WEBVTT 1 00:00:29.960 --> 00:00:32.759 Welcome to mid Rats with sal from Commander Salamander, an 2 00:00:32.840 --> 00:00:36.119 Eagle one from Eagle Speak at Seer Shore your home 3 00:00:36.159 --> 00:00:39.479 for a discussion of national security issues and all things maritime. 4 00:00:40.560 --> 00:00:43.439 Welcome a board to another edition of mid Rats. We 5 00:00:43.560 --> 00:00:47.280 greatly appreciate you taking time to join us today, and 6 00:00:47.359 --> 00:00:49.880 if you are with us live, i'd like to extend 7 00:00:49.920 --> 00:00:52.280 the altar call. As always, you can go over and 8 00:00:52.320 --> 00:00:55.320 find the chat room, and if you are so inclined, 9 00:00:55.359 --> 00:00:57.640 hop in the chat room. If you have some observations 10 00:00:57.679 --> 00:00:59.600 you would like to share during the course of the show, 11 00:01:00.039 --> 00:01:03.079 or even suggest a question that we could present to 12 00:01:03.159 --> 00:01:05.359 our guests. 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We got a returning 21 00:01:32.000 --> 00:01:35.200 guest and a new guest, which is always lots of fun. 22 00:01:35.719 --> 00:01:39.680 We have Craig Whiteside and Ian Rice on board with 23 00:01:39.760 --> 00:01:43.280 their new book that they've written together. It's coming out 24 00:01:43.319 --> 00:01:48.040 this month titled Non State Special Operations, Capabilities and Effects. 25 00:01:48.439 --> 00:01:50.879 And what we're going to talk about today is something 26 00:01:50.920 --> 00:01:53.159 that a lot of times, well, that's just a terrorist 27 00:01:53.200 --> 00:01:57.200 act or this isis terrorist did this. There's a lot 28 00:01:57.280 --> 00:01:59.719 more to it than that. There's a longer history to that, 29 00:02:00.280 --> 00:02:02.439 and as we'll talk about in the course of the 30 00:02:02.480 --> 00:02:06.120 next hour, I think in understanding not just the history, 31 00:02:06.599 --> 00:02:11.400 but the different goals, in the different aspects to why 32 00:02:11.639 --> 00:02:16.199 non state actors act in similar ways to state actors 33 00:02:16.280 --> 00:02:19.120 in some ways is an important way to understand the 34 00:02:19.199 --> 00:02:21.439 challenges that we're looking at and the responses and we 35 00:02:21.520 --> 00:02:23.680 may want to take at it. Craig he is a 36 00:02:23.680 --> 00:02:26.479 professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War 37 00:02:26.560 --> 00:02:28.879 College and he's also in the resident program at the 38 00:02:28.960 --> 00:02:33.000 Naval Postgraduate School in wonderful Monterey, California, and that's how 39 00:02:33.080 --> 00:02:35.840 he gets to spend quality time with Ian Rice, who 40 00:02:35.879 --> 00:02:38.680 is an adjunct senior lecturer in the Department of Defense 41 00:02:38.680 --> 00:02:42.120 Analysis at the Naval post Graduate School. Ian and Craig, 42 00:02:42.240 --> 00:02:42.639 Welcome to. 43 00:02:42.639 --> 00:02:46.719 Midrats great, great to be here. So, as they say, 44 00:02:46.879 --> 00:02:50.520 a longtime listener, third time contributors, though thanks for having 45 00:02:50.560 --> 00:02:50.919 me back. 46 00:02:51.080 --> 00:02:53.159 Thank you sal for inviting us. 47 00:02:54.240 --> 00:02:57.319 Really appreciate and I don't know an hour justifvies it. 48 00:02:57.400 --> 00:03:00.960 First of all, congratulations on the book. Is I think 49 00:03:01.039 --> 00:03:03.120 I didn't do the count, but I'll just make a 50 00:03:03.120 --> 00:03:06.159 little thumb mark if people are looking at getting a 51 00:03:07.199 --> 00:03:09.840 quick read when you take out the footnotes, and you 52 00:03:09.840 --> 00:03:12.120 could spend a few months just looking at the footnotes 53 00:03:12.120 --> 00:03:14.560 if you wanted to, and open in the beginning. It's 54 00:03:14.599 --> 00:03:17.840 probably a nice digestible, one hundred and seventy page book 55 00:03:18.240 --> 00:03:22.360 covering a real broad spectrum of what a lot of 56 00:03:22.439 --> 00:03:26.919 us I think we've just been experiencing in the last 57 00:03:27.560 --> 00:03:29.800 few decades. But it actually has a lot more meat 58 00:03:29.840 --> 00:03:32.360 to it. But before we get to that, and Ian, 59 00:03:32.439 --> 00:03:34.439 because you're the new kid on the block here, I 60 00:03:34.439 --> 00:03:36.520 thought I'll roll the opening question to you and then 61 00:03:36.520 --> 00:03:39.560 Craig can follow on as well. Is you know, talk 62 00:03:39.599 --> 00:03:42.960 a little bit how the genesis of this book came 63 00:03:43.000 --> 00:03:46.400 into being and you and Craig got together. It was like, hey, 64 00:03:46.520 --> 00:03:49.560 here's a question that needs to be addressed. Let's go 65 00:03:49.599 --> 00:03:54.800 dive into wells. I first started collaborating with Craig. I 66 00:03:54.840 --> 00:03:57.280 think it was about twenty fourteen where we met at 67 00:03:57.319 --> 00:04:03.400 a Islamic State intelligence focus talk and we noticed we're 68 00:04:03.439 --> 00:04:05.120 seeing a lot of the same stuff. And we had 69 00:04:05.199 --> 00:04:08.280 not realized that we had served in parallel on a 70 00:04:08.280 --> 00:04:11.520 Command in General Staff College together at Levenworth, so we 71 00:04:11.560 --> 00:04:15.759 were really very similar interests. So in about I think 72 00:04:15.800 --> 00:04:20.000 it was twenty eighteen, Craig came up to me and said, hey, 73 00:04:20.000 --> 00:04:22.720 I want to show you this video of what's called 74 00:04:22.720 --> 00:04:26.519 the Hiditha raid by the Islamic State. It looks really 75 00:04:26.600 --> 00:04:28.639 different from a lot of the other tacks the Islamic 76 00:04:28.680 --> 00:04:29.199 State does. 77 00:04:29.879 --> 00:04:31.600 And so he shows it to me, and it was 78 00:04:33.199 --> 00:04:38.560 very well documented. They show rehearsals, they show planning. They 79 00:04:38.600 --> 00:04:41.399 even have one of those montage maps where you follow 80 00:04:41.439 --> 00:04:46.279 like the arrow as they're conducting the operation. And I said, Craig, 81 00:04:46.360 --> 00:04:49.399 this looks just this looks like the Islamic States version 82 00:04:49.920 --> 00:04:54.920 of the newsreel of the nineteen forty two Dolittle raid. 83 00:04:55.839 --> 00:04:59.720 And I said, this looks like a special operation to me. 84 00:05:00.079 --> 00:05:04.040 I said, it has all the all like the key 85 00:05:04.120 --> 00:05:08.800 characteristics of what we would see from something that's generating 86 00:05:09.199 --> 00:05:12.079 a larger effect than just the tactical action. So that's 87 00:05:12.079 --> 00:05:12.720 how it started. 88 00:05:13.360 --> 00:05:15.279 Anything else, Craig, Well, let me let me throw a 89 00:05:15.360 --> 00:05:20.120 question out there, which is, let's talk about what does 90 00:05:20.279 --> 00:05:22.720 what makes and you've covered this in the book. Let's 91 00:05:22.879 --> 00:05:26.560 talk about what makes something a special operation that's different 92 00:05:26.639 --> 00:05:31.639 than other kinds of operations. That makes sense. 93 00:05:31.839 --> 00:05:33.920 You want to take this one first, greg Or, Okay, 94 00:05:34.120 --> 00:05:40.920 I'll take that, well, Mark, So, special operations are we 95 00:05:41.000 --> 00:05:43.879 have a chicken and egg thing with special operations. In 96 00:05:43.920 --> 00:05:49.399 the US military, we have special operations forces and we 97 00:05:49.480 --> 00:05:52.759 have special operations. The actual actions and a lot of 98 00:05:52.800 --> 00:05:56.759 times we get these get convoluted and we use the 99 00:05:56.879 --> 00:06:00.360 terms interchangeably. But really what we're talking about when we're 100 00:06:00.360 --> 00:06:03.079 looking at the idea of a special operation is a 101 00:06:03.120 --> 00:06:10.079 tactical action that has, by design, uses increased resources with 102 00:06:10.199 --> 00:06:17.480 special training, maybe special people, to achieve a premeditated, outsized effect, 103 00:06:17.480 --> 00:06:20.000 in other words, an effect that's larger than the tactical 104 00:06:20.040 --> 00:06:23.519 action itself, something that can have an effect on a 105 00:06:23.560 --> 00:06:31.399 campaign or end a crisis. That's typically we have forces 106 00:06:31.439 --> 00:06:34.839 that are designed to conduct these actions, but it's not 107 00:06:34.920 --> 00:06:38.920 necessarily the case. If say an actor, like a non 108 00:06:38.959 --> 00:06:43.399 state actor, like a militant group, doesn't have a standing 109 00:06:43.439 --> 00:06:46.839 capability to conduct these actions, they might have to use 110 00:06:46.879 --> 00:06:49.720 an ad hoc force. And actually that's what the Doual 111 00:06:49.720 --> 00:06:52.199 Little Rate is in nineteen forty two is an ad 112 00:06:52.240 --> 00:06:57.279 hoc force that uses a very unique capability stripped down 113 00:06:57.519 --> 00:07:02.279 B twenty five Mitchell bombers launching off of the USS Hornet. 114 00:07:03.120 --> 00:07:05.800 And you don't get much more special than the one 115 00:07:05.839 --> 00:07:09.639 way bombing of mainland Japan than that in terms of 116 00:07:09.800 --> 00:07:16.240 the global informational effect that that raid had. Even though 117 00:07:16.279 --> 00:07:21.519 the damage was nominal, the morale effect, both positive for 118 00:07:21.600 --> 00:07:24.000 the Allies and negative for the Japanese, was. 119 00:07:25.720 --> 00:07:26.199 Lasting. 120 00:07:27.160 --> 00:07:29.959 So that's kind of how we define those. 121 00:07:32.120 --> 00:07:36.240 I first started diving into this, and the first flush 122 00:07:36.480 --> 00:07:39.439 that I had in my mind, I was like, we're gonna, like, 123 00:07:39.519 --> 00:07:41.439 you know, dig into some of the history of non 124 00:07:41.439 --> 00:07:45.480 state actors doing special operations. Hey, let's look at Munich 125 00:07:46.439 --> 00:07:48.439 in nineteen seventy two. That was the first thing that 126 00:07:48.480 --> 00:07:52.879 came to mind. But that what I thought was going back, 127 00:07:53.240 --> 00:07:56.079 that's just a small sliver of what y'all put together 128 00:07:56.079 --> 00:08:00.319 and y'all put some wonderful examples about how there's actually 129 00:08:00.319 --> 00:08:03.519 a substantial history, and one that until I got to 130 00:08:03.600 --> 00:08:06.360 this section, I was like, dumb man, why don't you 131 00:08:06.399 --> 00:08:08.319 think of this? But you know, you can go back 132 00:08:08.360 --> 00:08:11.240 to the late Bronze Age Siege of Troy and the 133 00:08:11.279 --> 00:08:14.319 Trojan Horse everybody knows about. That meets a lot of 134 00:08:14.360 --> 00:08:18.240 the criteria that y'all put in there, but also there 135 00:08:18.399 --> 00:08:23.160 is and y'all had an extended quote from everybody's favorite 136 00:08:23.519 --> 00:08:27.120 British officer of World War One, Lawrence of Arabia, and 137 00:08:27.199 --> 00:08:30.839 some of his comments about working with the Bedouin armies 138 00:08:30.920 --> 00:08:34.200 and what he was actually trying to accomplish. So when 139 00:08:34.200 --> 00:08:37.039 you are diving into this, it's not just about what 140 00:08:37.080 --> 00:08:40.480 we know since the events of nine to eleven. There 141 00:08:40.559 --> 00:08:44.919 actually is a substantial At every conflict we've been in, 142 00:08:45.240 --> 00:08:49.840 there is a substantial line that you can draw through history, 143 00:08:50.120 --> 00:08:53.440 as other people have tried to not just use, but 144 00:08:53.519 --> 00:08:58.320 to understand why other forces, are state and nonstate, are 145 00:08:58.399 --> 00:09:00.600 diving into this. And you do have to, like I 146 00:09:00.919 --> 00:09:04.279 described with the genesis of this book, you've got to 147 00:09:04.279 --> 00:09:09.679 give a nod of respect to these you know, terrorist organizations, whatever, 148 00:09:09.799 --> 00:09:15.600 their ideology may be contrary to what we perceive as correct. Uh, 149 00:09:15.799 --> 00:09:18.759 they have learned from history and can be very professional 150 00:09:18.799 --> 00:09:19.279 in what they do. 151 00:09:20.840 --> 00:09:23.000 Yeah, I think that's that's one of the things that 152 00:09:23.320 --> 00:09:25.039 that we were that we were trying to do. We 153 00:09:25.080 --> 00:09:28.600 were trying to make make some sense of why these 154 00:09:28.639 --> 00:09:32.840 actors would would try to do these out outsized create 155 00:09:32.879 --> 00:09:37.960 these outsized effects, and we dug into it. Obviously, there's 156 00:09:38.000 --> 00:09:41.919 there's plenty of h of history of non state actors 157 00:09:41.960 --> 00:09:45.240 doing this to state actors, and UH, certainly you know 158 00:09:45.440 --> 00:09:50.120 transcends the global warrant terror and our more recent experiences. 159 00:09:50.159 --> 00:09:54.159 As you pointed out right, Uh, we use Lawrence's example, 160 00:09:55.360 --> 00:09:58.559 but but try to recharacterize it in a different way 161 00:09:58.639 --> 00:10:01.519 than people have remembered it. Many people have all they 162 00:10:01.559 --> 00:10:05.360 understand Lawrence as an early special operator type. They don't 163 00:10:05.360 --> 00:10:09.320 really think of his actions always as a special operation. 164 00:10:09.639 --> 00:10:13.200 But when you look at how he integrated his campaign 165 00:10:13.519 --> 00:10:17.799 UH to take Acoba using Araba regulars as part of 166 00:10:17.799 --> 00:10:22.120 a larger conventional battle, you know, that's what That's what 167 00:10:22.240 --> 00:10:27.559 interested us in in how different actors use UH or 168 00:10:28.440 --> 00:10:33.399 develop a capability to using non state actors, whether it's 169 00:10:33.440 --> 00:10:36.600 states using non state actors or militant groups like ISIS 170 00:10:36.679 --> 00:10:40.720 or al Qaeda doing it on on their own. So 171 00:10:40.720 --> 00:10:43.639 so one one thing we're trying to do is use 172 00:10:43.720 --> 00:10:48.120 history to to to show that, you know, show examples, 173 00:10:48.120 --> 00:10:50.039 but also to show that it's it's been around for 174 00:10:50.080 --> 00:10:53.080 a while, but are our kind of hypothesis is that 175 00:10:53.559 --> 00:10:59.600 with technology and it's the democratization of technology, uh throughout 176 00:11:00.240 --> 00:11:05.159 the globe today thanks to globalization and many other factors, 177 00:11:05.240 --> 00:11:09.639 is that you probably, uh, it's going to see an 178 00:11:09.720 --> 00:11:13.559 increase and a trend in non state actors, you know, 179 00:11:13.720 --> 00:11:17.519 using special operations to humiliate state opponents. 180 00:11:17.720 --> 00:11:21.080 Yeah. I was interested in the fact that in order 181 00:11:21.159 --> 00:11:24.360 to do the work that you've done this in this book, 182 00:11:24.679 --> 00:11:28.039 you first had to create a system for analyzing, uh, 183 00:11:29.120 --> 00:11:34.279 the actors, their motives and the extent of their success 184 00:11:34.600 --> 00:11:37.080 or what their intentions were. Talk a little bit about 185 00:11:37.080 --> 00:11:39.360 how you you developed the grid that's in the book, 186 00:11:39.360 --> 00:11:42.120 because I know this is uh, you know, this is 187 00:11:42.159 --> 00:11:46.000 more my my social scientist background coming to the forehier. 188 00:11:46.279 --> 00:11:48.600 But talk a little bit how you how you structure 189 00:11:48.679 --> 00:11:51.799 your work so that you can analyze the various cases 190 00:11:51.840 --> 00:11:54.480 you looked at and sort of sort the weight from 191 00:11:54.480 --> 00:11:55.600 the chaff, so to speak. 192 00:11:56.159 --> 00:11:58.679 Yeah, I'll let Ian take a crack at this. I 193 00:11:58.759 --> 00:12:02.279 just wanted to say that, you know, we started with 194 00:12:03.039 --> 00:12:06.480 these long state example that Ian you know described earlier, 195 00:12:08.200 --> 00:12:10.159 which was really part of a project. You know. The 196 00:12:10.200 --> 00:12:13.240 cool thing about being here at Naval post Graduate School 197 00:12:13.240 --> 00:12:15.440 and you know, being being a war college guy here 198 00:12:16.120 --> 00:12:18.559 is that you know, there's a lot of collaboration. And 199 00:12:18.759 --> 00:12:22.320 Ian was working on a state centric special operations project 200 00:12:22.320 --> 00:12:24.840 at the time, and I was I was, you know, 201 00:12:24.960 --> 00:12:27.720 asking this stupid question like, hey, do the non states 202 00:12:27.759 --> 00:12:30.440 do this thing? And and that's you know, as Ian 203 00:12:30.600 --> 00:12:32.720 told the rest of that story. You know that that's uh, 204 00:12:33.120 --> 00:12:35.919 that's kind of how that happened. But you know, Ian 205 00:12:35.960 --> 00:12:40.360 pushed me to say, Okay, well then do other types 206 00:12:40.399 --> 00:12:43.759 of groups beyond militant groups like the one that you 207 00:12:43.840 --> 00:12:47.759 study ice is do you and and He's like, theoretically 208 00:12:47.960 --> 00:12:49.879 the answer should be yes. I'll let I'll let Ian 209 00:12:49.960 --> 00:12:52.279 talk to the rest of the of how that typology 210 00:12:52.320 --> 00:12:53.000 gets developed. 211 00:12:54.480 --> 00:12:58.799 So in developing the typology, it all goes back to 212 00:12:58.960 --> 00:13:03.360 their and again it's all research, so you're always there's 213 00:13:03.399 --> 00:13:05.919 an ri in front of search. That's how I like 214 00:13:05.960 --> 00:13:08.639 to think of it, so we're always refining it. So 215 00:13:08.679 --> 00:13:12.240 where the initial stuff with the Islamic state was Okay, 216 00:13:12.320 --> 00:13:17.159 let's just demonstrate this one case with these few examples, 217 00:13:17.159 --> 00:13:20.799 that this one this one actor has the ability to 218 00:13:20.919 --> 00:13:24.840 generate this kind of outsized effect. We started to look 219 00:13:24.879 --> 00:13:28.039 at it in terms of, okay, if we're really looking 220 00:13:28.080 --> 00:13:32.279 at what a premeditated In other words, the leadership of 221 00:13:32.320 --> 00:13:37.639 the group is like, okay, how do we see if 222 00:13:37.639 --> 00:13:40.720 it's got a premeditated outsized effect. 223 00:13:40.960 --> 00:13:42.320 So we're the two. 224 00:13:42.120 --> 00:13:47.159 By two kind of schematic of organizing the different types 225 00:13:47.200 --> 00:13:50.360 of actors that would do that. We looked at, okay, 226 00:13:50.480 --> 00:13:54.120 why would these actors do it? And and that's really 227 00:13:54.200 --> 00:13:56.519 kind of comes down to like what their goals are, 228 00:13:56.639 --> 00:14:00.639 whether they have a general ideological goal or do they 229 00:14:00.639 --> 00:14:03.919 have like a self interest or profit based goal. And 230 00:14:03.960 --> 00:14:06.879 so this tells us, Okay, maybe this is why they're 231 00:14:06.919 --> 00:14:10.919 trying to execute something that's larger than just a single effect, 232 00:14:11.080 --> 00:14:18.159 like an assassination like El Choppa's Sineloa. The Chopo Disco 233 00:14:18.240 --> 00:14:23.440 assassination back in the nineties is a great example of 234 00:14:23.720 --> 00:14:26.840 power consolidation, right, So that was like one of the 235 00:14:27.080 --> 00:14:31.279 dimensions we're looking at okay, so if they're either ideological 236 00:14:31.720 --> 00:14:37.360 or self interested, and then we're like, hey, maybe actors 237 00:14:37.440 --> 00:14:41.399 don't always do things for themselves. And this also goes 238 00:14:41.480 --> 00:14:44.399 to who wants it done? So then we looked at 239 00:14:44.600 --> 00:14:47.799 general like this concept of agency. Do they do it 240 00:14:47.840 --> 00:14:52.200 for themselves an independent group like the Islamic state, or 241 00:14:52.519 --> 00:14:57.919 do they have some kind of boss or sponsor like 242 00:14:57.960 --> 00:15:01.039 a proxy or a patron or an employe. So we 243 00:15:01.080 --> 00:15:04.399 started to we did this to try to put these 244 00:15:04.440 --> 00:15:07.799 different types of groups into bins. And you know, Craig 245 00:15:07.840 --> 00:15:12.039 and I have experience h during the recent unpleasantness in 246 00:15:12.399 --> 00:15:14.799 uh in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a lot of the 247 00:15:14.799 --> 00:15:18.360 groups were clumped together and so but what. 248 00:15:18.480 --> 00:15:20.360 Wasn't but out over time. 249 00:15:22.279 --> 00:15:25.399 As the US led coalition in both cases did they 250 00:15:25.440 --> 00:15:29.159 were trying to disaggregate what these what types of violence 251 00:15:29.159 --> 00:15:32.200 these groups used, And that's really was kind of the 252 00:15:32.279 --> 00:15:35.879 genesis for the two by two kind of organization of 253 00:15:35.919 --> 00:15:39.080 the group type. Now they're not like completely discreet, there's 254 00:15:39.120 --> 00:15:41.440 always going to be bleed over as you saw in 255 00:15:41.480 --> 00:15:45.159 the book, But that's where it came from. 256 00:15:45.480 --> 00:15:47.600 I wanted to just do a follow on of that 257 00:15:47.720 --> 00:15:50.480 grid and you know, for the listeners, I'll put a 258 00:15:50.519 --> 00:15:53.039 link to the to the book on on the on 259 00:15:53.120 --> 00:15:56.000 the show page, and I might, even with the author's permission, 260 00:15:56.399 --> 00:15:58.679 do a screenshot of this grid and add it to 261 00:15:58.759 --> 00:16:01.759 the show page after the show. But I think what 262 00:16:01.919 --> 00:16:04.919 was really useful about it, and it's it's one of 263 00:16:04.960 --> 00:16:06.519 those things that I offer to people who are trying 264 00:16:06.519 --> 00:16:09.919 to get their head around is like, you know, control control, pee, 265 00:16:09.919 --> 00:16:12.000 print it off, cut it off, put it up on 266 00:16:12.039 --> 00:16:14.960 your on your corkboard there, because I know when the 267 00:16:15.080 --> 00:16:18.240 when the Ahuiti attacks originally were going off, people would say, 268 00:16:18.399 --> 00:16:22.200 you know, yiminy militants, and you can see in this 269 00:16:22.279 --> 00:16:24.279 grid the fact that okay, well you're not really looking 270 00:16:24.320 --> 00:16:28.039 at it right, because I really see they're they're ideological, 271 00:16:28.080 --> 00:16:31.279 but they're also proxy clients. But if they are self 272 00:16:31.320 --> 00:16:34.480 interested proxy clients. Another thing that's been broken above the 273 00:16:34.519 --> 00:16:38.519 background noise in the last few years was a Wagner group. 274 00:16:38.960 --> 00:16:41.440 They were you know, quasi national, but they were they 275 00:16:41.440 --> 00:16:44.840 were mercenaries and professional military companies like that, and it 276 00:16:44.960 --> 00:16:48.480 reminded me of you know, one of my podcasts I 277 00:16:48.519 --> 00:16:51.320 listened to is History of the Germans podcast, and when 278 00:16:51.320 --> 00:16:54.600 they were talking about the Holy Roman Empires wars in 279 00:16:54.720 --> 00:16:58.799 Northern Italy. There's a story of the Mercenary Companies where 280 00:16:59.279 --> 00:17:01.720 it literally in the middle of the battle that they 281 00:17:01.799 --> 00:17:05.599 knew these people are not ideological, it's all self interest 282 00:17:06.000 --> 00:17:08.759 and their client over here is paying them twenty thousand 283 00:17:08.839 --> 00:17:10.559 du cats. Well, I want to pay them forty five 284 00:17:10.559 --> 00:17:15.079 thousand do cats if after my starboard wing moves forward, 285 00:17:15.119 --> 00:17:18.359 they switch sides? And they would. So if you had 286 00:17:18.400 --> 00:17:21.720 decision makers and our planners who are looking at you, 287 00:17:21.960 --> 00:17:26.200 how do you counter an organization like the Hoothies or 288 00:17:26.240 --> 00:17:30.000 Wagner or pick whoever's out there. If you misidentify a 289 00:17:30.039 --> 00:17:34.279 proxy as a militant or a militant as a proxy, 290 00:17:34.079 --> 00:17:37.240 the actions and effects you would try to create to 291 00:17:37.319 --> 00:17:40.599 counter them could if not only be ineffective, but could 292 00:17:40.640 --> 00:17:44.839 be counterproductive. So this intellectual exercise, it does really form 293 00:17:44.880 --> 00:17:48.960 a foundation for how we respond to these types of 294 00:17:49.359 --> 00:17:51.920 nonstate violent acts that take place, which, by the way, 295 00:17:52.160 --> 00:17:55.559 because words mean things, and another thing I really appreciated 296 00:17:56.079 --> 00:18:00.559 academically is y'all have kind of created a word acronym. 297 00:18:00.680 --> 00:18:02.359 Usually I make fun of acronyms, but I think this 298 00:18:02.440 --> 00:18:06.880 works out really well. Part of I think our problem 299 00:18:06.960 --> 00:18:09.720 with addressing the issues is we don't define things well, 300 00:18:10.240 --> 00:18:13.160 like you know, the war on terror. Terror is the technique. 301 00:18:13.160 --> 00:18:16.799 You can't really declare war on terror, that's the old cliche. 302 00:18:17.079 --> 00:18:21.279 But you know, terror acts. I like the violent nonstate 303 00:18:21.480 --> 00:18:24.319 actor defined because that lets you go, okay, this is 304 00:18:24.359 --> 00:18:27.079 a violent non state actor, what flavor of it is it? 305 00:18:27.519 --> 00:18:30.400 So going back to kind of my question if there 306 00:18:30.400 --> 00:18:33.319 is one in my monologue here and I'll go ahead 307 00:18:33.359 --> 00:18:37.240 throw it at in is you know, do you see 308 00:18:37.559 --> 00:18:43.039 circumstances where there have been significant error simply because decision 309 00:18:43.119 --> 00:18:48.000 makers and planners didn't quite know what type of adversary 310 00:18:48.039 --> 00:18:50.160 they were looking at in this particle. 311 00:18:49.960 --> 00:18:53.839 Definitely say that is a as a fantastic question, and 312 00:18:53.880 --> 00:18:57.480 that actually led us to kind of disaggregate the groups 313 00:18:57.519 --> 00:18:58.240 this way. 314 00:18:59.519 --> 00:19:02.680 Across different periods. 315 00:19:02.720 --> 00:19:10.279 In Iraq, attacks would be have certain associated characteristics that 316 00:19:10.319 --> 00:19:14.440 could be associated with certain types of groups, such as 317 00:19:14.519 --> 00:19:19.160 suicide attacks were more prevalent around Sunni groups in Iraq, 318 00:19:19.680 --> 00:19:23.400 and so especially working with the Iraqi partners, they would 319 00:19:23.400 --> 00:19:28.119 ask questions of who did we know that was at 320 00:19:28.160 --> 00:19:32.920 the attack site? What was the means used? They would 321 00:19:32.920 --> 00:19:36.359 ask these things because they're in terms they're also trying 322 00:19:36.359 --> 00:19:40.880 to figure out how it came to how the who 323 00:19:40.920 --> 00:19:44.400 was sponsoring the attack, and why might they have done it. 324 00:19:44.680 --> 00:19:47.359 In others, they're already thinking in terms of was this 325 00:19:47.559 --> 00:19:51.200 just a normal disruption attack or was there somebody there 326 00:19:51.319 --> 00:19:57.400 important that might have been the target. And so, yeah, 327 00:19:57.640 --> 00:20:01.960 I think when we think think about one of the 328 00:20:02.039 --> 00:20:07.039 key points of this study was as a mirror for 329 00:20:07.160 --> 00:20:10.599 our own state sponsored special operation. Well, two things. One, 330 00:20:10.920 --> 00:20:15.200 can we see non state actors campaign when we see 331 00:20:15.200 --> 00:20:17.640 these unique events, and we'll talk I think a little 332 00:20:17.720 --> 00:20:20.599 later about how we separate like a typical attack from 333 00:20:20.599 --> 00:20:23.720 a special attack or a special tactical action as we 334 00:20:23.759 --> 00:20:28.440 call them. We have the opportunity to see our opponent's campaign, 335 00:20:29.640 --> 00:20:32.119 and then in turn, we can also use this study 336 00:20:32.160 --> 00:20:35.359 as a mirror to look at ourselves to say, hey, 337 00:20:35.559 --> 00:20:39.319 are what we are calling special operations really special operations 338 00:20:39.400 --> 00:20:44.599 or are we just using special operations forces to perform 339 00:20:44.880 --> 00:20:48.920 actions that just have a tactical effect. So this is 340 00:20:49.000 --> 00:20:53.200 heavily laden with decision making criteria, both as we analyze 341 00:20:53.200 --> 00:20:55.200 our opponents and as we look at ourselves. 342 00:20:56.279 --> 00:20:57.599 Over Yeah, I guess. 343 00:20:59.319 --> 00:21:04.200 I was going to add that's right, Mark, Yeah, you 344 00:21:04.240 --> 00:21:07.200 know that's Sale's got a great point about like the 345 00:21:07.279 --> 00:21:10.400 who these are they militant group or are they proxies 346 00:21:10.480 --> 00:21:13.279 and that's it's not And he also brought up Wagner, 347 00:21:13.319 --> 00:21:15.759 which you know, they're a mercenary group obviously, but they 348 00:21:15.920 --> 00:21:21.079 sometimes can be confused as a proxy for state actor conducting, 349 00:21:21.240 --> 00:21:23.799 you know, the policy that that the director that that 350 00:21:23.920 --> 00:21:27.759 actor is is directing. And so we've got some really 351 00:21:27.799 --> 00:21:31.000 good questions as as we've as we've worked on the 352 00:21:31.079 --> 00:21:33.240 concept for this book on you know, well, how do 353 00:21:33.279 --> 00:21:35.960 you deal with this actor or that actor and which 354 00:21:35.960 --> 00:21:37.880 actor are they? Which box are they in in this 355 00:21:37.920 --> 00:21:42.440 particular time and place, And you know, our point is 356 00:21:42.440 --> 00:21:47.119 that having a typology helps us think about just those 357 00:21:47.200 --> 00:21:50.440 main questions about why these actors are doing it or 358 00:21:50.440 --> 00:21:52.640 why has Ian just talked about how why are they 359 00:21:52.720 --> 00:21:56.799 integrating it into you know, larger What it helps us 360 00:21:56.880 --> 00:22:01.319 understand is variations in the type. And we focused so 361 00:22:01.480 --> 00:22:04.599 for example, on the like trying to suss out whether 362 00:22:04.640 --> 00:22:08.319 it's a militant group or a proxy group or a 363 00:22:08.319 --> 00:22:12.759 group that's frequently confused for both. Is in this particular operation, 364 00:22:13.680 --> 00:22:16.759 who told who what to do? And if the Iranians 365 00:22:16.799 --> 00:22:19.960 are telling one of their many proxies to execute an 366 00:22:19.960 --> 00:22:23.400 attack on their behalf, whether or not that whatever other 367 00:22:23.920 --> 00:22:26.759 motive that group has for we consider that a proxy. 368 00:22:27.480 --> 00:22:29.240 And what it does is it allows you to find 369 00:22:29.319 --> 00:22:34.559 variation because for let's say, proxy groups, they can harness 370 00:22:34.599 --> 00:22:38.480 the power of a state like Iran with or other 371 00:22:38.640 --> 00:22:43.039 kind of capabilities that will really fast track a special 372 00:22:43.039 --> 00:22:45.640 operation for non states because they're getting a lot of 373 00:22:45.680 --> 00:22:48.599 outside assistances, they're getting a lot of resourcing and money, 374 00:22:48.920 --> 00:22:52.200 and all of a sudden, something you didn't see a 375 00:22:52.240 --> 00:22:55.880 militant group having the capability of doing it as a proxy, 376 00:22:55.960 --> 00:22:58.000 all of a sudden, they can fast track a special 377 00:22:58.000 --> 00:23:01.400 operation and create a lot of uh, you know, destruction 378 00:23:01.519 --> 00:23:03.880 and humiliation in the process. 379 00:23:04.680 --> 00:23:08.519 Yeah. I was fascinated by the way you screen the 380 00:23:08.640 --> 00:23:12.000 need first, the need to screen uh some of these 381 00:23:12.039 --> 00:23:18.720 non state UH actors actions from their normal routine. So 382 00:23:18.799 --> 00:23:22.559 you you you set up three criteria and you know 383 00:23:22.680 --> 00:23:26.200 not it's not in the regular line of work, not 384 00:23:26.359 --> 00:23:29.200 the djure. You know, we're just we usually blow up 385 00:23:29.279 --> 00:23:32.119 cars next to buildings, but this time we did something different. 386 00:23:32.839 --> 00:23:33.960 Uh. 387 00:23:34.160 --> 00:23:37.640 There was as you just said, the specialized tactical action 388 00:23:38.279 --> 00:23:42.039 and then then the outsized effect. And I looked, I 389 00:23:42.079 --> 00:23:44.079 was confused until I kind of got to the to 390 00:23:44.160 --> 00:23:48.440 the TET offensive and there's this this actually pre TET 391 00:23:48.480 --> 00:23:51.039 offensive when there was an attack on the US embassy, 392 00:23:51.240 --> 00:23:56.519 but it was part of a much larger action, uh, 393 00:23:56.599 --> 00:23:59.160 in the whole TET business. So kind of kind of 394 00:23:59.160 --> 00:24:02.480 discuss how that how you sort out in the middle 395 00:24:02.480 --> 00:24:04.920 of all this other stuff, how you take that attack 396 00:24:04.960 --> 00:24:07.319 on the US mb and embassy and say this is 397 00:24:07.359 --> 00:24:12.200 a non state actor engaged in a special effort. 398 00:24:12.359 --> 00:24:15.359 I think one of the things we want to do 399 00:24:15.480 --> 00:24:18.799 is start these kind of discussions with a vignette, And 400 00:24:18.839 --> 00:24:22.440 the vignette for TET actually has my dad and my 401 00:24:22.519 --> 00:24:25.119