Speaker 1: Get ready.
Speaker 2: It looks like it's the twenty eighth day of August
Speaker 2: twenty twenty four, allegedly, according to that thing we call
Speaker 2: a calendar, this the o'celli effect. You probably hearing us
Speaker 2: via the podcast, but we do this live, and it
Speaker 2: does happen to be a Wednesday, right, Wednesday, Yeah, that's.
Speaker 3: The correct day.
Speaker 2: I got to turn my head and look at the
Speaker 2: calendar to tell me what day it is, because some
Speaker 2: days blend into others.
Speaker 3: Anyway, enough of my problems.
Speaker 2: It is Wednesday, it's the middle of the week, and
Speaker 2: we've had an interesting broadcast week so far. But we're
Speaker 2: going to resume a conversation that I should have resumed
Speaker 2: last week, but you know, some of us weren't feeling
Speaker 2: good and it was not the week to do it.
Speaker 2: This week is the week to do it. Who do
Speaker 2: we have with us? Well, returning once again Larry Hancock,
Speaker 2: who I'm more than happy to break down a discussion
Speaker 2: over guess what a familiar topic.
Speaker 3: Lee rv. Oswald.
Speaker 2: We've been doing this because the Oswald puzzle Pieces. That
Speaker 2: is the title now, right, Larry Oswald puzzle.
Speaker 4: Pieces, now, just the Oswald puzzle.
Speaker 3: I do that every time. The Oswald puzzle. That's what
Speaker 3: it is.
Speaker 2: And I know I do it every time and I
Speaker 2: realize it after I say it. But anyway, the Oswald puzzle,
Speaker 2: and it is a puzzle. That is the name of
Speaker 2: the book that should be out pretty soon. Not exactly
Speaker 2: clear on a release date at least, I'm not. Do
Speaker 2: you have a release date yet, Larry.
Speaker 4: No, we don't. The book.
Speaker 5: The manuscript is going to the publisher officially in two
Speaker 5: days at the end of this month, so really, you know,
Speaker 5: it begins the publishers schedule, right and so very clean.
Speaker 5: It's been intensely edited. That ought to speed things up.
Speaker 5: One of the interesting things though, is David's been working
Speaker 5: on this, Rex has been working on it. The publisher
Speaker 5: has given us the is allowing us to have a
Speaker 5: pretty large photo section, and as you can understand, Chuck,
Speaker 5: it takes a good bit of time to come up
Speaker 5: with to address the use privileges for photos to get
Speaker 5: a generation of copy that's suitable, so we also have
Speaker 5: a deadline.
Speaker 4: For that, but we're close to all of that.
Speaker 5: So the publisher will begin working on it next month,
Speaker 5: and it just spends on when it fits into their schedule.
Speaker 5: It's hard for me to see it other than a
Speaker 5: twenty twenty five release because of the process they have
Speaker 5: to go through, but I think it'll be relatively early
Speaker 5: in twenty twenty five.
Speaker 2: Well, there you go, and I'm definitely looking forward to
Speaker 2: this because, as we've talked about pretty much throughout this
Speaker 2: entire year, this is a re examination, another examination, because
Speaker 2: it's not like you haven't looked into the character the
Speaker 2: historical character of Leo rvey Oswald before. You certainly have,
Speaker 2: but it was time for a reevaluation, a clean look again,
Speaker 2: and you march back into this knowing that you know
Speaker 2: there's a lot more to be known now because of
Speaker 2: a documentation that's been released, other people's work that might
Speaker 2: have furthered this that or the third thing, a few
Speaker 2: mysteries might have been cleared up, et cetera. And in fact,
Speaker 2: we're going to talk about one of those specific mysteries
Speaker 2: tonight with another gentleman who will also be involved with
Speaker 2: the Lancer Conference in November, that's November twenty second to
Speaker 2: the twenty fourth of this year, and he'll be in
Speaker 2: person there, so he's got to put up with me.
Speaker 2: David Boylan Okay, and I know he'll be presenting there
Speaker 2: and he's joining us to actually help us through something here,
Speaker 2: because we talked about a lot lot of the process here,
Speaker 2: a lot of the things that go on when it
Speaker 2: comes to oh, let's just say people getting involved with Well,
Speaker 2: there used to be less intelligence agencies, but still, whether
Speaker 2: it's today or it's sixty years ago, there was always
Speaker 2: a vetting process, a clearing process that people went through,
Speaker 2: and we wind up talking about a lot of characters
Speaker 2: who were useful to or were sources, or maybe they
Speaker 2: were sources and methods themselves. Okay, depending on who we're
Speaker 2: talking about, for various operations, especially at the height of
Speaker 2: the Cold War, we're going to talk a lot about
Speaker 2: the vetting process, the clearing process.
Speaker 3: The examination. How is it that we know who it
Speaker 3: is we're dealing with.
Speaker 2: Is a legitimate source, is somebody that can be trusted,
Speaker 2: can't be trusted?
Speaker 3: How useful are they? A lot of ways to go
Speaker 3: about it.
Speaker 2: I mean, as I mentioned to you guys just before
Speaker 2: going to air, I even applied and I know this
Speaker 2: always sounds strange, but I applied for a job with
Speaker 2: the NSA and well, let's see, in two thousand and one,
Speaker 2: and well, you know, they had a whole thing where
Speaker 2: they wanted to talk to family members and neighbors, and
Speaker 2: they were going to investigate me to give me a
Speaker 2: low level nothing job. You know, if they were going
Speaker 2: to hand me something sensitive, if they were going to
Speaker 2: involve me in you know, some stuff that really the
Speaker 2: public is not supposed to know, or something that might
Speaker 2: be counterintelligence, something that might be you know, various types
Speaker 2: of intelligence operations. They would have to know exactly who
Speaker 2: they were dealing with, what my entire background was, all
Speaker 2: that stuff. Meanwhile, I was going for a low level job,
Speaker 2: and I swear they wanted to talk to my second
Speaker 2: grade teacher.
Speaker 3: You know. It was weird.
Speaker 2: And I knew other people who went through the process,
Speaker 2: and they told me stories about them going beyond that
Speaker 2: and investigating them and so on and so forth.
Speaker 3: Again.
Speaker 2: In some cases, I mean, one guy was pretty much
Speaker 2: like a tour guide at an NSA facility, and you know,
Speaker 2: he was exposed to next to nothing except you know,
Speaker 2: showing people the building, the facility and all that. And
Speaker 2: meanwhile they dug into his background so deep it was
Speaker 2: it was kind of disturbing. But anyway, sounds like somebody
Speaker 2: trying to do their job, and maybe we should know
Speaker 2: exactly who we're dealing with when they're close to something sensitive.
Speaker 2: That almost sounds like responsible behavior anyway, Is that always
Speaker 2: the case? I don't know, But this is what we're
Speaker 2: going to talk about him. Why because well, Lee Harvey
Speaker 2: Oswald touches upon is involved in He's around people like
Speaker 2: this at various times. And also, by the way, you
Speaker 2: go to Larry Dashancock dot com and whether that book
Speaker 2: comes out in twenty twenty five or somehow makes it
Speaker 2: at the end of the year or whatever, you can
Speaker 2: definitely get Larry's existing works that are already out there
Speaker 2: or this brand new one which I know I'm already
Speaker 2: going to recommend, as I do recommend all of Larry's stuff,
Speaker 2: as I say all the time, he takes up a
Speaker 2: large portion of the bookshelf I keep behind me here
Speaker 2: and definitely well worth the price of admission any of
Speaker 2: Larry's work, whether it's about the Kennedy assassination or gee,
Speaker 2: let's just pick a couple of other topics. Unidentified creating chaos,
Speaker 2: if you want to look at shadow warfare, the various
Speaker 2: behaviors of intelligence communities assets, how they react to things, etc. Well,
Speaker 2: Larry's written volumes and volumes on it, plus a couple
Speaker 2: things about the Kennedy assassination, just saying like tipping point,
Speaker 2: and of course someone would have talked all of that.
Speaker 3: And I recommend all of Larry's work. But if you
Speaker 3: go to Larry.
Speaker 2: Danishancock dot com you can check out his work, his blog, etc.
Speaker 2: And I advise you to do so. Oh and by
Speaker 2: the way, Larry will be involved with the Lancer conference
Speaker 2: as well as he has been for many years. And
Speaker 2: although you'll be there remotely, I understand, Larry, glad that
Speaker 2: you're involved and really happy always that you've been involved
Speaker 2: with the Lancer conferences that I've.
Speaker 3: Been involved with.
Speaker 2: So anyways, now that I've said all of that and
Speaker 2: a bunch of mouthfuls, I need to shut up and
Speaker 2: kind of turn it over to you.
Speaker 3: Larry. What is it that we need to understand here?
Speaker 2: And we have David here specifically to help us through
Speaker 2: a couple of things. And I'm glad also David that
Speaker 2: you're here. You're you're a rare guy on the show,
Speaker 2: and I appreciate you taking.
Speaker 3: The time to do this.
Speaker 2: But where should we begin explaining this? You know nexus
Speaker 2: of people. Again, I like that that title. That word
Speaker 2: another one of Larry's book titles. Anyways, So back to it,
Speaker 2: How do we begin to explain this? What is a
Speaker 2: way to introduce use somebody who is completely uninitiated, or
Speaker 2: even somebody who has a vague understanding of what it
Speaker 2: is they might encounter when trying to study Lee Harvey
Speaker 2: Oswald and the well, the people that surrounded him, the
Speaker 2: people that you know, brought him to whose attention at
Speaker 2: what time, and all of that outside of the defection,
Speaker 2: et cetera, et cetera.
Speaker 3: Where should we begin with this?
Speaker 4: Larry, I think.
Speaker 5: Really the place to begin, Chuck is well, in my
Speaker 5: part is partially an apology, but it's something that's been
Speaker 5: symptomatic in the community, as it were, is that we've
Speaker 5: tossed around words.
Speaker 4: We've tossed around words.
Speaker 5: Like asset or source or informant or even spy without
Speaker 5: defining them and kind of taking it for granted that.
Speaker 4: We knew what we were talking about.
Speaker 5: And actually, when we're talking about an organization like the
Speaker 5: Central Intelligence Agency, that's the wrong way to approach it.
Speaker 5: The Central organize, the CIA is very professional organization, very structured,
Speaker 5: very bureaucratic. Oftentimes even for its it's UH staff frustrating
Speaker 5: because of its degree of security that that it oversaw
Speaker 5: the degree of the approvals process.
Speaker 4: Uh.
Speaker 5: Lots of people that were in field operations were routinely
Speaker 5: frustrated by how slowly it moved.
Speaker 6: UH.
Speaker 4: And I think what we have.
Speaker 5: Neglected to do is really understand the process for that
Speaker 5: went along with these various words that we have just
Speaker 5: thrown around casually.
Speaker 4: You and I have talked before.
Speaker 5: It's like when you paint with a broad brush, you
Speaker 5: miss things and you make mistake.
Speaker 4: Uh. When you talk about the mob.
Speaker 5: Or the mafia or the CIA, just in broad terms, UH,
Speaker 5: you're always making a mistake. So I think one of
Speaker 5: the things we'd like to do, and in the course
Speaker 5: of working on the OSLO puzzle, both David and I
Speaker 5: have gone through a much deeper exploration of these sorts
Speaker 5: of things than certainly I had done before. And one
Speaker 5: of the reasons that we've been able to do it
Speaker 5: is that David has had access. We have had access
Speaker 5: to so many CIA documents where you literally can trace
Speaker 5: the path of individuals through their spotting by the CIA,
Speaker 5: by their identification, you know, just entering in the system
Speaker 5: as an individual that's known.
Speaker 4: Then okay, perhaps they might be some use. How would
Speaker 4: they be a some use?
Speaker 5: And all the way through to the point of which
Speaker 5: takes a long time to get them what's called provisional
Speaker 5: operational approval, and then, for heaven's sakes, to actually get
Speaker 5: them to assigned to an operation, and to understand that
Speaker 5: some people carried operational approvals, were never used, weren't used
Speaker 5: for a period of two or three months, and then
Speaker 5: put on the shelf. This is not the kind of
Speaker 5: simplistic world that we've often written.
Speaker 4: About in the JFK community.
Speaker 5: And so what we would like to do is to
Speaker 5: walk through the process, give some examples, and explain how
Speaker 5: it works, how that the CIA worked in identifying people
Speaker 5: and clearing them for certain levels of activity as well
Speaker 5: as actually using them. But one of the things, and
Speaker 5: this is a this is something I was actually quite
Speaker 5: surprised for. Obviously, the CIA doesn't just call somebody in
Speaker 5: and decide they're going to use them for something if
Speaker 5: they don't have the right background.
Speaker 4: I mean, that's.
Speaker 5: Almost a couple of examples that we're going to talk
Speaker 5: about here, David. We'll talk about the right background means
Speaker 5: be related to somebody, a business relationship, a family relationship,
Speaker 5: a trusted relationship, an established pattern of communications where people
Speaker 5: are talking with each other that makes someone interesting. Okay,
Speaker 5: but if that doesn't exist, you just don't call someone
Speaker 5: and say, oh, okay, we need to get close to.
Speaker 4: Somebody we know, you don't know them.
Speaker 7: Go do it.
Speaker 5: Yeah, that's that would not be a professional approach to things.
Speaker 5: So a lot of this starts with actually just building
Speaker 5: hundreds and hundreds and thousands.
Speaker 4: Of files of people that might be of interest.
Speaker 5: They're doing something, they live somewhere, they're associated with some one,
Speaker 5: and you open a two oh one file and I
Speaker 5: can remember when I first got into this and people
Speaker 5: were going, well, Oswall had a two to oh one file, so.
Speaker 4: It must be he was a spy. No, No, that's
Speaker 4: not what it means.
Speaker 5: You don't understand. But early on it's like, well, that's
Speaker 5: that seems reasonable. Let's see I he's got a file
Speaker 5: on him, right, Okay, why would they have a file
Speaker 5: on him? Well, you know, like you might ask when
Speaker 5: was that file created and where was it created?
Speaker 4: And then when you find out that.
Speaker 5: It was created when he went to Russia and it
Speaker 5: resided in the counterintelligence group. You go, oh, well, geez,
Speaker 5: if they were doing their job, they better. He's in
Speaker 5: the newspapers, for lord's sake, He's in the newspapers. He's
Speaker 5: in State Department memos. If if the CEI did not
Speaker 5: have a file on him, someone is grossly incompetent, you know.
Speaker 4: So now that's not all that suspicious.
Speaker 5: But so what I'd like to do is just kind
Speaker 5: of have asked David to walk through the process. You know, Okay,
Speaker 5: there's a two oh one file. What are the steps
Speaker 5: that happen between there being a two to oh one
Speaker 5: file and the CIA actually using someone in an operation?
Speaker 5: And he's he's done enough work on these people that
Speaker 5: we actually have links to documents and can illustrate how.
Speaker 4: This process goes on.
Speaker 5: So I just like to turn it over to him
Speaker 5: and have him go through the process and give some examples.
Speaker 2: Right now, as a parallel to this, we have to
Speaker 2: be careful again not to paint with the sloppy brush,
Speaker 2: because you have specific terms, specific definitions, specific classifications for
Speaker 2: people for operations, et cetera. And these are not inconsequential.
Speaker 2: Like you said, and like we've said many times, you know,
Speaker 2: people use these very generalized, sort of odd terminologies, broad
Speaker 2: ideas about what things mean, et cetera. You know, simply
Speaker 2: because someone was in somebody's proximity doesn't necessarily mean that
Speaker 2: they were operationally connected. Although if that was a useful thing,
Speaker 2: that's another issue. Right, But you know, again, as we go, right,
Speaker 2: people used to have used the word handler quite often
Speaker 2: in order to explain, well, here's somebody who had, you know,
Speaker 2: a background already, we can establish they were involved in
Speaker 2: certain things.
Speaker 3: They get involved with someone who's sort of new to the.
Speaker 2: What shall we call it the landscape at the time,
Speaker 2: and they automatically assume in a lot of people's writings
Speaker 2: and statements that that person's a handler for this person.
Speaker 2: That's not necessarily true. Whether they interacted with them or
Speaker 2: not is one thing, But what their specific purpose for
Speaker 2: interacting with them is that needs to be defined as
Speaker 2: we go. So everything needs to be carefully established as
Speaker 2: you go. You need to understand the terms, and you
Speaker 2: need to be able to read these documents. That's another thing.
Speaker 2: These things are not in the plainest of language, you know,
Speaker 2: where it's like, well, operationally, this person controls what this
Speaker 2: person gets to know and they give the orders. These
Speaker 2: documents don't read like that. They read in a much
Speaker 2: different way. Plus you have cryptonyms. All kinds of stuff
Speaker 2: goes into this interpretation, and it is very specific. It's
Speaker 2: not written to be broad like you know, you and
Speaker 2: I talked about. Well, they just say organized crime and
Speaker 2: they move on. That is a really bad definition. For
Speaker 2: somebody who has a criminal background, it may or may
Speaker 2: not be organized crime, you know, simply because they have
Speaker 2: a criminal background. Again, that's a different you know, sub section,
Speaker 2: if you will. But when it comes to this sort
Speaker 2: of thing, you've got to be very specific because people
Speaker 2: serve specific purposes. One part of the agency might see
Speaker 2: somebody in one way, they might see them in another way.
Speaker 3: The two on one file is a great example.
Speaker 2: You know, two on one file just means effectively, you're
Speaker 2: an interesting person to the agency.
Speaker 3: That's all that that means.
Speaker 2: Back then, as far as I understand, it doesn't necessarily
Speaker 2: infer that you are working for them, that you're their agent.
Speaker 2: You're just a person of interest. Now I might have
Speaker 2: that wrong, and you guys, might you know, help me
Speaker 2: clear this up. But I'm pretty certain that's the way
Speaker 2: that goes. And there's a lot more to this as
Speaker 2: we go, Larry, Yeah.
Speaker 4: Go ahead, Yeah, I checked to elaborate on that.
Speaker 5: And again we often forget that the agency, like every company,
Speaker 5: is for a task oriented. A person might be in
Speaker 5: ato a one file and just setting there and somebody
Speaker 5: might come across it and go, oh, I've been assigned
Speaker 5: to this project and I need a resource. Okay, we're
Speaker 5: going to take this person, and we're not going to
Speaker 5: necessarily put this into two to oh one file because
Speaker 5: that's a general reference file within my functional area. Let's
Speaker 5: say it's the director of operations. I create an entirely
Speaker 5: new file for this person because now I'm thinking about
Speaker 5: using them for something specific. And there's going to be
Speaker 5: a project that this is related to, you know, because
Speaker 5: we get project, we have to fund it. We've going
Speaker 5: to you know, there's a case offer, this case officer
Speaker 5: that's going to be assigned to this group or to
Speaker 5: this and they have tasks and this is all again.
Speaker 4: Very organizationally structured.
Speaker 5: So there might there may very well be a two
Speaker 5: to oh one file that is entirely compartmentalized from a
Speaker 5: group within the agent's that actually decides to investigate this person,
Speaker 5: and may ultimately use him. So that's very important to
Speaker 5: keep in mind. Compartmentalization. Why compartmentalization. Were they worried about us, No,
Speaker 5: they weren't worried about us getting into their files. They
Speaker 5: were worried about the bad guys, the Soviets, the you know,
Speaker 5: Eastern European intelligence agencies. You know, we compartmentalized information for that,
Speaker 5: for that level. But I guess the one other thing
Speaker 5: that I would like to throw out is that.
Speaker 4: Even when someone.
Speaker 5: Gets approval operational approval and is used on a mission
Speaker 5: or for a task, they can then be put back
Speaker 5: on the shelf if there's nothing useful for them at
Speaker 5: the moment, if there's nothing pending. Yeah, they were cleared,
Speaker 5: but they were taken off operational aproof because we don't
Speaker 5: have a project for them at the moment. And the
Speaker 5: fascinating thing about that is they could still be assigned
Speaker 5: to a case officer. They're no longer operational. They might
Speaker 5: even be paid, but they're not. They're not operational, and
Speaker 5: at that point in time, they can go off and
Speaker 5: do whatever they want to do. Uh.
Speaker 4: They're They're fascinating.
Speaker 5: They We have examples of them actually telling anecdotal stories
Speaker 5: about Oh, my case officer had no idea I was
Speaker 5: going and breaking into Watergate. Oh okay, my case officer
Speaker 5: had no idea that I was going to Libya and
Speaker 5: making explosives trigadav Oh nope.
Speaker 4: Uh, you know, but we thought you were.
Speaker 5: Yeah, I was, but I wasn't working for them at
Speaker 5: the moment. And so that's something you often we often
Speaker 5: timing is very important. It's kind of like where they cleared,
Speaker 5: were they operational? Were they not at a given point
Speaker 5: in time. The timelines are always critical.
Speaker 2: Right, and when objectives change and things like that, you're
Speaker 2: you're revolving carousels of Cubans, right. They might be useful
Speaker 2: one month, the next month, the objective changes, regime change,
Speaker 2: somebody that they were trying to get at is no
Speaker 2: longer important, et cetera, et cetera. Maybe they're trying to
Speaker 2: deal with another foreign nation that could be involved with Cuba.
Speaker 2: Now they don't need to because that whole situation has
Speaker 2: been taken care of in some other way. And these
Speaker 2: things are all subject to change as they go on.
Speaker 2: And like you said, they could still be on the payroll,
Speaker 2: on the books, or maybe just sitting on the shelf waiting, and.
Speaker 3: These guys have lives.
Speaker 2: I mean, you know, not to be too snarky about it,
Speaker 2: but you know some of them go on to do
Speaker 2: other things.
Speaker 3: Because they're not going to make it.
Speaker 2: There you go, you know, and some of them just
Speaker 2: go around talking themselves up and confusing us even more.
Speaker 2: Frank Sturgis comes to mind. Anyways. So with all that
Speaker 2: in mind, David, now that you've had all this dumped
Speaker 2: onto your lap, yeah, go ahead.
Speaker 4: I'll be back later, David.
Speaker 3: Have fun there you go.
Speaker 8: Fascinating conversations, guys. You know, I was just listening and
Speaker 8: you guys hit right on the head. So I could
Speaker 8: probably be covering six terms here. Now you do a
Speaker 8: lot of reading and write from the docs just to
Speaker 8: make sure I get it right. How they explained it,
Speaker 8: how the CIA explained it. Beck the House Fleck Committee
Speaker 8: on Assassinations interviewed William Larson. Here's the chief of the
Speaker 8: Information Management staff. Really interesting guy, answered all the questions,
Speaker 8: gave a lot of good information and it was classified
Speaker 8: secret of course because no. He explained how the filing
Speaker 8: system for a lot of these documents and where they
Speaker 8: went and.
Speaker 7: Who started them.
Speaker 8: So going through that is just a mine, I can
Speaker 8: send you guys the link or if Chuck puts it
Speaker 8: up afterwards, so here we can do the wrong reading
Speaker 8: on it. So one of the first files I want
Speaker 8: to subjects I want to cover is a two on
Speaker 8: one file. What is a two on one file? How
Speaker 8: he describes it, William Larson, the chief goes, it's a
Speaker 8: folder or a dacia and which information about individual is collated.
Speaker 8: There could be an interest, it could be a target,
Speaker 8: could actually be a staff officer of the CIA would
Speaker 8: also have a two on one file, he said. If
Speaker 8: there is a counter intelligence interest, a file would be
Speaker 8: opened in the course of running a trace. If so
Speaker 8: you get a trace, you get a case officer saying,
Speaker 8: I want to run a trace on this guy. Let's
Speaker 8: open a two on one file. Whether he's a target
Speaker 8: or a potential agent as they call him. They're going
Speaker 8: to open a two on one file, and they should
Speaker 8: open one automatically. If they're five or more files that
Speaker 8: a two on one file shoul to be open. So
Speaker 8: I run a trace on a guy. When I come
Speaker 8: back with five hits, I said, WHOA, all right, we're
Speaker 8: gonna open a too on one file. You know, that's
Speaker 8: how they're supposed to do it as the bureaucrats. They're saying,
Speaker 8: So Oswald had a too one file. She had a
Speaker 8: first request came in in October of fifty nine, like saying,
Speaker 8: all right, who is this guy? And it took the
Speaker 8: CIA of a little over a full year. It was
Speaker 8: December of nineteen sixty that they actually opened the too
Speaker 8: one file on that we know about. That would be
Speaker 8: from Anne Editor from the Counterintelligence SIG Office. She's the
Speaker 8: one that actually started the file on Oswald. And that's
Speaker 8: what where we get there. She opened it up, so
Speaker 8: you actually call them Lee Henry Oswald. That's where that
Speaker 8: came from. So you get a tool one file. Now,
Speaker 8: if you're going to use this person or whether there
Speaker 8: what they call witting or unwitting, unwitting, you know we're
Speaker 8: using you.
Speaker 7: You have no idea we're using you.
Speaker 8: Winning is said, Yep, I'm gonna I'm gonna do what
Speaker 8: you tell me to do. I know I'm working for
Speaker 8: the CIA, you know, So you become a witting.
Speaker 7: Participant there to do that.
Speaker 8: There's a couple of uh forms, believe it or not,
Speaker 8: you know, in the pureaucracy he had they have to
Speaker 8: fill out. It's a pr Q one and two part one,
Speaker 8: Part two. S Larry mentioned there's a lot it's a bureaucracy.
Speaker 8: A PRQ is a personal record questionnaire.
Speaker 7: A pr Q. I'm gonna read rate here from one.
Speaker 2: Yeah, just so you know, I am going to include
Speaker 2: notes including, uh, the stuff on Larson, what he said,
Speaker 2: exactly what you just said. I'm putting it in the
Speaker 2: live chatroom at o'celli dot com, so you can always
Speaker 2: roll that back or it'll be in with the show
Speaker 2: notes to this podcast. Uh, just so you can follow
Speaker 2: along with some of this up and uh yeah, now
Speaker 2: we're onto uh the the green list in pr Q
Speaker 2: part one, all right, which is the next link I
Speaker 2: have here to uh to share after the one that's
Speaker 2: in the chat.
Speaker 8: So go go right ahead, David, Yeah, sure, stop me
Speaker 8: anytime I tend to ramble here.
Speaker 3: You're doing great.
Speaker 7: A pr Q part one.
Speaker 8: It's really just basic information and it's the guy's name,
Speaker 8: is he married with, is he lived? So it's just
Speaker 8: a small small piece of information. And they add the
Speaker 8: pr Q Part one to the two one file so
Speaker 8: you can see how a two O one file is
Speaker 8: the you know, your master file. This is where everything accumulates.
Speaker 8: Pr Q two usually filled out, got a lot more information.
Speaker 8: It's when it's almost like a personality file. Who are they,
Speaker 8: they're working for us, what's the job?
Speaker 7: A little bit more information there.
Speaker 2: So me describing the the two oh one file as
Speaker 2: you know, look, you're a person of interest. Now we
Speaker 2: get into the specifics and you actually give us a
Speaker 2: good example of what is the es Minosa green list
Speaker 2: in p r Q part one, and then we have
Speaker 2: a good example of Emilio Rodriguez for the p r
Speaker 2: Q part two as as references here, right, yes.
Speaker 8: Yeah, well we probably get into a little bit about
Speaker 8: Melia Rodriguez.
Speaker 7: She became to do.
Speaker 3: A whole show on him. But yeah, go yeah.
Speaker 8: Basically an agent that became a staff officer. He's just
Speaker 8: kind of progressed. He went from just an agent that
Speaker 8: was being very helpful to being a contract officer for
Speaker 8: the CIA becoming a staff agent where he's actually getting
Speaker 8: paid and gets retirement.
Speaker 7: So that's how he started.
Speaker 8: So, but he had the classic two o one file,
Speaker 8: Part one, Part two green list and in the part
Speaker 8: this is a key when we start to look at
Speaker 8: the pr Q part two, this is where they list
Speaker 8: whether you are an unwitting or witting asset or agent,
Speaker 8: which is key. Oswald had a too Part two. They
Speaker 8: would say whether he was a witting or unwitting agent,
Speaker 8: so that would be clear.
Speaker 7: But we don't have a part two that we know about.
Speaker 8: You see that or it's been cleaned from the file, Larry,
Speaker 8: have you ever seen anything like that?
Speaker 5: Now, as a matter of fact, you might think that
Speaker 5: was suspicious, but it's only suspicious if you I mean,
Speaker 5: if he's unwitting, you don't really need it because anybody
Speaker 5: can add access to his tuoh one file and use it.
Speaker 5: The fact that the fact that there is not one
Speaker 5: there suggests.
Speaker 4: Either they hit it and forgot to idde the two
Speaker 4: oh one.
Speaker 5: Right, you know, it's like, okay, yeah, we're gonna admit
Speaker 5: that we had a file on this guy, which is
Speaker 5: going to sound suspicious, but we're just going to hide
Speaker 5: the fact that he was witting by you know, doing
Speaker 5: away with these the green lists and the you know,
Speaker 5: the polygraph tests and the background check, so you'll you
Speaker 5: won't know for sure.
Speaker 4: We'll destroy all that.
Speaker 5: But no, as far as I'm as far as I'm
Speaker 5: aware of, nobody has ever found any paperwork beyond the
Speaker 5: basic TUO one.
Speaker 8: File right exactly, and looking at the green list. We've
Speaker 8: looked at the two one pr Q POT one Part two.
Speaker 8: How green list is can we find anything detrimental on
Speaker 8: this person? Again, it's in a form they fill out
Speaker 8: goes in your tool one file and they usually have
Speaker 8: the results there. They send an inquiry to the FBI saying, hey,
Speaker 8: is this guy clean? Anything you can find the old
Speaker 8: JM wave wave. They'd also send it to the Miami
Speaker 8: Police Department, you see, if these guys been arrested FBI,
Speaker 8: they'd also send it to what they call staffty internal.
Speaker 7: Is this guy okay?
Speaker 3: You know?
Speaker 8: Can we use this person for whatever project we want
Speaker 8: to use? So if you get a clean now pr
Speaker 8: Q one and two get your greenlist started, they will
Speaker 8: give you a provisional operational approval. That means, yep, this
Speaker 8: looks good. We're gonna use this person for infiltration into Cuba,
Speaker 8: you know.
Speaker 4: So, you know, David not tonsert too much, but I
Speaker 4: would say.
Speaker 5: If they followed procedure certainly in greenlisting Oswald to in
Speaker 5: pursuing him as an you know, as an asset, they
Speaker 5: should have greenlisted with an investigation that there should be
Speaker 5: an inquiry to the Navy, an inquiry to the Marines. Uh,
Speaker 5: there should there should be inquiries at various places where
Speaker 5: they were.
Speaker 4: Doing a background check. So just just keep in.
Speaker 5: Mind if they are doing this sort of thing, even
Speaker 5: at the most minimum level for vetting, they should be
Speaker 5: doing background checks. If they're not, it's strange because nobody
Speaker 5: takes anything for granted. Uh, you know, and and Oswald
Speaker 5: certainly had a history in the Marines.
Speaker 4: That would have raised some security issues.
Speaker 5: I can think of many people that I've seen bounced
Speaker 5: by CIA security for less less problems than Oswald heading
Speaker 5: the Marines, not to mention his his you know, any
Speaker 5: background beyond that, but in any event, so they don't
Speaker 5: do this in isolation.
Speaker 4: I think this is.
Speaker 5: The picture of the you know that CI is all
Speaker 5: so secret that we could never know because they never
Speaker 5: reach out and touch anybody.
Speaker 4: But that's not the way this works.
Speaker 2: They might have also gone deeper. I mean, he's not
Speaker 2: an old guy at this point, you know, Like I
Speaker 2: always point out, he only lived to be twenty four
Speaker 2: years of age, so still plenty of access to his
Speaker 2: early life. They could have done like I was talking about,
Speaker 2: with the NSA investigation, you know, just checking background, looked
Speaker 2: into his family life, his known associates. Was he around
Speaker 2: people that maybe you know, would have made him an
Speaker 2: undesirable asset in one way or another for certain operations.
Speaker 3: You would need to know these things.
Speaker 2: Considering that he was still a young man, you know,
Speaker 2: so he might still be quite quite in touch with
Speaker 2: some of the people that he knew as a teenager,
Speaker 2: et cetera.
Speaker 3: What what does his.
Speaker 2: Immediate family do, uh, you know, siblings, parents, these kind
Speaker 2: of things might have been looked into as well.
Speaker 8: David right, Yes, there would have been reports of actually,
Speaker 8: you know, people being interviewed, you know, so the first
Speaker 8: things that would have happened. The green list, you know,
Speaker 8: would have triggered a bunch of inquiries. So if he
Speaker 8: passed the green list, you know, he was good enough,
Speaker 8: then he would have given given an operational approval. Chances
Speaker 8: I would have get paid to once he passed the
Speaker 8: operational approval. See yep, he's an asset. Agent can be
Speaker 8: used for this particular project for six months a year,
Speaker 8: two years, and we could paid one hundred and fifty
Speaker 8: dollars a month. That's used to be the going rate.
Speaker 8: You see a lot of people getting that amount.
Speaker 2: Well, and I was, I don't like to go too
Speaker 2: deep theoretically, David. But fact is, people point out all
Speaker 2: the time, you know, this situation where he's defecting to
Speaker 2: the Soviet Union in quotes I'll put it because you know,
Speaker 2: did he properly defect? No, but you know his whole
Speaker 2: episode there, that in and of itself is something that
Speaker 2: could have triggered a whole bunch of stuff here. And
Speaker 2: is that, you know, not something that would have also
Speaker 2: come up because a lot of people say, well, he
Speaker 2: was part of the false defector program. Well, if indeed
Speaker 2: he was, there should be some other paperwork here in
Speaker 2: this two a one file, right, if it's all being
Speaker 2: retained in the same spot, if it's all actually kept together,
Speaker 2: there should be some other existing documentation here Or am
Speaker 2: I wrong about that?
Speaker 8: Oh, you're right, there's also you know, looking at Larsons
Speaker 8: again recommended you read that, he said throws, so go
Speaker 8: shadow files and soft files. The case officer may keep
Speaker 8: at his desk, not necessarily or her a desk like
Speaker 8: annd eager not sending the information to the tool one
Speaker 8: the central repository. They may keep that close to the vest,
Speaker 8: so that's also an interesting thing to look at. They
Speaker 8: also keep a lot of handwritten notes the case officer
Speaker 8: that may not make it.
Speaker 7: Into the tool one file.
Speaker 8: So there's always that, you know, but again there's the bureaucracy,
Speaker 8: and there should be a lot more files. If he
Speaker 8: was being a witting asset, maybe they just took.
Speaker 2: Him out of his tool on one file, similar to
Speaker 2: what the FBI might do with informants of all types.
Speaker 2: Right you have confidential informants, and you have you know,
Speaker 2: sort of a secret informants and so on and so forth,
Speaker 2: and the FBI in some cases would have that stuff,
Speaker 2: maybe only at a certain level. It doesn't necessarily go
Speaker 2: all throughout the agency because it's only useful to the
Speaker 2: guys in you know, pick a city, Chicago or New
Speaker 2: Orleans or wherever.
Speaker 3: It's only useful to them, So they might have notes
Speaker 3: on it.
Speaker 2: They might have a binder sitting there that isn't necessarily
Speaker 2: collected right away with that person's general file, but it's
Speaker 2: useful to people that are in control of operations, you know,
Speaker 2: in a very direct sense, and they might use informants
Speaker 2: that they never you know, they that they identify later
Speaker 2: under a code or whatever, but that doesn't necessarily attach
Speaker 2: directly to somebody's named personnel file right away, right or
Speaker 2: at least that that's my understanding.
Speaker 5: Historically, Eventually two tiers their check at least one is
Speaker 5: if this person has been pulled for assigned to a project.
Speaker 5: Let's just say there's a false effective project somebody is
Speaker 5: running that it's going to involve multiple people. There's going
Speaker 5: to be record keeping on this project to even ascertain
Speaker 5: if it's working. You know, again corporate level approach, Is
Speaker 5: it working, how many people that we send in, how
Speaker 5: much information are we going to back?
Speaker 4: Should we keep funding it? It's high risks.
Speaker 5: So there's going to be a project file that rolls
Speaker 5: up some of this information. But then there will also
Speaker 5: be a case officers file, as David said, and that
Speaker 5: will be a soft file. That will be a soft
Speaker 5: file that will be in somebody's desk, well, when we
Speaker 5: had a desk, it'll be in a lot filing cabinet
Speaker 5: that's going to be giving the details of the communication
Speaker 5: with that person, the instructions that have been given to
Speaker 5: that person. And one of the things that we that
Speaker 5: we have to acknowledge is soft files never go to
Speaker 5: headquarters unless there's some special reason to go to headquarters.
Speaker 5: In fact, one of the HSCA one of the things
Speaker 5: that they've noted is that there were individuals where they
Speaker 5: actually found a record that there had been a soft
Speaker 5: file on a certain on a certain individual, something special
Speaker 5: was going on operationally with that individual. For example, they
Speaker 5: found a soft file listing it's just a list of
Speaker 5: you know, we're maintaining these out in the world. One
Speaker 5: of them was for Roy Hargrave's which is kind of fascinating,
Speaker 5: but you're never going to get that file unless somebody
Speaker 5: collects it in real time. And the Warrant Commission didn't
Speaker 5: know about those things, didn't even though to.
Speaker 4: Ask for it.
Speaker 5: They just went to the CIA central filing systems. And
Speaker 5: not to jump too much over what David is doing now,
Speaker 5: but I was always amused when I.
Speaker 4: Was writing about.
Speaker 5: CI operations in uh counter terrorist activities that the CIA
Speaker 5: got very upset. Headquarters got very upset because the field
Speaker 5: was training in Afghanistan.
Speaker 4: Feel us, we're training.
Speaker 5: Afghani volunteers to go fight the Russians and build IEDs
Speaker 5: and use sniper rifles, and Headquarters thought that was kind
Speaker 5: of dangerous because these were real radical Islamist and what
Speaker 5: else might they do with that training? So they wrote
Speaker 5: to project, they wrote to the field and said, you know,
Speaker 5: stop that. Well, actually, years later a soft file turned up,
Speaker 5: and all this all file reflects was that the senior
Speaker 5: agent in charge said, Okay, we've got orders not to
Speaker 5: do this. My order to you is not to report it.
Speaker 5: So just we don't we confuse ourselves when we think
Speaker 5: that the the central files CIA files, or the solutions
Speaker 5: of the world's problems.
Speaker 4: It's kind of like the FBI office files.
Speaker 5: If you don't have the FBI office files, you really
Speaker 5: don't know what was going on. And do you think
Speaker 5: they told Hoover everything? No, they did not, and CIA
Speaker 5: field operations didn't tail headquarters everything either. Right, And it's right, David,
Speaker 5: I tromped all over your process.
Speaker 7: Gives me a chance to breathe them up. Yeah.
Speaker 2: Yeah, But but David, maybe a quick explanation. Okay, so
Speaker 2: a soft file, I mean we should get from the
Speaker 2: inferences what that actually is and what we mean by that.
Speaker 2: You know, it's it's one of these things that doesn't
Speaker 2: necessarily go through the whole system, but is a notation somewhere,
Speaker 2: and again, like Larry points out, you know, in some cases, okay,
Speaker 2: well you know what, they don't they don't want us
Speaker 2: to do that. If we don't report it, they don't
Speaker 2: know we're doing it anymore. These kind of things occur, right,
Speaker 2: and again, this is a bit of a confusing world
Speaker 2: that you get into here, because it's not as simple
Speaker 2: as okay, this person is just an agent now, or
Speaker 2: they are an agent. There's financial files also. Somebody's got
Speaker 2: to keep track of the money, and in various cases
Speaker 2: we found that there might be financial traces here that
Speaker 2: reveal that obviously there was more going on than say,
Speaker 2: was preserved in a file regarding an operation. Because you're
Speaker 2: spending money in eight different places here, you're describing two operations.
Speaker 2: Obviously there's more stuff going on here. Either that or
Speaker 2: we're just paying people for nothing. Something's going on there.
Speaker 2: And sometimes you get things like that right where you
Speaker 2: have a financial record emerges. My favorite example of that,
Speaker 2: of course, is the mk Ultra stuff, you know, where
Speaker 2: we wouldn't even know about that if it wasn't for
Speaker 2: the fact that the financial files had not been destroyed. Right, So,
Speaker 2: you know, how do we tackle that whole issue of
Speaker 2: just because you know there's an absence of evidence here
Speaker 2: or there, doesn't mean that it couldn't exist somewhere else.
Speaker 2: And what about these soft files? I mean, what are
Speaker 2: the the the possibilities here regarding you know, somebody being
Speaker 2: a witting or unwitting asset at certain points and big
Speaker 2: difference between asset and an agent as well. So how
Speaker 2: do you break that down, you know, and explain the
Speaker 2: soft files sort of to somebody who's like going, what
Speaker 2: does that mean?
Speaker 3: Yeah?
Speaker 8: Kind of like it's like, you know, I I have
Speaker 8: a yellow pad paper, I get a phone call of
Speaker 8: writing down things on here. I may or may not
Speaker 8: type this up and send it to headquarters for distribution,
Speaker 8: right just you know, so lots of explains a lot
Speaker 8: of guys they just get backed up.
Speaker 7: And they don't want to go through the paperwork. You know,
Speaker 7: they're busy.
Speaker 8: You know, some of these guys have a lot of
Speaker 8: case officers, have a lot of agents.
Speaker 7: They work, and they're very busy.
Speaker 8: A lot of them are traveling, a lot of them
Speaker 8: going down to sites and things like that, and so
Speaker 8: a lot of it's phone call which they may or
Speaker 8: may not write down.
Speaker 7: A lot of it's pat a lot of it's handwritten.
Speaker 8: If you look at a lot of the documents too,
Speaker 8: there's a lot of handwritten notes on documents, and some
Speaker 8: of them actually put the tool one number at the
Speaker 8: top of the document for a particular assets, so they
Speaker 8: can file that in the tool one file a copy
Speaker 8: of it the too on one file. But sometimes a
Speaker 8: lot of times they don't, so you're not that's not
Speaker 8: going to hit the tool one file and may get
Speaker 8: distributed to a small subset of people, or just may
Speaker 8: not get distributed at all. That's essentially what a soft
Speaker 8: file turns into is like I'm not sure what I'm
Speaker 8: going to do with this. It's not official enough to
Speaker 8: actually send it to headquarters, documented and putting the Information
Speaker 8: Management staff system. So that's essentially soft file is same
Speaker 8: thing with the shadow violence similar to a soft file,
Speaker 8: very similar.
Speaker 5: Okay, there must be again, there must be a project
Speaker 5: that this doesn't occur at random. The case officer had
Speaker 5: to be assigned to a project in which this person
Speaker 5: is being used.
Speaker 4: Uh, you know, and this is for a witting person.
Speaker 5: Now, that doesn't mean there can't be a project that's
Speaker 5: handling unwitting people. Okay, but assuming that they've been cleared,
Speaker 5: you know, and assuming they're going to be paid paid
Speaker 5: through you know, deniable mechanisms. They're all paid through covers
Speaker 5: and with deniability. I think one of the funniest examples
Speaker 5: we run across is in the Garrison investigation. Garrison was
Speaker 5: investigating this one Cuban exile that had been working on
Speaker 5: infiltration missions as a guide because he actually had a
Speaker 5: history as a smuggler. Okay, Garrison turns up an application,
Speaker 5: a credit application for a car, and the guy has
Speaker 5: written down employer, Central Intelligence Agency.
Speaker 4: You gotta love this. You got whoever the guy's case
Speaker 4: officer was.
Speaker 5: It's just that's this sort of thing that would drive
Speaker 5: you nuts. Did I not get the message across to
Speaker 5: you people that you were not really working for us?
Speaker 5: But it doesn't exist in a fact, none of this
Speaker 5: occurs in a vacuum. It doesn't occur unless the process
Speaker 5: that David has gone through, the two to one, the
Speaker 5: two levels of.
Speaker 4: P r Q one and two, the green listing.
Speaker 5: In many cases, if these guys are going to be
Speaker 5: operational in the field, uh, we didn't discuss it, but
Speaker 5: something called fluttering is required. They're going to have to
Speaker 5: be polygraphed. That's just routine practice to vet their backstory.
Speaker 5: So none of this happens to anybody who's going to
Speaker 5: have a WIT. I mean, this all goes with somebody
Speaker 5: who's going to be witting and operation operationally used in.
Speaker 4: A specific product project.
Speaker 5: You could hold somebody in that file as unwitting forever
Speaker 5: and just monitor what they're doing until you turn this
Speaker 5: process on. Then you may turn the process on and
Speaker 5: cut it at some point before you even approach them.
Speaker 5: But it's you know, there is a processed flutter.
Speaker 7: Essentially, it's a line detect to test.
Speaker 8: They gave these to a lot of their early recruits
Speaker 8: for the Bay of Pigs, what they what they call
Speaker 8: the Cadre back then first forty fifty people that can
Speaker 8: a detective test and they would send the results to
Speaker 8: headquarters and this would be put into you two on
Speaker 8: one file. And we have quite a few examples of
Speaker 8: that now even you know where they were a little
Speaker 8: bit off in there, you know, light detective test. So
Speaker 8: that's you know, in their two on one files also,
Speaker 8: HM okay.
Speaker 5: And that that's especially true, I think David Will. These
Speaker 5: were guys that they expected infiltrate into Cuba, and you
Speaker 5: have to worry, you know, you're worrying about whether they're
Speaker 5: sincere or not. Right, we're taking these folks that are
Speaker 5: supposed to be virulently anti Castro, well are they really?
Speaker 5: And in all honesty, you would probably I can't swear,
Speaker 5: I've not seen a file, but I would suspect that
Speaker 5: they did that for routinely, for anybody that was doing
Speaker 5: that kind of infiltration, because you've run a real risk of, oh,
Speaker 5: you're anti this or that. We recruit you, we train you,
Speaker 5: you send we send you in, and immediately we see
Speaker 5: you on the news talking about these evil Americans. You know,
Speaker 5: you really want to avoid that. You want to know
Speaker 5: that they're sincere.
Speaker 8: Right, right, Yeah, So that's for the people that actually
Speaker 8: made it to the United States. A lot of the
Speaker 8: agent's assets in Cuba couldn't get a you know, light
Speaker 8: detective test because there's nobody there to give them a
Speaker 8: light detective test.
Speaker 7: So had to do what they could with who's living there.
Speaker 2: You know, all right, and now when Oswald bumps up
Speaker 2: against a whole lot of people that clearly would have
Speaker 2: had to have gone through a lot of these processes
Speaker 2: because they're activists, Uh, they're involved in the anti Cuban
Speaker 2: or excuse me, the anti Castro Cuban stuff, and so
Speaker 2: on and so forth. Uh, you know, when he bumps
Speaker 2: up against Berengear, et cetera. I mean, he's got to
Speaker 2: get mentioned in some of these other places. They have
Speaker 2: to note this guy. They ran into him. They got
Speaker 2: it to a one file on them. So you've got
Speaker 2: somebody who was a person of interest running up against
Speaker 2: another person of interest. Whether it happened to organically or
Speaker 2: somebody orchestrated it, this should be noted somewhere, you know,
Speaker 2: and and so on and so forth. So, I mean,
Speaker 2: there's a lot of things here, and I'm wondering, how
Speaker 2: is it that we tie.
Speaker 3: This to this historical figure.
Speaker 2: You know, this discussion we've had so far, we've been
Speaker 2: pretty general and open about it and given people a
Speaker 2: lot of ideas about possibilities. But what is it that
Speaker 2: that you see in these files now.
Speaker 3: That maybe was not.
Speaker 2: So readily obvious not so long ago, David, I mean,
Speaker 2: what what is new here and what is confirmed from
Speaker 2: old ideas, et cetera, et cetera. What do we know
Speaker 2: about Oswald based on being able to track these things?
Speaker 3: This way.
Speaker 8: Actually it's with the old negative template that Peter Dale
Speaker 8: Scott said.
Speaker 7: It's a lack of that should be there.
Speaker 8: Some of the people in New Orleans he had contact with,
Speaker 8: sorry cough, we're actually CIS assets that we talked about.
Speaker 8: Then they were winning CIS assets. The perfect example is
Speaker 8: Sylvio Odio's Sylvia Odio's uncle Augustine Guitot. He was actually
Speaker 8: well when he was at Oswald's quarter a parents and
Speaker 8: he was also at this time a cutout working for.
Speaker 7: Kyle Trenton, who.
Speaker 8: Works for the Desmond Fitzgerald's Special Affairs Staff CIA in headquarters.
Speaker 8: So I mean, there should be something in his two
Speaker 8: O one file, which we have, but there's a lot
Speaker 8: of us things that are still redacted in Guitot's TO
Speaker 8: one file. So I find that amazing. Frank Martes was
Speaker 8: also at Oswald's court apparents, and he actually confronted Oswald
Speaker 8: outside the court, you know, said you know you're a
Speaker 8: you're a danger, and things like that. A month later
Speaker 8: he's denying he ever met him, even know who he was.
Speaker 8: So that's when Larry and I suspect, like, was Oswald
Speaker 8: in play at that time?
Speaker 3: You know?
Speaker 8: So there's some Again there's no gaps and Martes's file
Speaker 8: he ended up being a CIS asset and going into
Speaker 8: the Congo as a pilot, you know, to fight the
Speaker 8: the Cubans there as an anti Castro Cuban. So there's
Speaker 8: still be gaps in some of these two oh one files,
Speaker 8: you know.
Speaker 5: So I think an example we've seen over and over again,
Speaker 5: if a case officer has these Cubans as assets, one
Speaker 5: of the things that you constantly see showing up in reports.
Speaker 4: I mean, one of.
Speaker 5: Their major jobs is to report anyone who's suspected of
Speaker 5: being a Castro supporter, right, we see over and over again,
Speaker 5: just rumors and gossip because that's what they're out there
Speaker 5: to do, circulating the community and pass on information about
Speaker 5: you know, they don't know what anybody may do with it,
Speaker 5: but their job is to pass on to their case
Speaker 5: officers any information of that nature where the person is
Speaker 5: overtly a supporter of Castro clandestinely a supporters perspectives, that's
Speaker 5: what they're supposed to be doing, so there should be reports.
Speaker 5: As David said, these guys are verifiable assets and they're
Speaker 5: reporting on everything else. It's like, wait a minute, you're
Speaker 5: reporting on everything else, and this is the one thing
Speaker 5: that you didn't report on the guy that's on TV
Speaker 5: and radio and you were to court his parents and
Speaker 5: you didn't say anything to anybody about it.
Speaker 4: Clearly they did.
Speaker 5: It's it's virtually impossible to think that there weren't reports
Speaker 5: at the case officer level, because that's what they're there
Speaker 5: to do. And quite frankly, uh, their credibility depends on
Speaker 5: their being in place, and they're seeing those sorts of things.
Speaker 5: We see them and we've written about this. We see
Speaker 5: them writing on Cubans coming into town that they suspect
Speaker 5: or you know, they're they're they're very vocal. And the
Speaker 5: funny thing is several of them report both of.
Speaker 4: The CIA and of the FBI, you know, So.
Speaker 5: It's not that they that there's a whole gap of
Speaker 5: missing information for that period of time.
Speaker 4: Now there isn't.
Speaker 5: There is only a missing gap pertaining to Oswal's activity.
Speaker 5: But that's kind of mirrored, Chuck by the fact that
Speaker 5: we won't get into the home Mexico City mess here.
Speaker 5: But the thing is that clearly information on Oswell is
Speaker 5: being compartmentalized, because when Oswell shows up in Mexico City.
Speaker 5: Nobody tells Mexico City Station anything about this sort of stuff, like, oh,
Speaker 5: wait a minute, Okay, yes, he's back in the United
Speaker 5: States and here's what he's doing. Nope, And I'm not
Speaker 5: going to talk about this now because we spend way
Speaker 5: too much of my life in the book talking about Mexico.
Speaker 4: City, right, David.
Speaker 5: But it's like, clearly this is intentional, and Morley and
Speaker 5: Newman dug this all out of testimony, and clearly there's
Speaker 5: clearly there is compartmental as a compartmentalization of information, which
Speaker 5: is why I brought up early on the fact that
Speaker 5: we would expect there would be things that are not
Speaker 5: in his consolidated too oh one file because somebody somewhere
Speaker 5: else in the agency decided to make use of him
Speaker 5: in some fashion winning unwitting that's another question. But you
Speaker 5: compartmentalize that information because that's operational. A two to oh
Speaker 5: one file is not operational. These other files, saw files,
Speaker 5: project files, shadow file, all those are operational.
Speaker 4: Those you got to keep secret.
Speaker 8: And you wonder about the domestic contact UH division files.
Speaker 8: New Orleans had their own domestic office. Theres Hunter Leak
Speaker 8: was running it, and we just mentioned Frank Bartees, who's
Speaker 8: at Oswald's Court of Parents.
Speaker 7: He was an off is a contact of hunter Leaks.
Speaker 8: You know that at least five reports that who's talking about,
Speaker 8: but there's probably others that we can't get our hands on.
Speaker 8: Wellians get to miss the contact office, So you wonder
Speaker 8: where they go. You know they soft files. Did they
Speaker 8: hang on to those? I don't know, Larry, what do
Speaker 8: you think would they hang on to those?
Speaker 5: My guess is those would be so would be just
Speaker 5: field level files again, because you're if you're not talking
Speaker 5: about something.
Speaker 4: Observational, they're they're just reporting it.
Speaker 5: And if domestic domestic contacts is normally more outbound than inbound,
Speaker 5: we see that in Dallas, where a domestics contact guy
Speaker 5: is actually told to investigate OSLO after he returns to Dallas.
Speaker 5: He uses a deniable cutout in the form of de
Speaker 5: Moorinshield to do that and obviously collects information and it
Speaker 5: goes somewhere we've never seen because we have not seen
Speaker 5: domestic contacts out of Dallas. But in New Orleans it's
Speaker 5: a little different in that you know, there's no sign
Speaker 5: that anybody activated domestic contacts to look at Oswald. We
Speaker 5: don't see the flip side of the coin, so I
Speaker 5: really don't know. I would assume that they were mention
Speaker 5: it to him. But if he didn't have a tasking
Speaker 5: to investigate Oswald, you know, he might not have done
Speaker 5: anything with it except you know, just setting in a
Speaker 5: SAFT file and those are destroyed after a period. We
Speaker 5: shouldn't we shouldn't make it all mysterious because in all honesty,
Speaker 5: you know, paperwork does accumulate and after a period of
Speaker 5: time that stuff just gets threaded.
Speaker 7: Well.
Speaker 2: And the other thing is I mean, when you got
Speaker 2: two guys that are assets showing up at you know,
Speaker 2: a misdemeanor court appearance for this Lee Harvey Oswald, you
Speaker 2: would think that there could potentially be some sort of
Speaker 2: contact there previous to that, where somebody says, why don't
Speaker 2: you guys go down there and show your face? Maybe
Speaker 2: somebody directed them to do that. That would end up
Speaker 2: in a soft file somewhere right there would be.
Speaker 4: A case officer file.
Speaker 5: And we absolutely know that that occurred because we know
Speaker 5: that that had been reported back to Miami. It had
Speaker 5: been reported to case officers by DR and the DR
Speaker 5: people told morally that they had done that.
Speaker 4: So by the time that courtting occurred.
Speaker 5: He was absolutely Oswell had been had been spotted by
Speaker 5: dre reported by DR, and there should have been an
Speaker 5: exchange of Actually what the DR guys told Morley was
Speaker 5: that this was one of the best opportunities for propaganda
Speaker 5: that they had ever had, and Oswell was the kind
Speaker 5: of guy that they were being paid to use in propaganda.
Speaker 5: There's clearly no doubt about it. And clearly again as
Speaker 5: Jeff found out, you know those files are withheld.
Speaker 8: Yeah, as Jeff was speaking of, you know, Sylvia Audio's uncle,
Speaker 8: Augustin Greek Todd, his case officer called Trenton. Jeff Walley
Speaker 8: actually interviewed him twice and Trenton knew wall about, he
Speaker 8: new bringier An, he knew Oswald and he he said,
Speaker 8: I can't remember the exact quote, but said he couldn't
Speaker 8: diego near Oswald, you know, wouldn't touch him with a
Speaker 8: ten foot poll which means somebody else had a relationship
Speaker 8: with him.
Speaker 7: That's I might take it.
Speaker 3: M M, well, there's that.
Speaker 2: Plus, you know I've seen the I don't know if
Speaker 2: I want to call it speculation or maybe beyond speculation.
Speaker 2: This idea that there was an operation to discredit the
Speaker 2: Fair Play for Cuba Committee. And Oswald's out there pretending
Speaker 2: to be the treasurer for the Fair Play for Cuba
Speaker 2: Committee in New Orleans, right with a with another guy
Speaker 2: who's supposedly the head of it, his pseudonym. Right, you know,
Speaker 2: that old thing is going on there, and you know,
Speaker 2: was that part of a greater operation? Was that something
Speaker 2: that he just dreamed up on his own?
Speaker 3: I mean, do we have any definitive.
Speaker 2: Proof here among the files that are attached to this
Speaker 2: character Lee Rby Oswald?
Speaker 4: Dave, Well, you're gonna have to wait for the book
Speaker 4: for that, Chuck.
Speaker 5: But okay, it's not that we don't explore that in detail.
Speaker 5: But the real honest answer to that twofold answers A
Speaker 5: the FPCC had already been destroyed. It was so thoroughly penetrated,
Speaker 5: it had lost so many chapter members. It's kind of
Speaker 5: like the FBI that the number of people involved with
Speaker 5: the FBCC, there were more intelligence people involved in seeing
Speaker 5: what they were doing than there were members. I mean,
Speaker 5: it was coming apart at the seams. But the here's
Speaker 5: how bad it was and now and that it changed.
Speaker 4: Here's for timing is a year before that that would
Speaker 4: not have been a true statement.
Speaker 5: But things things were such a nature that when then
Speaker 5: the FBI investigated Otiswell's relationship with them, you know how,
Speaker 5: they actually wrote it off the books and closed it down.
Speaker 4: They wrote the FPCC.
Speaker 5: This is the Federal Bureau of Investigations writing the FPCC saying, oh,
Speaker 5: it's this. This guy told us that you had this
Speaker 5: really big chapter in New Orleans and you know, we're
Speaker 5: just we're just curious about that. And the fb FPCC
Speaker 5: writes back and go, no, no, we don't have and
Speaker 5: they close the file. Like clearly the f PC is
Speaker 5: FPCC is not being treated seriously as a threatening clandestine
Speaker 5: our entity at that point in time. But the other
Speaker 5: thing you have to get to is, as David just
Speaker 5: brought up, somebody can have an operational interest in Oswald
Speaker 5: without his being witting. What we do not find and
Speaker 5: not to say they can be. There is no paperwork
Speaker 5: trail that shows witting. There is absolutely a paperwork trail
Speaker 5: that shows operational interest.
Speaker 4: If you want to be strictly.
Speaker 5: Factual, Absolutely the paperwork trail, what information is being shared,
Speaker 5: indicates an operational interest.
Speaker 4: Just as Jane Roman.
Speaker 5: Said, it did, but his paperwork does not show that.
Speaker 5: So that's where you get into a real fascinating discussion
Speaker 5: of witting versus unwitting.
Speaker 2: Right, So there's one way to look at all this.
Speaker 2: And I've already had you guys on for about an
Speaker 2: hour going.
Speaker 3: Through this just so you know.
Speaker 2: But David, but what key points have we not struck
Speaker 2: upon here that you think would be best to fill
Speaker 2: out this explanation.
Speaker 8: I think we hit them all pretty much. I think
Speaker 8: you guys also did a good job. Flynn, you know
Speaker 8: what was going on at that time, So no, I
Speaker 8: think we hit them.
Speaker 2: Okay, So Larry, is there anything else we should add here?
Speaker 2: Because again, it's an interesting study. It gives you an
Speaker 2: idea of you know, look, can we prove it was
Speaker 2: something that was happening or wasn't happening. I like that
Speaker 2: we can at least finally say that all those you know,
Speaker 2: blanket denials of there being absolutely no interest in this
Speaker 2: Oswald character. I mean, he was a screwball. You know,
Speaker 2: he was no good, He was not useful to anybody.
Speaker 2: We know now that that's wholly ridiculous. And by the way,
Speaker 2: it's not like the agencies are not willing to use
Speaker 2: screwballs anyway, just saying, you know, some of the people
Speaker 2: that we've discovered over time, Okay, you know, I find
Speaker 2: the one guy that we got after World War Two.
Speaker 2: It was totally paranoid, but was good with surveillance that
Speaker 2: got recruited.
Speaker 3: I always love that story.
Speaker 4: You know, that's what you want. But yeah, I think
Speaker 4: I would sum of them two things.
Speaker 5: First of all, only because we understand it at the
Speaker 5: day at the level that David can work the files now,
Speaker 5: A lot of what he was just telling you, if
Speaker 5: you look at the links he sent, you only see
Speaker 5: by looking at a marginal note down in a little
Speaker 5: check box on a form a notation that shows green listing,
Speaker 5: you will only see by somebody who was copied or
Speaker 5: somebody who signed off on a file. Until we could
Speaker 5: understand it at this level, or David can understand it
Speaker 5: at this level, I still don't that I asked David questions.
Speaker 5: We couldn't make conclusive statements about these people and what
Speaker 5: should be there and what should be there. Certainly, when
Speaker 5: I first started writing about this, we had no knowledge
Speaker 5: of that level of detail at all. Now we do
Speaker 5: have it, so it's a lot more comfortable to say
Speaker 5: what should be there and what shouldn't be there, and
Speaker 5: how this process works. So understanding the process has helped
Speaker 5: us a lot.
Speaker 4: And it's not easy.
Speaker 5: David hasn't said anything about that, but even use it
Speaker 5: knowing the crypts with the crypt busting, what, David, we
Speaker 5: couldn't say the things that we said on this broadcast.
Speaker 4: What maybe ten years of research.
Speaker 5: Before we could talk at this level of detail, A
Speaker 5: lot of reading.
Speaker 4: And thousands of documents.
Speaker 5: So I would encourage readers again, I guess what this
Speaker 5: is is encourage readers, not listeners, not to you know,
Speaker 5: take for granted generalizations that are made about individuals or
Speaker 5: documents or process because a lot of stuff has been
Speaker 5: thrown against the wall that was pure supposition and pure speculation,
Speaker 5: and we can do a.
Speaker 4: Better job now.
Speaker 5: So I think that would be my summary comment is
Speaker 5: the good news is, after all this gruntwork and all
Speaker 5: this slogging, we can do a better job now looking
Speaker 5: at the process, looking at the documents than we could
Speaker 5: have thought about earlier.
Speaker 3: You know.
Speaker 2: The only other thing to throw in here, I think
Speaker 2: is that it's also remarkable and useful to understand who
Speaker 2: handled these files. You know, you have that page that
Speaker 2: tells you who signed them out, who took possession of them.
Speaker 2: You know, it gives you an idea of who was
Speaker 2: actually handling these so who was interested in reading them
Speaker 2: at certain points in time, and the timing of their
Speaker 2: looking into these files is yet again another thing that
Speaker 2: opens up like a Rosetta stone to let you know
Speaker 2: what was going on here. Why would somebody want to
Speaker 2: read this file if they're part.
Speaker 3: Of you know, uh, the the uh, you know.
Speaker 2: This part of the agency, if they're uh, you know,
Speaker 2: looking for operational uses at that time, it's fascinating that
Speaker 2: it's this guy who checks it out, you know, uh,
Speaker 2: so on and so forth, because it's yeah.
Speaker 4: Excellent point, Jack.
Speaker 5: I'm really glad I should have said, I'm glad you
Speaker 5: brought that up, because you know who's reading what file,
Speaker 5: who's even copied? Is your only clue you have to
Speaker 5: the operational significance. And and I think that's another area
Speaker 5: David can point out. You know, we didn't understand JM
Speaker 5: way before, we didn't understand Fitzgerald's special affairs staff before.
Speaker 5: Now we understand it, and and actually we understand how
Speaker 5: many case officers should have seen something about Oswald and
Speaker 5: who were active in New Orleans. We didn't know that
Speaker 5: before and just knowing who's reading what document.
Speaker 4: It's funny in two ways.
Speaker 5: First of all, you know when they got questioned afterwards
Speaker 5: and said I know nothing, that it was a lie, right,
Speaker 5: And you know what, and we know what kind of
Speaker 5: projects they were engaged in, So if they were copied
Speaker 5: on something, it tells us something about project as well, right.
Speaker 2: I mean when you combine it with knowing what these
Speaker 2: guys and this takes a while. You got to know
Speaker 2: what these guys' responsibilities were, what it is their particular
Speaker 2: you know, they're compartmentalizing things so it can be distributed
Speaker 2: to specific offices within the agency. Those offices have specific
Speaker 2: purposes and are involved with specific things at certain points
Speaker 2: of time. So it is all relevant as you examined this.
Speaker 2: And you know, David, I really appreciate you taking the
Speaker 2: time to break this down and kind of you know,
Speaker 2: do this for us, you know, slow speed if you will.
Speaker 2: But it takes a while to build up this information.
Speaker 2: It does so that you know how to decipher what
Speaker 2: it is.
Speaker 3: You're looking at.
Speaker 2: You know, again, I always used to laugh when I
Speaker 2: would see these guys, you know, waving around a document
Speaker 2: and saying, oh, I know this because of what's in
Speaker 2: this document, you know, And people used to just take
Speaker 2: their word for it because they have a document.
Speaker 3: But do they even know how to read that thing?
Speaker 3: Do they know what.
Speaker 2: They're looking at? Do they understand who actually initialed this?
Speaker 7: You know?
Speaker 2: Do they understand who decided to read it in nineteen
Speaker 2: sixty as opposed to who decided to read it in
Speaker 2: nineteen sixty three. Is there a big difference, you know,
Speaker 2: between what is you know, supposed to be there and
Speaker 2: what ends up not being there.
Speaker 3: Who got you.
Speaker 2: Know, read into these things? Who needed to be aware
Speaker 2: of this guy? You know, who actually needs Oswald's to
Speaker 2: a one file right? I mean, all of it is relevant,
Speaker 2: and the timing of it is relevant.
Speaker 3: So anyway, there's always a lot more to it.
Speaker 2: And you're going to get into this in depth in
Speaker 2: the Oswald Puzzle, and I'm looking forward to it. I
Speaker 2: also am looking forward to David. Just before we go,
Speaker 2: would you mind giving me a hint about what it
Speaker 2: is you're going to do a presentation on it? Lancer,
Speaker 2: It's could be me and Larry, okay, and I'm guessing Oswald.
Speaker 5: How about how about Oswald and the FBI and New Orleans?
Speaker 3: Nice? Okay, And just to give.
Speaker 5: A teaser, let's pose this question. If I went into
Speaker 5: the FBI office and told them a series of lies
Speaker 5: about working with a Clandestino organization that was covertly meeting
Speaker 5: in people's and then they found out that I, like
Speaker 5: totally lied to them, what do you think they would
Speaker 5: do to me?
Speaker 3: Hmm today, I'm not sure, David. What were we saying?
Speaker 7: I said nothing. They didn't do anything.
Speaker 3: Interesting. And oh, by the way, they did have.
Speaker 2: Some surveillance on this guy too at a certain point
Speaker 2: the FBI. It's going to be interesting to have you
Speaker 2: guys sort of peel back the layers on that. And
Speaker 2: I look forward to it and can't wait to see
Speaker 2: how this is going to come out.
Speaker 3: At Lancer. There is always much more to.
Speaker 2: Dig into here, and again, it's good to have a
Speaker 2: re examination because those broad, sloppy strokes of the brush,
Speaker 2: I think you know, in a lot of ways, it
Speaker 2: got people introduced to a lot of ideas, but it
Speaker 2: didn't do them any favors about getting to the specifics.
Speaker 2: And I'm not blaming you, Larry, I'm saying that in general,
Speaker 2: you know, there were people using too broad a terminology.
Speaker 2: There were people throwing out ideas that, like you said,
Speaker 2: were almost purely supposition, based on very little evidence that
Speaker 2: they were just you know, let me see if I
Speaker 2: can fill in all these blanks. And that's what went
Speaker 2: on for many years. And we can now do a
Speaker 2: better job because there's more information out there, there's more literacy.
Speaker 2: You know, it's not just one guy among us all
Speaker 2: that knows how to read these documents. Now, you know,
Speaker 2: guys like David have learned.
Speaker 3: You know, I don't know where you went to learn this, David, but.
Speaker 2: You know I'm making a joke there, but I mean,
Speaker 2: you have to teach yourself how this stuff works, and
Speaker 2: you have to be as well informed as possible.
Speaker 3: And it's a process.
Speaker 2: And you know, sorry, it did take about a decade
Speaker 2: for us to understand certain things that might have been
Speaker 2: mysterious not so long ago.
Speaker 3: And here we are.
Speaker 2: So with all that in mind, again, both Larry and
Speaker 2: David will be involved with the Lancer Conference which is
Speaker 2: November twenty second to the twenty fourth in Dallas, Texas.
Speaker 2: In the show notes today, they'll be the you know,
Speaker 2: the the website to go ahead if you want to
Speaker 2: sign up. There's also a ten percent discount if you
Speaker 2: use the code Ocelli ten on the website. Whether you
Speaker 2: attended virtually or in person, that coupon code works and
Speaker 2: all that good stuff. I'll be there in person, David
Speaker 2: will be there in person, Larry will be there virtually,
Speaker 2: and there is a long list of speakers actually that
Speaker 2: ought to be really fascinating. So and again, go to
Speaker 2: Larry hyphen or Larry dash Handcock dot com. Check out
Speaker 2: his blog. I recommend all of his books. If you
Speaker 2: don't have them, all, what are you doing?
Speaker 3: Go get them.
Speaker 2: You know, not just his books on this case, but
Speaker 2: a wide variety of topics that again would greatly inform
Speaker 2: you about to be behaviors, reactions, and history of what
Speaker 2: goes on in the intelligence business with major events, various assassinations,
Speaker 2: surprise attacks, and shadow warfare.
Speaker 3: Whoops.
Speaker 2: Those sound like book titles because they are. And again
Speaker 2: I highly recommend all of Larry's works. So I want
Speaker 2: to thank Larry Hancock and David Boylan for joining me tonight,
Speaker 2: and I want to thank you guys for listening again.
Speaker 3: Read through the show notes, click.
Speaker 2: The links check out the stuff and educate yourself as
Speaker 2: best you can, because there is always more to learn.
Speaker 3: And keep digging.
Speaker 2: We may eventually get at the clearest picture possible and
Speaker 2: who knows, maybe even what solved the case. Anyway, I'm
Speaker 2: merely o'celly. All of you are indeed the effect.
Speaker 3: Goodnight, h go ahead, call.
Speaker 9: It a shot in the truth about the day as fascination.
Speaker 3: Right, Well, what do you want to know?
Speaker 8: Baker's wild claim Oswald girlfriends you knew Ruby and Berry
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Speaker 3: Really?
Speaker 2: I imagine I could claim I have four wheels. It
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Speaker 2: If you've expressed my caller schools anyone else left to
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