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I really appreciate all the support everyone's giving me, and
I hope to expand the show even more than it
already has. Thank you so much. Welcome everyone back to
the finale, Part eleven of Kudata by Edward Lutvak and
John Fieldhouse is here to finish it up with me.
Hey doing, John doing well?
Speaker 2: I think we're both ready to get this damn thing
over with.
Speaker 1: Yep, let's kill this uh and move on? All right,
I'm just going to start reading. Let's go heading the
immediate post coup situation Once our targets have been seized,
the loyalist forces have been isolated, and the rest of
the bureaucracy and armed forces have been neutralized, the active
and more mechanical phase of the coup will be over,
but everything will still be in the balance. The old
regime will have been deprived of its control over the
critical parts of the mechanism of the state, but we
ourselves will not yet be in control of it, except
in a purely physical sense, and then only in the
area of the capital city. If we can retain our
control over what we have seized, those political forces whose
primary requirement is the preservation of law and order will
probably give us their allegiance. Our objective, therefore, is to
freeze the situation, so that this process can take place
until the actual execution of the coup. Our aim was
to destabilize the situation. Afterward, however, all our efforts should
be directed at stabilizing, or rather restabilizing it. We will
be doing this at three different levels. A among our
own forces, where our aim is to prevent our military
or police allies from usurping our leadership. B within the
state bureaucracy, whose allegiance and cooperation we wish to secure
and c with the public at large whose accepstance we
want to gain. In each case, we will be using
our leverage within one level in order to control the
next one. But each level will also require separate and
particular measures.
Speaker 2: Yeah about that, there's I would say two things. Number One,
traditional military operations. We always say the most dangerous part
when you're conducting a direct attack on an objective is
right after you seized it, because at that point the
the adrenalines down, you start having physical fatigue set in,
but you haven't fully consolidated the target, so it's really
easy for somebody else to come along and attack you
and drive you off the objective at that point. The
second one is I've heard it described anytime you're having
a takeover of authority. The best analogy is probably the
Call of a While, the chapters where Buck takes over
a leadership of the pack. So in the beginning he's
out rightly attacking authority, he's instigating insurrection, he's trying to
create discontent. But once he's in authority, he has to
crush all that preferablybiliar with solt power. But you are
now the authority so you have to act as.
Speaker 1: An authority ay among our own forces, where our aim
is to prevent our military or police allies from usurping
our leadership. From your reading of history and looking studying
some coups, how often does that happen?
Speaker 2: I won't keep in mind coups can be hard to
really analyze because most effective coups you destroy the documents afterwards.
So the lead up is it tends to be conjecture,
and it tends to be materials you have from the
evidence remaining tends to be from Western journalists who not
only are their bias, they're also oblivious to anything that
happens in the real world. But that tends to be
fairly common right, because essentially you're having a coalition of
people who are cooperating to achieve their objective, and every
member that coalition has their own idea of what should
happen afterwards. So I'd say basically every coup is something
like that. The question is who.
Speaker 1: Wins new heading stabilizing our own forces. During the planning stage,
our recruits in the armed forces will be fully conscious
of the fact that the success of the coup and
their own safety depends on the work of coordination that
we perform immediately after the coup. However, the only manifestation
of all our efforts will be the direct force that
they themselves control. In these circumstances, they may well be
tempted into trying a coup of their own, and they
could do this by establishing contact with the other military
leaders we have recruited so as to secure their agreement
to our exclusion from their leadership. Apart from the dispersal
countermeasures discussed earlier, our only effective defense will be to
retain full control over all horizontal communications, or in other words,
to remain the only contact between each military leader we
have recruited and his colleagues. This can sometimes be done
technically by keeping under our control the actual communication equipment
linking the various units, but this would only be effective
in unusually extensive capital cities and would in any case
break down after a relatively short period of time. Typically,
we will need somewhat more subtle political and psychological methods
to keep the various military leaders we have recruited well
separated from each other. This may involve promises of accelerated
promotions to selected younger officers who could not otherwise expect
very rapid advancement, even within the limited context of those
who have participated in the coup. It will also be
useful to remind our military and police allies that their
colleagues outside the conspiracy may try to displace them and
block unless they and we form a tight and mutually
supportive group. In general, we should ensure that all those
who could pose an internal threat are kept occupied on
tasks which, whether essential or not, will at least absorb
their energies, and that there are divers and that there
are divisive factors operating between them. As soon as we
begin to receive the allegiance of military and bureaucratic leaders
who we previously outside the conspiracy, who were previously outside
the conspiracy, are leveraged with our military and police recruits
will increase very substantially. The problem of retaining control against
such internal threats will therefore be largely short term. As
soon as our position has been established, our best policy
may be to dispose of our dangerous allies by using
all the usual methods available for that purpose. Diplomatic posting abroad,
nominal end or remote command positions, and promotions to less
vital parts of the state. Apparatus, because it is possible
that an embryonic coup within our coup has existed within
our forces from the very beginning. The general security measures
we design to protect ourselves against the penetration of the
security agencies will also serve a useful supplementary function. They
will prevent the lateral spread of the conspiracy if our
internal security procedures are sufficiently good to prevent all contact
between the separate cells so that any infiltration by the
security agencies is contained, they will also prevent the coordination
of this inner opposition. It has been calculated that in
a defensive military situation, even if only twenty eight percent
of the troops of a unit are actively loyal, the
units concerned should operate successfully and perform their assigned function.
Speaker 2: There's a couple of things that are really important here.
The first off, he talks about the need to effectively
control lateral communication amongst your coalition immediately afterwards, which I
that's something I wouldn't have thought of, And that's a
very great point because it makes basically you're trying to
prevent your allies from coordinating around you. The downside of that,
the difficult part of that, and again the counterproductive part
of that is effective militaris have huge amounts of lateral communication,
horizontal communications. Very often they will have more communications horizontally
than vertically because junior leaders are trained and empowered. I know,
empowered is a stupid word, but we can say empowered
to exercise initiative in order to achieve their objectives, which
means that by eliminating horizontal communications, no matter how well temporarily,
keep in mind, we are also harming our own combat effectiveness.
So it's something we need to be very concerned with,
and it's part of why he emphasizes the need to
consolidate power and move on, because we don't want to
hang out in that situation for very long. Another thing,
he talks about ways you would eliminate either allies who
could become a risk or other people in the power
structure who become a risk afterwards, and you know, there's
a tendency to immediately think, well, we're gonna have a
purge and we're going to kill them all, and not
just morally, it creates huge problems with your legal structure
because it basically undermines any faith in your legal structure,
and it definitely harms you know the whole, you know,
collective cooperation at that point. So one of the most
effective ways to purge people, effectively purge people from an
organization after something like that, is to promote them and
retire them and maneuver them in a situation where they
can't do things. You know, most militaries have academic posts,
either at the military academy or higher command schools, or
sometimes even teaching at various level universities where you put
military historians at the end of the career. All those
are great ways where you can promote somebody, you know,
give them a nice cushy assignment into retirement, but while
you know, effectively purging them from the organization. So creativity matters.
And I mean the big takeaway from machiabilities to the
Prince is, you know, sometimes you have to behave altruistically
in order to you know, get what you want from
a power politics.
Speaker 1: Standpoint, stabilizing the bureaucracy. Our attitude towards the second level,
the armed forces and bureaucracy, which we're not infiltrated before
the coup, will depend partly on the degree of control
that we have over our own incorporated forces. Assuming that
we have a reasonably firm hold over them. We should
not try to extract any early commitment from the majority
of soldiers and bureaucrats, whose first information of our existence
will be the coup itself. Now knowing the extent of
the conspiracy, their principal preoccupation will be the possible danger
of those of their positions in the hierarchy. If most
of the officers of the armed forces or the officials
of a ministry have joined the coup, those who have
not are hardly likely to be rewarded subsequently by rapid promotion.
If the soldiers and bureaucrats realize that the group participating
in the coup was in reality quite small, they would
also realize the strength of their own position. The fact
is that they are collectively indispensable to any government, including
the one to be formed after the coup. In the
period immediately after the coup, however, they will probably see
themselves as isolated individuals whose careers and even lives could
be in danger. This feeling of insecurity may precipitate two
alternate alternative reactions, both extreme. They will either step forward
to assert their loyalty to the leaders of the coup,
or else they will try to foment or join an
opposition against US boss are undesirable from our point of view.
Assertions of loyalty will usually be worthless because they are
made by men who have just abandoned their previous and
possibly more legitimate masters. Opposition will always be dangerous and
sometimes disastrous. Our policy toward the military and bureaucratic cadres
will be to reduce this sense of insecurity. We should
establish direct communication with as many of the more senior
officers and officials as possible to convey one principal idea
in a forceful and convincing matter manner that the coup
will not threaten their positions in hierarchy and the aims
of the coup do not include a reshaping of the
existing military or administrative structures. This requirement will incidentally have
technical implications in the planning stage, when the sabotage of
the means of communication must be carried out so as
to be easily reversible.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I was going to say on that regard one
of the interesting things in the NSDAP taking over authority
in Germany, and just because of my research currently, what
was brought about or what was brought to my attention
is Reinhard. Heydrich was known very much when he was
made head of political police that he largely kept in
charge the technical people, the skilled professional investigators. In those agencies,
he eliminated one or two major leaders, and he eliminated
any person he was thinking as being actively opposed to
the health and well being of the German state. Generally,
these are people who are closet undercover communists. But for
the most part, he co opted them because he said
most of these people, even when they were his political enemies,
were German patriots who really wanted the security of Germany.
So if he could actually co opt them, he ensured
that not only did they not become punished as enemies
of the new regime, but he actually gave them a
stake in the new regime, to the point that Hydrich's
inner circle largely consisted of men who didn't join the
SS until he made them joins.
Speaker 1: So the information campaign over the mass media will also
reach this narrow but important section of the population, but
it would be highly desirable to have more direct and
confidential means of communication with them. The general political aims
of the coup, as expressed in our pronouncements, on the
radio and television will help to package our tacit deal
with the bureaucrats and soldiers, but its real content will
be the assurance that their careers are not threatened. In
dealing with particular army or police officers who control especially
important forces, or with important bureaucrats, we may well decide
to go further in the sense that an actual exchange
of promises of mutual support may take place. We should, however,
remember that our main strength lives in the fact that
only we have a precise idea of the extent of
our power. It would be unwise to enter into agreements
that show we need support urgently. More generally, any information
that reveals the limits of our capabilities could threaten our position,
which is essentially based on the fact that our inherent
weakness is concealed. Again, as an gud.
Speaker 2: No I was going to say, like any clandestine event
or activity, just like war itself, the goal is to
know as much about your enemy as possible, while concealing
as much of the facts about your situation from the
enemy as possible.
Speaker 1: Again, as in the case of our incorporated forces, we
should make every effort to prevent communication between the cadres
of the armed forces and bureaucracy outside our group. Such
communication would usually be indispensable to those who may seek
to stage a counter coup. The ignorance of the extent
of the conspiracy will discourage such consultations. It is obviously
dangerous to ask somebody to participate in the opposition to
a group of which he is himself a member, But
we should also interfere with such consultations directly by using
our control of the transport and communications infrastructure. New heading
from power to authority, stabilizing the masses. The masses have
neither the weapons of the military nor the administrative facilities
of the bureaucracy, but their attitude to the new government
established after the coup will ultimately be decisive. Our immediate
aim will be to enforce public order, but our long
term objective is to gain the acceptance of the masses,
so that physical coercion will no longer be needed in
order to secure compliance with our orders. In both phases,
we shall use our control over the infrastructure and the
means of coercion, but as the coup recedes in time,
political means will become increasingly important, physical ones less, so
our first measures to be taken immediately after the active
phase of the coup will be designed to freeze the
situation by imposing physical immobility. A total curfew, the interruption
of all forms of public transport, the closing of all
public buildings and facilities, and the interruption of the telecommunication
service will prevent or at any rate impede active resistance
to us. Organized resistance will be very difficult because there
will be no way of inspiring and coordinating our potential opponents.
Unorganized resistance is on the part of a mob, will,
on the other hand, be prevented because the people who
might form such a mob would have to violate the
curfew while acting as individuals, and not many will do
this without the protective shelter of anonymity that only a
crowd can provide the impact of our physical measures will
be reduced outside the capital city, but to the extent
that the capital city is to focus on the national
network of transport and communications, both physical movement and the
flow of information will be impeded. The physical controls will
be purely negative and defensive in character, and our reliance
on them could be minimal because their concommitment commitments effect
is to enhance the importance of the armed forces we
have subverted. Our second and far more flexible instrument will
be our control over the means of mass communications. Their
importance will be particularly great because the flow of all
other information, notably social media via the Internet, will be
filtered or blocked by our controls. Moreover, the confused and
dramatic events of the coup will mean that the radio
and television services will have a particularly attentive and receptive audience.
In broadcasting over the radio and television services, our purpose
is not to provide information about the situation, but rather
to affect its development by exploiting our monopoly of those media.
In the context of filtered or blocked social media, we
will have two principal objectives in the information campaign that
will start immediately after the coup. To discourage resistance to
us by emphasizing the strength of our position, and to
dampen the fears that would otherwise give rise to such resistance.
Our first objective will be achieved by conveying the reality
and strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it.
This will be done by listing the controls we have imposed,
by emphasizing the law and order, that law and order
have been fully restored, and by stating that all resistance
has ceased. One of the major obstacles to active resistance
will be the fact that we have fragmented the opposition
so that each individual opponent would have to operate in isolation,
cut off from friends and associates. In these circumstances, the
news of any resistance against us would act as a
powerful stimulant to further resistance by breaking down this feeling
of isolation. We must make every effort, therefore, to withhold
such news. If there is in fact some resistance, and
if its intensity and locale are such as to make
it difficult to conceal from particular segments of the public,
we should admit its existence. But we should strongly emphasize
that it is isolated, the product of the obstinacy of
a few misguided or dishonest individuals who are not affiliated
with any party or group or significant membership.
Speaker 2: When you read that, it suddenly becomes clear why that
any kind of mass or any kind of local organizing
against any kind of central government bullshit, like the school
system in Northern Virginia when they were organizing against transactivists
who were, you know, raping their daughters or the stuff
that's currently going on in Io against Haitian migrants. There's
a reason why they first try to, you know, block
any kind of discussion of that and then portray it
in a completely different light. Is they're trying to, above
all else, making sure that people see themselves as eye isolated.
Speaker 1: Well also that and in the process there demonizing that
group exact people on the outside.
Speaker 2: Yeah. I mean, probably the biggest form of communication management,
information management of your enemies is trying to control and
dictate their morality.
Speaker 1: Yeah. There really is no better example right now going
on than what's going on in Springfield, Ohio. When I
was just reading this and I just passed this along
to a friend to try and get some information on it,
twenty four houses were sold last year. Three of them.
One was valued at eighteen thousand, another at twenty four thousand,
another forty eight thousand, And each of these twenty four houses,
including those three, were sold for one point six million
dollars apiece.
Speaker 2: Jesus.
Speaker 1: So, I'm at the point where I think even the
migrant situation is there to try to cover up something else.
It's helping, it's a part of it. This is all
a part of something. But apparently there is either some
insane money laundering going on there or you know, something else,
and that's what we're trying to figure out.
Speaker 2: This gets in the realm of conspiracy theory just because
we have no heart evidence, because again they're controlling what
we have access to. But one of the issues that's
been brought up the fact that we essentially we're not
going to have a collapse population wise, but we're going
to have a demographic crunch where you know, our native
population because of birth rates combined with aging, we're just
going to have a contraction in total population. Among other things,
one of the quickest things that affects is housing prices
real estate, both housing prices and commercial. Elon Musk has
pointed out that one of the biggest negative consequences in
terms of the establishment of COVID is suddenly all of
that commercial real estate that banks hold on their balance
sheet as assets is basically valueless or as negative value.
So the process of moving migrants in the US, No,
that doesn't do anything for commercial real estate, but it
can make you know, private real estate, residential real estate
increase in value just because you have you know, suddenly
an increased number of people demanding a product in a
market that has limited ability to grow, but so fast.
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, this is all a you know, when you
look at this, it's Yaki talked about that from his
study of history. It doesn't matter why, but whenever large
groups of foreigners are moved into an existing location that
has a high culture, the existing the existing population stops
their birth rates to climb. Yeahs like like something metaphysical.
Like it's like it's something metaphysical or there's something happening
there that basically causes that to happen. When people see
this influx and then all of a sudden they stop
having children.
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's an interesting point because that seems to hold
up for whatever reason. When we're done offline, I've got
a document for suggested next read that deals with this directly.
Speaker 1: Okay, cool, all right, let me let let's finish this.
We can. You and I are definitely you and I
are definitely the rabbit trail kind of people.
Speaker 2: Yes, all right.
Speaker 1: The constant working of the motif of isolation, the repetition
of long and detailed list of the administrative and physical
controls we have imposed, and the emphasis on the fact
that law and order have been re established, should have
to effect, should have the effect of making resistance appear
both dangerous and useless. Then he just goes through a
first communicate choice of styles romantic, lyrical, messianic, unprepared, rational, administrative.
It's just different kind of I guess this is different
kind of styles that you would use to communicate with
communicate with the people, to let them know what's going on,
and to seek to get their so you get them
on your side.
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's what it looks like. And again, all the
charts he has are worthwhile, but none of them are
really good for reading in this format. For listeners at home.
You can get this book for free any number of
places and just look at those.
Speaker 1: Yeah, if you're reading along with this one, make sure
to get the updated version. I believe it's twenty sixteen,
because a lot of this is not going to be
in the original version.
Speaker 2: Yeah, the Internet was not a big issue in the
nineteen sixties.
Speaker 1: Now he wouldn't have been talking about social media.
Speaker 2: Table five point two.
Speaker 1: Yep. The second objective of our information campaign will be
to reassure the general public by dispelling fears that the
coup is inspired by foreign and or extremist elements, and
to persuade particular groups that the coup is not a
threat to them. The first aim will be achieved by
manipulating national symbols and by asserting our belief in the
prevailing pieties. In the Arab world, the new regime will
announce its belief in the Arab identity and Islam. Where
the Bath Party was institutionalized, as in Syria, it would
have been necessary to assert our loyalty to the true Bath,
not the corrupted one of the deposed dictator. In Africa,
the new regime will announce its intention of fighting tribalism
at home and racialism abroad. In Latin America, we need
to secure social justice will be invoked everywhere in the
Third World. Nationalist nationalistic rhetoric will be used in references
made to the glorious people of X and the glorious
land of X, which the last regime has degraded. Above all,
repeated denunciations of neo and not so neo colonialism are degear.
Such denunciations will be particularly important where there are a
large where there is a large foreign business enterprise operating
in the country in question, The inevitable. Suspicions that the
coup is a product of the machinations of the company
can only be dispelled by making violent attacks on it. These,
being verbal and not unexpected, will pacify the public without
disturbing the business interests, and the attacks should be all
the more violent if these suspicions are in fact justified.
While the religious attitude leads to the praise of the
gods for one's successes and self blame for one's failures,
the nationalistic attitude is to attribute successes to the nation
and to blame foreigners for its failures. Similarly, the chants
in praise of the gods have been replaced by ritualized curses,
variously addressed to different groups of foreigners and their activities.
It's really odd that Litvok would be choosing foreigners as
the scapegoat, Isn't it just? There's nothing personal there right.
Speaker 2: A certain amount of projections going along.
Speaker 1: Thus, for the phrase the imperious the imperialist neo colonial
power block the Americans or I or the French, if
it is spoken by Africans of their former colonies. Similarly,
the phrase zionist oil monopolist plotters translates into Jews and Christians.
In the subconscious of the Muslim Arabs who make use of.
Speaker 2: It, it still continues to be true.
Speaker 1: How could you argue there may be a purely ideological
element in these denunciations. But even in the nineteen fifties,
when the American extreme right used to denounce the international
conspiracy of godless communism, it was it is significant that
they stigmatized it as un American rather than anti capitalists.
We shall make use of suitable selection of those unlovely phrases,
though their meaning has been totally obscured by constant and
deliberate misuse. They will be useful as indicators of our
impeccable nationalism, and if that is not in reality our position,
they will serve to obscure our retre policy aims. The
flow of information emanating from all the sources under our
control should be coordinated with our other measures. The impositions
of physical controls will be announced and explained, and the
political moves to which we now turn will be suitably presented.
Physical coercion will deter or defeat direct opposition, while the
information campaign will lay the basis of our eventual acquisition
of authority, but only political means will secure for us
a base of active support. Where the pre coup regime
was exceptionally brutal, corrupt, or retrograde, the leaders of the
coup will have little trouble in gaining a generalized form
of acceptance. Even then. However, the active support of specific
groups can only be gained by political accommodation, i e.
By sponsoring policies to serve the interests of particular groups,
thus giving them reasons for becoming committed to or at
least interested in our survival. In some Latin American countries,
for example, we could gain the support of the landless
peasants by announcing our intention of carrying out a program
of agrarian reform. In West Africa, we could announce our
intention of increasing the prices paid to peasant producers by
the cocoa marketing brand. In Greece and Turkey, where there
is a heavy burden of agrarian indebtedness, we could announce
a general cancellation of bank debts. Each of these policy
announcements will bind the interests of a large and politically
powerful group to our government, unless we are overtaken by
other rival announcements, but it will also lead to the
hostility of other groups whose interests are damaged by our
intended policies. In Latin America, where the peasants would be
benefit would benefit, the landlords would lose, and Africa, the
urban population would be the loser. In Greece, the taxpayer
would bear the burden of agricultural debt relief. Thus, the
backing of one interest group will generally have at its
com commit the loss of support of, or even actual
hostility from other groups. Clearly it will be that.
Speaker 2: Hence an effectively anti white American regime.
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's the backing of one interest group. We generally
have at its concommitment the loss of support of or
even hot Yeah.
Speaker 2: Yeah. And it's why that this continued process has been
part of this in the last couple of years has
been the intentional purging of anybody who is to the
right of essentially George W. Bush from the American military.
There hasn't been an organized purge, but they're intentionally sidelining
any kind of senior officers who would appear to have
that kind of orientation. It's a way of furthering, you know,
their security because they know that the American military is
historically a very right wing, at least informally cultural institution,
and they know they're largely opposed to that, so they're
trying to remove an opposing center of power.
Speaker 1: What about NCOs and down right, now.
Speaker 2: That becomes an issue. I don't really have a good
feeling on that. Keep in mind, seeing your n CEO
is like the certain major level basically go through the
same level of review as general officers. Keep in mind,
then different sub components of each service are very different. Increasingly,
the regular US Army is a full employment program for
black women.
Speaker 1: I will continue and just let that hang. Clearly, it
will be necessary to estimate the net political support that
a given policy announcement will degenerate. This will mean taking
into account not only the political significance of each group,
but also the immediacy of its political power. In the
context of a Latin American post coup situation, for example,
the goodwill of remote and disperse peasants will not help
us much against the immediate powerful opposition of bureaucratic and
military cadres. If on the other hand, our short term
position is strong, but we are threatened by the longer
term usurpation of power. On the part of our military allies.
Our objective will be to create a counterweight capable eventually
of becoming a source of direct strength a peasant's militia,
for example. Thus, whether we opt out for a left
policy of land reform and longer compassino support or for
our right policy a peasant repression and immediate landowner support
will depend on the balance between the strength of our
short and our long term positions. The almost mechanical elements
that are important in the special climate of the immediate
post coup period will distort the normal balance between the
political forces of the country concerned. If therefore our short
term position is not fragile, we should repress the agitation
of those forces that possess a disproportion of strength in
the short term and concentrate instead on cultivating the part
of those groups whose longer term strength is far greater.
An element in our strategy. After the coup is halfway
between the information and the political campaign. The problem of
legitimizing the coup. Clearly, the coup is by definition illegal,
but whether this illegality matters and whether it is possible
to counteract its effects will depend on the total political
environment of the country.
Speaker 2: In question reminder that the United States of America as
a product of two coups in a row, the secession
from the United Kingdom followed by the overthrower of the
Articles of Confederation for a constitution, which means, if you
win very often you can legitimate, legitimate what you've done,
and the fact that it was illegal, nobody's really going
to care about them.
Speaker 1: We have seen in chapter two that in much of
the world, except for the rule of law countries, the
legitimacy or lack of legitimacy of the government will not
matter greatly. For example, as of twenty fifteen, Italy is
ruled by Matteo Renzi's government, whose ministers included young and
attractive female parliamentarians of his own Partito Democratico, as well
as defectors from the Forsa Forza Italia party of Silvio Berlusconi,
who also promoted female parliamentarians so long as they were pretty,
and members of several minor parties, giving Renzi a total
of three hundred and ninety five seats out of six
thirty enough to rule, but all were elected along with
Renzi himself in twenty thirteen, when his party was headed
by Pierre Luigi Bersani, not Renzi. In fact, Renzi only
became the head of government by winning an internal party
primary and then cutting a deal with Berlusconi. Essentially, Italians
ended up being ruled by a politician whom they never
elected except as parliamentarian. But good, it.
Speaker 2: Sounds pretty you know, pretty appropriate, pretty much our situation
at the moment, since we're probably about seven percent chance
because of fortification. But I was just going to say
the fact he keeps harping on the fact they would
only let female parliamentarians in who are attractive, and that's
got to be some Israeli projection, just considering their successful
women politicians have not been.
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, you tell me. Gold in my ear wasn't
a looker.
Speaker 2: It speaks for itself.
Speaker 1: But this in itself generates oppositions to the young and
personal Wrenzi. First, what Renzi did as is allowed by
the constitutional system in place, even though it allows a
post electoral primary that leaves most Italians unrepresented. Besides, in Italy,
legality is in any case optional, especially in politics, with
contempt for the law much intensified by the transparently politicized
persecution prosecutions of Italian magistrates who openly consort in political
groupings of their own, notably the left wing Magia Democratica.
As far as we are concerned, Italy is definitely not
a rule of law country, and our illegitimacy will be
easily swallowed if all else is in place. They're never
going to forgive Titus are the.
Speaker 2: Oh well that but I was saying increasingly the United States.
Speaker 1: Yeah, oh yeah, so much of this right here. And
even when he goes up here, when he says, you know,
they are never elected and everything. I mean, that's just
the administrative state. It's just different here. It's much bigger
and much more spread out here. And yeah, I know
a lot of people have tried to describe our government
as being highly centralized, and I think it's just highly decentralized.
You have no idea who's in charge.
Speaker 2: Elements of it are yeah, even then right like a
formally hierarchy state. One of the things I've heard those
described as is polyarchies, where yeah, you have a central
authority figure who can overrule a lot of things. But
even if they have the effective ability to make an exception,
understand that human attention is finite, so they can only
focus energy on so many things at once, so huge
elements of a large bureaucratic state are going to be
effectively decentralized to a lower level, even if they're authoritarian,
just because that's the reality of you know, human concentration.
Speaker 1: One way of legitimizing the post to whop government has
already been mentioned in the discussion of the selection of
the personalities to be arrested the retention of the nominal
head of state where such a constitutional role exists, as
our own highly nominal head of state as well.
Speaker 2: Just to point out again, we know about monarchies most
of Western Europe as parliamentary states, the monarch's head of state,
but they're not head of government, and the amount of
authority varies from state to state, and you know, so
they're relatives. So we tend to think of as monarchs
as being powerless, even though very often they have more
power than they exercise on a daily basis, which is
why there could be borderline civil wars in the twentieth
century when they actually did what they were allowed to do.
But keep in mind a parliamentary state that's a republic,
you will have a president as head of state along
with the prime minister that's head of government. But in
most of those states, the president is a meaningless title
and usually it's where you put a retired politician who's
you know, lucid enough that he continued to receive you know,
state envoys and stuff and shake hands, but doesn't actually
have to do anything and is very often not allowed
to do anything on a routine basis.
Speaker 1: From what I understand, the system still allows for the
monarchy to dissolve the parliament the parliament at any time
and takes over it does.
Speaker 2: And well they're required with a X number of days
to actually call for an election and to also put
in a cabinet in the interim, so they don't get
to rule by personal rule for more than a couple
of weeks. But yes, they do have the authority. Was
it Margaret Thatcher, you know, famously everybody calls her, you know,
crazy because she asked Queen Elizabeth to do that. But
keep in mind, was it ten to twelve years before
that Elizabeth dissolved the parliament in Australia and calls for election.
So it's something that's happened, not in mine, in your lifetime,
definitely in the lifetime of our parents. And again it
depends from monarchy to monarchy, with some of these actually
having huge amounts of authority in the field, with the
military is concerned to believe it or not.
Speaker 1: In this way, the appearance of continuity will be made maintained,
and with it an appearance of legitimacy. Where the head
of state is not nominal as in presidential regimes, other
taxics will have to be used, the announcement of forthcoming
elections or a referendum as a sort of expost facto legitimization,
or alternatively, the coup can be openly admitted as an
extra constitutional intervention, but one made against an unconstitutional regime,
one actility.
Speaker 2: We have to eliminate in order to preserve democracy.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean that's basically what this is. I mean,
it's we've seen this. We if we haven't seen this action,
we've definitely seen this rhetoric in our lifetimes.
Speaker 2: I think we've seen everything except for the use of
armed force. So I don't think but that last step
of a coup we've seen defacto occur in our lifetimes.
Speaker 1: One illegality will then be represented as being the cause
of the other. But we shall declare that whereas the
illegality of the pre coup regime was voluntary and permanently,
ours is necessary and temporary techniques. Such techniques will be
of limited value in conducting the political processes required to
create a base of active support and to secure our authority,
because everything will depend on the specific political environment in
which we shall be operating. One particular problem, however, requires
further exploration recognition by foreign powers.
Speaker 2: Before we go too far. I was going to definitely
emphasize the idea that of a coup expressing itself as
necessary and temporary. Interestingly enough, in effective coups, very often,
that is the case. One of the things that's been
brought up about military governments. After following a military coup,
and a coup is effective, very often, one of the
first things the military sets about doing transfer doesn't happen
immediately is going back to some kind of civilian rule professionally,
some kind of semi democratic constitutional rule, because the act
of actually running a state on a day to day
basis where you have to take the best in the
brightest side of the military and put them in charge
of things like trash pick up and making sure that
you know the sanitation system works is it undermines and
degrades the ability of that military to fight because suddenly
all of its leadership is more consumed with things like,
you know, making the mail service run instead of preparing
for war in the future.
Speaker 1: All right, so the talking about the problem of recognition
my foreign powers, this is almost always important, but for
the poorest countries who pays real what is that? Are
you familiar with that terms? Real?
Speaker 2: I pays real. It's a French term. I can look
it up.
Speaker 1: No, it's this is let's see what we can do
it in context. This is almost always important, but for
the poorest countries whose pays reel lies outside their home borders,
it will be a crucial problem. I would assume, Uh, yeah,
let's look that up real quick.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I'm looking up now. Oh the real country was Okay,
that was the name of a newspaper. That was Maral's
newspaper also, but that's probably not what he's referring to.
Speaker 1: Trust real country, legal country.
Speaker 2: Conversely, oh, real country over the legal country. I would
have to look. I'm guessing it's the case of where
the cultural and ethnic and national ties are. Yeah, definition
of a you know, a community may not be co
terminous with the state, which is a huge issue at
least in the Western Europe, definitely huge issue in Africa
where certain ethnic groups like Swedes and Fans cross both borders.
So the question of you know, one of the issues
is you don't necessarily take control of a people when
you take control of their country, because you know a
huge portion of their population lives right across the border
and has effectively lived there forever.
Speaker 1: Right, Okay, gotcha. When much of the available disposable funds
come from foreign aid, both official and via non governmental organizations,
and when foreign cadres carry out vital administration, technical, and
sometimes even military functions, the maintenance of good relations with
the particular donor country or country's concerned may well be
a determining factor in our political survival after the coup.
Are they talking about Ukraine here?
Speaker 2: Twenty sixteen? He might be, but that would probably be
too early.
Speaker 3: Keep in mind, yeah, yeah, is living as a strategic
forecast are often in the service to the United States,
So he's not necessarily going to be that blunt about
American mistakes.
Speaker 1: Correct premature recognition by a foreign power, i e. Recognition granted,
while the old regime still retains some degree of control
is becoming regarded as a form of aggression in international law.
Beyond that, however, recognition is usually granted even to very
illegitimate governments after a polite interval, if there are convincing
assurances about their continuity in terms of foreign relations. These
assurances are conveyed simply and publicly by formal announcements stating
that membership and alliances and groupings will be maintained, that
foreign agreements and obligations will be respected, and that legitimate
foreign interest in the country concern will not be harmed. Thus,
the leaders of Ghana's well named National Liberation Council, formed
after the overthrow of the historic independence leader Nukuma Kruma,
announced that Ghana would retain her membership in the Commonwealth,
the Organization of African Unity, and the United Nations, and
would respect all obligations assumed by in Kruma's regime. Similarly,
Arab post coup regimes habitually announced that they will remain
in the Arab League, and Latin American regimes pledged to
remain members of the Organization of American States. Far more
important than these declarations is a considerable diplomatic activity that
will take place after the coup, and sometimes even before it.
The purpose of these diplomatic exchanges will be to clarify
the political situation, and nowadays to indicate or to dissemble
the ideological orientation of the planners of the coup. Most
countries of the world follow British diplomatic doctrine in granting
recognition to regimes on the basis of their effective control
of their territories, if only after a decent interval. At present,
the rapidly Islamist AKP government of Turkey opposes the overthrow
of Ejus Islamist government by the armed forces, fearing that
Turkey's armed forces might do the same, but does not
withhold recognition.
Speaker 2: Turkey is a history of overthrowing the military overthrowing their government.
Speaker 1: In any case, the doctrine of effective control is as
flexible as definitions of as definitions of control, so that
recognition can sometimes be flexible if the pre coup regime
retains even a tenuous hold over some part of the
national territory.
Speaker 2: I was gonna say sorry, yeah. One of the funny
examples of this is the Spanish Civil War. You know,
most of the world except the Franco regime as being
the legitimate government of Spain within a couple of years
of winning. But if you didn't, and the Communist Republicans
of Spain continue to maintain recognized embassies in foreign countries
like Mexico into I don't remember what it was. It
was like twenty or thirty years after that. I think
it was until the sixties in some places.
Speaker 1: How shocked I am that would have been Mexico. Yeah,
after the necessary exchanges of information and assurances, the new
government will usually be recognized. This will occur even if
its illegality as an embarrassment, as in the case of
the United States and Latin American coups, or if it's
ideological orientation it's distasteful, as in the Ghanian and Indonesian
coups were for the Soviet Union at the time. Prolonged
non recognition is a rarity. One example was the widespread
refusal to recognize Madagascar's hot authority de la Transition. I'm
assuming that's that's French, but my French pronunciation is just awful.
Speaker 2: The average persons Madagascar does not speak proper French.
Speaker 1: Anyways, which came to power and Madagascar didn't they dodge
a bullet, which time, oh yeah, in the nineteen forties
they dodgedable which came to power by force in two
thousand and nine and did not organize elections till the
end of twenty thirteen. It did, however, restore democratic role
in twenty fourteen. Diplomatic recognition is one of the elements
in the general process of establishing the authority of the
new government. Until this is achieved, we will have to
rely on the brittle instruments of physical coercion, and our
position will be vulnerable to many threats, including that of
another coup de ETAs.
Speaker 2: And that is it.
Speaker 1: And it's amazing how if a contry, if there's a
coupdeta in one country, how it's almost like by magic,
they would be very apt to have another one happen
and pretty soon.
Speaker 2: Yeah, and again that's part of the issue. Once you
break the seal, as it were, as soon as you
make it acceptable to have one, you've made it acceptable
to have another one. So that's again that's a huge
part of why legitimizing what you're doing afterwards just such
a go you know, such an important part. It also
goes further to explaining why in an effective military coup,
you know, they want to get out of the governant's
business when they can.
Speaker 1: M Well, I appreciate you recommending this and joining me
because I just there's a lot of books that I
can read that I have the I have the knowledge
and the backgrounds of comments upon. But the historical knowledge
that yourself and Darryl for one episode and Lafayette for
one episode brought, but you for all the other episodes,
I think it's invaluable.
Speaker 2: Batch and Dark Enlightenment as well.
Speaker 1: Oh a Saan batchans Dark Enlightenment. Yeah. Yeah, through that episode,
I had a lot of people reach out wanting to
recognizing what was happening and wanted to say hi, just
and that's cool say that you know they appreciate you,
appreciate you, each one of you individually.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I appreciate it. And like I said in the beginning,
I mean, part of it's just the the fact is
it disabled veteran that they kept paying for college so
I kept going, especially since very often they paid me
more money and my day, you know, as a stipend
than what I would make my daily pay. So I'm
glad somebody is getting some value out of my higher education.
Speaker 1: All right, Well, I appreciate it, and I'll have you
back on real soon to do this again. Sounds good
to have you back on soon. Have you back on
soon to do something other than a reading, Let's talk
about Yeah, let's have you back on and talk about
some some real stuff.
Speaker 2: Yeah. I probably have to talk to Thomas and see
how much we can go down rabbit holes at some point.
Speaker 1: All right, John, appreciate it, Thank you anytime, Bro,