1 00:00:00,440 --> 00:00:02,520 Speaker 1: I don't think he can help but pay attention to 2 00:00:02,600 --> 00:00:05,160 the war in Iran a regional war now, but how 3 00:00:05,160 --> 00:00:07,599 we see it that's different than how someone who's done 4 00:00:07,639 --> 00:00:11,359 it sees it. Michael Rourke is the Special Forces veteran 5 00:00:11,400 --> 00:00:14,679 combat vetue, joins us for his eyes on this conflict. 6 00:00:14,720 --> 00:00:16,679 We'll talk about this with the help of renew dot 7 00:00:16,719 --> 00:00:18,480 Healthcare and God Almighty. 8 00:00:20,640 --> 00:00:24,519 Speaker 2: But Todd Herman Show is one percent disapproved by big 9 00:00:24,600 --> 00:00:32,359 pharma technocrats and tyrant's everywhere from the high mountains of 10 00:00:32,479 --> 00:00:40,320 Free America. Here's the Emerald City exile Todd Herman. 11 00:00:43,079 --> 00:00:45,719 Speaker 1: Today is the day the Lord has made, and these 12 00:00:45,759 --> 00:00:48,320 are the times to which God has decided we shall live. 13 00:00:48,880 --> 00:00:53,079 Michael Rourke joins me its advanced operational strategies, and Mike 14 00:00:53,200 --> 00:00:56,640 is a Special Forces veteran retired. Now, Mike, welcome back 15 00:00:56,679 --> 00:00:57,479 to the Todd Hermit Show. 16 00:00:57,479 --> 00:00:58,159 Speaker 3: It's great to have her. 17 00:00:59,240 --> 00:01:00,520 Speaker 4: Thanks to good back. 18 00:01:00,960 --> 00:01:02,240 Speaker 3: Yep, it's good to have you here. 19 00:01:02,280 --> 00:01:05,040 Speaker 1: And you see these things so differently than we do. 20 00:01:05,200 --> 00:01:07,159 And we've got a whole series of questions for you, 21 00:01:07,560 --> 00:01:10,719 starting with let's just from your perspective rate this is 22 00:01:10,760 --> 00:01:14,040 an operation, no politics, none of that. There's skepticism. I'm 23 00:01:14,040 --> 00:01:16,680 skeptical about the reason for this war, et cetera. I 24 00:01:17,040 --> 00:01:19,760 back our troops one hundred percent. I think they're incredible. 25 00:01:19,840 --> 00:01:22,400 I'm so thankful for them. So what do you see 26 00:01:23,359 --> 00:01:25,560 as a grade as an operator in this how do 27 00:01:25,560 --> 00:01:27,359 you grade the affair? 28 00:01:28,959 --> 00:01:34,200 Speaker 4: It's definitely a success. So far. We're seriously degrading Rand's 29 00:01:34,239 --> 00:01:40,159 ability to attack other countries. Yeah, I think the War 30 00:01:40,200 --> 00:01:44,480 Department has said that they're about above seventy five percent 31 00:01:45,000 --> 00:01:49,480 degraded and their ability to launch, particularly in the ballistic missiles. 32 00:01:49,760 --> 00:01:50,000 Speaker 3: Yep. 33 00:01:50,079 --> 00:01:53,640 Speaker 4: The drones are still a problem. And the drones are 34 00:01:53,680 --> 00:01:58,000 having an easier time getting through. They're much they fly 35 00:01:58,159 --> 00:02:02,599 much lower. There's a slower five flying weapon system, but 36 00:02:02,680 --> 00:02:05,840 a lot of them are getting through. But the ballistic missiles, 37 00:02:05,840 --> 00:02:08,520 which are the real danger, that's the big punch, those 38 00:02:08,520 --> 00:02:10,159 are seriously degraded. 39 00:02:10,960 --> 00:02:14,319 Speaker 1: And so being able to degrade that then that's one 40 00:02:14,360 --> 00:02:16,639 part of this operation. But we just did something else, 41 00:02:16,680 --> 00:02:18,879 and this is on the sea. You just showed this 42 00:02:19,039 --> 00:02:22,000 me this morning. We did something for the first time 43 00:02:22,080 --> 00:02:25,520 since to your knowledge, since World War Two, on the. 44 00:02:25,479 --> 00:02:30,400 Speaker 4: Sea, correct, Yeah, in the Indian Ocean, somewhere near Sri Lanka. 45 00:02:31,360 --> 00:02:36,080 A US Navy Fast Attacks submarine fired a torpedo and 46 00:02:36,240 --> 00:02:41,400 sank the Iranian frigate data. That was a ship over 47 00:02:41,479 --> 00:02:44,680 three hundred feet long, and it's now on the bottom 48 00:02:44,719 --> 00:02:47,680 of the ocean. Apparently there was a heavy loss of 49 00:02:47,719 --> 00:02:50,520 life among the crew. I think the Sri Lanka Navy 50 00:02:50,639 --> 00:02:53,039 is recovering bodies. I don't know if they've picked up 51 00:02:53,080 --> 00:02:57,479 any survivors, but yeah, the War Department released that video, 52 00:02:57,520 --> 00:03:01,759 and it's pretty spectacular. First time that we publicly acknowledged 53 00:03:01,919 --> 00:03:06,280 torpedoing an enemy's surface vessels since nineteen forty. 54 00:03:06,039 --> 00:03:09,520 Speaker 1: Five, you've cari since nineteen forty five World War Two, 55 00:03:09,719 --> 00:03:12,199 you've characterized this as a regional war, and I want 56 00:03:12,240 --> 00:03:14,800 to talk about that in the seconds. This is General 57 00:03:15,000 --> 00:03:18,919 Barry McCaffrey. He was on MSNBC, which we're now supposed 58 00:03:18,919 --> 00:03:20,840 to call ms NOW since they ruined that brand. 59 00:03:20,840 --> 00:03:21,680 Speaker 3: I hope you can hear this. 60 00:03:24,000 --> 00:03:27,840 Speaker 1: McCaffrey says, it's unlikely that we will have a success. 61 00:03:28,240 --> 00:03:32,759 Speaker 5: Tackle surprised more than five hundred targets have been hit. 62 00:03:34,400 --> 00:03:37,719 The Israelis and the US Air Force have massive superior 63 00:03:37,800 --> 00:03:41,879 over of the Iranian defense capacities, which is weakened by 64 00:03:41,879 --> 00:03:45,560 the Twelve Day War eight month ago. The Iranian regime 65 00:03:45,759 --> 00:03:49,120 is fragile. They've murdered more than seven thousand of their 66 00:03:49,159 --> 00:03:55,360 own people. They're widely five. We have apparently succeeded in 67 00:03:55,400 --> 00:03:59,639 eliminating a lot of the Iranian senior leadership. The problem 68 00:03:59,800 --> 00:04:03,680 which jumps out at you is the President did this 69 00:04:03,840 --> 00:04:10,520 by decree by whim, without consultation with Congress, without any 70 00:04:10,560 --> 00:04:15,120 attempt to gain the support of the American people, and finally, 71 00:04:15,159 --> 00:04:18,759 in the direct contradiction of the views of our allies, 72 00:04:18,920 --> 00:04:23,560 not just the European Union, but also there alas in 73 00:04:23,600 --> 00:04:26,959 a region, seven of which are now being struck in 74 00:04:27,199 --> 00:04:28,480 an Iranian retaliation. 75 00:04:28,639 --> 00:04:31,680 Speaker 1: So he went on to say, in regards to us 76 00:04:31,720 --> 00:04:37,040 having ultimate success there did McCaffrey unlikely? Unlikely? Unlikely for 77 00:04:37,079 --> 00:04:40,319 the circumstances. You're not someone who can read the future. 78 00:04:40,399 --> 00:04:43,040 None of us can. But if we've got en up 79 00:04:43,079 --> 00:04:45,879 to this start, do you think we're in an unlikely 80 00:04:45,920 --> 00:04:48,279 position to succeed? And what would success mean? 81 00:04:49,600 --> 00:04:52,800 Speaker 4: Well, you look at you know what the President and 82 00:04:52,839 --> 00:04:57,120 what the War Department has said success means, and they've 83 00:04:57,160 --> 00:05:01,040 said it means destroying a rans ability to make war 84 00:05:01,079 --> 00:05:05,240 on their neighbors, preventing them from ever having a nuclear weapon. Yeah, 85 00:05:05,920 --> 00:05:10,279 they don't really specifically talk about regime change and leaving 86 00:05:10,319 --> 00:05:12,319 that up to the Ranian people, but they're trying to 87 00:05:12,319 --> 00:05:16,439 set the conditions for that to happen. We're definitely going 88 00:05:16,480 --> 00:05:18,920 to succeed in their ability to make war on their neighbors. 89 00:05:19,720 --> 00:05:23,920 I think we're going to succeed on destroying their nuclear 90 00:05:24,160 --> 00:05:29,519 weapons program. And I would just ask Jerald McCaffrey, where 91 00:05:29,560 --> 00:05:33,120 was he in twenty eleven when Barack Obama by decree 92 00:05:33,480 --> 00:05:36,279 launched a seven month long operation against Libya. 93 00:05:37,439 --> 00:05:38,000 Speaker 3: Yeah? 94 00:05:38,360 --> 00:05:41,480 Speaker 1: Yeah, Well this wasn't that Hillary Clinton who launched that 95 00:05:42,720 --> 00:05:44,839 because of it was a YouTube video, wasn't it, Mike. 96 00:05:46,240 --> 00:05:49,439 Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean it was, of course Barack Obama was 97 00:05:49,439 --> 00:05:52,319 the commander in chief. But I want to say, yeah, 98 00:05:52,319 --> 00:05:55,079 the twenty eleven twenty twelve timeframe. 99 00:05:55,399 --> 00:05:57,920 Speaker 1: And that see, and this is how some people argue 100 00:05:57,920 --> 00:06:00,319 into this, that that turned out to be a very 101 00:06:00,319 --> 00:06:04,839 bad operation. Yes, we took out a bad guy, bad actor, 102 00:06:05,120 --> 00:06:08,000 but it costs us pretty dearly in lives of some 103 00:06:08,040 --> 00:06:11,480 of our men, obviously infamously in Benghazi. 104 00:06:12,240 --> 00:06:13,199 Speaker 3: So people worry about that. 105 00:06:13,279 --> 00:06:15,079 Speaker 1: I want to stay on mission with you, which is 106 00:06:15,120 --> 00:06:18,079 to have you look at this through military eyes and 107 00:06:18,079 --> 00:06:19,639 will continue this in just a second. 108 00:06:20,040 --> 00:06:20,720 Speaker 3: We were just talking. 109 00:06:20,800 --> 00:06:22,959 Speaker 1: We'll get back to this with Mike about the economic 110 00:06:23,000 --> 00:06:26,399 impact on China. Venezuela was doing a bunch of oil 111 00:06:26,439 --> 00:06:29,360 business with these guys. Iran has done this. If you 112 00:06:29,399 --> 00:06:31,160 think this isn't going to affect your retirement, I have 113 00:06:31,199 --> 00:06:34,879 news for you, because the whole landscape is changing because 114 00:06:34,879 --> 00:06:38,079 the players on the Board of change positions. Add to this, 115 00:06:38,160 --> 00:06:44,199 AI and President Trump's insane executive order to speed six 116 00:06:44,360 --> 00:06:47,920 G to put implants in our bodies so our bodies 117 00:06:47,959 --> 00:06:50,199 become cell phones. You think that's not going affect things, 118 00:06:50,199 --> 00:06:53,000 It obviously is. My friend Zach Abraham's putting out a 119 00:06:53,040 --> 00:06:55,839 free live webinar coming up. He's the chief investment officer 120 00:06:55,920 --> 00:06:58,519 Bulwer Capital Management. He's going to take the war into account, 121 00:06:58,959 --> 00:07:01,680 that's development in account, and talk about how they adjust 122 00:07:01,680 --> 00:07:05,160 for this with risk management strategies at Bulwark Capital Management. 123 00:07:05,199 --> 00:07:07,600 Speaker 3: This is free to attend. I have to do is register. 124 00:07:07,800 --> 00:07:10,720 Speaker 1: Just go to Know Your Risk podcast dot com March 125 00:07:10,759 --> 00:07:14,079 twenty six, three to thirty Pacific, Know Your Risk Podcast 126 00:07:14,160 --> 00:07:17,240 dot Com Go register right now, investment advisory services off 127 00:07:17,240 --> 00:07:20,360 through Teck Financial LC and sec Rich Investment Advisor. Investments 128 00:07:20,439 --> 00:07:22,839 volve risk and are not guaranteed pastforms is encarag to 129 00:07:22,959 --> 00:07:26,319 future result TRUK twenty six, Dash four to seven. Michael 130 00:07:26,319 --> 00:07:30,240 works with US retired Special Forces and Mike, from your 131 00:07:30,319 --> 00:07:32,800 perspective as a guy who served in the Middle East 132 00:07:32,839 --> 00:07:35,879 in special Forces, you said that you carried out What 133 00:07:35,920 --> 00:07:36,360 did you say? 134 00:07:36,439 --> 00:07:37,560 Speaker 3: People asked what you did? 135 00:07:38,079 --> 00:07:40,800 Speaker 1: We're talking about diplomatic relations, and you gave them a 136 00:07:40,879 --> 00:07:42,680 nice little shortcut for what you did. 137 00:07:43,879 --> 00:07:48,079 Speaker 4: Yeah, basically was a Green Beret do. And I typically 138 00:07:48,079 --> 00:07:51,000 say we implement foreign policy at the grassroots. 139 00:07:50,560 --> 00:07:51,079 Speaker 3: Level, okay. 140 00:07:51,360 --> 00:07:54,600 Speaker 1: And Alex overre Al was saying that war is aggressive 141 00:07:55,639 --> 00:07:59,480 aggressive negotiation or diplomacy by another means, and. 142 00:07:59,639 --> 00:08:01,480 Speaker 4: From yeah, diplomacy by other means. 143 00:08:01,519 --> 00:08:01,720 Speaker 2: Yep. 144 00:08:02,120 --> 00:08:04,519 Speaker 1: So when you look at the intel we had here, this, 145 00:08:05,279 --> 00:08:07,439 I want to say, this is astonishing to me, but 146 00:08:07,600 --> 00:08:09,839 I'm the guy who's always saying anything that can be 147 00:08:09,879 --> 00:08:14,519 coded can be hacked. But apparently the Masade gained access 148 00:08:14,800 --> 00:08:19,120 for fifteen years to the traffic cameras in and around 149 00:08:19,240 --> 00:08:23,319 where the leaders of Iran were located, and they developed 150 00:08:23,360 --> 00:08:27,360 what's called pattern of life packages and rolled those into 151 00:08:27,399 --> 00:08:28,839 target packages. Talk about that. 152 00:08:30,439 --> 00:08:34,960 Speaker 4: Yeah, if the Financial Times article is accurate, they hacked 153 00:08:35,000 --> 00:08:38,159 into the system of the traffic cams. And by the way, 154 00:08:38,279 --> 00:08:40,960 don't think China's not doing that here in the United States, 155 00:08:42,519 --> 00:08:47,080 or that we're not doing it in China. The I've 156 00:08:47,080 --> 00:08:50,360 heard also as possible that there were even internal security 157 00:08:50,399 --> 00:08:53,679 cameras that were hacked into. And yeah, we've establishing that 158 00:08:53,879 --> 00:08:56,720 we call pol or pattern of life on a target 159 00:08:57,200 --> 00:09:02,039 is absolutely critical to get some sort of predictive targeting analysis. 160 00:09:02,240 --> 00:09:04,559 And then when you get the information that, yeah, this 161 00:09:04,679 --> 00:09:06,720 meeting is going to take place, Apparently there are also 162 00:09:07,080 --> 00:09:10,879 human sources involved. Again according to that article, Yeah, the 163 00:09:10,919 --> 00:09:15,120 CIA had had a human source that was very well placed. Again, 164 00:09:15,159 --> 00:09:17,600 when this stuff becomes public, you don't really know how 165 00:09:17,600 --> 00:09:20,639 accurate it is because all the intelligence services are gonna 166 00:09:20,679 --> 00:09:25,399 say no comment. But if this stuff became public, and 167 00:09:25,440 --> 00:09:27,759 if it's accurate, it might mean that those sources and 168 00:09:27,799 --> 00:09:32,240 methods are no longer useful in that particular context. But yeah, 169 00:09:32,279 --> 00:09:34,360 they were. They were to be able to determine, well, 170 00:09:34,480 --> 00:09:36,600 he's there, and it was the way they took him 171 00:09:36,639 --> 00:09:37,720 out was quite spectacular. 172 00:09:37,960 --> 00:09:39,320 Speaker 1: So We'll talk about the way they took him out 173 00:09:39,320 --> 00:09:41,039 here in a seconds. But this is one of the 174 00:09:41,080 --> 00:09:44,399 reasons why I don't have a smart home. You know, 175 00:09:44,879 --> 00:09:48,600 we had someone out to fix our our hot. 176 00:09:48,480 --> 00:09:49,200 Speaker 3: Water the other day. 177 00:09:49,879 --> 00:09:52,519 Speaker 1: When the guy was looking at the at the readout 178 00:09:52,519 --> 00:09:53,960 and he goes, do you have your app i AD 179 00:09:54,080 --> 00:09:56,759 on your saus you tell what he goes, because I 180 00:09:56,799 --> 00:09:58,039 could just check this with Bluetooth. 181 00:09:58,120 --> 00:09:59,600 Speaker 3: It's going to cost you a little bit more money. 182 00:09:59,759 --> 00:10:01,840 Speaker 1: That's okay, because I'm not My house is not gonna 183 00:10:01,840 --> 00:10:04,159 have anything smart in it, and it's for this. And 184 00:10:04,200 --> 00:10:07,799 then just today I read about there's a new this 185 00:10:07,840 --> 00:10:10,519 is completely open source software patch you can put on 186 00:10:10,559 --> 00:10:14,240 your router to turn your house into a surveillance thing 187 00:10:14,840 --> 00:10:18,080 that counts heart rates and breath five meters from the 188 00:10:18,240 --> 00:10:21,519 uh from this goes through walls, et cetera. And it 189 00:10:21,600 --> 00:10:24,440 can be put on apparently any router. And that's if 190 00:10:24,480 --> 00:10:26,799 we decide to put it on. It's not like our 191 00:10:26,960 --> 00:10:30,960 intelligence services will ever pushed that down. So if you 192 00:10:31,039 --> 00:10:33,039 if this is true, and they got the traffic camera 193 00:10:33,120 --> 00:10:35,159 data and they built a pattern of life, what does 194 00:10:35,200 --> 00:10:37,159 that what does that look like? They feed that into 195 00:10:37,240 --> 00:10:39,960 AI to say, Okay, this is when they're likely to 196 00:10:39,960 --> 00:10:41,600 be there. Then they hit the attack, and then we'll 197 00:10:41,600 --> 00:10:44,240 talk about the way they actually took the eye toll out. 198 00:10:45,960 --> 00:10:48,639 Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean, nowadays, I'm sure they use AI, but 199 00:10:48,639 --> 00:10:50,639 you're also going to have a lot of human eyeballs 200 00:10:51,000 --> 00:10:54,759 looking at that data, compiling it, getting all these data points, 201 00:10:54,840 --> 00:10:58,559 Okay that you know, like this particular security guard is 202 00:10:58,600 --> 00:11:02,039 always with the ayatola, so when we see him standing 203 00:11:02,120 --> 00:11:06,240 outside that parked you know, limousine Okay, you know the 204 00:11:06,279 --> 00:11:09,679 iatolas inside that building, you know, things like that, and 205 00:11:09,720 --> 00:11:13,559 they're they're tracking, they're you know, they're tracking security detail. 206 00:11:14,000 --> 00:11:15,679 You know, what are the days on, what are their 207 00:11:15,720 --> 00:11:19,879 days off? When, which key players are always there when 208 00:11:19,919 --> 00:11:23,039 your head VIP is present. Yeah, and those are the 209 00:11:23,039 --> 00:11:25,799 indicators that they're building the picture with, even if they 210 00:11:25,799 --> 00:11:29,879 don't actually see the target themselves. But apparently the apparently 211 00:11:29,879 --> 00:11:33,519 they had other knowledge that he was inside the building, 212 00:11:33,559 --> 00:11:35,480 and they knew in advanced that the meeting was going 213 00:11:35,559 --> 00:11:36,120 to take place. 214 00:11:36,480 --> 00:11:38,600 Speaker 3: Yeah. I read an article and shared this. 215 00:11:38,720 --> 00:11:41,879 Speaker 1: Several years ago, Wired magazine proved that you can use 216 00:11:41,919 --> 00:11:46,399 AD targeting technology to take out high value targets. They 217 00:11:46,519 --> 00:11:50,000 used it to find out within fifteen feet where President 218 00:11:50,080 --> 00:11:53,879 Trump was, and they used this as a demonstration. They 219 00:11:53,879 --> 00:11:56,120 found out about this from someone who'd been an inside 220 00:11:56,120 --> 00:12:00,799 the Beltway actor who then started a company leveraging commercially 221 00:12:00,799 --> 00:12:02,960 available ad tech to just did. 222 00:12:02,919 --> 00:12:03,919 Speaker 3: The same thing with Putin. 223 00:12:04,039 --> 00:12:07,440 Speaker 1: So let's not kid ourselves that there aren't these these 224 00:12:07,480 --> 00:12:10,679 patterns of life being built everywhere. You believe the Chinese 225 00:12:10,720 --> 00:12:14,120 Communist Party has our traffic cameras and maybe our internal 226 00:12:14,200 --> 00:12:17,080 security cameras and our nest cams, et cetera. 227 00:12:18,279 --> 00:12:19,840 Speaker 3: You think that's almost a certainty. 228 00:12:20,919 --> 00:12:23,639 Speaker 4: Why wouldn't they you know, well, like you said, if 229 00:12:23,679 --> 00:12:26,799 it can be coded, it can be hacked. Yeah, there 230 00:12:26,799 --> 00:12:30,480 are all kinds of amateur you know, fifteen sixty year 231 00:12:30,480 --> 00:12:33,720 old hackers that are breaking into camera systems, breating in 232 00:12:33,759 --> 00:12:37,600 security systems. Like you, we don't have a smart smart home. 233 00:12:37,639 --> 00:12:42,200 We don't have you know, the computerized graphic thermostat that 234 00:12:42,200 --> 00:12:46,159 could be controlled from elsewhere, and you know, the appliances 235 00:12:46,720 --> 00:12:50,320 or as dumb as can be. So yeah, why wouldn't 236 00:12:50,360 --> 00:12:50,840 they do that? 237 00:12:51,440 --> 00:12:51,639 Speaker 3: Right? 238 00:12:52,000 --> 00:12:54,720 Speaker 1: And that raises another question that I want to talk 239 00:12:54,759 --> 00:12:57,759 about later, which is why aren't we seeing and praise 240 00:12:57,840 --> 00:13:00,879 God Almighty we're not seeing, But why aren't we seeing 241 00:13:00,919 --> 00:13:05,360 some truly devastating attacks by Iranian sleeper cells which I'd 242 00:13:05,440 --> 00:13:08,840 always assumed we're here ready to go and get massively 243 00:13:08,919 --> 00:13:12,639 kinetic in the case of war like this. So how 244 00:13:12,639 --> 00:13:14,639 did they take the eye toll outs? And looking at 245 00:13:14,639 --> 00:13:17,720 it from your perspective as a retired Green Beret Special 246 00:13:17,759 --> 00:13:19,799 Forces guy, how do you rate that part of the. 247 00:13:19,799 --> 00:13:23,840 Speaker 4: Opp Well, I mean, you can't call on anything but 248 00:13:23,919 --> 00:13:27,360 a spectacular success based on the results. What I heard 249 00:13:27,440 --> 00:13:31,519 was that they had some fairly new missiles on a 250 00:13:31,519 --> 00:13:36,440 bunch of Israeli F fifteens, and these missiles when they 251 00:13:36,440 --> 00:13:38,600 got and the planes were supposedly in the air for 252 00:13:38,720 --> 00:13:42,320 hours just waiting for the launch signal, and once they 253 00:13:42,480 --> 00:13:46,759 got it, these missiles were fired, supposedly left the atmosphere 254 00:13:47,440 --> 00:13:50,600 and then got over the target and then came plunging 255 00:13:51,159 --> 00:13:56,120 straight down, probably at hypersonic speeds, and just multiple of 256 00:13:56,159 --> 00:13:59,320 these weapons hit the building that the I tool was 257 00:13:59,360 --> 00:14:01,879 in and just turned it into rubble and pretty much 258 00:14:01,879 --> 00:14:03,240 pulverized everything inside. 259 00:14:03,639 --> 00:14:06,120 Speaker 1: And the significance of leaving the atmosphere is that speed 260 00:14:06,200 --> 00:14:08,399 or does that get outside the realm of their radar? 261 00:14:08,679 --> 00:14:11,279 Their surveillance capabilities, one would assume. 262 00:14:11,679 --> 00:14:16,159 Speaker 4: It just the degrade and the ability to detect and intercept. Yeah, 263 00:14:16,200 --> 00:14:18,679 and plus the fact that it was happening in daylight. 264 00:14:19,039 --> 00:14:22,000 You know, they weren't expecting it. That's what you know. 265 00:14:22,240 --> 00:14:24,919 They certainly weren't expecting anything to happen, Otherwise they wouldn't 266 00:14:24,919 --> 00:14:26,360 be having a meeting above ground. 267 00:14:26,919 --> 00:14:27,200 Speaker 2: Yeah. 268 00:14:27,240 --> 00:14:29,799 Speaker 1: And I guess if the missiles coming straight down, there's 269 00:14:30,039 --> 00:14:31,200 there's no vector on it. 270 00:14:31,200 --> 00:14:32,519 Speaker 3: It's just it's it's. 271 00:14:32,360 --> 00:14:35,360 Speaker 1: This thing coming straight down. I was curious about that that. 272 00:14:35,440 --> 00:14:37,840 I asked you the day of the attack, why are 273 00:14:37,879 --> 00:14:39,720 we doing this during the day, because you'd set me 274 00:14:39,840 --> 00:14:43,519 some some thoughts prior to the attack, saying, you know, 275 00:14:43,559 --> 00:14:48,480 there's there's not enough moonlight, it's not good coverage, you know, 276 00:14:48,759 --> 00:14:53,320 not good light at night. But that daylight thing, that's 277 00:14:53,360 --> 00:14:57,240 this obviously target of opportunity. But this is me thinking 278 00:14:57,480 --> 00:15:01,679 non military, Mike, I look at this for the Iranian forces, 279 00:15:01,799 --> 00:15:04,720 and I look at this psychologic saying, we took you 280 00:15:04,799 --> 00:15:08,600 guys out in the middle of the morning in full daylight, 281 00:15:08,960 --> 00:15:11,080 and that's what we can do and you can't. 282 00:15:12,919 --> 00:15:16,480 Speaker 4: Correct. And another indicator you know that we're talking about 283 00:15:16,559 --> 00:15:19,879 operation before is that the civilian airspace was still open. 284 00:15:20,320 --> 00:15:22,519 You know, the skis in Iran, the skys in the 285 00:15:22,519 --> 00:15:25,879 Middle East were full of civilian airliners in normal operation, 286 00:15:26,000 --> 00:15:28,960 and they're going to clear that airspace first. And but 287 00:15:29,080 --> 00:15:31,840 they had what we call a fleeting target, a fleeting 288 00:15:31,879 --> 00:15:34,799 opportunity that they had to take advantage of. Not only 289 00:15:35,000 --> 00:15:38,799 do we take out their queue leadership that morning, but 290 00:15:38,840 --> 00:15:41,440 then we kept doing it. Now they're trying to elect 291 00:15:41,440 --> 00:15:44,919 a new Ayatola, Well, we hit the place where they 292 00:15:44,919 --> 00:15:48,399 were counting the votes, took out more key leaders. So 293 00:15:48,440 --> 00:15:51,679 we're just working down the chain, the national chain of command. 294 00:15:51,960 --> 00:15:56,360 We're also targeting military leaders at every level that that 295 00:15:56,399 --> 00:15:59,240 we can find them. So far, I think just the 296 00:15:59,320 --> 00:16:03,440 United States will has it two thousand separate targets. Israel 297 00:16:03,639 --> 00:16:06,960 might have hit as many. You know that this is 298 00:16:07,000 --> 00:16:10,519 targets from a key leadership to infrastructure, to police stations, 299 00:16:11,159 --> 00:16:14,440 to ballistic missile launchers, to blistic missile storage, to air 300 00:16:14,440 --> 00:16:17,279 defense systems. And that's what so far has also given 301 00:16:17,360 --> 00:16:21,879 US air superiority, not necessarily air dominance yet, but complete 302 00:16:21,919 --> 00:16:23,399 air superiority. 303 00:16:23,600 --> 00:16:26,120 Speaker 1: Takes Sas said today, he thinks that we will have 304 00:16:26,240 --> 00:16:30,720 air dominance within the next couple of days. He thinks 305 00:16:30,759 --> 00:16:34,240 that the air Force Arena air Force is close to 306 00:16:34,279 --> 00:16:37,600 being non existent at this point. Although we've seen some 307 00:16:37,639 --> 00:16:40,840 air action and you talked about this, we've seen some 308 00:16:41,000 --> 00:16:44,440 dogfights and some plane shot down and this went very viral, 309 00:16:45,159 --> 00:16:48,480 and I think rightly, so that's an image of a 310 00:16:48,679 --> 00:16:51,480 female pilot. We had two pilots shot down that we 311 00:16:51,559 --> 00:16:55,320 know about. One was a male pilot, as the female pilots, 312 00:16:55,759 --> 00:16:58,440 and she's in the middle of the desert, and it's 313 00:16:58,480 --> 00:17:01,799 pretty phenomenal, and even people who are skeptical of the 314 00:17:01,840 --> 00:17:04,880 war looking at this as really phenomenal. A she was 315 00:17:04,920 --> 00:17:09,039 able to eject and survive. B she was met by 316 00:17:09,079 --> 00:17:12,200 what could only be described as a gentleman who saw 317 00:17:12,240 --> 00:17:12,920 her and came up. 318 00:17:12,839 --> 00:17:15,319 Speaker 3: Said are you okay? And she said, yeah, I'm okay. 319 00:17:15,319 --> 00:17:15,880 Are you sure? 320 00:17:16,039 --> 00:17:19,440 Speaker 1: Yes, well, thanks for helping us. And then came this 321 00:17:19,640 --> 00:17:22,720 iconic photo of these guys in really beautiful white robes 322 00:17:22,799 --> 00:17:27,240 and headdresses and posing with her, and people saying it's propaganda. Okay, 323 00:17:27,240 --> 00:17:29,880 maybe it is, but I don't think the shootdown was propaganda. 324 00:17:29,960 --> 00:17:32,720 That's a big thing to eject from a plane, and 325 00:17:32,759 --> 00:17:36,720 she was wearing something. We're told and apparently our guys 326 00:17:36,759 --> 00:17:39,400 you wore this. It's called a blood shit. Shits is 327 00:17:39,440 --> 00:17:44,160 always had bloodshit. That's like a nasty word, but that's 328 00:17:44,279 --> 00:17:47,039 a bloodshit that they wear. And it says on this 329 00:17:47,079 --> 00:17:49,240 I'm an American. I do not speak your language. I 330 00:17:49,240 --> 00:17:52,440 will do you no harm. Please give me food, water, shelter, clothing, 331 00:17:52,440 --> 00:17:54,960 and a doctor. Help me reach Americans or friendly forces. 332 00:17:55,160 --> 00:17:57,720 When you provide my name and this number to US authorities, 333 00:17:57,759 --> 00:18:00,799 you will be rewarded. So you knew about these things, 334 00:18:00,799 --> 00:18:02,599 and I guess you wore one. 335 00:18:03,279 --> 00:18:05,400 Speaker 4: Well, we didn't wear them, we carried them on. 336 00:18:05,880 --> 00:18:07,640 Speaker 3: Okay, they were knitted into their clothing. 337 00:18:07,680 --> 00:18:11,480 Speaker 4: Apparently, No, we just had my mind was just folded 338 00:18:11,559 --> 00:18:15,759 up in a pocket. Okay, but yeah, blood chit. I 339 00:18:15,799 --> 00:18:18,559 believe the actually started with the American Volunteer Group, which 340 00:18:18,599 --> 00:18:22,880 is the Flying Tigers in uh in the Burma Theater, 341 00:18:23,000 --> 00:18:25,640 before the United States you even got into World War two. 342 00:18:26,200 --> 00:18:29,200 But yeah, there there there there's multiple languages on them 343 00:18:29,720 --> 00:18:33,319 that pretty much say that message that you know that 344 00:18:33,319 --> 00:18:35,920 that you read that you know, hey, I'm an American. 345 00:18:36,079 --> 00:18:38,680 If you help help us, you will be rewarded. And 346 00:18:38,720 --> 00:18:41,119 so these are yeah, these are controlled items. We actually 347 00:18:41,160 --> 00:18:43,519 had to sign for them and then turn them back 348 00:18:43,519 --> 00:18:47,240 in when our combat tour was over. But yeah, yeah, 349 00:18:47,279 --> 00:18:48,920 they most definitely exist. 350 00:18:49,240 --> 00:18:51,000 Speaker 3: So this is the video I was talking about. 351 00:18:51,000 --> 00:18:55,000 Speaker 1: This is the the Kuwaiti locals uh and approaching one 352 00:18:55,000 --> 00:18:55,640 of the Ais. 353 00:18:55,720 --> 00:19:00,920 Speaker 3: Just this case, this female filet fine, really really. 354 00:19:01,680 --> 00:19:05,880 Speaker 5: You need something to help you? 355 00:19:05,880 --> 00:19:08,960 Speaker 3: No problem, save you want save, You're safe? 356 00:19:09,519 --> 00:19:13,039 Speaker 4: Everything good problem, Thank you for. 357 00:19:14,680 --> 00:19:15,000 Speaker 2: Everything? 358 00:19:15,079 --> 00:19:18,359 Speaker 3: Horrible, Mike. 359 00:19:18,480 --> 00:19:21,559 Speaker 1: I'm touched by this because of the humanity of it. 360 00:19:21,920 --> 00:19:25,359 I'm touched that a she's a woman, and you're not 361 00:19:25,400 --> 00:19:27,000 always going to be treated well as. 362 00:19:26,920 --> 00:19:28,440 Speaker 3: A woman in some of these countries. 363 00:19:28,920 --> 00:19:31,720 Speaker 1: Be that the relief on her face says you're okay, 364 00:19:31,960 --> 00:19:35,359 You're okay, right, do you need anything? And then his 365 00:19:35,480 --> 00:19:38,079 apparent joy in thank you for helping us and wanting 366 00:19:38,119 --> 00:19:41,119 to get a selfie with her. So that leads me 367 00:19:41,160 --> 00:19:44,519 into a human, very human question for you. Obviously, when 368 00:19:44,559 --> 00:19:47,559 you are over there as a green bray, your job 369 00:19:47,839 --> 00:19:51,000 is to help or to actually go break things and 370 00:19:51,079 --> 00:19:54,880 kill people, but you run into these human moments, and 371 00:19:55,000 --> 00:19:58,119 I wanted to ask you about your feelings about the 372 00:19:58,119 --> 00:20:00,240 the Iranian people as a whole and the p believe 373 00:20:00,319 --> 00:20:01,400 met overhere there wolf fighting. 374 00:20:03,319 --> 00:20:07,920 Speaker 4: The the Iranian people. The Persians are very different than 375 00:20:08,000 --> 00:20:10,319 what you'll find in a lot of the Middle East. 376 00:20:11,359 --> 00:20:16,359 Most of them aren't necessarily Muslims, the uh. But I've 377 00:20:16,400 --> 00:20:19,720 certainly fought side by side with Muslims. I've bet my 378 00:20:19,799 --> 00:20:23,720 life on, you know, on Muslims on Iranian Muslims that 379 00:20:24,519 --> 00:20:26,519 were going through the door and had, you know, a 380 00:20:26,519 --> 00:20:28,880 loaded weapon right behind me as we're going through the 381 00:20:28,880 --> 00:20:32,720 door on a target. But yeah, the people are very different. 382 00:20:32,759 --> 00:20:34,880 They actually, unlike a lot of the other countries, they 383 00:20:34,920 --> 00:20:38,000 seem to be yearning for democracy, unlike say the people 384 00:20:38,039 --> 00:20:42,799 in Iraq who had no concept of it. On our Instagram, 385 00:20:43,000 --> 00:20:47,480 we have a very different pilot bailout video than the 386 00:20:47,480 --> 00:20:49,640 one you showed him that I've seen of the female. 387 00:20:49,720 --> 00:20:52,880 This is a male pilot and when he after he lands, 388 00:20:52,880 --> 00:20:56,559 when he's first encountered, the Kuwaiti civilians are ready to 389 00:20:56,720 --> 00:21:00,480 attack him because they're not yet sure who he is. 390 00:21:01,000 --> 00:21:04,160 Imagine your country is under attack by air yeah, and 391 00:21:04,200 --> 00:21:07,519 all of a sudden there's there's someone parachuting down in 392 00:21:07,559 --> 00:21:09,880 your midst and you don't know who he is. Now 393 00:21:09,960 --> 00:21:11,880 that they back down as soon as they you know, 394 00:21:11,880 --> 00:21:14,640 as soon as I identifies himself as an American. But 395 00:21:15,119 --> 00:21:17,440 it could have gone if they hadn't hesitated, that could 396 00:21:17,480 --> 00:21:18,920 have gone the other way really fast. 397 00:21:19,160 --> 00:21:20,960 Speaker 1: Yeah, I've seen that vida. We could have pulled that 398 00:21:21,000 --> 00:21:23,599 in as well. And then he was treated well. And 399 00:21:23,920 --> 00:21:25,400 you know, I saw the vida of the guy. I 400 00:21:25,400 --> 00:21:27,200 think it was an ak he had, and then that 401 00:21:27,319 --> 00:21:29,200 he put it up like oh no wait so an American? 402 00:21:29,240 --> 00:21:30,279 Speaker 3: Stop? Stop stop. 403 00:21:31,480 --> 00:21:34,759 Speaker 1: So you think that your estimation, you've been there and 404 00:21:34,759 --> 00:21:36,880 spent time with these people, you've had a Muslim behind 405 00:21:36,920 --> 00:21:38,559 your back who could have shot you in the back. 406 00:21:38,720 --> 00:21:41,759 Is I guess what you're suggesting there? You think that 407 00:21:41,799 --> 00:21:47,839 the Persian people particularly ran this yearning for democracy is real, Yes. 408 00:21:47,920 --> 00:21:51,559 Speaker 4: Either yearning for democracy or yearning for their the return 409 00:21:51,640 --> 00:21:57,160 of their monarchy, or mostly just yearning for the removal 410 00:21:57,279 --> 00:22:03,119 of the despotic Iotolda and coming out from under the 411 00:22:04,160 --> 00:22:07,079 veil of their brand of Islam. Because if you look 412 00:22:07,119 --> 00:22:11,079 at there's videos out there college yearbooks from prior to 413 00:22:11,799 --> 00:22:15,359 nineteen seventy nine when I had Toola Komani came in 414 00:22:16,000 --> 00:22:19,359 that you know that they're in western dress, the women 415 00:22:19,440 --> 00:22:21,880 are wearing beautiful dresses. They're a little you know, long 416 00:22:21,920 --> 00:22:25,640 flowing hair. Yeah, they look pretty much like a Western country, 417 00:22:25,759 --> 00:22:29,680 obviously with their own Persian culture, you know, attached to 418 00:22:29,720 --> 00:22:32,920 it so that they didn't want this veil of darkness 419 00:22:33,000 --> 00:22:35,759 to come over their country, and they're eager to see 420 00:22:35,759 --> 00:22:36,319 it removed. 421 00:22:36,720 --> 00:22:39,039 Speaker 1: Yeah, And my wife and I were looking at some footage, 422 00:22:39,039 --> 00:22:41,519 and my wife is my wife has a feel very 423 00:22:41,559 --> 00:22:45,599 heavy hearts right now for the loss of life there, 424 00:22:46,279 --> 00:22:51,480 and really really has her hearts. It's breaking seeing children killed, 425 00:22:51,480 --> 00:22:51,920 et cetera. 426 00:22:52,200 --> 00:22:52,319 Speaker 3: End. 427 00:22:53,000 --> 00:22:54,799 Speaker 1: But she was also looking at some of the places 428 00:22:54,799 --> 00:22:58,759 and I ran absolutely beautiful places, beautiful artwork, And I 429 00:22:58,880 --> 00:23:02,519 remind you of when I think it was isis who 430 00:23:02,519 --> 00:23:05,240 went and destroyed a lot of those temples, a lot 431 00:23:05,319 --> 00:23:09,240 of those you know, very ornate, old old temples and 432 00:23:09,400 --> 00:23:12,720 artwork and pulled down these incredible statues, et cetera. So, 433 00:23:12,880 --> 00:23:15,480 because we're gonna look at this from two different perspectives, 434 00:23:15,519 --> 00:23:17,759 we'll look at it from our perspective we've never been there, 435 00:23:18,079 --> 00:23:19,279 and then this is why I wanted you have on 436 00:23:19,400 --> 00:23:22,599 your perspective, because you spent time there, you fought with them, 437 00:23:22,680 --> 00:23:25,440 you fought against them, and have some more questions about 438 00:23:25,480 --> 00:23:28,079 our country, Mike and what we'll see here. You're not 439 00:23:28,200 --> 00:23:29,680 the only one of my friends who did this. I 440 00:23:29,720 --> 00:23:32,839 have other friends. I lost a friends last year who 441 00:23:32,920 --> 00:23:37,559 was contracting in Ukraine. And don't worry, he wasn't in 442 00:23:37,680 --> 00:23:39,160 Russia when he was killed, even though he was in 443 00:23:39,240 --> 00:23:40,599 Russia when he was killed, because we didn't have. 444 00:23:40,599 --> 00:23:42,680 Speaker 3: People in Russia when he was killed. But he was 445 00:23:42,720 --> 00:23:43,200 in Russia. 446 00:23:43,599 --> 00:23:46,279 Speaker 1: And my other friend Tim Krukshank, you know Tim. Tim 447 00:23:46,359 --> 00:23:48,279 is the founder and CEO bone Frog Coffee. 448 00:23:48,559 --> 00:23:49,359 Speaker 3: He was over there on. 449 00:23:49,440 --> 00:23:53,359 Speaker 1: Three separate deployments. He also fought against people who are Muslim, 450 00:23:53,480 --> 00:23:56,319 and just like you, Mike, fought next to people who 451 00:23:56,359 --> 00:24:00,279 are Muslim, developed great friendships. We celebrate the Navy seal 452 00:24:00,359 --> 00:24:03,440 community with the coffee Bone Frog Coffee. Ten percent of 453 00:24:03,519 --> 00:24:06,079 proceeds go to help the families of fallen Navy Seals. 454 00:24:06,440 --> 00:24:08,119 If you haven't body yet, this would be a great 455 00:24:08,160 --> 00:24:10,240 time to do it. To support the people in the field. 456 00:24:10,240 --> 00:24:12,279 No matter what you think of the war, support our 457 00:24:12,319 --> 00:24:15,400 troops one hundred percent. And when you purchase bone Frog, 458 00:24:15,440 --> 00:24:17,839 go to Bonefrog Coffee dot com slash Todd use promo 459 00:24:17,880 --> 00:24:20,440 code Todd to get ten percent off, And do consider, 460 00:24:20,519 --> 00:24:22,960 particularly if you have family members, friends who are serving, 461 00:24:23,480 --> 00:24:25,240 if they're able to get this stuff shipped to them, 462 00:24:25,279 --> 00:24:27,160 ship it to them, because sometimes a coffee there is 463 00:24:27,240 --> 00:24:30,319 not the best bone Frog Coffee dot com slash Todd 464 00:24:30,720 --> 00:24:33,839 promo code Todd. I want to get back onto sort 465 00:24:33,880 --> 00:24:36,720 of a domestic look at this. You'd said that China 466 00:24:37,160 --> 00:24:38,920 almost certainly, and I agree with you. Why would they 467 00:24:39,000 --> 00:24:41,920 not hack our systems? Why would they not be developing 468 00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:46,119 pattern of life views of our leaders and an ability 469 00:24:46,240 --> 00:24:48,000 to take them out one day in an action like this? 470 00:24:49,119 --> 00:24:51,559 But a subtext to this is why aren't we seeing 471 00:24:52,200 --> 00:24:54,920 big action by Iranian sleeper cells? Because we had a 472 00:24:55,000 --> 00:24:58,480 wide open border for a long stink and time and 473 00:24:58,559 --> 00:25:00,279 a bunch of people come in. We know we're on 474 00:25:00,359 --> 00:25:03,000 the terrorist watch list, So I guess, are you surprised 475 00:25:03,039 --> 00:25:05,640 that we haven't seen a big, huge, coordinated attack. 476 00:25:07,359 --> 00:25:12,119 Speaker 4: I'm I'm definitely somewhat surprised, which and the lack of 477 00:25:12,200 --> 00:25:14,319 that action, because you would think that the death of 478 00:25:14,400 --> 00:25:18,119 that Atolla would be the ghost signal, even if no 479 00:25:18,240 --> 00:25:21,799 official ghost signal had been received. So you know, it 480 00:25:21,920 --> 00:25:25,319 calls into question do these cells exist or if they 481 00:25:25,400 --> 00:25:28,920 do exist. Are they thinking maybe we'll just sit this out? 482 00:25:29,519 --> 00:25:31,119 Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, yeah. 483 00:25:31,799 --> 00:25:36,079 Speaker 4: Secretary Gnome was testifying in Congress yesterday and they were 484 00:25:36,119 --> 00:25:39,160 asking her about these sleeper cells, and she kind of 485 00:25:39,720 --> 00:25:44,119 really didn't give a solid answer, which means, yes they are. 486 00:25:44,160 --> 00:25:47,400 These cells probably exist, and in a classified setting, a 487 00:25:47,480 --> 00:25:50,599 classified hearing before Congress, they would probably get more detail. 488 00:25:51,359 --> 00:25:54,920 Everyone I know who's still close to the intelligence community, 489 00:25:54,960 --> 00:25:59,759 and there's currently in my industry, they believe these cells exist. 490 00:26:00,599 --> 00:26:06,319 The loan murderer in Austin, Texas recently appeared to be 491 00:26:06,440 --> 00:26:09,599 motivated by events in Iran. He had an Iranian T 492 00:26:09,759 --> 00:26:13,640 shirt under his property of a La hoodie. So I 493 00:26:13,759 --> 00:26:16,920 think we'll definitely see some more of these loan killers, 494 00:26:18,119 --> 00:26:22,319 and probably in Europe as well. But yeah, I'm surprised 495 00:26:22,359 --> 00:26:24,440 that we're not seeing these cells. We didn't see them 496 00:26:25,079 --> 00:26:27,240 during other events either. We didn't see him during the 497 00:26:27,640 --> 00:26:29,799 you know, the Twelve Day War. We're going after their 498 00:26:29,960 --> 00:26:31,359 nuclear program the first time. 499 00:26:31,960 --> 00:26:35,480 Speaker 1: Were you surprised that President Trump was in the initial 500 00:26:35,519 --> 00:26:39,519 stations is of this of our action in Iran? That 501 00:26:39,640 --> 00:26:41,599 he was apparently running that from mar Largo and not 502 00:26:41,799 --> 00:26:46,599 from a Maybe I don't know more secure location than 503 00:26:46,839 --> 00:26:47,759 his resort. 504 00:26:48,839 --> 00:26:51,279 Speaker 4: Well, Dona mar Logo. They're going to have a skiff 505 00:26:51,359 --> 00:26:55,480 set up skiff as a special compartment and information facility 506 00:26:55,839 --> 00:26:58,960 where you can process information at the top secret level. 507 00:27:00,119 --> 00:27:03,759 I think also the part of that was deception. You know, hey, 508 00:27:03,839 --> 00:27:07,079 the leaders, the key leaders out of place. He's not there, 509 00:27:07,839 --> 00:27:10,799 you know, in the White House situation room. Everything's cool 510 00:27:10,960 --> 00:27:12,920 over here. We're going to go ahead with our meeting. 511 00:27:13,160 --> 00:27:15,759 Speaker 1: Okay, so said the golfing weekend for the president, So 512 00:27:15,920 --> 00:27:16,319 we're good. 513 00:27:17,240 --> 00:27:20,960 Speaker 4: Yeah. Yeah. But the but the fact is when they travel, 514 00:27:21,079 --> 00:27:24,039 they have all this information you know, available to them. 515 00:27:24,400 --> 00:27:26,799 Even when you have key leaders and hotels, they'll set 516 00:27:26,880 --> 00:27:29,640 up a they'll set up a skiff in the hotel 517 00:27:29,720 --> 00:27:32,440 room to you know, where they can stay in touch. 518 00:27:32,680 --> 00:27:32,839 Speaker 2: Yeah. 519 00:27:32,880 --> 00:27:34,960 Speaker 1: I guess I'm thinking through physical safety. And I know 520 00:27:35,079 --> 00:27:37,920 that we've got secret Service people down there, but oddly 521 00:27:38,079 --> 00:27:41,519 they haven't had a great records protecting President Trump and 522 00:27:41,519 --> 00:27:44,279 at least two assassination attempts. And I hope that's better 523 00:27:44,359 --> 00:27:46,200 now that he is, you know, kind of picking his 524 00:27:46,319 --> 00:27:50,119 own guys, et cetera. I guess I'm just brainstorming here. 525 00:27:50,240 --> 00:27:53,119 Could it be that the sleeper cells here don't want 526 00:27:53,160 --> 00:27:56,400 to go hit civilian targets because they want to go 527 00:27:56,559 --> 00:28:00,359 hit harder targets, because hitting civilian targets could create more 528 00:28:00,440 --> 00:28:04,359 public support for the war and for quicker ending, or 529 00:28:04,440 --> 00:28:08,000 creates more anger among the American people that they might 530 00:28:08,039 --> 00:28:10,279 be looking for, how could we actually hurt the command 531 00:28:10,359 --> 00:28:12,359 apparatus that they might be waiting for something like that, 532 00:28:12,640 --> 00:28:14,400 And I don't think they're going to get it, because 533 00:28:14,400 --> 00:28:16,160 I think their intel feeds are wiped out. 534 00:28:18,039 --> 00:28:20,839 Speaker 4: Well, the Iranian government has no problem launching missiles and 535 00:28:20,920 --> 00:28:27,000 drones against civilian hotels. They're Hezbola surrogate has no problem 536 00:28:27,119 --> 00:28:32,960 launching Katucia rockets against hospitals and schools. So no terrorists 537 00:28:33,039 --> 00:28:35,599 is gonna even blink an eye at taken on civilian 538 00:28:35,640 --> 00:28:37,960 targets and stacking up as many bodies as they can. 539 00:28:38,440 --> 00:28:42,559 They know they can't achieve a strategic impact by hitting 540 00:28:42,920 --> 00:28:47,480 any sort of military or government leadership target, So if 541 00:28:47,519 --> 00:28:49,400 they're going to act, they're going to go after whatever 542 00:28:49,480 --> 00:28:52,680 they can. They would have already had targets selected, They've 543 00:28:52,720 --> 00:28:57,000 probably already conducted their reconnaissance, and then it's just a 544 00:28:57,160 --> 00:28:59,160 matter of are we going to do this or not. 545 00:29:00,240 --> 00:29:05,559 Speaker 1: Yeah, okay, Well, the fact that they haven't leads me 546 00:29:05,680 --> 00:29:08,640 to have two separate questions. One, maybe they don't exist 547 00:29:09,839 --> 00:29:12,640 and we've been concerned for good cause, and it's better 548 00:29:12,720 --> 00:29:14,359 to be concerned and have it not exist and be 549 00:29:14,440 --> 00:29:17,160 concerned and or not be concerned to how it exists. 550 00:29:17,519 --> 00:29:20,799 Or maybe they got here and spend some time here 551 00:29:20,920 --> 00:29:24,519 and said, wait, I like it here. Maybe I don't 552 00:29:24,559 --> 00:29:26,960 want to harm this country. But do you think there's 553 00:29:26,960 --> 00:29:28,279 a chance they don't exist. 554 00:29:30,279 --> 00:29:33,359 Speaker 4: I think there's a small chance they don't. But I 555 00:29:33,480 --> 00:29:35,880 want to caution everyone too, is that we're only a 556 00:29:36,000 --> 00:29:38,480 couple of days into this and what's going to be 557 00:29:38,640 --> 00:29:41,920 a multi week effort. So this is no time to 558 00:29:42,039 --> 00:29:44,799 let your guard down. If anything, you need to be 559 00:29:44,920 --> 00:29:49,720 switching on your SYSUE situational awareness even more because you know, 560 00:29:49,799 --> 00:29:51,920 if these cells are out there, they may be conducting 561 00:29:52,000 --> 00:29:56,319 final target reconnaissance before they actually go, and they're going 562 00:29:56,400 --> 00:30:00,319 to be looking for vulnerable settings where the there are 563 00:30:00,319 --> 00:30:03,119 a lot of people that are going to be easy 564 00:30:03,200 --> 00:30:06,200 to attack, and whether they decide to get away after 565 00:30:06,319 --> 00:30:09,599 conducting the attack, or they've already made up their mind 566 00:30:09,680 --> 00:30:13,440 that it's a one way martyr dimission it's definitely no 567 00:30:13,599 --> 00:30:14,680 time to lay our guard down. 568 00:30:15,359 --> 00:30:17,519 Speaker 3: And I couldn't agree more on that. And you're saying 569 00:30:17,640 --> 00:30:18,279 many weeks. 570 00:30:18,359 --> 00:30:21,039 Speaker 1: There are other people who are saying, you know, buckle 571 00:30:21,160 --> 00:30:23,559 up because it's going to be many years. Because there 572 00:30:23,720 --> 00:30:25,839 are people who believe that President Trump is not going 573 00:30:25,880 --> 00:30:28,920 to be able to avoid the temptation of nation building 574 00:30:29,440 --> 00:30:32,960 and if it comes to the point where and they've 575 00:30:33,000 --> 00:30:36,319 said regime change is not part of this, but we've 576 00:30:36,359 --> 00:30:38,960 got people coming over and apparently trying to contact the 577 00:30:39,039 --> 00:30:42,359 president and Mark or Rubio they want to have talks 578 00:30:42,400 --> 00:30:45,400 about how they can lead Iran. I'm sorry, Mike, but 579 00:30:45,519 --> 00:30:48,200 when one group comes and they get audience with the president, 580 00:30:48,440 --> 00:30:52,319 we want to lead Iran. You are engaged in regime change, 581 00:30:52,559 --> 00:30:55,359 and I don't think you finish off regeam change. You 582 00:30:55,480 --> 00:30:56,880 said it yourself without boots. 583 00:30:56,640 --> 00:30:57,039 Speaker 2: On the ground. 584 00:30:58,279 --> 00:31:01,599 Speaker 4: Well, it's really hard to completely change the government from 585 00:31:01,680 --> 00:31:04,759 the air. But right now the state of goal is 586 00:31:04,799 --> 00:31:09,960 to set the conditions for the Iranian people to overthrow 587 00:31:10,079 --> 00:31:13,759 the current government. There's still a viable scenarios where what 588 00:31:13,960 --> 00:31:18,920 ends up after this is some remnant of the current government. 589 00:31:19,519 --> 00:31:22,759 You know, someone further down the chain that says, Okay, 590 00:31:22,880 --> 00:31:24,759 you know we're going to meet your demands. You know, 591 00:31:24,880 --> 00:31:27,960 stop buying us. We won't build any we won't try 592 00:31:28,000 --> 00:31:30,519 to build any nuclear weapons. We want to rich uranium. 593 00:31:30,599 --> 00:31:34,160 And yes, we will throw open the doors to inspection, 594 00:31:34,599 --> 00:31:36,759 which is the only way you can absolutely verify that. 595 00:31:36,880 --> 00:31:39,519 Now this has taken place, you know, if they want 596 00:31:40,480 --> 00:31:43,519 nuclear power for peaceful means, fine, you know that could 597 00:31:43,559 --> 00:31:46,759 be provided from outside. You don't build a peaceful nuclear 598 00:31:46,839 --> 00:31:49,240 program some seventy feet underground. 599 00:31:50,039 --> 00:31:51,359 Speaker 3: Yeah, so, yeah, great point. 600 00:31:52,000 --> 00:31:53,759 Speaker 4: There are a lot of scenarios how this can play up. 601 00:31:54,160 --> 00:31:57,960 Speaker 1: So, speaking of situational awareness and not letting our guard down, 602 00:31:58,079 --> 00:32:00,440 I want to ask you some specific questions about specific 603 00:32:00,519 --> 00:32:04,559 settings because you help people in organizations with situational awareness 604 00:32:04,680 --> 00:32:08,160 using your expertise retired Special Forces retire ger embrace. So 605 00:32:08,200 --> 00:32:11,160 we'll get into that second. I've been talking with people 606 00:32:11,160 --> 00:32:13,680 about and scheduling my trip to Mexico. Hey, look things 607 00:32:13,720 --> 00:32:15,880 got better there, Mike, very quickly imagine that they went 608 00:32:15,920 --> 00:32:17,839 behind the scenes and said we're going to stop all this. 609 00:32:18,759 --> 00:32:20,880 So I'm going to go down to renew healthcare. I'm 610 00:32:20,920 --> 00:32:24,039 going down for the anti aging protocol. And it's not 611 00:32:24,160 --> 00:32:27,200 that I feel old. I mean, I genuinely feel pretty young. 612 00:32:28,079 --> 00:32:30,240 But I'd also like to live a lot longer because 613 00:32:30,240 --> 00:32:33,279 I'm really enjoying life with my wife and I want 614 00:32:33,319 --> 00:32:35,400 to see my daughter continue to grow up and maybe 615 00:32:35,440 --> 00:32:36,319 one day have kids. 616 00:32:36,839 --> 00:32:38,759 Speaker 3: And if I'm going to live, I want to live fruitfully. 617 00:32:38,920 --> 00:32:42,039 Speaker 1: So this is a male clinic level analysis of my body, 618 00:32:42,319 --> 00:32:45,000 starting with the epigenetic aging. What does that look like, 619 00:32:45,079 --> 00:32:48,279 what's my aging arc? And from that then they'll be 620 00:32:48,359 --> 00:32:51,079 informed with that information. When I go down, they'll have 621 00:32:51,119 --> 00:32:53,359 a plan of records. So for me, it's going to 622 00:32:53,359 --> 00:32:55,799 be specific ivs. It will be specific ivs for you. 623 00:32:56,079 --> 00:32:58,480 We're going to spend time in the hyperbrek chamber, which 624 00:32:58,559 --> 00:33:01,680 destroys inflammation in the box. They're gonna have specific things 625 00:33:01,720 --> 00:33:04,200 they do for me given what they see in the data. 626 00:33:04,279 --> 00:33:06,720 It will be different for you. What I'm excited about. 627 00:33:06,720 --> 00:33:08,599 As well as they give me a kit to take 628 00:33:08,680 --> 00:33:12,079 home so that at home, I can continue to affect 629 00:33:12,119 --> 00:33:14,519 the three to five areas in my body that could 630 00:33:14,599 --> 00:33:17,160 lead to my demise or am my slowing down or pain, 631 00:33:17,279 --> 00:33:20,319 et cetera. That's the packet of information I'll have for 632 00:33:20,440 --> 00:33:22,440 any doctor with whom I interact. As you know in 633 00:33:22,559 --> 00:33:25,839 my own general contractor. I have a hormone doc. I 634 00:33:25,880 --> 00:33:27,880 have a sports medicine doc, I have a clinic. I'm 635 00:33:27,920 --> 00:33:30,680 on the board of nonprofit board. If I have to 636 00:33:30,720 --> 00:33:33,039 go see a doc or get antibotics or something. But 637 00:33:33,160 --> 00:33:36,000 it's that packet of information that will guide me as 638 00:33:36,119 --> 00:33:38,079 CEO of my health. So if you want to be 639 00:33:38,200 --> 00:33:41,079 CEO of your health, get in touch with renew r 640 00:33:41,160 --> 00:33:43,960 E n U E dot Healthcare. Tell me a part 641 00:33:43,960 --> 00:33:45,920 of the Todd Hermann Shaw family. That's renew r E 642 00:33:46,079 --> 00:33:49,480 n U E dot Healthcare. So, Mike, I'm thinking about 643 00:33:49,480 --> 00:33:52,000 some of the events that are upcoming. We have the 644 00:33:52,200 --> 00:33:55,119 Soccer World Finals Championships that are spent to go on 645 00:33:55,160 --> 00:33:58,200 in the United States. Well, and by the way, I 646 00:33:58,279 --> 00:34:01,880 think in Seattle that right, Seattle is it's gonna have 647 00:34:01,880 --> 00:34:03,079 at lest one of these big matches. 648 00:34:03,119 --> 00:34:06,240 Speaker 4: So if you've been down the entire West coast, okay, so. 649 00:34:06,319 --> 00:34:08,800 Speaker 1: The entire West Coast is gonna have all these soccer matches, 650 00:34:08,960 --> 00:34:12,719 all sorts of rich targets of opportunity. If they called you, 651 00:34:12,880 --> 00:34:16,159 Michael Rourkan said, hey, you can't tell us the secret 652 00:34:16,239 --> 00:34:18,880 things you do. But on the very basics at a 653 00:34:18,920 --> 00:34:20,639 big event like this, or we're going to have a 654 00:34:20,800 --> 00:34:23,119 major we have a major series of events coming up 655 00:34:23,119 --> 00:34:25,920 at our church. We'll have over a weekend, We'll have 656 00:34:26,039 --> 00:34:28,960 seventeen to twenty thousand people in and out of our church. 657 00:34:29,400 --> 00:34:32,079 So what are the top lines given this this situation 658 00:34:32,239 --> 00:34:33,199 we find ourselves. 659 00:34:32,920 --> 00:34:38,719 Speaker 4: In for people attending World Cup events, the stadium itself 660 00:34:39,079 --> 00:34:43,480 is going to be pretty secure. The vulnerability is the 661 00:34:43,599 --> 00:34:47,920 crowds outside before they get inside the secure perimeter. Like 662 00:34:49,039 --> 00:34:50,880 back during football season, I was at one of the 663 00:34:50,880 --> 00:34:55,159 Seattle Seahawks playoff games. There's plenty of bars and restaurants 664 00:34:55,280 --> 00:34:57,800 right outside the stadium. They're not part of the stadium 665 00:34:57,880 --> 00:35:01,119 security perimeter. They're packed full of people. Those are soft 666 00:35:01,159 --> 00:35:05,000 targets at your church, you know, I imagine you have 667 00:35:05,119 --> 00:35:08,840 some sort of security team there is. Yeah, it's the 668 00:35:09,039 --> 00:35:11,960 it's the arriving is the departure. What happens when the 669 00:35:12,079 --> 00:35:15,079 service starts. You know, if the doors are locked and 670 00:35:15,239 --> 00:35:19,079 everyone's inside, including all their security people, you still have vulnerability. 671 00:35:19,159 --> 00:35:21,960 You need some security folks on the outside making sure 672 00:35:22,800 --> 00:35:26,360 no one's approaching, no one's conducting surveillance against the facility, 673 00:35:26,400 --> 00:35:30,639 and ready to strike the congreghens as they depart. So 674 00:35:30,840 --> 00:35:34,159 it's a it's the whole perimeter has to be looked at, 675 00:35:34,840 --> 00:35:39,360 and individuals have to learn situational awareness. And when you 676 00:35:39,400 --> 00:35:42,800 think about it, with everyone's situationally aware and it becomes 677 00:35:42,880 --> 00:35:45,800 a team sport, then you've got what I call all 678 00:35:45,880 --> 00:35:49,800 hands security. Now every person is a security sensor, every 679 00:35:49,920 --> 00:35:54,039 person is a uh a de facto security officer, and 680 00:35:54,159 --> 00:35:55,559 thus everyone becomes safer. 681 00:35:55,880 --> 00:35:58,880 Speaker 1: Yeah, so it shouldn't be just someone who lives in 682 00:35:58,960 --> 00:36:03,079 a state of vigilance, a low key paranoia like me 683 00:36:03,599 --> 00:36:05,639 who sees when I'm at the youth group and we're 684 00:36:05,679 --> 00:36:08,320 outside hanging out and I see a car I've never 685 00:36:08,440 --> 00:36:11,599 seen go through the parking lot three times on a 686 00:36:11,679 --> 00:36:14,480 slow roll past the door. I shouldn't be the only 687 00:36:14,519 --> 00:36:16,480 guy going why are they doing that? Why do they 688 00:36:16,559 --> 00:36:18,440 keep slowing down at the door? What are they looking for? 689 00:36:18,960 --> 00:36:20,960 And you know you were talking about a security team. 690 00:36:21,159 --> 00:36:24,039 I actually witnessed this going on. Decided to walk over 691 00:36:24,119 --> 00:36:26,559 to our security team and they're sat up front the door. 692 00:36:26,800 --> 00:36:28,199 I came up and said, hey, guys, I go, are 693 00:36:28,239 --> 00:36:30,760 you talking about the car that's coming by? I go, yeah, 694 00:36:30,800 --> 00:36:33,760 because yeah, we're on that we're curious too, And sure 695 00:36:33,840 --> 00:36:37,679 enough ups pulled some Sheriff's deputies and did a little 696 00:36:37,719 --> 00:36:41,000 pullover since they weren't respecting the stop signs, et cetera, 697 00:36:41,159 --> 00:36:42,920 and found a reason to chat with them. And it 698 00:36:43,039 --> 00:36:44,800 wasn't a big deal. It was just someone looking for 699 00:36:44,880 --> 00:36:48,480 their brother and sister, et cetera. So if you're saying 700 00:36:48,639 --> 00:36:51,199 that situation awareness is a team sport, it should have 701 00:36:51,280 --> 00:36:54,840 been every eyeball on that car saying that's wrong, that's 702 00:36:54,960 --> 00:36:55,480 out of place. 703 00:36:57,039 --> 00:37:00,280 Speaker 4: Correct, and it's situationally where aren't paranoid because they don't 704 00:37:00,320 --> 00:37:02,679 have to be, just live in a heightened state of awareness. 705 00:37:03,079 --> 00:37:05,119 And also that person said they're looking for their brother 706 00:37:05,239 --> 00:37:08,119 or sister. Was that just a cover story? Were they 707 00:37:08,199 --> 00:37:11,360 really conducting some sort of pre attack surveillance saying is 708 00:37:11,400 --> 00:37:13,880 this a target I want to hit? But then since 709 00:37:14,440 --> 00:37:16,519 but since the police were called and they were pulled over, 710 00:37:16,880 --> 00:37:19,639 they might decide, Okay, this isn't the place for me. 711 00:37:20,079 --> 00:37:23,119 I'm gonna go look for a place where no one's 712 00:37:23,159 --> 00:37:27,079 paying attention. And that's actually happened before I want to 713 00:37:27,079 --> 00:37:30,960 say the the Nashville Christian School shooter. I think they 714 00:37:31,000 --> 00:37:34,480 originally planned to hit a different school and thought, oh, nope, 715 00:37:34,480 --> 00:37:37,880 they have too much security. This has happened I think 716 00:37:38,199 --> 00:37:42,840 at other schools before too. Original target was was declined 717 00:37:43,360 --> 00:37:47,599 the paulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, that isis inspired a shooter. 718 00:37:47,800 --> 00:37:51,199 I think he had planned other and you know, other 719 00:37:51,320 --> 00:37:54,199 targets first and saw like I think, I can't remember 720 00:37:54,199 --> 00:37:57,360 if it was a Disneyland or Walt disney World type venue, 721 00:37:57,639 --> 00:37:59,559 but okay, they have security. I'm gonna go find a 722 00:37:59,599 --> 00:38:01,119 place where there's no real security. 723 00:38:01,480 --> 00:38:04,679 Speaker 1: So there's a purpose then, also that in having evident security, 724 00:38:04,719 --> 00:38:07,000 because we have a ton of guys men and women 725 00:38:07,360 --> 00:38:09,760 in our church who are undercover and you don't know 726 00:38:09,840 --> 00:38:12,679 who they are. They're just in our concealed carry defensive 727 00:38:12,960 --> 00:38:15,960 you know, tactical shooting courses that we hold all the time. 728 00:38:16,320 --> 00:38:17,079 Speaker 3: You wouldn't know that. 729 00:38:17,199 --> 00:38:19,039 Speaker 1: You'll see some of them with an earpiece, but many 730 00:38:19,079 --> 00:38:22,400 of them don't have earpieces. They just respond to other signals. 731 00:38:22,719 --> 00:38:25,280 But there's a purpose then to having your facility have 732 00:38:25,480 --> 00:38:28,519 evident security. These guys are venue shopping. They come and say, oh, 733 00:38:28,760 --> 00:38:30,440 they've got fifteen guys outside here. 734 00:38:30,519 --> 00:38:31,360 Speaker 3: This is not our place. 735 00:38:32,440 --> 00:38:36,079 Speaker 4: Yeah. Absolutely, I would love to see church websites talk 736 00:38:36,119 --> 00:38:40,159 about how safe you know their facility is, and even 737 00:38:40,239 --> 00:38:42,159 ask for you know, out in the open, ask for 738 00:38:42,360 --> 00:38:45,719 volunteers to join the security team. That tells anyone doing 739 00:38:45,800 --> 00:38:50,599 online reconnaissance what we call internet casing, that Okay, this 740 00:38:50,679 --> 00:38:54,400 place has some sort of security posture. Then when members 741 00:38:54,519 --> 00:38:57,599 of the security team, whether they're even identify security, they 742 00:38:57,719 --> 00:39:01,119 see something, then they do something. Maybe someone in the 743 00:39:01,199 --> 00:39:03,679 parking lot could have like flagged the car down, say hey, 744 00:39:03,800 --> 00:39:05,639 can I help you? And then while you're there, if 745 00:39:05,679 --> 00:39:08,239 you make note of the license plate. So I mean 746 00:39:08,599 --> 00:39:10,920 there are certain high level hotels that do the cel 747 00:39:10,920 --> 00:39:14,199 of security members in the lobby of that hotel. They're 748 00:39:14,280 --> 00:39:18,639 not overtly security, but they're clearly working for the hotel, 749 00:39:18,719 --> 00:39:20,880 and they will come up to someone in the lobby 750 00:39:20,960 --> 00:39:24,639 who appears to be looking around taking pictures. Hi, may 751 00:39:24,719 --> 00:39:28,159 I help you? Yeah, you have that initial encounter. Then 752 00:39:28,280 --> 00:39:31,559 that then you know someone's remembering that face, that person's 753 00:39:31,599 --> 00:39:34,639 getting noted on the security cameras, and then you can 754 00:39:35,079 --> 00:39:37,239 kind of have a bolo. Hey, let's be on the 755 00:39:37,280 --> 00:39:38,679 lookout for this person again. 756 00:39:39,000 --> 00:39:41,559 Speaker 1: Yeah, And this is what you do in part of 757 00:39:41,639 --> 00:39:43,679 your job and part of your career is helping organizations 758 00:39:43,719 --> 00:39:45,599 with this. So how do people get in touch with 759 00:39:45,719 --> 00:39:47,639 you to make sure that they are as secure as 760 00:39:47,719 --> 00:39:48,840 possible as. 761 00:39:48,719 --> 00:39:51,119 Speaker 3: For like just not even a week yet into this war. 762 00:39:52,440 --> 00:39:57,000 Speaker 4: Yeah, sure, contact us on our website at opcon dot com, 763 00:39:57,239 --> 00:40:02,079 a d opcn dot com and they can email us 764 00:40:02,119 --> 00:40:06,119 at AOC dot security at opcon dot com. And you 765 00:40:06,159 --> 00:40:08,559 can also sign up for our career otic newsletters and 766 00:40:08,719 --> 00:40:13,119 see some of the other articles I've written for International Magazine, 767 00:40:13,199 --> 00:40:15,440 some of the other media appearances like I've done with 768 00:40:15,559 --> 00:40:18,280 you where we talk about this stuff. We're at AOC 769 00:40:18,480 --> 00:40:21,599 Underscore Security on both Instagram and x. 770 00:40:21,840 --> 00:40:24,960 Speaker 3: Good and we'll put those links into the show notes. Mike, 771 00:40:25,079 --> 00:40:28,400 I pray for our troops. I want this over. 772 00:40:29,480 --> 00:40:32,159 Speaker 1: I don't think you enjoy loss of life. I don't 773 00:40:32,400 --> 00:40:36,119 as a Christian. I want God to end this as 774 00:40:36,199 --> 00:40:39,320 quickly as possible. I'm so proud of our troops. I'm 775 00:40:39,360 --> 00:40:42,039 so thankful for them. No great of love has man 776 00:40:42,119 --> 00:40:44,840 than the lead down his life for a brother. And 777 00:40:46,119 --> 00:40:47,760 on that topic, I thank you for what you do 778 00:40:47,920 --> 00:40:49,760 for us and did for us, and God bless you. 779 00:40:49,880 --> 00:40:52,039 Thank you for coming on the show, and. 780 00:40:52,159 --> 00:40:53,800 Speaker 4: Thank you Tod I hope we don't lose any more 781 00:40:53,840 --> 00:40:57,079 people than we have. And yeah, we'll talk. I'm sure 782 00:40:57,119 --> 00:40:57,679 we'll talk again. 783 00:40:57,880 --> 00:41:01,440 Speaker 3: Well, and I join you in exactly that thought. This 784 00:41:01,639 --> 00:41:02,599 is the Todd Herman Show. 785 00:41:02,679 --> 00:41:06,280 Speaker 1: Please go, be well, be strong, be kind, and please 786 00:41:06,320 --> 00:41:08,519 make every effort to walk in the light of Christ.