Speaker 1: Okay, you know that feeling you're staring at this mountain
Speaker 1: of articles, research papers, all this stuff about cybersecurity threats
Speaker 1: and you just wish someone could cut straight to the
Speaker 1: important bits. Well, consider that wish granted. Today we're basically
Speaker 1: giving you that shortcut. We want you to really understand
Speaker 1: how the leading experts are detecting, deterring, and responding to
Speaker 1: security threats, but without grounding you and all the jargon.
Speaker 2: That's absolutely our mission for this deep dive. We've poured
Speaker 2: through a pretty comprehensive guide from some of the field's
Speaker 2: leading experts, and it's packed with insights everything from incident
Speaker 2: response fundamentals right up to advanced threat hunting. What really
Speaker 2: jumps out, I think is how they demystify these really
Speaker 2: complex challenges, break them down into actionable steps exactly.
Speaker 1: So our goal today is to pull out the most
Speaker 1: important nuggets of knowledge, give you a clear, structured understanding
Speaker 1: of what's really cutting edge in cybersecurity right now. So,
Speaker 1: whether you're prepping for a meeting, just catching up on
Speaker 1: the latest, or maybe you're just you know, super curious
Speaker 1: about what keeps our digital world safe, let's dive in
Speaker 1: to really build a strong defense. It really helps to
Speaker 1: understand how the attacker thinks.
Speaker 2: Oh absolutely, So.
Speaker 1: We're going to kick things off by looking at their playbook.
Speaker 2: Okay. And you know, while a lot of people see
Speaker 2: these cyber attacks and think they seem uniquely sophisticated each time,
Speaker 2: security researchers have actually uncovered pretty consistent patterns over time,
Speaker 2: which kind of makes you wonder, is there like a
Speaker 2: standard method, a universal way to analyze and detect these threats.
Speaker 1: As it turns out, yes, there absolutely is. We'll start
Speaker 1: with a really foundational concept developed by Lockheed Martin. It's
Speaker 1: called the cyber kill chain.
Speaker 2: Ah, the kill chain, Yeah, yeah.
Speaker 1: I think of it as the seven distinct phases, like
Speaker 1: stages of a targeted attack. But the real brilliance here
Speaker 1: isn't just seeing the attacker steps. It's realizing that every
Speaker 1: single one of those stages gives defenders a chance, you know,
Speaker 1: a distinct opportunity to interrupt them, even if you miss
Speaker 1: something earlier.
Speaker 2: That's a great point. Okay, let's walk through these phases. Then.
Speaker 2: First up is reconnaissance. This is where the attacker is
Speaker 2: just gathering information about a.
Speaker 1: Target system, right, intel gathering.
Speaker 2: Exactly, harvesting email addresses, maybe identifying employees on social media,
Speaker 2: that kind of thing. Your defense here involves, say collecting
Speaker 2: website visitor logs or educating employees about social media danger.
Speaker 1: Okay, So gathering intel, got it.
Speaker 2: Then comes weaponization. So here the intruder actually creates tailored malware,
Speaker 2: like a virus or a worm, maybe designed for specific
Speaker 2: vulnerabilities they found back in the reconfduce.
Speaker 1: Ah, okay, And on.
Speaker 2: The defender side, you need to be analyzing this malware,
Speaker 2: understanding how it's built, maybe tracking newly registered malicious domains.
Speaker 1: Right, building the actual weapon okay, and then they have
Speaker 1: to get it to you somehow precisely.
Speaker 2: That's the delivery phase. This could be you know, the
Speaker 2: classic malicious email attachment, maybe a compromised USB sticks someone
Speaker 2: plugs in. Oh yeah, social media interactions, or even what
Speaker 2: they call a watering hole website right.
Speaker 1: Where they compromise a site they know you visit often exactly.
Speaker 2: So as a defender, your job is blocking those common
Speaker 2: threat vectors, collecting email and weblogs so you can reconstruct
Speaker 2: what happened later if you need to.
Speaker 1: Okay. So after delivery, it's all about actually getting in.
Speaker 2: That's exploitation. The malware triggers it exploits a vulnerability to
Speaker 2: gain access. This is often where you might first feel
Speaker 2: something's wrong, you know, an anomaly. Defenses here include user
Speaker 2: awareness training, physical security scanning for vulnerabilities. Hardening your end
Speaker 2: points makes sense once they're in. The next step is installation.
Speaker 2: This is where the malware establishes a persistent access point,
Speaker 2: like setting.
Speaker 1: Up a backdoor ah, so they can come back easily right.
Speaker 2: Defenders use things like host intrusion prevention or detection systems
Speaker 2: hips or hids to get alerts on say common installation
Speaker 2: being used or abnormal files being created, and.
Speaker 1: Then they basically take control.
Speaker 2: That's command and control or C two. The attacker gets
Speaker 2: persistent hands on the keyboard access to your network. They
Speaker 2: often use common channels like web, DNS or email protocols
Speaker 2: for this.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 2: Defenders work to discover the C two infrastructure, maybe through
Speaker 2: malware analysis, and they harden the network using things like
Speaker 2: proxies or dnsing colling that basically redirects the bad traffic
Speaker 2: ut you and finally you have action on objectives.
Speaker 1: This is the endgame, the whole reason they did all this.
Speaker 2: Exactly, collecting user credentials, escalating their privileges, moving laterally across
Speaker 2: the network, exfiltrating data or sometimes even just destroying systems.
Speaker 2: And here your incident response playbook. Having restricted admin policies
Speaker 2: and media analyst response are absolutely critical.
Speaker 1: It's a really comprehensive framework. But even with all these
Speaker 1: steps laid out, actually implementing the cyber kil chain for
Speaker 1: a security operations center at SC, well it can be quite.
Speaker 2: A beast, right absolutely. And that's actually where something called
Speaker 2: the Unified cyber kill Chain or UCKC comes in.
Speaker 1: Okay, UCKC, how's that different?
Speaker 2: Well, unlike the basic CPC, which primarily focuses on successful
Speaker 2: external attacks, the UCKC provides a much more granular analysis.
Speaker 2: It covers not just attacks from outsiders, but also insider threats,
Speaker 2: and it details how an attacker maintains presence and plans
Speaker 2: for you know, even larger, more complex attacks down the line.
Speaker 1: So it adds more detail, like extra phases.
Speaker 2: Yeah, exactly, it adds critical phases like defense, evasion, persistence, pivoting,
Speaker 2: and lateral movement. So to give you a concrete example,
Speaker 2: think about a ransomware attack. Okay, the UCPC would map
Speaker 2: out every single step it starts with target reconnaissance, maybe
Speaker 2: collecting email info, then target exploitation a user opens a
Speaker 2: macro enabled file boom infection. Weaponization is when that malicious
Speaker 2: file connects to a C two server to download the
Speaker 2: actual ransomware. Then installation. It auto installs, then execution the
Speaker 2: files get encrypted.
Speaker 1: The part everyone dreads, right, But.
Speaker 2: The UCKC goes deeper. It details target recon internally as
Speaker 2: the ransomware scans the network, then internal exploitation as it
Speaker 2: exploits other systems. It finds privilege escalation, getting higher permissions,
Speaker 2: lateral movement, maintaining persistence by say, registering with startup programs,
Speaker 2: and finally target manipulation, encrypting and maybe sending valuable data out.
Speaker 2: It really paints that complete picture, the whole continuity of
Speaker 2: the attack.
Speaker 1: Wow. Okay, so beyond just reacting when something happens, the
Speaker 1: experts really lean into something called threat hunting. Right. This
Speaker 1: isn't just waiting for an alert. It sounds more aggressive, proactive.
Speaker 2: Proactive is a great word for it. They describe threat
Speaker 2: hunting as both a science and an art form. And
Speaker 2: what's truly critical is how human centric it is. You
Speaker 2: really need to immerse your hunters and what your company's
Speaker 2: normal environment looks like. Train them thoroughly, give them clearer
Speaker 2: guidelines on what they should focus on, and crucial you
Speaker 2: want to cultivate these skills from within your own sc Okay, that.
Speaker 1: Begs the question, then, what actually makes someone an effective
Speaker 1: threat hunter?
Speaker 2: That's a good question.
Speaker 1: From what I've read, it sounds like it's about critical thinking, right,
Speaker 1: and learning from everything, even the false positive, like maybe
Speaker 1: you spend hours chasing a weird redirect only to find
Speaker 1: out it's just an ad Exactly.
Speaker 2: That experience is valuable, even if it feels frustrating at
Speaker 2: the time. Effective hunters also stay hyper informed on the
Speaker 2: latest threats, and they often mix different styles. There's open hunting,
Speaker 2: sort of casting a large net with broad search terms
Speaker 2: looking for threats that might have been ignored, okay, and
Speaker 2: then there's targeted hunting, where you're using specific indicators of
Speaker 2: compromise or IOCs that you might have received from intelligence feeds. Right.
Speaker 1: So different approaches for different situations.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, but no matter the style, you should always approach
Speaker 2: it with a plan and a clear hypothesis. For instance,
Speaker 2: you might think, okay, if a trojan were to infect
Speaker 2: this machine, it would probably need exploit. Let me look
Speaker 2: for signs of say CVE twenty eighteen four eight seven
Speaker 2: eight by checking downloaded dot SWF files. That kind of
Speaker 2: focus thinking saves a ton of valuable time.
Speaker 1: Makes sense, And underlying all of this, I guess, are
Speaker 1: thoughtful policies like mandatory training, getting hunters to work closely
Speaker 1: with other IT folks, and having clear rules for escalating
Speaker 1: things and reporting.
Speaker 2: Findings precisely so when you put it all together, threat
Speaker 2: hunting isn't just an add on. It's a vital complement
Speaker 2: to your SoC and your automated security tools. But it
Speaker 2: really requires intentional team building, dedicated training, and those empowering
Speaker 2: policies to make it work well.
Speaker 1: All right, So, if that's the attacker's playbook, the kill chain,
Speaker 1: what about the digital breadcrumbs they inevitably leave behind once
Speaker 1: they found a way in. That's where digital forensics comes in, right,
Speaker 1: finding those traces exactly.
Speaker 2: We're talking about digging into the digital footprints.
Speaker 1: Okay, let's get into the nitty gritty then.
Speaker 2: Well, a key place to start is Windows event logs.
Speaker 2: These are absolutely essential artifacts for identifying compromise systems.
Speaker 1: Right, those logs that record everything pretty much.
Speaker 2: The Windows OS logs events based on categories Applications, system
Speaker 2: security are the main ones, and these logs record everything
Speaker 2: from errors and warnings to simple information successes failures. It
Speaker 2: helps you classify how severe an event might be.
Speaker 1: Okay, so how do we actually turn these, you know,
Speaker 1: potentially millions of log entries into actionable intelligence for hunting.
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's the challenge. But what's truly illuminating is how
Speaker 2: these Windows event logs capture steps that are really common
Speaker 2: to advanced persistent threats apts, like the steps in the
Speaker 2: kill chain very similar. Yeah, initial compromise, maintaining presence, escalating privileges,
Speaker 2: internal recon lateral movement, and finally mission completion. By correlating
Speaker 2: various event IDs, these numerical codes Windows as signs, you
Speaker 2: can piece together that entire attack narrative.
Speaker 1: Okay, give me an example for that initial conpromise.
Speaker 2: Sure, event ID four six eight eight logs and new
Speaker 2: process creation. Now you don't need to memorize the number
Speaker 2: four six eight eight, but you need to understand that
Speaker 2: this specific event is like the attacker's unavoidable digital fingerprint.
Speaker 2: It happens every time they run something new. So looking
Speaker 2: for unusual process names or paths in these forty six
Speaker 2: and eight events can help detect that initial breach. Similarly,
Speaker 2: there are event IDs related to object auditing, like four
Speaker 2: to six sixty three, which tracks object access. These can
Speaker 2: help identify malware being dropped or changed to the registry.
Speaker 2: And you know, be wary of attacks on applications seeing
Speaker 2: event IDs like one thousand and two, which is an
Speaker 2: application hangar crash, or even one thousand, the dreaded blue
Speaker 2: screen of death. These could indicate things like buffer overflow attacks.
Speaker 2: Even just a malicious application installation will leave traces, maybe
Speaker 2: like event ID one oh three three.
Speaker 1: So it's not just that something happened, but the type
Speaker 1: of event gives you clues about.
Speaker 2: What happened exactly. And for maintaining access and lateral movement,
Speaker 2: attackers often use things like scheduled tasks, or they install
Speaker 2: themselves as services to persist.
Speaker 1: Right, so they stick around yep.
Speaker 2: So if you suddenly see a service terminate unexpectedly, that's
Speaker 2: event ID seven zero three four, or a brand new
Speaker 2: service gets installed, that's a huge red flag.
Speaker 1: Absolutely, those would definitely stick out.
Speaker 2: Account usage is another gold mine. We all know about
Speaker 2: event ID four six twenty four for successful logans and
Speaker 2: four to six to twenty five for failed logans. Those
Speaker 2: are foundational, sure, but you also want to look for
Speaker 2: things like four to six seventy two, which is special
Speaker 2: privileges assigned to new logan or account lockouts, maybe a
Speaker 2: NID five thirty nine. What's particularly insightful, though, is the
Speaker 2: logan type field within these logan events.
Speaker 1: Logan type what does that tell you?
Speaker 2: It tells you how the logan happened. For example, a
Speaker 2: type three is a network logan like accessing a file share,
Speaker 2: a type ten is a remote RDP logan someone connecting remotely,
Speaker 2: and a type four is a batch slogan often used
Speaker 2: by scheduled tasks.
Speaker 1: Wow, that's powerful. So you can see the actual method
Speaker 1: of entry, not just that.
Speaker 2: Someone got in precisely. It gives you much more context
Speaker 2: network share usage. Event ID fifty one forty can show
Speaker 2: attackers mounting file shares to move move laterally. And finally,
Speaker 2: attackers often attempt covering tracks. They try to clear the logs.
Speaker 1: Ah they're bracing their footprints exactly.
Speaker 2: Event ID eleven oh two is for clearing the security
Speaker 2: log one oh four for the application log Seeing those
Speaker 2: as highly suspicious. And that's exactly why forwarding your logs
Speaker 2: to a central simim a security information and event management
Speaker 2: system is so crucial.
Speaker 1: Because the logs are already off the compromised machine.
Speaker 2: Right, it makes covering tracks much much harder for them.
Speaker 1: It really sounds like Windows event logs if you know
Speaker 1: how to read them, let threadhunters track and attackers every
Speaker 1: single move. It offers some hope in a battle that
Speaker 1: often seems kind of stacked against the defenders.
Speaker 2: It definitely does. And you know, something that's often overlooked
Speaker 2: is how attackers frequently leverage legitimate tools that are already
Speaker 2: present in your environment. PowerShell is a prime example.
Speaker 1: PowerShell. Yeah, it's incredibly powerful for administrators.
Speaker 2: Equally so for adversaries.
Speaker 1: Right.
Speaker 2: They use it for data exfiltration, privileged escalation, lateral movement,
Speaker 2: all that stuff.
Speaker 1: That's the paradox of PowerShell, isn't it. It's supposed to
Speaker 1: be there. It's powerful, it's legitimate, but it's also a
Speaker 1: prime tool for attackers. So how do defenders possibly untangle
Speaker 1: with malicious use from just routine admin activity that seems
Speaker 1: like it would generate constant false positives.
Speaker 2: It's definitely tricky. Yeah, but the guide points out some
Speaker 2: key tells, some giveaways. Attackers often have to bypass PowerShell's
Speaker 2: execution policies, those things designed to prevent accidental script execution.
Speaker 1: Okay, how do they do that? Well?
Speaker 2: They might pipe scripts directly into the PowerShell executable itself,
Speaker 2: or use a Base sixty four encoded command to hide
Speaker 2: the actual code, or simply pass the execution policy bypass
Speaker 2: argument when they run it. Sneaky, very and in most
Speaker 2: malicious cases, these PowerShell scripts are just acting as downloaders
Speaker 2: for additional payloads. They often use arguments like monarch no
Speaker 2: P which means no profile, or enw hidden to hide
Speaker 2: the window, or ENSDN for that encoded command we mentioned.
Speaker 2: These are all about stealth, trying to fly under the radar.
Speaker 1: Okay, So what are some of the key command line
Speaker 1: functions or bits of code that if you see them
Speaker 1: in a PowerShell command should instantly raise a red flag?
Speaker 2: Right? The guide highlights some common ones used in malicious scripts,
Speaker 2: things like newobjectsystem, dot net, dot web client, download string,
Speaker 2: or maybe download file.
Speaker 1: Okay, so commands for downloading things exactly.
Speaker 2: These download content from remote locations, sometimes directly into memory
Speaker 2: to avoid touching the disc They also frequently use commands
Speaker 2: like invoke expression or start process to actually run that
Speaker 2: downloaded code.
Speaker 1: And to hunt for these kinds of activities, you need
Speaker 1: specific data sources, right, It's not just the command line
Speaker 1: itself exactly.
Speaker 2: PowerShell itself can actually log highly relevant details. There are
Speaker 2: three main mechanisms defenders should know about. First, there's module logging.
Speaker 2: This gives you a sort of high level audit trail
Speaker 2: of PowerShell activity showing which commands were executed. The experts
Speaker 2: generally recommend enabling it for all modules using a wildcard
Speaker 2: got it us. Second is script block logging. This one
Speaker 2: is much more for a BOSE. It gives you more context,
Speaker 2: includes the actual script block content, especially when functions are invoked.
Speaker 2: It's highly recommended to turn this on too, although you
Speaker 2: might need to customize it if it generates, you know,
Speaker 2: too much data for your environment.
Speaker 1: Tide the balance and the third.
Speaker 2: The third is PowerShell transcription. This offers a full log
Speaker 2: of basically all input and output, like a transcript of
Speaker 2: the session. It stores these transcript files on the file system.
Speaker 2: Because these files can contain sensitive information, This is typically
Speaker 2: reserved for high security environments where you can really lock
Speaker 2: down access to those transcript files.
Speaker 1: Okay, so module logging, script block logging, and transcription. Yeah,
Speaker 1: but beyond those internal powershow logs, you can also look
Speaker 1: at network data sources, right like NetFlow packet captures.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, NetFlow full packet captures, PC copies, proxy logs, firewall logs.
Speaker 2: They all provide valuable context. For example, if you see
Speaker 2: powershells suddenly making unusual web request out to the Internet,
Speaker 2: that would be weird, yeah, or worse, if you see
Speaker 2: it uploading data via HTTP, that's a major red flag.
Speaker 2: While attackers can change things like user agent strings to
Speaker 2: try and blend in doing a frequency analyssis of HTTP
Speaker 2: pot methods, which are often used for uploading entire files,
Speaker 2: can be a really strong indicator of data ex filtration.
Speaker 1: Okay, that makes sense. So we've talked quite a bit
Speaker 1: about the attacks themselves and the digital breadcrumbs they leave. Yeah,
Speaker 1: but who are the actual people on the front lines,
Speaker 1: you know, doing this complex work of defending our digital landscape.
Speaker 2: Yeah, the human element is critical, and it's fascinating to
Speaker 2: see the sheer variety of incident response teams out there.
Speaker 2: You hear terms like c SERTs computer Security Incident Response
Speaker 2: teams psrts for product security incident response teams focusing on
Speaker 2: vulnerabilities in a company's own products, and even national CERTs
Speaker 2: like us SERT here in the States.
Speaker 1: Lots of different flavors, definitely.
Speaker 2: And establishing a c SERT is a major undertaking for
Speaker 2: any organization. You have to define its constituency, who does
Speaker 2: it serve. You need management, buy in budget. Of course,
Speaker 2: you have to decide where it fits in the org
Speaker 2: chart and develop crystal clear processes for everything.
Speaker 1: To give FLIKS a practical example, the guide shares how
Speaker 1: one medium sized software as a service company structures its response.
Speaker 1: They actually have two distinct groups. First, there's the Incident
Speaker 1: Response Team or IRT. Oh, this is the dedicated internal staff.
Speaker 1: They're really on the front lines, reviewing alerts from the
Speaker 1: SIM from their managed security service provider, validating endpoint alerts,
Speaker 1: doing that threat hunting we talked about, and managing the
Speaker 1: whole incident triosh and post mortem process.
Speaker 2: Right the day to day defenders exactly.
Speaker 1: But then complementing them is this security Incident Response team.
Speaker 2: Or cerch okayc circ part. How's that different? This team
Speaker 2: steps in for what they call executive declared security incidents,
Speaker 2: So the bigger stuff. They provide the management direction during
Speaker 2: a major crisis, and crucially they manage all the external communitys,
Speaker 2: talking to investors, dealing with law enforcement, that kind of thing.
Speaker 2: This team operates two four seven on call, and it
Speaker 2: includes cross functional leaders like the Chief Information Officer, maybe
Speaker 2: the Corporate Privacy.
Speaker 1: Council ah okay. So IRT handles the Technical Response CERT
Speaker 1: handles the management and communication for major incidents pretty much. Yeah.
Speaker 1: That makes me wonder though, how do these distinct teams
Speaker 1: coordinate effectively, especially during really high stress, rapidly evolving situations.
Speaker 2: That's a critical question absolutely. The experts in the guide
Speaker 2: highlight adapting something called the Incident Command System or ICs.
Speaker 1: Isn't it used for like firefighters and emergency management exactly?
Speaker 2: It's a proven system developed originally by the US Office
Speaker 2: of Emergency Management for managing everything from forest fires to
Speaker 2: you know, major disaster incidents. The idea is it overlays
Speaker 2: functional watch rolls like command, operations, planning intelligence onto the situation.
Speaker 2: This allows for really clear responsibilities, regardless of who reports
Speaker 2: to whom in their normal day job. It's all about
Speaker 2: clarity under pressure.
Speaker 1: Interesting applying that emergency response model to.
Speaker 2: Cyber Yeah, now shifting here is a bit. Let's connect
Speaker 2: this to the bigger picture of industrial control systems or ICs.
Speaker 1: Right, the systems that run power plants, water treatment, manufacturing
Speaker 1: really critical stuff.
Speaker 2: Absolutely critical, and historically the resources dedicated to their cyber
Speaker 2: defense lags significantly behind standard IT systems.
Speaker 1: Why was that?
Speaker 2: It's largely because IT traditionally prioritizes the CIA triad confidentiality,
Speaker 2: integrity and availability of data, whereas ICs prioritizes SRP operational safety, reliability,
Speaker 2: and productivity. The people running ICs are understandably inherently conservative.
Speaker 2: They resist any change that might jeopardize safety or interrupt
Speaker 2: the physical process.
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's easy to see why they be cautious. I mean,
Speaker 1: an active vulnerability scan, which is totally standard practice in
Speaker 1: it could literally cause an ICs operation to fail, maybe
Speaker 1: even result in severe physical damage, your injury.
Speaker 2: Indeed, and for years, some ICs managers operated under this
Speaker 2: well illusion that their systems were air gapped, totally isolated
Speaker 2: from other networks and therefore safe the air gap myth exactly.
Speaker 2: But the stocks net attag back in twenty ten really
Speaker 2: shattered that notion. It definitively proved that sophisticated malware could
Speaker 2: penetrate even supposedly isolated networks, often via things like infected
Speaker 2: USB drives. This whole incident led to a much greater
Speaker 2: push for connecting ICs and IT systems more securely, and
Speaker 2: with that the evolution of vital standards like an ERRCCIP,
Speaker 2: especially for the power grid and IEC six x two
Speaker 2: four four three, which is more general.
Speaker 1: So, given that unique environment and the high stakes, how
Speaker 1: do we actually go about protecting these vital systems effectively?
Speaker 1: What does the guide suggest?
Speaker 2: It really demands a threefold approach. First, comprehensive cyberrisk awareness
Speaker 2: training for all employees, not just IT. Second, clear procedures
Speaker 2: and policies specifically for the secured integration of IT and
Speaker 2: ICs networks. And third, deploying security technologies that are specifically
Speaker 2: adapted for ICs environments, making absolutely sure they don't introduce
Speaker 2: new safety risks themselves.
Speaker 1: So no one size fits all.
Speaker 2: Solutions, definitely not. It's about integrating a comprehensive set of
Speaker 2: measures that respects their unique operational requirements. Safety first always.
Speaker 1: Okay, that makes me ask can traditional intrusion prevention systems
Speaker 1: you know IPS be safely used in these ICs environments.
Speaker 1: The guide seem pretty farm on this.
Speaker 2: Yeah, generally the answer is a resounding and o.
Speaker 1: Right.
Speaker 2: Deploying a traditional IPS, which might automatically block traffic it
Speaker 2: deems malicious, can potentially cause more severe harm to the
Speaker 2: ICs process than the intrusion itself. It might interfere with
Speaker 2: critical control signals and cause physical damage.
Speaker 1: So usually hands off. Is there any exception?
Speaker 2: The clear exception mention is if an attack is extremely
Speaker 2: severe and poses an immediate credible risk to human life.
Speaker 2: In that scenario, taking automated action to stop the process,
Speaker 2: even if it causes damage, might be necessary to save lives.
Speaker 2: That's the paramount concern understood.
Speaker 1: Okay, let's not look forward to it. How is cutting
Speaker 1: edge technology transforming this fight against cyber threats? Let's get
Speaker 1: into artificial intelligence.
Speaker 2: Yeah, we're certainly in a well a new wave of
Speaker 2: technological advancement with artificial intelligence AI. And AI is much
Speaker 2: more than just simple if then statements right. It has
Speaker 2: this remarkable ability to learn and improve over time, sort
Speaker 2: of mimicking human intelligence in some ways.
Speaker 1: We've definitely seen its capabilities expand dramatically. IBM's Deep Blue
Speaker 1: beating Gary kasprov and Jess back in the day right,
Speaker 1: and more recently, Google deep Mind's AlphaGo conquering go, a
Speaker 1: game way more complex than chess.
Speaker 2: Exactly. Those are milestones.
Speaker 1: But as powerful as that sounds, it also brings up
Speaker 1: that ongoing debate, doesn't it. How real are those warnings
Speaker 1: from people like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk about AI
Speaker 1: potentially becoming too smart for our own good? Is that
Speaker 1: something cybersecurity folks worry about? Now?
Speaker 2: Well, those are definitely important long term maybe even existential
Speaker 2: considerations for society as a whole. But in cybersecurity today
Speaker 2: the focus is much more practical. We're mainly leveraging machine
Speaker 2: learning or mL, which is a specific approach within AI,
Speaker 2: and that is already a game changer for defense.
Speaker 1: Okay, so machine learning a subset of AI. How does
Speaker 1: that work in practice?
Speaker 2: So machine learning algorithms learn from data and examples. We
Speaker 2: typically categorize them into different models. One type is supervised learning. Okay,
Speaker 2: This is why you have both input data and the
Speaker 2: desired output data already labeled. The model learns to map
Speaker 2: the input to the output. Think of it like explicitly
Speaker 2: teaching an algorithm exactly what a needle looks like so
Speaker 2: it can find it in a haystack.
Speaker 1: Got it labeled examples? What's the other type?
Speaker 2: The other main type, especially useful in INFOSEC is unsupervised learning.
Speaker 2: This is particularly powerful for anomaly of detection. Here you
Speaker 2: don't have predefined outputs or labels. Instead, the algorithm just
Speaker 2: sifts through all the data you give it. It starts
Speaker 2: grouping similar items together. It finds the sharp objects in
Speaker 2: the haystack, even if it doesn't initially know they're called needles.
Speaker 1: Ah, So it finds things that stand out as different exactly.
Speaker 2: Then the human analyst reviews these clusters or anomalies classifies them. Yes,
Speaker 2: this is suspicious, No, this is benign, and the algorithm
Speaker 2: learns from that feedback, continuously refining its understanding of what's
Speaker 2: normal and what's not.
Speaker 1: That needle in a haystack analogy really works well. It
Speaker 1: illustrates how machine learning isn't just about finding threats you
Speaker 1: already know how to define, but potentially discovering completely unknown
Speaker 1: novel attacks precisely. And what's even better, it sounds like
Speaker 1: this often doesn't require buying entirely new exotic tools. You
Speaker 1: can often leverage data sources you already have right, like
Speaker 1: logs from firewalls, act directory proxies DNS exactly right.
Speaker 2: You feed that existing data into the mL models. It
Speaker 2: allows you to move beyond just traditional signature based detections,
Speaker 2: which can only find known threats. mL identifies subtle patterns, anomalies,
Speaker 2: des from baseline behavior, and it continuously learns from analysts
Speaker 2: feedback over time.
Speaker 1: So how widespread is this now?
Speaker 2: It's still relatively new in terms of widespread adoption, but
Speaker 2: it's growing fast. A recent SANDS survey, for instance, showed
Speaker 2: that over a third of respondents are already using data
Speaker 2: science techniques, including machine learning, specifically for threat hunting. It's
Speaker 2: definitely a major growth area.
Speaker 1: Okay, so while all this innovation is driving new defenses,
Speaker 1: we also need some kind of foundational structure, right. This
Speaker 1: deep dive wouldn't really be complete without touching on the
Speaker 1: role of compliance frameworks.
Speaker 2: Absolutely, compliance framework they really set the foundation for an
Speaker 2: organization's security processes and controls. They're crucial.
Speaker 1: How so what do they actually do for a company?
Speaker 2: Well, they help companies meet legal and regulatory requirements obviously,
Speaker 2: but beyond that, they help improve the overall security posture.
Speaker 2: They provide clear audit trails which are essential after an incident,
Speaker 2: and they help systematically identify and manage risk.
Speaker 1: And there are tons of them right depending on the
Speaker 1: industry or reach.
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, loads, You've got GDPR for data privacy in Europe,
Speaker 2: PCI DSS for anyone handling credit cards, Hi Thai for
Speaker 2: healthcare in the US, and or ic CIP for energy.
Speaker 2: The list goes on.
Speaker 1: But what's critical is that while they vary widely in
Speaker 1: their specifics, they all share a common thread the absolute
Speaker 1: need for regular auditing of internal controls.
Speaker 2: So it's not just about having the right policies written
Speaker 2: down somewhere in a binder. It's about consistently following those
Speaker 2: policies and procedures and then having external parties come in
Speaker 2: and verify that you actually are doing what you say
Speaker 2: you're doing precisely.
Speaker 1: They serve as a vital guiding rail ensuring a structured,
Speaker 1: consistent and audible approach to maintaining a strong security posture. Okay,
Speaker 1: so finally we've covered prevention with things like the kill
Speaker 1: chain detection using logs and threadhunting, but let's be honest,
Speaker 1: sometimes a breach still occurs. What happens then those are
Speaker 1: the digital forensics professional steps.
Speaker 2: In right Absolutely when prevention and detection fail or when
Speaker 2: you need to understand exactly what happened after the fact.
Speaker 2: That's the realm of the forensic computer analyst.
Speaker 1: And what exactly do they do?
Speaker 2: Their core job is to extract behavioral evidence in other
Speaker 2: forms of data from it infrastructure, computers, servers, networks, mobile devices.
Speaker 2: It's a field built on the principle that digital hardware, software,
Speaker 2: and communications invariably leave breadcrumbs everywhere, traces of activity exactly.
Speaker 2: And what's truly interesting from a career perspective is that
Speaker 2: demand for this role is incredibly high rate. Now, the
Speaker 2: guide mentioned that even junior to mid level analysts can
Speaker 2: earn well over one hundred thousand dollars.
Speaker 1: Wow, that's a great salary. Yeah, So what does a
Speaker 1: typical day look like for them? What are the core
Speaker 1: responsibilities beyond just technical recovery.
Speaker 2: Well, a crucial responsibility, maybe even the most crucial, is
Speaker 2: understanding the basics of investigation and the law. Any evidence
Speaker 2: they collect that might end up in civil or criminal
Speaker 2: litigation must be forensically sound.
Speaker 1: Forensically sound What does that mean?
Speaker 2: It means the evidence hid's collection and analysis process was complete, impartial,
Speaker 2: documented meticulously, and maintained a clear chain of custody, proving
Speaker 2: who had the evidence and when ensuring it wasn't tampered with.
Speaker 2: Any weakness in that process will be fiercely attacked by
Speaker 2: the opposing legal side, right, so the process has to
Speaker 2: be rigorous absolutely. Technically, they are experts at understanding and
Speaker 2: analyzing all the metadata collected by platforms and hardware, things
Speaker 2: like undeleting files, pulling operating system logs, digging through registry entries,
Speaker 2: analyzing network traffic captures.
Speaker 1: It sounds like it requires some serious technical wizardry.
Speaker 2: Then the technical skills are definitely vital. Yes, But interestingly,
Speaker 2: the guide highlights that perhaps the single most important skill
Speaker 2: for any forensics practitioner is the ability to write understandable
Speaker 2: and concise reports quickly.
Speaker 1: Really more important than the tech skills.
Speaker 2: Often, yes, because it doesn't matter how brilliant your technical
Speaker 2: analysis is if you can't clearly communicate your findings to lawyers, judges, executives,
Speaker 2: or juries who likely aren't technical experts. That communication skill
Speaker 2: often outweighs the most complex technical feats in terms of impact.
Speaker 2: It's also noted as a field where intellectual curiosity and
Speaker 2: deep hands on it experience often make more of a
Speaker 2: difference than just academic degrees alone. Wow.
Speaker 1: Okay, that was the truly insightful deep dive into the
Speaker 1: complex world of cybersecurity. We went all the way from
Speaker 1: understanding the attackers, cyber kill chain and the proactive art
Speaker 1: of threat hunting, to the really granular but vital details
Speaker 1: of Windows event logs and that dual nature of.
Speaker 2: PowerShell yeah, And we also explored the critical human element
Speaker 2: looking at incident response teams both the IRT and THESSERT,
Speaker 2: and the very unique challenges and solutions required for protecting
Speaker 2: industrial control systems.
Speaker 1: Right.
Speaker 2: And we wrapped it up looking at how cutting edge
Speaker 2: machine learning is starting to augment our defenses and also
Speaker 2: circled back to the foundational importance of those compliance frameworks.
Speaker 1: So what does all this mean for you listening in.
Speaker 2: Well, the world of cybersecurity is definitely complex, it's constantly evolving,
Speaker 2: but you don't necessarily have to be a full time
Speaker 2: expert yourself to be truly well informed.
Speaker 1: That's a good point.
Speaker 2: The real beauty seems to be in the combination. It's
Speaker 2: human ingenuity, it's smart processes like ICs and the kill chain,
Speaker 2: and it's increasingly sophisticated technology like mL all working together.
Speaker 2: The defense isn't a one time setup. It's clearly an
Speaker 2: ongoing adaptive process, always learning from experience.
Speaker 1: Which you know makes me wonder. As technology continues its
Speaker 1: relentless advance and attackers inevitably become even more sophisticated, how
Speaker 1: will our strategies for defense need to adapt beyond even
Speaker 1: what we've discussed today. What kinds of unexpected digital breadcrumbs
Speaker 1: might future technologies leave for threat hunters to discover, and
Speaker 1: what new tools or techniques will we need to invent
Speaker 1: to actually find them? That is a truly thought provoking question,
Speaker 1: tom all over, Where does it go next? We really
Speaker 1: hope this deep dive has given you a clearer map
Speaker 1: for navigating the complex landscape of cybersecurity today, and maybe
Speaker 1: you feel a little more confident about what actually keeps
Speaker 1: our digital world safe.