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<v Speaker 1>Get ready.

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<v Speaker 2>It looks like it's the twenty eighth day of August

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<v Speaker 2>twenty twenty four, allegedly, according to that thing we call

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<v Speaker 2>a calendar, this the o'celli effect. You probably hearing us

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<v Speaker 2>via the podcast, but we do this live, and it

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<v Speaker 2>does happen to be a Wednesday, right, Wednesday, Yeah, that's.

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<v Speaker 3>The correct day.

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<v Speaker 2>I got to turn my head and look at the

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<v Speaker 2>calendar to tell me what day it is, because some

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<v Speaker 2>days blend into others.

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<v Speaker 3>Anyway, enough of my problems.

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<v Speaker 2>It is Wednesday, it's the middle of the week, and

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<v Speaker 2>we've had an interesting broadcast week so far. But we're

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<v Speaker 2>going to resume a conversation that I should have resumed

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<v Speaker 2>last week, but you know, some of us weren't feeling

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<v Speaker 2>good and it was not the week to do it.

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<v Speaker 2>This week is the week to do it. Who do

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<v Speaker 2>we have with us? Well, returning once again Larry Hancock,

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<v Speaker 2>who I'm more than happy to break down a discussion

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<v Speaker 2>over guess what a familiar topic.

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<v Speaker 3>Lee rv. Oswald.

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<v Speaker 2>We've been doing this because the Oswald puzzle Pieces. That

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<v Speaker 2>is the title now, right, Larry Oswald puzzle.

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<v Speaker 4>Pieces, now, just the Oswald puzzle.

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<v Speaker 3>I do that every time. The Oswald puzzle. That's what

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<v Speaker 3>it is.

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<v Speaker 2>And I know I do it every time and I

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<v Speaker 2>realize it after I say it. But anyway, the Oswald puzzle,

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<v Speaker 2>and it is a puzzle. That is the name of

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<v Speaker 2>the book that should be out pretty soon. Not exactly

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<v Speaker 2>clear on a release date at least, I'm not. Do

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<v Speaker 2>you have a release date yet, Larry.

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<v Speaker 4>No, we don't. The book.

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<v Speaker 5>The manuscript is going to the publisher officially in two

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<v Speaker 5>days at the end of this month, so really, you know,

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<v Speaker 5>it begins the publishers schedule, right and so very clean.

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<v Speaker 5>It's been intensely edited. That ought to speed things up.

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<v Speaker 5>One of the interesting things though, is David's been working

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<v Speaker 5>on this, Rex has been working on it. The publisher

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<v Speaker 5>has given us the is allowing us to have a

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<v Speaker 5>pretty large photo section, and as you can understand, Chuck,

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<v Speaker 5>it takes a good bit of time to come up

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<v Speaker 5>with to address the use privileges for photos to get

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<v Speaker 5>a generation of copy that's suitable, so we also have

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<v Speaker 5>a deadline.

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<v Speaker 4>For that, but we're close to all of that.

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<v Speaker 5>So the publisher will begin working on it next month,

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<v Speaker 5>and it just spends on when it fits into their schedule.

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<v Speaker 5>It's hard for me to see it other than a

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<v Speaker 5>twenty twenty five release because of the process they have

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<v Speaker 5>to go through, but I think it'll be relatively early

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<v Speaker 5>in twenty twenty five.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, there you go, and I'm definitely looking forward to

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<v Speaker 2>this because, as we've talked about pretty much throughout this

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<v Speaker 2>entire year, this is a re examination, another examination, because

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<v Speaker 2>it's not like you haven't looked into the character the

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<v Speaker 2>historical character of Leo rvey Oswald before. You certainly have,

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<v Speaker 2>but it was time for a reevaluation, a clean look again,

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<v Speaker 2>and you march back into this knowing that you know

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<v Speaker 2>there's a lot more to be known now because of

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<v Speaker 2>a documentation that's been released, other people's work that might

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<v Speaker 2>have furthered this that or the third thing, a few

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<v Speaker 2>mysteries might have been cleared up, et cetera. And in fact,

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<v Speaker 2>we're going to talk about one of those specific mysteries

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<v Speaker 2>tonight with another gentleman who will also be involved with

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<v Speaker 2>the Lancer Conference in November, that's November twenty second to

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<v Speaker 2>the twenty fourth of this year, and he'll be in

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<v Speaker 2>person there, so he's got to put up with me.

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<v Speaker 2>David Boylan Okay, and I know he'll be presenting there

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<v Speaker 2>and he's joining us to actually help us through something here,

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<v Speaker 2>because we talked about a lot lot of the process here,

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of the things that go on when it

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<v Speaker 2>comes to oh, let's just say people getting involved with Well,

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<v Speaker 2>there used to be less intelligence agencies, but still, whether

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<v Speaker 2>it's today or it's sixty years ago, there was always

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<v Speaker 2>a vetting process, a clearing process that people went through,

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<v Speaker 2>and we wind up talking about a lot of characters

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<v Speaker 2>who were useful to or were sources, or maybe they

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<v Speaker 2>were sources and methods themselves. Okay, depending on who we're

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<v Speaker 2>talking about, for various operations, especially at the height of

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<v Speaker 2>the Cold War, we're going to talk a lot about

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<v Speaker 2>the vetting process, the clearing process.

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<v Speaker 3>The examination. How is it that we know who it

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<v Speaker 3>is we're dealing with.

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<v Speaker 2>Is a legitimate source, is somebody that can be trusted,

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<v Speaker 2>can't be trusted?

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<v Speaker 3>How useful are they? A lot of ways to go

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<v Speaker 3>about it.

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, as I mentioned to you guys just before

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<v Speaker 2>going to air, I even applied and I know this

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<v Speaker 2>always sounds strange, but I applied for a job with

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<v Speaker 2>the NSA and well, let's see, in two thousand and one,

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<v Speaker 2>and well, you know, they had a whole thing where

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<v Speaker 2>they wanted to talk to family members and neighbors, and

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<v Speaker 2>they were going to investigate me to give me a

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<v Speaker 2>low level nothing job. You know, if they were going

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<v Speaker 2>to hand me something sensitive, if they were going to

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<v Speaker 2>involve me in you know, some stuff that really the

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<v Speaker 2>public is not supposed to know, or something that might

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<v Speaker 2>be counterintelligence, something that might be you know, various types

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<v Speaker 2>of intelligence operations. They would have to know exactly who

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<v Speaker 2>they were dealing with, what my entire background was, all

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<v Speaker 2>that stuff. Meanwhile, I was going for a low level job,

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<v Speaker 2>and I swear they wanted to talk to my second

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<v Speaker 2>grade teacher.

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<v Speaker 3>You know. It was weird.

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<v Speaker 2>And I knew other people who went through the process,

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<v Speaker 2>and they told me stories about them going beyond that

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<v Speaker 2>and investigating them and so on and so forth.

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<v Speaker 3>Again.

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<v Speaker 2>In some cases, I mean, one guy was pretty much

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<v Speaker 2>like a tour guide at an NSA facility, and you know,

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<v Speaker 2>he was exposed to next to nothing except you know,

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<v Speaker 2>showing people the building, the facility and all that. And

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<v Speaker 2>meanwhile they dug into his background so deep it was

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<v Speaker 2>it was kind of disturbing. But anyway, sounds like somebody

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<v Speaker 2>trying to do their job, and maybe we should know

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<v Speaker 2>exactly who we're dealing with when they're close to something sensitive.

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<v Speaker 2>That almost sounds like responsible behavior anyway, Is that always

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<v Speaker 2>the case? I don't know, But this is what we're

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<v Speaker 2>going to talk about him. Why because well, Lee Harvey

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<v Speaker 2>Oswald touches upon is involved in He's around people like

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<v Speaker 2>this at various times. And also, by the way, you

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<v Speaker 2>go to Larry Dashancock dot com and whether that book

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<v Speaker 2>comes out in twenty twenty five or somehow makes it

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<v Speaker 2>at the end of the year or whatever, you can

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<v Speaker 2>definitely get Larry's existing works that are already out there

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<v Speaker 2>or this brand new one which I know I'm already

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<v Speaker 2>going to recommend, as I do recommend all of Larry's stuff,

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<v Speaker 2>as I say all the time, he takes up a

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<v Speaker 2>large portion of the bookshelf I keep behind me here

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<v Speaker 2>and definitely well worth the price of admission any of

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<v Speaker 2>Larry's work, whether it's about the Kennedy assassination or gee,

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<v Speaker 2>let's just pick a couple of other topics. Unidentified creating chaos,

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<v Speaker 2>if you want to look at shadow warfare, the various

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<v Speaker 2>behaviors of intelligence communities assets, how they react to things, etc. Well,

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<v Speaker 2>Larry's written volumes and volumes on it, plus a couple

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<v Speaker 2>things about the Kennedy assassination, just saying like tipping point,

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<v Speaker 2>and of course someone would have talked all of that.

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<v Speaker 3>And I recommend all of Larry's work. But if you

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<v Speaker 3>go to Larry.

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<v Speaker 2>Danishancock dot com you can check out his work, his blog, etc.

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<v Speaker 2>And I advise you to do so. Oh and by

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<v Speaker 2>the way, Larry will be involved with the Lancer conference

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<v Speaker 2>as well as he has been for many years. And

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<v Speaker 2>although you'll be there remotely, I understand, Larry, glad that

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<v Speaker 2>you're involved and really happy always that you've been involved

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<v Speaker 2>with the Lancer conferences that I've.

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<v Speaker 3>Been involved with.

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<v Speaker 2>So anyways, now that I've said all of that and

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<v Speaker 2>a bunch of mouthfuls, I need to shut up and

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<v Speaker 2>kind of turn it over to you.

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<v Speaker 3>Larry. What is it that we need to understand here?

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<v Speaker 2>And we have David here specifically to help us through

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<v Speaker 2>a couple of things. And I'm glad also David that

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<v Speaker 2>you're here. You're you're a rare guy on the show,

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<v Speaker 2>and I appreciate you taking.

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<v Speaker 3>The time to do this.

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<v Speaker 2>But where should we begin explaining this? You know nexus

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<v Speaker 2>of people. Again, I like that that title. That word

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<v Speaker 2>another one of Larry's book titles. Anyways, So back to it,

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<v Speaker 2>How do we begin to explain this? What is a

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<v Speaker 2>way to introduce use somebody who is completely uninitiated, or

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<v Speaker 2>even somebody who has a vague understanding of what it

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<v Speaker 2>is they might encounter when trying to study Lee Harvey

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<v Speaker 2>Oswald and the well, the people that surrounded him, the

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<v Speaker 2>people that you know, brought him to whose attention at

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<v Speaker 2>what time, and all of that outside of the defection,

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<v Speaker 2>et cetera, et cetera.

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<v Speaker 3>Where should we begin with this?

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<v Speaker 4>Larry, I think.

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<v Speaker 5>Really the place to begin, Chuck is well, in my

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<v Speaker 5>part is partially an apology, but it's something that's been

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<v Speaker 5>symptomatic in the community, as it were, is that we've

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<v Speaker 5>tossed around words.

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<v Speaker 4>We've tossed around words.

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<v Speaker 5>Like asset or source or informant or even spy without

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<v Speaker 5>defining them and kind of taking it for granted that.

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<v Speaker 4>We knew what we were talking about.

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<v Speaker 5>And actually, when we're talking about an organization like the

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<v Speaker 5>Central Intelligence Agency, that's the wrong way to approach it.

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<v Speaker 5>The Central organize, the CIA is very professional organization, very structured,

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<v Speaker 5>very bureaucratic. Oftentimes even for its it's UH staff frustrating

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<v Speaker 5>because of its degree of security that that it oversaw

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<v Speaker 5>the degree of the approvals process.

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<v Speaker 4>Uh.

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<v Speaker 5>Lots of people that were in field operations were routinely

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<v Speaker 5>frustrated by how slowly it moved.

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<v Speaker 6>UH.

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<v Speaker 4>And I think what we have.

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<v Speaker 5>Neglected to do is really understand the process for that

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<v Speaker 5>went along with these various words that we have just

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<v Speaker 5>thrown around casually.

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<v Speaker 4>You and I have talked before.

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<v Speaker 5>It's like when you paint with a broad brush, you

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<v Speaker 5>miss things and you make mistake.

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<v Speaker 4>Uh. When you talk about the mob.

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<v Speaker 5>Or the mafia or the CIA, just in broad terms, UH,

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<v Speaker 5>you're always making a mistake. So I think one of

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<v Speaker 5>the things we'd like to do, and in the course

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<v Speaker 5>of working on the OSLO puzzle, both David and I

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<v Speaker 5>have gone through a much deeper exploration of these sorts

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<v Speaker 5>of things than certainly I had done before. And one

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<v Speaker 5>of the reasons that we've been able to do it

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<v Speaker 5>is that David has had access. We have had access

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<v Speaker 5>to so many CIA documents where you literally can trace

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<v Speaker 5>the path of individuals through their spotting by the CIA,

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<v Speaker 5>by their identification, you know, just entering in the system

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<v Speaker 5>as an individual that's known.

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<v Speaker 4>Then okay, perhaps they might be some use. How would

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<v Speaker 4>they be a some use?

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<v Speaker 5>And all the way through to the point of which

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<v Speaker 5>takes a long time to get them what's called provisional

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<v Speaker 5>operational approval, and then, for heaven's sakes, to actually get

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<v Speaker 5>them to assigned to an operation, and to understand that

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<v Speaker 5>some people carried operational approvals, were never used, weren't used

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<v Speaker 5>for a period of two or three months, and then

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<v Speaker 5>put on the shelf. This is not the kind of

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<v Speaker 5>simplistic world that we've often written.

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<v Speaker 4>About in the JFK community.

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<v Speaker 5>And so what we would like to do is to

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<v Speaker 5>walk through the process, give some examples, and explain how

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<v Speaker 5>it works, how that the CIA worked in identifying people

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<v Speaker 5>and clearing them for certain levels of activity as well

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<v Speaker 5>as actually using them. But one of the things, and

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<v Speaker 5>this is a this is something I was actually quite

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<v Speaker 5>surprised for. Obviously, the CIA doesn't just call somebody in

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<v Speaker 5>and decide they're going to use them for something if

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<v Speaker 5>they don't have the right background.

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<v Speaker 4>I mean, that's.

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<v Speaker 5>Almost a couple of examples that we're going to talk

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<v Speaker 5>about here, David. We'll talk about the right background means

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<v Speaker 5>be related to somebody, a business relationship, a family relationship,

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<v Speaker 5>a trusted relationship, an established pattern of communications where people

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<v Speaker 5>are talking with each other that makes someone interesting. Okay,

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<v Speaker 5>but if that doesn't exist, you just don't call someone

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<v Speaker 5>and say, oh, okay, we need to get close to.

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<v Speaker 4>Somebody we know, you don't know them.

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<v Speaker 7>Go do it.

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<v Speaker 5>Yeah, that's that would not be a professional approach to things.

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<v Speaker 5>So a lot of this starts with actually just building

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<v Speaker 5>hundreds and hundreds and thousands.

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<v Speaker 4>Of files of people that might be of interest.

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<v Speaker 5>They're doing something, they live somewhere, they're associated with some one,

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<v Speaker 5>and you open a two oh one file and I

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<v Speaker 5>can remember when I first got into this and people

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<v Speaker 5>were going, well, Oswall had a two to oh one file, so.

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<v Speaker 4>It must be he was a spy. No, No, that's

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<v Speaker 4>not what it means.

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<v Speaker 5>You don't understand. But early on it's like, well, that's

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<v Speaker 5>that seems reasonable. Let's see I he's got a file

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<v Speaker 5>on him, right, Okay, why would they have a file

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<v Speaker 5>on him? Well, you know, like you might ask when

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<v Speaker 5>was that file created and where was it created?

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<v Speaker 4>And then when you find out that.

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<v Speaker 5>It was created when he went to Russia and it

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<v Speaker 5>resided in the counterintelligence group. You go, oh, well, geez,

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<v Speaker 5>if they were doing their job, they better. He's in

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<v Speaker 5>the newspapers, for lord's sake, He's in the newspapers. He's

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<v Speaker 5>in State Department memos. If if the CEI did not

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<v Speaker 5>have a file on him, someone is grossly incompetent, you know.

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<v Speaker 4>So now that's not all that suspicious.

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<v Speaker 5>But so what I'd like to do is just kind

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<v Speaker 5>of have asked David to walk through the process. You know, Okay,

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<v Speaker 5>there's a two oh one file. What are the steps

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<v Speaker 5>that happen between there being a two to oh one

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<v Speaker 5>file and the CIA actually using someone in an operation?

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<v Speaker 5>And he's he's done enough work on these people that

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<v Speaker 5>we actually have links to documents and can illustrate how.

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<v Speaker 4>This process goes on.

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<v Speaker 5>So I just like to turn it over to him

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<v Speaker 5>and have him go through the process and give some examples.

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<v Speaker 2>Right now, as a parallel to this, we have to

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<v Speaker 2>be careful again not to paint with the sloppy brush,

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<v Speaker 2>because you have specific terms, specific definitions, specific classifications for

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<v Speaker 2>people for operations, et cetera. And these are not inconsequential.

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<v Speaker 2>Like you said, and like we've said many times, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>people use these very generalized, sort of odd terminologies, broad

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<v Speaker 2>ideas about what things mean, et cetera. You know, simply

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<v Speaker 2>because someone was in somebody's proximity doesn't necessarily mean that

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<v Speaker 2>they were operationally connected. Although if that was a useful thing,

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<v Speaker 2>that's another issue. Right, But you know, again, as we go, right,

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<v Speaker 2>people used to have used the word handler quite often

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<v Speaker 2>in order to explain, well, here's somebody who had, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>a background already, we can establish they were involved in

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<v Speaker 2>certain things.

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<v Speaker 3>They get involved with someone who's sort of new to the.

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<v Speaker 2>What shall we call it the landscape at the time,

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<v Speaker 2>and they automatically assume in a lot of people's writings

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<v Speaker 2>and statements that that person's a handler for this person.

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<v Speaker 2>That's not necessarily true. Whether they interacted with them or

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<v Speaker 2>not is one thing, But what their specific purpose for

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<v Speaker 2>interacting with them is that needs to be defined as

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<v Speaker 2>we go. So everything needs to be carefully established as

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<v Speaker 2>you go. You need to understand the terms, and you

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<v Speaker 2>need to be able to read these documents. That's another thing.

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<v Speaker 2>These things are not in the plainest of language, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>where it's like, well, operationally, this person controls what this

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<v Speaker 2>person gets to know and they give the orders. These

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<v Speaker 2>documents don't read like that. They read in a much

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<v Speaker 2>different way. Plus you have cryptonyms. All kinds of stuff

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00:17:31.799 --> 00:17:37.200
<v Speaker 2>goes into this interpretation, and it is very specific. It's

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<v Speaker 2>not written to be broad like you know, you and

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<v Speaker 2>I talked about. Well, they just say organized crime and

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<v Speaker 2>they move on. That is a really bad definition. For

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<v Speaker 2>somebody who has a criminal background, it may or may

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<v Speaker 2>not be organized crime, you know, simply because they have

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<v Speaker 2>a criminal background. Again, that's a different you know, sub section,

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<v Speaker 2>if you will. But when it comes to this sort

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<v Speaker 2>of thing, you've got to be very specific because people

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<v Speaker 2>serve specific purposes. One part of the agency might see

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<v Speaker 2>somebody in one way, they might see them in another way.

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<v Speaker 3>The two on one file is a great example.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, two on one file just means effectively, you're

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<v Speaker 2>an interesting person to the agency.

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<v Speaker 3>That's all that that means.

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<v Speaker 2>Back then, as far as I understand, it doesn't necessarily

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<v Speaker 2>infer that you are working for them, that you're their agent.

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<v Speaker 2>You're just a person of interest. Now I might have

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<v Speaker 2>that wrong, and you guys, might you know, help me

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<v Speaker 2>clear this up. But I'm pretty certain that's the way

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<v Speaker 2>that goes. And there's a lot more to this as

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<v Speaker 2>we go, Larry, Yeah.

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<v Speaker 4>Go ahead, Yeah, I checked to elaborate on that.

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<v Speaker 5>And again we often forget that the agency, like every company,

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<v Speaker 5>is for a task oriented. A person might be in

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<v Speaker 5>ato a one file and just setting there and somebody

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<v Speaker 5>might come across it and go, oh, I've been assigned

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<v Speaker 5>to this project and I need a resource. Okay, we're

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<v Speaker 5>going to take this person, and we're not going to

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<v Speaker 5>necessarily put this into two to oh one file because

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<v Speaker 5>that's a general reference file within my functional area. Let's

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<v Speaker 5>say it's the director of operations. I create an entirely

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<v Speaker 5>new file for this person because now I'm thinking about

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<v Speaker 5>using them for something specific. And there's going to be

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<v Speaker 5>a project that this is related to, you know, because

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<v Speaker 5>we get project, we have to fund it. We've going

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<v Speaker 5>to you know, there's a case offer, this case officer

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<v Speaker 5>that's going to be assigned to this group or to

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<v Speaker 5>this and they have tasks and this is all again.

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<v Speaker 4>Very organizationally structured.

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<v Speaker 5>So there might there may very well be a two

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<v Speaker 5>to oh one file that is entirely compartmentalized from a

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<v Speaker 5>group within the agent's that actually decides to investigate this person,

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<v Speaker 5>and may ultimately use him. So that's very important to

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<v Speaker 5>keep in mind. Compartmentalization. Why compartmentalization. Were they worried about us, No,

347
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<v Speaker 5>they weren't worried about us getting into their files. They

348
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<v Speaker 5>were worried about the bad guys, the Soviets, the you know,

349
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<v Speaker 5>Eastern European intelligence agencies. You know, we compartmentalized information for that,

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<v Speaker 5>for that level. But I guess the one other thing

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<v Speaker 5>that I would like to throw out is that.

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<v Speaker 4>Even when someone.

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<v Speaker 5>Gets approval operational approval and is used on a mission

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<v Speaker 5>or for a task, they can then be put back

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<v Speaker 5>on the shelf if there's nothing useful for them at

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<v Speaker 5>the moment, if there's nothing pending. Yeah, they were cleared,

357
00:20:57.799 --> 00:21:00.880
<v Speaker 5>but they were taken off operational aproof because we don't

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<v Speaker 5>have a project for them at the moment. And the

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<v Speaker 5>fascinating thing about that is they could still be assigned

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<v Speaker 5>to a case officer. They're no longer operational. They might

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<v Speaker 5>even be paid, but they're not. They're not operational, and

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<v Speaker 5>at that point in time, they can go off and

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<v Speaker 5>do whatever they want to do. Uh.

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<v Speaker 4>They're They're fascinating.

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<v Speaker 5>They We have examples of them actually telling anecdotal stories

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<v Speaker 5>about Oh, my case officer had no idea I was

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<v Speaker 5>going and breaking into Watergate. Oh okay, my case officer

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<v Speaker 5>had no idea that I was going to Libya and

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<v Speaker 5>making explosives trigadav Oh nope.

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<v Speaker 4>Uh, you know, but we thought you were.

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<v Speaker 5>Yeah, I was, but I wasn't working for them at

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<v Speaker 5>the moment. And so that's something you often we often

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<v Speaker 5>timing is very important. It's kind of like where they cleared,

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<v Speaker 5>were they operational? Were they not at a given point

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<v Speaker 5>in time. The timelines are always critical.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, and when objectives change and things like that, you're

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<v Speaker 2>you're revolving carousels of Cubans, right. They might be useful

378
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<v Speaker 2>one month, the next month, the objective changes, regime change,

379
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<v Speaker 2>somebody that they were trying to get at is no

380
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<v Speaker 2>longer important, et cetera, et cetera. Maybe they're trying to

381
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<v Speaker 2>deal with another foreign nation that could be involved with Cuba.

382
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<v Speaker 2>Now they don't need to because that whole situation has

383
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<v Speaker 2>been taken care of in some other way. And these

384
00:22:31.720 --> 00:22:34.440
<v Speaker 2>things are all subject to change as they go on.

385
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<v Speaker 2>And like you said, they could still be on the payroll,

386
00:22:37.359 --> 00:22:40.839
<v Speaker 2>on the books, or maybe just sitting on the shelf waiting, and.

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<v Speaker 3>These guys have lives.

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, you know, not to be too snarky about it,

389
00:22:44.759 --> 00:22:46.519
<v Speaker 2>but you know some of them go on to do

390
00:22:46.599 --> 00:22:47.480
<v Speaker 2>other things.

391
00:22:47.680 --> 00:22:49.279
<v Speaker 3>Because they're not going to make it.

392
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<v Speaker 2>There you go, you know, and some of them just

393
00:22:53.960 --> 00:22:57.759
<v Speaker 2>go around talking themselves up and confusing us even more.

394
00:22:58.680 --> 00:23:03.000
<v Speaker 2>Frank Sturgis comes to mind. Anyways. So with all that

395
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<v Speaker 2>in mind, David, now that you've had all this dumped

396
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<v Speaker 2>onto your lap, yeah, go ahead.

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<v Speaker 4>I'll be back later, David.

398
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<v Speaker 3>Have fun there you go.

399
00:23:13.400 --> 00:23:16.160
<v Speaker 8>Fascinating conversations, guys. You know, I was just listening and

400
00:23:16.880 --> 00:23:20.160
<v Speaker 8>you guys hit right on the head. So I could

401
00:23:20.200 --> 00:23:23.960
<v Speaker 8>probably be covering six terms here. Now you do a

402
00:23:24.000 --> 00:23:25.519
<v Speaker 8>lot of reading and write from the docs just to

403
00:23:25.559 --> 00:23:28.480
<v Speaker 8>make sure I get it right. How they explained it,

404
00:23:28.519 --> 00:23:35.240
<v Speaker 8>how the CIA explained it. Beck the House Fleck Committee

405
00:23:35.240 --> 00:23:39.680
<v Speaker 8>on Assassinations interviewed William Larson. Here's the chief of the

406
00:23:39.839 --> 00:23:45.279
<v Speaker 8>Information Management staff. Really interesting guy, answered all the questions,

407
00:23:46.640 --> 00:23:49.799
<v Speaker 8>gave a lot of good information and it was classified

408
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<v Speaker 8>secret of course because no. He explained how the filing

409
00:23:53.279 --> 00:23:55.880
<v Speaker 8>system for a lot of these documents and where they

410
00:23:55.920 --> 00:23:56.440
<v Speaker 8>went and.

411
00:23:56.400 --> 00:23:57.799
<v Speaker 7>Who started them.

412
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<v Speaker 8>So going through that is just a mine, I can

413
00:24:00.960 --> 00:24:03.200
<v Speaker 8>send you guys the link or if Chuck puts it

414
00:24:03.279 --> 00:24:06.240
<v Speaker 8>up afterwards, so here we can do the wrong reading

415
00:24:06.279 --> 00:24:09.680
<v Speaker 8>on it. So one of the first files I want

416
00:24:09.720 --> 00:24:12.240
<v Speaker 8>to subjects I want to cover is a two on

417
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<v Speaker 8>one file. What is a two on one file? How

418
00:24:16.279 --> 00:24:20.240
<v Speaker 8>he describes it, William Larson, the chief goes, it's a

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<v Speaker 8>folder or a dacia and which information about individual is collated.

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<v Speaker 8>There could be an interest, it could be a target,

421
00:24:27.839 --> 00:24:31.160
<v Speaker 8>could actually be a staff officer of the CIA would

422
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<v Speaker 8>also have a two on one file, he said. If

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<v Speaker 8>there is a counter intelligence interest, a file would be

424
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<v Speaker 8>opened in the course of running a trace. If so

425
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<v Speaker 8>you get a trace, you get a case officer saying,

426
00:24:43.400 --> 00:24:46.440
<v Speaker 8>I want to run a trace on this guy. Let's

427
00:24:46.440 --> 00:24:49.160
<v Speaker 8>open a two on one file. Whether he's a target

428
00:24:49.279 --> 00:24:52.279
<v Speaker 8>or a potential agent as they call him. They're going

429
00:24:52.319 --> 00:24:54.799
<v Speaker 8>to open a two on one file, and they should

430
00:24:54.880 --> 00:24:59.000
<v Speaker 8>open one automatically. If they're five or more files that

431
00:24:59.079 --> 00:25:00.680
<v Speaker 8>a two on one file shoul to be open. So

432
00:25:00.960 --> 00:25:04.440
<v Speaker 8>I run a trace on a guy. When I come

433
00:25:04.480 --> 00:25:07.000
<v Speaker 8>back with five hits, I said, WHOA, all right, we're

434
00:25:07.000 --> 00:25:09.000
<v Speaker 8>gonna open a too on one file. You know, that's

435
00:25:09.160 --> 00:25:11.960
<v Speaker 8>how they're supposed to do it as the bureaucrats. They're saying,

436
00:25:14.000 --> 00:25:17.720
<v Speaker 8>So Oswald had a too one file. She had a

437
00:25:17.759 --> 00:25:23.319
<v Speaker 8>first request came in in October of fifty nine, like saying,

438
00:25:23.359 --> 00:25:25.839
<v Speaker 8>all right, who is this guy? And it took the

439
00:25:25.920 --> 00:25:28.400
<v Speaker 8>CIA of a little over a full year. It was

440
00:25:28.480 --> 00:25:32.359
<v Speaker 8>December of nineteen sixty that they actually opened the too

441
00:25:32.519 --> 00:25:36.680
<v Speaker 8>one file on that we know about. That would be

442
00:25:37.240 --> 00:25:42.799
<v Speaker 8>from Anne Editor from the Counterintelligence SIG Office. She's the

443
00:25:42.799 --> 00:25:47.039
<v Speaker 8>one that actually started the file on Oswald. And that's

444
00:25:47.039 --> 00:25:48.680
<v Speaker 8>what where we get there. She opened it up, so

445
00:25:48.799 --> 00:25:52.319
<v Speaker 8>you actually call them Lee Henry Oswald. That's where that

446
00:25:52.359 --> 00:25:58.839
<v Speaker 8>came from. So you get a tool one file. Now,

447
00:25:59.160 --> 00:26:01.880
<v Speaker 8>if you're going to use this person or whether there

448
00:26:02.079 --> 00:26:05.960
<v Speaker 8>what they call witting or unwitting, unwitting, you know we're

449
00:26:06.000 --> 00:26:06.400
<v Speaker 8>using you.

450
00:26:06.400 --> 00:26:07.839
<v Speaker 7>You have no idea we're using you.

451
00:26:08.720 --> 00:26:11.359
<v Speaker 8>Winning is said, Yep, I'm gonna I'm gonna do what

452
00:26:11.400 --> 00:26:13.279
<v Speaker 8>you tell me to do. I know I'm working for

453
00:26:14.079 --> 00:26:16.960
<v Speaker 8>the CIA, you know, So you become a witting.

454
00:26:16.680 --> 00:26:20.119
<v Speaker 7>Participant there to do that.

455
00:26:21.000 --> 00:26:23.720
<v Speaker 8>There's a couple of uh forms, believe it or not,

456
00:26:23.759 --> 00:26:25.519
<v Speaker 8>you know, in the pureaucracy he had they have to

457
00:26:25.519 --> 00:26:30.000
<v Speaker 8>fill out. It's a pr Q one and two part one,

458
00:26:30.079 --> 00:26:34.319
<v Speaker 8>Part two. S Larry mentioned there's a lot it's a bureaucracy.

459
00:26:34.559 --> 00:26:38.599
<v Speaker 8>A PRQ is a personal record questionnaire.

460
00:26:39.799 --> 00:26:42.240
<v Speaker 7>A pr Q. I'm gonna read rate here from one.

461
00:26:43.640 --> 00:26:45.519
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, just so you know, I am going to include

462
00:26:45.799 --> 00:26:48.640
<v Speaker 2>notes including, uh, the stuff on Larson, what he said,

463
00:26:48.680 --> 00:26:51.119
<v Speaker 2>exactly what you just said. I'm putting it in the

464
00:26:51.200 --> 00:26:53.440
<v Speaker 2>live chatroom at o'celli dot com, so you can always

465
00:26:53.519 --> 00:26:55.839
<v Speaker 2>roll that back or it'll be in with the show

466
00:26:55.880 --> 00:26:59.039
<v Speaker 2>notes to this podcast. Uh, just so you can follow

467
00:26:59.079 --> 00:27:02.160
<v Speaker 2>along with some of this up and uh yeah, now

468
00:27:02.240 --> 00:27:05.279
<v Speaker 2>we're onto uh the the green list in pr Q

469
00:27:06.000 --> 00:27:09.400
<v Speaker 2>part one, all right, which is the next link I

470
00:27:09.440 --> 00:27:12.000
<v Speaker 2>have here to uh to share after the one that's

471
00:27:12.000 --> 00:27:12.559
<v Speaker 2>in the chat.

472
00:27:12.640 --> 00:27:16.359
<v Speaker 8>So go go right ahead, David, Yeah, sure, stop me

473
00:27:16.400 --> 00:27:18.359
<v Speaker 8>anytime I tend to ramble here.

474
00:27:19.880 --> 00:27:20.519
<v Speaker 3>You're doing great.

475
00:27:22.599 --> 00:27:24.640
<v Speaker 7>A pr Q part one.

476
00:27:25.720 --> 00:27:29.160
<v Speaker 8>It's really just basic information and it's the guy's name,

477
00:27:29.440 --> 00:27:33.279
<v Speaker 8>is he married with, is he lived? So it's just

478
00:27:33.319 --> 00:27:36.160
<v Speaker 8>a small small piece of information. And they add the

479
00:27:36.200 --> 00:27:38.960
<v Speaker 8>pr Q Part one to the two one file so

480
00:27:39.000 --> 00:27:41.400
<v Speaker 8>you can see how a two O one file is

481
00:27:41.440 --> 00:27:45.359
<v Speaker 8>the you know, your master file. This is where everything accumulates.

482
00:27:46.519 --> 00:27:50.359
<v Speaker 8>Pr Q two usually filled out, got a lot more information.

483
00:27:53.960 --> 00:28:00.160
<v Speaker 8>It's when it's almost like a personality file. Who are they,

484
00:28:00.319 --> 00:28:05.559
<v Speaker 8>they're working for us, what's the job?

485
00:28:06.359 --> 00:28:08.200
<v Speaker 7>A little bit more information there.

486
00:28:09.640 --> 00:28:13.079
<v Speaker 2>So me describing the the two oh one file as

487
00:28:13.119 --> 00:28:15.920
<v Speaker 2>you know, look, you're a person of interest. Now we

488
00:28:16.039 --> 00:28:19.759
<v Speaker 2>get into the specifics and you actually give us a

489
00:28:19.799 --> 00:28:23.359
<v Speaker 2>good example of what is the es Minosa green list

490
00:28:23.400 --> 00:28:26.039
<v Speaker 2>in p r Q part one, and then we have

491
00:28:26.079 --> 00:28:30.799
<v Speaker 2>a good example of Emilio Rodriguez for the p r

492
00:28:30.920 --> 00:28:37.039
<v Speaker 2>Q part two as as references here, right, yes.

493
00:28:37.519 --> 00:28:39.400
<v Speaker 8>Yeah, well we probably get into a little bit about

494
00:28:39.400 --> 00:28:40.400
<v Speaker 8>Melia Rodriguez.

495
00:28:42.880 --> 00:28:44.079
<v Speaker 7>She became to do.

496
00:28:44.079 --> 00:28:46.720
<v Speaker 3>A whole show on him. But yeah, go yeah.

497
00:28:46.759 --> 00:28:50.599
<v Speaker 8>Basically an agent that became a staff officer. He's just

498
00:28:50.680 --> 00:28:53.599
<v Speaker 8>kind of progressed. He went from just an agent that

499
00:28:53.680 --> 00:28:58.640
<v Speaker 8>was being very helpful to being a contract officer for

500
00:28:58.680 --> 00:29:02.279
<v Speaker 8>the CIA becoming a staff agent where he's actually getting

501
00:29:02.279 --> 00:29:03.960
<v Speaker 8>paid and gets retirement.

502
00:29:04.519 --> 00:29:07.279
<v Speaker 7>So that's how he started.

503
00:29:07.319 --> 00:29:10.160
<v Speaker 8>So, but he had the classic two o one file,

504
00:29:11.799 --> 00:29:15.880
<v Speaker 8>Part one, Part two green list and in the part

505
00:29:16.119 --> 00:29:17.960
<v Speaker 8>this is a key when we start to look at

506
00:29:18.000 --> 00:29:21.680
<v Speaker 8>the pr Q part two, this is where they list

507
00:29:21.960 --> 00:29:25.680
<v Speaker 8>whether you are an unwitting or witting asset or agent,

508
00:29:26.799 --> 00:29:32.039
<v Speaker 8>which is key. Oswald had a too Part two. They

509
00:29:32.039 --> 00:29:37.319
<v Speaker 8>would say whether he was a witting or unwitting agent,

510
00:29:37.400 --> 00:29:38.519
<v Speaker 8>so that would be clear.

511
00:29:38.599 --> 00:29:41.000
<v Speaker 7>But we don't have a part two that we know about.

512
00:29:41.720 --> 00:29:44.480
<v Speaker 8>You see that or it's been cleaned from the file, Larry,

513
00:29:44.559 --> 00:29:46.359
<v Speaker 8>have you ever seen anything like that?

514
00:29:47.359 --> 00:29:52.440
<v Speaker 5>Now, as a matter of fact, you might think that

515
00:29:52.640 --> 00:29:57.559
<v Speaker 5>was suspicious, but it's only suspicious if you I mean,

516
00:29:57.759 --> 00:30:03.279
<v Speaker 5>if he's unwitting, you don't really need it because anybody

517
00:30:03.359 --> 00:30:07.680
<v Speaker 5>can add access to his tuoh one file and use it.

518
00:30:08.079 --> 00:30:11.160
<v Speaker 5>The fact that the fact that there is not one

519
00:30:11.240 --> 00:30:13.200
<v Speaker 5>there suggests.

520
00:30:12.759 --> 00:30:15.400
<v Speaker 4>Either they hit it and forgot to idde the two

521
00:30:15.480 --> 00:30:15.839
<v Speaker 4>oh one.

522
00:30:16.119 --> 00:30:19.160
<v Speaker 5>Right, you know, it's like, okay, yeah, we're gonna admit

523
00:30:19.279 --> 00:30:22.039
<v Speaker 5>that we had a file on this guy, which is

524
00:30:22.599 --> 00:30:26.079
<v Speaker 5>going to sound suspicious, but we're just going to hide

525
00:30:26.079 --> 00:30:28.920
<v Speaker 5>the fact that he was witting by you know, doing

526
00:30:28.960 --> 00:30:32.200
<v Speaker 5>away with these the green lists and the you know,

527
00:30:32.640 --> 00:30:35.599
<v Speaker 5>the polygraph tests and the background check, so you'll you

528
00:30:35.720 --> 00:30:36.799
<v Speaker 5>won't know for sure.

529
00:30:36.880 --> 00:30:38.319
<v Speaker 4>We'll destroy all that.

530
00:30:38.400 --> 00:30:40.799
<v Speaker 5>But no, as far as I'm as far as I'm

531
00:30:40.839 --> 00:30:46.119
<v Speaker 5>aware of, nobody has ever found any paperwork beyond the

532
00:30:46.200 --> 00:30:47.720
<v Speaker 5>basic TUO one.

533
00:30:47.559 --> 00:30:56.519
<v Speaker 8>File right exactly, and looking at the green list. We've

534
00:30:56.519 --> 00:30:59.599
<v Speaker 8>looked at the two one pr Q POT one Part two.

535
00:31:00.319 --> 00:31:04.000
<v Speaker 8>How green list is can we find anything detrimental on

536
00:31:04.039 --> 00:31:09.880
<v Speaker 8>this person? Again, it's in a form they fill out

537
00:31:09.960 --> 00:31:12.960
<v Speaker 8>goes in your tool one file and they usually have

538
00:31:13.039 --> 00:31:18.200
<v Speaker 8>the results there. They send an inquiry to the FBI saying, hey,

539
00:31:18.279 --> 00:31:21.559
<v Speaker 8>is this guy clean? Anything you can find the old

540
00:31:21.640 --> 00:31:24.440
<v Speaker 8>JM wave wave. They'd also send it to the Miami

541
00:31:24.480 --> 00:31:27.680
<v Speaker 8>Police Department, you see, if these guys been arrested FBI,

542
00:31:28.200 --> 00:31:31.200
<v Speaker 8>they'd also send it to what they call staffty internal.

543
00:31:31.960 --> 00:31:32.839
<v Speaker 7>Is this guy okay?

544
00:31:32.920 --> 00:31:33.079
<v Speaker 3>You know?

545
00:31:33.160 --> 00:31:37.759
<v Speaker 8>Can we use this person for whatever project we want

546
00:31:37.759 --> 00:31:42.599
<v Speaker 8>to use? So if you get a clean now pr

547
00:31:42.680 --> 00:31:46.000
<v Speaker 8>Q one and two get your greenlist started, they will

548
00:31:46.000 --> 00:31:49.640
<v Speaker 8>give you a provisional operational approval. That means, yep, this

549
00:31:49.680 --> 00:31:54.319
<v Speaker 8>looks good. We're gonna use this person for infiltration into Cuba,

550
00:31:54.559 --> 00:31:54.720
<v Speaker 8>you know.

551
00:31:54.920 --> 00:31:58.079
<v Speaker 4>So, you know, David not tonsert too much, but I

552
00:31:58.119 --> 00:31:58.759
<v Speaker 4>would say.

553
00:32:00.400 --> 00:32:05.039
<v Speaker 5>If they followed procedure certainly in greenlisting Oswald to in

554
00:32:05.119 --> 00:32:08.559
<v Speaker 5>pursuing him as an you know, as an asset, they

555
00:32:08.599 --> 00:32:12.160
<v Speaker 5>should have greenlisted with an investigation that there should be

556
00:32:12.519 --> 00:32:18.640
<v Speaker 5>an inquiry to the Navy, an inquiry to the Marines. Uh,

557
00:32:18.680 --> 00:32:22.599
<v Speaker 5>there should there should be inquiries at various places where

558
00:32:22.599 --> 00:32:23.079
<v Speaker 5>they were.

559
00:32:23.000 --> 00:32:26.519
<v Speaker 4>Doing a background check. So just just keep in.

560
00:32:26.480 --> 00:32:29.759
<v Speaker 5>Mind if they are doing this sort of thing, even

561
00:32:29.799 --> 00:32:33.400
<v Speaker 5>at the most minimum level for vetting, they should be

562
00:32:33.440 --> 00:32:38.720
<v Speaker 5>doing background checks. If they're not, it's strange because nobody

563
00:32:38.759 --> 00:32:43.720
<v Speaker 5>takes anything for granted. Uh, you know, and and Oswald

564
00:32:43.720 --> 00:32:46.839
<v Speaker 5>certainly had a history in the Marines.

565
00:32:47.039 --> 00:32:49.119
<v Speaker 4>That would have raised some security issues.

566
00:32:49.839 --> 00:32:53.240
<v Speaker 5>I can think of many people that I've seen bounced

567
00:32:53.319 --> 00:32:58.720
<v Speaker 5>by CIA security for less less problems than Oswald heading

568
00:32:58.759 --> 00:33:05.079
<v Speaker 5>the Marines, not to mention his his you know, any

569
00:33:05.119 --> 00:33:09.680
<v Speaker 5>background beyond that, but in any event, so they don't

570
00:33:09.680 --> 00:33:10.759
<v Speaker 5>do this in isolation.

571
00:33:11.039 --> 00:33:11.839
<v Speaker 4>I think this is.

572
00:33:11.799 --> 00:33:14.200
<v Speaker 5>The picture of the you know that CI is all

573
00:33:14.759 --> 00:33:17.920
<v Speaker 5>so secret that we could never know because they never

574
00:33:17.960 --> 00:33:19.240
<v Speaker 5>reach out and touch anybody.

575
00:33:19.279 --> 00:33:20.640
<v Speaker 4>But that's not the way this works.

576
00:33:23.279 --> 00:33:25.200
<v Speaker 2>They might have also gone deeper. I mean, he's not

577
00:33:25.279 --> 00:33:27.359
<v Speaker 2>an old guy at this point, you know, Like I

578
00:33:27.440 --> 00:33:29.480
<v Speaker 2>always point out, he only lived to be twenty four

579
00:33:29.559 --> 00:33:33.160
<v Speaker 2>years of age, so still plenty of access to his

580
00:33:33.279 --> 00:33:36.319
<v Speaker 2>early life. They could have done like I was talking about,

581
00:33:36.359 --> 00:33:41.519
<v Speaker 2>with the NSA investigation, you know, just checking background, looked

582
00:33:41.519 --> 00:33:45.720
<v Speaker 2>into his family life, his known associates. Was he around

583
00:33:45.799 --> 00:33:48.839
<v Speaker 2>people that maybe you know, would have made him an

584
00:33:48.880 --> 00:33:53.759
<v Speaker 2>undesirable asset in one way or another for certain operations.

585
00:33:53.880 --> 00:33:55.160
<v Speaker 3>You would need to know these things.

586
00:33:55.519 --> 00:33:58.720
<v Speaker 2>Considering that he was still a young man, you know,

587
00:33:58.920 --> 00:34:01.559
<v Speaker 2>so he might still be quite quite in touch with

588
00:34:01.599 --> 00:34:03.359
<v Speaker 2>some of the people that he knew as a teenager,

589
00:34:03.480 --> 00:34:03.960
<v Speaker 2>et cetera.

590
00:34:04.880 --> 00:34:05.960
<v Speaker 3>What what does his.

591
00:34:05.839 --> 00:34:11.599
<v Speaker 2>Immediate family do, uh, you know, siblings, parents, these kind

592
00:34:11.599 --> 00:34:13.360
<v Speaker 2>of things might have been looked into as well.

593
00:34:13.679 --> 00:34:17.760
<v Speaker 8>David right, Yes, there would have been reports of actually,

594
00:34:17.880 --> 00:34:21.400
<v Speaker 8>you know, people being interviewed, you know, so the first

595
00:34:21.400 --> 00:34:24.960
<v Speaker 8>things that would have happened. The green list, you know,

596
00:34:25.000 --> 00:34:31.800
<v Speaker 8>would have triggered a bunch of inquiries. So if he

597
00:34:32.000 --> 00:34:33.880
<v Speaker 8>passed the green list, you know, he was good enough,

598
00:34:34.000 --> 00:34:38.639
<v Speaker 8>then he would have given given an operational approval. Chances

599
00:34:38.679 --> 00:34:40.280
<v Speaker 8>I would have get paid to once he passed the

600
00:34:40.320 --> 00:34:44.480
<v Speaker 8>operational approval. See yep, he's an asset. Agent can be

601
00:34:44.599 --> 00:34:47.639
<v Speaker 8>used for this particular project for six months a year,

602
00:34:47.760 --> 00:34:51.079
<v Speaker 8>two years, and we could paid one hundred and fifty

603
00:34:51.119 --> 00:34:53.000
<v Speaker 8>dollars a month. That's used to be the going rate.

604
00:34:54.079 --> 00:34:57.320
<v Speaker 8>You see a lot of people getting that amount.

605
00:34:59.320 --> 00:35:01.280
<v Speaker 2>Well, and I was, I don't like to go too

606
00:35:01.280 --> 00:35:05.159
<v Speaker 2>deep theoretically, David. But fact is, people point out all

607
00:35:05.199 --> 00:35:08.960
<v Speaker 2>the time, you know, this situation where he's defecting to

608
00:35:09.039 --> 00:35:13.199
<v Speaker 2>the Soviet Union in quotes I'll put it because you know,

609
00:35:13.280 --> 00:35:17.119
<v Speaker 2>did he properly defect? No, but you know his whole

610
00:35:17.199 --> 00:35:22.400
<v Speaker 2>episode there, that in and of itself is something that

611
00:35:23.119 --> 00:35:26.199
<v Speaker 2>could have triggered a whole bunch of stuff here. And

612
00:35:26.800 --> 00:35:30.599
<v Speaker 2>is that, you know, not something that would have also

613
00:35:30.679 --> 00:35:32.960
<v Speaker 2>come up because a lot of people say, well, he

614
00:35:33.079 --> 00:35:37.000
<v Speaker 2>was part of the false defector program. Well, if indeed

615
00:35:37.000 --> 00:35:40.480
<v Speaker 2>he was, there should be some other paperwork here in

616
00:35:40.519 --> 00:35:43.280
<v Speaker 2>this two a one file, right, if it's all being

617
00:35:43.320 --> 00:35:47.079
<v Speaker 2>retained in the same spot, if it's all actually kept together,

618
00:35:47.760 --> 00:35:51.480
<v Speaker 2>there should be some other existing documentation here Or am

619
00:35:51.519 --> 00:35:52.400
<v Speaker 2>I wrong about that?

620
00:35:53.199 --> 00:35:56.960
<v Speaker 8>Oh, you're right, there's also you know, looking at Larsons

621
00:35:56.960 --> 00:36:00.599
<v Speaker 8>again recommended you read that, he said throws, so go

622
00:36:00.920 --> 00:36:06.480
<v Speaker 8>shadow files and soft files. The case officer may keep

623
00:36:06.599 --> 00:36:10.320
<v Speaker 8>at his desk, not necessarily or her a desk like

624
00:36:10.360 --> 00:36:15.000
<v Speaker 8>annd eager not sending the information to the tool one

625
00:36:15.760 --> 00:36:18.440
<v Speaker 8>the central repository. They may keep that close to the vest,

626
00:36:19.440 --> 00:36:22.360
<v Speaker 8>so that's also an interesting thing to look at. They

627
00:36:22.400 --> 00:36:25.599
<v Speaker 8>also keep a lot of handwritten notes the case officer

628
00:36:26.159 --> 00:36:27.599
<v Speaker 8>that may not make it.

629
00:36:27.639 --> 00:36:29.280
<v Speaker 7>Into the tool one file.

630
00:36:29.960 --> 00:36:33.719
<v Speaker 8>So there's always that, you know, but again there's the bureaucracy,

631
00:36:33.760 --> 00:36:36.039
<v Speaker 8>and there should be a lot more files. If he

632
00:36:36.159 --> 00:36:39.039
<v Speaker 8>was being a witting asset, maybe they just took.

633
00:36:39.000 --> 00:36:42.800
<v Speaker 2>Him out of his tool on one file, similar to

634
00:36:42.840 --> 00:36:46.119
<v Speaker 2>what the FBI might do with informants of all types.

635
00:36:46.199 --> 00:36:49.440
<v Speaker 2>Right you have confidential informants, and you have you know,

636
00:36:49.679 --> 00:36:52.559
<v Speaker 2>sort of a secret informants and so on and so forth,

637
00:36:52.880 --> 00:36:55.519
<v Speaker 2>and the FBI in some cases would have that stuff,

638
00:36:55.559 --> 00:36:59.440
<v Speaker 2>maybe only at a certain level. It doesn't necessarily go

639
00:36:59.719 --> 00:37:03.760
<v Speaker 2>all throughout the agency because it's only useful to the

640
00:37:03.800 --> 00:37:06.800
<v Speaker 2>guys in you know, pick a city, Chicago or New

641
00:37:06.880 --> 00:37:07.719
<v Speaker 2>Orleans or wherever.

642
00:37:08.199 --> 00:37:11.400
<v Speaker 3>It's only useful to them, So they might have notes

643
00:37:11.440 --> 00:37:11.679
<v Speaker 3>on it.

644
00:37:11.719 --> 00:37:15.199
<v Speaker 2>They might have a binder sitting there that isn't necessarily

645
00:37:16.039 --> 00:37:20.079
<v Speaker 2>collected right away with that person's general file, but it's

646
00:37:20.159 --> 00:37:25.480
<v Speaker 2>useful to people that are in control of operations, you know,

647
00:37:25.840 --> 00:37:29.280
<v Speaker 2>in a very direct sense, and they might use informants

648
00:37:29.320 --> 00:37:31.960
<v Speaker 2>that they never you know, they that they identify later

649
00:37:32.239 --> 00:37:36.880
<v Speaker 2>under a code or whatever, but that doesn't necessarily attach

650
00:37:37.000 --> 00:37:43.440
<v Speaker 2>directly to somebody's named personnel file right away, right or

651
00:37:43.440 --> 00:37:45.119
<v Speaker 2>at least that that's my understanding.

652
00:37:45.480 --> 00:37:50.559
<v Speaker 5>Historically, Eventually two tiers their check at least one is

653
00:37:50.800 --> 00:37:55.079
<v Speaker 5>if this person has been pulled for assigned to a project.

654
00:37:55.360 --> 00:37:58.960
<v Speaker 5>Let's just say there's a false effective project somebody is

655
00:37:59.079 --> 00:38:02.599
<v Speaker 5>running that it's going to involve multiple people. There's going

656
00:38:02.639 --> 00:38:06.000
<v Speaker 5>to be record keeping on this project to even ascertain

657
00:38:06.079 --> 00:38:10.320
<v Speaker 5>if it's working. You know, again corporate level approach, Is

658
00:38:10.320 --> 00:38:13.000
<v Speaker 5>it working, how many people that we send in, how

659
00:38:13.079 --> 00:38:14.559
<v Speaker 5>much information are we going to back?

660
00:38:14.719 --> 00:38:17.199
<v Speaker 4>Should we keep funding it? It's high risks.

661
00:38:17.519 --> 00:38:19.639
<v Speaker 5>So there's going to be a project file that rolls

662
00:38:19.760 --> 00:38:23.000
<v Speaker 5>up some of this information. But then there will also

663
00:38:23.079 --> 00:38:26.159
<v Speaker 5>be a case officers file, as David said, and that

664
00:38:26.199 --> 00:38:28.960
<v Speaker 5>will be a soft file. That will be a soft

665
00:38:29.000 --> 00:38:32.079
<v Speaker 5>file that will be in somebody's desk, well, when we

666
00:38:32.159 --> 00:38:35.320
<v Speaker 5>had a desk, it'll be in a lot filing cabinet

667
00:38:35.679 --> 00:38:38.599
<v Speaker 5>that's going to be giving the details of the communication

668
00:38:38.800 --> 00:38:41.679
<v Speaker 5>with that person, the instructions that have been given to

669
00:38:41.719 --> 00:38:46.800
<v Speaker 5>that person. And one of the things that we that

670
00:38:46.880 --> 00:38:52.880
<v Speaker 5>we have to acknowledge is soft files never go to

671
00:38:52.960 --> 00:38:59.119
<v Speaker 5>headquarters unless there's some special reason to go to headquarters.

672
00:38:59.159 --> 00:39:02.639
<v Speaker 5>In fact, one of the HSCA one of the things

673
00:39:02.679 --> 00:39:06.159
<v Speaker 5>that they've noted is that there were individuals where they

674
00:39:06.199 --> 00:39:10.000
<v Speaker 5>actually found a record that there had been a soft

675
00:39:10.039 --> 00:39:14.519
<v Speaker 5>file on a certain on a certain individual, something special

676
00:39:14.639 --> 00:39:18.719
<v Speaker 5>was going on operationally with that individual. For example, they

677
00:39:18.760 --> 00:39:22.280
<v Speaker 5>found a soft file listing it's just a list of

678
00:39:22.840 --> 00:39:26.360
<v Speaker 5>you know, we're maintaining these out in the world. One

679
00:39:26.400 --> 00:39:29.840
<v Speaker 5>of them was for Roy Hargrave's which is kind of fascinating,

680
00:39:31.599 --> 00:39:36.239
<v Speaker 5>but you're never going to get that file unless somebody

681
00:39:36.280 --> 00:39:40.159
<v Speaker 5>collects it in real time. And the Warrant Commission didn't

682
00:39:40.159 --> 00:39:41.960
<v Speaker 5>know about those things, didn't even though to.

683
00:39:41.960 --> 00:39:42.519
<v Speaker 4>Ask for it.

684
00:39:42.800 --> 00:39:47.119
<v Speaker 5>They just went to the CIA central filing systems. And

685
00:39:47.960 --> 00:39:50.440
<v Speaker 5>not to jump too much over what David is doing now,

686
00:39:50.480 --> 00:39:52.639
<v Speaker 5>but I was always amused when I.

687
00:39:52.639 --> 00:39:53.920
<v Speaker 4>Was writing about.

688
00:39:55.280 --> 00:40:00.639
<v Speaker 5>CI operations in uh counter terrorist activities that the CIA

689
00:40:00.760 --> 00:40:04.960
<v Speaker 5>got very upset. Headquarters got very upset because the field

690
00:40:05.119 --> 00:40:07.760
<v Speaker 5>was training in Afghanistan.

691
00:40:08.119 --> 00:40:10.480
<v Speaker 4>Feel us, we're training.

692
00:40:12.079 --> 00:40:16.280
<v Speaker 5>Afghani volunteers to go fight the Russians and build IEDs

693
00:40:16.480 --> 00:40:20.119
<v Speaker 5>and use sniper rifles, and Headquarters thought that was kind

694
00:40:20.119 --> 00:40:24.280
<v Speaker 5>of dangerous because these were real radical Islamist and what

695
00:40:24.280 --> 00:40:27.400
<v Speaker 5>else might they do with that training? So they wrote

696
00:40:27.440 --> 00:40:30.800
<v Speaker 5>to project, they wrote to the field and said, you know,

697
00:40:31.159 --> 00:40:36.920
<v Speaker 5>stop that. Well, actually, years later a soft file turned up,

698
00:40:37.440 --> 00:40:40.760
<v Speaker 5>and all this all file reflects was that the senior

699
00:40:40.800 --> 00:40:44.159
<v Speaker 5>agent in charge said, Okay, we've got orders not to

700
00:40:44.239 --> 00:40:46.800
<v Speaker 5>do this. My order to you is not to report it.

701
00:40:48.719 --> 00:40:52.880
<v Speaker 5>So just we don't we confuse ourselves when we think

702
00:40:52.920 --> 00:40:57.599
<v Speaker 5>that the the central files CIA files, or the solutions

703
00:40:57.599 --> 00:40:58.880
<v Speaker 5>of the world's problems.

704
00:40:59.320 --> 00:41:01.920
<v Speaker 4>It's kind of like the FBI office files.

705
00:41:02.239 --> 00:41:05.559
<v Speaker 5>If you don't have the FBI office files, you really

706
00:41:05.599 --> 00:41:08.119
<v Speaker 5>don't know what was going on. And do you think

707
00:41:08.159 --> 00:41:13.480
<v Speaker 5>they told Hoover everything? No, they did not, and CIA

708
00:41:13.679 --> 00:41:21.360
<v Speaker 5>field operations didn't tail headquarters everything either. Right, And it's right, David,

709
00:41:21.400 --> 00:41:24.280
<v Speaker 5>I tromped all over your process.

710
00:41:25.159 --> 00:41:27.000
<v Speaker 7>Gives me a chance to breathe them up. Yeah.

711
00:41:27.760 --> 00:41:31.320
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, But but David, maybe a quick explanation. Okay, so

712
00:41:31.400 --> 00:41:33.519
<v Speaker 2>a soft file, I mean we should get from the

713
00:41:33.559 --> 00:41:37.760
<v Speaker 2>inferences what that actually is and what we mean by that.

714
00:41:39.000 --> 00:41:41.400
<v Speaker 2>You know, it's it's one of these things that doesn't

715
00:41:41.440 --> 00:41:46.239
<v Speaker 2>necessarily go through the whole system, but is a notation somewhere,

716
00:41:47.679 --> 00:41:50.840
<v Speaker 2>and again, like Larry points out, you know, in some cases, okay,

717
00:41:50.880 --> 00:41:52.519
<v Speaker 2>well you know what, they don't they don't want us

718
00:41:52.559 --> 00:41:54.079
<v Speaker 2>to do that. If we don't report it, they don't

719
00:41:54.079 --> 00:41:58.519
<v Speaker 2>know we're doing it anymore. These kind of things occur, right,

720
00:41:59.639 --> 00:42:04.280
<v Speaker 2>and again, this is a bit of a confusing world

721
00:42:04.280 --> 00:42:07.599
<v Speaker 2>that you get into here, because it's not as simple

722
00:42:07.639 --> 00:42:10.360
<v Speaker 2>as okay, this person is just an agent now, or

723
00:42:10.400 --> 00:42:15.000
<v Speaker 2>they are an agent. There's financial files also. Somebody's got

724
00:42:15.039 --> 00:42:17.519
<v Speaker 2>to keep track of the money, and in various cases

725
00:42:17.559 --> 00:42:21.599
<v Speaker 2>we found that there might be financial traces here that

726
00:42:21.800 --> 00:42:25.519
<v Speaker 2>reveal that obviously there was more going on than say,

727
00:42:25.719 --> 00:42:30.199
<v Speaker 2>was preserved in a file regarding an operation. Because you're

728
00:42:30.239 --> 00:42:34.239
<v Speaker 2>spending money in eight different places here, you're describing two operations.

729
00:42:34.679 --> 00:42:38.039
<v Speaker 2>Obviously there's more stuff going on here. Either that or

730
00:42:38.119 --> 00:42:42.000
<v Speaker 2>we're just paying people for nothing. Something's going on there.

731
00:42:42.400 --> 00:42:44.639
<v Speaker 2>And sometimes you get things like that right where you

732
00:42:44.719 --> 00:42:48.480
<v Speaker 2>have a financial record emerges. My favorite example of that,

733
00:42:48.519 --> 00:42:51.559
<v Speaker 2>of course, is the mk Ultra stuff, you know, where

734
00:42:51.559 --> 00:42:54.239
<v Speaker 2>we wouldn't even know about that if it wasn't for

735
00:42:54.280 --> 00:42:59.639
<v Speaker 2>the fact that the financial files had not been destroyed. Right, So,

736
00:43:01.039 --> 00:43:03.599
<v Speaker 2>you know, how do we tackle that whole issue of

737
00:43:04.480 --> 00:43:07.639
<v Speaker 2>just because you know there's an absence of evidence here

738
00:43:07.719 --> 00:43:11.320
<v Speaker 2>or there, doesn't mean that it couldn't exist somewhere else.

739
00:43:12.480 --> 00:43:15.119
<v Speaker 2>And what about these soft files? I mean, what are

740
00:43:15.159 --> 00:43:20.000
<v Speaker 2>the the the possibilities here regarding you know, somebody being

741
00:43:20.039 --> 00:43:23.920
<v Speaker 2>a witting or unwitting asset at certain points and big

742
00:43:23.960 --> 00:43:27.960
<v Speaker 2>difference between asset and an agent as well. So how

743
00:43:28.000 --> 00:43:30.039
<v Speaker 2>do you break that down, you know, and explain the

744
00:43:30.079 --> 00:43:32.599
<v Speaker 2>soft files sort of to somebody who's like going, what

745
00:43:32.679 --> 00:43:33.239
<v Speaker 2>does that mean?

746
00:43:35.639 --> 00:43:35.840
<v Speaker 3>Yeah?

747
00:43:35.960 --> 00:43:40.639
<v Speaker 8>Kind of like it's like, you know, I I have

748
00:43:40.719 --> 00:43:44.840
<v Speaker 8>a yellow pad paper, I get a phone call of

749
00:43:44.920 --> 00:43:48.360
<v Speaker 8>writing down things on here. I may or may not

750
00:43:48.440 --> 00:43:51.960
<v Speaker 8>type this up and send it to headquarters for distribution,

751
00:43:52.719 --> 00:43:56.000
<v Speaker 8>right just you know, so lots of explains a lot

752
00:43:56.000 --> 00:43:57.480
<v Speaker 8>of guys they just get backed up.

753
00:43:57.400 --> 00:44:01.320
<v Speaker 7>And they don't want to go through the paperwork. You know,

754
00:44:02.480 --> 00:44:03.000
<v Speaker 7>they're busy.

755
00:44:03.039 --> 00:44:04.559
<v Speaker 8>You know, some of these guys have a lot of

756
00:44:05.280 --> 00:44:06.880
<v Speaker 8>case officers, have a lot of agents.

757
00:44:06.920 --> 00:44:08.199
<v Speaker 7>They work, and they're very busy.

758
00:44:08.960 --> 00:44:10.480
<v Speaker 8>A lot of them are traveling, a lot of them

759
00:44:10.519 --> 00:44:12.960
<v Speaker 8>going down to sites and things like that, and so

760
00:44:14.039 --> 00:44:17.320
<v Speaker 8>a lot of it's phone call which they may or

761
00:44:17.360 --> 00:44:18.159
<v Speaker 8>may not write down.

762
00:44:18.199 --> 00:44:20.280
<v Speaker 7>A lot of it's pat a lot of it's handwritten.

763
00:44:20.639 --> 00:44:22.400
<v Speaker 8>If you look at a lot of the documents too,

764
00:44:23.239 --> 00:44:26.800
<v Speaker 8>there's a lot of handwritten notes on documents, and some

765
00:44:26.840 --> 00:44:30.639
<v Speaker 8>of them actually put the tool one number at the

766
00:44:30.639 --> 00:44:33.880
<v Speaker 8>top of the document for a particular assets, so they

767
00:44:33.920 --> 00:44:36.880
<v Speaker 8>can file that in the tool one file a copy

768
00:44:36.880 --> 00:44:39.519
<v Speaker 8>of it the too on one file. But sometimes a

769
00:44:39.559 --> 00:44:42.119
<v Speaker 8>lot of times they don't, so you're not that's not

770
00:44:42.159 --> 00:44:44.480
<v Speaker 8>going to hit the tool one file and may get

771
00:44:44.480 --> 00:44:49.519
<v Speaker 8>distributed to a small subset of people, or just may

772
00:44:49.519 --> 00:44:52.079
<v Speaker 8>not get distributed at all. That's essentially what a soft

773
00:44:52.079 --> 00:44:54.360
<v Speaker 8>file turns into is like I'm not sure what I'm

774
00:44:54.360 --> 00:44:57.079
<v Speaker 8>going to do with this. It's not official enough to

775
00:44:57.159 --> 00:45:03.039
<v Speaker 8>actually send it to headquarters, documented and putting the Information

776
00:45:03.199 --> 00:45:09.320
<v Speaker 8>Management staff system. So that's essentially soft file is same

777
00:45:09.360 --> 00:45:12.639
<v Speaker 8>thing with the shadow violence similar to a soft file,

778
00:45:12.800 --> 00:45:13.400
<v Speaker 8>very similar.

779
00:45:14.679 --> 00:45:18.000
<v Speaker 5>Okay, there must be again, there must be a project

780
00:45:18.639 --> 00:45:22.679
<v Speaker 5>that this doesn't occur at random. The case officer had

781
00:45:22.719 --> 00:45:25.719
<v Speaker 5>to be assigned to a project in which this person

782
00:45:25.800 --> 00:45:26.559
<v Speaker 5>is being used.

783
00:45:28.639 --> 00:45:32.239
<v Speaker 4>Uh, you know, and this is for a witting person.

784
00:45:32.280 --> 00:45:34.800
<v Speaker 5>Now, that doesn't mean there can't be a project that's

785
00:45:34.880 --> 00:45:39.400
<v Speaker 5>handling unwitting people. Okay, but assuming that they've been cleared,

786
00:45:40.119 --> 00:45:44.199
<v Speaker 5>you know, and assuming they're going to be paid paid

787
00:45:44.199 --> 00:45:48.760
<v Speaker 5>through you know, deniable mechanisms. They're all paid through covers

788
00:45:48.880 --> 00:45:53.440
<v Speaker 5>and with deniability. I think one of the funniest examples

789
00:45:53.480 --> 00:45:58.239
<v Speaker 5>we run across is in the Garrison investigation. Garrison was

790
00:45:58.360 --> 00:46:01.840
<v Speaker 5>investigating this one Cuban exile that had been working on

791
00:46:01.960 --> 00:46:05.840
<v Speaker 5>infiltration missions as a guide because he actually had a

792
00:46:05.960 --> 00:46:11.679
<v Speaker 5>history as a smuggler. Okay, Garrison turns up an application,

793
00:46:11.840 --> 00:46:15.960
<v Speaker 5>a credit application for a car, and the guy has

794
00:46:16.000 --> 00:46:21.840
<v Speaker 5>written down employer, Central Intelligence Agency.

795
00:46:22.400 --> 00:46:25.559
<v Speaker 4>You gotta love this. You got whoever the guy's case

796
00:46:25.599 --> 00:46:26.280
<v Speaker 4>officer was.

797
00:46:26.440 --> 00:46:28.960
<v Speaker 5>It's just that's this sort of thing that would drive

798
00:46:29.000 --> 00:46:33.199
<v Speaker 5>you nuts. Did I not get the message across to

799
00:46:33.199 --> 00:46:36.639
<v Speaker 5>you people that you were not really working for us?

800
00:46:36.760 --> 00:46:40.360
<v Speaker 5>But it doesn't exist in a fact, none of this

801
00:46:40.519 --> 00:46:45.360
<v Speaker 5>occurs in a vacuum. It doesn't occur unless the process

802
00:46:45.440 --> 00:46:49.599
<v Speaker 5>that David has gone through, the two to one, the

803
00:46:49.800 --> 00:46:50.639
<v Speaker 5>two levels of.

804
00:46:52.840 --> 00:46:55.199
<v Speaker 4>P r Q one and two, the green listing.

805
00:46:55.599 --> 00:46:58.000
<v Speaker 5>In many cases, if these guys are going to be

806
00:46:58.119 --> 00:47:02.280
<v Speaker 5>operational in the field, uh, we didn't discuss it, but

807
00:47:02.440 --> 00:47:05.400
<v Speaker 5>something called fluttering is required. They're going to have to

808
00:47:05.440 --> 00:47:10.280
<v Speaker 5>be polygraphed. That's just routine practice to vet their backstory.

809
00:47:11.360 --> 00:47:15.400
<v Speaker 5>So none of this happens to anybody who's going to

810
00:47:15.480 --> 00:47:18.519
<v Speaker 5>have a WIT. I mean, this all goes with somebody

811
00:47:18.559 --> 00:47:22.760
<v Speaker 5>who's going to be witting and operation operationally used in.

812
00:47:22.719 --> 00:47:24.679
<v Speaker 4>A specific product project.

813
00:47:26.199 --> 00:47:30.840
<v Speaker 5>You could hold somebody in that file as unwitting forever

814
00:47:31.119 --> 00:47:33.840
<v Speaker 5>and just monitor what they're doing until you turn this

815
00:47:33.960 --> 00:47:37.400
<v Speaker 5>process on. Then you may turn the process on and

816
00:47:37.440 --> 00:47:40.360
<v Speaker 5>cut it at some point before you even approach them.

817
00:47:40.880 --> 00:47:47.199
<v Speaker 5>But it's you know, there is a processed flutter.

818
00:47:48.119 --> 00:47:49.719
<v Speaker 7>Essentially, it's a line detect to test.

819
00:47:50.960 --> 00:47:53.400
<v Speaker 8>They gave these to a lot of their early recruits

820
00:47:53.400 --> 00:47:55.880
<v Speaker 8>for the Bay of Pigs, what they what they call

821
00:47:56.119 --> 00:47:59.760
<v Speaker 8>the Cadre back then first forty fifty people that can

822
00:47:59.840 --> 00:48:04.760
<v Speaker 8>a detective test and they would send the results to

823
00:48:04.920 --> 00:48:07.119
<v Speaker 8>headquarters and this would be put into you two on

824
00:48:07.119 --> 00:48:09.440
<v Speaker 8>one file. And we have quite a few examples of

825
00:48:09.480 --> 00:48:13.880
<v Speaker 8>that now even you know where they were a little

826
00:48:13.920 --> 00:48:17.079
<v Speaker 8>bit off in there, you know, light detective test. So

827
00:48:17.199 --> 00:48:19.679
<v Speaker 8>that's you know, in their two on one files also,

828
00:48:21.079 --> 00:48:22.400
<v Speaker 8>HM okay.

829
00:48:22.159 --> 00:48:26.280
<v Speaker 5>And that that's especially true, I think David Will. These

830
00:48:26.320 --> 00:48:31.840
<v Speaker 5>were guys that they expected infiltrate into Cuba, and you

831
00:48:32.000 --> 00:48:34.320
<v Speaker 5>have to worry, you know, you're worrying about whether they're

832
00:48:34.360 --> 00:48:37.639
<v Speaker 5>sincere or not. Right, we're taking these folks that are

833
00:48:37.840 --> 00:48:42.440
<v Speaker 5>supposed to be virulently anti Castro, well are they really?

834
00:48:43.719 --> 00:48:46.840
<v Speaker 5>And in all honesty, you would probably I can't swear,

835
00:48:47.199 --> 00:48:49.920
<v Speaker 5>I've not seen a file, but I would suspect that

836
00:48:50.559 --> 00:48:56.519
<v Speaker 5>they did that for routinely, for anybody that was doing

837
00:48:56.599 --> 00:49:01.400
<v Speaker 5>that kind of infiltration, because you've run a real risk of, oh,

838
00:49:01.440 --> 00:49:05.960
<v Speaker 5>you're anti this or that. We recruit you, we train you,

839
00:49:05.960 --> 00:49:09.280
<v Speaker 5>you send we send you in, and immediately we see

840
00:49:09.280 --> 00:49:13.440
<v Speaker 5>you on the news talking about these evil Americans. You know,

841
00:49:13.719 --> 00:49:15.920
<v Speaker 5>you really want to avoid that. You want to know

842
00:49:15.960 --> 00:49:17.880
<v Speaker 5>that they're sincere.

843
00:49:18.679 --> 00:49:21.719
<v Speaker 8>Right, right, Yeah, So that's for the people that actually

844
00:49:21.719 --> 00:49:25.480
<v Speaker 8>made it to the United States. A lot of the

845
00:49:25.519 --> 00:49:30.519
<v Speaker 8>agent's assets in Cuba couldn't get a you know, light

846
00:49:30.559 --> 00:49:32.559
<v Speaker 8>detective test because there's nobody there to give them a

847
00:49:32.599 --> 00:49:33.480
<v Speaker 8>light detective test.

848
00:49:33.519 --> 00:49:36.880
<v Speaker 7>So had to do what they could with who's living there.

849
00:49:36.679 --> 00:49:41.119
<v Speaker 2>You know, all right, and now when Oswald bumps up

850
00:49:41.119 --> 00:49:44.239
<v Speaker 2>against a whole lot of people that clearly would have

851
00:49:44.280 --> 00:49:46.440
<v Speaker 2>had to have gone through a lot of these processes

852
00:49:46.519 --> 00:49:51.599
<v Speaker 2>because they're activists, Uh, they're involved in the anti Cuban

853
00:49:52.079 --> 00:49:55.880
<v Speaker 2>or excuse me, the anti Castro Cuban stuff, and so

854
00:49:55.960 --> 00:49:58.760
<v Speaker 2>on and so forth. Uh, you know, when he bumps

855
00:49:58.840 --> 00:50:01.920
<v Speaker 2>up against Berengear, et cetera. I mean, he's got to

856
00:50:01.960 --> 00:50:05.840
<v Speaker 2>get mentioned in some of these other places. They have

857
00:50:05.960 --> 00:50:09.039
<v Speaker 2>to note this guy. They ran into him. They got

858
00:50:09.039 --> 00:50:10.840
<v Speaker 2>it to a one file on them. So you've got

859
00:50:10.840 --> 00:50:13.280
<v Speaker 2>somebody who was a person of interest running up against

860
00:50:13.320 --> 00:50:16.559
<v Speaker 2>another person of interest. Whether it happened to organically or

861
00:50:16.599 --> 00:50:21.679
<v Speaker 2>somebody orchestrated it, this should be noted somewhere, you know,

862
00:50:21.760 --> 00:50:23.559
<v Speaker 2>and and so on and so forth. So, I mean,

863
00:50:23.599 --> 00:50:26.360
<v Speaker 2>there's a lot of things here, and I'm wondering, how

864
00:50:26.440 --> 00:50:27.599
<v Speaker 2>is it that we tie.

865
00:50:27.280 --> 00:50:29.000
<v Speaker 3>This to this historical figure.

866
00:50:30.000 --> 00:50:32.119
<v Speaker 2>You know, this discussion we've had so far, we've been

867
00:50:32.119 --> 00:50:34.800
<v Speaker 2>pretty general and open about it and given people a

868
00:50:34.840 --> 00:50:38.760
<v Speaker 2>lot of ideas about possibilities. But what is it that

869
00:50:38.760 --> 00:50:42.719
<v Speaker 2>that you see in these files now.

870
00:50:42.400 --> 00:50:43.519
<v Speaker 3>That maybe was not.

871
00:50:45.239 --> 00:50:48.679
<v Speaker 2>So readily obvious not so long ago, David, I mean,

872
00:50:48.719 --> 00:50:52.599
<v Speaker 2>what what is new here and what is confirmed from

873
00:50:52.679 --> 00:50:55.599
<v Speaker 2>old ideas, et cetera, et cetera. What do we know

874
00:50:55.880 --> 00:50:58.599
<v Speaker 2>about Oswald based on being able to track these things?

875
00:50:58.679 --> 00:50:59.079
<v Speaker 3>This way.

876
00:51:01.039 --> 00:51:05.800
<v Speaker 8>Actually it's with the old negative template that Peter Dale

877
00:51:05.840 --> 00:51:06.639
<v Speaker 8>Scott said.

878
00:51:06.719 --> 00:51:10.119
<v Speaker 7>It's a lack of that should be there.

879
00:51:10.760 --> 00:51:13.039
<v Speaker 8>Some of the people in New Orleans he had contact with,

880
00:51:15.719 --> 00:51:21.280
<v Speaker 8>sorry cough, we're actually CIS assets that we talked about.

881
00:51:21.320 --> 00:51:24.840
<v Speaker 8>Then they were winning CIS assets. The perfect example is

882
00:51:25.039 --> 00:51:30.920
<v Speaker 8>Sylvio Odio's Sylvia Odio's uncle Augustine Guitot. He was actually

883
00:51:31.840 --> 00:51:37.119
<v Speaker 8>well when he was at Oswald's quarter a parents and

884
00:51:37.239 --> 00:51:40.920
<v Speaker 8>he was also at this time a cutout working for.

885
00:51:42.360 --> 00:51:44.159
<v Speaker 7>Kyle Trenton, who.

886
00:51:44.119 --> 00:51:50.039
<v Speaker 8>Works for the Desmond Fitzgerald's Special Affairs Staff CIA in headquarters.

887
00:51:50.360 --> 00:51:53.000
<v Speaker 8>So I mean, there should be something in his two

888
00:51:53.039 --> 00:51:55.280
<v Speaker 8>O one file, which we have, but there's a lot

889
00:51:55.320 --> 00:51:58.639
<v Speaker 8>of us things that are still redacted in Guitot's TO

890
00:51:58.960 --> 00:52:03.960
<v Speaker 8>one file. So I find that amazing. Frank Martes was

891
00:52:04.000 --> 00:52:09.480
<v Speaker 8>also at Oswald's court apparents, and he actually confronted Oswald

892
00:52:10.079 --> 00:52:12.719
<v Speaker 8>outside the court, you know, said you know you're a

893
00:52:13.119 --> 00:52:16.400
<v Speaker 8>you're a danger, and things like that. A month later

894
00:52:16.599 --> 00:52:18.800
<v Speaker 8>he's denying he ever met him, even know who he was.

895
00:52:19.639 --> 00:52:22.400
<v Speaker 8>So that's when Larry and I suspect, like, was Oswald

896
00:52:22.480 --> 00:52:23.440
<v Speaker 8>in play at that time?

897
00:52:24.599 --> 00:52:24.800
<v Speaker 3>You know?

898
00:52:24.880 --> 00:52:29.400
<v Speaker 8>So there's some Again there's no gaps and Martes's file

899
00:52:30.519 --> 00:52:33.400
<v Speaker 8>he ended up being a CIS asset and going into

900
00:52:33.639 --> 00:52:38.039
<v Speaker 8>the Congo as a pilot, you know, to fight the

901
00:52:38.039 --> 00:52:41.079
<v Speaker 8>the Cubans there as an anti Castro Cuban. So there's

902
00:52:41.079 --> 00:52:44.079
<v Speaker 8>still be gaps in some of these two oh one files,

903
00:52:44.719 --> 00:52:44.920
<v Speaker 8>you know.

904
00:52:45.000 --> 00:52:49.039
<v Speaker 5>So I think an example we've seen over and over again,

905
00:52:49.599 --> 00:52:53.320
<v Speaker 5>if a case officer has these Cubans as assets, one

906
00:52:53.440 --> 00:52:56.519
<v Speaker 5>of the things that you constantly see showing up in reports.

907
00:52:57.280 --> 00:52:59.119
<v Speaker 4>I mean, one of.

908
00:52:59.079 --> 00:53:03.639
<v Speaker 5>Their major jobs is to report anyone who's suspected of

909
00:53:03.679 --> 00:53:08.719
<v Speaker 5>being a Castro supporter, right, we see over and over again,

910
00:53:09.199 --> 00:53:12.880
<v Speaker 5>just rumors and gossip because that's what they're out there

911
00:53:12.920 --> 00:53:18.360
<v Speaker 5>to do, circulating the community and pass on information about

912
00:53:18.760 --> 00:53:21.559
<v Speaker 5>you know, they don't know what anybody may do with it,

913
00:53:21.920 --> 00:53:24.440
<v Speaker 5>but their job is to pass on to their case

914
00:53:24.480 --> 00:53:29.079
<v Speaker 5>officers any information of that nature where the person is

915
00:53:29.320 --> 00:53:35.599
<v Speaker 5>overtly a supporter of Castro clandestinely a supporters perspectives, that's

916
00:53:35.639 --> 00:53:40.400
<v Speaker 5>what they're supposed to be doing, so there should be reports.

917
00:53:40.480 --> 00:53:44.400
<v Speaker 5>As David said, these guys are verifiable assets and they're

918
00:53:44.440 --> 00:53:49.360
<v Speaker 5>reporting on everything else. It's like, wait a minute, you're

919
00:53:49.400 --> 00:53:54.039
<v Speaker 5>reporting on everything else, and this is the one thing

920
00:53:54.079 --> 00:53:56.760
<v Speaker 5>that you didn't report on the guy that's on TV

921
00:53:57.360 --> 00:54:00.400
<v Speaker 5>and radio and you were to court his parents and

922
00:54:00.480 --> 00:54:04.000
<v Speaker 5>you didn't say anything to anybody about it.

923
00:54:04.119 --> 00:54:05.039
<v Speaker 4>Clearly they did.

924
00:54:06.440 --> 00:54:11.000
<v Speaker 5>It's it's virtually impossible to think that there weren't reports

925
00:54:11.679 --> 00:54:14.880
<v Speaker 5>at the case officer level, because that's what they're there

926
00:54:14.920 --> 00:54:22.400
<v Speaker 5>to do. And quite frankly, uh, their credibility depends on

927
00:54:22.519 --> 00:54:25.400
<v Speaker 5>their being in place, and they're seeing those sorts of things.

928
00:54:25.480 --> 00:54:30.119
<v Speaker 5>We see them and we've written about this. We see

929
00:54:30.159 --> 00:54:34.880
<v Speaker 5>them writing on Cubans coming into town that they suspect

930
00:54:35.159 --> 00:54:38.639
<v Speaker 5>or you know, they're they're they're very vocal. And the

931
00:54:38.679 --> 00:54:41.800
<v Speaker 5>funny thing is several of them report both of.

932
00:54:41.760 --> 00:54:46.239
<v Speaker 4>The CIA and of the FBI, you know, So.

933
00:54:48.239 --> 00:54:52.599
<v Speaker 5>It's not that they that there's a whole gap of

934
00:54:52.679 --> 00:54:54.880
<v Speaker 5>missing information for that period of time.

935
00:54:55.360 --> 00:54:56.159
<v Speaker 4>Now there isn't.

936
00:54:56.320 --> 00:55:00.440
<v Speaker 5>There is only a missing gap pertaining to Oswal's activity.

937
00:55:00.800 --> 00:55:04.079
<v Speaker 5>But that's kind of mirrored, Chuck by the fact that

938
00:55:05.599 --> 00:55:08.199
<v Speaker 5>we won't get into the home Mexico City mess here.

939
00:55:08.679 --> 00:55:13.519
<v Speaker 5>But the thing is that clearly information on Oswell is

940
00:55:13.519 --> 00:55:19.440
<v Speaker 5>being compartmentalized, because when Oswell shows up in Mexico City.

941
00:55:19.920 --> 00:55:25.360
<v Speaker 5>Nobody tells Mexico City Station anything about this sort of stuff, like, oh,

942
00:55:25.360 --> 00:55:27.800
<v Speaker 5>wait a minute, Okay, yes, he's back in the United

943
00:55:27.800 --> 00:55:32.760
<v Speaker 5>States and here's what he's doing. Nope, And I'm not

944
00:55:32.800 --> 00:55:34.800
<v Speaker 5>going to talk about this now because we spend way

945
00:55:34.800 --> 00:55:37.840
<v Speaker 5>too much of my life in the book talking about Mexico.

946
00:55:37.440 --> 00:55:38.360
<v Speaker 4>City, right, David.

947
00:55:39.079 --> 00:55:43.559
<v Speaker 5>But it's like, clearly this is intentional, and Morley and

948
00:55:44.079 --> 00:55:49.159
<v Speaker 5>Newman dug this all out of testimony, and clearly there's

949
00:55:49.400 --> 00:55:54.400
<v Speaker 5>clearly there is compartmental as a compartmentalization of information, which

950
00:55:54.440 --> 00:55:58.159
<v Speaker 5>is why I brought up early on the fact that

951
00:55:58.679 --> 00:56:01.360
<v Speaker 5>we would expect there would be things that are not

952
00:56:02.400 --> 00:56:07.000
<v Speaker 5>in his consolidated too oh one file because somebody somewhere

953
00:56:07.000 --> 00:56:11.119
<v Speaker 5>else in the agency decided to make use of him

954
00:56:11.159 --> 00:56:15.480
<v Speaker 5>in some fashion winning unwitting that's another question. But you

955
00:56:15.599 --> 00:56:20.719
<v Speaker 5>compartmentalize that information because that's operational. A two to oh

956
00:56:20.800 --> 00:56:25.760
<v Speaker 5>one file is not operational. These other files, saw files,

957
00:56:26.239 --> 00:56:29.719
<v Speaker 5>project files, shadow file, all those are operational.

958
00:56:29.800 --> 00:56:31.119
<v Speaker 4>Those you got to keep secret.

959
00:56:32.639 --> 00:56:37.039
<v Speaker 8>And you wonder about the domestic contact UH division files.

960
00:56:37.679 --> 00:56:41.880
<v Speaker 8>New Orleans had their own domestic office. Theres Hunter Leak

961
00:56:41.960 --> 00:56:45.440
<v Speaker 8>was running it, and we just mentioned Frank Bartees, who's

962
00:56:45.480 --> 00:56:47.639
<v Speaker 8>at Oswald's Court of Parents.

963
00:56:47.880 --> 00:56:51.880
<v Speaker 7>He was an off is a contact of hunter Leaks.

964
00:56:51.920 --> 00:56:56.599
<v Speaker 8>You know that at least five reports that who's talking about,

965
00:56:56.679 --> 00:56:59.400
<v Speaker 8>but there's probably others that we can't get our hands on.

966
00:57:01.960 --> 00:57:04.760
<v Speaker 8>Wellians get to miss the contact office, So you wonder

967
00:57:04.800 --> 00:57:07.800
<v Speaker 8>where they go. You know they soft files. Did they

968
00:57:07.800 --> 00:57:10.400
<v Speaker 8>hang on to those? I don't know, Larry, what do

969
00:57:10.480 --> 00:57:11.760
<v Speaker 8>you think would they hang on to those?

970
00:57:12.320 --> 00:57:15.320
<v Speaker 5>My guess is those would be so would be just

971
00:57:15.719 --> 00:57:19.280
<v Speaker 5>field level files again, because you're if you're not talking

972
00:57:19.280 --> 00:57:20.239
<v Speaker 5>about something.

973
00:57:20.000 --> 00:57:22.679
<v Speaker 4>Observational, they're they're just reporting it.

974
00:57:23.559 --> 00:57:30.559
<v Speaker 5>And if domestic domestic contacts is normally more outbound than inbound,

975
00:57:30.679 --> 00:57:34.519
<v Speaker 5>we see that in Dallas, where a domestics contact guy

976
00:57:34.679 --> 00:57:40.000
<v Speaker 5>is actually told to investigate OSLO after he returns to Dallas.

977
00:57:40.599 --> 00:57:43.039
<v Speaker 5>He uses a deniable cutout in the form of de

978
00:57:43.159 --> 00:57:48.119
<v Speaker 5>Moorinshield to do that and obviously collects information and it

979
00:57:48.159 --> 00:57:51.199
<v Speaker 5>goes somewhere we've never seen because we have not seen

980
00:57:51.239 --> 00:57:55.440
<v Speaker 5>domestic contacts out of Dallas. But in New Orleans it's

981
00:57:55.480 --> 00:57:59.679
<v Speaker 5>a little different in that you know, there's no sign

982
00:57:59.840 --> 00:58:05.639
<v Speaker 5>that anybody activated domestic contacts to look at Oswald. We

983
00:58:05.920 --> 00:58:08.280
<v Speaker 5>don't see the flip side of the coin, so I

984
00:58:08.360 --> 00:58:12.639
<v Speaker 5>really don't know. I would assume that they were mention

985
00:58:12.760 --> 00:58:15.199
<v Speaker 5>it to him. But if he didn't have a tasking

986
00:58:15.320 --> 00:58:18.840
<v Speaker 5>to investigate Oswald, you know, he might not have done

987
00:58:18.880 --> 00:58:21.199
<v Speaker 5>anything with it except you know, just setting in a

988
00:58:21.280 --> 00:58:24.280
<v Speaker 5>SAFT file and those are destroyed after a period. We

989
00:58:24.280 --> 00:58:28.239
<v Speaker 5>shouldn't we shouldn't make it all mysterious because in all honesty,

990
00:58:28.920 --> 00:58:31.840
<v Speaker 5>you know, paperwork does accumulate and after a period of

991
00:58:31.840 --> 00:58:33.760
<v Speaker 5>time that stuff just gets threaded.

992
00:58:35.639 --> 00:58:35.840
<v Speaker 7>Well.

993
00:58:35.840 --> 00:58:37.519
<v Speaker 2>And the other thing is I mean, when you got

994
00:58:37.519 --> 00:58:40.480
<v Speaker 2>two guys that are assets showing up at you know,

995
00:58:40.639 --> 00:58:44.800
<v Speaker 2>a misdemeanor court appearance for this Lee Harvey Oswald, you

996
00:58:44.800 --> 00:58:48.159
<v Speaker 2>would think that there could potentially be some sort of

997
00:58:48.159 --> 00:58:51.679
<v Speaker 2>contact there previous to that, where somebody says, why don't

998
00:58:51.679 --> 00:58:55.039
<v Speaker 2>you guys go down there and show your face? Maybe

999
00:58:55.039 --> 00:58:57.519
<v Speaker 2>somebody directed them to do that. That would end up

1000
00:58:57.519 --> 00:59:02.079
<v Speaker 2>in a soft file somewhere right there would be.

1001
00:59:02.079 --> 00:59:03.199
<v Speaker 4>A case officer file.

1002
00:59:03.239 --> 00:59:07.960
<v Speaker 5>And we absolutely know that that occurred because we know

1003
00:59:08.119 --> 00:59:11.719
<v Speaker 5>that that had been reported back to Miami. It had

1004
00:59:11.719 --> 00:59:16.559
<v Speaker 5>been reported to case officers by DR and the DR

1005
00:59:16.800 --> 00:59:18.840
<v Speaker 5>people told morally that they had done that.

1006
00:59:19.599 --> 00:59:22.719
<v Speaker 4>So by the time that courtting occurred.

1007
00:59:22.760 --> 00:59:27.599
<v Speaker 5>He was absolutely Oswell had been had been spotted by

1008
00:59:27.719 --> 00:59:31.039
<v Speaker 5>dre reported by DR, and there should have been an

1009
00:59:31.039 --> 00:59:37.519
<v Speaker 5>exchange of Actually what the DR guys told Morley was

1010
00:59:37.559 --> 00:59:40.679
<v Speaker 5>that this was one of the best opportunities for propaganda

1011
00:59:41.159 --> 00:59:44.039
<v Speaker 5>that they had ever had, and Oswell was the kind

1012
00:59:44.039 --> 00:59:47.719
<v Speaker 5>of guy that they were being paid to use in propaganda.

1013
00:59:49.039 --> 00:59:53.719
<v Speaker 5>There's clearly no doubt about it. And clearly again as

1014
00:59:53.800 --> 00:59:57.079
<v Speaker 5>Jeff found out, you know those files are withheld.

1015
00:59:58.480 --> 01:00:04.360
<v Speaker 8>Yeah, as Jeff was speaking of, you know, Sylvia Audio's uncle,

1016
01:00:04.599 --> 01:00:09.880
<v Speaker 8>Augustin Greek Todd, his case officer called Trenton. Jeff Walley

1017
01:00:09.960 --> 01:00:13.679
<v Speaker 8>actually interviewed him twice and Trenton knew wall about, he

1018
01:00:13.800 --> 01:00:18.039
<v Speaker 8>new bringier An, he knew Oswald and he he said,

1019
01:00:18.280 --> 01:00:21.760
<v Speaker 8>I can't remember the exact quote, but said he couldn't

1020
01:00:21.800 --> 01:00:24.440
<v Speaker 8>diego near Oswald, you know, wouldn't touch him with a

1021
01:00:24.440 --> 01:00:27.639
<v Speaker 8>ten foot poll which means somebody else had a relationship

1022
01:00:27.679 --> 01:00:28.039
<v Speaker 8>with him.

1023
01:00:28.199 --> 01:00:29.400
<v Speaker 7>That's I might take it.

1024
01:00:29.960 --> 01:00:32.239
<v Speaker 3>M M, well, there's that.

1025
01:00:32.320 --> 01:00:35.079
<v Speaker 2>Plus, you know I've seen the I don't know if

1026
01:00:35.119 --> 01:00:39.320
<v Speaker 2>I want to call it speculation or maybe beyond speculation.

1027
01:00:39.440 --> 01:00:43.760
<v Speaker 2>This idea that there was an operation to discredit the

1028
01:00:43.840 --> 01:00:47.960
<v Speaker 2>Fair Play for Cuba Committee. And Oswald's out there pretending

1029
01:00:48.079 --> 01:00:51.599
<v Speaker 2>to be the treasurer for the Fair Play for Cuba

1030
01:00:51.599 --> 01:00:56.320
<v Speaker 2>Committee in New Orleans, right with a with another guy

1031
01:00:56.360 --> 01:01:01.559
<v Speaker 2>who's supposedly the head of it, his pseudonym. Right, you know,

1032
01:01:01.679 --> 01:01:04.639
<v Speaker 2>that old thing is going on there, and you know,

1033
01:01:04.880 --> 01:01:07.880
<v Speaker 2>was that part of a greater operation? Was that something

1034
01:01:07.880 --> 01:01:09.440
<v Speaker 2>that he just dreamed up on his own?

1035
01:01:09.880 --> 01:01:12.159
<v Speaker 3>I mean, do we have any definitive.

1036
01:01:11.760 --> 01:01:16.400
<v Speaker 2>Proof here among the files that are attached to this

1037
01:01:16.519 --> 01:01:17.880
<v Speaker 2>character Lee Rby Oswald?

1038
01:01:19.079 --> 01:01:21.920
<v Speaker 4>Dave, Well, you're gonna have to wait for the book

1039
01:01:21.960 --> 01:01:22.599
<v Speaker 4>for that, Chuck.

1040
01:01:22.679 --> 01:01:27.280
<v Speaker 5>But okay, it's not that we don't explore that in detail.

1041
01:01:27.519 --> 01:01:32.079
<v Speaker 5>But the real honest answer to that twofold answers A

1042
01:01:32.360 --> 01:01:38.719
<v Speaker 5>the FPCC had already been destroyed. It was so thoroughly penetrated,

1043
01:01:38.920 --> 01:01:42.400
<v Speaker 5>it had lost so many chapter members. It's kind of

1044
01:01:42.400 --> 01:01:45.880
<v Speaker 5>like the FBI that the number of people involved with

1045
01:01:45.920 --> 01:01:50.960
<v Speaker 5>the FBCC, there were more intelligence people involved in seeing

1046
01:01:51.000 --> 01:01:53.079
<v Speaker 5>what they were doing than there were members. I mean,

1047
01:01:53.119 --> 01:01:58.239
<v Speaker 5>it was coming apart at the seams. But the here's

1048
01:01:58.239 --> 01:02:02.400
<v Speaker 5>how bad it was and now and that it changed.

1049
01:02:02.800 --> 01:02:05.880
<v Speaker 4>Here's for timing is a year before that that would

1050
01:02:05.960 --> 01:02:07.159
<v Speaker 4>not have been a true statement.

1051
01:02:07.679 --> 01:02:11.920
<v Speaker 5>But things things were such a nature that when then

1052
01:02:12.000 --> 01:02:17.199
<v Speaker 5>the FBI investigated Otiswell's relationship with them, you know how,

1053
01:02:17.239 --> 01:02:20.960
<v Speaker 5>they actually wrote it off the books and closed it down.

1054
01:02:22.039 --> 01:02:23.320
<v Speaker 4>They wrote the FPCC.

1055
01:02:24.800 --> 01:02:30.199
<v Speaker 5>This is the Federal Bureau of Investigations writing the FPCC saying, oh,

1056
01:02:30.239 --> 01:02:33.599
<v Speaker 5>it's this. This guy told us that you had this

1057
01:02:33.679 --> 01:02:37.960
<v Speaker 5>really big chapter in New Orleans and you know, we're

1058
01:02:38.079 --> 01:02:41.800
<v Speaker 5>just we're just curious about that. And the fb FPCC

1059
01:02:41.960 --> 01:02:44.559
<v Speaker 5>writes back and go, no, no, we don't have and

1060
01:02:44.599 --> 01:02:49.960
<v Speaker 5>they close the file. Like clearly the f PC is

1061
01:02:51.039 --> 01:02:55.119
<v Speaker 5>FPCC is not being treated seriously as a threatening clandestine

1062
01:02:55.119 --> 01:02:58.480
<v Speaker 5>our entity at that point in time. But the other

1063
01:02:58.519 --> 01:03:01.800
<v Speaker 5>thing you have to get to is, as David just

1064
01:03:01.960 --> 01:03:07.760
<v Speaker 5>brought up, somebody can have an operational interest in Oswald

1065
01:03:08.239 --> 01:03:12.480
<v Speaker 5>without his being witting. What we do not find and

1066
01:03:12.679 --> 01:03:16.519
<v Speaker 5>not to say they can be. There is no paperwork

1067
01:03:16.599 --> 01:03:23.199
<v Speaker 5>trail that shows witting. There is absolutely a paperwork trail

1068
01:03:23.519 --> 01:03:25.519
<v Speaker 5>that shows operational interest.

1069
01:03:26.679 --> 01:03:28.440
<v Speaker 4>If you want to be strictly.

1070
01:03:28.039 --> 01:03:33.280
<v Speaker 5>Factual, Absolutely the paperwork trail, what information is being shared,

1071
01:03:34.440 --> 01:03:37.639
<v Speaker 5>indicates an operational interest.

1072
01:03:38.000 --> 01:03:39.199
<v Speaker 4>Just as Jane Roman.

1073
01:03:39.000 --> 01:03:42.599
<v Speaker 5>Said, it did, but his paperwork does not show that.

1074
01:03:43.320 --> 01:03:47.400
<v Speaker 5>So that's where you get into a real fascinating discussion

1075
01:03:47.400 --> 01:03:48.800
<v Speaker 5>of witting versus unwitting.

1076
01:03:50.840 --> 01:03:53.280
<v Speaker 2>Right, So there's one way to look at all this.

1077
01:03:53.400 --> 01:03:55.320
<v Speaker 2>And I've already had you guys on for about an

1078
01:03:55.360 --> 01:03:56.119
<v Speaker 2>hour going.

1079
01:03:55.960 --> 01:03:57.880
<v Speaker 3>Through this just so you know.

1080
01:03:58.440 --> 01:04:01.880
<v Speaker 2>But David, but what key points have we not struck

1081
01:04:01.960 --> 01:04:05.559
<v Speaker 2>upon here that you think would be best to fill

1082
01:04:05.559 --> 01:04:06.599
<v Speaker 2>out this explanation.

1083
01:04:08.039 --> 01:04:10.199
<v Speaker 8>I think we hit them all pretty much. I think

1084
01:04:10.480 --> 01:04:14.280
<v Speaker 8>you guys also did a good job. Flynn, you know

1085
01:04:14.320 --> 01:04:16.800
<v Speaker 8>what was going on at that time, So no, I

1086
01:04:16.800 --> 01:04:17.559
<v Speaker 8>think we hit them.

1087
01:04:18.280 --> 01:04:21.400
<v Speaker 2>Okay, So Larry, is there anything else we should add here?

1088
01:04:21.440 --> 01:04:26.039
<v Speaker 2>Because again, it's an interesting study. It gives you an

1089
01:04:26.079 --> 01:04:28.960
<v Speaker 2>idea of you know, look, can we prove it was

1090
01:04:29.000 --> 01:04:32.840
<v Speaker 2>something that was happening or wasn't happening. I like that

1091
01:04:32.920 --> 01:04:35.280
<v Speaker 2>we can at least finally say that all those you know,

1092
01:04:35.360 --> 01:04:39.719
<v Speaker 2>blanket denials of there being absolutely no interest in this

1093
01:04:39.760 --> 01:04:42.719
<v Speaker 2>Oswald character. I mean, he was a screwball. You know,

1094
01:04:42.840 --> 01:04:45.400
<v Speaker 2>he was no good, He was not useful to anybody.

1095
01:04:45.880 --> 01:04:49.800
<v Speaker 2>We know now that that's wholly ridiculous. And by the way,

1096
01:04:49.840 --> 01:04:52.519
<v Speaker 2>it's not like the agencies are not willing to use

1097
01:04:52.559 --> 01:04:56.199
<v Speaker 2>screwballs anyway, just saying, you know, some of the people

1098
01:04:56.199 --> 01:05:01.280
<v Speaker 2>that we've discovered over time, Okay, you know, I find

1099
01:05:01.320 --> 01:05:03.159
<v Speaker 2>the one guy that we got after World War Two.

1100
01:05:03.159 --> 01:05:06.400
<v Speaker 2>It was totally paranoid, but was good with surveillance that

1101
01:05:06.760 --> 01:05:07.519
<v Speaker 2>got recruited.

1102
01:05:08.320 --> 01:05:09.599
<v Speaker 3>I always love that story.

1103
01:05:10.159 --> 01:05:14.800
<v Speaker 4>You know, that's what you want. But yeah, I think

1104
01:05:15.039 --> 01:05:16.519
<v Speaker 4>I would sum of them two things.

1105
01:05:16.559 --> 01:05:22.039
<v Speaker 5>First of all, only because we understand it at the

1106
01:05:22.119 --> 01:05:25.239
<v Speaker 5>day at the level that David can work the files now,

1107
01:05:25.599 --> 01:05:28.039
<v Speaker 5>A lot of what he was just telling you, if

1108
01:05:28.039 --> 01:05:32.119
<v Speaker 5>you look at the links he sent, you only see

1109
01:05:32.440 --> 01:05:35.239
<v Speaker 5>by looking at a marginal note down in a little

1110
01:05:35.360 --> 01:05:40.159
<v Speaker 5>check box on a form a notation that shows green listing,

1111
01:05:41.239 --> 01:05:46.000
<v Speaker 5>you will only see by somebody who was copied or

1112
01:05:46.039 --> 01:05:49.440
<v Speaker 5>somebody who signed off on a file. Until we could

1113
01:05:50.039 --> 01:05:52.840
<v Speaker 5>understand it at this level, or David can understand it

1114
01:05:52.840 --> 01:05:55.960
<v Speaker 5>at this level, I still don't that I asked David questions.

1115
01:05:56.840 --> 01:06:00.639
<v Speaker 5>We couldn't make conclusive statements about these people and what

1116
01:06:00.800 --> 01:06:03.519
<v Speaker 5>should be there and what should be there. Certainly, when

1117
01:06:03.559 --> 01:06:07.440
<v Speaker 5>I first started writing about this, we had no knowledge

1118
01:06:07.480 --> 01:06:10.960
<v Speaker 5>of that level of detail at all. Now we do

1119
01:06:11.039 --> 01:06:13.920
<v Speaker 5>have it, so it's a lot more comfortable to say

1120
01:06:14.320 --> 01:06:17.000
<v Speaker 5>what should be there and what shouldn't be there, and

1121
01:06:17.039 --> 01:06:21.119
<v Speaker 5>how this process works. So understanding the process has helped

1122
01:06:21.199 --> 01:06:21.800
<v Speaker 5>us a lot.

1123
01:06:22.039 --> 01:06:25.840
<v Speaker 4>And it's not easy.

1124
01:06:27.360 --> 01:06:31.119
<v Speaker 5>David hasn't said anything about that, but even use it

1125
01:06:31.239 --> 01:06:35.159
<v Speaker 5>knowing the crypts with the crypt busting, what, David, we

1126
01:06:35.239 --> 01:06:38.079
<v Speaker 5>couldn't say the things that we said on this broadcast.

1127
01:06:39.239 --> 01:06:42.280
<v Speaker 4>What maybe ten years of research.

1128
01:06:42.559 --> 01:06:46.440
<v Speaker 5>Before we could talk at this level of detail, A

1129
01:06:46.440 --> 01:06:47.400
<v Speaker 5>lot of reading.

1130
01:06:49.599 --> 01:06:51.119
<v Speaker 4>And thousands of documents.

1131
01:06:51.159 --> 01:06:54.559
<v Speaker 5>So I would encourage readers again, I guess what this

1132
01:06:54.800 --> 01:06:59.320
<v Speaker 5>is is encourage readers, not listeners, not to you know,

1133
01:07:00.360 --> 01:07:05.920
<v Speaker 5>take for granted generalizations that are made about individuals or

1134
01:07:06.039 --> 01:07:11.039
<v Speaker 5>documents or process because a lot of stuff has been

1135
01:07:11.079 --> 01:07:15.199
<v Speaker 5>thrown against the wall that was pure supposition and pure speculation,

1136
01:07:15.719 --> 01:07:16.559
<v Speaker 5>and we can do a.

1137
01:07:16.519 --> 01:07:17.440
<v Speaker 4>Better job now.

1138
01:07:17.519 --> 01:07:21.920
<v Speaker 5>So I think that would be my summary comment is

1139
01:07:21.960 --> 01:07:25.280
<v Speaker 5>the good news is, after all this gruntwork and all

1140
01:07:25.320 --> 01:07:29.280
<v Speaker 5>this slogging, we can do a better job now looking

1141
01:07:29.320 --> 01:07:32.679
<v Speaker 5>at the process, looking at the documents than we could

1142
01:07:32.719 --> 01:07:33.840
<v Speaker 5>have thought about earlier.

1143
01:07:35.000 --> 01:07:35.239
<v Speaker 3>You know.

1144
01:07:35.280 --> 01:07:37.079
<v Speaker 2>The only other thing to throw in here, I think

1145
01:07:37.239 --> 01:07:41.519
<v Speaker 2>is that it's also remarkable and useful to understand who

1146
01:07:41.599 --> 01:07:45.280
<v Speaker 2>handled these files. You know, you have that page that

1147
01:07:45.360 --> 01:07:48.079
<v Speaker 2>tells you who signed them out, who took possession of them.

1148
01:07:48.960 --> 01:07:50.599
<v Speaker 2>You know, it gives you an idea of who was

1149
01:07:50.599 --> 01:07:53.679
<v Speaker 2>actually handling these so who was interested in reading them

1150
01:07:54.199 --> 01:07:57.760
<v Speaker 2>at certain points in time, and the timing of their

1151
01:07:58.000 --> 01:08:02.079
<v Speaker 2>looking into these files is yet again another thing that

1152
01:08:03.199 --> 01:08:05.920
<v Speaker 2>opens up like a Rosetta stone to let you know

1153
01:08:06.599 --> 01:08:09.119
<v Speaker 2>what was going on here. Why would somebody want to

1154
01:08:09.159 --> 01:08:11.400
<v Speaker 2>read this file if they're part.

1155
01:08:11.159 --> 01:08:14.119
<v Speaker 3>Of you know, uh, the the uh, you know.

1156
01:08:14.280 --> 01:08:17.079
<v Speaker 2>This part of the agency, if they're uh, you know,

1157
01:08:17.159 --> 01:08:21.239
<v Speaker 2>looking for operational uses at that time, it's fascinating that

1158
01:08:21.279 --> 01:08:23.840
<v Speaker 2>it's this guy who checks it out, you know, uh,

1159
01:08:23.920 --> 01:08:26.680
<v Speaker 2>so on and so forth, because it's yeah.

1160
01:08:26.680 --> 01:08:27.760
<v Speaker 4>Excellent point, Jack.

1161
01:08:27.840 --> 01:08:30.079
<v Speaker 5>I'm really glad I should have said, I'm glad you

1162
01:08:30.159 --> 01:08:35.159
<v Speaker 5>brought that up, because you know who's reading what file,

1163
01:08:35.199 --> 01:08:38.840
<v Speaker 5>who's even copied? Is your only clue you have to

1164
01:08:38.920 --> 01:08:42.920
<v Speaker 5>the operational significance. And and I think that's another area

1165
01:08:43.039 --> 01:08:46.520
<v Speaker 5>David can point out. You know, we didn't understand JM

1166
01:08:46.600 --> 01:08:50.760
<v Speaker 5>way before, we didn't understand Fitzgerald's special affairs staff before.

1167
01:08:51.560 --> 01:08:55.199
<v Speaker 5>Now we understand it, and and actually we understand how

1168
01:08:55.239 --> 01:09:00.319
<v Speaker 5>many case officers should have seen something about Oswald and

1169
01:09:00.359 --> 01:09:04.479
<v Speaker 5>who were active in New Orleans. We didn't know that

1170
01:09:04.600 --> 01:09:09.359
<v Speaker 5>before and just knowing who's reading what document.

1171
01:09:09.600 --> 01:09:11.119
<v Speaker 4>It's funny in two ways.

1172
01:09:11.159 --> 01:09:13.800
<v Speaker 5>First of all, you know when they got questioned afterwards

1173
01:09:13.800 --> 01:09:17.079
<v Speaker 5>and said I know nothing, that it was a lie, right,

1174
01:09:18.119 --> 01:09:22.800
<v Speaker 5>And you know what, and we know what kind of

1175
01:09:22.800 --> 01:09:26.079
<v Speaker 5>projects they were engaged in, So if they were copied

1176
01:09:26.119 --> 01:09:34.439
<v Speaker 5>on something, it tells us something about project as well, right.

1177
01:09:34.479 --> 01:09:36.640
<v Speaker 2>I mean when you combine it with knowing what these

1178
01:09:36.640 --> 01:09:38.479
<v Speaker 2>guys and this takes a while. You got to know

1179
01:09:38.479 --> 01:09:41.800
<v Speaker 2>what these guys' responsibilities were, what it is their particular

1180
01:09:42.239 --> 01:09:45.560
<v Speaker 2>you know, they're compartmentalizing things so it can be distributed

1181
01:09:45.560 --> 01:09:50.800
<v Speaker 2>to specific offices within the agency. Those offices have specific

1182
01:09:50.840 --> 01:09:54.479
<v Speaker 2>purposes and are involved with specific things at certain points

1183
01:09:54.479 --> 01:09:59.239
<v Speaker 2>of time. So it is all relevant as you examined this.

1184
01:10:00.000 --> 01:10:02.880
<v Speaker 2>And you know, David, I really appreciate you taking the

1185
01:10:02.920 --> 01:10:05.520
<v Speaker 2>time to break this down and kind of you know,

1186
01:10:05.560 --> 01:10:07.720
<v Speaker 2>do this for us, you know, slow speed if you will.

1187
01:10:08.560 --> 01:10:10.640
<v Speaker 2>But it takes a while to build up this information.

1188
01:10:11.640 --> 01:10:14.800
<v Speaker 2>It does so that you know how to decipher what

1189
01:10:14.840 --> 01:10:15.159
<v Speaker 2>it is.

1190
01:10:15.119 --> 01:10:15.880
<v Speaker 3>You're looking at.

1191
01:10:15.960 --> 01:10:18.159
<v Speaker 2>You know, again, I always used to laugh when I

1192
01:10:18.159 --> 01:10:21.359
<v Speaker 2>would see these guys, you know, waving around a document

1193
01:10:22.560 --> 01:10:25.199
<v Speaker 2>and saying, oh, I know this because of what's in

1194
01:10:25.239 --> 01:10:29.039
<v Speaker 2>this document, you know, And people used to just take

1195
01:10:29.039 --> 01:10:30.680
<v Speaker 2>their word for it because they have a document.

1196
01:10:31.680 --> 01:10:33.479
<v Speaker 3>But do they even know how to read that thing?

1197
01:10:33.680 --> 01:10:34.560
<v Speaker 3>Do they know what.

1198
01:10:34.399 --> 01:10:38.000
<v Speaker 2>They're looking at? Do they understand who actually initialed this?

1199
01:10:38.520 --> 01:10:38.720
<v Speaker 7>You know?

1200
01:10:38.800 --> 01:10:41.319
<v Speaker 2>Do they understand who decided to read it in nineteen

1201
01:10:41.399 --> 01:10:43.760
<v Speaker 2>sixty as opposed to who decided to read it in

1202
01:10:43.800 --> 01:10:48.479
<v Speaker 2>nineteen sixty three. Is there a big difference, you know,

1203
01:10:48.720 --> 01:10:53.439
<v Speaker 2>between what is you know, supposed to be there and

1204
01:10:53.600 --> 01:10:55.079
<v Speaker 2>what ends up not being there.

1205
01:10:56.039 --> 01:10:56.880
<v Speaker 3>Who got you.

1206
01:10:56.800 --> 01:10:59.680
<v Speaker 2>Know, read into these things? Who needed to be aware

1207
01:10:59.680 --> 01:11:03.159
<v Speaker 2>of this guy? You know, who actually needs Oswald's to

1208
01:11:03.239 --> 01:11:07.399
<v Speaker 2>a one file right? I mean, all of it is relevant,

1209
01:11:08.000 --> 01:11:09.680
<v Speaker 2>and the timing of it is relevant.

1210
01:11:09.760 --> 01:11:12.920
<v Speaker 3>So anyway, there's always a lot more to it.

1211
01:11:13.000 --> 01:11:14.840
<v Speaker 2>And you're going to get into this in depth in

1212
01:11:14.920 --> 01:11:18.720
<v Speaker 2>the Oswald Puzzle, and I'm looking forward to it. I

1213
01:11:18.760 --> 01:11:22.239
<v Speaker 2>also am looking forward to David. Just before we go,

1214
01:11:22.680 --> 01:11:25.840
<v Speaker 2>would you mind giving me a hint about what it

1215
01:11:25.920 --> 01:11:27.920
<v Speaker 2>is you're going to do a presentation on it? Lancer,

1216
01:11:29.079 --> 01:11:34.920
<v Speaker 2>It's could be me and Larry, okay, and I'm guessing Oswald.

1217
01:11:37.239 --> 01:11:40.479
<v Speaker 5>How about how about Oswald and the FBI and New Orleans?

1218
01:11:41.199 --> 01:11:44.399
<v Speaker 3>Nice? Okay, And just to give.

1219
01:11:44.279 --> 01:11:48.640
<v Speaker 5>A teaser, let's pose this question. If I went into

1220
01:11:48.680 --> 01:11:53.119
<v Speaker 5>the FBI office and told them a series of lies

1221
01:11:54.159 --> 01:11:59.359
<v Speaker 5>about working with a Clandestino organization that was covertly meeting

1222
01:11:59.399 --> 01:12:05.439
<v Speaker 5>in people's and then they found out that I, like

1223
01:12:05.600 --> 01:12:08.359
<v Speaker 5>totally lied to them, what do you think they would

1224
01:12:08.399 --> 01:12:08.720
<v Speaker 5>do to me?

1225
01:12:10.279 --> 01:12:16.159
<v Speaker 3>Hmm today, I'm not sure, David. What were we saying?

1226
01:12:17.199 --> 01:12:19.640
<v Speaker 7>I said nothing. They didn't do anything.

1227
01:12:21.760 --> 01:12:25.680
<v Speaker 3>Interesting. And oh, by the way, they did have.

1228
01:12:25.560 --> 01:12:28.039
<v Speaker 2>Some surveillance on this guy too at a certain point

1229
01:12:28.079 --> 01:12:31.720
<v Speaker 2>the FBI. It's going to be interesting to have you

1230
01:12:31.800 --> 01:12:33.960
<v Speaker 2>guys sort of peel back the layers on that. And

1231
01:12:34.000 --> 01:12:37.159
<v Speaker 2>I look forward to it and can't wait to see

1232
01:12:37.439 --> 01:12:38.520
<v Speaker 2>how this is going to come out.

1233
01:12:38.560 --> 01:12:41.680
<v Speaker 3>At Lancer. There is always much more to.

1234
01:12:41.560 --> 01:12:44.159
<v Speaker 2>Dig into here, and again, it's good to have a

1235
01:12:44.199 --> 01:12:47.760
<v Speaker 2>re examination because those broad, sloppy strokes of the brush,

1236
01:12:48.239 --> 01:12:49.840
<v Speaker 2>I think you know, in a lot of ways, it

1237
01:12:49.880 --> 01:12:53.279
<v Speaker 2>got people introduced to a lot of ideas, but it

1238
01:12:53.319 --> 01:12:56.359
<v Speaker 2>didn't do them any favors about getting to the specifics.

1239
01:12:56.600 --> 01:12:59.600
<v Speaker 2>And I'm not blaming you, Larry, I'm saying that in general,

1240
01:13:01.039 --> 01:13:03.880
<v Speaker 2>you know, there were people using too broad a terminology.

1241
01:13:04.920 --> 01:13:07.920
<v Speaker 2>There were people throwing out ideas that, like you said,

1242
01:13:07.960 --> 01:13:13.720
<v Speaker 2>were almost purely supposition, based on very little evidence that

1243
01:13:13.760 --> 01:13:15.319
<v Speaker 2>they were just you know, let me see if I

1244
01:13:15.319 --> 01:13:18.960
<v Speaker 2>can fill in all these blanks. And that's what went

1245
01:13:19.000 --> 01:13:22.119
<v Speaker 2>on for many years. And we can now do a

1246
01:13:22.159 --> 01:13:25.960
<v Speaker 2>better job because there's more information out there, there's more literacy.

1247
01:13:27.039 --> 01:13:29.000
<v Speaker 2>You know, it's not just one guy among us all

1248
01:13:29.000 --> 01:13:31.840
<v Speaker 2>that knows how to read these documents. Now, you know,

1249
01:13:31.920 --> 01:13:33.760
<v Speaker 2>guys like David have learned.

1250
01:13:33.800 --> 01:13:36.720
<v Speaker 3>You know, I don't know where you went to learn this, David, but.

1251
01:13:38.239 --> 01:13:40.840
<v Speaker 2>You know I'm making a joke there, but I mean,

1252
01:13:41.319 --> 01:13:44.319
<v Speaker 2>you have to teach yourself how this stuff works, and

1253
01:13:44.359 --> 01:13:46.439
<v Speaker 2>you have to be as well informed as possible.

1254
01:13:46.960 --> 01:13:48.319
<v Speaker 3>And it's a process.

1255
01:13:48.600 --> 01:13:51.840
<v Speaker 2>And you know, sorry, it did take about a decade

1256
01:13:51.880 --> 01:13:54.720
<v Speaker 2>for us to understand certain things that might have been

1257
01:13:54.760 --> 01:13:56.359
<v Speaker 2>mysterious not so long ago.

1258
01:13:57.960 --> 01:13:58.760
<v Speaker 3>And here we are.

1259
01:13:59.640 --> 01:14:02.840
<v Speaker 2>So with all that in mind, again, both Larry and

1260
01:14:03.119 --> 01:14:05.560
<v Speaker 2>David will be involved with the Lancer Conference which is

1261
01:14:06.279 --> 01:14:09.840
<v Speaker 2>November twenty second to the twenty fourth in Dallas, Texas.

1262
01:14:10.960 --> 01:14:13.960
<v Speaker 2>In the show notes today, they'll be the you know,

1263
01:14:14.000 --> 01:14:16.159
<v Speaker 2>the the website to go ahead if you want to

1264
01:14:16.199 --> 01:14:19.439
<v Speaker 2>sign up. There's also a ten percent discount if you

1265
01:14:19.520 --> 01:14:22.920
<v Speaker 2>use the code Ocelli ten on the website. Whether you

1266
01:14:23.479 --> 01:14:28.800
<v Speaker 2>attended virtually or in person, that coupon code works and

1267
01:14:29.359 --> 01:14:32.079
<v Speaker 2>all that good stuff. I'll be there in person, David

1268
01:14:32.079 --> 01:14:34.920
<v Speaker 2>will be there in person, Larry will be there virtually,

1269
01:14:35.479 --> 01:14:38.800
<v Speaker 2>and there is a long list of speakers actually that

1270
01:14:39.279 --> 01:14:42.119
<v Speaker 2>ought to be really fascinating. So and again, go to

1271
01:14:42.239 --> 01:14:46.520
<v Speaker 2>Larry hyphen or Larry dash Handcock dot com. Check out

1272
01:14:46.520 --> 01:14:49.199
<v Speaker 2>his blog. I recommend all of his books. If you

1273
01:14:49.199 --> 01:14:50.680
<v Speaker 2>don't have them, all, what are you doing?

1274
01:14:50.760 --> 01:14:51.479
<v Speaker 3>Go get them.

1275
01:14:52.079 --> 01:14:54.399
<v Speaker 2>You know, not just his books on this case, but

1276
01:14:54.560 --> 01:14:58.840
<v Speaker 2>a wide variety of topics that again would greatly inform

1277
01:14:58.920 --> 01:15:04.239
<v Speaker 2>you about to be behaviors, reactions, and history of what

1278
01:15:04.399 --> 01:15:10.840
<v Speaker 2>goes on in the intelligence business with major events, various assassinations,

1279
01:15:11.239 --> 01:15:13.399
<v Speaker 2>surprise attacks, and shadow warfare.

1280
01:15:13.720 --> 01:15:14.199
<v Speaker 3>Whoops.

1281
01:15:14.439 --> 01:15:19.039
<v Speaker 2>Those sound like book titles because they are. And again

1282
01:15:19.319 --> 01:15:22.279
<v Speaker 2>I highly recommend all of Larry's works. So I want

1283
01:15:22.279 --> 01:15:25.000
<v Speaker 2>to thank Larry Hancock and David Boylan for joining me tonight,

1284
01:15:25.279 --> 01:15:27.520
<v Speaker 2>and I want to thank you guys for listening again.

1285
01:15:27.600 --> 01:15:29.159
<v Speaker 3>Read through the show notes, click.

1286
01:15:28.960 --> 01:15:32.119
<v Speaker 2>The links check out the stuff and educate yourself as

1287
01:15:32.199 --> 01:15:36.399
<v Speaker 2>best you can, because there is always more to learn.

1288
01:15:36.520 --> 01:15:37.319
<v Speaker 3>And keep digging.

1289
01:15:37.720 --> 01:15:42.079
<v Speaker 2>We may eventually get at the clearest picture possible and

1290
01:15:43.039 --> 01:15:48.760
<v Speaker 2>who knows, maybe even what solved the case. Anyway, I'm

1291
01:15:48.760 --> 01:15:51.079
<v Speaker 2>merely o'celly. All of you are indeed the effect.

1292
01:15:52.079 --> 01:16:44.039
<v Speaker 3>Goodnight, h go ahead, call.

1293
01:16:43.960 --> 01:16:46.640
<v Speaker 9>It a shot in the truth about the day as fascination.

1294
01:16:46.960 --> 01:16:47.920
<v Speaker 3>Right, Well, what do you want to know?

1295
01:16:48.319 --> 01:16:51.920
<v Speaker 8>Baker's wild claim Oswald girlfriends you knew Ruby and Berry

1296
01:16:52.039 --> 01:16:52.960
<v Speaker 8>hans you weapons?

1297
01:16:53.000 --> 01:16:53.279
<v Speaker 3>Really?

1298
01:16:53.399 --> 01:16:55.399
<v Speaker 2>I imagine I could claim I have four wheels. It

1299
01:16:55.439 --> 01:16:56.479
<v Speaker 2>doesn't make me a wagon.

1300
01:16:56.560 --> 01:16:59.680
<v Speaker 3>But okay, Oswald was on the Bilding and Frings events.

1301
01:16:59.720 --> 01:17:02.000
<v Speaker 3>The John Kennedy Come on Now has a.

1302
01:17:01.880 --> 01:17:03.800
<v Speaker 6>Real effort on the DAFA assassination.

1303
01:17:05.039 --> 01:17:09.000
<v Speaker 2>Go to Amazon dot com enter Judith Baker.

1304
01:17:08.720 --> 01:17:09.840
<v Speaker 3>In her own words.

1305
01:17:09.920 --> 01:17:12.239
<v Speaker 2>You'll get the results for a digital copy of a

1306
01:17:12.239 --> 01:17:15.920
<v Speaker 2>book where Walt Brown utilizes her own words and the

1307
01:17:15.960 --> 01:17:19.439
<v Speaker 2>known evidence in the case to get at well a

1308
01:17:19.520 --> 01:17:20.520
<v Speaker 2>different perspective.

1309
01:17:20.600 --> 01:17:21.760
<v Speaker 3>Let's say you can get.

1310
01:17:21.680 --> 01:17:25.319
<v Speaker 2>Judith Ary Baker in her own words from the author himself,

1311
01:17:25.479 --> 01:17:28.520
<v Speaker 2>signed if you request it by contacting doctor Brown at

1312
01:17:28.600 --> 01:17:33.319
<v Speaker 2>kias jfk at Aol dot com. It's a fun book

1313
01:17:33.359 --> 01:17:37.479
<v Speaker 2>and it actually dissects the many, many fantastic claims.

1314
01:17:37.720 --> 01:17:39.800
<v Speaker 3>Judith very Baker, in her own.

1315
01:17:39.560 --> 01:17:42.560
<v Speaker 9>Words, thank you for all the great information. In Denial

1316
01:17:42.960 --> 01:17:47.600
<v Speaker 9>The Secret Wars with Air Strikes and Tanks by Larry Hancock.

1317
01:17:48.399 --> 01:17:51.960
<v Speaker 9>Secret wars became a staple of US covert operations and

1318
01:17:52.000 --> 01:17:56.159
<v Speaker 9>are still happening today. Larry Hancock's book In Denial rips

1319
01:17:56.279 --> 01:17:59.079
<v Speaker 9>the cover off many of them, using new files. It

1320
01:17:59.079 --> 01:18:01.640
<v Speaker 9>exposes things about the Bay and Pigs that no one

1321
01:18:01.680 --> 01:18:04.760
<v Speaker 9>has ever written about before. It shows why it really

1322
01:18:04.800 --> 01:18:07.000
<v Speaker 9>failed and why the United States did.

1323
01:18:06.840 --> 01:18:09.760
<v Speaker 10>Not earn from it. It also shows why other countries

1324
01:18:09.800 --> 01:18:13.720
<v Speaker 10>today are doing secret operations with more success. This is

1325
01:18:13.760 --> 01:18:17.119
<v Speaker 10>the book that puts what some want to deny into

1326
01:18:17.159 --> 01:18:21.279
<v Speaker 10>the light. In Denial, Secret Wars with Air Strikes and

1327
01:18:21.399 --> 01:18:27.199
<v Speaker 10>Tanks Larryhancock. For more information, go to Larry hyphen Hancock

1328
01:18:27.319 --> 01:18:30.159
<v Speaker 10>dot com. Pick up your copy of In Denial at

1329
01:18:30.199 --> 01:18:33.239
<v Speaker 10>Amazon dot com in digital or physical force.

1330
01:18:34.399 --> 01:18:36.800
<v Speaker 2>If you've expressed my caller schools anyone else left to

1331
01:18:36.800 --> 01:18:38.279
<v Speaker 2>get on the air Lly dot com if you've.

1332
01:18:38.119 --> 01:18:40.880
<v Speaker 7>Not necessarily replied views or UK.

1333
01:18:41.239 --> 01:18:44.000
<v Speaker 3>And we are not responsible for any stupidity, which might ensue.

1334
01:18:45.239 --> 01:18:47.239
<v Speaker 4>Dot Com Radio Network.

1335
01:18:47.439 --> 01:18:50.520
<v Speaker 11>Do you like history, Real history that you were never

1336
01:18:50.640 --> 01:18:55.079
<v Speaker 11>taught in schools? Why the Vietnam War, Nuclear Bombs and

1337
01:18:55.239 --> 01:18:59.239
<v Speaker 11>Nation Building in Southeast Asia by author Mike Swanson, with

1338
01:18:59.399 --> 01:19:03.720
<v Speaker 11>new document never seen before that'll open your eyes to

1339
01:19:03.840 --> 01:19:07.359
<v Speaker 11>events that led up to this. Why the Vietnam War,

1340
01:19:07.640 --> 01:19:12.239
<v Speaker 11>Nuclear Bombs in Nation Building in Southeast Asia nineteen forty

1341
01:19:12.359 --> 01:19:16.479
<v Speaker 11>five through nineteen sixty one. Get your copy today at

1342
01:19:16.560 --> 01:19:21.760
<v Speaker 11>Amazon dot Com. Why the Vietnam War by author Mike Swanson.

1343
01:19:21.920 --> 01:19:25.119
<v Speaker 6>The War State by Michael Swanson explains the great national

1344
01:19:25.119 --> 01:19:28.159
<v Speaker 6>transformation that took place and put the Kennedy presidency in

1345
01:19:28.199 --> 01:19:31.600
<v Speaker 6>the context of the times and reveals never before published

1346
01:19:31.640 --> 01:19:35.319
<v Speaker 6>information about the Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy would not

1347
01:19:35.399 --> 01:19:38.000
<v Speaker 6>have been assassinated if he had been president two hundred

1348
01:19:38.079 --> 01:19:41.399
<v Speaker 6>years ago. His assassination took place in the context of

1349
01:19:41.439 --> 01:19:44.439
<v Speaker 6>the Cold War and the rise of the national security state.

1350
01:19:44.520 --> 01:19:48.079
<v Speaker 6>Before World War II, the United States was a continental republic.

1351
01:19:48.399 --> 01:19:51.479
<v Speaker 6>In the decade that followed, it became an imperial superpower.

1352
01:19:51.720 --> 01:19:55.319
<v Speaker 6>Generals such as Curtis LeMay not only wanted to invade Cuba,

1353
01:19:55.359 --> 01:19:57.640
<v Speaker 6>but knew that there were short range missiles on the

1354
01:19:57.640 --> 01:20:00.880
<v Speaker 6>island armed with nuclear warheads that they could not destroyed

1355
01:20:00.920 --> 01:20:03.760
<v Speaker 6>because they were on mobile launchers. Their invasion could have

1356
01:20:03.840 --> 01:20:06.840
<v Speaker 6>led to a Third World War, and they wanted to

1357
01:20:06.840 --> 01:20:10.159
<v Speaker 6>go to war anyway. The War State by Michael Swanson

1358
01:20:10.399 --> 01:20:13.199
<v Speaker 6>reveals why, and we'll show you what President Kennedy was

1359
01:20:13.279 --> 01:20:17.199
<v Speaker 6>up against. For more information, The War State dot com

1360
01:20:17.319 --> 01:20:18.439
<v Speaker 6>Nuclear Holocaust.

1361
01:20:18.720 --> 01:20:19.880
<v Speaker 3>You know what uranium is, right?

1362
01:20:20.199 --> 01:20:23.199
<v Speaker 7>I think called nuclear weapons and other things like lots

1363
01:20:23.239 --> 01:20:25.000
<v Speaker 7>of you know what uranium is, right?

1364
01:20:25.279 --> 01:20:29.319
<v Speaker 8>Bad things things are done with uranium, including some bad things.

1365
01:20:29.680 --> 01:20:30.760
<v Speaker 3>Nuclear holocaust.

1366
01:20:31.159 --> 01:20:33.479
<v Speaker 7>You know what uranium is, right, I've been a brief.

1367
01:20:33.439 --> 01:20:37.479
<v Speaker 3>Nuclear holocaust is nuclear holocaust. You know what uranium is, right?

1368
01:20:37.920 --> 01:20:40.920
<v Speaker 8>Think called nuclear weapons and other things like lots of

1369
01:20:41.399 --> 01:20:41.760
<v Speaker 8>you know what.

1370
01:20:41.840 --> 01:20:42.600
<v Speaker 3>Uranium is, right?

1371
01:20:42.880 --> 01:20:46.960
<v Speaker 8>Bad things things are done with uranium, including some bad things.

1372
01:20:47.239 --> 01:20:55.119
<v Speaker 8>Nuclear holocaust, nuclear holoclear Holocaust, nuclear holocaust, nuclear holocaust, nuclear.

1373
01:20:54.680 --> 01:23:08.760
<v Speaker 1>Hollow Chili dot Com.

1374
01:22:03.359 --> 01:22:06.520
<v Speaker 6>Increased to act

1375
01:22:07.199 --> 01:22:11.079
<v Speaker 2>Drove st Slaw partic