1 00:00:00,160 --> 00:00:03,200 Speaker 1: Welcome to the Deep Dive, the knowledge shortcut that turns 2 00:00:03,279 --> 00:00:07,240 massive stacks of historical files, congressional hearings, and a cutting 3 00:00:07,320 --> 00:00:11,359 edge research into the essential insights you need fast. Today 4 00:00:11,400 --> 00:00:13,320 we are opening a set of files that, well, they 5 00:00:13,359 --> 00:00:16,399 confirm one of the most persistent and unsettling rumors of 6 00:00:16,399 --> 00:00:19,600 the Cold War era. We're talking about the deep secret 7 00:00:19,600 --> 00:00:23,440 relationship between US intelligence and the news media. And we're 8 00:00:23,440 --> 00:00:25,719 going to track this story right up to the present day, 9 00:00:25,760 --> 00:00:29,000 where the fight isn't about human spies and newsrooms anymore, 10 00:00:29,039 --> 00:00:33,600 but something else entirely. It's about algorithmic warfare am squarely 11 00:00:33,640 --> 00:00:36,359 at your perception. I want you to just think about 12 00:00:36,399 --> 00:00:39,719 this for a second. Imagine you're a foreign correspondent operating 13 00:00:39,759 --> 00:00:43,520 in say Beirut or Moscow or Tehran. Your ultimate professional 14 00:00:43,520 --> 00:00:46,119 fear it's not necessarily being killed in a crossfire, it's 15 00:00:46,119 --> 00:00:48,840 being mistakenly labeled a spy. That suspicion alone is a 16 00:00:48,880 --> 00:00:50,920 death sentence in so many parts of the world. What 17 00:00:51,000 --> 00:00:53,200 we're looking at today is the documented kind of frightening 18 00:00:53,240 --> 00:00:55,399 reality that for two whole decades during the Cold War, 19 00:00:55,520 --> 00:00:59,920 major US media organizations they didn't just passively tolerate intelligence contact. 20 00:01:00,200 --> 00:01:03,479 They systematically cooperated with the CIA. It was an institutional 21 00:01:03,520 --> 00:01:07,599 policy of collusion. That I mean. It fundamentally blurred the 22 00:01:07,640 --> 00:01:10,120 lines between gathering news and gathering intelligence. 23 00:01:10,319 --> 00:01:13,480 Speaker 2: And that systematic collusion is really the anchor for this 24 00:01:13,519 --> 00:01:17,760 whole deep dive. Our goal here is to synthesize three 25 00:01:19,319 --> 00:01:22,159 very different eras of these influence operations. We're going to 26 00:01:22,159 --> 00:01:24,480 start with the institutional history in the nineteen fifties, the 27 00:01:24,560 --> 00:01:28,519 documented arrangement between the fledgling CIA or even its predecessor 28 00:01:28,519 --> 00:01:32,079 of the Central Intelligence Group, the CIG, and media titans 29 00:01:32,120 --> 00:01:35,519 like Time Ink, the parent company of Time and Life magazines, 30 00:01:35,560 --> 00:01:37,959 and the New York Times. This is basically Operation Mockingbird, 31 00:01:38,159 --> 00:01:39,879 but confirmed by the records, not. 32 00:01:39,799 --> 00:01:42,000 Speaker 1: Just a conspiracy theory anymore. 33 00:01:41,599 --> 00:01:44,079 Speaker 2: Not at all. Then we jump forward to the high 34 00:01:44,120 --> 00:01:47,640 stakes public accountability hearings of the nineteen nineties. This was 35 00:01:47,680 --> 00:01:51,319 the moment of reckoning, a real debate over ethical boundaries, 36 00:01:51,799 --> 00:01:55,200 and it featured powerful, just heart wrenching testimony from former 37 00:01:55,200 --> 00:01:58,519 hostages about the real world danger when journalists get associated 38 00:01:58,519 --> 00:02:01,359 with intelligence work. The whole debate centered on whether the 39 00:02:01,400 --> 00:02:04,920 CIA could ever legally keep a waiver authority to use reporters. 40 00:02:05,040 --> 00:02:06,400 Speaker 1: And then the third part. 41 00:02:06,239 --> 00:02:09,960 Speaker 2: Finally we accelerate to the present. We connect this historical 42 00:02:10,039 --> 00:02:14,199 legacy to the rise of what's now being called cognitive warfare. 43 00:02:15,000 --> 00:02:17,039 This is where the target is no longer the editor 44 00:02:17,080 --> 00:02:21,039 in the newsroom, but the very way you process information online. 45 00:02:21,159 --> 00:02:25,599 We're talking about state actors leveraging digital platforms in AI 46 00:02:25,840 --> 00:02:29,159 to fundamentally manipulate well the cognitive domain, and. 47 00:02:29,080 --> 00:02:31,759 Speaker 1: The clarity of the evidence on that Cold War illusion 48 00:02:31,879 --> 00:02:34,840 is genuinely startling. I mean, we are not discussing some 49 00:02:35,000 --> 00:02:38,840 isolated instance of a journalist who occasionally reported back to 50 00:02:38,879 --> 00:02:43,039 the agency. We have documentation revealing a structural operational arrangement 51 00:02:43,039 --> 00:02:45,800 between time Ink and the CIA that was established in 52 00:02:45,840 --> 00:02:48,319 the very first decade of the Cold War and lasted 53 00:02:48,360 --> 00:02:51,479 well into the late nineteen sixties. This wasn't a rogue operation. 54 00:02:51,960 --> 00:02:54,919 This was strategic policy executed at the highest levels of 55 00:02:54,960 --> 00:02:56,199 both organizations. 56 00:02:56,280 --> 00:02:59,280 Speaker 2: So when we really start to dissect the CIA's access 57 00:02:59,319 --> 00:03:01,840 to these media empires, we see right away that the 58 00:03:01,919 --> 00:03:06,400 relationship with time Ink wasn't just transactional, it was symbiotic. 59 00:03:06,840 --> 00:03:09,159 It began around nineteen forty nine, not long after the 60 00:03:09,159 --> 00:03:12,159 CIA was even formed, taking over from the CIG to 61 00:03:12,240 --> 00:03:15,479 Central Intelligence Group. The key thing to remember is that 62 00:03:15,599 --> 00:03:19,800 time Ink had this massive, irreplaceable global presence. 63 00:03:20,039 --> 00:03:24,319 Speaker 1: The CIA was new, but time Inc. Was already everywhere. 64 00:03:23,840 --> 00:03:26,919 Speaker 2: Exactly, and what time Ink offered the CIA was something 65 00:03:27,400 --> 00:03:30,360 no amount of government funding could just create. 66 00:03:30,039 --> 00:03:33,199 Speaker 1: Overnight, which was what exactly. The people on the ground. 67 00:03:32,919 --> 00:03:36,599 Speaker 2: The unfiltered eyes and ears of experienced correspondence on the 68 00:03:36,599 --> 00:03:40,159 ground in every single strategically important corner of the globe. 69 00:03:40,599 --> 00:03:43,960 So the agency gained systematic, continuous access to time Inc's 70 00:03:44,000 --> 00:03:48,639 most valuable assets, their foreign correspondence, their confidential dispatches, and 71 00:03:48,639 --> 00:03:51,000 their massive research and photographic files. 72 00:03:51,120 --> 00:03:54,840 Speaker 1: These were resources the fledgling CIA just desperately needed to 73 00:03:54,919 --> 00:03:57,719 map the post war world and I guess track all 74 00:03:57,759 --> 00:04:00,879 these rising threats quickly. Let's talk about the gold standard 75 00:04:00,919 --> 00:04:05,120 of intelligence. They receive this fyi material for your information. 76 00:04:05,919 --> 00:04:08,680 This wasn't the polished, vetted stuff that you or I 77 00:04:08,680 --> 00:04:10,680 would read in Time magazine, not even close. 78 00:04:10,840 --> 00:04:13,039 Speaker 2: The published articles were just the tip of the iceberg. 79 00:04:13,560 --> 00:04:16,879 The real intelligence, the real value, came from the private reports, 80 00:04:17,199 --> 00:04:20,519 the cables, the personal letters the correspondents were sending back 81 00:04:20,560 --> 00:04:25,279 to their editors. This fyi material was pure raw intelligence. 82 00:04:25,279 --> 00:04:30,240 We're talking spicy corridor gossip, unverified but highly illuminating background 83 00:04:30,279 --> 00:04:31,279 on political. 84 00:04:30,879 --> 00:04:33,399 Speaker 1: Crises, post mortems on major events. 85 00:04:33,160 --> 00:04:36,439 Speaker 2: And crucially private guidance for editors writing local stories that 86 00:04:36,480 --> 00:04:38,639 had nuance only available to people on the inside. 87 00:04:38,720 --> 00:04:41,240 Speaker 1: So okay, this is where the historian and make us fascinated. 88 00:04:41,399 --> 00:04:45,600 Why would gossip and background speculation be considered priceless intelligence 89 00:04:45,600 --> 00:04:47,720 that sounds so informal? 90 00:04:47,920 --> 00:04:51,839 Speaker 2: Well, because it provided context, motive, personality assessments. It's the 91 00:04:52,000 --> 00:04:56,959 human layer that hard military intelligence so often misses. For 92 00:04:57,160 --> 00:05:01,120 young intelligence organization trying to understand closes societies like the 93 00:05:01,279 --> 00:05:05,319 entire Soviet bloc, where press censorship was absolute. This material 94 00:05:05,399 --> 00:05:06,959 was revolutionary. 95 00:05:06,480 --> 00:05:08,920 Speaker 1: So they were getting a picture they couldn't get anywhere else. 96 00:05:08,800 --> 00:05:13,959 Speaker 2: Nowhere else. In fact, experienced CIA officers admitted openly that 97 00:05:14,040 --> 00:05:17,519 many US journalists were and I'm quoting here, presenting a 98 00:05:17,560 --> 00:05:21,120 more accurate and informed picture of conditions in Eastern Europe 99 00:05:21,319 --> 00:05:24,959 than the agency's own spy networks. Wow, it was faster, 100 00:05:25,279 --> 00:05:29,000 it was broader, and often more insightful because journalists had 101 00:05:29,000 --> 00:05:33,720 access to circles that diplomats or traditional spies just couldn't touch. 102 00:05:33,720 --> 00:05:35,879 Speaker 1: And that dependency is why they formalized this. 103 00:05:36,279 --> 00:05:39,439 Speaker 2: That's exactly why this is why the CIA formalized this 104 00:05:39,519 --> 00:05:42,800 system with major publishers. It was a necessity for them. 105 00:05:42,839 --> 00:05:44,600 Speaker 1: And we know this wasn't just a one off thing 106 00:05:44,680 --> 00:05:48,000 with Time Inc. Because the structure was well, it was 107 00:05:48,040 --> 00:05:49,439 basically copied elsewhere. 108 00:05:49,560 --> 00:05:53,160 Speaker 2: Absolutely, the evidence we have suggest the arrangement between the 109 00:05:53,199 --> 00:05:55,879 CIA and the New York Times was almost identical to 110 00:05:55,920 --> 00:05:57,959 the one with Time Inc. And that tells you this 111 00:05:58,079 --> 00:06:02,399 was a common CIA policy of systemic press engagement, established 112 00:06:02,439 --> 00:06:04,720 right when the agency was transitioning from the CIG to 113 00:06:04,759 --> 00:06:07,759 the CIA in the late nineteen forties. It was viewed 114 00:06:07,759 --> 00:06:11,879 as a necessary, if a controversial, tool for intelligence collection 115 00:06:12,079 --> 00:06:13,480 in a rapidly changing world. 116 00:06:13,720 --> 00:06:15,839 Speaker 1: Okay, so let's move from the written word to the 117 00:06:15,920 --> 00:06:20,600 visual because the CIA's intense interest in the Life magazine 118 00:06:20,600 --> 00:06:24,360 photo archive that gives us a really fascinating look into 119 00:06:24,600 --> 00:06:29,680 their collection methods. Before we had sophisticated spyplanes or satellites, 120 00:06:30,199 --> 00:06:34,199 this was basically photographic intelligence gathering using a commercial library. 121 00:06:34,439 --> 00:06:38,160 Speaker 2: It was a crucial partnership. The CIA was intensely interested 122 00:06:38,199 --> 00:06:41,439 in the Life magazine photo archive, which had what fourteen 123 00:06:41,519 --> 00:06:43,560 years worth of images going all the way back to 124 00:06:43,639 --> 00:06:47,439 nineteen thirty six. They were essentially backfilling their strategic intelligence 125 00:06:47,519 --> 00:06:51,399 databases using commercial photography. This was before the U two flights, 126 00:06:51,639 --> 00:06:55,920 before high resolution spy satellites. Their main visual intelligence was 127 00:06:56,000 --> 00:06:58,480 often what they could manually pull from sources like life. 128 00:06:58,519 --> 00:07:01,560 Speaker 1: And we have some incredible specific on the operational scale 129 00:07:01,600 --> 00:07:03,519 of this. This wasn't a one off request. We're talking 130 00:07:03,560 --> 00:07:06,439 about CIA officers making weekly visits to the archives for 131 00:07:06,439 --> 00:07:07,360 almost two decades. 132 00:07:07,600 --> 00:07:10,720 Speaker 2: Correct. The sheer volume is what really shows how systematic 133 00:07:10,759 --> 00:07:13,600 this was. Yeah, when they started reviewing the historical files 134 00:07:13,600 --> 00:07:16,759 back in nineteen forty nine, CIA officers were copying an 135 00:07:16,759 --> 00:07:19,639 average of three to five hundred photographs per week, per week, 136 00:07:19,720 --> 00:07:22,720 per week. I mean, just think about that logistical operation. 137 00:07:23,120 --> 00:07:26,319 And even after they finished that big historical review, they 138 00:07:26,399 --> 00:07:29,319 kept going. They continued to pull an average of eighty 139 00:07:29,399 --> 00:07:31,639 nine photos per week from the current. 140 00:07:31,399 --> 00:07:34,519 Speaker 1: Files, every single week, year after year, year after year. 141 00:07:34,720 --> 00:07:37,120 So what were they looking for? Was it just you know, 142 00:07:37,439 --> 00:07:39,560 war photos or something more tactical. 143 00:07:39,879 --> 00:07:43,680 Speaker 2: The material fell into two really critical buckets. About three 144 00:07:43,759 --> 00:07:45,800 quarters of it was classified as geographic. 145 00:07:45,879 --> 00:07:46,720 Speaker 1: Okay, what does that mean? 146 00:07:46,839 --> 00:07:51,120 Speaker 2: Coastline mapping of Europe, detailed topography of sensitive areas like Iran, 147 00:07:51,879 --> 00:07:57,120 or infrastructure details. This was hard foundational intelligence, the kind 148 00:07:57,160 --> 00:07:59,920 of stuff you use for mapping and visualizing targets for 149 00:08:00,120 --> 00:08:02,120 future military or intelligence planning. 150 00:08:02,160 --> 00:08:02,920 Speaker 1: And the other quarter. 151 00:08:03,199 --> 00:08:06,680 Speaker 2: That remaining quarter focused almost exclusively on identifying and tracking 152 00:08:06,720 --> 00:08:11,480 personalities from behind the Iron Curtain, key leaders, potential assets, 153 00:08:11,839 --> 00:08:13,959 targets within the Soviet sphere of influence. 154 00:08:14,199 --> 00:08:18,240 Speaker 1: So you have this top secret, critical operation for national security, 155 00:08:18,800 --> 00:08:22,879 but the human element inside time inc soughw it very 156 00:08:23,000 --> 00:08:27,120 very differently. The photo overseer a woman named Susie Eggleston. 157 00:08:27,720 --> 00:08:30,600 She didn't see this as some patriotic service to her. 158 00:08:30,720 --> 00:08:32,559 It was a massive bureaucratic headache. 159 00:08:32,559 --> 00:08:35,360 Speaker 2: It is the classic collision of espionage in publishing. Right. 160 00:08:35,879 --> 00:08:39,559 Eggleston complained in nineteen fifty two that the CIA visits 161 00:08:39,600 --> 00:08:43,480 were a huge nuisance. I mean, imagine you're the photo 162 00:08:43,600 --> 00:08:45,480 editor for a global magazine like. 163 00:08:45,480 --> 00:08:48,120 Speaker 1: Life, right. Your whole job is that library. 164 00:08:48,159 --> 00:08:51,240 Speaker 2: Your most important asset is your image library. And every 165 00:08:51,279 --> 00:08:54,039 single week the CIA takes hundreds of images out of 166 00:08:54,080 --> 00:08:57,080 circulation for copying, even if it's just for a few days. 167 00:08:57,639 --> 00:09:01,159 This handicapped the magazine's own editorial skit. She concluded, and 168 00:09:01,200 --> 00:09:03,200 this is a quote. Possibly they are building up a 169 00:09:03,200 --> 00:09:05,639 Peachey strategic file, but I take a dim view of 170 00:09:05,679 --> 00:09:06,480 the whole thing at. 171 00:09:06,360 --> 00:09:09,240 Speaker 1: This point, a Peachey strategic file. She just saw it 172 00:09:09,279 --> 00:09:13,080 as annoying, tedious work, no matter the national security rationale 173 00:09:13,080 --> 00:09:15,399 behind it. Exactly so, to keep this whole arrangement going, 174 00:09:15,440 --> 00:09:18,639 the CIA had to pull strings at the corporate level. 175 00:09:18,720 --> 00:09:21,159 They couldn't just deal with the annoyed archivist. 176 00:09:21,600 --> 00:09:25,919 Speaker 2: Oh, they absolutely needed high level reassurance. James M. Andrews, 177 00:09:26,000 --> 00:09:29,720 who was the CIA's Assistant director for Intelligence Collection, he 178 00:09:29,879 --> 00:09:32,799 personally intervened. He gave a tour of the CIA to 179 00:09:32,799 --> 00:09:37,120 Bernard Barnes, Egleston's direct supervisor, just to impress upon him 180 00:09:37,159 --> 00:09:40,080 the gravity of the mission. And then Andrews wrote directly 181 00:09:40,120 --> 00:09:43,480 to Time Ink president roy E Larson, assuring him that 182 00:09:43,519 --> 00:09:48,320 the life photographs were quote extremely valuable for a variety 183 00:09:48,320 --> 00:09:52,240 of intelligence purposes and were directly serving national security. 184 00:09:52,320 --> 00:09:56,799 Speaker 1: So this was a high level corporate to spymaster relationship. 185 00:09:56,200 --> 00:09:59,960 Speaker 2: Absolutely, which just demonstrates how much the CIA valued this act. 186 00:10:00,399 --> 00:10:03,000 Speaker 1: But despite all that high level management, we know the 187 00:10:03,080 --> 00:10:06,480 arrangement sparked some really serious internal dissent among the senior 188 00:10:06,600 --> 00:10:11,240 editorial staff. The patriotic consensus wasn't, you know, absolute. 189 00:10:10,840 --> 00:10:13,519 Speaker 2: No, it wasn't, and the dissent was powerful, even though 190 00:10:13,519 --> 00:10:16,919 it was kept internal and strictly confidential. He kept to consider. 191 00:10:16,960 --> 00:10:20,120 Manfred Gottfried, a senior editor at Time, Inc. He did 192 00:10:20,120 --> 00:10:23,559 not mince words. He argued fiercely, saying, CIA is still 193 00:10:23,600 --> 00:10:26,080 the top us spy ring. As long as we pretend 194 00:10:26,080 --> 00:10:27,879 to be honest journalists, we had not to be mixed 195 00:10:27,919 --> 00:10:31,159 up in it. He questioned the entire premise. He pointed 196 00:10:31,159 --> 00:10:33,960 out the irony that Congress would never allow the CIA 197 00:10:34,080 --> 00:10:37,919 to tap a US news organization's communication wires. Yet here 198 00:10:38,039 --> 00:10:42,559 the organization was just willingly handing over its confidential files. 199 00:10:43,159 --> 00:10:45,960 Speaker 1: So did that internal critique actually have any effect? 200 00:10:46,720 --> 00:10:49,279 Speaker 2: It did. It had a limited but really important effect. 201 00:10:49,840 --> 00:10:53,600 Henry LUs, the powerful founder of Time, Inc. He partially 202 00:10:53,639 --> 00:10:57,000 conceded to the concerns of his senior editors. He ended 203 00:10:57,000 --> 00:10:59,919 the practice of sharing the foreign dispatches directly with the CIA. 204 00:11:00,240 --> 00:11:02,120 Speaker 1: Okay, so that's a big deal, it is. 205 00:11:02,480 --> 00:11:05,879 Speaker 2: But other collaborations, and crucially the photo archive access that 206 00:11:05,919 --> 00:11:08,559 continued for several more years. It just shows how difficult 207 00:11:08,600 --> 00:11:11,080 it was to sever such a valuable intelligence stream. 208 00:11:11,159 --> 00:11:13,200 Speaker 1: What stands out most to me about this whole period 209 00:11:13,279 --> 00:11:16,960 is the almost fanatical commitment to secrecy, even more intense 210 00:11:17,000 --> 00:11:19,360 than the agency's oone. And this leads us to this 211 00:11:19,480 --> 00:11:22,559 unwritten code that kept this whole thing secret even after 212 00:11:22,679 --> 00:11:25,440 all the intelligence abuses were exposed in the nineteen seventies 213 00:11:25,440 --> 00:11:26,480 by the Church Committee. 214 00:11:26,639 --> 00:11:30,320 Speaker 2: Yeah, that enduring secrecy. It boils down to multiple layers 215 00:11:30,320 --> 00:11:34,639 of loyalty. Senior staff were loyal to each other, and 216 00:11:34,679 --> 00:11:39,360 they preferred resolving internal disputes privately, not as they'd say, 217 00:11:39,440 --> 00:11:42,399 airing their grievances in print. They were loyal to this 218 00:11:42,480 --> 00:11:46,039 abstract concept of national security, and critically, they felt a 219 00:11:46,080 --> 00:11:49,600 responsibility to protect their government sources, you know, the people 220 00:11:49,639 --> 00:11:55,559 sharing sensitive confidential information with responsible journalists under the expectation 221 00:11:55,960 --> 00:11:56,600 of discretion. 222 00:11:56,919 --> 00:12:00,559 Speaker 1: And this commitment to secrecy is just beautifully illustrated by 223 00:12:00,600 --> 00:12:03,519 the security classification details. This is my favorite part. 224 00:12:03,600 --> 00:12:06,240 Speaker 2: It's the ultimate mic drop detail, isn't it. When the 225 00:12:06,240 --> 00:12:09,960 CIA proposed lowering the security classification of the copied photos 226 00:12:10,000 --> 00:12:13,919 from confidential to restricted, which would have made them much 227 00:12:13,960 --> 00:12:16,600 easier for the agency to share with the other government departments. 228 00:12:16,879 --> 00:12:20,639 Time Inc. President roy E Larson flatly refused. 229 00:12:20,720 --> 00:12:22,840 Speaker 1: Wait, so, let me get this straight. The private media 230 00:12:22,879 --> 00:12:25,840 company was more concerned about protecting the idea of secrecy 231 00:12:26,039 --> 00:12:29,360 than the intelligence agency was about easily sharing its own 232 00:12:29,440 --> 00:12:30,279 gathered data. 233 00:12:30,320 --> 00:12:32,799 Speaker 2: That's it. That shows you where the true loyalty lay. 234 00:12:32,919 --> 00:12:33,559 Speaker 1: Unbelievable. 235 00:12:33,639 --> 00:12:37,840 Speaker 2: Absolutely, Time Inc. Insisted on keeping the higher confidential classification, 236 00:12:38,240 --> 00:12:42,200 specifically to ensure that the existence of their relationship with 237 00:12:42,240 --> 00:12:46,279 the CIA would never be discovered publicly. They prioritized keeping 238 00:12:46,279 --> 00:12:50,000 the operational collaboration secret even more highly than the CIA 239 00:12:50,360 --> 00:12:54,159 prioritized the easy dissemination of the intelligence they gathered. This 240 00:12:54,320 --> 00:12:58,360 just reveals the immense institutional pressure and cultural imperative to 241 00:12:58,399 --> 00:13:01,000 protect the arrangement at all costs during that period. 242 00:13:01,559 --> 00:13:04,480 Speaker 1: So that deep systematic collusion, you know, the one relying 243 00:13:04,519 --> 00:13:08,039 on internal loyalty and discretion. It eventually crumbled under the 244 00:13:08,039 --> 00:13:11,840 weight of post Vietnam and Watergate public accountability. The revelations 245 00:13:11,840 --> 00:13:14,960 from the Church Committee investigations in the nineteen seventies, which 246 00:13:15,000 --> 00:13:19,679 exposed these widespread domestic intelligence abuses. They forced Congress to 247 00:13:19,720 --> 00:13:22,399 look very closely at the ethical lines between the CIA 248 00:13:22,440 --> 00:13:24,799 and civilian society, and this all came to a head 249 00:13:24,799 --> 00:13:26,840 in nineteen ninety six with the Senate hearing that was 250 00:13:26,879 --> 00:13:30,519 specifically focused on the CIA's use of journalists, clergy and 251 00:13:30,559 --> 00:13:31,600 Peace Corps personnel. 252 00:13:31,879 --> 00:13:34,799 Speaker 2: And the stakes in nineteen ninety six were just dramatically 253 00:13:34,919 --> 00:13:38,000 raised by the living cost of that past collusion, and 254 00:13:38,080 --> 00:13:40,600 it was all demonstrated through the testimony of one man, 255 00:13:40,879 --> 00:13:44,320 Terry Anderson. Anderson was the Associated Pressed euro chief in 256 00:13:44,360 --> 00:13:47,360 the Middle East, a very high profile figure who spent 257 00:13:47,440 --> 00:13:50,600 six agonizing years as a hostage from nineteen eighty five 258 00:13:50,639 --> 00:13:53,960 to nineteen ninety one, held by fundamentalist Sheites in Lebanon. 259 00:13:54,519 --> 00:13:58,360 Speaker 1: Anderson's testimony was just devastating because it personalized the threat completely. 260 00:13:58,759 --> 00:14:01,399 He recounted how his cats didn't just suspect you as 261 00:14:01,440 --> 00:14:04,720 a spy, they operated under the absolute assumption that he 262 00:14:04,840 --> 00:14:08,840 was one. He was interrogated repeatedly, constantly pressed to reveal 263 00:14:08,840 --> 00:14:11,279 the name of the CIA agent within the AP that 264 00:14:11,320 --> 00:14:12,039 you report to. 265 00:14:12,519 --> 00:14:16,159 Speaker 2: His experience was absolutely critical to the policy debate. Anderson 266 00:14:16,279 --> 00:14:18,799 argued that the mere suspicion that journalists are spies is 267 00:14:18,840 --> 00:14:21,159 already a global occupational hazard. 268 00:14:20,879 --> 00:14:24,320 Speaker 1: But any official US policy that provides a formal exception 269 00:14:24,399 --> 00:14:26,480 to a ban on using journalists, and no matter how 270 00:14:26,559 --> 00:14:29,279 narrow it is, it just validates that paranoia. 271 00:14:29,679 --> 00:14:33,559 Speaker 2: Exactly, it validates it and actively endangers the lives of 272 00:14:33,600 --> 00:14:37,759 every single non governmental American working in hostile territory. He 273 00:14:37,840 --> 00:14:42,120 advocated for a clear, absolute, public blanket ban on using 274 00:14:42,200 --> 00:14:46,200 journalists to cover or recruiting journalists as intelligence assets period. 275 00:14:46,360 --> 00:14:50,039 Speaker 1: He was basically arguing that giving the CIA an official loophole, 276 00:14:50,200 --> 00:14:54,360 even for the most extreme circumstances, effectively hands propaganda to 277 00:14:54,399 --> 00:14:57,240 those who want to kidnap or execute Americans abroad. 278 00:14:57,399 --> 00:15:01,080 Speaker 2: Yes, the point was that perception is reality and hostile zones. 279 00:15:01,759 --> 00:15:04,679 Anderson insisted that the agency's public insistence on keeping a 280 00:15:04,720 --> 00:15:07,799 formal exception to a rule. It's supposedly accepted that using 281 00:15:07,840 --> 00:15:11,360 journalists in dangers lives was creating immediate harm just by 282 00:15:11,399 --> 00:15:15,559 reinforcing this narrative of espionage, he asked Congress. He said, 283 00:15:15,799 --> 00:15:17,720 just because we can conceive of a scenario where speed 284 00:15:17,720 --> 00:15:20,360 limits must be broken for an emergency, do we legislate 285 00:15:20,360 --> 00:15:23,480 a formal exception for speeding for all citizens. No, the 286 00:15:23,559 --> 00:15:25,480 law has to stand absolute, even if it might be 287 00:15:25,480 --> 00:15:27,480 occasionally broken in an extreme emergency. 288 00:15:27,720 --> 00:15:30,919 Speaker 1: Okay, So let's pivot to the government's stance, which was 289 00:15:31,000 --> 00:15:33,879 articulated by the CIA director at the time, John Deutsch. 290 00:15:34,159 --> 00:15:36,480 He affirmed that the general policy was a ban, that 291 00:15:36,559 --> 00:15:40,159 the entire debate really hinged on his insistence on retaining 292 00:15:40,279 --> 00:15:42,480 this waiver authority. The director's option. 293 00:15:42,879 --> 00:15:46,480 Speaker 2: Deutsch's policy was essentially, we ban it, but we need 294 00:15:46,480 --> 00:15:51,080 an emergency escape clause. The Director of Central Intelligence, the DCI, 295 00:15:51,360 --> 00:15:55,399 must retain the waiver authority for truly exceptional circumstances that 296 00:15:55,480 --> 00:15:57,159 involve an extreme threat to the nation. 297 00:15:57,240 --> 00:15:58,919 Speaker 1: And he gave examples right he did. 298 00:15:59,279 --> 00:16:02,919 Speaker 2: He cited finding American hostages or deterring the use of 299 00:16:02,960 --> 00:16:06,120 a weapon of mass destruction in a densely populated urban 300 00:16:06,200 --> 00:16:10,399 area as scenarios where rapid unconventional action might be necessary. 301 00:16:10,480 --> 00:16:13,360 Speaker 1: And his rationale for keeping this ultimate power in the 302 00:16:13,440 --> 00:16:16,360 DCI's office rather than say, elevating it to the president, 303 00:16:16,440 --> 00:16:19,279 and that was purely about operational efficiency and chain of command, 304 00:16:19,320 --> 00:16:20,240 wasn't it it was? 305 00:16:21,000 --> 00:16:24,159 Speaker 2: Deutsch argued very strongly against involving the White House in 306 00:16:24,240 --> 00:16:27,879 day to day operational decisions, even these rare ones. He 307 00:16:27,960 --> 00:16:31,440 felt the DCI should be trusted with operational command. His 308 00:16:31,559 --> 00:16:34,799 ultimate accountability, he argued, was that the President could fire 309 00:16:34,879 --> 00:16:37,600 him if he made a poor judgment call. 310 00:16:36,960 --> 00:16:38,840 Speaker 1: But he did offer some oversight. 311 00:16:39,000 --> 00:16:41,799 Speaker 2: He did. He agreed that if a waiver were used, 312 00:16:42,039 --> 00:16:45,919 the decision would involve immediate notification of the Congressional oversight committees, 313 00:16:46,279 --> 00:16:48,519 setting a goal of about forty eight hours to inform 314 00:16:48,559 --> 00:16:49,960 the chairman in ranking members. 315 00:16:50,480 --> 00:16:53,159 Speaker 1: And this whole question of who holds the waiver power, 316 00:16:53,279 --> 00:16:56,600 the DCI or the President that became the focal point 317 00:16:56,639 --> 00:16:59,960 for the Congressional pushback. I'm thinking specifically of Senator Arline 318 00:17:00,000 --> 00:17:04,119 Inspector and previous legislative efforts like the House's Richardson Amendment 319 00:17:04,400 --> 00:17:04,839 that's right. 320 00:17:05,079 --> 00:17:08,319 Speaker 2: The push from Congress, which was fueled by this intense 321 00:17:08,400 --> 00:17:11,240 testimony from the press and clergy, was either for an 322 00:17:11,279 --> 00:17:16,279 absolute legally enshrined prohibition or at the very minimum, elevating 323 00:17:16,319 --> 00:17:19,519 the exception authority to the president. They felt that if 324 00:17:19,519 --> 00:17:22,880 a situation truly constituted an extreme threat to the nation, 325 00:17:23,480 --> 00:17:26,759 it deserved the highest level of executive approval possible, not 326 00:17:26,839 --> 00:17:28,039 just a director's signature. 327 00:17:28,519 --> 00:17:30,359 Speaker 1: And the House had already passed a bill on this right. 328 00:17:30,440 --> 00:17:33,079 Speaker 2: The House had yeah, they passed a bill supporting the 329 00:17:33,079 --> 00:17:36,000 need for this legislative solution by an overwhelming margin of 330 00:17:36,039 --> 00:17:39,480 four hundred and seventeen to six. This wasn't a partisan debate, 331 00:17:39,759 --> 00:17:42,279 it was a constitutional one about checks and balances on 332 00:17:42,319 --> 00:17:43,599 executive intelligence power. 333 00:17:43,920 --> 00:17:46,880 Speaker 1: So the press and clergy response was just absolute, and 334 00:17:46,920 --> 00:17:49,440 it was rooted in this idea that their work requires 335 00:17:49,519 --> 00:17:53,839 unimpeachable trust. Mortimer B. Zuckerman of US News and World Report, 336 00:17:53,880 --> 00:17:56,640 he made a powerful case based on the constitutional integrity 337 00:17:56,680 --> 00:17:57,160 of the press. 338 00:17:57,559 --> 00:18:01,880 Speaker 2: Zuckerman argued that untainted journalism is itself a precious national resource, 339 00:18:02,160 --> 00:18:04,400 and it does more long term good for the country 340 00:18:04,440 --> 00:18:07,839 than any short term intelligence gained from compromising a reporter. 341 00:18:08,319 --> 00:18:10,920 And he brought up the case of Nick Daniloff, who 342 00:18:11,000 --> 00:18:13,759 was the Moscow bureau chief for US News. He was 343 00:18:13,799 --> 00:18:16,799 falsely accused and arrested by the KGB in nineteen eighty six. 344 00:18:17,319 --> 00:18:21,480 And crucially, Daniloff was unwittingly involved in an intelligence drop. 345 00:18:21,519 --> 00:18:23,039 He had no idea he was being used. 346 00:18:23,200 --> 00:18:26,759 Speaker 1: And the implication there is if even unwitting involvement taints 347 00:18:26,799 --> 00:18:30,519 the entire profession, how can any official policy that supports 348 00:18:30,519 --> 00:18:33,200 witting involvement ever be justified precisely. 349 00:18:33,359 --> 00:18:36,240 Speaker 2: Zuckerman contended that the damage caused by the mere perception 350 00:18:36,279 --> 00:18:39,440 of a link spreads across the entire profession, endangering all 351 00:18:39,519 --> 00:18:43,279 journalists working overseas. The independence of the press, he argued, 352 00:18:43,440 --> 00:18:46,000 had to be protected by an absolute legal line. 353 00:18:46,039 --> 00:18:48,880 Speaker 1: Meanwhile, you had Ted Copple of ABC News, with his 354 00:18:49,039 --> 00:18:52,319 deep history of reporting from high conflict zones, and he 355 00:18:52,359 --> 00:18:55,039 took a different, almost cynical path to the exact same 356 00:18:55,079 --> 00:18:57,920 conclusion Bannett. Absolutely, even if you know the ban will 357 00:18:57,920 --> 00:18:58,319 be broken. 358 00:18:58,519 --> 00:19:02,400 Speaker 2: Copple was intensely pressed. He stated that foreign governments and 359 00:19:02,440 --> 00:19:06,799 intelligence agencies worldwide already assume American journalists are working for 360 00:19:06,839 --> 00:19:11,480 the CIA. He just acknowledged that reality. He also acknowledged 361 00:19:11,480 --> 00:19:15,640 that US intelligence agencies have historically circumvented laws when they 362 00:19:15,680 --> 00:19:18,960 perceived a dire national interest, and he assumed they would 363 00:19:19,000 --> 00:19:21,640 continue to do so in truly extreme emergencies. 364 00:19:21,960 --> 00:19:25,480 Speaker 1: So his argument was essentially, don't validate the necessary evil. 365 00:19:25,720 --> 00:19:28,480 Let the law stand as absolute, even if you suspect 366 00:19:28,519 --> 00:19:30,119 it might be violated in a crisis. 367 00:19:30,279 --> 00:19:34,000 Speaker 2: Yes, Copple's core point was this, if the CIA must, 368 00:19:34,039 --> 00:19:36,880 on occasion use the role of an American journalist to 369 00:19:36,880 --> 00:19:40,079 conceal one of its operatives, it will do so regardless 370 00:19:40,119 --> 00:19:42,960 of what is decided by Congress. But if they do, 371 00:19:43,319 --> 00:19:45,240 they should be acting in the full knowledge that they 372 00:19:45,240 --> 00:19:47,839 are endangering a free press and breaking at US law. 373 00:19:48,400 --> 00:19:51,799 Legislating an exception to him just sanctions the danger's behavior, 374 00:19:51,920 --> 00:19:54,400 where as an absolute ban preserves the legal and moral 375 00:19:54,440 --> 00:19:57,599 high ground that journalists need when they're defending their independence 376 00:19:57,599 --> 00:19:58,880 to skeptical foreign powers. 377 00:19:59,160 --> 00:20:02,200 Speaker 1: And the piece core and the clergy were similarly unified. 378 00:20:02,440 --> 00:20:05,279 They argued not from a constitutional position, but from one 379 00:20:05,319 --> 00:20:07,920 of trust and physical risk management. 380 00:20:08,039 --> 00:20:11,799 Speaker 2: Yeah leaders representing the National Association of Evangelicals, mari Andal Sisters, 381 00:20:11,799 --> 00:20:14,680 and Church Role Service they all emphasized that the roughly 382 00:20:14,759 --> 00:20:18,640 fifty thousand Americans working abroad in ministry and relief rely 383 00:20:18,920 --> 00:20:23,960 entirely on absolute, unquestioned trust. Any waiver, any loophole just 384 00:20:24,039 --> 00:20:28,279 destroys that confidence and jeopardizes personnel in politically sensitive areas. 385 00:20:28,359 --> 00:20:31,200 Speaker 1: And the most poignant example of that tangible cost came 386 00:20:31,240 --> 00:20:34,119 from Senator Paul Coverdelle, who was a former director of 387 00:20:34,119 --> 00:20:34,799 the Peace Corps. 388 00:20:34,960 --> 00:20:37,799 Speaker 2: Coverdell was crystal clear the Peace Corps was founded on 389 00:20:37,839 --> 00:20:40,799 a strict ethical separation. They maintained a ten year in 390 00:20:40,880 --> 00:20:45,039 eligibility rule for anyone with recent intelligence activity, and he 391 00:20:45,119 --> 00:20:47,640 recalled opening a program in Bolivia where a volunteer was 392 00:20:47,680 --> 00:20:50,880 tragically lost simply because she was mistaken for an agent 393 00:20:50,920 --> 00:20:54,720 of the DEA. It just highlights the brutal reality mistake 394 00:20:54,720 --> 00:20:56,680 and identity is a life or death matter. 395 00:20:56,799 --> 00:20:58,319 Speaker 1: So their policy is absolute. 396 00:20:58,480 --> 00:21:01,960 Speaker 2: Absolutely, the Peace Corps policy remains there shall not be 397 00:21:02,079 --> 00:21:06,039 any contact whatsoever between anyone in the intelligence community and 398 00:21:06,119 --> 00:21:10,559 any Peace Corps volunteer or trainee. That absolute line is 399 00:21:10,599 --> 00:21:13,200 a non negotiable insurance policy for their lives. 400 00:21:13,279 --> 00:21:16,079 Speaker 1: So the nineteen ninety six debate really shows this massive 401 00:21:16,119 --> 00:21:19,880 shift in consciousness. We're moving from the silent, institutionalized loyalty 402 00:21:19,880 --> 00:21:23,720 of the nineteen fifties toward an insistence on public, legally 403 00:21:23,759 --> 00:21:27,519 defined separation, all to protect American lives and the integrity 404 00:21:27,519 --> 00:21:29,039 of non governmental work abroad. 405 00:21:29,519 --> 00:21:31,880 Speaker 2: And that great fight of the nineteen nineties was all 406 00:21:31,920 --> 00:21:35,079 about protecting the body of the journalist, drawing a clear 407 00:21:35,119 --> 00:21:38,559 line in the sand to prevent physical risk and reputational harm. 408 00:21:39,079 --> 00:21:42,640 Today the battlefield has shifted entirely. The fight is about 409 00:21:42,680 --> 00:21:45,240 protecting the mind and judgment of the audience itself. 410 00:21:45,559 --> 00:21:48,440 Speaker 1: So if the strategic goal remains the same controlling narratives 411 00:21:48,440 --> 00:21:51,400 and influencing decision makers, just like the CIA wanted those 412 00:21:51,440 --> 00:21:55,359 time ink dispatches, the method is now algorithmic. We've transitioned 413 00:21:55,359 --> 00:21:58,720 from recruiting human spies to deploying automated systems, and the 414 00:21:58,759 --> 00:22:02,240 resulting phenomenon is what military strategists are now calling cognitive 415 00:22:02,279 --> 00:22:03,839 warfare or CW. 416 00:22:04,079 --> 00:22:08,599 Speaker 2: Cognitive warfare is the modern operational threat. It's defined explicitly 417 00:22:08,680 --> 00:22:13,920 as the application of information science and cognitive science to enhance, 418 00:22:14,200 --> 00:22:18,359 or more often, to degrade the decision making process and 419 00:22:18,400 --> 00:22:22,200 the resulting behavior of target populations that could be political leaders, 420 00:22:22,480 --> 00:22:27,359 military personnel, or just civilian society. It targets the cognitive domain, 421 00:22:27,599 --> 00:22:31,640 that intangible space where individuals form thoughts, process information, and 422 00:22:31,759 --> 00:22:33,480 ultimately decide how to act. 423 00:22:34,119 --> 00:22:37,640 Speaker 1: This sounds far more sophisticated than simply dropping leaflets or 424 00:22:37,640 --> 00:22:41,200 releasing standard propaganda. It feels like an attack on trust itself. 425 00:22:41,440 --> 00:22:46,039 Speaker 2: That's the key distinction. Its highly focused, personalized psychological manipulation. 426 00:22:46,640 --> 00:22:49,839 The strategic goal and this ECHOSANSU is winning without fighting. 427 00:22:50,000 --> 00:22:53,359 It's to gain a positional advantage dominate perceptions and shape 428 00:22:53,359 --> 00:22:56,480 the adversary's will to act without ever needing a physical conflict. 429 00:22:56,599 --> 00:22:59,119 Speaker 1: So influencing minds has always been part of warfare, but 430 00:22:59,160 --> 00:23:00,720 the technology of itailable today. 431 00:23:00,839 --> 00:23:04,039 Speaker 2: It exponentially enhances the reach and efficacy of these activities, and. 432 00:23:03,920 --> 00:23:07,400 Speaker 1: This brings us to the accelerators artificial intelligence and global 433 00:23:07,440 --> 00:23:08,480 digital platforms. 434 00:23:08,759 --> 00:23:13,880 Speaker 2: These technologies are the transformative forces enabling mass disruption AI. 435 00:23:14,079 --> 00:23:18,519 In advanced computational methods. They facilitate hyper specific, micro targeting 436 00:23:18,799 --> 00:23:22,440 and deep analysis of psychological profiles that are derived from 437 00:23:22,480 --> 00:23:25,559 massive data sets. This allows for the automation of influence 438 00:23:25,640 --> 00:23:28,359 campaigns on a scale and at a speed that was 439 00:23:28,400 --> 00:23:31,279 just unimaginable in the Cold War era. They are used 440 00:23:31,279 --> 00:23:35,200 to quote, assess access, and affect the cognitive space of 441 00:23:35,400 --> 00:23:37,240 millions of people simultaneously. 442 00:23:37,359 --> 00:23:40,359 Speaker 1: And the most disrupt development here seems to be generative AI, 443 00:23:40,640 --> 00:23:44,000 which raises some I don't know existential questions about the 444 00:23:44,119 --> 00:23:45,640 very concept of objective truth. 445 00:23:45,839 --> 00:23:49,799 Speaker 2: It really does. Generative AI, specifically large language models LMS 446 00:23:49,839 --> 00:23:52,720 and deep fake technology. It allows state actors to create 447 00:23:52,759 --> 00:23:56,799 mass disruption using low cost but incredibly impactful influence operations. 448 00:23:57,359 --> 00:24:00,680 The technology makes it increasingly difficult, if not impots, to 449 00:24:00,759 --> 00:24:04,079 reliably distinguish between real and manufactured media. 450 00:24:03,880 --> 00:24:05,759 Speaker 1: And we've seen this in the wild right we have. 451 00:24:06,039 --> 00:24:08,759 Speaker 2: For instance, so twenty twenty two pro Chinese influence operation 452 00:24:08,920 --> 00:24:12,640 was found to be using video content featuring hyperrealistic AI 453 00:24:12,720 --> 00:24:16,720 generated fictitious newscasters. The barrier to entry for producing high 454 00:24:16,799 --> 00:24:21,839 quality targeted disinformation has completely collapsed, and that fundamentally alters 455 00:24:21,839 --> 00:24:22,920 the strategic environment. 456 00:24:23,319 --> 00:24:26,680 Speaker 1: So let's examine how our major adversaries, Russia and China 457 00:24:26,759 --> 00:24:30,640 are structuring their approach to dominate this cognitive space. They 458 00:24:30,640 --> 00:24:32,799 don't just see this as a tactic for them, it's 459 00:24:32,799 --> 00:24:33,599 a doctrine. 460 00:24:33,880 --> 00:24:38,200 Speaker 2: China explicitly incorporates these concepts into its three warfarees doctrine. 461 00:24:38,240 --> 00:24:42,960 That's one public opinion warfare, two psychological warfare, and three 462 00:24:43,440 --> 00:24:48,759 legal warfare. Chinese analysts are focused on intelligentized warfare, meaning 463 00:24:48,799 --> 00:24:52,759 warfare heavily reliant on smart technologies, and they openly discussed 464 00:24:52,799 --> 00:24:56,720 the struggle for brain control. Brain control for them, public 465 00:24:56,720 --> 00:24:59,960 opinion warfare is controlling the global media narrative about China. 466 00:25:00,559 --> 00:25:03,480 It's an institutional attack on how the world perceives their 467 00:25:03,480 --> 00:25:05,039 intentions and their actions. 468 00:25:05,400 --> 00:25:08,079 Speaker 1: So when China talks about brain control, They're not really 469 00:25:08,119 --> 00:25:11,400 discussing science fiction. They're talking about using automated systems to 470 00:25:11,640 --> 00:25:16,759 flood media platforms with customized, realistic disinformation to erode trust 471 00:25:16,799 --> 00:25:18,160 and manipulate policymakers. 472 00:25:18,440 --> 00:25:22,480 Speaker 2: Precisely, they view the cognitive domain as the central battleground 473 00:25:22,720 --> 00:25:26,319 where political will and societal resilience are broken down long 474 00:25:26,400 --> 00:25:29,160 before any kinetic conflict even begins. 475 00:25:29,039 --> 00:25:32,200 Speaker 1: And Russia's methods, which are built on this long history 476 00:25:32,240 --> 00:25:36,759 of active measures, also heavily emphasize information confrontation. 477 00:25:37,359 --> 00:25:41,200 Speaker 2: Russia's doctrine of new generation warfare is completely dominated by 478 00:25:41,200 --> 00:25:45,799 information and psychological operations. Influential Russian military authors stress the 479 00:25:45,880 --> 00:25:49,640 role of non military means, things like military, economic and 480 00:25:49,720 --> 00:25:54,039 IT measures, in combination with efficient psychological information campaigns. They 481 00:25:54,119 --> 00:25:56,519 argue that these non kinetic methods can actually exceed the 482 00:25:56,559 --> 00:25:58,759 power of conventional weapons and their effectiveness. 483 00:25:58,799 --> 00:26:02,079 Speaker 1: And crucially, Russia's cognitive warfare is multimodal. It's not just 484 00:26:02,119 --> 00:26:04,319 limited to spamming social media. 485 00:26:04,359 --> 00:26:08,519 Speaker 2: That is a key analytical distinction. Russia's efforts use every 486 00:26:08,599 --> 00:26:14,079 possible platform for information transmission social media, yes, but also 487 00:26:14,119 --> 00:26:19,319 specialized conferences, official diplomatic channels and influential individuals, and furthermore, 488 00:26:19,640 --> 00:26:24,480 their cognitive operations often pair physical actions like military exercises, 489 00:26:24,559 --> 00:26:28,039 cyber attacks, or even minor acts of sabotage with psychological 490 00:26:28,119 --> 00:26:31,640 campaigns to shape adversaries decision making and weaken their collective 491 00:26:31,640 --> 00:26:32,279 will to act. 492 00:26:32,599 --> 00:26:35,279 Speaker 1: The physical action is just a stage for the psychological 493 00:26:35,359 --> 00:26:37,359 message you got it. So this brings us back to 494 00:26:37,359 --> 00:26:39,759 the question of the US government. If the goal is 495 00:26:39,799 --> 00:26:44,039 still clandestine influence, the modern parallel isn't the CIA recruiting 496 00:26:44,079 --> 00:26:47,920 a journalist, it's running large scale automated influence operations across 497 00:26:47,920 --> 00:26:48,920 global platforms. 498 00:26:49,200 --> 00:26:53,319 Speaker 2: That is the modern continuum of influence. US government agencies 499 00:26:53,359 --> 00:26:56,720 today they address the threat from adversaries using terms like 500 00:26:56,960 --> 00:27:00,920 for norm align, influence, or influence operations, but the core 501 00:27:00,960 --> 00:27:04,880 activity shaping foreign narratives without attribution remains relevant for them 502 00:27:04,920 --> 00:27:07,559 as well. And the crucial data point here is the 503 00:27:07,599 --> 00:27:10,599 November twenty twenty two Meta report that detailed a pro 504 00:27:10,759 --> 00:27:14,519 US influence operation linked to the US military itself. 505 00:27:14,640 --> 00:27:16,039 Speaker 1: And this is where we see the echoes of the 506 00:27:16,079 --> 00:27:19,880 nineteen fifties collusion, but with modern tools, a US linked 507 00:27:19,920 --> 00:27:24,920 operation using the exact same coordinated inauthentic behavior methods that 508 00:27:24,960 --> 00:27:27,519 we routinely criticize Russia and China for using. 509 00:27:27,680 --> 00:27:31,319 Speaker 2: Yes, metafound links the individuals associated with the US military 510 00:27:31,359 --> 00:27:36,160 who created fake accounts on over seven Internet services, including Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, 511 00:27:36,400 --> 00:27:39,519 and even Russian platforms like v contact day. The campaign 512 00:27:39,519 --> 00:27:42,319 was highly targeted, primarily focused on Central Asia and the 513 00:27:42,319 --> 00:27:46,480 Middle East, including countries critical to US strategy like Iran, Afghanistan, 514 00:27:46,519 --> 00:27:47,160 and Russia. 515 00:27:47,200 --> 00:27:49,480 Speaker 1: And what was the content of these fake campaigns? What 516 00:27:49,519 --> 00:27:50,480 were they trying to push? 517 00:27:50,599 --> 00:27:55,440 Speaker 2: They employed coordinated memes, fake personas, and carefully curated content 518 00:27:55,880 --> 00:28:00,119 posting primarily in Arabic, Farsi and Russian, the message to 519 00:28:00,119 --> 00:28:03,920 emphasize cooperation with the US and often sharply criticize the 520 00:28:03,920 --> 00:28:06,119 governments of Iran, China, and Russia. 521 00:28:06,240 --> 00:28:08,599 Speaker 1: So this campaign was a clear example of the US 522 00:28:08,720 --> 00:28:13,759 military using these sophisticated influence operations coordinated inauthentic behavior to 523 00:28:13,920 --> 00:28:16,440 shape foreign narratives digitally exactly now. 524 00:28:16,640 --> 00:28:19,440 Speaker 2: Meta noted the overall impact was low because the networks 525 00:28:19,440 --> 00:28:22,519 were small, but the existence of a US linked operation 526 00:28:22,759 --> 00:28:27,000 using fake accounts mirrors the historical desire to control foreign narratives. 527 00:28:27,599 --> 00:28:31,279 It's just being executed through clandestine digital systems now instead 528 00:28:31,319 --> 00:28:33,680 of relying on compromise journalists. 529 00:28:33,599 --> 00:28:36,400 Speaker 1: So the infrastructure of influence has shifted from the publisher's 530 00:28:36,440 --> 00:28:39,880 annex where the CIA reviewed photos, to the algorithmic feed 531 00:28:39,880 --> 00:28:44,680 where fake newscasters just appear. The fundamental operational principle controlling 532 00:28:44,680 --> 00:28:47,880 the narrative without being discovered, that remains the driving force. 533 00:28:48,319 --> 00:28:52,400 Speaker 2: Absolutely. The Cold War desire to influence global opinion required 534 00:28:52,480 --> 00:28:57,160 secrecy protected by a confidential stamp. The modern imperative requires 535 00:28:57,200 --> 00:29:01,319 anonymity protected by VPNs, fake personas, and bought networks designed 536 00:29:01,359 --> 00:29:04,920 for coordinated inauthentic behavior. The threat today is not just 537 00:29:05,200 --> 00:29:08,400 what information you are receiving, but who controls the architecture 538 00:29:08,400 --> 00:29:11,680 of your perception. So, to synthesize this long journey, we've 539 00:29:11,680 --> 00:29:14,759 been on the thread connecting the CIA harvesting intelligence from 540 00:29:14,799 --> 00:29:18,000 time making the nineteen fifties and modern state actors using 541 00:29:18,039 --> 00:29:21,440 deep fakes. Is this consistent strategic effort to influence perception 542 00:29:21,480 --> 00:29:25,039 and control narratives for military or political gain. The nineteen 543 00:29:25,079 --> 00:29:27,759 fifties relied on the loyalty and discretion of elite journalists 544 00:29:27,799 --> 00:29:30,319 to build what they called a priceless intelligence. 545 00:29:29,839 --> 00:29:33,119 Speaker 1: Resource, and that historical collusion, even when it was hidden, 546 00:29:33,160 --> 00:29:37,039 had devastating real world consequences. It risked the lives of 547 00:29:37,079 --> 00:29:40,480 every honest journalist, missionary, and aid worker abroad, as we 548 00:29:40,519 --> 00:29:43,920 saw so powerfully illustrated by Terry Anderson's painful six Years 549 00:29:43,920 --> 00:29:47,920 of Captivity. The resulting nineteen ninety six policy debate really 550 00:29:47,960 --> 00:29:50,759 centered on whether to protect the constitutional integrity of the 551 00:29:50,799 --> 00:29:53,839 press with an absolute legal ban, or whether to permit 552 00:29:53,880 --> 00:29:56,799 a high level exception for extreme national security. 553 00:29:57,240 --> 00:29:59,839 Speaker 2: Today, the focus has entirely shifted away from regulating the 554 00:29:59,920 --> 00:30:03,839 u actions of individual human spies toward grappling with cognitive warfare, 555 00:30:04,279 --> 00:30:07,559 a challenge that exploits the very architecture of our digital lives. 556 00:30:08,039 --> 00:30:10,759 Global powers like China and Russia are investing heavily and 557 00:30:10,799 --> 00:30:14,599 algorithmic tools to target our decision making processes, leveraging AI, 558 00:30:15,039 --> 00:30:18,440 deep fakes and vast social media platforms, creating a systemic 559 00:30:18,480 --> 00:30:19,720 information vulnerability. 560 00:30:20,279 --> 00:30:24,759 Speaker 1: The ethical dimensions for democracy are just staggering. The historical 561 00:30:24,759 --> 00:30:28,839 infiltration was a betrayal of specific organizations and individuals, but 562 00:30:28,920 --> 00:30:32,240 the modern cognitive attack it threatens the entire mechanism of 563 00:30:32,279 --> 00:30:36,519 public discourse. The irony is profound in the nineteen fifties, 564 00:30:36,559 --> 00:30:38,880 the greatest fear was that your government was secretly lined 565 00:30:38,880 --> 00:30:41,400 to you by embedding spies in the media. Today, the 566 00:30:41,440 --> 00:30:45,160 fears that adversarial state actors and perhaps even domestic entities, 567 00:30:45,200 --> 00:30:48,920 as that meta report suggests, are using automated, untraceable methods 568 00:30:49,000 --> 00:30:51,680 to manipulate how you think, regardless of who the nominal 569 00:30:51,799 --> 00:30:57,039 source even is. The rise of cheap, hyperrealistic AI generated 570 00:30:57,119 --> 00:31:00,400 media means the integrity of our shared information of vironment 571 00:31:00,440 --> 00:31:04,000 is under constant, mass scale assault. When the Chinese talk 572 00:31:04,039 --> 00:31:07,920 about brain control, they're highlighting our unique vulnerability, our reliance 573 00:31:07,920 --> 00:31:11,599 on citizens being able to verify basic truth claims. So 574 00:31:11,799 --> 00:31:14,799 I want you to consider this profound evolution. We've gone 575 00:31:14,839 --> 00:31:17,799 from the systemic but discrete infiltration of a few elite 576 00:31:17,799 --> 00:31:20,759 newsrooms in the nineteen fifties that risk individual lives to 577 00:31:20,880 --> 00:31:24,640 state sponsored entities using AI and automated systems today to 578 00:31:24,759 --> 00:31:29,640 manipulate your fundamental cognitive processes and perceptions online. So here's 579 00:31:29,640 --> 00:31:32,279 the question for you. Which threat, in your view, poses 580 00:31:32,319 --> 00:31:34,960 a greater long term danger to the integrity of public 581 00:31:35,000 --> 00:31:38,240 information and the functioning of democracy and why is it? 582 00:31:38,319 --> 00:31:41,440 The secret betrayal of press integrity? By human spies, or 583 00:31:41,480 --> 00:31:44,880 is it the overt systemic attack on truth itself by algorithms. 584 00:31:45,319 --> 00:31:47,079 Head over to our community page to leave a comment 585 00:31:47,079 --> 00:31:48,039 and let us know what you think.