1
00:00:26,800 --> 00:00:30,239
Speaker 1: Apologize for canceling a couple of weeks ago, but canceled

2
00:00:30,280 --> 00:00:31,559
for the best of reasons, as I.

3
00:00:31,559 --> 00:00:34,920
Speaker 2: Say, And yeah, we have a happy and healthy baby boy.

4
00:00:35,000 --> 00:00:38,840
Speaker 3: Now that's awesome. That's great. So here we are in

5
00:00:38,920 --> 00:00:41,119
ports With New Hampshire, and I'm so glad you can

6
00:00:41,159 --> 00:00:42,960
make it up here. You don't live really that far away.

7
00:00:43,159 --> 00:00:46,119
And I only discovered this. I was in the line

8
00:00:46,240 --> 00:00:49,359
in Washington, d C. And I was talking about people

9
00:00:49,399 --> 00:00:51,799
and someone said, hey, Ryan Graves is here. Said, oh, really,

10
00:00:51,840 --> 00:00:53,920
you know? And I was excited and we actually met,

11
00:00:54,439 --> 00:00:58,119
but he said, yeah, he lives. He lives in your area.

12
00:00:58,119 --> 00:01:00,000
And I said, what are you talking about you? Because

13
00:01:00,079 --> 00:01:01,719
the guy who I lived in Portsmouth, he says he

14
00:01:01,759 --> 00:01:03,840
lives in New Hampshire. He said, no, no, you're thinking

15
00:01:03,840 --> 00:01:07,319
of David Fravor. He said no, no. So anyway, when

16
00:01:07,319 --> 00:01:10,000
we talked, he said, yeah, you actually did your show

17
00:01:10,079 --> 00:01:11,359
up the road here. Yep.

18
00:01:12,120 --> 00:01:14,000
Speaker 1: Not a lot of people know the Merged podcast was

19
00:01:14,040 --> 00:01:16,959
filmed downtown in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and I live about

20
00:01:16,959 --> 00:01:17,959
an hour away from there.

21
00:01:18,239 --> 00:01:20,120
Speaker 2: Yeah, Dave Fravor doesn't live too far from me.

22
00:01:20,159 --> 00:01:22,239
Speaker 3: In fact, oh yeah, I thought he was in that

23
00:01:22,280 --> 00:01:24,040
araa matter of fact, I did get his address once,

24
00:01:24,079 --> 00:01:27,079
but I think he I did sign him something. I

25
00:01:27,079 --> 00:01:29,480
don't know how I got a suctress. He wasn't illegal,

26
00:01:29,519 --> 00:01:32,239
but anyway, but I didn't hear back from it. He

27
00:01:32,239 --> 00:01:36,359
doesn't do too much in the realm of interviews.

28
00:01:35,879 --> 00:01:37,719
Speaker 2: And things now, and I understand said.

29
00:01:38,159 --> 00:01:41,719
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, and how is it. You know, we're going

30
00:01:41,760 --> 00:01:43,400
to get into your background and all that, But how

31
00:01:43,599 --> 00:01:45,920
is that for someone like you?

32
00:01:46,040 --> 00:01:46,200
Speaker 2: Now?

33
00:01:46,200 --> 00:01:51,000
Speaker 3: I got to tell you that when you first started

34
00:01:51,040 --> 00:01:55,719
talking about this topic, I was in the was it

35
00:01:55,760 --> 00:01:57,680
in the New York Times? How was that? I remember

36
00:01:58,120 --> 00:02:00,359
Leslie Kane had talked spoke to you.

37
00:02:01,359 --> 00:02:04,480
Speaker 1: The first time I spoke publicly about this was in

38
00:02:04,560 --> 00:02:09,960
conjunction with a History Channel documentary that was made, and

39
00:02:10,000 --> 00:02:13,520
it actually followed some of my journey very early on,

40
00:02:13,560 --> 00:02:15,560
when I went to speak to the Senate Armed Service

41
00:02:15,560 --> 00:02:18,280
Committee in DC as I was just finishing my active

42
00:02:18,360 --> 00:02:20,400
duty service, and that was really the first time that

43
00:02:20,439 --> 00:02:24,120
I came for in any manner to discuss this topic.

44
00:02:24,199 --> 00:02:26,080
Speaker 2: That was the very beginning of the journey for me.

45
00:02:26,639 --> 00:02:29,000
Speaker 3: Now, I asked her because she was very good about

46
00:02:29,560 --> 00:02:32,159
I was the first one to interview Chris Mellan first

47
00:02:32,199 --> 00:02:36,280
one interview Ralph plomanhal all through Leslie and so I said, hey,

48
00:02:36,319 --> 00:02:38,639
can you get me Ryan Graves And she said at

49
00:02:38,680 --> 00:02:40,840
that time, I believe she said you were in active

50
00:02:40,960 --> 00:02:45,199
duty or something. She said he cannot at that time. Yeah,

51
00:02:45,240 --> 00:02:47,879
but that boy, I can't believe how much time's gone

52
00:02:47,879 --> 00:02:50,400
by and hasn't the world. I don't know how much

53
00:02:50,400 --> 00:02:54,280
you paid attention to the UFO topic prior to you

54
00:02:54,360 --> 00:02:57,240
actually talking about it, but I've seen such a change,

55
00:02:57,520 --> 00:03:00,800
and you know, the people that are taking this topics

56
00:03:00,840 --> 00:03:02,080
more seriously. It's great.

57
00:03:02,400 --> 00:03:05,759
Speaker 1: I didn't pay attention to it before we had our instances.

58
00:03:05,919 --> 00:03:08,520
It was something that, you know, was in the back

59
00:03:08,520 --> 00:03:12,080
of my periphery, you know, a cultural item, if you will,

60
00:03:12,080 --> 00:03:14,680
but not something that I invested any time into. So

61
00:03:16,159 --> 00:03:19,199
although I had a broad understanding of some of the

62
00:03:19,280 --> 00:03:21,680
key points in history, it wasn't something I researched actively

63
00:03:21,759 --> 00:03:24,199
or anything like that. So which in some sense was

64
00:03:24,240 --> 00:03:26,240
a strength because I was able to kind of come

65
00:03:26,280 --> 00:03:30,879
into the conversation with my experiences and with an objective

66
00:03:30,879 --> 00:03:34,159
and agnostic mindset and kind of really start to discover

67
00:03:34,280 --> 00:03:36,120
stuff and erners on my own at that point.

68
00:03:36,680 --> 00:03:38,840
Speaker 3: Yeah, that's a that's a great way, a great way

69
00:03:39,159 --> 00:03:42,439
to approach it, I think, because you know, as you know,

70
00:03:42,560 --> 00:03:46,199
as you've been looking into this, there's a there's a

71
00:03:46,280 --> 00:03:50,280
lot of fringe out there and and social media things

72
00:03:50,280 --> 00:03:53,080
get twisted all around, and you know, and I'd like

73
00:03:53,120 --> 00:03:54,840
to talk a little bit about the drones at some point,

74
00:03:54,879 --> 00:03:57,919
because they really quieted down from what was happening as

75
00:03:57,960 --> 00:04:02,439
far as I know. But but I had listened to

76
00:04:02,879 --> 00:04:06,319
you on Joe Rogan, and I, you know, I agree

77
00:04:06,360 --> 00:04:09,159
with what you're saying. And he said too, is you know,

78
00:04:09,280 --> 00:04:12,000
social media can twist things all around. You really have

79
00:04:12,120 --> 00:04:15,520
to check sources and you know, try to understand what

80
00:04:15,599 --> 00:04:16,480
is real and what's not.

81
00:04:17,120 --> 00:04:17,720
Speaker 2: Absolutely.

82
00:04:17,959 --> 00:04:22,680
Speaker 3: Yeah. So but how has this affected you? I I

83
00:04:22,920 --> 00:04:25,000
first of all, I want to say, I really love

84
00:04:25,079 --> 00:04:28,439
the organization that you helped found or you did found,

85
00:04:28,639 --> 00:04:32,360
you know, uh started, and that's American Safety. How does

86
00:04:32,360 --> 00:04:32,639
that what?

87
00:04:32,680 --> 00:04:34,199
Speaker 2: Americans for Safe Aerospace?

88
00:04:34,480 --> 00:04:35,560
Speaker 3: Yeah? Got it.

89
00:04:35,879 --> 00:04:36,079
Speaker 2: Yeah.

90
00:04:36,160 --> 00:04:38,920
Speaker 1: We're a five oh one c three nonprofit and we

91
00:04:39,040 --> 00:04:44,600
started in February of last year, so coming up on.

92
00:04:47,120 --> 00:04:48,839
Speaker 2: Almost two years at this point.

93
00:04:49,279 --> 00:04:52,199
Speaker 1: And what we do is we focus on Initially, our

94
00:04:52,399 --> 00:04:54,680
our intent was to focus on changing the conversation the

95
00:04:54,720 --> 00:04:57,319
public sphere as well as specifically on Capitol Hill to

96
00:04:57,319 --> 00:05:01,240
be able to introduce legislation and educate our representatives on

97
00:05:01,319 --> 00:05:04,240
what we thought was the best path forward for mitigating

98
00:05:04,240 --> 00:05:06,759
the issues that pilots and other professionals have been dealing

99
00:05:06,800 --> 00:05:11,000
with when it relates to UAP. But once we started that,

100
00:05:11,040 --> 00:05:14,639
we started receiving a ton of reports from pilots, veterans

101
00:05:14,680 --> 00:05:17,319
and others, and so that's really taken over a lot

102
00:05:17,319 --> 00:05:18,879
of the core work that we do now and it

103
00:05:18,920 --> 00:05:21,680
helps inform a lot of the other activities.

104
00:05:21,040 --> 00:05:21,560
Speaker 2: That we do.

105
00:05:21,959 --> 00:05:24,160
Speaker 1: I mean, even just in the past few weeks, we've

106
00:05:24,160 --> 00:05:25,959
received over six hundred reports.

107
00:05:26,279 --> 00:05:32,199
Speaker 3: Oh six hundred Wow, that's like unheard of, that's amazing. Wow.

108
00:05:33,839 --> 00:05:36,040
Why do you think there were so many in such

109
00:05:36,079 --> 00:05:36,639
a short time.

110
00:05:37,360 --> 00:05:39,680
Speaker 1: Well, I think Joe Rogan helped with that, you know,

111
00:05:39,920 --> 00:05:43,759
bringing further attention to us. But it also occurred at

112
00:05:43,800 --> 00:05:46,040
the same time that we were having this influx of

113
00:05:46,079 --> 00:05:48,680
reportings in New Jersey area as well. And not to

114
00:05:48,720 --> 00:05:51,920
say they are all related to the situation in New Jersey,

115
00:05:51,959 --> 00:05:55,839
but there was increased attention on this topic nationally, and

116
00:05:55,879 --> 00:05:58,680
so I think that was key to getting that many reports.

117
00:05:58,680 --> 00:06:00,160
So it just goes to show you how many are

118
00:06:00,199 --> 00:06:02,800
out there once the media is engaged and once people

119
00:06:02,879 --> 00:06:04,519
understand that there's a place that they can go to

120
00:06:04,560 --> 00:06:05,000
a report.

121
00:06:05,519 --> 00:06:10,759
Speaker 3: Yeah, excellent. Now I had like an art gallery auction company.

122
00:06:10,759 --> 00:06:14,040
I took a sabbatical this is in nineteen ninety nine

123
00:06:14,079 --> 00:06:17,120
and became a flight attendant. So as a flight attendant,

124
00:06:17,360 --> 00:06:19,000
and I'm still in touch with a lot of the

125
00:06:19,000 --> 00:06:23,519
pilots of that I flew with. It was a third

126
00:06:23,560 --> 00:06:26,800
incarnation of pan Am. We threw. We flew seven to

127
00:06:26,879 --> 00:06:30,759
forty sevens and so. But it was interesting. But there's

128
00:06:30,800 --> 00:06:33,360
not too many people that I'm talking to at this

129
00:06:33,439 --> 00:06:36,199
point that I'm connected to that, you know, one or two. Oh,

130
00:06:36,279 --> 00:06:38,199
I have a buddy that this has happened to her that.

131
00:06:39,319 --> 00:06:41,399
But anyway, I think there's a great thing to have

132
00:06:41,600 --> 00:06:45,399
out there. And you know, I was actually taking a

133
00:06:45,439 --> 00:06:49,480
regular flight on American Airlines and I sat next to

134
00:06:49,480 --> 00:06:52,800
this guy he was dead heading to another location. And

135
00:06:52,839 --> 00:06:55,279
he said he was a captain, you know, and worked

136
00:06:55,279 --> 00:06:59,519
for American Airlines. And this was right after December seventeenth,

137
00:06:59,680 --> 00:07:04,639
six whatever it was, twenty seventeen, And I said to him, Hey,

138
00:07:04,680 --> 00:07:06,360
did you see the thing in the New York Times

139
00:07:06,399 --> 00:07:09,360
about the UFOs. I just threw it out there because

140
00:07:09,360 --> 00:07:11,480
you never know what's going to happen. He goes, No,

141
00:07:11,600 --> 00:07:13,160
I have no idea what you're talking about, but I

142
00:07:13,160 --> 00:07:15,759
can tell you they're real. And he was a pilot

143
00:07:15,959 --> 00:07:19,759
in the Air Force and flying at F sixteen I believe,

144
00:07:19,759 --> 00:07:22,920
he said, And this is what where I've talked to

145
00:07:23,600 --> 00:07:27,279
someone like Chris Lido and Chris as it doesn't something's

146
00:07:27,279 --> 00:07:29,439
a little bit fishy about there, because he was on

147
00:07:29,519 --> 00:07:33,800
a relocating whatever he was re relocating this F sixteen,

148
00:07:34,519 --> 00:07:35,759
and he said that.

149
00:07:35,800 --> 00:07:38,279
Speaker 2: His Wiso Wizzo was.

150
00:07:38,240 --> 00:07:40,360
Speaker 3: In the back sleeping. Now, they don't ever do that,

151
00:07:40,439 --> 00:07:40,800
do they.

152
00:07:41,560 --> 00:07:44,680
Speaker 1: Well I'm not going to say they ever do, but

153
00:07:44,720 --> 00:07:47,120
it wouldn't surprise me to find that scenario in a

154
00:07:47,160 --> 00:07:48,519
long cross country perhaps.

155
00:07:48,839 --> 00:07:51,279
Speaker 3: Okay, So he said, all of a sudden, this green

156
00:07:51,439 --> 00:07:54,319
orb came right up to him and was pacing him,

157
00:07:54,560 --> 00:07:57,480
and it lit up the right the whole cockpit up

158
00:07:57,560 --> 00:08:02,639
so brilliantly bright and that and followed him for three

159
00:08:02,720 --> 00:08:06,639
hundred miles. And he said that he never woke up

160
00:08:06,839 --> 00:08:09,360
the guy in the back, and he never reported it.

161
00:08:09,680 --> 00:08:11,279
And so I asked him if I said, would you

162
00:08:11,360 --> 00:08:15,399
be on my show anonymously even Nope, want nothing to

163
00:08:15,439 --> 00:08:18,079
do with it. But I see that. So there's sort

164
00:08:18,120 --> 00:08:21,639
of a sea change, and you know, and the six

165
00:08:21,720 --> 00:08:26,120
hundred reports you're talking about kind of shows that. But

166
00:08:26,519 --> 00:08:29,120
here's the thing. I'm sure you've probably heard of the

167
00:08:29,120 --> 00:08:33,600
O'Hare incident, and so what puzzles me and I want

168
00:08:33,639 --> 00:08:37,360
to ask you this. It seems to be that there

169
00:08:37,360 --> 00:08:39,720
would be people retired right now that would have nothing

170
00:08:39,759 --> 00:08:41,679
to lose to talk about that. And why do you

171
00:08:41,720 --> 00:08:45,120
think the silence is when that was such an extraordinary event.

172
00:08:45,919 --> 00:08:49,639
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's hard to say. Due to the time that passed.

173
00:08:49,639 --> 00:08:52,039
People might have just moved on with their life. And

174
00:08:52,200 --> 00:08:55,360
maybe they're tracking the conversation now and wondering who the

175
00:08:55,440 --> 00:08:58,120
right person to bring that information to is, or perhaps

176
00:08:58,159 --> 00:09:03,399
they've just moved on. One might suggest that if it

177
00:09:03,600 --> 00:09:08,320
was an event that garnered the interests of the military

178
00:09:08,600 --> 00:09:10,960
or any type of active investigation they had going on,

179
00:09:11,039 --> 00:09:14,759
they might have stepped in to mitigate people talking about it.

180
00:09:14,759 --> 00:09:17,639
But that's just pure speculation. But you know, I really

181
00:09:17,720 --> 00:09:20,960
don't know when I got into this conversation. You know,

182
00:09:21,000 --> 00:09:23,960
around the twenty seventeen timeframe, and it was essentially taboo

183
00:09:23,960 --> 00:09:27,399
to talk about this even within the cockpit itself. You know,

184
00:09:27,759 --> 00:09:30,159
a pilot might see something and he might not feel

185
00:09:30,159 --> 00:09:34,080
comfortable sharing it with his copilot. But that has changed

186
00:09:34,080 --> 00:09:37,519
over time to the point where pilots are actively seeing this,

187
00:09:37,639 --> 00:09:42,159
they're sharing the report with air traffic control you know,

188
00:09:42,919 --> 00:09:45,960
certain percentage of them, or sharing them with outside reporting mechanisms,

189
00:09:46,039 --> 00:09:49,320
or they're reporting them YA the Aviation Safety Reporting System

190
00:09:49,440 --> 00:09:53,399
or other safety reporting systems. So we've seen a sea

191
00:09:53,519 --> 00:09:58,080
change in aviator's comfort and reporting these instances, which I

192
00:09:58,080 --> 00:10:00,600
think is providing a lot of data a awareness to

193
00:10:01,440 --> 00:10:03,799
one just how common it is, but just how unusual

194
00:10:03,879 --> 00:10:05,519
some of these circumstances are as well.

195
00:10:06,159 --> 00:10:09,679
Speaker 3: Now, what about Nightcap, Is there any working with them?

196
00:10:09,720 --> 00:10:12,519
I know they they actually work with pilots as well.

197
00:10:13,279 --> 00:10:14,080
Speaker 2: Yeah, we have.

198
00:10:14,399 --> 00:10:19,000
Speaker 1: We haven't worked hand in hand with Nightcap or New Fork,

199
00:10:19,399 --> 00:10:22,000
although they are organizations we've reached out to and just

200
00:10:22,120 --> 00:10:26,320
established communications with. But we're not actively sharing data or

201
00:10:26,360 --> 00:10:29,440
collaborating in any type of research at this time, and

202
00:10:29,480 --> 00:10:30,559
we're not necessarily.

203
00:10:30,240 --> 00:10:30,919
Speaker 2: Opposed to it.

204
00:10:31,879 --> 00:10:34,320
Speaker 1: We're you know, in a building phase right now where

205
00:10:34,320 --> 00:10:37,480
we're kind of building up our processes, procedures or database.

206
00:10:37,559 --> 00:10:39,679
And I think in the near future we're going to

207
00:10:39,720 --> 00:10:44,080
be looking to make the data that we have available

208
00:10:44,120 --> 00:10:45,679
to the public on our website.

209
00:10:46,519 --> 00:10:48,399
Speaker 2: So I think there'll be more opportunity for that in

210
00:10:48,440 --> 00:10:48,879
the future.

211
00:10:49,159 --> 00:10:52,039
Speaker 3: That would be great, That would be great if that happens. Now,

212
00:10:52,320 --> 00:10:57,840
when you had your sightings off, was it off the

213
00:10:57,879 --> 00:10:58,600
coast of Florida?

214
00:10:58,960 --> 00:11:01,320
Speaker 1: Is that off the coast of Virginia and then later

215
00:11:01,440 --> 00:11:02,480
off the coast of Florida.

216
00:11:02,720 --> 00:11:05,759
Speaker 3: Yeah, so you were flying off of Virginia Beach and

217
00:11:06,440 --> 00:11:09,559
so can you tell us how what the very first

218
00:11:09,600 --> 00:11:11,759
incident was like for you?

219
00:11:12,759 --> 00:11:17,200
Speaker 1: Yeah, so the very first instance was essentially only detecting

220
00:11:17,240 --> 00:11:21,080
these on our radar itself. So the way this kind

221
00:11:21,080 --> 00:11:23,000
of all got started for me is that, you know,

222
00:11:23,039 --> 00:11:26,840
I was assigned to VFA eleven, Navy Fighter Attack Squadron

223
00:11:26,879 --> 00:11:30,600
eleven in the Navy, and that was my primary active

224
00:11:30,639 --> 00:11:33,679
duty squadron, and I actually joined them on deployment after

225
00:11:33,720 --> 00:11:36,440
my training. So finished my training two weeks later and

226
00:11:36,480 --> 00:11:40,480
flying my first combat mission in Afghanistan. And we did

227
00:11:40,480 --> 00:11:43,039
that for a number of months and then we flew back,

228
00:11:43,519 --> 00:11:46,240
entered a maintenance phase and we started to upgrade certain systems,

229
00:11:46,279 --> 00:11:49,519
including our radar, and we upgraded to a much more

230
00:11:49,519 --> 00:11:53,360
powerful radar system, the APG seventy nine from the APG

231
00:11:53,399 --> 00:11:56,840
seventy three. Without going into too many details, it just

232
00:11:56,879 --> 00:12:00,519
allowed us to see smaller objects further away with higher precision,

233
00:12:00,639 --> 00:12:05,320
more consistently. And it took about eight months for that upgrade.

234
00:12:05,360 --> 00:12:07,639
That happened across all of our aircraft. And so you

235
00:12:07,720 --> 00:12:10,240
might be flying with the older radar in the morning

236
00:12:10,279 --> 00:12:13,159
and a newer radar in the evening, and we were

237
00:12:13,159 --> 00:12:16,840
noticing that we were seeing many more objects with interesting

238
00:12:16,879 --> 00:12:21,200
flight characteristics with the newer radar that we weren't seeing

239
00:12:21,200 --> 00:12:25,440
with the older radar. But there was you know, during

240
00:12:25,480 --> 00:12:27,919
that active time when we were seeing these, at least

241
00:12:27,919 --> 00:12:30,440
from my perspective, we weren't seeing these and going, oh

242
00:12:30,480 --> 00:12:33,679
my gosh, you know, we're seeing UFOs or UAPs. You know,

243
00:12:34,120 --> 00:12:36,159
when we first saw them on a radar, we assume

244
00:12:36,200 --> 00:12:38,879
they were radar errors, they were some type of issue

245
00:12:38,879 --> 00:12:42,679
with a new radar or the software that was providing

246
00:12:42,759 --> 00:12:46,399
us what we would call false track. And these objects

247
00:12:46,440 --> 00:12:51,480
were stationary. They were orbiting in circular patterns or racetrack patterns.

248
00:12:52,279 --> 00:12:54,600
And they were sometimes going supersonic as well, so not

249
00:12:54,679 --> 00:12:58,000
things you would really expect from a radar error because

250
00:12:58,000 --> 00:12:59,159
it would be less.

251
00:12:58,879 --> 00:13:01,120
Speaker 2: Consistent and what I just described.

252
00:13:01,879 --> 00:13:04,720
Speaker 1: But that was our first brush that there was something

253
00:13:04,720 --> 00:13:07,759
else out there with us, and.

254
00:13:07,759 --> 00:13:09,320
Speaker 2: We didn't know what to do with that information.

255
00:13:09,440 --> 00:13:14,840
Speaker 1: Really, we just essentially ignored it until over time, you know,

256
00:13:15,080 --> 00:13:17,440
you know, only a few weeks later, we happen to

257
00:13:17,480 --> 00:13:20,320
be flying with a targeting pod on our cheek, which

258
00:13:20,320 --> 00:13:23,559
we don't always fly with on the jet, and we

259
00:13:23,679 --> 00:13:25,679
autoq all the tracks that are out there right so

260
00:13:25,679 --> 00:13:27,840
we can flip through them and know where they are.

261
00:13:28,200 --> 00:13:31,000
So as we're kind of doing that, we're our tracking

262
00:13:31,039 --> 00:13:33,440
pod is looking where our radar is looking, and just

263
00:13:33,440 --> 00:13:35,360
so happened that some of these objects that we thought

264
00:13:35,360 --> 00:13:39,039
were radar errors were close enough for the targeting pod

265
00:13:39,159 --> 00:13:42,159
to capture something there as well. So now we have

266
00:13:42,200 --> 00:13:46,240
correlation across multiple sensors. Shortly after that, now our aired

267
00:13:46,240 --> 00:13:49,000
air missiles are walking onto these that are independent sensor

268
00:13:49,039 --> 00:13:52,799
system as well. We have multiple sensors now correlating these objects.

269
00:13:52,799 --> 00:13:54,200
And that's when we said, hey, there's got to be

270
00:13:54,200 --> 00:13:57,240
something here, you know, like something physical that these represent

271
00:13:59,159 --> 00:14:01,159
and so the next logical step for us at the

272
00:14:01,159 --> 00:14:02,759
time was to try to fly up and gain a

273
00:14:02,799 --> 00:14:04,320
visual sighting of these.

274
00:14:04,120 --> 00:14:06,440
Speaker 2: And we tried to do that. I tried to do that.

275
00:14:07,519 --> 00:14:10,480
Speaker 1: We'd find one typically that was stationary, we'd step down

276
00:14:10,480 --> 00:14:12,559
below it a little bit, slow down so that there's

277
00:14:12,679 --> 00:14:16,360
less cross tracking rate, and we'd fly up to it.

278
00:14:16,679 --> 00:14:19,159
All our censors would show us it's there. It would

279
00:14:19,200 --> 00:14:23,039
project that information and our augmented reality had sat essentially

280
00:14:23,600 --> 00:14:25,080
and so we know exactly where to look for this

281
00:14:25,120 --> 00:14:27,600
object and we'd come up to that merge and it

282
00:14:27,639 --> 00:14:31,360
wouldn't be anything there. Wow, we turned back around, we'd

283
00:14:31,399 --> 00:14:33,919
reacquire the target across all those sensors. It would be

284
00:14:33,960 --> 00:14:38,519
displaced from its initial location. But that again, that was

285
00:14:38,600 --> 00:14:40,799
then the status quo for another couple of weeks, where

286
00:14:40,799 --> 00:14:42,799
guys were trying to merge with them and they couldn't

287
00:14:42,840 --> 00:14:47,279
visually id them. And then that changed, at least, you know,

288
00:14:47,600 --> 00:14:50,799
in a linear progression of the story. It changed when

289
00:14:50,840 --> 00:14:52,759
we had a near miss with one of these objects

290
00:14:52,799 --> 00:14:55,600
unexpectedly at the entrance to the working areas, came within

291
00:14:55,639 --> 00:14:58,519
about fifty feet of lead aircraft split two f eighteens.

292
00:14:58,559 --> 00:15:01,559
In my squadron, and that's the object you're here described

293
00:15:01,559 --> 00:15:03,679
as a dark gray or black cube inside of a

294
00:15:03,679 --> 00:15:06,879
clear sphere, right, And when that happened, we kind of

295
00:15:06,879 --> 00:15:09,679
had a little safety stand down our squadron to assess

296
00:15:09,759 --> 00:15:12,279
what we were seeing, how serious an issue this was,

297
00:15:12,320 --> 00:15:15,440
and the safety officer while doing that investigation, learned that

298
00:15:15,480 --> 00:15:18,399
there were about four other mid airs that went unreported.

299
00:15:18,159 --> 00:15:20,600
Speaker 2: Of these objects over the past several.

300
00:15:20,320 --> 00:15:23,759
Speaker 1: Weeks, which is, you know, goes to show you, you know,

301
00:15:23,919 --> 00:15:26,240
how big of a deal and how hard it can

302
00:15:26,240 --> 00:15:29,080
sometimes be to pull that information from the aviation community

303
00:15:29,080 --> 00:15:31,399
when they're not comfortable reporting something. I mean, your miss

304
00:15:31,399 --> 00:15:34,039
is our big deal, and to have that go unreported

305
00:15:34,159 --> 00:15:37,200
just goes to show you how how much inertia there

306
00:15:37,360 --> 00:15:38,559
was talking about.

307
00:15:38,240 --> 00:15:45,000
Speaker 3: This, right right, When something like this is is not

308
00:15:45,240 --> 00:15:49,960
seen physically by the eye, do you have equipment on

309
00:15:50,039 --> 00:15:53,320
board that will go into the other spectrums that we

310
00:15:54,120 --> 00:15:56,200
you know, we can't see with our naked eye.

311
00:15:56,360 --> 00:16:00,120
Speaker 1: Most of our censors on the jet operate outside of

312
00:16:00,120 --> 00:16:03,159
the optical spectrum, so that's what's.

313
00:16:02,960 --> 00:16:03,720
Speaker 2: Getting us there.

314
00:16:03,840 --> 00:16:08,200
Speaker 1: And so when we are then faced with a lack

315
00:16:08,240 --> 00:16:12,480
of information, when we try to ide it with our eyeballs.

316
00:16:15,600 --> 00:16:18,039
It's not like we were then changing settings. It's just

317
00:16:18,120 --> 00:16:21,639
we already were using that information to determine the location

318
00:16:21,679 --> 00:16:25,879
of these objects. So so there really wasn't much more

319
00:16:25,919 --> 00:16:28,799
we could do at that point as far as fiddling

320
00:16:28,919 --> 00:16:30,279
with settings or anything like that.

321
00:16:31,759 --> 00:16:33,960
Speaker 2: Yeah. Sorry, I think that answered your question, but yeah,

322
00:16:34,159 --> 00:16:35,200
not much of a conclusion.

323
00:16:35,519 --> 00:16:40,519
Speaker 3: Yeah, so once you see this the first time I

324
00:16:40,559 --> 00:16:45,000
heard that this is so unusual. I love unusual objects

325
00:16:45,000 --> 00:16:48,039
that you know, people claim that they have seen. So

326
00:16:48,120 --> 00:16:53,559
there's cube inside a sphere, so unusual, and how it

327
00:16:53,639 --> 00:16:58,240
could possibly have any type of propulsion system? And I know,

328
00:16:58,399 --> 00:17:01,320
Kirkpatrick at one point, oh, it could have been the

329
00:17:01,519 --> 00:17:04,759
Chinese were developing a sphere and I saw a picture

330
00:17:04,759 --> 00:17:07,880
of it's just a chrome sphere, you know, nothing like

331
00:17:07,960 --> 00:17:10,960
what you mentioned that you saw. How many people would

332
00:17:10,960 --> 00:17:15,799
you say, in total, how many pilots or how many

333
00:17:15,839 --> 00:17:19,119
sightings of this particular type of thing, the sphere and feud?

334
00:17:19,480 --> 00:17:20,119
Would you say the.

335
00:17:20,160 --> 00:17:22,680
Speaker 2: Work less than ten?

336
00:17:24,759 --> 00:17:29,680
Speaker 1: Most of the objects were described as metallic spheres, elongated spheres,

337
00:17:30,440 --> 00:17:33,200
or like a like a propane tank if you will,

338
00:17:33,720 --> 00:17:35,720
maybe not to the full size of quote unquote the

339
00:17:35,720 --> 00:17:41,279
tic tac that David Fravor saw, but similar, similar characteristics,

340
00:17:42,000 --> 00:17:45,759
a lot of glowing objects that appear to be a

341
00:17:45,839 --> 00:17:49,400
sphere that are illuminated but so hard to tell what

342
00:17:49,440 --> 00:17:51,000
the actual structure is underneath.

343
00:17:52,359 --> 00:17:54,759
Speaker 2: But that was kind of the general gist of what

344
00:17:54,799 --> 00:17:55,400
we were seeing.

345
00:17:56,000 --> 00:17:59,440
Speaker 3: And when you were deployed in the Middle East, I

346
00:17:59,480 --> 00:18:03,039
believe wherever it once you went, they followed you there.

347
00:18:03,920 --> 00:18:06,119
Speaker 1: Yeah, so it's started to say whether they followed us

348
00:18:06,200 --> 00:18:08,559
or whether they're already there. And I say the same

349
00:18:08,559 --> 00:18:11,680
thing about the gimbal object go fast objects that we

350
00:18:11,720 --> 00:18:14,839
saw off the coast of Jacksonville. But we were seeing

351
00:18:14,920 --> 00:18:19,160
radar contacts in that area that were very similar, if

352
00:18:19,200 --> 00:18:21,839
not the same as what we were seeing back home.

353
00:18:22,240 --> 00:18:25,160
But we don't have the agency to really investigate it

354
00:18:25,240 --> 00:18:28,680
like we do back home. We're very busy, you know,

355
00:18:28,839 --> 00:18:32,200
we're on actual you know, no kidding mission, So we

356
00:18:32,559 --> 00:18:35,119
just didn't have the ability to go investigate.

357
00:18:35,559 --> 00:18:39,279
Speaker 3: So look, when you first saw this que and within

358
00:18:39,640 --> 00:18:43,240
a sphere, how did you go about reporting that and

359
00:18:43,279 --> 00:18:44,279
how was it received?

360
00:18:45,160 --> 00:18:47,559
Speaker 1: Well, there was no official reporting that we were aware of,

361
00:18:47,640 --> 00:18:49,960
so we simply passed it word of mouth to our

362
00:18:49,960 --> 00:18:54,240
commanding officer with the expectation it would run up the

363
00:18:54,319 --> 00:18:58,720
chain or less and ideally some resolution would have come forth.

364
00:18:58,839 --> 00:19:01,240
You know, again, we weren't thinking you know, UFOs at

365
00:19:01,240 --> 00:19:04,359
this point. But you know, the more pertinent threat to

366
00:19:04,440 --> 00:19:07,160
US is one as an aviation safety issue and as

367
00:19:07,160 --> 00:19:10,960
a potential tactical issue as well, right, a national security issue.

368
00:19:10,960 --> 00:19:14,240
If there are adversaries utilizing some platform to spy on this,

369
00:19:14,480 --> 00:19:16,119
that's of concern to us obviously.

370
00:19:16,279 --> 00:19:18,920
Speaker 2: Yeah, So you know, there.

371
00:19:18,799 --> 00:19:21,759
Speaker 1: Was I think some unspoken expectation that you know, some

372
00:19:21,799 --> 00:19:25,839
type of you know, investigation within the Pentagon would have

373
00:19:25,880 --> 00:19:29,000
been launched in order to resolve this issue. But from

374
00:19:29,000 --> 00:19:32,680
our perspective, that didn't occur. I've since learned that there

375
00:19:32,759 --> 00:19:35,559
was a task force that was investigating this as a

376
00:19:35,640 --> 00:19:39,440
UAP task force, but that we you know, we didn't

377
00:19:39,480 --> 00:19:42,680
receive any information about that ongoing work. So from our perspective,

378
00:19:42,680 --> 00:19:46,200
it was essentially something that wasn't getting mitigative resolved in

379
00:19:46,240 --> 00:19:46,880
any fashion.

380
00:19:47,640 --> 00:19:51,559
Speaker 3: Well frustrating, Yeah, you know, I mean, because you have

381
00:19:51,799 --> 00:19:54,319
something like this that it's it's a danger, I mean,

382
00:19:55,480 --> 00:19:57,240
I would think that they would want to know, and

383
00:19:57,279 --> 00:20:00,759
that's that's what's so unusual to me. One of the

384
00:20:00,799 --> 00:20:03,319
things that are so unusual about the whole tic TAC

385
00:20:03,440 --> 00:20:05,920
thing in two thousand and four off the coast of California,

386
00:20:05,960 --> 00:20:09,839
when it just didn't seem like it was that big

387
00:20:09,839 --> 00:20:14,119
of a deal to the upper you know, officers and

388
00:20:14,160 --> 00:20:18,359
things like. It just didn't seem like, you know, it

389
00:20:18,400 --> 00:20:21,640
didn't seem like they were that concerned. Yeah, and it

390
00:20:21,920 --> 00:20:25,400
seems very alarming to have something like that, you know,

391
00:20:25,519 --> 00:20:30,200
happening when during you know, I've had there's there's a

392
00:20:30,240 --> 00:20:35,119
guy that's he's a helicopter pilot that I've talked to

393
00:20:35,160 --> 00:20:39,319
a lot who's interested in this topic, and he's he

394
00:20:39,359 --> 00:20:44,519
feels absolutely certain that that whole situation was ours and

395
00:20:44,559 --> 00:20:47,559
it was put there purposely for a reaction. And I

396
00:20:47,599 --> 00:20:50,480
told that to Kevin Day, and Kevin got really upset.

397
00:20:50,519 --> 00:20:53,559
He said, if that's the truth, and I'm suing, you know,

398
00:20:53,640 --> 00:20:56,759
he says, because I was, you know, keeping people at risk,

399
00:20:57,319 --> 00:20:58,720
you know, through that whole thing.

400
00:20:58,839 --> 00:21:02,200
Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean, doing that would essentially be illegal, right,

401
00:21:02,319 --> 00:21:04,799
because what they would be doing, in effect, is taking

402
00:21:04,799 --> 00:21:10,920
an ultra classified special access program and exposing it to

403
00:21:11,000 --> 00:21:13,839
people that are not read in just to test their equipment,

404
00:21:14,279 --> 00:21:17,480
which is just as legal as if I take classified information,

405
00:21:17,640 --> 00:21:20,720
especially if pout a special access program, which is serious

406
00:21:20,920 --> 00:21:25,599
you know, repercussions for breaking that secrecy and just telling

407
00:21:25,599 --> 00:21:28,079
it to somebody, right, because that's effectively what they're doing

408
00:21:28,599 --> 00:21:32,119
is they're taking their technology and they're demonstrating the classified

409
00:21:32,160 --> 00:21:34,359
capabilities to people that are not read in. So that

410
00:21:34,400 --> 00:21:36,240
would be an illegal activity for them to do, and

411
00:21:36,279 --> 00:21:39,440
they would be serious ramifications for them. We would all

412
00:21:39,480 --> 00:21:42,559
have to get read into that program and debriefed, you know,

413
00:21:42,680 --> 00:21:44,799
be a whole event. So but of course none of

414
00:21:44,880 --> 00:21:48,240
that happened because I don't think it was our own technology, of.

415
00:21:48,160 --> 00:21:51,279
Speaker 3: Course, right, Yeah, I don't believe so too. That's just

416
00:21:51,319 --> 00:21:55,799
my opinion. But I watched a stream with doctor kirk

417
00:21:55,799 --> 00:22:00,960
Sean Kirkpatrick that it wasn't it didn't seem too well attended,

418
00:22:01,400 --> 00:22:06,039
but it was a some type of conference where he

419
00:22:06,200 --> 00:22:10,039
was talking. This was several months ago, and a journalist

420
00:22:10,079 --> 00:22:13,759
was sitting in the front row and asked the question question, well,

421
00:22:13,880 --> 00:22:16,240
are you going to be looking into the so called

422
00:22:16,279 --> 00:22:23,559
TIC TAC situation nimics, And he just said, well, everything

423
00:22:24,160 --> 00:22:27,400
that you can see out there on YouTube is all

424
00:22:27,400 --> 00:22:30,200
the information there is on this, and I have to

425
00:22:30,240 --> 00:22:32,880
say BS, I mean that just can't be. First of all,

426
00:22:33,039 --> 00:22:35,240
you must have heard and I don't know if this

427
00:22:35,279 --> 00:22:37,200
can be one hundred percent verify, but you must have

428
00:22:37,240 --> 00:22:39,920
heard about the data bricks being removed from the ship,

429
00:22:41,279 --> 00:22:49,440
you know, from the Hawkeye once that landed. So anyway,

430
00:22:50,319 --> 00:22:52,039
what do you think of that? That comment? And I

431
00:22:52,039 --> 00:22:54,440
know you probably don't want to say anything negative about

432
00:22:55,039 --> 00:22:59,079
kirk Patrick, but that statement just didn't seem very correct.

433
00:23:00,960 --> 00:23:03,720
Speaker 1: You know, we generate a lot of data, and I'm

434
00:23:03,759 --> 00:23:06,680
speaking strictly for the FAT and I'm not necessarily sure

435
00:23:06,720 --> 00:23:10,960
how it's done with the ship's data logs, but for us,

436
00:23:11,000 --> 00:23:13,400
I mean, we essentially have a limited number of classified

437
00:23:13,440 --> 00:23:15,799
storage devices and we utilize them for flights, and we

438
00:23:15,880 --> 00:23:17,640
come back and we strip the data off we need

439
00:23:17,680 --> 00:23:18,400
and then we wipe it.

440
00:23:19,400 --> 00:23:20,480
Speaker 2: And typically the data we.

441
00:23:20,440 --> 00:23:23,519
Speaker 1: Need is for debriefing purposes or if there's something in

442
00:23:23,559 --> 00:23:28,480
particular to brief to intelligence. So theoretically, I can I

443
00:23:28,519 --> 00:23:31,200
can imagine a world where the data does not get preserved,

444
00:23:31,880 --> 00:23:35,160
right if no one you know, and there's no procedure

445
00:23:35,200 --> 00:23:37,240
to do that. So someone would have had to take

446
00:23:37,279 --> 00:23:39,160
it upon themselves to say, maybe this is going to

447
00:23:39,160 --> 00:23:40,119
be important in the future.

448
00:23:40,200 --> 00:23:43,079
Speaker 2: We need to save this now. Did that happen or not?

449
00:23:43,160 --> 00:23:43,559
I don't know.

450
00:23:44,240 --> 00:23:46,799
Speaker 1: And then but part of the conversation or story that

451
00:23:47,359 --> 00:23:50,720
you mentioned is that people specifically came on board this ship,

452
00:23:50,759 --> 00:23:53,680
as I understand, to retrieve that information, like within an

453
00:23:53,680 --> 00:23:54,519
hour or something.

454
00:23:56,519 --> 00:23:57,599
Speaker 2: You know, how much.

455
00:23:57,440 --> 00:24:01,480
Speaker 1: Reality there is to that, I don't know, Right, It

456
00:24:01,559 --> 00:24:04,039
takes time to fly to an aircraft carrier, right, like

457
00:24:04,279 --> 00:24:07,359
an hour, pretty big ask even a half a day, right,

458
00:24:07,359 --> 00:24:09,960
because you need permission, you need to find an air vehicle,

459
00:24:10,039 --> 00:24:13,880
you need to fly out there at a certain time. So

460
00:24:13,920 --> 00:24:16,640
it's not a trivial thing to just hop, you know,

461
00:24:16,720 --> 00:24:21,640
hop out there for someone to do and then you know, supposedly,

462
00:24:22,279 --> 00:24:24,720
you know, the story goes on. People flew on, they

463
00:24:25,119 --> 00:24:28,160
took the data from I think the Hawkeye, like you mentioned,

464
00:24:28,880 --> 00:24:35,319
and left. It's not inconceivable, but it wouldn't be it

465
00:24:35,319 --> 00:24:37,279
wouldn't be a normal, normal.

466
00:24:37,000 --> 00:24:37,799
Speaker 2: Day of operations.

467
00:24:37,839 --> 00:24:39,680
Speaker 1: I'll say that would have have you know, been a

468
00:24:39,759 --> 00:24:41,519
very high priority event for that to happen.

469
00:24:41,640 --> 00:24:44,000
Speaker 2: So you know, I've heard I've heard similar things.

470
00:24:44,000 --> 00:24:46,400
Speaker 1: I've had people, I've had the person that supposedly handled

471
00:24:46,400 --> 00:24:48,759
those tapes to those people reach out to me, right,

472
00:24:48,759 --> 00:24:51,119
and it's it's I can't verify any of the information.

473
00:24:52,000 --> 00:24:53,880
It doesn't mean I dismiss it or throw it away,

474
00:24:53,960 --> 00:24:57,559
but it's just you know, more information on the database

475
00:24:57,680 --> 00:24:59,839
that I can look to for correlations for other of

476
00:24:59,880 --> 00:25:00,799
it in the future.

477
00:25:01,359 --> 00:25:04,599
Speaker 3: Yeah. Yeah, he was on the show. Just can't remember

478
00:25:04,640 --> 00:25:08,519
his name right the second but anyway, yeah, I mean that.

479
00:25:08,960 --> 00:25:13,640
But even though let's just throw away the bricks, it

480
00:25:13,759 --> 00:25:18,200
just seems like it can't be that little video clip

481
00:25:18,240 --> 00:25:20,720
that we see, you know, very short clip. And I

482
00:25:20,799 --> 00:25:23,920
understand that it could be classified because it might show

483
00:25:24,319 --> 00:25:27,960
information that we wouldn't want to reveal in the longer clip.

484
00:25:27,960 --> 00:25:30,839
But there's got to be more video than just that

485
00:25:31,599 --> 00:25:34,720
the two videos that are known of that particular situation.

486
00:25:35,279 --> 00:25:38,119
Speaker 1: I believe the Charlie models of the F eighteen worked

487
00:25:38,119 --> 00:25:40,599
the same way as the super Hornets that I flew,

488
00:25:41,039 --> 00:25:42,359
which means when.

489
00:25:42,160 --> 00:25:45,359
Speaker 2: They record data, they record.

490
00:25:45,000 --> 00:25:47,799
Speaker 1: Two screens at a time, and there's they're like stitched

491
00:25:47,799 --> 00:25:51,160
together the same file, right, so you have one display here,

492
00:25:51,200 --> 00:25:55,039
one display here in that scenario. In our scenarios, like

493
00:25:55,119 --> 00:25:58,240
say for the gimbal object, you know, the flear footage

494
00:25:58,240 --> 00:26:00,599
has been released. I know for a fact that there

495
00:26:00,640 --> 00:26:02,720
was radar data that was recorded at the same time

496
00:26:02,759 --> 00:26:05,640
that could provide more information, right because I saw it

497
00:26:06,119 --> 00:26:10,240
that was stripped out, and they preserve the fle the

498
00:26:10,240 --> 00:26:13,720
fleer video, but unknown what happened to the radar data.

499
00:26:14,640 --> 00:26:17,240
That's just how those pods work, right. So in the

500
00:26:17,279 --> 00:26:19,200
tic TAC instance, the same thing would have occurred. They

501
00:26:19,200 --> 00:26:21,880
would have utilized their radar in order to detect this object,

502
00:26:22,279 --> 00:26:24,279
and they would have then gone to their fleer, which

503
00:26:24,279 --> 00:26:26,119
it was slave to that same location and say what

504
00:26:26,119 --> 00:26:26,839
do you see there?

505
00:26:27,000 --> 00:26:29,440
Speaker 2: Right, and that data assuming.

506
00:26:29,599 --> 00:26:32,480
Speaker 1: Well they were recording of course, so that's one file right,

507
00:26:32,519 --> 00:26:37,559
So very likely the radar data was stripped at some point.

508
00:26:37,680 --> 00:26:41,039
Whether it was retained afterwards, I don't know the answered that,

509
00:26:41,160 --> 00:26:43,640
but it was created and would have been useful for

510
00:26:43,680 --> 00:26:46,880
analysis if it was capp So theoretically that information could

511
00:26:47,000 --> 00:26:50,039
still exist as well, and that provides a lot of.

512
00:26:50,039 --> 00:26:51,400
Speaker 2: Information about the kinematics.

513
00:26:52,759 --> 00:26:55,319
Speaker 1: You know, where it is, how it's moving, altitudes, things

514
00:26:55,359 --> 00:26:55,960
of that nature.

515
00:26:56,720 --> 00:27:01,519
Speaker 3: Now getting back to what you saw and other pilots

516
00:27:01,720 --> 00:27:04,759
saw the cube in the sphere, did was there ever

517
00:27:04,799 --> 00:27:08,519
any footage or an attempt to get any images.

518
00:27:08,480 --> 00:27:09,279
Speaker 2: It was so fast.

519
00:27:09,440 --> 00:27:13,119
Speaker 1: Yeah, you know, I believe the object was most likely

520
00:27:13,160 --> 00:27:15,880
stationary at that location, and so then you have these

521
00:27:15,920 --> 00:27:17,599
two jets that are probably go about three hundred and

522
00:27:18,000 --> 00:27:21,119
fifty knots basically flying between like by it.

523
00:27:21,640 --> 00:27:22,920
Speaker 2: So it was a flash.

524
00:27:23,000 --> 00:27:27,480
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, yeah. All right, Well, let's kind of change

525
00:27:27,519 --> 00:27:30,920
gears a little bit, because you know, we had this

526
00:27:31,119 --> 00:27:36,839
flap of drones, which is very mysterious and it's quiet now,

527
00:27:37,160 --> 00:27:40,119
you don't you do hear bits and pieces about people

528
00:27:40,200 --> 00:27:44,680
reporting drones still. You mentioned on Joe's show that this

529
00:27:44,759 --> 00:27:47,039
started three years ago, and I was wondering if you

530
00:27:47,160 --> 00:27:51,160
were also aware of the Colorado drones. Yeah, so do

531
00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:52,960
you think they're all related in some way?

532
00:27:53,680 --> 00:27:54,440
Speaker 2: It's hard to say.

533
00:27:57,359 --> 00:28:00,720
Speaker 1: My gut tells me yes, based off of some of

534
00:28:00,759 --> 00:28:03,240
the kind of mysterious aspects of it. But it's really

535
00:28:03,240 --> 00:28:05,359
hard to say with any certainty. So I'll have to

536
00:28:06,000 --> 00:28:09,440
I'll have to, you know, I'll have to play the

537
00:28:10,359 --> 00:28:12,119
play the idiot here and say I just don't know.

538
00:28:12,160 --> 00:28:13,079
Speaker 2: They answer that question.

539
00:28:13,160 --> 00:28:15,960
Speaker 1: But you know, but this is part of the problem, right,

540
00:28:15,960 --> 00:28:18,440
we don't know because these things happen, happen for a

541
00:28:18,440 --> 00:28:22,000
short amount of time. There's no response, there's no data

542
00:28:22,000 --> 00:28:24,440
that's generated from it, and then we kind of just

543
00:28:24,480 --> 00:28:27,759
hear from the peripher ay. What makes it hard to

544
00:28:27,799 --> 00:28:30,519
explain because if it was easily explainable, then we'd be

545
00:28:30,519 --> 00:28:33,960
hearing about that, right, hearing about some Chinese, you know,

546
00:28:34,079 --> 00:28:39,559
criminal organization flying drones over critical infrastructure in Colorado or elsewhere.

547
00:28:39,839 --> 00:28:40,640
Speaker 2: But we don't hear that.

548
00:28:40,680 --> 00:28:42,920
Speaker 1: It just kind of fades out and fizzles as somewhat

549
00:28:42,920 --> 00:28:46,839
of a mystery. And same thing with what's happening or

550
00:28:47,000 --> 00:28:50,160
has been happening on the Eastern Seaboard with you know,

551
00:28:50,680 --> 00:28:53,119
the Langley Air Force Base in twenty twenty two, small

552
00:28:53,240 --> 00:28:57,400
number of unidentifiable objects that were penetrating the airspace of

553
00:28:57,599 --> 00:29:02,519
the military base. Same thing in twenty twenty three, but

554
00:29:02,680 --> 00:29:05,359
many more objects, you know, from like five to twenty

555
00:29:06,200 --> 00:29:07,200
all during the same like.

556
00:29:07,160 --> 00:29:09,000
Speaker 2: Several week period before Christmas.

557
00:29:09,319 --> 00:29:13,119
Speaker 1: And then twenty twenty three, exact same thing occurs, but

558
00:29:13,359 --> 00:29:16,160
this time a bit of a wider window about five

559
00:29:16,200 --> 00:29:21,200
weeks still right before Christmas, and the area affected essentially

560
00:29:21,240 --> 00:29:24,160
drifts north to and much more objects are detected.

561
00:29:24,880 --> 00:29:26,279
Speaker 2: So you know, what are they?

562
00:29:26,440 --> 00:29:28,519
Speaker 1: I think we're you know, I'm still in a position

563
00:29:28,559 --> 00:29:32,759
where I'm not certain in entirety what is happening there

564
00:29:32,799 --> 00:29:36,720
does seem to be an almost behavior that's occurring with

565
00:29:36,799 --> 00:29:38,920
a lot of the number of these objects. I think

566
00:29:38,960 --> 00:29:44,480
as the media attention came onto this incident, the quality

567
00:29:44,480 --> 00:29:47,039
of reports went down, although the number went up, So

568
00:29:47,079 --> 00:29:49,160
then you started getting a lot of confusion about what

569
00:29:49,200 --> 00:29:51,200
people are seeing. And you know, it seems as the

570
00:29:52,160 --> 00:29:55,319
Biden administration used as an opportunity to try to dismiss

571
00:29:55,319 --> 00:29:56,240
what people were seeing.

572
00:29:57,200 --> 00:30:00,279
Speaker 2: But it is still occurring, So it is still ocurring.

573
00:30:00,319 --> 00:30:01,640
People are still reporting it.

574
00:30:02,359 --> 00:30:05,279
Speaker 1: The media attention and the social media attention has moved

575
00:30:05,319 --> 00:30:08,880
on to different topics, but right, but it is still

576
00:30:08,880 --> 00:30:13,839
occurring in Americans. State Aerospace is considering a few options

577
00:30:13,880 --> 00:30:17,079
for actually getting boots on the ground using some advanced

578
00:30:17,119 --> 00:30:20,559
technology to perhaps do our own investigation of what these

579
00:30:20,599 --> 00:30:24,559
objects are in collaboration with companies that do this professionally.

580
00:30:25,000 --> 00:30:27,920
Speaker 3: Yeah, you know, I'm sure you heard many times people

581
00:30:27,920 --> 00:30:29,680
will say why don't they just shoot one down? And

582
00:30:30,039 --> 00:30:34,960
you know, but it is puzzling because it just seems

583
00:30:34,960 --> 00:30:37,079
like they I know, they're small and hard to track.

584
00:30:37,119 --> 00:30:39,039
I guess that's what the answer is. But it seems

585
00:30:39,039 --> 00:30:42,880
like they'd be able to track where they go to,

586
00:30:43,680 --> 00:30:46,599
not necessarily where they come from, because they kind of

587
00:30:46,640 --> 00:30:48,920
just show up. But a lot of people are considering

588
00:30:48,960 --> 00:30:52,279
they're possibly off of a ship or maybe be even

589
00:30:52,319 --> 00:30:56,079
a submarine off the coast east, you know, Atlanta.

590
00:30:56,119 --> 00:30:59,240
Speaker 1: I can't buy that there are military like adversarial and

591
00:30:59,279 --> 00:31:03,960
military says ms of substantial size operating in close proximity

592
00:31:04,000 --> 00:31:05,240
to DC, right.

593
00:31:05,319 --> 00:31:07,000
Speaker 2: I mean we might not have.

594
00:31:06,920 --> 00:31:10,519
Speaker 1: The best ability to text really small form factor drones

595
00:31:10,559 --> 00:31:15,079
and small aerial objects, but to detect.

596
00:31:14,720 --> 00:31:17,960
Speaker 2: A ship, even cargo ships, right.

597
00:31:17,960 --> 00:31:20,839
Speaker 1: I'm sure they were looking at you know, civilian flagships as.

598
00:31:20,680 --> 00:31:22,279
Speaker 2: Well, or even submarines.

599
00:31:22,359 --> 00:31:22,519
Speaker 3: Right.

600
00:31:22,759 --> 00:31:24,279
Speaker 2: I mean that that's kind of one of.

601
00:31:24,319 --> 00:31:29,519
Speaker 1: The core missions of NORAD, right, the North North American Command.

602
00:31:30,279 --> 00:31:33,000
So you know, they've said, know in certain terms that

603
00:31:33,039 --> 00:31:36,359
there are not adversarial ships off or coast launching these.

604
00:31:36,559 --> 00:31:40,720
I tend to believe them on that statement. But you know,

605
00:31:41,559 --> 00:31:44,160
we should be able to detect drone size object, especially

606
00:31:44,200 --> 00:31:48,000
what they're describing as car shaped or car sized objects, right.

607
00:31:48,079 --> 00:31:48,720
Speaker 2: You know, I mean you.

608
00:31:50,240 --> 00:31:54,519
Speaker 1: We measure radar reflectivity or radars ability to detect objects

609
00:31:54,640 --> 00:31:57,839
using something called radar cross section right, and then F

610
00:31:57,839 --> 00:32:00,000
twenty two for example, basically as the raidar cross sect

611
00:32:00,240 --> 00:32:05,000
of an insect. F eighteen you know, has a slightly

612
00:32:05,039 --> 00:32:07,279
bigger one. Let's make it up, call it basketball, right,

613
00:32:07,400 --> 00:32:09,759
So we do have the technicque like that, that is

614
00:32:09,799 --> 00:32:13,279
the realm of sizes that our advanced radar systems are

615
00:32:13,279 --> 00:32:15,519
looking for when they're doing air defense.

616
00:32:15,920 --> 00:32:20,559
Speaker 2: They are small objects. So to have potentially you.

617
00:32:20,519 --> 00:32:24,039
Speaker 1: Know, six eight twelve foot which is called it diameter

618
00:32:24,279 --> 00:32:28,079
shaped objects that are operating in close vicinity to those

619
00:32:28,160 --> 00:32:31,359
radar sites and yet they're still not receiving that information

620
00:32:31,599 --> 00:32:36,240
means that there's some kind of jumping signature management capabilities,

621
00:32:36,400 --> 00:32:40,240
or from an adversary, or there's some other mechanisms that's

622
00:32:40,480 --> 00:32:43,400
not allowing our radar systems to tect these objects. And

623
00:32:43,440 --> 00:32:46,720
that not just radar, but electro optical and infrared sensors

624
00:32:47,200 --> 00:32:50,119
have been ineffective for tracking a large number of these.

625
00:32:49,960 --> 00:32:53,759
Speaker 3: Objects as well. So that's just so bizarre. I mean,

626
00:32:54,039 --> 00:32:59,039
it's another it's such a mystery, I'm and it's apart

627
00:32:59,119 --> 00:33:02,440
from the UFO mystery if I think it is, for

628
00:33:02,680 --> 00:33:05,680
I mean, it seems like a separate thing, you know,

629
00:33:05,839 --> 00:33:09,559
But what it is you know, what type of technology

630
00:33:10,799 --> 00:33:13,079
could do what you're just saying, you know, I mean

631
00:33:13,480 --> 00:33:14,599
it really makes me wonder.

632
00:33:14,640 --> 00:33:18,119
Speaker 1: It's potentially a separate issue, but it points to the

633
00:33:18,119 --> 00:33:20,960
same court issue, right, which is we cannot be having

634
00:33:21,079 --> 00:33:24,680
unidentified objects within airspace and we need to invest the

635
00:33:24,720 --> 00:33:28,119
resources and time and energy into being able to have

636
00:33:28,160 --> 00:33:31,519
a proper system in place to be able to manage

637
00:33:31,839 --> 00:33:34,279
instances where we do have these cases, so that they

638
00:33:34,279 --> 00:33:37,759
can be prosecuted and investigated to determine whether they are

639
00:33:37,799 --> 00:33:41,759
an adversary, whether they are perhaps some kind of criminal activity,

640
00:33:41,839 --> 00:33:43,319
or whether they are something unknown.

641
00:33:43,720 --> 00:33:46,680
Speaker 3: Yeah. I mean there are some incursions, you know, which

642
00:33:46,720 --> 00:33:51,440
is into you know, military airspace, which I just can't

643
00:33:51,480 --> 00:33:57,400
imagine that you know, have not been investigated more. I mean,

644
00:33:57,440 --> 00:33:59,720
maybe they are and we just don't hear about it,

645
00:34:00,039 --> 00:34:02,480
but it just seems like it's such a taboo thing

646
00:34:02,680 --> 00:34:06,359
to be happening and dangerous. I think there was wasn't

647
00:34:06,400 --> 00:34:08,639
there a near miss? I think there was at least

648
00:34:08,639 --> 00:34:12,079
one near miss right from one of these we've.

649
00:34:11,920 --> 00:34:14,760
Speaker 1: Had, you know, I mean, we have a lot of

650
00:34:14,800 --> 00:34:18,000
reports from pilots where these things are operating within relatively

651
00:34:18,000 --> 00:34:19,760
close proximity to their aircraft.

652
00:34:21,159 --> 00:34:23,679
Speaker 2: We've recently discussed an instance.

653
00:34:23,320 --> 00:34:30,039
Speaker 1: Where a object reportedly went down the intake of a

654
00:34:30,199 --> 00:34:33,880
Gulf Stream aircraft. We've received some new information that might

655
00:34:33,920 --> 00:34:36,599
lead us to believe that that was prosaic, although bizarre,

656
00:34:36,760 --> 00:34:42,880
instance of aviation safety concern but not necessarily related to

657
00:34:43,000 --> 00:34:46,519
the drones per se. But that's something we're still actively investigating.

658
00:34:46,840 --> 00:34:50,280
And even just you know, during that same time period,

659
00:34:50,280 --> 00:34:53,039
we had multiple other pilots that were reporting, you know,

660
00:34:53,320 --> 00:34:56,519
strange objects that they were witnessing at very high altitudes

661
00:34:56,559 --> 00:34:59,920
sixty thousand feet green orbs that were maneuvering in zig

662
00:35:00,039 --> 00:35:03,239
zag patterns as a series of three and follow the

663
00:35:03,280 --> 00:35:06,639
aircraft for about forty five minutes.

664
00:35:06,800 --> 00:35:08,920
Speaker 3: So it was just the Oregon case.

665
00:35:09,199 --> 00:35:11,480
Speaker 1: No, this is this is over Florida in the middle

666
00:35:11,480 --> 00:35:14,360
of December. Yeah, it's an unreported case.

667
00:35:14,559 --> 00:35:16,960
Speaker 3: Wow. I'd also like to talk about the Oregon case

668
00:35:17,000 --> 00:35:19,800
because I don't I don't think it was a Gulf Stream,

669
00:35:19,840 --> 00:35:23,360
but it was a it was a medical.

670
00:35:23,199 --> 00:35:25,679
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, Yeah, that was an interesting one.

671
00:35:25,920 --> 00:35:29,480
Speaker 1: Sure, I don't think I'm in a position to summarize it,

672
00:35:29,519 --> 00:35:32,320
but generally, an aircraft, you know, multiple aircraft spotted an

673
00:35:32,320 --> 00:35:37,360
object that appeared to be traveling from the ocean over

674
00:35:37,480 --> 00:35:41,199
land back to the ocean at very rapid in high.

675
00:35:41,079 --> 00:35:41,800
Speaker 2: Rates of speed.

676
00:35:42,079 --> 00:35:46,519
Speaker 1: Yeah, seen by multiple pilots, reported air traffic control, no resolution,

677
00:35:46,679 --> 00:35:48,000
you know, just awareness of course.

678
00:35:48,079 --> 00:35:52,519
Speaker 2: But you know, I could fill a book with reports.

679
00:35:52,159 --> 00:35:55,679
Speaker 1: That are interested, you know, similar levels of interesting. Is

680
00:35:55,679 --> 00:35:59,239
that it's there's just I've talked to guys. It's happening

681
00:35:59,239 --> 00:36:01,880
every night. It's happening every night. It's just a matter

682
00:36:01,920 --> 00:36:03,000
of if they're reporting it.

683
00:36:03,679 --> 00:36:06,639
Speaker 3: Wow. Wow, that's really something. I bet you never knew

684
00:36:06,639 --> 00:36:09,960
you were going to end up this years ago. You

685
00:36:09,960 --> 00:36:11,320
would have never thought this should happen.

686
00:36:11,599 --> 00:36:14,599
Speaker 2: Absolutely not now. Did not see this in my future.

687
00:36:14,639 --> 00:36:15,639
But you know, here we are.

688
00:36:15,840 --> 00:36:18,679
Speaker 1: Yeah, and you know I did it because just like

689
00:36:18,760 --> 00:36:21,719
we talked about for the issues we were having over

690
00:36:22,760 --> 00:36:25,400
Virginia Beach, right, it wasn't getting resolved.

691
00:36:25,639 --> 00:36:26,880
Speaker 2: There was no resolution.

692
00:36:27,000 --> 00:36:29,519
Speaker 1: We were expecting something to happen, but we just went

693
00:36:29,559 --> 00:36:32,679
on with our missions, our training, and you know, dealt

694
00:36:32,719 --> 00:36:35,800
with it as best we could, you know, essentially treating

695
00:36:35,800 --> 00:36:38,840
it as a mid air hazard. We ended up going

696
00:36:38,840 --> 00:36:42,119
on deployment in twenty fifteen. I left on deployment, went

697
00:36:42,159 --> 00:36:44,679
to Murdy Mississippi to be a flight instructor still.

698
00:36:44,519 --> 00:36:45,000
Speaker 2: In the Navy.

699
00:36:45,599 --> 00:36:48,519
Speaker 1: In twenty seventeen, I saw the New York Times article

700
00:36:48,599 --> 00:36:51,840
come out that talked about programs with an efforts within

701
00:36:51,880 --> 00:36:55,239
the Pentagon to investigate this with you know, boom two

702
00:36:55,320 --> 00:37:00,320
videos from a UAP incident that pilots in my squadron after.

703
00:37:01,079 --> 00:37:03,360
And that's when I saw that article as a cry

704
00:37:03,400 --> 00:37:05,320
for help essentially, right, they're like, all right, this is

705
00:37:05,400 --> 00:37:07,679
still not resolved. You know, we thought it was going

706
00:37:07,719 --> 00:37:09,280
to be. We kind of started just looking the other

707
00:37:09,320 --> 00:37:11,480
way doing our training, but now guys are still dealing

708
00:37:11,480 --> 00:37:15,079
with this on the East Coast and elsewhere, no mitigation.

709
00:37:15,239 --> 00:37:17,199
And so perhaps I can help in some way now

710
00:37:17,239 --> 00:37:19,039
that I'm in a training command, you know, a little

711
00:37:19,039 --> 00:37:22,960
bit less busy, non operational, perhaps I can you know,

712
00:37:23,000 --> 00:37:25,840
at least add some some data to the conversation to

713
00:37:25,880 --> 00:37:28,320
be able to let people know that this is a

714
00:37:28,360 --> 00:37:31,719
serious issue, not because we're curious about UFOs, but because

715
00:37:32,000 --> 00:37:35,159
there's some serious national security and safety issues behind this.

716
00:37:35,960 --> 00:37:40,760
Speaker 3: Right right now, the go fast there's a lot of

717
00:37:42,719 --> 00:37:46,440
work to say that that was really nothing like this,

718
00:37:46,840 --> 00:37:49,719
the parallax, I think it's called something like that. I'm

719
00:37:49,719 --> 00:37:53,159
sorry if I'm butchering that word, but that it's something

720
00:37:53,199 --> 00:37:56,079
that's just floating with the wind. But I mean that

721
00:37:56,079 --> 00:37:58,239
that doesn't seem like that makes any sense to me.

722
00:37:58,360 --> 00:38:00,239
And what do you what can you tell us about

723
00:38:00,280 --> 00:38:03,320
what you know about that particular the go Fast video?

724
00:38:03,559 --> 00:38:06,679
Speaker 1: You know, it's funny because if I if I saw

725
00:38:06,920 --> 00:38:12,079
a big foot in the forest right walking around, and

726
00:38:12,119 --> 00:38:14,000
there was many reasons that led me to believe it

727
00:38:14,039 --> 00:38:16,679
was something super strange, it was huge, maybe it was

728
00:38:16,719 --> 00:38:21,280
walking very fast, you know, and then everyone zooms in

729
00:38:21,360 --> 00:38:24,119
focused like, well, the hair color on this yetti is

730
00:38:24,159 --> 00:38:26,880
the same color as a bear, so clearly this is

731
00:38:26,880 --> 00:38:27,239
a bear.

732
00:38:27,719 --> 00:38:27,880
Speaker 3: Right.

733
00:38:27,960 --> 00:38:30,119
Speaker 1: That's kind of what I feel like with this because

734
00:38:31,039 --> 00:38:32,760
I'll just say it out loud. I mean, the pilots

735
00:38:32,840 --> 00:38:35,880
never said the object was going fast, like. They never

736
00:38:35,920 --> 00:38:39,000
said that, although interestingly it was edited into their the

737
00:38:39,039 --> 00:38:41,880
Wikipedia entry for the Go Fast video that the pilots

738
00:38:42,199 --> 00:38:43,119
are saying.

739
00:38:42,840 --> 00:38:45,800
Speaker 2: Look, how look at it go? How fast it's flying?

740
00:38:46,280 --> 00:38:48,280
Like in parentheses, they never say that wow.

741
00:38:48,360 --> 00:38:51,639
Speaker 1: Right, So there's this weird kind of obsession about how

742
00:38:51,679 --> 00:38:52,840
fast this object is going.

743
00:38:52,840 --> 00:38:54,079
Speaker 2: But that's not what's interesting.

744
00:38:54,800 --> 00:38:57,960
Speaker 1: What's interesting is that there were four of them buying

745
00:38:58,000 --> 00:39:00,960
in a line of breast formation? Really, and they were,

746
00:39:01,079 --> 00:39:06,679
And this was occurring within minutes of another formation of objects,

747
00:39:06,719 --> 00:39:09,320
the gimbal, and the what appeared to be a formation

748
00:39:09,440 --> 00:39:12,159
of these objects behind it. Right, So now we have

749
00:39:13,119 --> 00:39:16,039
so now we have four objects here, We have five

750
00:39:16,079 --> 00:39:16,679
objects here.

751
00:39:16,679 --> 00:39:18,280
Speaker 2: We have a large gimbal object.

752
00:39:18,039 --> 00:39:20,880
Speaker 1: Here that are all maneuvering in ways that can tell

753
00:39:20,960 --> 00:39:21,719
us something about it.

754
00:39:21,800 --> 00:39:21,960
Speaker 3: Right?

755
00:39:22,000 --> 00:39:24,400
Speaker 1: Are they using a data link to communicate the flying

756
00:39:24,480 --> 00:39:25,760
formation that far apart?

757
00:39:25,880 --> 00:39:26,760
Speaker 2: How are they doing that?

758
00:39:26,880 --> 00:39:29,599
Speaker 1: Why are they flying within fifty miles of a US

759
00:39:29,679 --> 00:39:31,360
carrier three hundred and fifty miles out?

760
00:39:31,400 --> 00:39:33,039
Speaker 2: To see where did they come from? How are they

761
00:39:33,039 --> 00:39:33,719
being propelled?

762
00:39:34,199 --> 00:39:38,119
Speaker 1: These are the things that make it interesting. The specific

763
00:39:38,199 --> 00:39:40,320
speed of it. Yes, I think we'd all think it

764
00:39:40,360 --> 00:39:42,480
was pretty cool if it was going forty five hundred

765
00:39:42,480 --> 00:39:44,920
miles an hour, But that doesn't necessarily mean it's a

766
00:39:44,960 --> 00:39:47,239
normal occurrence, just because that's not what's happening.

767
00:39:47,800 --> 00:39:48,280
Speaker 3: Right, So.

768
00:39:50,840 --> 00:39:53,519
Speaker 1: That case is just as interesting to me as it

769
00:39:53,599 --> 00:39:55,880
was when we first saw it, as is the gimbal object.

770
00:39:55,960 --> 00:39:59,880
And regardless of what people might think in certain communities,

771
00:40:00,039 --> 00:40:02,800
it's certainly a very open and very interesting case to me.

772
00:40:03,360 --> 00:40:06,360
Speaker 3: Right, I had no idea they were all tied in together,

773
00:40:07,440 --> 00:40:09,320
so that was all happening at the same time. I

774
00:40:09,320 --> 00:40:13,400
thought these were just totally separate incidents. Nope, all at

775
00:40:13,400 --> 00:40:14,440
the same time, isn't that.

776
00:40:14,880 --> 00:40:17,239
Speaker 1: Yeah, so we're going to ignore this formation of unknown

777
00:40:17,239 --> 00:40:20,679
objects operating like in the backyard of a carrier within

778
00:40:20,719 --> 00:40:23,159
fifty miles, Like that's our closes fifty miles when you're

779
00:40:23,159 --> 00:40:25,639
a fighter pilot, is you know, might as will be

780
00:40:25,679 --> 00:40:27,960
ten feet you know when you're walking down the street.

781
00:40:28,320 --> 00:40:29,639
Speaker 2: So these are all.

782
00:40:29,599 --> 00:40:32,960
Speaker 1: Very close and personal and essentially invading our airspace in

783
00:40:33,000 --> 00:40:35,239
a way, and we were just, you know, we're just brushing

784
00:40:35,239 --> 00:40:36,760
it aside, which is a major concern.

785
00:40:37,239 --> 00:40:42,000
Speaker 3: Now, have you ever had any reports of usos, you know,

786
00:40:42,159 --> 00:40:43,440
underwater type of.

787
00:40:43,400 --> 00:40:46,760
Speaker 1: Situations, So yeah, aware, we've received some from people within

788
00:40:46,800 --> 00:40:50,880
that community. For US as aviators, we don't really have

789
00:40:50,960 --> 00:40:53,239
the tools to be able to tell. I mean, we're

790
00:40:53,239 --> 00:40:56,840
all typically flying at pretty high altitudes and when things

791
00:40:56,880 --> 00:40:58,880
get very low like that, it could be hard, like

792
00:40:58,920 --> 00:41:01,639
you can't just see it transition into the water necessarily,

793
00:41:01,719 --> 00:41:04,960
So we just don't have the mechanisms to make that determination.

794
00:41:05,119 --> 00:41:08,719
Speaker 2: But a number of reports that describe.

795
00:41:08,760 --> 00:41:12,679
Speaker 1: These things going into the water, from lower aircraft, from

796
00:41:12,960 --> 00:41:18,400
shipborn personnel, from submariners who have tracked objects at high

797
00:41:18,440 --> 00:41:20,119
velocities in their submarine.

798
00:41:21,239 --> 00:41:22,960
Speaker 2: Certainly not as many reports as we.

799
00:41:22,920 --> 00:41:27,440
Speaker 1: Do in the aeronautical regime, but they're certainly out there.

800
00:41:27,920 --> 00:41:31,239
Speaker 3: Well. What keeps me going on this topic is the mystery.

801
00:41:31,280 --> 00:41:34,679
I mean, it's such such a puzzle. And do you

802
00:41:34,719 --> 00:41:36,840
feel the same way, like do you? I mean, I

803
00:41:36,840 --> 00:41:38,760
don't have any great hope that we're going to know.

804
00:41:39,320 --> 00:41:41,239
And I actually I'm going to throw something else at

805
00:41:41,239 --> 00:41:42,880
you that I say on my show quite a bit

806
00:41:42,920 --> 00:41:46,599
that I really don't think that the our government really

807
00:41:46,639 --> 00:41:48,559
has the full picture. And I wonder way you think

808
00:41:48,559 --> 00:41:49,039
about that.

809
00:41:49,639 --> 00:41:50,719
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's a good question.

810
00:41:52,079 --> 00:41:55,280
Speaker 1: You know, there's there's kind of two sides to this conversation,

811
00:41:55,760 --> 00:42:00,639
right There's this conversation about what pilot that you're seeing,

812
00:42:00,679 --> 00:42:04,280
what people are seeing that's happening right now, And in

813
00:42:04,320 --> 00:42:07,920
that conversation, we often treat it as we're all kind

814
00:42:07,920 --> 00:42:10,199
of trying to figure out this together, and the government

815
00:42:10,320 --> 00:42:13,679
is maybe dismissive but ultimately clueless, and.

816
00:42:13,719 --> 00:42:14,920
Speaker 2: We have to figure something out.

817
00:42:15,760 --> 00:42:17,920
Speaker 1: The other side of the conversation you often hear is

818
00:42:17,920 --> 00:42:20,920
is you know the term disclosure, which implies that the

819
00:42:20,920 --> 00:42:26,039
government has been investigating this and perhaps you know, investing

820
00:42:26,199 --> 00:42:30,159
scientifically into understanding this, perhaps for decades.

821
00:42:32,079 --> 00:42:33,679
Speaker 2: My personal experience.

822
00:42:33,199 --> 00:42:35,679
Speaker 1: Is not on that disclosure side. I've never been read

823
00:42:35,760 --> 00:42:39,599
in any programs like that. I feel like I should

824
00:42:39,599 --> 00:42:44,559
say obviously, but maybe it's not obvious. And so from

825
00:42:44,760 --> 00:42:48,199
kind of from the aviation safety perspective, it seems like

826
00:42:49,679 --> 00:42:52,880
kind of a wall where they're just not investing time

827
00:42:52,920 --> 00:42:56,239
and energy into this. But on the disclosure on the

828
00:42:56,239 --> 00:43:00,360
technology side, it does seem like there are there are

829
00:43:01,039 --> 00:43:03,360
there are parts of the elephant. I've felt in some sense,

830
00:43:03,440 --> 00:43:06,880
right so the blind man, you know, touching the elephant,

831
00:43:06,920 --> 00:43:09,079
and they all describe it differently because you're touching different

832
00:43:09,079 --> 00:43:10,280
parts and trying to figure out.

833
00:43:10,159 --> 00:43:10,599
Speaker 2: What it is.

834
00:43:11,159 --> 00:43:15,599
Speaker 1: You know, there have been have been parts of I think,

835
00:43:15,679 --> 00:43:20,719
what what are likely classified programs dedicated to this that

836
00:43:20,920 --> 00:43:23,639
I feel like I've touched in some ways and others

837
00:43:23,639 --> 00:43:26,559
have touched that I've talked to, But it doesn't give

838
00:43:26,559 --> 00:43:30,039
me a cohesive whole picture of you know, the depth

839
00:43:30,079 --> 00:43:31,199
of knowledge that.

840
00:43:32,760 --> 00:43:34,119
Speaker 2: They may have on this topic.

841
00:43:34,239 --> 00:43:38,119
Speaker 1: So I do get the sense that there are classified

842
00:43:38,159 --> 00:43:41,239
efforts to understand this to what degree, I don't know,

843
00:43:42,119 --> 00:43:44,320
And of course this is outside of the public programs

844
00:43:44,360 --> 00:43:46,960
we've all heard about, like the UAP Task Force and others.

845
00:43:48,760 --> 00:43:51,320
But I really don't know how deep it goes. But

846
00:43:51,360 --> 00:43:53,719
I do suspect that there's there's work done there.

847
00:43:54,519 --> 00:43:57,800
Speaker 3: Yeah, Yeah, I think, yeah. I One of the things

848
00:43:57,840 --> 00:44:01,519
I've thought of is, you know, maybe if they don't

849
00:44:01,679 --> 00:44:05,000
have the full picture, then they can't also say that

850
00:44:05,039 --> 00:44:07,519
they can protect us because they It's kind of like

851
00:44:07,599 --> 00:44:10,599
the drones in a way, they're saying, well, we don't

852
00:44:10,639 --> 00:44:12,880
know what they are, but they're not dangerous. It's kind

853
00:44:12,880 --> 00:44:15,280
of a silly statement because if they don't know what

854
00:44:15,360 --> 00:44:17,960
they are, then how do they know if they're nick

855
00:44:18,039 --> 00:44:23,679
dangerous or some type of you know, foreign adversary. They don't, yeah,

856
00:44:23,719 --> 00:44:27,639
that this this whole thing, So you're you're basically saying

857
00:44:27,719 --> 00:44:30,480
that these drones are still happening. It's just not like

858
00:44:30,599 --> 00:44:33,960
the media as it always does, like you hardly ever

859
00:44:34,000 --> 00:44:36,880
hear about the Ukraine War or something, you know, like

860
00:44:37,079 --> 00:44:40,519
it just moves on to whatever is fresh and you know,

861
00:44:40,880 --> 00:44:42,719
talk about Trump or whatever the heck it is that

862
00:44:42,760 --> 00:44:46,440
they're talking about today, So you think that they're having

863
00:44:47,079 --> 00:44:49,239
the same amount of.

864
00:44:49,760 --> 00:44:52,239
Speaker 1: I get the sense it's probably diminished a bit, but

865
00:44:52,440 --> 00:44:55,920
it's certainly there is still consistent reporting coming in from

866
00:44:55,920 --> 00:44:56,800
that area.

867
00:44:57,159 --> 00:45:01,400
Speaker 3: And are people actually reporting drone as well to you

868
00:45:02,159 --> 00:45:04,480
separately or you just hear about the reports coming in.

869
00:45:06,440 --> 00:45:07,679
Speaker 2: I'm not sure I understood question.

870
00:45:07,800 --> 00:45:11,079
Speaker 3: Oh yeah, I'm talking about the Your Your Your program

871
00:45:11,079 --> 00:45:11,440
that you have.

872
00:45:11,719 --> 00:45:15,559
Speaker 1: Yeah, so we do get reports through Americans State Aerospace

873
00:45:15,599 --> 00:45:17,880
that are relevant, you know, and timely right now as

874
00:45:17,920 --> 00:45:21,119
to what's happening New Jersey. And of course I'm seeing

875
00:45:21,800 --> 00:45:24,920
and talking to other people who are maybe not aware

876
00:45:24,960 --> 00:45:26,119
of that reporting mechanism.

877
00:45:26,440 --> 00:45:28,920
Speaker 2: They're sharing those reports or through.

878
00:45:28,719 --> 00:45:31,760
Speaker 1: Conversation and whatnot, and of course seeing some stuff to

879
00:45:31,840 --> 00:45:34,920
a diminished degree on social media. But you know, it's

880
00:45:35,280 --> 00:45:37,679
it's hard, right, I Mean, people get pretty excited about

881
00:45:37,719 --> 00:45:40,719
sending a clip sometimes, but it's often very difficult to

882
00:45:40,760 --> 00:45:42,800
assess what's happening in the clip, which is why the

883
00:45:42,840 --> 00:45:44,920
context around it is so important.

884
00:45:44,880 --> 00:45:48,599
Speaker 3: Right right, And you know you talked about these reports

885
00:45:48,639 --> 00:45:52,519
that came in. I'm assuming that a lot of these

886
00:45:52,559 --> 00:45:55,719
people are relieved that they can actually talk to someone

887
00:45:55,760 --> 00:45:56,239
about this.

888
00:45:56,480 --> 00:46:00,800
Speaker 1: Yeah. Absolutely, I mean, especially especially when we kind of

889
00:46:00,800 --> 00:46:03,559
first started, because there was a wave of people that

890
00:46:03,800 --> 00:46:06,480
I think had a lot you know, had something to

891
00:46:06,559 --> 00:46:08,320
share for a while. You know, if you just go

892
00:46:08,400 --> 00:46:09,920
in your backyard you see this, you saw me on

893
00:46:10,000 --> 00:46:11,840
Joe Rogan last week, and you submit a report, might

894
00:46:11,920 --> 00:46:15,039
not have the same emotional impact. But you know, there's

895
00:46:15,079 --> 00:46:17,760
there's folks that we've spoken to that have you know,

896
00:46:17,800 --> 00:46:19,559
in some cases they're like, hey, you know, I've been

897
00:46:19,559 --> 00:46:21,840
sitting on this for eight months. It took me three

898
00:46:21,880 --> 00:46:25,280
months to tell my wife. You know, Yeah, it's changed

899
00:46:25,320 --> 00:46:28,320
my entire perspective on everything.

900
00:46:29,159 --> 00:46:29,320
Speaker 3: Here.

901
00:46:29,360 --> 00:46:30,639
Speaker 1: I'm going to share it with you because I think

902
00:46:30,679 --> 00:46:33,639
you guys can actually you know, help in some way,

903
00:46:33,679 --> 00:46:35,880
not help them, but help the issue at large. But

904
00:46:35,920 --> 00:46:39,440
with this new information that they've offered, so so, I mean,

905
00:46:39,440 --> 00:46:41,559
more than I can count people that have had that

906
00:46:41,679 --> 00:46:43,360
common I mean, I've talked to a lot of people

907
00:46:43,400 --> 00:46:46,920
who have had their lives changed because of these these instances.

908
00:46:47,039 --> 00:46:51,679
Speaker 3: I'm going to tell you two different incidents that involved

909
00:46:51,920 --> 00:46:55,079
fighter jets of people that I know. One of them,

910
00:46:55,079 --> 00:46:58,679
I'm a antique and ardi appraiser and a fellow appraiser

911
00:46:58,760 --> 00:47:03,960
up in Montreal, that we did a big job in

912
00:47:04,000 --> 00:47:10,760
Atlanta together with I told him one day that in

913
00:47:10,800 --> 00:47:12,760
a conversation, I go, hey, you know, I had a

914
00:47:12,840 --> 00:47:15,440
UFO sighting in two thousand and seven. I don't know

915
00:47:15,440 --> 00:47:16,800
what you think about it, by I do a show

916
00:47:16,800 --> 00:47:19,960
on UFOs And he goes, oh, well, you know. And

917
00:47:20,000 --> 00:47:22,119
I love when people say that, you know, they start

918
00:47:22,119 --> 00:47:25,159
to bring up their own story. He was. He said

919
00:47:25,159 --> 00:47:28,599
that he had a party at his house and everyone

920
00:47:28,719 --> 00:47:30,719
was out in the deck and all of a sudden

921
00:47:30,719 --> 00:47:33,840
they hear these like an afterburner. They hear this fighter

922
00:47:33,920 --> 00:47:36,880
jets like coming and they look over and it's chasing

923
00:47:36,920 --> 00:47:41,360
a disc. And this was about fifteen years ago. And

924
00:47:41,360 --> 00:47:43,239
he said he couldn't believe when he got up the

925
00:47:43,320 --> 00:47:45,559
next day and started looking at the paper and looking online,

926
00:47:45,559 --> 00:47:47,840
there was nothing about it. He just couldn't believe that.

927
00:47:48,480 --> 00:47:49,960
And he said, I don't know what it was, but

928
00:47:50,039 --> 00:47:52,440
it was a disc and it was it was ahead

929
00:47:52,480 --> 00:47:59,559
of them. Another story that and Amherst College. This guy

930
00:47:59,599 --> 00:48:02,440
that I shared an office with on the Antiques road

931
00:48:02,440 --> 00:48:05,039
Show and he's not you know, he's not just I

932
00:48:05,079 --> 00:48:08,599
don't know. I don't know if that makes his credibility

933
00:48:08,639 --> 00:48:12,679
anymore or less. But anyway, he was saying, when he

934
00:48:12,760 --> 00:48:17,800
was in college, this square box floated in between the

935
00:48:17,920 --> 00:48:20,000
towers were in his dorm, and he said, we're all

936
00:48:20,000 --> 00:48:21,400
looking out. He said, I'm not going to say I

937
00:48:21,400 --> 00:48:23,760
didn't have a couple of beers, but we're all looking

938
00:48:23,800 --> 00:48:25,559
at this thing and it's shaped like a box, and

939
00:48:25,559 --> 00:48:28,239
there's lights in each corner blinking. He said, all of

940
00:48:28,239 --> 00:48:30,840
a sudden, it shoots off towards the mountain, and then

941
00:48:31,360 --> 00:48:34,559
these two fighter jets go flying toward it and they

942
00:48:34,559 --> 00:48:36,960
get close to it, and it bursts into five lights

943
00:48:37,039 --> 00:48:39,760
and the lights start blinking. Then the lights in formation

944
00:48:39,880 --> 00:48:43,920
shoot off. So bizarre, but I asked him, you know, wow,

945
00:48:44,039 --> 00:48:45,599
that must have changed your life. He said, I could

946
00:48:45,599 --> 00:48:49,840
care less. But anyway, the reason I'm bringing these two

947
00:48:49,880 --> 00:48:54,400
sightings up is there must be military pilots that are

948
00:48:54,599 --> 00:48:58,239
chasing these things. There's too many people talking about these

949
00:48:58,239 --> 00:49:02,239
things being chased, And have you ever heard from anyone

950
00:49:02,280 --> 00:49:03,320
that actually chased.

951
00:49:03,440 --> 00:49:07,639
Speaker 2: I've heard from a couple kind of more historical cases.

952
00:49:08,440 --> 00:49:08,639
Speaker 3: You know.

953
00:49:08,679 --> 00:49:11,800
Speaker 1: The organization that is responsible for that type of homeland

954
00:49:11,840 --> 00:49:13,840
security like that, you know, it's the Air Force, and

955
00:49:13,840 --> 00:49:15,920
they've been notoriously quiet on this topic.

956
00:49:16,079 --> 00:49:17,199
Speaker 3: Yeah, I'm just going to talk about that.

957
00:49:17,280 --> 00:49:18,800
Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean they have you know, it's different from

958
00:49:18,800 --> 00:49:21,719
the Navy because we're training when we're flying within the

959
00:49:21,840 --> 00:49:24,679
US here and we were an expeditionary group, then we

960
00:49:24,719 --> 00:49:27,880
do our operational missions elsewhere. The Air Force has an

961
00:49:27,920 --> 00:49:31,079
operational mission here in the United States, and so that

962
00:49:31,119 --> 00:49:33,800
would lead me to believe that if they are responding

963
00:49:33,840 --> 00:49:37,800
to instances, those are likely classified operational missions that they're on,

964
00:49:38,400 --> 00:49:40,679
and thus they would have less leeway to share that

965
00:49:40,719 --> 00:49:42,599
information compared to the Navy.

966
00:49:44,000 --> 00:49:45,960
Speaker 3: I've been wondering, you know, and that was one of

967
00:49:45,960 --> 00:49:47,719
the things I was going to bring up, wondering why

968
00:49:47,760 --> 00:49:51,960
the Air Force seems to be the quietest on this topic,

969
00:49:52,320 --> 00:49:55,239
even the Army was getting involved a little bit in

970
00:49:55,280 --> 00:49:59,519
a while back on materials. I believe that's it just

971
00:49:59,559 --> 00:50:02,599
seems to me, you know, like Project Bluebook was, you know,

972
00:50:02,679 --> 00:50:06,159
the Air Force, and you know, there's been rumors. I'm

973
00:50:06,159 --> 00:50:09,079
sure you've heard them that that always continued. And I

974
00:50:09,119 --> 00:50:12,519
actually met someone that was in Ohio that was doing

975
00:50:12,559 --> 00:50:14,840
water cooler talk with the UFO guys. That's what he

976
00:50:14,920 --> 00:50:17,440
told me. Now he's down in South Carolina where I

977
00:50:17,440 --> 00:50:21,960
go had a retirement, not a retirement, yeah, I mean

978
00:50:22,000 --> 00:50:25,800
the community that I'm in down there. And he says

979
00:50:26,039 --> 00:50:29,480
that water cooler talk with the UFO guys was in

980
00:50:29,519 --> 00:50:34,920
the seventies in Ohio. You Project Bluebook closed in nineteen

981
00:50:34,920 --> 00:50:37,360
sixty the end of nineteen sixty nine, so I think

982
00:50:37,360 --> 00:50:40,639
that's kind of interesting that something was still going on there. Yeah.

983
00:50:40,719 --> 00:50:43,199
Speaker 1: I mean, I think if we make the assumption that

984
00:50:43,239 --> 00:50:46,760
the government within certain circles at least has accepted the

985
00:50:46,760 --> 00:50:49,920
reality situation, I would think that that effort would be ongoing.

986
00:50:50,239 --> 00:50:50,440
Speaker 3: Right.

987
00:50:50,519 --> 00:50:53,840
Speaker 1: There's just there's too much to gain and too much

988
00:50:53,880 --> 00:50:55,159
at risk to ignore it.

989
00:50:55,400 --> 00:50:58,719
Speaker 3: Yeah. Yeah, Now this might be sort of philosophical, but

990
00:50:59,239 --> 00:51:01,960
you know, I I wonder, like, if there's so much

991
00:51:02,000 --> 00:51:06,239
intelligent let's just say we're being visited from extraterrestrial and

992
00:51:06,440 --> 00:51:08,800
just throw that out there. And I don't really I'm

993
00:51:08,840 --> 00:51:10,760
not going to say I know because I have no clue,

994
00:51:10,920 --> 00:51:13,679
but let's just say we are. But I always wonder,

995
00:51:14,079 --> 00:51:17,159
and I'd like to ask people like you, why would

996
00:51:17,400 --> 00:51:22,199
be so special if there's intelligent life all through the universe,

997
00:51:22,639 --> 00:51:27,639
you know, like possibly billions and billions of planets with intelligent,

998
00:51:27,760 --> 00:51:33,079
more advanced life than us possibly just to you know

999
00:51:33,119 --> 00:51:35,039
your opinion, Why do you think we would have all

1000
00:51:35,039 --> 00:51:38,360
these things happening on our planet?

1001
00:51:38,960 --> 00:51:42,880
Speaker 2: Well, there's a few ways you might logically think about that.

1002
00:51:43,000 --> 00:51:48,320
Speaker 1: One might be that although there could be let's just

1003
00:51:48,360 --> 00:51:53,119
call it, you know, billions of civilizations, there's still you know,

1004
00:51:53,320 --> 00:51:56,400
trillions of planets out there, right, So that does still

1005
00:51:56,400 --> 00:52:01,400
make it relatively rare, right, yeah, and you know, so

1006
00:52:01,480 --> 00:52:07,960
there could be value I think in well, let me

1007
00:52:08,000 --> 00:52:10,400
say this, right, I mean, what is Earth of a sense?

1008
00:52:10,480 --> 00:52:10,599
Speaker 3: Right?

1009
00:52:10,760 --> 00:52:14,519
Speaker 1: You have all these different creatures that evolved according to

1010
00:52:14,559 --> 00:52:19,440
the parameters of their planet. You have, for whatever reason,

1011
00:52:19,679 --> 00:52:22,960
this one unique species that was able to transcend its

1012
00:52:23,119 --> 00:52:26,320
own limitations to the use of technology and communication and

1013
00:52:26,400 --> 00:52:34,159
things of that nature. In some sense, it's it's entropy, right,

1014
00:52:34,199 --> 00:52:37,639
I mean, we're controlling entropy in a different way than

1015
00:52:37,719 --> 00:52:40,840
say a dead planet does. Right, where you just have

1016
00:52:41,079 --> 00:52:43,519
you know, it's just called a bunch of material packed

1017
00:52:43,559 --> 00:52:46,360
into a sphere, right, that's one level of enturebub We're

1018
00:52:46,360 --> 00:52:49,639
almost like reverse entropy, right, We're creating more complex structures

1019
00:52:50,239 --> 00:52:53,960
over time, and I think that that probably is something

1020
00:52:54,000 --> 00:52:56,239
that adds a lot of data and value to someone

1021
00:52:56,280 --> 00:52:58,400
that didn't grow because you could probably you know, reverse

1022
00:52:58,400 --> 00:53:01,599
engineer a lot about that planet, come to new understandings

1023
00:53:01,599 --> 00:53:05,000
about you know, systems or complexity that maybe you didn't

1024
00:53:05,039 --> 00:53:09,519
otherwise understand, you know, studying your own your own planet

1025
00:53:09,559 --> 00:53:11,079
or your own your own species.

1026
00:53:12,320 --> 00:53:13,800
Speaker 2: There could be perhaps.

1027
00:53:13,480 --> 00:53:17,159
Speaker 1: You know, some type of mineral or resource need that

1028
00:53:17,519 --> 00:53:20,280
a planet like this has a is perhaps you know,

1029
00:53:20,760 --> 00:53:25,239
somewhat rare within the universe. It could be, you know,

1030
00:53:25,320 --> 00:53:27,599
if if there are truly a lot of sentient life

1031
00:53:27,599 --> 00:53:32,360
out there that have promulgated their civilizations within our local,

1032
00:53:32,679 --> 00:53:34,519
you know, sphere of our part.

1033
00:53:34,320 --> 00:53:35,639
Speaker 2: Of the galaxy.

1034
00:53:35,760 --> 00:53:39,559
Speaker 1: It might not be an overly specific mission to understand us,

1035
00:53:39,599 --> 00:53:42,119
but it might be a byproduct of kind of normal

1036
00:53:42,199 --> 00:53:45,719
commerce and movement you know, amongst the galaxy in some sense,

1037
00:53:45,719 --> 00:53:50,760
and of course is totally speculative, but I find it

1038
00:53:50,760 --> 00:53:57,599
hard to believe that if life is is present elsewhere

1039
00:53:57,800 --> 00:54:02,280
in the universe, even to a large degree, I still

1040
00:54:02,320 --> 00:54:04,519
think it would be rare enough to be of interest.

1041
00:54:04,719 --> 00:54:07,039
And of course that's not equally distributed, right, I mean,

1042
00:54:07,079 --> 00:54:09,880
you could have a galaxy next door that maybe has

1043
00:54:10,360 --> 00:54:14,360
a thousand different civilizations. Maybe the parameters in our universe

1044
00:54:14,639 --> 00:54:17,840
are slightly different, or our galaxy are slightly different. Maybe

1045
00:54:17,880 --> 00:54:21,320
there's less or maybe even just maybe space travel is

1046
00:54:21,599 --> 00:54:25,480
ultimately limited by the speed of light, and therefore, you know,

1047
00:54:25,559 --> 00:54:30,079
perhaps it's just actors within our local environment, maybe call

1048
00:54:30,119 --> 00:54:32,880
it two thousand stars around us, right, And that's what

1049
00:54:32,920 --> 00:54:36,199
we're seeing is participants in that kind of community versus

1050
00:54:36,280 --> 00:54:39,960
a wider ecosystem, and that would shrink the size of

1051
00:54:40,000 --> 00:54:42,000
the universe, so to speak, in such a manner that

1052
00:54:42,119 --> 00:54:44,639
we would perhaps be more interesting than if they had,

1053
00:54:44,960 --> 00:54:47,360
you know, availability to the entire universe. Right.

1054
00:54:47,400 --> 00:54:50,159
Speaker 2: So we're speculating about.

1055
00:54:49,920 --> 00:54:53,079
Speaker 1: Things that we don't know because we don't have an understanding,

1056
00:54:53,119 --> 00:54:54,760
and it's hard for us to pin down what the

1057
00:54:54,960 --> 00:54:58,280
ultimate reason of interest would be. But I can just

1058
00:54:58,400 --> 00:55:00,519
you know, as I just did, just think of several

1059
00:55:00,559 --> 00:55:02,840
reasons why it would be. I think it would be

1060
00:55:02,840 --> 00:55:06,679
foolish to think that just because there's life elsewhere that

1061
00:55:06,679 --> 00:55:11,039
would make us less special here now to those that

1062
00:55:11,119 --> 00:55:12,360
are around us potentially.

1063
00:55:12,559 --> 00:55:17,800
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, thanks for that. Interesting David Grush, you and

1064
00:55:17,920 --> 00:55:22,519
David Fravor and he were testifying, and I think it

1065
00:55:22,519 --> 00:55:26,840
was July twenty sixth, twenty twenty three, and like I

1066
00:55:26,880 --> 00:55:29,679
mentioned earlier, was one of the last three people in

1067
00:55:29,719 --> 00:55:32,880
the room, Chris Lido, Donna who you met, and myself

1068
00:55:33,280 --> 00:55:37,199
And that was really that was thrilling to be there.

1069
00:55:37,559 --> 00:55:45,880
Thrilling David not David Prayer, I'm sorry, David rush the

1070
00:55:47,039 --> 00:55:51,599
how when I first heard him with Ross caltheart way

1071
00:55:51,599 --> 00:55:55,679
back talking about the crash retrieval program, ooh, that might

1072
00:55:55,719 --> 00:55:57,920
be a little step too far, And you know, I

1073
00:55:57,920 --> 00:56:00,519
mean I was a little bit nervous for the actually

1074
00:56:00,519 --> 00:56:03,440
the whole community UFO community, thinking maybe that's a little

1075
00:56:03,480 --> 00:56:08,840
too far, or you know, maybe maybe maybe it's uh fringe.

1076
00:56:09,239 --> 00:56:13,039
Is it possible? And then I've come to talk to

1077
00:56:13,400 --> 00:56:15,760
a number of people over the years that makes me

1078
00:56:15,840 --> 00:56:19,039
think that is, I mean, even since that time, that

1079
00:56:19,440 --> 00:56:22,719
it is a possibility. Why they you know, the number

1080
00:56:22,719 --> 00:56:25,320
one thing people ask me why would they crash here?

1081
00:56:25,360 --> 00:56:27,119
If they got here, you know how what would make

1082
00:56:27,159 --> 00:56:31,079
them crash? But for whatever reason? I'm just wondering, do

1083
00:56:31,119 --> 00:56:35,639
you think they'll ever be a you know more disclosure

1084
00:56:35,679 --> 00:56:37,119
on that particular topic.

1085
00:56:36,920 --> 00:56:39,639
Speaker 1: Is yeah, I'll just say I get this, you know,

1086
00:56:39,679 --> 00:56:42,960
I don't know for certain, of course, but well, one

1087
00:56:43,039 --> 00:56:46,719
let me just say, you know, for aggress in particular,

1088
00:56:46,920 --> 00:56:47,559
people will.

1089
00:56:47,440 --> 00:56:49,719
Speaker 2: Ask me like, do you believe him?

1090
00:56:50,800 --> 00:56:54,039
Speaker 1: Let me just say, you know, he was specifically tasked

1091
00:56:54,039 --> 00:56:57,800
to do the job that he reported on as the

1092
00:56:57,840 --> 00:57:00,760
representative I believe for that or NGA.

1093
00:57:00,920 --> 00:57:04,039
Speaker 2: I think NGA for you know, in conjunction with the

1094
00:57:04,119 --> 00:57:05,039
UP task Force.

1095
00:57:05,360 --> 00:57:07,800
Speaker 1: And he was selected for that job, that that role

1096
00:57:07,840 --> 00:57:11,280
because he had a high level of readings across many programs,

1097
00:57:11,320 --> 00:57:15,880
and so the ability for him to get more clearances

1098
00:57:15,920 --> 00:57:17,719
to be able to get rid of these digital programs

1099
00:57:17,800 --> 00:57:21,159
was relatively trivial compared to someone else. And he did

1100
00:57:21,159 --> 00:57:25,159
his job, and he reported that information, and that was

1101
00:57:25,199 --> 00:57:28,679
the output of that. Now, it doesn't necessarily mean I

1102
00:57:29,039 --> 00:57:33,159
quote unquote believe or of course can validate any of

1103
00:57:33,159 --> 00:57:36,840
what he said. But do I believe it? I don't

1104
00:57:36,880 --> 00:57:39,920
necessarily believe any one data point per se. But overall,

1105
00:57:39,960 --> 00:57:41,400
I think he's generally telling the.

1106
00:57:41,360 --> 00:57:43,320
Speaker 2: Truth that he's seen it through his research.

1107
00:57:43,480 --> 00:57:47,280
Speaker 1: Right, was he potentially lied to in certain circumstances or manipulated?

1108
00:57:47,800 --> 00:57:50,639
That possibility exists, But I think the general message that

1109
00:57:50,679 --> 00:57:55,440
he's sharing, you know, rings rings accurate, you know, generally speaking,

1110
00:57:57,119 --> 00:57:58,599
I'm sorry, what was the original question.

1111
00:57:58,920 --> 00:58:01,039
Speaker 3: Oh, it's just just wondered if we'll.

1112
00:58:01,360 --> 00:58:03,360
Speaker 2: We'll hear more more, But I think we will.

1113
00:58:03,519 --> 00:58:05,400
Speaker 1: You know, I think there are you know, if what

1114
00:58:05,400 --> 00:58:08,039
he said is true, then there's potentially thousands or tens

1115
00:58:08,039 --> 00:58:08,920
of thousands of other.

1116
00:58:08,800 --> 00:58:11,719
Speaker 2: People that could corroborate what he what he stated.

1117
00:58:11,920 --> 00:58:16,920
Speaker 1: And I imagine the way that this conversation is continuing

1118
00:58:16,960 --> 00:58:22,039
and accelerating, especially with the interest communicated by the next

1119
00:58:22,039 --> 00:58:25,639
administration on this topic, that there will be a lot

1120
00:58:25,679 --> 00:58:29,119
of continued efforts to bring a light either through new

1121
00:58:29,320 --> 00:58:32,480
whistleblowers or through investigation of what David Gruss shared. So

1122
00:58:34,480 --> 00:58:36,519
I do expect that story to continue.

1123
00:58:37,079 --> 00:58:40,199
Speaker 3: I was told, you know, someone in the UFO community

1124
00:58:40,639 --> 00:58:43,639
had a conversation in Washington, DC when I was standing

1125
00:58:43,679 --> 00:58:48,599
there in line and said all these things. Everything leads

1126
00:58:48,639 --> 00:58:51,840
back to how put off. It doesn't go any further

1127
00:58:51,880 --> 00:58:54,679
back than that. And I don't know how accurate that

1128
00:58:54,760 --> 00:58:59,760
statement is. I have no idea. It was an interesting statement,

1129
00:58:59,840 --> 00:59:02,880
but I still like, I don't know if that's if

1130
00:59:02,880 --> 00:59:06,159
that's where David you know, got some of his information

1131
00:59:06,800 --> 00:59:07,000
or not.

1132
00:59:07,360 --> 00:59:11,599
Speaker 2: I really don't know, do you know, how Yeah, I won't,

1133
00:59:11,639 --> 00:59:13,159
I mean, I won't sure his friend, but you know,

1134
00:59:13,239 --> 00:59:16,519
we've we've talked a few times, and yeah, yeah, I

1135
00:59:16,559 --> 00:59:17,639
know him.

1136
00:59:18,760 --> 00:59:21,239
Speaker 1: I did gres get information on how I don't know,

1137
00:59:21,400 --> 00:59:25,840
presumably probably some, but I say I'm fairly confident that

1138
00:59:25,880 --> 00:59:28,840
a lot of the information came from independent sources that

1139
00:59:29,320 --> 00:59:30,159
haven't been named.

1140
00:59:30,480 --> 00:59:33,719
Speaker 3: Yeah. Yeah, And Todd Curtis was on my show a

1141
00:59:33,719 --> 00:59:38,639
while ago. I know that, you know. Yeah, aviation, yeah, safety, Yeah, interesting.

1142
00:59:38,679 --> 00:59:41,440
I love this whole aspect of it. And I'm really

1143
00:59:42,039 --> 00:59:44,360
really glad that you were able to come up here

1144
00:59:44,639 --> 00:59:47,880
and talk face to face. It's always so much better

1145
00:59:49,039 --> 00:59:53,239
this way in my opinion. And so the Nova specials

1146
00:59:53,280 --> 00:59:59,039
coming out tomorrow actually and on the twenty second, nine

1147
00:59:59,039 --> 01:00:05,480
PM and on PBS, and that was what is What

1148
01:00:05,599 --> 01:00:08,119
are UFOs is? I'm trying to remember the exact title

1149
01:00:08,159 --> 01:00:09,599
to that.

1150
01:00:09,239 --> 01:00:11,360
Speaker 2: Sounds right, sorry, BBS.

1151
01:00:11,960 --> 01:00:15,039
Speaker 3: Yeah, so I've always respected Nova. Was that was that

1152
01:00:15,079 --> 01:00:17,519
an interesting program too?

1153
01:00:17,679 --> 01:00:17,920
Speaker 1: Yeah?

1154
01:00:18,000 --> 01:00:20,719
Speaker 2: I mean I love PBS. I love PBS Nova.

1155
01:00:21,519 --> 01:00:26,440
Speaker 1: You know, I'm approaching this from a scientific standpoint, you know,

1156
01:00:26,480 --> 01:00:28,760
I'm not I want to consider myself a believer. I've

1157
01:00:28,800 --> 01:00:31,760
you know, I've had my experiences, you know, which I

1158
01:00:31,760 --> 01:00:34,239
would claim as objective reality in a lot of ways,

1159
01:00:34,239 --> 01:00:34,840
so I don't need.

1160
01:00:34,719 --> 01:00:37,599
Speaker 2: To prove those particular events.

1161
01:00:38,000 --> 01:00:39,840
Speaker 1: But you know, as I engage in this topic, I

1162
01:00:40,119 --> 01:00:43,320
think it's critically important that it's a data driven scientific

1163
01:00:43,360 --> 01:00:48,559
conversation and that we expose the scientific community, academia, and

1164
01:00:48,679 --> 01:00:51,480
industry to this conversation because I'm not I'm not smart

1165
01:00:51,599 --> 01:00:52,840
enough to do it by myself.

1166
01:00:53,079 --> 01:00:53,280
Speaker 2: Right.

1167
01:00:53,599 --> 01:00:56,719
Speaker 1: We need to have the gears of government, the gears

1168
01:00:56,719 --> 01:01:00,159
of academia churning on this so that we can understand this.

1169
01:01:00,280 --> 01:01:03,199
And you know, we're at a very I think interesting

1170
01:01:03,239 --> 01:01:06,920
point right now, because an inflection point in a lot

1171
01:01:06,920 --> 01:01:09,159
of ways, and that you know, I mean.

1172
01:01:09,039 --> 01:01:10,400
Speaker 2: It's funny we have this conversation.

1173
01:01:10,480 --> 01:01:13,320
Speaker 1: Now, maybe we'll look back in twenty years and you know,

1174
01:01:13,440 --> 01:01:18,639
after academia and everywhere else has updated their priors on

1175
01:01:18,679 --> 01:01:20,719
this conversation, and now this is one of the most

1176
01:01:20,760 --> 01:01:23,519
interesting topics that people fled into, right, and we'll laugh

1177
01:01:23,519 --> 01:01:27,199
about how uncertainly were of the future of this conversation

1178
01:01:27,360 --> 01:01:28,760
in those in those circles.

1179
01:01:29,079 --> 01:01:30,559
Speaker 2: But I think it's critically important.

1180
01:01:30,559 --> 01:01:34,920
Speaker 1: I think NOVA has a great role to play in introducing,

1181
01:01:35,400 --> 01:01:39,119
you know, the complexities of this conversation to the audience.

1182
01:01:39,079 --> 01:01:43,079
Speaker 3: Right yeah, no, I'm it is such a puzzle, as

1183
01:01:43,079 --> 01:01:47,039
I mentioned earlier, and I do love the fact that

1184
01:01:47,280 --> 01:01:52,320
there is academia getting involved and scientists and you know,

1185
01:01:52,400 --> 01:01:55,440
I mean that's that was up before two thousand. I

1186
01:01:55,440 --> 01:01:59,000
started this in twenty eleven and I used to ask

1187
01:01:59,239 --> 01:02:04,360
people astrophysicists I had on I said, why doesn't science

1188
01:02:04,400 --> 01:02:07,440
look at this? And he said, it's an unsolvable problem.

1189
01:02:07,920 --> 01:02:12,079
And also the stigma there was the two things, so

1190
01:02:12,119 --> 01:02:15,320
they can't get funding basically, but the stigma I think

1191
01:02:15,440 --> 01:02:19,679
in that department has really changed a lot. And I'm

1192
01:02:19,800 --> 01:02:22,320
very encouraging. I do want to say that I do

1193
01:02:22,400 --> 01:02:25,760
really feel as though the needle has moved forward a lot.

1194
01:02:26,039 --> 01:02:29,280
And you know, and people like you talking about it,

1195
01:02:29,519 --> 01:02:31,199
I don't know if you would have talked about it

1196
01:02:31,719 --> 01:02:34,239
if that New York Times article didn't come out. You know,

1197
01:02:34,280 --> 01:02:35,039
I don't know how, you.

1198
01:02:35,039 --> 01:02:36,840
Speaker 1: Know, why not I would you know, I was just

1199
01:02:37,239 --> 01:02:40,280
going about my life, moved past it, you know, I

1200
01:02:40,320 --> 01:02:42,519
didn't know it was still a problem for the folks

1201
01:02:42,559 --> 01:02:45,360
that were flying back there still. But yeah, I mean

1202
01:02:45,599 --> 01:02:48,559
without that article, I doubt I would have I would

1203
01:02:48,559 --> 01:02:50,239
have come forward. I didn't even know would have come

1204
01:02:50,280 --> 01:02:52,360
forward to I didn't know it was something that was

1205
01:02:52,400 --> 01:02:54,320
even still occurring, or how widespread it was.

1206
01:02:54,599 --> 01:02:57,119
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, I when I had my setting in two

1207
01:02:57,159 --> 01:02:59,440
thousand and seven, I had no idea that you could

1208
01:02:59,440 --> 01:03:04,719
report it online. I called the police station. But thank

1209
01:03:04,719 --> 01:03:06,239
you so much trying it's been a real pleasure.

1210
01:03:06,280 --> 01:03:07,679
Speaker 2: Yeah, thanks for having me, all right,