one file, it's in an FPCC file.

548
00:33:22.119 --> 00:33:24.839
<v Speaker 3>So you can find about it, but you can't find

549
00:33:24.880 --> 00:33:28.000
<v Speaker 3>it from his to A one file nor And this

550
00:33:28.200 --> 00:33:34.160
<v Speaker 3>is really striking. We now know, uh that there was

551
00:33:34.200 --> 00:33:39.279
<v Speaker 3>a lot of reporting on Oswald and his arrest for

552
00:33:39.640 --> 00:33:44.920
<v Speaker 3>in New Orleans for you know, uh, the protest on

553
00:33:45.000 --> 00:33:48.400
<v Speaker 3>the street, and as that came to the to the

554
00:33:48.440 --> 00:33:52.720
<v Speaker 3>CIA from the FBI, certainly that should have gone into

555
00:33:52.720 --> 00:33:55.480
<v Speaker 3>his to A one file. And we know that that

556
00:33:55.599 --> 00:33:59.160
<v Speaker 3>did go to CIA headquarters. We know it went to

557
00:33:59.240 --> 00:34:01.599
<v Speaker 3>the lady who can roll this file. We know it

558
00:34:01.640 --> 00:34:04.960
<v Speaker 3>went to JM Wave, it went several places in Miami.

559
00:34:05.359 --> 00:34:09.480
<v Speaker 3>But it's like not in the system. And so nobody

560
00:34:09.559 --> 00:34:13.239
<v Speaker 3>is telling Mexico City that, yeah, this guy is actually

561
00:34:13.239 --> 00:34:16.480
<v Speaker 3>a real trouble maker. He's been protesting for the FECC.

562
00:34:17.000 --> 00:34:20.519
<v Speaker 3>He claims to have some sort of specialist connection to them,

563
00:34:20.760 --> 00:34:23.159
<v Speaker 3>and he was just arrested a couple of months ago.

564
00:34:23.559 --> 00:34:29.000
<v Speaker 3>Nobody's telling Mexico City that, well.

565
00:34:29.119 --> 00:34:30.360
<v Speaker 1>And there you have it.

566
00:34:30.400 --> 00:34:32.840
<v Speaker 2>Look, there's stuff that's missing, and you know when it

567
00:34:32.960 --> 00:34:36.280
<v Speaker 2>was missing, But now do we know that the same

568
00:34:36.360 --> 00:34:40.039
<v Speaker 2>information which was extracted from that file was replaced or not,

569
00:34:40.920 --> 00:34:43.480
<v Speaker 2>and this becomes an issue.

570
00:34:43.639 --> 00:34:45.559
<v Speaker 1>Now try to apply this.

571
00:34:45.840 --> 00:34:50.119
<v Speaker 2>Just quickly if you wouldn't mind to current events where

572
00:34:50.119 --> 00:34:52.760
<v Speaker 2>people are talking about, you know, release everything, and I

573
00:34:52.840 --> 00:34:56.719
<v Speaker 2>know that's the reflex release everything, release everything.

574
00:34:57.440 --> 00:34:59.079
<v Speaker 1>It doesn't mean that the public.

575
00:34:58.760 --> 00:35:01.199
<v Speaker 2>Would understand that, and if it was all dumped in

576
00:35:01.199 --> 00:35:05.440
<v Speaker 2>front of us, what we're looking at even right, I mean,

577
00:35:06.480 --> 00:35:09.480
<v Speaker 2>they can fabulate many things. I'm going to use that

578
00:35:09.559 --> 00:35:11.840
<v Speaker 2>term a few times since you decide to use it, which,

579
00:35:11.840 --> 00:35:14.559
<v Speaker 2>by the way, independently, I was looking at using that

580
00:35:14.639 --> 00:35:19.400
<v Speaker 2>term more often because it's necessary now to sit here

581
00:35:19.480 --> 00:35:22.039
<v Speaker 2>and combine a bunch of issues and sort of spit

582
00:35:22.119 --> 00:35:27.599
<v Speaker 2>out this recycled and you know, just because you can

583
00:35:27.639 --> 00:35:30.559
<v Speaker 2>melt it into a usable piece of metal, doesn't mean

584
00:35:30.639 --> 00:35:32.599
<v Speaker 2>that all these elements belong together.

585
00:35:34.519 --> 00:35:34.800
<v Speaker 1>You know.

586
00:35:35.199 --> 00:35:39.280
<v Speaker 2>And it's a weird sort of thing happening with what's

587
00:35:39.280 --> 00:35:43.079
<v Speaker 2>emerging right now, right where people are demanding the emergence

588
00:35:43.119 --> 00:35:46.320
<v Speaker 2>of files and talking about what's missing, but they're missing

589
00:35:46.400 --> 00:35:51.360
<v Speaker 2>the point of the nuance, like why is something missing?

590
00:35:52.000 --> 00:35:54.719
<v Speaker 2>What should be there in the first place. Hardly anybody

591
00:35:54.760 --> 00:35:58.000
<v Speaker 2>seems to know. That's the biggest problem with the negative

592
00:35:58.039 --> 00:36:02.119
<v Speaker 2>template idea among the general public. It seems like there

593
00:36:02.119 --> 00:36:04.519
<v Speaker 2>are people that seem to think that certain things should

594
00:36:04.559 --> 00:36:07.840
<v Speaker 2>be in files, or certain things should be included that

595
00:36:07.920 --> 00:36:11.519
<v Speaker 2>are not necessarily sensible considering what it is they're looking at.

596
00:36:11.559 --> 00:36:15.679
<v Speaker 2>Sometimes you know, and now it sounds like I talked

597
00:36:15.719 --> 00:36:16.679
<v Speaker 2>in a circle, doesn't it.

598
00:36:17.079 --> 00:36:20.800
<v Speaker 1>I didn't try to. It's just said, this is what's happening. Noah,

599
00:36:20.920 --> 00:36:22.000
<v Speaker 1>go ahead, I think.

600
00:36:21.880 --> 00:36:27.159
<v Speaker 3>Check what to really dial that down. The bottom line is,

601
00:36:27.599 --> 00:36:30.519
<v Speaker 3>unless you put that sort of information in front of

602
00:36:30.559 --> 00:36:33.679
<v Speaker 3>people who know what the standard practical what is SOP?

603
00:36:34.320 --> 00:36:38.639
<v Speaker 3>What was SOP? Then what was the standard actor operating practice?

604
00:36:38.960 --> 00:36:42.079
<v Speaker 3>So you've got to have somebody from either from inside

605
00:36:42.119 --> 00:36:45.400
<v Speaker 3>the agency, right or you've got to have somebody who's

606
00:36:45.440 --> 00:36:49.559
<v Speaker 3>really studied the agency long enough to know. You've got

607
00:36:49.599 --> 00:36:51.880
<v Speaker 3>to have somebody to look at it to say, look,

608
00:36:52.519 --> 00:36:55.599
<v Speaker 3>this is just it's just a one time anomaly. Okay,

609
00:36:56.079 --> 00:36:59.840
<v Speaker 3>the standard operating practice? You know, could this happen? Sure

610
00:37:00.039 --> 00:37:02.840
<v Speaker 3>somebody could have pulled the file for a week because

611
00:37:03.280 --> 00:37:06.159
<v Speaker 3>they were looking at the sky and we'll put it

612
00:37:06.199 --> 00:37:09.679
<v Speaker 3>back in Okay. Not You've got to have somebody. That's

613
00:37:09.719 --> 00:37:13.800
<v Speaker 3>why when Jeff Morley and John Newman did the right

614
00:37:13.840 --> 00:37:17.280
<v Speaker 3>thing when when they took this issue and took the

615
00:37:17.360 --> 00:37:20.199
<v Speaker 3>documents of what was in the file, what wasn't in

616
00:37:20.239 --> 00:37:26.760
<v Speaker 3>the file, they went to a CIA personnel operations person

617
00:37:27.239 --> 00:37:30.519
<v Speaker 3>who knew what this you know, is this significant? Is

618
00:37:30.559 --> 00:37:31.480
<v Speaker 3>it not significant?

619
00:37:31.559 --> 00:37:31.719
<v Speaker 1>Now?

620
00:37:31.719 --> 00:37:35.760
<v Speaker 3>The problem is, even you know, twenty five thirty years later,

621
00:37:36.199 --> 00:37:39.440
<v Speaker 3>this lady is still under you know, security constraints, she's

622
00:37:39.440 --> 00:37:42.760
<v Speaker 3>still loyal to the agency. She's you know, if she

623
00:37:43.159 --> 00:37:46.559
<v Speaker 3>if she was going to say something like, well, geez,

624
00:37:46.760 --> 00:37:49.599
<v Speaker 3>you know the day after the assassination, I knew there

625
00:37:49.639 --> 00:37:52.800
<v Speaker 3>was something wrong and something going on with Oswald, she

626
00:37:52.840 --> 00:37:56.400
<v Speaker 3>would have been telling the Warrant Commission. But she didn't, right, Okay,

627
00:37:56.760 --> 00:38:00.679
<v Speaker 3>So you've got that problem that you're facing historically. Bottom

628
00:38:00.719 --> 00:38:03.239
<v Speaker 3>line is they went to her and said, you know,

629
00:38:03.920 --> 00:38:08.320
<v Speaker 3>is this right? Is this standard operating practice? And if

630
00:38:08.320 --> 00:38:11.800
<v Speaker 3>it's not, tell us if it is, and if it's not,

631
00:38:12.280 --> 00:38:16.159
<v Speaker 3>what does it suggest to you? And her remark was no,

632
00:38:16.280 --> 00:38:20.400
<v Speaker 3>it's not standard practice, and it would suggest that there

633
00:38:20.599 --> 00:38:25.199
<v Speaker 3>was someone within the agency had a special interest in

634
00:38:25.199 --> 00:38:29.800
<v Speaker 3>Ousle at that point in time and was compartment information

635
00:38:30.480 --> 00:38:35.239
<v Speaker 3>from other groups because they had an operational interest. That

636
00:38:35.320 --> 00:38:37.559
<v Speaker 3>didn't mean that they were you. Now, she didn't say

637
00:38:37.559 --> 00:38:40.639
<v Speaker 3>all that, right, She just said enough so that you

638
00:38:40.719 --> 00:38:42.960
<v Speaker 3>could go, Okay, you don't want to let it all

639
00:38:43.000 --> 00:38:44.239
<v Speaker 3>hang out there, do you, lady?

640
00:38:44.639 --> 00:38:44.760
<v Speaker 4>Uh?

641
00:38:45.119 --> 00:38:49.239
<v Speaker 3>She But she couldn't deny it, basically, And so it

642
00:38:49.679 --> 00:38:51.679
<v Speaker 3>tells us at that point in time. And that's not

643
00:38:51.760 --> 00:38:54.719
<v Speaker 3>the only thing. By the way, we have a trove

644
00:38:54.840 --> 00:38:57.519
<v Speaker 3>of new information that we've just learned based on what

645
00:38:58.760 --> 00:39:02.119
<v Speaker 3>we got released in regard to join edies that confirms that.

646
00:39:02.840 --> 00:39:06.159
<v Speaker 3>But what it does say is no, it's not standard practice.

647
00:39:06.199 --> 00:39:08.599
<v Speaker 3>It should have been there, it should have been missing,

648
00:39:09.119 --> 00:39:11.880
<v Speaker 3>should have been missing for months. It shouldn't have had

649
00:39:11.920 --> 00:39:15.559
<v Speaker 3>to be put back in after the assassination. You know,

650
00:39:16.000 --> 00:39:20.960
<v Speaker 3>somebody had a special interest, an operational interest. That doesn't

651
00:39:21.039 --> 00:39:23.199
<v Speaker 3>mean that they were using him, doesn't mean he was

652
00:39:23.280 --> 00:39:27.639
<v Speaker 3>witting or unwitting. It just means they had some interest

653
00:39:27.800 --> 00:39:33.639
<v Speaker 3>and enough interest to preserve information to themselves and not

654
00:39:33.840 --> 00:39:38.719
<v Speaker 3>share it throughout the agency. Another example of that that

655
00:39:38.800 --> 00:39:41.760
<v Speaker 3>we have from that period of time has to do

656
00:39:42.519 --> 00:39:49.440
<v Speaker 3>with Coebela, who was a Cuban regime figure who the

657
00:39:49.480 --> 00:39:55.199
<v Speaker 3>CIA was contacting about. You know, possibly even assassinating Castro.

658
00:39:55.920 --> 00:39:59.280
<v Speaker 3>And you will look and find that his information was

659
00:39:59.320 --> 00:40:03.280
<v Speaker 3>all compartment wise. They weren't sharing their contacts with him

660
00:40:03.320 --> 00:40:06.800
<v Speaker 3>with anybody else, you know. So when when things do

661
00:40:06.920 --> 00:40:11.840
<v Speaker 3>start to get operationally serious, information starts being shielded because

662
00:40:12.159 --> 00:40:17.800
<v Speaker 3>it's it's what's called operational security, right opsec. If you're

663
00:40:17.840 --> 00:40:23.280
<v Speaker 3>getting serious, you're not only concerned about your adversaries, you're

664
00:40:23.280 --> 00:40:26.960
<v Speaker 3>concerned about honestly leaks, somebody saying something that they shouldn't,

665
00:40:27.320 --> 00:40:31.639
<v Speaker 3>somebody knowing something unintentionally, you know, letting the cat out

666
00:40:31.679 --> 00:40:34.400
<v Speaker 3>of the bag. But the upshot of all of this

667
00:40:34.719 --> 00:40:38.880
<v Speaker 3>is that we know, both from that two O one

668
00:40:38.920 --> 00:40:42.880
<v Speaker 3>file activity and from now from what we know was

669
00:40:43.079 --> 00:40:48.920
<v Speaker 3>widely distributed within jam Wave and Special Fair staff in

670
00:40:49.000 --> 00:40:53.519
<v Speaker 3>Miami about Oswald and is not in their records and

671
00:40:53.679 --> 00:40:57.920
<v Speaker 3>is gone literally and should have been there, that Oswald

672
00:40:58.039 --> 00:41:02.480
<v Speaker 3>was a special operationally, I have no doubt in my

673
00:41:02.599 --> 00:41:04.039
<v Speaker 3>mind at this point in time.

674
00:41:05.920 --> 00:41:08.440
<v Speaker 1>And that doesn't necessarily mean that he's an employee.

675
00:41:08.719 --> 00:41:12.480
<v Speaker 2>That means, like you said, he could be associated to somebody.

676
00:41:12.519 --> 00:41:16.599
<v Speaker 2>He could be in a group with people that are problematic,

677
00:41:17.480 --> 00:41:21.480
<v Speaker 2>He could be connected to somebody directly. Let's just say,

678
00:41:21.559 --> 00:41:24.079
<v Speaker 2>you know, even his wife could be an issue here

679
00:41:24.719 --> 00:41:27.159
<v Speaker 2>right where it's like, well, you know, there is some

680
00:41:27.199 --> 00:41:30.719
<v Speaker 2>special interest we have in somebody who is in close proximity.

681
00:41:30.079 --> 00:41:37.360
<v Speaker 1>To this individual. Maybe, oh, there's a lot of possibilities, right, Yeah.

682
00:41:36.639 --> 00:41:39.559
<v Speaker 3>There's even a sheet for that. I mean, because that

683
00:41:39.800 --> 00:41:42.360
<v Speaker 3>happened all of the time. And back on that two

684
00:41:42.320 --> 00:41:44.480
<v Speaker 3>to one file, one of the forums has a sheet

685
00:41:44.519 --> 00:41:48.000
<v Speaker 3>that says, you know this person, you know, this person

686
00:41:48.079 --> 00:41:51.360
<v Speaker 3>could be a value to us. Here's the information on him,

687
00:41:51.559 --> 00:41:57.159
<v Speaker 3>and they are an unwitting asset. It is even conceivably important.

688
00:41:57.280 --> 00:42:01.280
<v Speaker 3>If November twenty second had not happened, the file might

689
00:42:01.320 --> 00:42:05.039
<v Speaker 3>have gone into his folder, or quite frankly, it might

690
00:42:05.079 --> 00:42:08.320
<v Speaker 3>have gone in there and then disappeared after November twenty second.

691
00:42:08.639 --> 00:42:12.199
<v Speaker 3>That said he was an unwitting asset because the CIA

692
00:42:12.280 --> 00:42:14.800
<v Speaker 3>had to manage that part of it. They had a

693
00:42:14.840 --> 00:42:17.719
<v Speaker 3>lot of people that they were doing things with, maneuvering,

694
00:42:17.800 --> 00:42:22.400
<v Speaker 3>manipulating that had no clue, and quite frankly, that applies

695
00:42:22.519 --> 00:42:27.440
<v Speaker 3>to a lot of their media assets. You will find

696
00:42:27.519 --> 00:42:30.199
<v Speaker 3>people that show up in files that yeah, here's a

697
00:42:30.280 --> 00:42:33.880
<v Speaker 3>media asset. We talked to them, they're trusted, you know,

698
00:42:34.000 --> 00:42:39.559
<v Speaker 3>we'll give them, but that person didn't know the CIA

699
00:42:39.800 --> 00:42:43.800
<v Speaker 3>considered them an asset. One of the things I've always found,

700
00:42:43.800 --> 00:42:46.599
<v Speaker 3>and it's not just the CIA. I always found it

701
00:42:46.639 --> 00:42:51.480
<v Speaker 3>interesting when I came across an FBI file for James Angleton,

702
00:42:52.199 --> 00:42:55.400
<v Speaker 3>and the FBI file with a code name for James

703
00:42:55.440 --> 00:42:59.960
<v Speaker 3>Angleton says this is Angleton is a source for the FBI,

704
00:43:01.159 --> 00:43:05.039
<v Speaker 3>Like the director of Counterintelligence is a source for the FBI.

705
00:43:05.199 --> 00:43:08.840
<v Speaker 3>How interesting? Why is he a source because he's telling

706
00:43:08.880 --> 00:43:13.239
<v Speaker 3>the FBI what career criminals that they're using in his

707
00:43:13.320 --> 00:43:17.800
<v Speaker 3>division for break ins and bank robberies not bank robbery,

708
00:43:17.880 --> 00:43:21.960
<v Speaker 3>sorry burutaries that it's like, okay, we're using these guys

709
00:43:22.039 --> 00:43:23.880
<v Speaker 3>right now, so would you not arrest them for a

710
00:43:23.960 --> 00:43:26.639
<v Speaker 3>little bit because we're using That's why he's a source.

711
00:43:26.719 --> 00:43:30.039
<v Speaker 3>But now this is a game that was played by

712
00:43:30.599 --> 00:43:34.599
<v Speaker 3>the FBI and the CIA and by other intelligence agencies.

713
00:43:34.960 --> 00:43:38.159
<v Speaker 2>Well, and there's also what I call secondary sourcing. There's

714
00:43:38.159 --> 00:43:42.079
<v Speaker 2>probably a better term for that. But here's the thing again,

715
00:43:42.360 --> 00:43:45.639
<v Speaker 2>if he's in communication with somebody, let's just take Angleton

716
00:43:45.679 --> 00:43:51.159
<v Speaker 2>as an example, and he's got a trusted, I don't know, secretary, Well,

717
00:43:51.320 --> 00:43:54.920
<v Speaker 2>they might have the secretary as a source, you know,

718
00:43:55.000 --> 00:43:59.280
<v Speaker 2>the FBI, and they're getting information that originates with Angleton

719
00:44:00.199 --> 00:44:05.440
<v Speaker 2>that the secretary is feeding to them. So therefore Angleton

720
00:44:05.599 --> 00:44:07.760
<v Speaker 2>is a source, and he's an unwitting and even on

721
00:44:07.920 --> 00:44:11.679
<v Speaker 2>knowing source for certain types of information that are coming

722
00:44:11.679 --> 00:44:12.840
<v Speaker 2>through the secretary.

723
00:44:12.880 --> 00:44:19.320
<v Speaker 3>Theoretically, right, It's a complex business, and people get wrapped.

724
00:44:19.360 --> 00:44:22.559
<v Speaker 3>I mean people get wrapped up, People get confused, they

725
00:44:22.559 --> 00:44:27.239
<v Speaker 3>make mistakes. What you just discussed might well be in

726
00:44:27.360 --> 00:44:31.039
<v Speaker 3>a soft file, which we have not discussed. Those are

727
00:44:31.079 --> 00:44:35.719
<v Speaker 3>files that are somebody's desk. Like, okay, so somebody's secretary

728
00:44:35.760 --> 00:44:38.119
<v Speaker 3>is giving us information. Do we want to put that

729
00:44:38.239 --> 00:44:41.599
<v Speaker 3>into the permanent system. Well, as long as she's give

730
00:44:41.639 --> 00:44:44.000
<v Speaker 3>me us information, I'm going to have a file on

731
00:44:44.000 --> 00:44:46.480
<v Speaker 3>my desk on what's coming from her. But I'm not

732
00:44:46.559 --> 00:44:49.519
<v Speaker 3>necessarily going to put her into the main system. Why

733
00:44:50.119 --> 00:44:54.679
<v Speaker 3>because it may blow back on her. And for that matter,

734
00:44:55.880 --> 00:44:58.960
<v Speaker 3>if you're playing this game within the FBI, some other

735
00:44:59.159 --> 00:45:01.920
<v Speaker 3>FBI office may try to steal that asset. It was

736
00:45:02.039 --> 00:45:07.400
<v Speaker 3>quite common within the FBI for field offices to try

737
00:45:07.400 --> 00:45:13.599
<v Speaker 3>to essentially grab other offices sources and assets because they

738
00:45:13.880 --> 00:45:18.079
<v Speaker 3>had points. How many do you have? That's one of

739
00:45:18.119 --> 00:45:21.079
<v Speaker 3>the ways Hoover ran the game. So not to get

740
00:45:21.119 --> 00:45:23.840
<v Speaker 3>too far off track, but but yeah, there's the issue

741
00:45:23.840 --> 00:45:26.559
<v Speaker 3>of there's always the issue of what do I put

742
00:45:26.639 --> 00:45:29.920
<v Speaker 3>in the headquarters file. If it's you know, if it's

743
00:45:29.920 --> 00:45:32.360
<v Speaker 3>a value just to me right at the moment, maybe

744
00:45:32.400 --> 00:45:33.960
<v Speaker 3>I won't share it with headquarters.

745
00:45:34.880 --> 00:45:36.079
<v Speaker 1>Okay, fair enough.

746
00:45:36.280 --> 00:45:40.119
<v Speaker 2>So I'm going to unfairly put something in current events

747
00:45:40.159 --> 00:45:44.760
<v Speaker 2>into this context real fast. This idea that you know

748
00:45:45.000 --> 00:45:47.920
<v Speaker 2>that the Speaker of the House put out there about

749
00:45:47.960 --> 00:45:52.719
<v Speaker 2>you know, Trump being an informant to the FBI. Now, sorry,

750
00:45:53.079 --> 00:45:55.800
<v Speaker 2>I know, I know, but but here's the thing. Informant

751
00:45:55.840 --> 00:46:00.360
<v Speaker 2>is probably the wrong word. But is it possible that

752
00:46:00.400 --> 00:46:04.760
<v Speaker 2>Trump was some kind of asset, either in a secondary way,

753
00:46:04.840 --> 00:46:07.119
<v Speaker 2>in a soft file somewhere or in an.

754
00:46:07.119 --> 00:46:08.480
<v Speaker 1>Official agency file.

755
00:46:08.599 --> 00:46:11.519
<v Speaker 2>Because one thing you got to say about Donald Trump,

756
00:46:12.119 --> 00:46:16.159
<v Speaker 2>no matter what your political orientation is, he likes to

757
00:46:16.199 --> 00:46:21.480
<v Speaker 2>talk to people about things. So he might be talking

758
00:46:21.519 --> 00:46:25.400
<v Speaker 2>to somebody and who knows, maybe his wife at the

759
00:46:25.440 --> 00:46:31.920
<v Speaker 2>time is an informant and she's informing about information being

760
00:46:31.960 --> 00:46:35.559
<v Speaker 2>fed to her by Donald Trump. Regarding the Jeffrey Epstein

761
00:46:35.599 --> 00:46:37.920
<v Speaker 2>think is at one point you got to admit they

762
00:46:37.920 --> 00:46:41.039
<v Speaker 2>were at least in proximity to one another. And you

763
00:46:41.079 --> 00:46:43.639
<v Speaker 2>could say that, and I'm being as benign about this

764
00:46:43.679 --> 00:46:48.000
<v Speaker 2>as possible, it is plausible that he's in those files

765
00:46:48.079 --> 00:46:52.599
<v Speaker 2>as somebody who is informing on a circumstance that the

766
00:46:52.639 --> 00:46:56.440
<v Speaker 2>FBI is investigating. Whether he knows it or not another

767
00:46:56.519 --> 00:46:59.880
<v Speaker 2>issue you'd have to pull that apart. I mean, but

768
00:47:00.119 --> 00:47:03.480
<v Speaker 2>is he literally an informant and maybe that guy's using

769
00:47:03.480 --> 00:47:06.840
<v Speaker 2>the wrong word but describing something that he does have

770
00:47:06.880 --> 00:47:07.639
<v Speaker 2>the clearance to.

771
00:47:07.599 --> 00:47:11.400
<v Speaker 1>See as the speaker of the House. I mean, I

772
00:47:11.639 --> 00:47:12.199
<v Speaker 1>think we can.

773
00:47:12.280 --> 00:47:14.559
<v Speaker 3>I think we can parse that out because we we

774
00:47:14.679 --> 00:47:17.679
<v Speaker 3>actually know how that works for the FBI, you know,

775
00:47:19.760 --> 00:47:20.360
<v Speaker 3>first of us.

776
00:47:20.400 --> 00:47:23.559
<v Speaker 2>Why that's why the way, just so you know, I

777
00:47:23.599 --> 00:47:24.800
<v Speaker 2>knew that you could parse us out.

778
00:47:24.840 --> 00:47:26.840
<v Speaker 1>That's why I gave it to you.

779
00:47:27.840 --> 00:47:32.599
<v Speaker 3>So he can't. He would There they're two ways. He

780
00:47:32.960 --> 00:47:38.760
<v Speaker 3>could have voluntarily gone to the FBI and provided information

781
00:47:39.119 --> 00:47:43.159
<v Speaker 3>and have been considered a source, okay, and the FBI

782
00:47:43.320 --> 00:47:46.519
<v Speaker 3>would have opened a file just saying we received this

783
00:47:46.679 --> 00:47:50.840
<v Speaker 3>report from Donald Trump. That's it, you know, He's just

784
00:47:51.199 --> 00:47:54.159
<v Speaker 3>we just got a report from And that happens, you know,

785
00:47:54.559 --> 00:47:58.039
<v Speaker 3>hundreds of times a day, on hundreds of cases people

786
00:47:58.119 --> 00:48:01.840
<v Speaker 3>walk in, people call up, say they have information about something,

787
00:48:02.199 --> 00:48:06.119
<v Speaker 3>So he could have been a source, very very benign. Okay.

788
00:48:06.760 --> 00:48:09.159
<v Speaker 3>To take it to the next step, he would have

789
00:48:09.320 --> 00:48:17.039
<v Speaker 3>to actually be considered as a criminal informant. The first

790
00:48:17.079 --> 00:48:19.920
<v Speaker 3>step would be to consider him as a potential criminal

791
00:48:20.000 --> 00:48:23.239
<v Speaker 3>environment informant, because he would have had he would have

792
00:48:23.280 --> 00:48:26.159
<v Speaker 3>had to take the next step to say or they

793
00:48:26.199 --> 00:48:29.320
<v Speaker 3>would have had to go let's say he's a source

794
00:48:29.480 --> 00:48:33.480
<v Speaker 3>and they investigate him and find out, yeah, okay, he

795
00:48:33.559 --> 00:48:36.559
<v Speaker 3>knows what he's talking about, he knows these people, he

796
00:48:36.639 --> 00:48:42.039
<v Speaker 3>associates with these people, He's seen something that might be illegal.

797
00:48:43.679 --> 00:48:47.880
<v Speaker 3>You know, maybe he could be useful. So, uh, we

798
00:48:48.000 --> 00:48:53.039
<v Speaker 3>might consider him as a potential criminal informant because he's

799
00:48:53.079 --> 00:48:57.199
<v Speaker 3>a he's a source that might have information that we

800
00:48:57.239 --> 00:48:59.280
<v Speaker 3>could use in court. So they would have to go

801
00:48:59.400 --> 00:49:06.599
<v Speaker 3>back and ask him if he's going to be a

802
00:49:06.599 --> 00:49:10.280
<v Speaker 3>criminal informant. Now he's going to have to agree to that.

803
00:49:10.920 --> 00:49:14.039
<v Speaker 3>But the problem is, he won't be a criminal informant

804
00:49:14.480 --> 00:49:18.320
<v Speaker 3>unless he is actually deep enough into something that's illegal

805
00:49:18.519 --> 00:49:23.519
<v Speaker 3>to tell they about it, which means he's seen a crime.

806
00:49:24.400 --> 00:49:28.920
<v Speaker 3>Which is an interesting situation because because he has seen

807
00:49:28.960 --> 00:49:33.079
<v Speaker 3>a crime and he let it go on. You know,

808
00:49:33.199 --> 00:49:38.280
<v Speaker 3>he just called it in. He didn't asially get to

809
00:49:38.320 --> 00:49:41.519
<v Speaker 3>that point. As a criminal informant, he's going to have

810
00:49:41.639 --> 00:49:45.320
<v Speaker 3>to be paid because he is going to express to him,

811
00:49:45.320 --> 00:49:47.760
<v Speaker 3>So he's going to be in kind of a buying basically, Okay,

812
00:49:47.800 --> 00:49:50.119
<v Speaker 3>we know you've seen something illegal. Do you want to

813
00:49:50.159 --> 00:49:52.119
<v Speaker 3>be a criminal informant for us? Or we shall we

814
00:49:52.159 --> 00:49:56.159
<v Speaker 3>just press charges against you? You know, Oh okay, that's interesting.

815
00:49:56.920 --> 00:49:59.920
<v Speaker 3>But to be an actual criminal informant, he's going to

816
00:50:00.159 --> 00:50:03.480
<v Speaker 3>have to take money and be willing to be called

817
00:50:03.519 --> 00:50:07.079
<v Speaker 3>into court, not an open court session necessarily, but to

818
00:50:07.119 --> 00:50:08.360
<v Speaker 3>give s foreign testimony.

819
00:50:08.880 --> 00:50:11.320
<v Speaker 1>Well, and from the devils want to be a record.

820
00:50:11.400 --> 00:50:14.159
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and from a devil's advocate position, The same sort

821
00:50:14.159 --> 00:50:17.000
<v Speaker 2>of circumstance could be created if he were the victim

822
00:50:17.320 --> 00:50:20.480
<v Speaker 2>of a crime, right where he can say, look, I

823
00:50:20.519 --> 00:50:22.599
<v Speaker 2>have first hand information because I was a victim of

824
00:50:22.639 --> 00:50:23.079
<v Speaker 2>a crime.

825
00:50:23.559 --> 00:50:25.320
<v Speaker 1>I didn't want to report it. I don't want to

826
00:50:25.360 --> 00:50:28.119
<v Speaker 1>report it, but I can tell you what happened. You know.

827
00:50:28.360 --> 00:50:31.280
<v Speaker 2>Let's just say a mob guide decides to try and

828
00:50:31.280 --> 00:50:35.119
<v Speaker 2>intimidate you. They've literally tried to extort you.

829
00:50:35.119 --> 00:50:37.280
<v Speaker 1>You're now a witness. But also a victim.

830
00:50:37.400 --> 00:50:42.400
<v Speaker 2>It doesn't necessarily mean you're a participant in the crime, right, Yeah, but.

831
00:50:42.480 --> 00:50:44.760
<v Speaker 3>He would not be a criminal informant then.

832
00:50:44.880 --> 00:50:46.039
<v Speaker 1>No, that would be a different to me.

833
00:50:46.119 --> 00:50:50.119
<v Speaker 3>A criminal informative implies that you are involved in not

834
00:50:50.239 --> 00:50:53.519
<v Speaker 3>the not the you're not on the receiving end. You

835
00:50:53.599 --> 00:50:56.960
<v Speaker 3>somehow have information about how the crime is being conducted

836
00:50:57.039 --> 00:51:02.199
<v Speaker 3>or was conducted. For example, taking it back to the JFK,

837
00:51:02.639 --> 00:51:08.079
<v Speaker 3>Jack Ruby was a provisional and criminal informant in Dallas

838
00:51:08.079 --> 00:51:12.239
<v Speaker 3>for two years and the FBI put him in that category.

839
00:51:12.719 --> 00:51:16.400
<v Speaker 3>They actually bought him equipment, they took statements from him.

840
00:51:16.639 --> 00:51:20.440
<v Speaker 3>We know nothing about that as to what he was

841
00:51:21.159 --> 00:51:26.440
<v Speaker 3>a criminal informant on. We just know he was so

842
00:51:27.000 --> 00:51:31.440
<v Speaker 3>in any event. But to get back to your original question, Yeah,

843
00:51:31.559 --> 00:51:33.800
<v Speaker 3>he could have been a source, but for it to

844
00:51:33.840 --> 00:51:37.480
<v Speaker 3>go anything further, the FBI would have had to check

845
00:51:37.559 --> 00:51:41.079
<v Speaker 3>him out as the source, determined that he was legitimate,

846
00:51:41.559 --> 00:51:46.760
<v Speaker 3>and essentially bring him in, bring him into the legal process.

847
00:51:48.159 --> 00:51:48.599
<v Speaker 1>All right.

848
00:51:48.719 --> 00:51:52.159
<v Speaker 2>So my point here though, overall, is that the Speaker

849
00:51:52.159 --> 00:51:55.760
<v Speaker 2>of the House using the term informant that is particular

850
00:51:56.760 --> 00:52:00.920
<v Speaker 2>and there are different types of informants, and look, I'm

851
00:52:00.960 --> 00:52:03.719
<v Speaker 2>just trying to be as open minded about this as possible.

852
00:52:03.800 --> 00:52:08.840
<v Speaker 2>That is a possibility, But we haven't seen that publicly

853
00:52:08.880 --> 00:52:10.480
<v Speaker 2>displayed in the files, have we.

854
00:52:11.440 --> 00:52:14.639
<v Speaker 3>And it would be I mean, we have what we

855
00:52:14.760 --> 00:52:17.920
<v Speaker 3>have not seen, and I just be really forthright about this.

856
00:52:18.559 --> 00:52:21.920
<v Speaker 3>What we are seeing and have seen so far is

857
00:52:22.000 --> 00:52:25.360
<v Speaker 3>not what we really need to see. We need to

858
00:52:25.400 --> 00:52:30.880
<v Speaker 3>see the criminal investigation materials. We don't need to see

859
00:52:31.280 --> 00:52:34.159
<v Speaker 3>what came from the families bad enough, but we really

860
00:52:34.239 --> 00:52:38.559
<v Speaker 3>need to see the criminal investigation files with all of

861
00:52:38.599 --> 00:52:42.639
<v Speaker 3>the details that are in there. And that's the only

862
00:52:42.679 --> 00:52:45.239
<v Speaker 3>way that you could actually verify what you were just saying.

863
00:52:45.440 --> 00:52:49.119
<v Speaker 3>He would have to have been identified as a criminal informant.

864
00:52:49.960 --> 00:52:54.119
<v Speaker 3>But again, people shouldn't throw those words around. It. Appaused

865
00:52:54.119 --> 00:52:59.239
<v Speaker 3>me that people in the position you don't throw those

866
00:52:59.280 --> 00:53:01.639
<v Speaker 3>words around and lets you know what you're talking about.

867
00:53:02.119 --> 00:53:07.280
<v Speaker 3>That's just you didn't protect him, you did. You know, Actually,

868
00:53:07.679 --> 00:53:12.480
<v Speaker 3>if if he was an informant on that activity, you

869
00:53:12.679 --> 00:53:18.320
<v Speaker 3>just confirmed that he had seen pedophilia in action. Sorry

870
00:53:19.079 --> 00:53:22.000
<v Speaker 3>like it or don't like it? Good intention, bad intention?

871
00:53:22.719 --> 00:53:23.760
<v Speaker 3>That would have confirmed it.

872
00:53:24.800 --> 00:53:27.880
<v Speaker 1>See now that's what I thought. But I said to myself,

873
00:53:28.000 --> 00:53:30.800
<v Speaker 1>is it just you know, using the wrong word. Is

874
00:53:30.840 --> 00:53:33.920
<v Speaker 1>it just a miss because now he's saying I misspoke,

875
00:53:34.159 --> 00:53:34.360
<v Speaker 1>you know.

876
00:53:35.639 --> 00:53:39.159
<v Speaker 2>But anyway, going back to the historical which we know

877
00:53:39.360 --> 00:53:42.880
<v Speaker 2>much more about than this current situation, regardless of the

878
00:53:42.920 --> 00:53:46.280
<v Speaker 2>fact that people did work for many years investigative journalists,

879
00:53:46.320 --> 00:53:48.719
<v Speaker 2>there are public records out there, et cetera, et cetera.

880
00:53:50.199 --> 00:53:52.679
<v Speaker 2>We know a lot more about what happened here with

881
00:53:52.719 --> 00:53:56.440
<v Speaker 2>Oswald's to a one file than we certainly used to.

882
00:53:56.559 --> 00:53:58.039
<v Speaker 2>I mean, in fact, we could go back to the

883
00:53:58.039 --> 00:54:00.760
<v Speaker 2>evolution where there was a state meant that there was

884
00:54:00.800 --> 00:54:03.960
<v Speaker 2>no file at one point, and then we find out

885
00:54:04.039 --> 00:54:06.880
<v Speaker 2>there is a file, and then we find out there's

886
00:54:06.920 --> 00:54:07.599
<v Speaker 2>things missing.

887
00:54:08.559 --> 00:54:10.559
<v Speaker 1>We've had to go back to this negative template.

888
00:54:10.679 --> 00:54:15.400
<v Speaker 2>So again, when you know that there is something happening

889
00:54:15.960 --> 00:54:19.239
<v Speaker 2>and yet there are things missing, how can we use

890
00:54:19.320 --> 00:54:23.880
<v Speaker 2>this to, like you said, reverse engineer what should be there?

891
00:54:24.599 --> 00:54:27.719
<v Speaker 2>And then what have more informant questions moving forward?

892
00:54:27.800 --> 00:54:28.000
<v Speaker 1>Right?

893
00:54:29.559 --> 00:54:31.719
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, And I think that's the point I was trying

894
00:54:31.719 --> 00:54:34.920
<v Speaker 3>to make early on. Only the people that are really

895
00:54:36.000 --> 00:54:38.880
<v Speaker 3>you do have to use the right terminology, you do

896
00:54:38.920 --> 00:54:41.119
<v Speaker 3>have to know the practices. So when I was talking

897
00:54:41.159 --> 00:54:45.679
<v Speaker 3>about these congressional committee hearings, if you just have somebody

898
00:54:45.719 --> 00:54:48.079
<v Speaker 3>that you ute in and you maybe even they have

899
00:54:48.159 --> 00:54:53.000
<v Speaker 3>good information. But if you can't balance that out with oh,

900
00:54:53.199 --> 00:54:58.199
<v Speaker 3>you know, mister DoD employ, mister air Force person, you know,

901
00:54:58.440 --> 00:55:00.360
<v Speaker 3>tell me about what they just said. Do you have

902
00:55:00.400 --> 00:55:02.320
<v Speaker 3>a record of it? Should you have had a record

903
00:55:02.320 --> 00:55:05.480
<v Speaker 3>of it? What's the what's the process for having a

904
00:55:05.519 --> 00:55:08.440
<v Speaker 3>record of it? If there's not, why not? You know,

905
00:55:09.400 --> 00:55:11.440
<v Speaker 3>you missed the whole side of the story. If we

906
00:55:11.599 --> 00:55:15.840
<v Speaker 3>just if we just had this anomaly in Oswald's record

907
00:55:16.280 --> 00:55:18.880
<v Speaker 3>and we didn't know what the standard practice is, then

908
00:55:18.920 --> 00:55:23.440
<v Speaker 3>we can't reverse engineer it. You can't reverse engineer something

909
00:55:23.440 --> 00:55:26.280
<v Speaker 3>that you didn't know how to engineer in the first place, right,

910
00:55:26.599 --> 00:55:29.559
<v Speaker 3>I know that. Okay, wait a minute, what did he

911
00:55:29.679 --> 00:55:33.119
<v Speaker 3>just say? But you really can't. You've got to You've

912
00:55:33.159 --> 00:55:35.360
<v Speaker 3>got to go, Oh, I know what these parts are,

913
00:55:35.400 --> 00:55:37.880
<v Speaker 3>I know how they fit together. Let's look at the Oh,

914
00:55:38.039 --> 00:55:41.239
<v Speaker 3>look at that. Okay, I can reverse engineer it from

915
00:55:41.280 --> 00:55:43.960
<v Speaker 3>the pieces. But if I don't know how to build

916
00:55:44.000 --> 00:55:46.800
<v Speaker 3>something like that in the first place, it's not happening.

917
00:55:48.440 --> 00:55:52.000
<v Speaker 1>Right, So there you have it. I mean, I think

918
00:55:52.000 --> 00:55:54.679
<v Speaker 1>you pretty much put this in a nutshell very well.

919
00:55:54.719 --> 00:55:57.599
<v Speaker 1>But what else needs to be said, as we go forward,

920
00:55:57.840 --> 00:55:59.400
<v Speaker 1>you know, with again.

921
00:55:59.280 --> 00:56:02.719
<v Speaker 2>Still the explo there has been some progress here when

922
00:56:02.719 --> 00:56:05.079
<v Speaker 2>it comes to Joe and Edes, when it comes to

923
00:56:05.239 --> 00:56:09.559
<v Speaker 2>obviously the files overall. You know, I say progress in

924
00:56:09.599 --> 00:56:13.320
<v Speaker 2>that we have an increased volume of information. As for

925
00:56:13.920 --> 00:56:18.039
<v Speaker 2>how valuable that information is your your experience may vary.

926
00:56:18.719 --> 00:56:20.719
<v Speaker 2>And I know some people are screaming that there has

927
00:56:20.760 --> 00:56:23.760
<v Speaker 2>been a great victory here. I wouldn't say that there's

928
00:56:23.760 --> 00:56:28.039
<v Speaker 2>been no victory. But have we actually gotten finally to

929
00:56:28.119 --> 00:56:31.800
<v Speaker 2>the bottom of any of these questions is something that

930
00:56:31.880 --> 00:56:34.480
<v Speaker 2>I keep asking and a lot of people will get,

931
00:56:34.480 --> 00:56:38.199
<v Speaker 2>you know, WinCE when I say that, because ultimately I

932
00:56:38.239 --> 00:56:40.519
<v Speaker 2>want to know what, you know, the quality of the

933
00:56:40.559 --> 00:56:43.559
<v Speaker 2>progress is not just that there was progress.

934
00:56:43.639 --> 00:56:45.519
<v Speaker 1>So, you know, do we understand this?

935
00:56:46.000 --> 00:56:50.599
<v Speaker 2>I'm still sorting it out personally myself, still looking back

936
00:56:50.639 --> 00:56:52.599
<v Speaker 2>at this and still trying to put it in context

937
00:56:52.599 --> 00:56:55.719
<v Speaker 2>with what we knew before. And I don't claim to

938
00:56:55.760 --> 00:56:58.960
<v Speaker 2>be somebody who knows that engineer all of these things

939
00:56:58.960 --> 00:57:02.599
<v Speaker 2>in detail to begin with, But for those that do

940
00:57:03.199 --> 00:57:06.719
<v Speaker 2>know that, there is a way to try and figure

941
00:57:06.719 --> 00:57:09.559
<v Speaker 2>out what's missing and why, what's been manipulated and why

942
00:57:11.239 --> 00:57:13.679
<v Speaker 2>you know, and what else should have resulted from it, right,

943
00:57:14.039 --> 00:57:17.000
<v Speaker 2>because outside of Oswalt's to a one file, let's just say,

944
00:57:17.039 --> 00:57:20.719
<v Speaker 2>going back to that example, there should be other things

945
00:57:20.760 --> 00:57:24.199
<v Speaker 2>that occur because of what's in that file, and then

946
00:57:24.239 --> 00:57:25.679
<v Speaker 2>you can go look at those things.

947
00:57:25.800 --> 00:57:28.039
<v Speaker 1>Right, it should have changed as.

948
00:57:28.000 --> 00:57:29.719
<v Speaker 2>You know, like if you still have a file saying

949
00:57:29.719 --> 00:57:31.960
<v Speaker 2>he had crypto clearance after he had been to the

950
00:57:32.000 --> 00:57:38.280
<v Speaker 2>Soviet Union, you know as a tourist, something's wrong there. No,

951
00:57:39.000 --> 00:57:41.280
<v Speaker 2>you know, they wouldn't have pulled that security at some point.

952
00:57:41.360 --> 00:57:44.280
<v Speaker 2>They wouldn't have changed his status. I mean, he's no

953
00:57:44.400 --> 00:57:47.000
<v Speaker 2>longer a marine. Also by the time he goes over there, right,

954
00:57:47.039 --> 00:57:50.920
<v Speaker 2>he has been discharged. There's a change in status that

955
00:57:50.960 --> 00:57:54.039
<v Speaker 2>occurs here. If you didn't change that, what are you doing?

956
00:57:54.239 --> 00:57:56.760
<v Speaker 2>And is this to a one file even of value

957
00:57:57.840 --> 00:58:00.440
<v Speaker 2>at the time of the assassination question?

958
00:58:00.559 --> 00:58:03.199
<v Speaker 1>I guess I.

959
00:58:03.119 --> 00:58:06.519
<v Speaker 3>Guess the thing is, Yeah, the way I've wrapped that

960
00:58:06.639 --> 00:58:09.719
<v Speaker 3>up is we have known everything that you just said

961
00:58:09.719 --> 00:58:12.559
<v Speaker 3>about is file. We have known. This is not new information.

962
00:58:13.400 --> 00:58:18.119
<v Speaker 3>Ninety five percent of what's come out of the administration

963
00:58:18.320 --> 00:58:22.480
<v Speaker 3>file releases. Kind of like okay, just go FBI, go

964
00:58:22.599 --> 00:58:27.000
<v Speaker 3>to to NAR and say tell them everything we sent

965
00:58:27.039 --> 00:58:31.280
<v Speaker 3>you they can have CIA tell them everything. That's effectively

966
00:58:31.320 --> 00:58:35.039
<v Speaker 3>what it was the President saying, you, agencies, you've got

967
00:58:35.039 --> 00:58:38.599
<v Speaker 3>to tell them, you can have they can release everything

968
00:58:38.639 --> 00:58:44.760
<v Speaker 3>that they've already sent you. We've seen that before, or

969
00:58:44.800 --> 00:58:48.480
<v Speaker 3>anything that was significant important after thirty thirty five years

970
00:58:48.920 --> 00:58:51.199
<v Speaker 3>before your work and research, we've seen that.

971
00:58:51.599 --> 00:58:51.840
<v Speaker 1>You know.

972
00:58:52.239 --> 00:58:54.800
<v Speaker 3>What we're seeing new out of that is is what

973
00:58:55.000 --> 00:58:58.599
<v Speaker 3>somebody didn't think was important enough to hand off to

974
00:58:58.719 --> 00:59:01.400
<v Speaker 3>the Warrant Commission or the our House Select Committee or

975
00:59:01.440 --> 00:59:05.519
<v Speaker 3>the you know who's seen that. So not that there's

976
00:59:05.559 --> 00:59:10.440
<v Speaker 3>not interesting historical information in there, how the State Department

977
00:59:10.559 --> 00:59:15.440
<v Speaker 3>responded to the rfk assassination. We can look at new

978
00:59:15.480 --> 00:59:18.000
<v Speaker 3>files that we had not seen there and see that

979
00:59:18.039 --> 00:59:23.320
<v Speaker 3>the State Department was really intent in not allowing the

980
00:59:23.519 --> 00:59:27.000
<v Speaker 3>international element of that to come into play because it

981
00:59:27.079 --> 00:59:31.800
<v Speaker 3>was a problem across the Arab world. That so that's

982
00:59:31.920 --> 00:59:34.960
<v Speaker 3>that's new. We've not seen those before. But that's historic

983
00:59:35.280 --> 00:59:39.960
<v Speaker 3>historical information. It's not so much forensic or crime scene stuff.

984
00:59:40.119 --> 00:59:40.559
<v Speaker 5>Okay.

985
00:59:41.079 --> 00:59:44.920
<v Speaker 3>What our real opportunity is seems to me to be

986
00:59:45.440 --> 00:59:49.639
<v Speaker 3>not that massive. Okay, just give them what's already at Nara.

987
00:59:49.639 --> 00:59:54.039
<v Speaker 3>Thing it has to do with the opportunity for people

988
00:59:54.079 --> 00:59:57.719
<v Speaker 3>to testify to the oversight committees, and then for the

989
00:59:57.760 --> 01:00:01.519
<v Speaker 3>oversight committee itself to put pressure on based on what

990
01:00:01.519 --> 01:00:06.280
<v Speaker 3>they're hearing. If the oversight committees don't get overly political,

991
01:00:06.960 --> 01:00:10.039
<v Speaker 3>just take some notes from what they hear and then

992
01:00:10.119 --> 01:00:13.280
<v Speaker 3>go back to the agency's involved and say, why in

993
01:00:13.320 --> 01:00:15.840
<v Speaker 3>the heck haven't you shared this? What do you have

994
01:00:16.000 --> 01:00:20.000
<v Speaker 3>explain this to us? You know, if Congress actually acted,

995
01:00:21.639 --> 01:00:26.280
<v Speaker 3>an oversight committee is great if it does something. If

996
01:00:26.320 --> 01:00:31.039
<v Speaker 3>it just takes testimony and does nothing, it fails. So

997
01:00:31.119 --> 01:00:35.840
<v Speaker 3>that's where the opportunity lies. In a nutshell in my view, Okay,

998
01:00:36.079 --> 01:00:40.119
<v Speaker 3>you called people, you took testimony, they showed you interesting stuff,

999
01:00:40.320 --> 01:00:41.360
<v Speaker 3>Now do something with it.

1000
01:00:42.920 --> 01:00:46.239
<v Speaker 2>Well, there you have it, and ultimately that's the question

1001
01:00:46.320 --> 01:00:48.199
<v Speaker 2>that everybody should be asking, what are you going to

1002
01:00:48.280 --> 01:00:50.679
<v Speaker 2>do with it next? And that's the weird thing is

1003
01:00:50.719 --> 01:00:53.119
<v Speaker 2>I've seen people complain, now, how come we're not getting

1004
01:00:53.119 --> 01:00:57.519
<v Speaker 2>a full investigation. That's not the point of the oversight committee.

1005
01:00:58.119 --> 01:01:01.320
<v Speaker 2>That's not their function. You know, people said, oh, we

1006
01:01:01.360 --> 01:01:03.519
<v Speaker 2>could get at least an HSCA out of this, and

1007
01:01:03.559 --> 01:01:06.199
<v Speaker 2>I'm like, oh boy, you guys don't understand the process

1008
01:01:06.239 --> 01:01:11.119
<v Speaker 2>that took to create that thing, and this is not

1009
01:01:11.360 --> 01:01:15.039
<v Speaker 2>what this committee is doing. They are doing guess what oversight,

1010
01:01:16.719 --> 01:01:19.599
<v Speaker 2>you know, not trying to be redundant here, It's just

1011
01:01:20.519 --> 01:01:22.840
<v Speaker 2>that's not their function. They're not there to investigate.

1012
01:01:24.039 --> 01:01:24.400
<v Speaker 1>Sorry.

1013
01:01:24.440 --> 01:01:28.360
<v Speaker 3>The practical matter is, you'll put this in a nutshell too.

1014
01:01:28.679 --> 01:01:33.159
<v Speaker 3>The practical matter is Luna's boss in Congress would have

1015
01:01:33.280 --> 01:01:37.000
<v Speaker 3>to say, there's enough political capital in this for me

1016
01:01:37.119 --> 01:01:40.199
<v Speaker 3>to elevate it up to make it a congressional issue,

1017
01:01:40.760 --> 01:01:44.440
<v Speaker 3>not a committee issue, a congressional issue. Now do you

1018
01:01:44.519 --> 01:01:46.960
<v Speaker 3>really think her boss is going to make the Epstein

1019
01:01:47.039 --> 01:01:51.719
<v Speaker 3>files a congressional issue? I don't. No, do you think

1020
01:01:51.760 --> 01:01:55.559
<v Speaker 3>he's gonna take UFO is a congressional issue? I don't.

1021
01:01:56.280 --> 01:01:58.719
<v Speaker 3>I'm not sure at this point in time that.

1022
01:01:59.280 --> 01:01:59.480
<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

1023
01:01:59.480 --> 01:02:01.840
<v Speaker 3>I would love to say that's what should happen next.

1024
01:02:01.880 --> 01:02:05.159
<v Speaker 3>There should be congressional investigations of some of these things,

1025
01:02:05.559 --> 01:02:09.960
<v Speaker 3>but that's not happening. So one has to be rational

1026
01:02:10.000 --> 01:02:14.519
<v Speaker 3>and unfortunately pragmatical. But Luna's committee can only do so much.

1027
01:02:14.639 --> 01:02:18.320
<v Speaker 3>They can ask for things that they have been told about,

1028
01:02:18.320 --> 01:02:22.000
<v Speaker 3>and she's been pretty successful in asking the CIA for

1029
01:02:22.119 --> 01:02:27.400
<v Speaker 3>things and asking for camera footage from NBC but Aushington

1030
01:02:27.480 --> 01:02:31.199
<v Speaker 3>is ask and you know, kind of leverage her position,

1031
01:02:31.320 --> 01:02:34.960
<v Speaker 3>but for it to be taken into an actual forced

1032
01:02:35.039 --> 01:02:38.280
<v Speaker 3>collection and yeah, that's another story entirely.

1033
01:02:38.960 --> 01:02:39.599
<v Speaker 1>There you go.

1034
01:02:39.800 --> 01:02:43.159
<v Speaker 2>And yet again this story will continue, probably two weeks

1035
01:02:43.159 --> 01:02:46.840
<v Speaker 2>from now, we'll talk to Larry Hancock again to give

1036
01:02:46.920 --> 01:02:50.000
<v Speaker 2>us the context of what's actually happening and what has

1037
01:02:50.079 --> 01:02:54.480
<v Speaker 2>been happening regarding let's just say transparency in general, but

1038
01:02:55.400 --> 01:02:58.400
<v Speaker 2>specifically focusing on some of the history that people do

1039
01:02:58.960 --> 01:03:03.199
<v Speaker 2>want to know the information about. But we must be

1040
01:03:03.920 --> 01:03:08.119
<v Speaker 2>reasonable about the mechanisms that we've been handed and the

1041
01:03:08.320 --> 01:03:12.599
<v Speaker 2>strength of the committee members and etc. As far as

1042
01:03:12.639 --> 01:03:15.159
<v Speaker 2>what it is we're going to receive from all of this.

1043
01:03:15.800 --> 01:03:19.960
<v Speaker 2>And progress has been made, no doubt, but is it

1044
01:03:20.039 --> 01:03:23.400
<v Speaker 2>exactly what everybody wanted? I guess we all have to

1045
01:03:23.440 --> 01:03:26.639
<v Speaker 2>stay tuned, and you should stay tuned. Go to Larrydashncock

1046
01:03:26.719 --> 01:03:29.840
<v Speaker 2>dot com check out his blog. I'm sure he'll be

1047
01:03:29.880 --> 01:03:32.440
<v Speaker 2>talking about these things and has been talking about these things,

1048
01:03:32.840 --> 01:03:35.960
<v Speaker 2>but also highly recommend all of his books links in

1049
01:03:36.000 --> 01:03:40.679
<v Speaker 2>the show notes to follow Larry's work. And also he'll

1050
01:03:40.679 --> 01:03:42.960
<v Speaker 2>be presenting at the Lancer Conference the twenty first to

1051
01:03:43.039 --> 01:03:46.039
<v Speaker 2>the twenty third this year in November. Larry will be

1052
01:03:46.079 --> 01:03:49.199
<v Speaker 2>there virtually, David Boylan will be with him, and I

1053
01:03:49.360 --> 01:03:54.239
<v Speaker 2>highly recommend the Oswald puzzle, although Larry, you're currently kind

1054
01:03:54.280 --> 01:03:59.199
<v Speaker 2>of working on maybe in addendum to that, I wonder

1055
01:03:59.199 --> 01:04:00.559
<v Speaker 2>if you want to tell any I.

1056
01:04:00.480 --> 01:04:00.960
<v Speaker 1>Don't know that.

1057
01:04:02.400 --> 01:04:05.039
<v Speaker 3>I don't know if there is no I actually blogged

1058
01:04:05.079 --> 01:04:08.039
<v Speaker 3>over that recently. David and I are doing what we

1059
01:04:08.199 --> 01:04:10.599
<v Speaker 3>promised to do. We promised we would see if we

1060
01:04:10.639 --> 01:04:13.360
<v Speaker 3>could pick up the story of Oswell and New Orleans

1061
01:04:13.920 --> 01:04:16.719
<v Speaker 3>and carry that a little bit further. You know, I'd

1062
01:04:16.719 --> 01:04:18.400
<v Speaker 3>love to be able to say, carry it all the

1063
01:04:18.400 --> 01:04:22.239
<v Speaker 3>way to the school book depository. That doesn't seem feasible,

1064
01:04:22.840 --> 01:04:26.480
<v Speaker 3>but I think we might. We're working on a white paper,

1065
01:04:26.519 --> 01:04:29.400
<v Speaker 3>and our presentation will be based on the white paper

1066
01:04:29.920 --> 01:04:36.000
<v Speaker 3>looking at the indications that Oswell actually became of operational

1067
01:04:36.159 --> 01:04:40.480
<v Speaker 3>use to both the CIA and the Conspiracy at almost

1068
01:04:40.559 --> 01:04:45.280
<v Speaker 3>the same time. The irony of that is terrific, and

1069
01:04:45.360 --> 01:04:50.039
<v Speaker 3>we're a lot of speculation involved. Not on the CI side,

1070
01:04:50.239 --> 01:04:52.519
<v Speaker 3>with the work Jeff is done and some other things

1071
01:04:52.559 --> 01:04:56.199
<v Speaker 3>that have come together, that's pretty much concrete in my view.

1072
01:04:56.320 --> 01:04:59.840
<v Speaker 3>The other side more speculative. But yeah, we'll be pre

1073
01:05:00.159 --> 01:05:03.239
<v Speaker 3>ending on at least the first part of that in Dallas,

1074
01:05:03.239 --> 01:05:06.360
<v Speaker 3>because I'm not sure that we have time. But that's

1075
01:05:06.480 --> 01:05:10.599
<v Speaker 3>that's the extension that we're working on. Oswald of operational Interest.

1076
01:05:11.559 --> 01:05:13.719
<v Speaker 2>Well, I'm looking forward to that as I look forward

1077
01:05:13.719 --> 01:05:15.079
<v Speaker 2>to all of the releases.

1078
01:05:15.159 --> 01:05:17.519
<v Speaker 1>And again, thank you Larry for doing this with.

1079
01:05:17.480 --> 01:05:21.079
<v Speaker 2>Me, and I appreciate you guys for listening and going

1080
01:05:21.119 --> 01:05:24.719
<v Speaker 2>through this conversation, which I hope has given you a

1081
01:05:24.719 --> 01:05:27.920
<v Speaker 2>couple of new pieces of enlightenment to move forward with

1082
01:05:28.079 --> 01:05:31.760
<v Speaker 2>as you interpret what's coming out from the committees, the

1083
01:05:31.800 --> 01:05:35.639
<v Speaker 2>people releasing, you know, these different interpretations of what's.

1084
01:05:35.480 --> 01:05:36.679
<v Speaker 1>Being released, et cetera.

1085
01:05:37.840 --> 01:06:30.800
<v Speaker 2>It's all worthy, it's all worthwhile and hopefully.

1086
01:06:13.239 --> 01:06:14.760
<v Speaker 6>Revel leg.

1087
01:06:17.599 --> 01:06:20.039
<v Speaker 7>Through calm section.

1088
01:06:23.280 --> 01:06:43.079
<v Speaker 6>Here Oh chill fact, Oh chilly fact, dream that from

1089
01:06:43.559 --> 01:06:45.000
<v Speaker 6>right day from.

1090
01:06:47.280 --> 01:06:54.239
<v Speaker 5>You, I ain't on the world.

1091
01:06:56.960 --> 01:06:58.639
<v Speaker 7>Oh chili dot com?

1092
01:07:00.119 --> 01:07:05.639
<v Speaker 4>Sure through conversation, what the effect?

1093
01:07:06.039 --> 01:07:07.519
<v Speaker 1>Decide it's broken.

1094
01:07:07.760 --> 01:07:10.719
<v Speaker 6>Through spoken revelation.

1095
01:07:10.920 --> 01:07:20.800
<v Speaker 4>Through conversation, stop line, so show fact, revelation, the saba

1096
01:07:24.639 --> 01:07:32.480
<v Speaker 4>A devastation, revelation through conversation, the effect you are the

1097
01:07:32.559 --> 01:07:35.000
<v Speaker 4>effects true.

1098
01:07:34.880 --> 01:07:42.960
<v Speaker 5>Conversation all raised a stranger or selling effect. Last conversation

1099
01:07:43.960 --> 01:07:52.000
<v Speaker 5>through a season through conversation, or shall leave effect revelations

1100
01:07:52.119 --> 01:07:54.480
<v Speaker 5>of conversation gone have forgotten?

1101
01:07:54.880 --> 01:07:55.760
<v Speaker 6>What show you effect?

1102
01:07:56.440 --> 01:08:00.840
<v Speaker 1>Beyond display of raps and fears of the safe?

1103
01:08:01.639 --> 01:08:06.760
<v Speaker 4>The gears find enough mind me afraid, and that is not.

1104
01:08:07.239 --> 01:08:10.559
<v Speaker 1>A debate with the scroll.

1105
01:08:11.079 --> 01:08:13.159
<v Speaker 5>I am the master of my fate.

1106
01:08:13.599 --> 01:08:15.760
<v Speaker 4>I am the chat of my soul.

1107
01:08:16.880 --> 01:08:24.399
<v Speaker 5>So fatten brother kind of horse continued cashing in and.

1108
01:08:26.239 --> 01:08:29.000
<v Speaker 4>Teach us about religion, keeping score at home?

1109
01:08:29.960 --> 01:08:33.399
<v Speaker 5>Are people you'd like to see even by wolves disrupted

1110
01:08:33.680 --> 01:08:36.760
<v Speaker 5>dying soon The tangles my Taco texs and has continued

1111
01:08:36.800 --> 01:08:39.439
<v Speaker 5>gulfs starring tour him when he streak, since.

1112
01:08:39.279 --> 01:08:41.119
<v Speaker 1>God spared him and decided.

1113
01:08:41.159 --> 01:08:42.399
<v Speaker 4>A firefighter dies.

1114
01:08:42.319 --> 01:08:42.600
<v Speaker 5>In the.

1115
01:08:44.359 --> 01:08:46.760
<v Speaker 1>Revelasa the center.

1116
01:08:48.119 --> 01:08:48.439
<v Speaker 5>Of that.

1117
01:08:50.000 --> 01:08:54.119
<v Speaker 7>In Denial the Secret Wars with air strikes and tanks

1118
01:08:54.560 --> 01:08:58.840
<v Speaker 7>by Larry Hancock. Secret wars became a staple of US

1119
01:08:58.960 --> 01:09:03.760
<v Speaker 7>covert operation are still happening today. Larryhancock's book In Denial

1120
01:09:04.000 --> 01:09:05.880
<v Speaker 7>rips the cover off many of them.

1121
01:09:06.199 --> 01:09:07.119
<v Speaker 1>Using new files.

1122
01:09:07.159 --> 01:09:09.520
<v Speaker 8>It exposes things about the Bay of Pigs that no

1123
01:09:09.640 --> 01:09:12.600
<v Speaker 8>one has ever written about before. It shows why it

1124
01:09:12.720 --> 01:09:15.560
<v Speaker 8>really failed and why the United States did not earn

1125
01:09:15.680 --> 01:09:18.560
<v Speaker 8>from it. It also shows why other countries today are

1126
01:09:18.680 --> 01:09:22.319
<v Speaker 8>doing secret operations with more success. This is the book

1127
01:09:22.359 --> 01:09:25.760
<v Speaker 8>that puts what some want to deny into the light.

1128
01:09:26.199 --> 01:09:31.319
<v Speaker 8>In Denial secret wars with air strikes and tanks Larry Hancock.

1129
01:09:32.520 --> 01:09:36.039
<v Speaker 8>For more information, go to Larry hyphen Hancock dot com.

1130
01:09:36.239 --> 01:09:39.239
<v Speaker 8>Pick up your copy of In Denial at Amazon dot

1131
01:09:39.359 --> 01:09:41.359
<v Speaker 8>com in digital or physical force.

1132
01:09:41.439 --> 01:09:44.399
<v Speaker 2>Uncole, do you remember that time when Benjamin Fulford said

1133
01:09:44.600 --> 01:09:48.239
<v Speaker 2>that an Asian secret society was going to dispatch ninja's

1134
01:09:48.279 --> 01:09:49.680
<v Speaker 2>to take down the Illuminati?

1135
01:09:49.960 --> 01:09:52.800
<v Speaker 3>Ooh, that's interesting, Yeah and the Claton?

1136
01:09:53.439 --> 01:09:55.159
<v Speaker 1>Yeah? Did that ever work out? To day?

1137
01:10:02.600 --> 01:10:06.640
<v Speaker 3>Go ahead, Cola speak about the DAFA assassation right, Well,

1138
01:10:06.680 --> 01:10:07.239
<v Speaker 3>what do you want to know?

1139
01:10:07.359 --> 01:10:10.359
<v Speaker 2>Toddy Baker's wild claim? Oswald girlfriends he knew?

1140
01:10:10.439 --> 01:10:12.279
<v Speaker 3>Ruby and Barrie answer weapons?

1141
01:10:12.319 --> 01:10:14.600
<v Speaker 1>Really, I imagine I could claim I have four wheels.

1142
01:10:14.680 --> 01:10:15.760
<v Speaker 1>It doesn't make me a wagon.

1143
01:10:15.880 --> 01:10:18.720
<v Speaker 5>But okay, Oswald was on the building and trying to

1144
01:10:18.760 --> 01:10:20.159
<v Speaker 5>prevent the murder of John Kennedy.

1145
01:10:20.239 --> 01:10:22.399
<v Speaker 7>Come on now, has a real effort on the DAFA

1146
01:10:22.520 --> 01:10:24.159
<v Speaker 7>assassination claim.

1147
01:10:24.359 --> 01:10:28.359
<v Speaker 2>Go to Amazon dot com enter Judith Baker in her

1148
01:10:28.439 --> 01:10:31.239
<v Speaker 2>own words. You'll get the results for a digital copy

1149
01:10:31.359 --> 01:10:34.720
<v Speaker 2>of a book where Walt Brown utilizes her own words

1150
01:10:34.880 --> 01:10:37.680
<v Speaker 2>and the known evidence in the case to get at

1151
01:10:37.840 --> 01:10:41.279
<v Speaker 2>well a different perspective. Let's say you can get Judith

1152
01:10:41.439 --> 01:10:44.600
<v Speaker 2>Ary Baker in her own words from the author himself,

1153
01:10:44.800 --> 01:10:47.840
<v Speaker 2>signed if you request it by contacting doctor Brown at

1154
01:10:47.920 --> 01:10:52.000
<v Speaker 2>k I A s jfk at aol dot com. It's

1155
01:10:52.039 --> 01:10:55.399
<v Speaker 2>a fun book and it actually dissects the many, many

1156
01:10:55.520 --> 01:10:59.239
<v Speaker 2>fantastic claims Judith very Baker in her own words.

1157
01:10:59.399 --> 01:11:00.920
<v Speaker 5>Thank you for all the great information.

1158
01:11:01.359 --> 01:11:03.760
<v Speaker 3>Shelley dot com Radio Network