Speaker 1: This is Jay Dyer from Jay's Analysis. You're listening to
Speaker 1: Esoteric Hollywood. Esoteric Hollywood is where I deconstruct the biggest
Speaker 1: films in an unparalleled way, from the classics of the
Speaker 1: silver screen to today's blockbusters. Learned to watch film with
Speaker 1: new eyes. As we enter Esoteric Hollywood, Welcome, you're listening
Speaker 1: to Jay's analysis. And I want to do some reflections
Speaker 1: on the debate and discussion with Adam Kokesh, which was
Speaker 1: a lot of fun. I appreciate Kokash being willing to.
Speaker 2: Do that. I thought that was actually, you know, he
Speaker 2: didn't really have to.
Speaker 1: Do that, and he's a pretty big name guy, so
Speaker 1: you know, he's basically sending traffic my way, just from
Speaker 1: a practical standpoint, So I appreciate that, and it was
Speaker 1: a lot of fun, and I don't think there's no
Speaker 1: hostility or anything like that. We had a good conversation afterwards,
Speaker 1: so hopefully we can, you know, continue to have an
Speaker 1: open discussion on these topics, and I'm thinking I would
Speaker 1: like to eventually get at them on the podcast to
Speaker 1: discuss his experiences in war and his principle of non aggression,
Speaker 1: which actually I do agree with. I just think that
Speaker 1: it needs to be filled out in a broader philosophical
Speaker 1: worldview setting that it doesn't function on its own, but
Speaker 1: the statement itself that we shouldn't provoke or aggress others
Speaker 1: for the sake of stability and progress and flourishing.
Speaker 2: I totally agree with.
Speaker 1: A couple ideas that I also had that I think
Speaker 1: will be illustrative and instructive that I didn't actually get
Speaker 1: to in the debate. It didn't get to bring up
Speaker 1: was that there's interesting discussions even from various types of
Speaker 1: libertarians such as Hans Harmenhaupa. And this was actually a
Speaker 1: point that Tim Kelly made where he points out that
Speaker 1: in the book Democracy that God Has That Failed, basically
Speaker 1: overall government spending under monarchies was limited and it averaged
Speaker 1: around three to nine percent of GDP, whereas government spending
Speaker 1: under the Masonic republics of our day with the state's bite,
Speaker 1: hovers around thirty five to fifty percent of GDP on average,
Speaker 1: So that that's a big difference in I understand the
Speaker 1: ABS position, you know, is not interested in any state,
Speaker 1: But the problem is that the long march towards what
Speaker 1: we're supposed to believe is the stateless society, the coming possible,
Speaker 1: hopeful stateless society one day is a long march of revolutions, right,
Speaker 1: and Adam admitted this when he was talking about the
Speaker 1: phases of history. And that's sort of sort of a
Speaker 1: slicing up of history that both the Libertarians and the
Speaker 1: Anglo Saxon liberal tradition and the Marxist share. Is this
Speaker 1: idea that you can cut out these phases of history
Speaker 1: like the Dark Ages and things like this, and that's
Speaker 1: not really how history. I mean, I'm not opposed to
Speaker 1: those kinds of classifications across the board, because you know,
Speaker 1: we speak of the Enlightenment, which is a phase in
Speaker 1: the history of the West where ideas shift and change.
Speaker 1: I'm not opposed to that totally speaking. But at the
Speaker 1: same time, it's also can be used just as a
Speaker 1: kind of rhetorical device that doesn't really have much meaning, like, oh,
Speaker 1: everyone in the Dark Ages was superstitious and domb and
Speaker 1: that's not actually true. When you go and read them,
Speaker 1: many of them are much more capable philosophers than the
Speaker 1: average intellectual today that inhabits academia or something like this,
Speaker 1: you would learn. I'm a big critic of Aquinas, for example,
Speaker 1: but you'd learn a lot more from the feet of
Speaker 1: Aquinas than you would.
Speaker 2: Professor Richard J.
Speaker 1: Darwin at the local university, who's just got one mythology
Speaker 1: to try to teach you. That tryes to encapsulate all
Speaker 1: reality under one unified vision of materialism. For example, So
Speaker 1: other points and notes I had ambiguity on nature. We
Speaker 1: talk a lot about nature. I don't have a problem
Speaker 1: talking about nature. But for me, obviously, as you know,
Speaker 1: nature is confined within a specific worldview. So when Paul says,
Speaker 1: for example, in Romans One, that nature itself testifies to
Speaker 1: the existence of God, he's speaking from the advantage point
Speaker 1: of a person who believes in creation. You know, Paul
Speaker 1: talks about x neulo creation more than once in his epistles.
Speaker 1: So for him, reality is a created reality, and it
Speaker 1: has its beginning, its middle period, and its terminus or
Speaker 1: final state telos in God. And that's of course our
Speaker 1: Orthodox vision of creation and the process of history. So
Speaker 1: when Paul uses the term nature, it's nature understood in
Speaker 1: that perspective with that vantage point. Right, when a person
Speaker 1: with a reductionistic materialist view uses the term nature, they
Speaker 1: mean something totally different. So we have a lot of
Speaker 1: these ambiguities, oftentimes in appealing to ambiguous terms like law, freedom, nature,
Speaker 1: et cetera, et cetera, that are really conditioned and interpreted
Speaker 1: by our worldview as a whole. And this is the
Speaker 1: point that I continually try to stress, and what we're
Speaker 1: going to see in.
Speaker 2: This talk is.
Speaker 1: When we look at a couple essays, I guess, I
Speaker 1: guess one of them is kind of famous by the
Speaker 1: famous semiutitian in Berto Echo, whom I've referenced many times
Speaker 1: and whose books I've read many I've read many of
Speaker 1: his book Excuse Me of Fucoast, Pendulum and Name of
Speaker 1: the Rose, and even some of his philosophical and literary
Speaker 1: works as probably the foremost Semiutitian. Before I think he's died,
Speaker 1: I don't know that the Mandela effect hitting me where
Speaker 1: he didn't die and I thought he did. I don't know,
Speaker 1: but maybe I thought I saw on Drudge Report that
Speaker 1: Echo died a year or two ago.
Speaker 2: I don't know.
Speaker 1: But regardless of whether he did or didn't, he is
Speaker 1: an interesting thinker, and I guess you could say he
Speaker 1: represents maybe the modern progressive liberal academic. He's a good
Speaker 1: candidate for that role, and he's going to critique fascism.
Speaker 1: And this is the essay that we're going to look
Speaker 1: at that Daniel Spaulding sent to me. That's illustrative, and
Speaker 1: so what we're going to do after I finished discussing
Speaker 1: Adam's position in the debate and some of the points
Speaker 1: that I didn't ever get to in my notes reflections
Speaker 1: on the debate, we're going to dissect echoes essay, and
Speaker 1: we're going to use the apologetic methodology that I'm hoping
Speaker 1: to instill in people out there to give them the
Speaker 1: skills to do what I'm doing, as well as to
Speaker 1: hopefully better understand where I'm coming from, so that they
Speaker 1: can implement these kinds of ideas in their own life.
Speaker 1: Because I think they're beneficial, I think they're healthy. I
Speaker 1: think that they will help you to flourish, at least
Speaker 1: intellectually in this life and then hopefully into the life
Speaker 1: beyond this life. So that's what we're going to look at,
Speaker 1: probably in the second half of the talk. I don't
Speaker 1: know how much of the I don't really have it
Speaker 1: planned out time wise, how much you know what's going
Speaker 1: to take care of what, But in terms of looking
Speaker 1: at the debate and then looking at echoes essay. But
Speaker 1: a couple other points that I did want to touch
Speaker 1: on briefly is that I got a couple of hit
Speaker 1: pieces written on me this week, one from this Jason
Speaker 1: Calavito character that Chris at Hoasbusters has had on the show,
Speaker 1: and Calveto is in the I guess you could say
Speaker 1: the Snopes Shechrmer nexus of pathological skepticism, as the Colins
Speaker 1: Brothers called it, which that was a good way to
Speaker 1: put it. And this is just really the naive scientism
Speaker 1: slash empiricism perspective. And I've done countless critiques of naive empiricism.
Speaker 2: It's very easy to refute. It's been refuted many times.
Speaker 1: Of course, the people in those positions don't really get
Speaker 1: it and don't have the motivation, I don't think to
Speaker 1: want to question their presubpositions of native scientism and naive
Speaker 1: empiricism because it would obviously fall apart very quick, you know,
Speaker 1: the whole house of cards comes down. And really this
Speaker 1: is characteristic of all modernity. So there's a lot of
Speaker 1: scare tactics, straw men, false statements in.
Speaker 2: His hit piece.
Speaker 1: And since he sent a whopping four people my way,
Speaker 1: four hits from his hit piece. I'm not even going
Speaker 1: to spend that much time on it. I mean, just
Speaker 1: at my website, I'm getting over one hundred thousand views
Speaker 1: a month, and I don't think four hits from Jason
Speaker 1: Calvito's kind of do too much damage.
Speaker 2: But that's okay.
Speaker 1: There's a his article was more of a hip piece
Speaker 1: than any kind of actual argumentation. I will give him
Speaker 1: credit that he does seem to have listened to some
Speaker 1: of my talks, and so that I appreciate that he
Speaker 1: says that there's nothing worth listening to in my talks,
Speaker 1: which is interesting that he went to the trouble to
Speaker 1: write a hip piece, given I'm not that interesting. So
Speaker 1: thank you for all the liberal gatekeepers who are out
Speaker 1: there to protect everybody nobly in their actions, the noble
Speaker 1: protectors of the common men, right who You're you're stupid
Speaker 1: enough to fall for listening to my podcast, but you're
Speaker 1: smart enough to figure out if you listen to Jason
Speaker 1: calveto his argumentation, which is actually hit piece that's going
Speaker 1: to prove me wrong. So nothing but loaded questions, nothing
Speaker 1: but bandwagon fallacy, nothing but begging the question and nothing
Speaker 1: but special pleading straw men, appeals to emotion at homonyms.
Speaker 1: That's basically the entirety of his piece, So not even
Speaker 1: really worth dealing with. But of course, all of these
Speaker 1: positions that are really emotional based, reactionary positions, and that
Speaker 1: would be liberalism, leftism, progressivism, anarchism. In my view, they
Speaker 1: have an appearance of logic and coherence, but when you
Speaker 1: really boil it down to the brass tacks, you're really
Speaker 1: just appealing to these empty broad categories such as freedom, democracy, rights, quality, egalitarianism,
Speaker 1: and so Jason Calvito actually got trolled, and the humorous,
Speaker 1: humorless left is quite easy to troll because he actually
Speaker 1: believed that I think Trump is God emperor.
Speaker 2: He says that in this article, which of course that
Speaker 2: was a joke.
Speaker 1: Okay, that's he wasn't deft enough to figure out that
Speaker 1: that's a meme.
Speaker 2: That was used to troll the left right.
Speaker 1: I don't I don't know anybody that actually believes Trump
Speaker 1: is a god emperor.
Speaker 2: This is a joke.
Speaker 1: This is from Dune, Okay, Frank Kerbert's novels Dune, David
Speaker 1: Lynch movie Dune, God Emperor of Dune it's a joke,
Speaker 1: man lighting up.
Speaker 2: So I went by the way.
Speaker 1: Jason Calvito lost his argument with Chris Kendall at Hoaxbusters
Speaker 1: because it got down to the point in their debate
Speaker 1: where Calvito had to argue that DNA produces absolutely magical
Speaker 1: new information and that this is how you get the
Speaker 1: rise of new species from one organism to the next.
Speaker 1: And of course there's absolutely no evidence or proof that
Speaker 1: DNA produces new information. Actually, it only codes the information
Speaker 1: existing already within the DNA. So Chris nailed Calavito on
Speaker 1: that point, and Calvito had absolutely no response, and if
Speaker 1: I recall, he at that point left the discussion because
Speaker 1: he talked himself into circles. So, I mean, come on, seriously,
Speaker 1: naive scientism and evolutionary Darwinism. I mean, these people, I
Speaker 1: don't think they've ever taken a philosophy classes or logic class.
Speaker 1: They've had maybe pop psychology and a few maybe biologic classes,
Speaker 1: maybe maybe, and that's about it. But don't ever expect
Speaker 1: any kind of upper level analytical philosophy class, any kind
Speaker 1: of understanding of continental philosophy, any understanding of math theory
Speaker 1: or metallogic. No don't ever expect that out of these people.
Speaker 1: So the problem that we want to hinge the argument against, well,
Speaker 1: this would extend to all modern liberal positions, and that
Speaker 1: would include Calavito and koquesh Is Nominalism. Nominalism is the
Speaker 1: medieval philosophical idea that came as a response to medieval
Speaker 1: Augustinianism or Platonism or neoplatonism. Noominalism says that there are
Speaker 1: no metaphysical ideas or categories. There are only humanly constructed symbols, signs,
Speaker 1: or what are called tokens. So a token similar sign
Speaker 1: is a purely social construct. It's purely made up from
Speaker 1: the human creative, pragmatic, it's solely based I guess on
Speaker 1: use right functional. So when we talk about things like truth,
Speaker 1: or when we talk about any metaphysical categories like ethics
Speaker 1: of right and wrong or whatever, these are all constructs, right,
Speaker 1: They're relative. This is what nominalism ultimately has to devolve into,
Speaker 1: because nominalism again starts from the position of rejecting any
Speaker 1: of these objective, logical, ontological, ethical, metaphysical, and even mathematical categories.
Speaker 1: Now you say, why do they do this, Well, they
Speaker 1: do this. Number one because they're wrong and they're stupid.
Speaker 1: But number two, because they have an agenda I believe ultimately,
Speaker 1: which was to attack.
Speaker 2: The existing power structures.
Speaker 1: And so I don't really care about what Akham's personal
Speaker 1: motivations are. You know, if he wanted to I don't know,
Speaker 1: he wanted to be with some check or something or
Speaker 1: Abalard the other famous anomalists.
Speaker 2: I don't you know, he wanted to be.
Speaker 1: With some check and maybe the existing power structures, rules,
Speaker 1: or the papacy or something like this was in the way.
Speaker 2: It doesn't really matter.
Speaker 1: If you want to really dive deep into that, you
Speaker 1: can read Haiko Oberman's book on Luther, Harvest of Medieval Theology,
Speaker 1: where he discussed is the influence of nominalism on Luther
Speaker 1: in A. Gabriel by all in these other characters be
Speaker 1: I eal and again, that's Haiko Oberman's excellent book. I
Speaker 1: read that probably twelve years ago. Very technical theological, philosophical book,
Speaker 1: but very illustrative, very enlightening to see the rise of
Speaker 1: the present Reformation coming out of the nominalist tradition. So
Speaker 1: this is what nominalism says. It says that you don't
Speaker 1: really the human mind is confined to its sense data.
Speaker 1: And because it's confined to it, since data, it can't pretend.
Speaker 1: It's a pretense to speak of eternal verities, or to
Speaker 1: speak of metaphysical categories, to speak of objective properties of knowledge, right,
Speaker 1: because it's always confined to the finite. So anything that
Speaker 1: we might speak of as spiritual metaphysical eventually gets smushed
Speaker 1: into the here and the now and the immediate now.
Speaker 1: Maybe many of the early nominalists did not have that intention.
Speaker 1: They did not have the intention of smushing all of
Speaker 1: man's knowledge or belief in objective properties into.
Speaker 2: The here and the now.
Speaker 1: But this is eventually what happens, and this is what
Speaker 1: is not debatable. This is known. This is where you
Speaker 1: get empiricism. Empiricism rises from medieval nominalism, and empiricism is
Speaker 1: just nominalism right. Empiricism says we.
Speaker 2: Only know.
Speaker 1: What we can derive from sense impressions and sense data.
Speaker 1: And this is why for a presubsitionalist such as myself
Speaker 1: or anyone else who has followed this train of thought,
Speaker 1: Hume is very useful. David Hume is very good, not
Speaker 1: insofar as he's the great of a philosopher, but rather
Speaker 1: he is the illustrative philosopher for the empiricists because he
Speaker 1: took it to its consistent conclusions. You see, Hume is consistent,
Speaker 1: and that's why he's worthy of note. And he admits
Speaker 1: that the end result of this empiricism is total skepticism.
Speaker 1: So you don't really know, you don't really have access
Speaker 1: to objective truths, you don't really know that the future
Speaker 1: will be like the past. You don't have any rational
Speaker 1: logical basis for induction. It's something that you assume and
Speaker 1: use pragmatically, but you can't justify it. It's unjustifiable because
Speaker 1: it's by its very nature not provable on empirical grounds.
Speaker 1: So empiricism can't stand the test of empiricism. And this
Speaker 1: is the ultimately the question that hum Is is putting
Speaker 1: out there to his fellow Enlightenment skeptics and empiricists.
Speaker 2: And he's saying, let's not fool.
Speaker 1: Ourselves here, right and be dishonest and assume that we
Speaker 1: have objective truth.
Speaker 2: We don't. It's not possible.
Speaker 1: So really all we have is pragmatic truth, right, positivism.
Speaker 1: Yet how often do we hear the rationalist, scientistic empiricist
Speaker 1: Michael Schrmer, Dawkins, Nildigrasse, Tyson, Jason Calvito. No, no, no,
Speaker 1: on arguing and behaving and operating as if they have
Speaker 1: objective reason, logic and metaphysical truths, as they consistently deny
Speaker 1: and denounce metaphysical truths. And this is of course the
Speaker 1: great pologetic point that we're making here. Now most of
Speaker 1: these guys don't know this because again, well number one,
Speaker 1: they don't care to know it. It would under mine
Speaker 1: all of their thought and philosophy, pseudo philosophy, their sophistry
Speaker 1: really and they actually are of the descendants of the sophists.
Speaker 1: But they also didn't ever learn any of this stuff.
Speaker 1: So there's a dual problem here. It's not one of
Speaker 1: the others, not just ignorance. It's also probably in many
Speaker 1: cases bad will. If you're Richard Dawkins, do you want
Speaker 1: to admit you've been wronging for all these years?
Speaker 2: Of course not.
Speaker 1: So there's a career political motivation obviously in many of
Speaker 1: these cases. And so let's come back to Cocash, because
Speaker 1: we can actually group Cocush and Jason Calvito's again, as
Speaker 1: we said, empiricism and skepticism under one banner here, when
Speaker 1: we've gotten rid of in our worldview or philosophy of
Speaker 1: the world, the possibility of anything like metaphysical categories, truths,
Speaker 1: objective principles and so forth, what we've actually done is
Speaker 1: severely limited ourselves.
Speaker 2: Now you may think that they.
Speaker 1: Argue, of course, that this severe limitation is good, and
Speaker 1: it's just the fact of how things are. It is
Speaker 1: just how it is, and like it or not, you're
Speaker 1: just confined to your immediate sense datum. The question then becomes, Okay,
Speaker 1: if that's true, then let's be consistent with that, And
Speaker 1: the argument, the presubpositional argument, the transcendental argument here is
Speaker 1: that no one is consistent with that because it's absurd
Speaker 1: and it's a reductio ad absurdum. So in logic, one
Speaker 1: of the arguments that you can make, and it's actually,
Speaker 1: I believe a very strong argument.
Speaker 2: Is a reducty argument.
Speaker 1: If you reduce the opponent's position to absurdity, then it's
Speaker 1: obviously not a defensible rational logical position. And anytime you're
Speaker 1: engaging in debate, you're assuming logic, you're assuming rationality and reason.
Speaker 1: Otherwise no point in debating. You go home right, drop
Speaker 1: the mic turn off the mike from get off the stage.
Speaker 1: If you don't come to the table at least the
Speaker 1: professing belief in logic, then you don't have an argument. Right,
Speaker 1: argument presumes logic, but with a calaveto or with a
Speaker 1: co cash, we don't have any desire to question empiricism
Speaker 1: or the bounds of supposed skepticism.
Speaker 2: Rather, we just have this assumption that it's so.
Speaker 1: I would argue that it's not so, and I can
Speaker 1: prove that it's not so because it's a reduct Yet
Speaker 1: it reduces to absurdity. The first argument against empiricism would
Speaker 1: be that the as we said, the position itself cannot
Speaker 1: be verified empirically. Now, if you're going to argue that
Speaker 1: all human knowledge comes through sense data an empirical experience,
Speaker 1: then to be consistent, you're going to also have to
Speaker 1: include the maxims and presubsisitions of empiricism itself under that claim.
Speaker 1: You see, so we need empirical verification for the truth
Speaker 1: of empiricism because it's starting off of the universal claim.
Speaker 1: And remember Adam had no problem with universal claims. He
Speaker 1: admitted this several times in the debate. Liberals themselves are
Speaker 1: always touting these moral platitudes and all this universal claims
Speaker 1: of morals and ethics. Then they turn around and espouse
Speaker 1: total cultural epistemic moral relativism. So they're they're total fools
Speaker 1: from the outset. When it comes to logic, we're saying,
Speaker 1: excuse me, uh. When Adam argued for a person ory self,
Speaker 1: we are told that that there's some inherent dignity in
Speaker 1: this because of the development of consciousness and reason and mind.
Speaker 1: But the problem, as we see from that evolutionary position
Speaker 1: of man, is that there's no reason to believe that
Speaker 1: there's some inherent value to consciousness or mind. And as
Speaker 1: many of the present day Darwinists are now discovering, there's
Speaker 1: no argument for consciousness or mind on their on their presuppositions,
Speaker 1: and it's it's so stupid. It should be obvious that
Speaker 1: if you confine everything to materialism, that there's obviously no
Speaker 1: place for a mind because it's by definition not material
Speaker 1: or the soul or the self, right, the self is not.
Speaker 1: At what point can you tell me which collection of
Speaker 1: molecules is the self?
Speaker 2: Right?
Speaker 1: Well, you can't, obviously, and that none of them can,
Speaker 1: and they all admit that. And so since you can't,
Speaker 1: then the self is alusory because the self is really
Speaker 1: just an arbitrary collection grouping. Remember Adam had a problem
Speaker 1: with arbitrary collective groupings. Well, the self is an arbitrary
Speaker 1: collective groupings of a grouping of this group of molecules,
Speaker 1: this group of atoms, supposedly right, this section of the
Speaker 1: gray matter. Perhaps, well, no, I see, perhaps under this microscope,
Speaker 1: many chunks of gray matter. But you have not shown
Speaker 1: me that that equals a self exactly exactly, And we
Speaker 1: really need a person, the conception of a person, a soul,
Speaker 1: right in order to make sense of this idea of
Speaker 1: a morally responsible agent operating with a will. And we
Speaker 1: always hear from the libertarian perspective of the anarchic perspective
Speaker 1: of responsibility, moral responsibility, ethics, et cetera, et cetera.
Speaker 2: Well, this all assumes individually acting agents.
Speaker 1: But again, as many of the Darwinists have noted in
Speaker 1: their mechanistic view of the universe, if the universe is
Speaker 1: one giant machine of determined materialistic process, then the arising
Speaker 1: of consciousness in evolutionary process is also just another aspect
Speaker 1: of the determined machine. And so your belief in free
Speaker 1: will is really just illusory. It's a phantasm, just like
Speaker 1: the angels and the demons in God right according to
Speaker 1: your view. So this again reduces to a reductio, reduces
Speaker 1: to absurdity. If everything is in flux, how is it
Speaker 1: that we can claim to have access or knowledge of
Speaker 1: objective metaphysical principle and logic that are not in flux.
Speaker 1: This is another problem, and this is ultimately this was
Speaker 1: a problem for Plato as well, because Plato had a
Speaker 1: dialectical view of the body and the soul, the soul
Speaker 1: existing or subsisting, perhaps with its connection to the abstract, unchanging,
Speaker 1: eternal verities of the forms, yet at the same time
Speaker 1: being imprisoned in the body subject to perpetual flux. So
Speaker 1: you have a dialectical tension between two realms, one realm
Speaker 1: of perpetual flux, another realm of stasis and permanence and unchangeability.
Speaker 1: And the problem, of course is that never the twain
Speaker 1: shall meet. And this is a dialectical tension in the
Speaker 1: history of all Western philosophy. You could argue as well
Speaker 1: in for Eastern philosophy we reject all dialectics.
Speaker 2: But of course all modern.
Speaker 1: Philosophies, especially in the West, are built on dialectics. Be
Speaker 1: it libertarianism, be it anarchism, be it Marxism. They are
Speaker 1: all classed and start from the presupposition of dialectics. This
Speaker 1: goes back to Plato, goes back to Aristotle, to Platinus,
Speaker 1: who all argued that the starting point of philosophy is
Speaker 1: that multiplicity equals tension and division, or excuse me, multiplicity
Speaker 1: or distinction implies tension or opposition. And this is why
Speaker 1: we have so many problems in society, in man's own life,
Speaker 1: and so forth and so on, because we believe that
Speaker 1: the fall is what brought about dialectical tensions as a
Speaker 1: result of the movement of the will. Okay, it's not
Speaker 1: a metaphysical problem of differences or distinctions that are Man's problem,
Speaker 1: but the movement of the will away from the good
Speaker 1: that is man's problem.
Speaker 2: So two different views there.
Speaker 1: Whereas so we locate Man's problem as ethical in a
Speaker 1: matter of the heart, the Greeks and the rest of
Speaker 1: the tradition of the West locates Man's problem in the
Speaker 1: externals of metaphysics, politics, and then ultimately with Marx and
Speaker 1: so forth, class, gender right, identity, politics right, So all
Speaker 1: of Man's problems are located in the external sphere. Right,
Speaker 1: this is where we get behaviorism, the perfecting of man
Speaker 1: through external stimuli.
Speaker 2: No no, no, no no.
Speaker 1: Man's problems begin, as Paul and the Book of James say, internal,
Speaker 1: with the desires and lusts of passions of the heart,
Speaker 1: right the corruption that resulted as from the fall, and
Speaker 1: man no longer having control of his passions. So man
Speaker 1: needs a renovation of his heart. And this is why
Speaker 1: we believe that Christian theology preaches this repentance, this change
Speaker 1: of heart, which is a lifetime thing, a continual process
Speaker 1: through life of moving away from rebellion, dialectical tensions and
Speaker 1: towards God. So dialectics and dialectical tensions actually is a
Speaker 1: manifestation of blaming God for man's own moral vices and fall.
Speaker 1: In other words, when we say that man's problem is
Speaker 1: the fact that there's these differences out there in the world,
Speaker 1: and there's these there's your nation over there, and your
Speaker 1: race and your gender over there, and then I've got
Speaker 1: mine over here. And the problem that we all have
Speaker 1: is that we're different. And if we can just battle
Speaker 1: and smash and war against each other until we all
Speaker 1: have one giant small is board, melting pot or something.
Speaker 1: Then we'll finally have peace when we destroy all the
Speaker 1: differences or when we say God, it's your fault because
Speaker 1: you created these distinctions, and distinctions cause division and opposition. Well, no, actually,
Speaker 1: in our theology, we believe in a balance between the
Speaker 1: one and the many. In God, there is a perfect
Speaker 1: ultimacy between the one and the many. There's no divergence
Speaker 1: or imbalance. There's no premissy to unity in God over
Speaker 1: against the.
Speaker 2: Triad of God.
Speaker 1: Right, so it's not like the Father has more being
Speaker 1: or the oneness of God has more being over against
Speaker 1: the Son and the Spirit. No, the Son is just
Speaker 1: as much God as the Father, we say. And so
Speaker 1: our view is that the Trinity, the doctrine of the Trinity,
Speaker 1: is the source, foundation and basis for our belief that
Speaker 1: there is harmony of both with unity and with multiplicity.
Speaker 1: The one and the many are never out of balance,
Speaker 1: and they're not intention And by tension I mean te
Speaker 1: and s I owing in tension, not intention.
Speaker 2: So there's no dialectical tensions in oppositions.
Speaker 1: This has been argued many times by many many Orthodox
Speaker 1: theologians for many centuries. So this is not something that
Speaker 1: I derived from some new philosopher somewhere or something like that.
Speaker 1: It wasn't from some Protestant philosopher. No, this goes back
Speaker 1: to orthodox philosophers and theologians. So it goes back to
Speaker 1: Maximus Maximus a confessor arguing dialectics with.
Speaker 2: Uh Pirris the Monothelite. So all of this plays out.
Speaker 1: In our worldviews, whether we know it or not, is
Speaker 1: really the point here with.
Speaker 2: With the modern revolutionary.
Speaker 1: Okay, let's just I'm going to class all these people
Speaker 1: under the modern revolutionary, and the modern revolutionary for me
Speaker 1: will include the progressive libertarian, the right libertarian, the American
Speaker 1: neo conservative, the American conservative, the anarcho capitalists, the anarcho syndicalists,
Speaker 1: the anarcho liberal, the anarcho feminist, the Marxist, the socialist,
Speaker 1: the communist, the modern fascist. All of these I'm going
Speaker 1: to group under the category of the modern revolutionary because
Speaker 1: they all share the modern revolutionaries presuppositions. They're all birthed
Speaker 1: from that source, whether they know it or not. Interestingly,
Speaker 1: anarchism itself is a tradition. Many of the anarchists are
Speaker 1: apparently unaware of this, believe that they as a magical
Speaker 1: mathematical unit in a within a vacuum, came to anarchism
Speaker 1: through their supposed reasoning powers, when in fact they actually
Speaker 1: were propagandized by reading it on various online forums, YouTube videos,
Speaker 1: and books. So they, whether they know it or not,
Speaker 1: receive their information through a tradition. And some traditions are
Speaker 1: even you could argue anti traditions. I believe that one writer,
Speaker 1: Charles Upton talks about he has some term for it,
Speaker 1: like a dark not dark tradition, but I forget his
Speaker 1: term anyway. Point being, you could even argue that that
Speaker 1: some of these anti traditions are just really themselves a tradition.
Speaker 2: Right.
Speaker 1: It's kind of like the Baptist Church was grounded in
Speaker 1: opposing tradition, and then over time the Baptist Church develops
Speaker 1: its own traditions, right with you singing the hymns just
Speaker 1: as I am at the beginning of the church, and
Speaker 1: then you have the offering, and so they develop their
Speaker 1: own traditions when they're birded out of the.
Speaker 2: Desire to have no traditions.
Speaker 1: So quite absurd really, And so we heard a lot
Speaker 1: about the right to freedom of movement, and as I
Speaker 1: was pointing out where does the anarcho person derive these rights?
Speaker 1: And he says, well, from logic, and then also talks
Speaker 1: about nature. And I appreciate Adam admitting that nature seems
Speaker 1: to show us predators and pray. So nature is not
Speaker 1: always the best source of argumentation for a position natural rights,
Speaker 1: so to speak.
Speaker 2: So I'll give kudos to Adam for realizing that.
Speaker 1: So Adam wants to appeal to eternal verities, Thank good job. Yes, absolutely,
Speaker 1: of course, how do we have access to eternal verities
Speaker 1: when we're the product of millions of years of evolution?
Speaker 2: We will never know.
Speaker 1: But we're just going to assume that that's the case,
Speaker 1: and we're going to assume that this consciousness that we
Speaker 1: have is a self, some special identity we could look at,
Speaker 1: perhaps Descartes Daycartes says, well, how do I know that
Speaker 1: I exist?
Speaker 2: Well, if I.
Speaker 1: Doubt my own existence, I must assume my existence in
Speaker 1: doubting my existence, which is interesting a kind of transcendent argument. However,
Speaker 1: it's actually not that great of an argument because the
Speaker 1: argument doesn't actually prove the existence of a person or
Speaker 1: a self.
Speaker 2: It only appears, at least to prove the existence of thought.
Speaker 1: You see so leaping from a phenomena of thought to
Speaker 1: saying that O, therefore I am a person. You see,
Speaker 1: that only follows with a larger context in worldview, where
Speaker 1: you believe in and assume the existence of a self.
Speaker 1: So and I believe many philosophers have actually pointed that out.
Speaker 1: You know, I think therefore I am is not a
Speaker 1: non sequitor. It's a non sequitur. I think therefore thought happened.
Speaker 2: Right.
Speaker 1: You might can argue that that would be a better
Speaker 1: argument that I think therefore I am. You see, the
Speaker 1: I there is intended to denote a self or a person,
Speaker 1: and when we've just tried to boil down all of
Speaker 1: our starting points. And this is why descartes methodology, right,
Speaker 1: was this presuppositional attempt to get rid of all presuppositions,
Speaker 1: which is impossible. And this is the folly of Descartes.
Speaker 1: While at the same time being somewhat insightful, you can't
Speaker 1: ultimately get rid of all presubpositions. This is what Descartes
Speaker 1: shows us. Even in his heroic quest to theoretically divest
Speaker 1: himself of all presuppositions, he still has many presubpositions. And
Speaker 1: by the way, I actually critique this in my undergrad
Speaker 1: days because.
Speaker 2: There's a lot of actually, there's a lot.
Speaker 1: More things that Descartes is assuming here that people haven't noticed.
Speaker 2: Maybe somehow, I don't know, but.
Speaker 1: You can't boil all of your presubositions down to I think,
Speaker 1: therefore I am because you're assuming language, for one, right,
Speaker 1: You're assuming subjects and predicates and sentences. So this brings
Speaker 1: along with it the assumption of linguistics. You're assuming that
Speaker 1: language operates within time and space. You're assuming that subjects
Speaker 1: and predicates have reference to things in an external world,
Speaker 1: even within your attempt right at boiling things down to
Speaker 1: no presubpositions. So it's absolutely impossible, and that's why the
Speaker 1: presubpositional is rejects Classical foundationalism. Classical foundationalism is the idea
Speaker 1: that within philosophy you can just in terms of we'll
Speaker 1: say epistemology, Well you can just start with self evident maxims, right,
Speaker 1: the principle of non contradiction.
Speaker 2: Well, that's just a self evident maxim and you can't
Speaker 2: question that.
Speaker 1: Well, the whole of modernity is based on the idea,
Speaker 1: supposedly that we're going to question everything.
Speaker 2: Okay, Well, let's question everything.
Speaker 1: Now, what we find then is that in this long
Speaker 1: process from Descartes and anomalis on and questioning everything, they
Speaker 1: don't actually honestly do that. They rather turn their supposed
Speaker 1: questionings into a political or religious agenda slash motivation to
Speaker 1: remove the existing power structures and hierarchies. That's actually what
Speaker 1: was going on. And this is where, of course, we
Speaker 1: get revolutionary thought and revolutionary movements out of these philosophical ideas.
Speaker 1: And is everyone who's listened to Jay's analysis for any
Speaker 1: period of time knows revolutionary thought and movements are the
Speaker 1: tools of foreign powers and bankers and so forth and
Speaker 1: so on. Right, they're the tools of foreign states. And
Speaker 1: if you don't understand that or know that, then you're naive.
Speaker 1: So when you believe that you've come to a special
Speaker 1: position of autonomy and individualism, you've really actually just been
Speaker 1: propagandized by fought from a few hundred years ago. Now
Speaker 1: that does that mean that you got everything wrong? Nope, Nope, nope,
Speaker 1: because that's not how humans and worldviews work. It's not
Speaker 1: an all or nothing thing. But if you haven't questioned
Speaker 1: anarchism and empiricism and these kinds of things, then I would.
Speaker 2: Venture to say that you have a lot wrong. And
Speaker 2: this is what hopefully.
Speaker 1: The deconstructions and dissections and transcendent arguments and I'm presenting
Speaker 1: here will convey that's at least my goal in the
Speaker 1: debates that we're having.
Speaker 2: And so forth. So we heard all kinds of things
Speaker 2: like what it is to be rational? Right? This is
Speaker 2: special pleading, and.
Speaker 1: This is appeals to popularity, as if there's this popular
Speaker 1: notion of what it is to be rational that everyone shares,
Speaker 1: which they don't.
Speaker 2: Now does that mean that I deny common reason? I
Speaker 2: do not.
Speaker 1: Uh, but I don't think that there's such a thing
Speaker 1: that we can appeal to in a public sphere, especially
Speaker 1: not in our day.
Speaker 2: That that we that is just quote rational.
Speaker 1: So Richard Dawkins believes he's rational, right, but he also
Speaker 1: believes that everything is subject to evolutionary flux. So I
Speaker 1: would say Richard Dawkins is irrational, right. So there's no
Speaker 1: there's not really a prima fascia publicly accessible rationality that
Speaker 1: that that's in the public sphere of debate. Okay, Now,
Speaker 1: I'm not saying that human nature doesn't possess reason.
Speaker 2: It does.
Speaker 1: But you can also the great human nature through various means,
Speaker 1: toxic culture, whatever, brainwashing, bad bad.
Speaker 2: Education, and so forth, to.
Speaker 1: Have a programmed populace, and so reason in many of
Speaker 1: these cases, quote unquote is really just a propaganda tool.
Speaker 2: Right.
Speaker 1: In other words, in our day we think of reason,
Speaker 1: I would say a lot of people, especially in internet discourse,
Speaker 1: quote reason is identified with Dawkins, It's identified with scientism,
Speaker 1: it's identified with these kinds of things which are all
Speaker 1: the tools of statism.
Speaker 2: And I think that that can that alone, I think
Speaker 2: shows that.
Speaker 1: You know, when you're talking about reason, we have to
Speaker 1: be clear exactly what we're talking about. Now when I
Speaker 1: talk about reason, I believe that there's objective logic.
Speaker 2: Right.
Speaker 1: We should look at fallacies and syllogisms. We should understand
Speaker 1: what a straw man is. We should understand what no
Speaker 1: true scot stsman is as a fallacy, we should understand
Speaker 1: what two quoke way is. We should understand an appeal
Speaker 1: to emotion. We should understand either or fallacy, genetic fallacy. Right,
Speaker 1: we should understand all of those in the drama pen
Speaker 1: in the process of debate.
Speaker 2: Most people don't do that. They don't know the fallacies.
Speaker 1: I mean, just knowing the basic fallacies informal fallacies is
Speaker 1: a great step towards.
Speaker 2: Your own mental health.
Speaker 1: Actually, now what I do in my philosophy though, is
Speaker 1: and then what I think what you would get in
Speaker 1: a lot To be fair to a lot of people
Speaker 1: out there, they would probably agree and say, well, yeah,
Speaker 1: I'm talking about like the internet so called philosophers, but
Speaker 1: they're going to say or even in college classes, you
Speaker 1: should learn these things. I mean, I learned this in
Speaker 1: my first year of college in a literary class. Beliter
Speaker 1: or my English professor passed out the lists of informal fallacies, so.
Speaker 2: When I was like, I don't know, twenty twenty one.
Speaker 2: So these are good things to learn.
Speaker 1: But as you advance, and as you progress in these
Speaker 1: kinds of topics, especially in philosophy, you'll encounter really interesting
Speaker 1: questions for more advanced students, more technical students, which I
Speaker 1: totally support, which I've investigated and put a lot of
Speaker 1: time into in my education. And one of those which
Speaker 1: none of these so called Internet philosophers know anything about
Speaker 1: or I've ever looked into, is the question of metallogic.
Speaker 1: Right now, we're getting way, of course, but metaal loogic
Speaker 1: points us in the direction of the kind of argumentation
Speaker 1: that I'm talking about, transcendental arguments, And how do I
Speaker 1: know that? Well, meta logic is the question of how
Speaker 1: is it that logic operates as a logical process, right,
Speaker 1: How does it operate in the world of flux and
Speaker 1: change that we're talking about. We know that it does
Speaker 1: because you know, the mathematical you know, formulas that we
Speaker 1: use to build an airplane or to build a bridge
Speaker 1: ten years ago are the same ones that we're going
Speaker 1: to use to build a bridge today. They might get
Speaker 1: more complex, they might get more advanced, we might discover
Speaker 1: new materials, but the mathematical principles behind building these things
Speaker 1: or computers or whatever, they don't change, right, These theorems,
Speaker 1: these algorithms, they don't become the opposite of themselves tomorrow.
Speaker 1: I mean, this is should be obvious, right, I mean,
Speaker 1: the law of non contradiction doesn't turn into the opposite
Speaker 1: of itself tomorrow. Maybe in terms of multiverse other worlds, right, which,
Speaker 1: by the way, there's ways you can refute multiverse and
Speaker 1: all that kind of stuff philosophically speaking, which that I've
Speaker 1: delved into on Hoostbusters.
Speaker 2: On many occasions. How you can actually show that those.
Speaker 1: Supposed scientific views, which they are, are a nonsense. But
Speaker 1: you would do it through kind of transcendent augmentation like
Speaker 1: I'm doing here, because they would lead to absurdities.
Speaker 2: Anyway, we saw with Adams.
Speaker 1: Talk that progress is objective, it's universal, it's not what
Speaker 1: you believe is progress is going to be conditioned by
Speaker 1: your value judgments, which are conditioned by your worldview.
Speaker 2: Right, Well, you consider to be good, we considered to
Speaker 2: be bad.
Speaker 1: So if you, as I said, are a proponent of
Speaker 1: scientism and reductionistic materialism and global warming and depopulation, then
Speaker 1: you believe it's good to basically kill off most of
Speaker 1: the planet, right you would say that's progress, Well, is it?
Speaker 2: Right? So there's nothing.
Speaker 1: Inherent in the word of progress with this just bantering
Speaker 1: about throwing out the slogan of progress that actually tells
Speaker 1: us what is progressive. If you're a shaman in some
Speaker 1: tribe somewhere and you trip a bunch of ayahuasca or something,
Speaker 1: and you almost go crazy and kill yourself, but you
Speaker 1: got like to the limits of perception or something, right
Speaker 1: like that was in your view a good right because
Speaker 1: you went through the shamanica or initiatory process, and yeah,
Speaker 1: you might have almost died and lost your mind, but
Speaker 1: you came back and you survived the process, and you
Speaker 1: think you have an enlightenment, and so.
Speaker 2: For you that was a good right, that was that
Speaker 2: was progress for you individually.
Speaker 1: And then most of these people, of course, believe that
Speaker 1: everybody in a society then should be taking ayahuasca perfectly
Speaker 1: in line with the CIA's and culture of plans.
Speaker 2: And so is that progress or is that regress? Right?
Speaker 1: I mean, if we're all living in huts, you know,
Speaker 1: like archaic revival primitivism or something like this, and we're
Speaker 1: sitting around tripping ayahuasca, rolling around on our own shit
Speaker 1: or something, is that progress?
Speaker 2: Well, some people would say it is progress. I don't
Speaker 2: believe it is.
Speaker 1: But you can't just say progress as if it's somehow
Speaker 1: inherently clear as to what this is. Progress doesn't work
Speaker 1: or function outside of some context of a belief system
Speaker 1: or worldview. And so that was a lot of the
Speaker 1: stuff that we heard in the debate. We had Adam
Speaker 1: sort of arbitrarily consigning certain things to the category of
Speaker 1: eternal verities and other things to eternal progress or in
Speaker 1: to never any flux but we never heard any clear
Speaker 1: and consistent pattern or benchmark or judgment measure of judgment
Speaker 1: as to how we know which things are with right
Speaker 1: logic and reason, he says are in the eternal verities category,
Speaker 1: traditions and morals are in the evolutionary flux category. Well,
Speaker 1: on what basis do you know which is which? We're
Speaker 1: never going to get that from an empirical perspective. I
Speaker 1: think at one point he said something like, we test
Speaker 1: it and see what works. Well, again, what works is
Speaker 1: dependent on your presubsitions. Right, if my empire where I'm
Speaker 1: the god emperor and I smash all the people that
Speaker 1: I don't like, works for me, then I'm going to
Speaker 1: interpret that as a working. So what quote unquote works
Speaker 1: is a very ambiguous subjective notion. We can't just apply
Speaker 1: this abstract category something quote working as if we know
Speaker 1: exactly what that means. Every anarcho libertarian, whether right libertarian
Speaker 1: or left libertarian, I argue once nominalism when it comes
Speaker 1: to the category of the state.
Speaker 2: Right, the state is not real, it does not exist.
Speaker 2: It's a fiction.
Speaker 1: However, when it comes to other arbitrary groupings that they'll prefer,
Speaker 1: such as their own private voluntary incorporation status and its
Speaker 1: quote rights and legal categories. Suddenly they're essentialists and Platonists.
Speaker 1: Hence the parable that I told at the beginning of
Speaker 1: the debate. So I see this as a very arbitrary
Speaker 1: contradiction here, that we're the metaphysical groupings and categories where
Speaker 1: I voluntarily created corporation, and where I have laws that
Speaker 1: I will then extend into posterity, such as inheritance. That
Speaker 1: my inheritance, the people who inherit my wealth, they get
Speaker 1: this somehow magically as a right when they're so. In
Speaker 1: other words, if I say that my children are entitled
Speaker 1: to what I pass on to them, that's a collective
Speaker 1: legal category that I'm assuming, and you're saying, no, it's not.
Speaker 2: Oh, yes it is. I'm assuming that my family.
Speaker 1: Has some collective legality status by which my children right
Speaker 1: are going to get my stuff.
Speaker 2: And you say, oh, well, it's voluntary. Oh is it not? Always?
Speaker 1: Sometimes children inherit stuff and it wasn't voluntarily their decision
Speaker 1: to inherit it. Sometimes bad things are inherited, right, Well,
Speaker 1: how do we parcel this out in the supposed anarcho
Speaker 1: setting when we again, when we've been told that groupings
Speaker 1: are fictions. Law is a fiction unless it was voluntarily contracted. Well,
Speaker 1: I mean this is just retarded. I mean, come on, no,
Speaker 1: they're not. Humans have the ability to enact things that
Speaker 1: are binding on other people, and that does not always
Speaker 1: require voluntary submission on the part of other persons. And
Speaker 1: I would say that fathers and families and children.
Speaker 2: Show that to be the case.
Speaker 1: Now, modern political and ideological systems, as we said, we're
Speaker 1: arguing against the revolutionary here, the modern revolutionary in all
Speaker 1: of its forms, they prefer solving man's ills, as we said,
Speaker 1: through the imposition or the lack of imposition of some
Speaker 1: external structure.
Speaker 2: Man's problems are.
Speaker 1: The result of class, the result of race, the result
Speaker 1: of economic disparities, the result of the state, the result
Speaker 1: of hierarchies. And while many of these things are problematic,
Speaker 1: there's no doubt. Are they really the source and the
Speaker 1: solution to manzils?
Speaker 2: I don't believe so.
Speaker 1: And again that's because man's ills begin with his own
Speaker 1: internal vices. And this is why we see that libertarianism
Speaker 1: in our the modern revolutionary positions, all of them have
Speaker 1: their own version of faith, hope, and love. Interestingly, we
Speaker 1: have all these Christian categories, these biblical categories that are
Speaker 1: used by the left, by the modern revolutionary, but they've
Speaker 1: all been divorced from any transcendent theological status, and so
Speaker 1: they have absolutely no binding force or meaning or purpose
Speaker 1: because the whole universe is meaningless and purposelessness apart from
Speaker 1: everybody's subjective whims. So if your political economic theory has
Speaker 1: to argue, quote, well, we've never really seen the real
Speaker 1: implementation of blank, then you have a religious faith in
Speaker 1: an idealized position that will maybe eschatologically imminentize one day,
Speaker 1: we don't know. But of course this is out of
Speaker 1: a chord with all human nature and history as we've
Speaker 1: seen it so far, which requires some sort of social
Speaker 1: cohesion based on social norms and laws. Right, even the
Speaker 1: most tribal societies out there in the middle of nowhere
Speaker 1: still have families.
Speaker 2: Right, still takes a man and a woman, mommy and
Speaker 2: a daddy, and then a couple other people.
Speaker 1: Again, unless you live a completely hermetic existence, which is
Speaker 1: possible people do that. There are some guys out there
Speaker 1: out in the woods doing that. But again, most of
Speaker 1: these people who want the anarchism, the anarchical position are
Speaker 1: on the internet, arguing all day.
Speaker 2: They're not out there doing this.
Speaker 1: So another point that none of this stuff ever comes
Speaker 1: to realize is that we have protections, even if they're voluntary,
Speaker 1: for a reason. We have borders and walls for a reason,
Speaker 1: and that's because you can't have everybody, the whole other
Speaker 1: half of the planet, other chunk of the planet, with
Speaker 1: billions supposedly of the rest of the planet, just coming
Speaker 1: into your culture and your nation. And you say, well,
Speaker 1: the state is a fiction, it has no right to
Speaker 1: erect borders. Okay, that's all well and good for the
Speaker 1: fantasy world. But in our world we need borders. Okay,
Speaker 1: go down to El Paso and look at Juarez, and
Speaker 1: if you want to, if.
Speaker 2: You would literally rather live in Juarez.
Speaker 1: Where the cartels rule and it's all shacks, be my guest, right,
Speaker 1: Or if you would rather live in El Paso where
Speaker 1: you have running water and electricity.
Speaker 2: Yeah.
Speaker 1: I mean even the mainstream open border news outlets like
Speaker 1: AP and Reuters, they report on Juarez and El Paso
Speaker 1: this way. And I've been there, so I can speak
Speaker 1: from experience, my direct personal.
Speaker 2: Empirical experience. I went there and I took photos, and.
Speaker 1: You can stand on the one hand, at the Moca
Speaker 1: shop where you get your smoothie, you're sipping your smoothie
Speaker 1: and you have running water in a clean restroom, and
Speaker 1: you look over the wall and you see just endless
Speaker 1: shanty shacks and people being run by private cartels, private cartels, okay,
Speaker 1: where there's no state. Arguably, I mean, I guess you
Speaker 1: could argue this's like some local what's the Hispanic word
Speaker 1: for hethe right, who works for the cartel or something.
Speaker 2: So there's your private government right there. And we always hear.
Speaker 1: About the state, the state of the state, the state,
Speaker 1: but the anarcho capitalists don't often mention that the state
Speaker 1: that we exist under is a corporate state, that is,
Speaker 1: a private monopoly state, which is the result of their
Speaker 1: centuries of market god that they worship. In other words,
Speaker 1: the libertarian market god is precisely what gives birth to
Speaker 1: the monopolistic, capitally capital god which runs the society of
Speaker 1: the West that we now live under. So they're arguing
Speaker 1: for the beta position, right, liberty beta seventeen seventy six,
Speaker 1: seventeen eighty nine is what gives birth to nineteen eighty four.
Speaker 2: Now you say that's stupid. I don't believe that.
Speaker 1: Well, Quigley says that form one we saw that. Quigley
Speaker 1: says that the libertarian market positions of the seventeenth century
Speaker 1: and the eighteenth century that came to dominate were the
Speaker 1: banker's plot. How many times have I been saying this,
Speaker 1: but our anarco libertarian friends do not want to give
Speaker 1: this up. On what basis we can ask these libertarians?
Speaker 1: Do you then impose the non aggression principle upon me?
Speaker 1: And so what we actually see is that all world
Speaker 1: views have this implicit desire to export themselves. Right, Adam
Speaker 1: is out there debating, trying to convince people of his view. Well,
Speaker 1: that's not very relativistic, right, in other words, And to
Speaker 1: be fair to Adam, he believes his position is objectively true.
Speaker 1: But I would say that I agree with you, Adam,
Speaker 1: and the belief and objective truth. It's just I don't
Speaker 1: think we can have it on the basis that you
Speaker 1: argue for it. How can we have objective truths and
Speaker 1: at the same time be moral relativists.
Speaker 2: And I do get the.
Speaker 1: Sense that Madam, that Adam is a moral relativist because
Speaker 1: you know, things like homosexuality are not wrong in themselves.
Speaker 2: They're only quote wrong in some case of.
Speaker 1: It being done on someone's private property when it wasn't
Speaker 1: desire or something like that.
Speaker 2: But they're not objectively wrong. Right.
Speaker 1: So I can bang and screw dead horse carcasses all
Speaker 1: day long, I can commit necrophilia. I can actually have
Speaker 1: sex with dead bodies all day long, as long as
Speaker 1: they do it on my private property and it doesn't
Speaker 1: hurt somebody.
Speaker 2: Right.
Speaker 1: Yeah, Well, see, doesn't something seem wrong about this, right?
Speaker 1: I mean, doesn't something inherently don't? We want to say, Yeah,
Speaker 1: I don't really think that having sex with dead babies
Speaker 1: is good. There's something wrong with this, right, But on
Speaker 1: the anarcho moral relatives position, there's nothing wrong with it inherently.
Speaker 2: A couple more points.
Speaker 1: I guess Adam speaks English.
Speaker 2: English is a linguistic tradition.
Speaker 1: So when Adam makes all these arguments, tries to convince
Speaker 1: others of his position, which he believes is subject to Well,
Speaker 1: on the one hand, it's relativistic because everything is under
Speaker 1: perpetual evolution. At the same time, he's using a linguistic tradition,
Speaker 1: English to convey all of his ideas, which is strictly speaking,
Speaker 1: not in his view, not objective metaphysically objective. Right, everything
Speaker 1: is subject to evolution in terms of such traditions in
Speaker 1: Adam's view. Okay, well, then how are the words that
Speaker 1: you're using able to convey eternal verities?
Speaker 2: Exactly? Now?
Speaker 1: In my view, I believe that tradition and traditions actually
Speaker 1: can convey eternal truths and are not completely subject to evolution.
Speaker 1: So that I think, I mean, and I've got a
Speaker 1: whole bunch more notes, but we've talked for like an
Speaker 1: hour just to sort of recapping the debate, and you know,
Speaker 1: it boils down to utilizing universal claims and principles with
Speaker 1: no real way to make sense of how there are
Speaker 1: universe claims some principles. All right, we're just going to
Speaker 1: say that there are these eternal verities and we back
Speaker 1: them up by he says, testing it. Yeah, well, there's
Speaker 1: not really a way that we just test by trial
Speaker 1: and error. By the way, there's no been no trial
Speaker 1: and error test of his position yet, so we don't
Speaker 1: actually know if that position is true on its own grounds. Right,
Speaker 1: If everything that's an eternal verity is known, he said,
Speaker 1: by testing it and see if it works pragmatism, right.
Speaker 2: I don't think we can get.
Speaker 1: A coherent defense of where his anarchic society has been enacted.
Speaker 1: Maybe he does have an argument somewhere where this was
Speaker 1: done somewhere I don't know, but I think you would
Speaker 1: have to go in the direction of maybe Chris's arguments of.
Speaker 2: Like Indian tribes or Native American.
Speaker 1: Tribes or something like this would maybe be the closest approximation.
Speaker 1: But to me, it looks to me like they're all
Speaker 1: organized hierarchically with tribal chieftains.
Speaker 2: So I don't know how we're going to get that.
Speaker 1: But we have talked for an hour here. This has
Speaker 1: been the first hour you've been listening to Jay's analysis.
Speaker 1: This is my analysis of revolutionary thought and against the
Speaker 1: revolutionary moderns. And in the second part we're going to
Speaker 1: do an in depth critique of Umberto Echo's relatively famous
Speaker 1: essay uru fascism. That is how revolutionary moderns must ultimately
Speaker 1: argue against all meaning, because meaning, an objective truth is fascism.
Speaker 1: And this is going to be Echo's point, and this
Speaker 1: is a good point. Yes, we want to hold the
Speaker 1: left to their own presubositions, hold them to accountable, that
Speaker 1: they're accountable to their own claims and statements, and if
Speaker 1: they're going to be consistent, we want them to go
Speaker 1: the full way. We want them to ultimately say, as
Speaker 1: Wittgenstein and many of the revolutionary monitors will say, words
Speaker 1: are meaningless games and constructs.
Speaker 2: And guess what. Once you've said.
Speaker 1: Words are meaningless games and constructs, you have completely destroyed
Speaker 1: your own position. You can no longer argue and debate,
Speaker 1: and so actually you've contradicted yourself at the most fundamental level.
Speaker 1: So you've lost the debate. And we're going to show
Speaker 1: that in presubsitional fashion with Umberto Eco's famous essay. If
Speaker 1: you like what you're hearing and you want to hear
Speaker 1: the second half of the talk, subscribe at Jason Alsi's
Speaker 1: for four and a five a month or for sixty
Speaker 1: dollars a year. You can also get my book Esoteric Hollywood,
Speaker 1: Six Cults and Symbols in Film, which applies a lot
Speaker 1: of these philosophical techniques and critique methodologies to Hollywood. And
Speaker 1: so it's a way to teach people and learn the
Speaker 1: process of what I do through philm in a fun
Speaker 1: way through movies. And so you can get my book
Speaker 1: signed at jasonalysis dot com.
Speaker 2: At the tab at the top.
Speaker 1: There is PayPal options for inside the US and outside
Speaker 1: the US, and please get the book from me to
Speaker 1: help support the author, not through Amazon. Thank you for
Speaker 1: listening and stay tuned for hour two.