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<v Speaker 1>Hey, everybody, welcome to another episode of Eyes on Jill Pollocks.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm here with Thomas Sugar, Jonathan Hackett, and Jack Murphy.

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<v Speaker 1>For the people that don't know who Tom is, he

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<v Speaker 1>actually did a great episode on the Team House. You

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<v Speaker 1>should check that out. Talking about his career, he's a

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<v Speaker 1>former US Navy samriner who served more than twenty five

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<v Speaker 1>years and he's now a data analyst, defense analyst excuse me,

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<v Speaker 1>and ajunk senior fellow at the Center for New American Security,

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<v Speaker 1>where obviously he focuses on the end of Pacific and

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<v Speaker 1>the involving like and just the balance between America and

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<v Speaker 1>Chinese militaries and stuff. So he's the guy who's keeping

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<v Speaker 1>his eye on all this. He's got a great Twitter account.

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<v Speaker 1>I suggest anyone's interested in this topic to check him

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<v Speaker 1>out and follow him there. I'll leave a link in

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<v Speaker 1>the description as well, and you can find them. Tom.

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<v Speaker 1>Thanks for joining us.

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<v Speaker 2>Leasure to be here. Thanks t of course.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, obviously, I feel like the China American you know,

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<v Speaker 1>rivalry has kind of taken a back seat, at least

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<v Speaker 1>in the press since Iran started, and there's obviously some

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<v Speaker 1>connections there too, like there's some rumor that China is

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<v Speaker 1>helping Iran with some targeting or at least supplies. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>definitely they were the biggest Iranians. They were Iran's biggest

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<v Speaker 1>customer for oil, so there are some connections there, But

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<v Speaker 1>I definitely want to focus on that US Chinese rivalry

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<v Speaker 1>where it's at. You know, I just saw that China

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<v Speaker 1>just had some like live fire drills off the coast

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<v Speaker 1>of Taiwan a few days ago for a couple of days,

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<v Speaker 1>and like just where we're at essentially now, July twenty

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<v Speaker 1>twenty six with this, you know, this thing that will

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<v Speaker 1>basically define the next probably fifty years.

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<v Speaker 2>So I would say that while there has been perhaps

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<v Speaker 2>a drop off a bit in the rhetoric of the

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<v Speaker 2>of the competition as it were, I mean, the the

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<v Speaker 2>facts on the ground haven't from China's site certainly haven't

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<v Speaker 2>dialed back at all. You know, they are being aggressive

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<v Speaker 2>as they ever were in the South China Sea. You know,

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<v Speaker 2>we just saw the other day Chinese sailors, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>beating on Philippine sators with sticks. Remember that that's a

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<v Speaker 2>treaty ally of the United States. We're talking about that

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<v Speaker 2>they're you know, conducting violent action against the development of

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<v Speaker 2>the Chinese military has if anything, the trajectory has increased

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<v Speaker 2>in the last few years. We now have multiple classes

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<v Speaker 2>of nuclear submarines under production. We have the commander of

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<v Speaker 2>the Office of Naval Intelligence and Testimony recently said that

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<v Speaker 2>Chinese submarine production is now going to go all nuclear.

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<v Speaker 2>They're not going to build conventional submarines anymore, which is

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<v Speaker 2>quite a surprise to me. And development. We have their

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<v Speaker 2>first nuclear powered aircraft carrier under construction. We have the

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<v Speaker 2>revelation that they are using even more than we thought

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<v Speaker 2>commercial shipping and practicing conducting amphibious assaults. We have increasing

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<v Speaker 2>numbers of Chinese aircraft crossing the Median Line and the

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<v Speaker 2>Taiwan straight. We now have the Chinese not just Coast Guard,

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<v Speaker 2>but their whole of government other agencies as well, acting

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<v Speaker 2>like they own the waters east of Taiwan, waters that

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<v Speaker 2>are actually, you know, really should be divided between the

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<v Speaker 2>Philippines and Japan. I mean, so, the facts on the

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<v Speaker 2>ground in the in the Pacific are, if anything, more

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<v Speaker 2>aggressive than they were in the past. It's just the

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<v Speaker 2>US government doesn't seem to be choosing to make a

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<v Speaker 2>lot of hay about it right now? At this point,

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<v Speaker 2>I guess they've got other things they're busy with.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, boys, any questions go ahead please?

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<v Speaker 3>Well, I mean, I think you know, based on what

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<v Speaker 3>you're saying, I'd be interested to hear you expand on

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<v Speaker 3>the arms production because my impression at least of China

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<v Speaker 3>is that their strategy in the past.

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<v Speaker 4>Has been not to meet US tank for tank.

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<v Speaker 2>Fighter jet for fighter, jet, carrier for carrier. Is that still.

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<v Speaker 3>True and if it is, what do you think or

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<v Speaker 3>how do you interpret this sort of like I guess

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<v Speaker 3>increase in proliferation.

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<v Speaker 2>So I think what we'll see is until Taiwan is

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<v Speaker 2>resolved one way or another, uh, there will be a

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<v Speaker 2>pretty significant asymmetry between what China is doing and the and

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<v Speaker 2>the capabilities are developing. And what we traditionally see is

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<v Speaker 2>US power projection capabilities because Taiwan's only a hundred miles away, right,

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<v Speaker 2>So you need different capabilities to do that. So, for example,

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<v Speaker 2>let's talk about amphibious assault vessels. So you know, when

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<v Speaker 2>you look at the US Navy and it's amphibious assualt vessels,

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<v Speaker 2>you have you know, large anthimous assault chips. You know,

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<v Speaker 2>forty thousand plus tons. In some cases they're equipped to operate,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, thousands of miles from home for months at

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<v Speaker 2>a time. That's overkilled for the Taiwan straight you don't

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<v Speaker 2>you need something that can efficiently take troops as fast

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<v Speaker 2>as possible, load them as fast as possible, goal hundred

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<v Speaker 2>miles unloaded them as fast as possible, will come back

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<v Speaker 2>and get more. Right. So, so while China does have

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<v Speaker 2>and is building more Amphibisa salt ships that are similar

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<v Speaker 2>to those that we build, that's not the meat and

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<v Speaker 2>potatoes of what they would need to do with Taiwan invasion.

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<v Speaker 2>That's where a China uses an asset that it has

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<v Speaker 2>and we don't have any any longer, which is a

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<v Speaker 2>massive merchant marine. So they're going to so the vast

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<v Speaker 2>majority of the steed lift capacity that the China would use.

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<v Speaker 2>And this is not theoretical, right, we see them practicing

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<v Speaker 2>doing this routinely in their exercises. So they use civilian

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<v Speaker 2>vessels that have been modified, built to national defense standards,

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<v Speaker 2>owned by state owned companies that are run by the

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<v Speaker 2>Chinese Communist Party. I mean literally the leadership structure of

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<v Speaker 2>these companies is dual headed Chinese Communist Party and Company,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, they use these all the time. These are ferries,

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<v Speaker 2>These are landing craft tank which I l SATs and

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<v Speaker 2>I can I get expand on this some more kind

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<v Speaker 2>of remarkable discovery last year. So civilian vessels that are

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<v Speaker 2>used for kind of the dump trucks of the sea

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<v Speaker 2>that are derived on landing craft designs, we're now seeing

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<v Speaker 2>them use those in exercises. So that's going to kind

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<v Speaker 2>of be the meat and potatoes of a Taiwan invasion.

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<v Speaker 2>On the firepower end of it, it's going to be

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<v Speaker 2>rocket launchers like kind of China's Cheimar so to speak,

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<v Speaker 2>but that are long, longer range. So those are capabilities

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<v Speaker 2>that are asymmetric that are going to be focused on

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<v Speaker 2>that kind of assault. Now at the same time, China

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<v Speaker 2>is developing capabilities that do look more like the traditional

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<v Speaker 2>markers of US global power projections, so nuclear powered aircraft carriers,

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<v Speaker 2>more nuclear submarines, nuclear power, ballistic missile submarines, tankers, strategic

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<v Speaker 2>air lift. That's all going to is starting to look

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<v Speaker 2>in some cases toward that, you know, toward the future

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<v Speaker 2>where you have a China that has you know, they

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<v Speaker 2>made it clear their goals to have a world class military.

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<v Speaker 2>Well that's the kind of things you have to have

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<v Speaker 2>a world class military that projects power worldwide. So over time,

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<v Speaker 2>I think it will start to look a little bit

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<v Speaker 2>more like like those US capabilities. But they've still got

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<v Speaker 2>to get past Taiwan first. And Tom, I'm curious.

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<v Speaker 5>You know, China is building up a lot of these assets,

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<v Speaker 5>these physical things, but their forces haven't been tested in combat,

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<v Speaker 5>and of course or that as a huge question mark

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<v Speaker 5>of how will they stand up? Just like any military,

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<v Speaker 5>including our own World War Two? You know, there were

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<v Speaker 5>early moments when we learned a lot of lessons very quickly,

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<v Speaker 5>And I'm curious, how do you see that playing out?

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<v Speaker 5>How has China developed kind of a rapid lessons learned

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<v Speaker 5>uptake to an anticipation of something like that happening.

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<v Speaker 2>So I think that that point has flidity, the sense

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<v Speaker 2>that they have not engaged in combat operations. But what

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<v Speaker 2>I'd say it's important to keep in mind is what

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<v Speaker 2>kind of combat operations have they engaged in? And have

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<v Speaker 2>we engaged in? So the United States, yes, has engaged

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<v Speaker 2>in lots of wars over the last you know, twenty years. However,

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<v Speaker 2>none of them were against a peer competitor that had

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<v Speaker 2>anything close to our capabilities. So I think the utility

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<v Speaker 2>of that and calling a difference between the two is

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<v Speaker 2>maybe a little less than people might think. Let me

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<v Speaker 2>give you an example. Between World War One and World

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<v Speaker 2>War Two. You know, the Wehrmachs didn't fight anyone for

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<v Speaker 2>twenty years. There was almost no one in the German army,

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<v Speaker 2>very few. You know, you had a few really senior

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<v Speaker 2>officers who had been in World War One twenty years before,

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<v Speaker 2>but very few of their personnel had been involved in

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<v Speaker 2>combat with a with a peer adversary and high end warfare.

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<v Speaker 2>On the other hand, you had the UK who had

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<v Speaker 2>been engaged in all kinds of brush fire wars, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>colonial essentially imperial management around the world against various we

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<v Speaker 2>call them Third world countries today. Well, which army was

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<v Speaker 2>better prepared for high end combat when the shooting started

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<v Speaker 2>between peer industrialized nations would say, I would say, I

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<v Speaker 2>don't think they would want to look at the Germans

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<v Speaker 2>and say, well, they weren't ready for the war because

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<v Speaker 2>they didn't fight, They didn't fight for twenty years, but

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<v Speaker 2>clearly they were they were doing the right kind of

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<v Speaker 2>training for the fighting that they were going to have

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<v Speaker 2>to do. Now, of course, you did have German observers

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<v Speaker 2>in other conflicts, you know, in the Spanish Civil War,

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<v Speaker 2>probably observing. I know, I think they're working with the

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<v Speaker 2>Russians some probably in the Finland War that might have been.

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<v Speaker 4>Observing there any civil war also.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and well, and who do we have watching the

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<v Speaker 2>Russell Ukraine conflict. You've got Chinese observers. They're getting the

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<v Speaker 2>latest lessons earned probably at Russian headquarters seeing how they

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<v Speaker 2>do business, learn lessons for them. So I'm I'm not

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<v Speaker 2>as confident about that. Also, I would keep in mind

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<v Speaker 2>that we have to look at the fact that any

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<v Speaker 2>conflict in the Western Pacific is going to be the

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<v Speaker 2>decisive elements. They are probably going to be in the

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<v Speaker 2>air and at sea. You know, they're going to be

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<v Speaker 2>air in naval combat. I mean, if there is an

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<v Speaker 2>attempt to invade Taiwan, the conflict will eventually be finished

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<v Speaker 2>one way or the other on the ground in Taiwan,

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<v Speaker 2>but it'll be decided in the air and at sea.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, if the Chinese military, through air and sea superiority,

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<v Speaker 2>has unfettered access to Taiwan, it can send as much

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<v Speaker 2>troops and supplies as it wants across. I don't see

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<v Speaker 2>any way that that Taiwan survives that, so uh and

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<v Speaker 2>that assuming that Taiwan is isolated and can't get supplies

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<v Speaker 2>in like Ukraine can. So if that conflict is going

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<v Speaker 2>to be decided in air and at sea, well when's

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<v Speaker 2>the last time anybody fought appeer navy? See, it's not

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<v Speaker 2>the Iran War, that's for sure. The closest thing we

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<v Speaker 2>have is the Falklands in the nineteen eighties. So you know,

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<v Speaker 2>we have to remember that there's two ships in the

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<v Speaker 2>United States Navy that have sunk another warship at sea,

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<v Speaker 2>and that's USS Constitution, which we did it in nineteen

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<v Speaker 2>and the War of eighteen twelve and is in Boston Harbor.

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<v Speaker 2>And now we have USS Charlotte, the submarine that sank,

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<v Speaker 2>and essentially I wouldn't say defenseless, but pretty helpless or

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<v Speaker 2>Anian frigates. So I don't think either side has a

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<v Speaker 2>lot of experience in really high end naval combat. And

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<v Speaker 2>I think we have to be very careful about thinking otherwise.

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<v Speaker 3>I mean, the other question I'd like to ask, and

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<v Speaker 3>this is more of a political question, I suppose, is

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<v Speaker 3>sort of the timing. And We've been having this conversation

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<v Speaker 3>for many years now, and China has made it's always

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<v Speaker 3>been China's policy to reintegrate, reunify Taiwan into the mainland.

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<v Speaker 3>Why hasn't that happened yet? What are the Chinese waiting for?

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<v Speaker 3>Is the wars in Ukraine in the Middle East? Is

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<v Speaker 3>that sort of like figuring into their calculus that they

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<v Speaker 3>don't want to become a global pariah? What do you

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<v Speaker 3>think is there is the reason why they haven't made

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<v Speaker 3>this attempt yet.

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<v Speaker 2>So I always always make clear to that that I

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<v Speaker 2>am a military analyst, not a political analyst. I know,

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<v Speaker 2>so I look at it from a military perspective, and

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<v Speaker 2>I think certainly up until this point, it's been pretty

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<v Speaker 2>clear that they didn't have the military capability to be

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<v Speaker 2>able to successfully to have confidence that they would that

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<v Speaker 2>they would win an invasion of Taiwan and succeed in

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<v Speaker 2>the event of a US intervention, That they didn't have

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<v Speaker 2>the ability to deter in it a US intervention, and

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<v Speaker 2>they didn't have the ability if they failed to deter,

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<v Speaker 2>to defeat a US intervention. So that's a pretty pretty

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<v Speaker 2>clear reason why they wouldn't try. So the question becomes,

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<v Speaker 2>when do they reach the point where they do have

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<v Speaker 2>the confidence that they're going to succeed That either they

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<v Speaker 2>have the confidence that they're they will be able to

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<v Speaker 2>convince the United States not to intervene, or if he

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<v Speaker 2>or the US intervenes, it won't matter, they'll be able

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<v Speaker 2>to defeat it. So that's that's why we have to

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<v Speaker 2>I think if you're watching those capabilities that are that

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<v Speaker 2>they're developing, I think I think at this point, probably

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<v Speaker 2>deterring a US intervention is what they may be hoping for.

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<v Speaker 2>But but they if you look at Chinese doctrine, they

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<v Speaker 2>always say you have to be ready for that for

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<v Speaker 2>the intervention of the powerful enemy they call it, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>which is their their their code for the United States.

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<v Speaker 2>That means they have to be ready for a protracted conflict.

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<v Speaker 2>They also talk about that in their in their h

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<v Speaker 2>in their doctrinal texts. So you know, that's that is

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<v Speaker 2>I think what they're worried about. I think that's that's

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<v Speaker 2>what's kept them from pulling the trigger. From a military perspective.

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<v Speaker 2>So then the question is will there come a time

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<v Speaker 2>you know, Chi Jiping has told the PLA to be

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<v Speaker 2>ready to execute and a a invasion of an assault

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<v Speaker 2>on Taiwan in twenty twenty seven. Are they going to

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<v Speaker 2>be there? I don't know. I mean, it's it's hard

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<v Speaker 2>to tell at this point that I think they're doing

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<v Speaker 2>the kinds of things that I would expect them to

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<v Speaker 2>do to be able to do that.

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<v Speaker 4>You might be muted, John, Yeah, I was having some

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<v Speaker 4>mic problems.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, we'll see John's going. They'll be right back after

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<v Speaker 1>these messages. Now, Hello everyone. If you're hearing this you

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<v Speaker 1>open to it, you can go to patreon dot com

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<v Speaker 1>appreciate the supporters and we hope you would consider being one.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's Patreon dot com slash the Teamhouse. Thanks guys.

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<v Speaker 1>In your mind, Tom, what's your like? What's the most

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<v Speaker 1>pressing issue between the US and China, both militarily and politically.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, if they did go in in twenty twenty

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<v Speaker 1>seven and try to take Taiwan, obviously this is kind

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<v Speaker 1>of skewing into a political question there the US be

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<v Speaker 1>there to interdict, to stop it, to try and stop it.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, we're seeing like THAD missile batteries being moved

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<v Speaker 1>from the in and around the theater and stuff like that.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean that obviously signals something to China. Right where

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<v Speaker 1>are you at with that? Like, where's your thought process there?

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<v Speaker 2>I just don't know at this point. I mean, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>we had pretty clear statements from the last administration from

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<v Speaker 2>the president, from President Biden that you know, he said

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<v Speaker 2>things like straight up the United States would intervene in

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<v Speaker 2>the case of a of a of a Chinese assault

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<v Speaker 2>on Taiwan. Were to the point that the administration, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>the folks below him kind of reeled it back at

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<v Speaker 2>times and said, well, the United States our policy remains

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<v Speaker 2>the same as it ever was. You know, are strategic ambiguity.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, we would consider it to be a grave problem,

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<v Speaker 2>but it doesn't mean we're gonna you know, they would

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<v Speaker 2>they would kind of walk that back. President Trump has

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<v Speaker 2>kind of said things now and then that it's hard

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<v Speaker 2>to tell where he would go on this where you know,

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<v Speaker 2>he's given indications he wouldn't would not defend Taiwan in

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<v Speaker 2>some cases. But at the same time you have it,

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<v Speaker 2>you have a natural defense strategy that very explicitly says

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<v Speaker 2>a goal is to prevent China from gaining control the

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<v Speaker 2>first island chain, of which China, of which Taiwan is

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<v Speaker 2>kind of the lynchpin in the center of the first

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<v Speaker 2>island chain. So it's hard to know, quite frankly, what

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<v Speaker 2>what what this administration would do in the event of that.

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<v Speaker 2>I think any administration against the Chinese military that really

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<v Speaker 2>has been fully prepared is going to face some pretty

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<v Speaker 2>grave decisions about about what to do. This would not

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<v Speaker 2>be free for the United States to intervene, and China

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<v Speaker 2>has been looking at this problem for decades now and

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<v Speaker 2>is basically building the military that is the scariest that

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<v Speaker 2>you could deal with, you know, that is built for

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<v Speaker 2>the American way of war, that is designed to destroy

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<v Speaker 2>the bases that the U, the US has come to

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<v Speaker 2>rely upon in the region. That's designed to attack the

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<v Speaker 2>US's highest value naval units at see. It's it's aircraft carriers.

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<v Speaker 2>If you look in particular, you know there was one

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<v Speaker 2>kind of ominous development recently. The Air Force War College

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<v Speaker 2>air Force Air War Colleges, China Aerospace Studies Institute CISI

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<v Speaker 2>recently released a study that they had found, using open

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<v Speaker 2>source imagery a new type of Chinese missile launcher being

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<v Speaker 2>tested at in the desert in western China. And what

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<v Speaker 2>this was basically a large rectangular kind of retractable roof

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<v Speaker 2>silo complex. But it wasn't just one silo. It appeared

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<v Speaker 2>to be one kind of building that would have multiple

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<v Speaker 2>medium rangeableist MRBM sized missiles in it, and if you

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<v Speaker 2>do the math, I'm guessing something like twelve to sixteen

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<v Speaker 2>missiles per one of these things. So basically the roof

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<v Speaker 2>would roll back and this thing would launch like a

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<v Speaker 2>vertical launch system but full of humongous MRBMs missiles that

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<v Speaker 2>can hit all of Japan, potentially Guam or beyond. These

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<v Speaker 2>were just underevelable, but this is a couple of years ago,

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<v Speaker 2>and they move pretty fast on this stuff, so it's

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<v Speaker 2>possible that, you know, that sort of thing could be

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<v Speaker 2>under construction. Now why does that worry me? Because that

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<v Speaker 2>is the kind of weapon system that is built for

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<v Speaker 2>a first strike, that's built for them to use it first.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a user or to lose it type weapon system.

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<v Speaker 2>Here you got a fixed target with a bunch of

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<v Speaker 2>missiles in one place that are relatively expensive, that could

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<v Speaker 2>be struck in event of an ongoing conflict. It's very

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<v Speaker 2>much the kind of thing you used to initiate a

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<v Speaker 2>conflict or to threaten to start of it. So I

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<v Speaker 2>talked about this on Twitter like this is this is

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<v Speaker 2>a textbook first strike weapon. So to see them testing

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<v Speaker 2>those a couple of years ago, now this is when

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<v Speaker 2>these images were taken, makes me wonder are they are

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<v Speaker 2>they being built somewhere. That's the kind of thing that

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<v Speaker 2>I worry about, in conjunction with their improvements and amphibious capacity,

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<v Speaker 2>that indicates they really are making the preparations that the

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<v Speaker 2>kind of things you would need to be able to

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<v Speaker 2>again either to defeat or ideally deter US intervention.

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<v Speaker 1>John, you was about today, please, yeah, I was curious.

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<v Speaker 5>You know, we're talking a lot about the march toward conflict,

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<v Speaker 5>and I wonder about them away from conflict. I mean

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<v Speaker 5>in early maybe let's say fifteen twenty years ago, we

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<v Speaker 5>allowed impact to have Chinese observers. We've allowed other periods

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<v Speaker 5>of time to have Chinese military folks interacting with US

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<v Speaker 5>in exchanges and different things, kind of like trying to

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<v Speaker 5>pool some tensions or at least bring each other closer for.

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<v Speaker 4>Various diplomatic reasons.

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<v Speaker 5>What do you think that the way forward on that

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<v Speaker 5>could be if you were if you were going to make,

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<v Speaker 5>you know, an argument to say that's a good idea,

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<v Speaker 5>what are some ways the government could actually do that

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<v Speaker 5>that would be effective.

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<v Speaker 2>So I think the tricky part of those connections between

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<v Speaker 2>the US military and China is that it's pretty consistently

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<v Speaker 2>the US has tried to have those hotlines open and

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<v Speaker 2>lines of communications open because I think we see that

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<v Speaker 2>as useful and part of this based on our experience

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<v Speaker 2>in the Cold War. You know, we set up a

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<v Speaker 2>hotline with Moscow for a reason, and we found that

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<v Speaker 2>to be useful that from both side, for both sides,

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<v Speaker 2>to prevent and on, you know, and misunderstandings from turning

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<v Speaker 2>into something bigger. The Chinese, I think, I think think

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<v Speaker 2>have from what I've read, seem to see this very differently,

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<v Speaker 2>and that they see those those lines of communication as

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<v Speaker 2>something to reward us with when when we're when we're

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<v Speaker 2>behaving the way they like us to behave because they

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<v Speaker 2>know that we seem to want that more than they do.

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<v Speaker 2>They actually there are accounts that they see some utility

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<v Speaker 2>in the lack of those lines of communication causing us

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<v Speaker 2>to be more cautious. They want us to be more

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<v Speaker 2>uncertain about what might happen, and that therefore will be

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<v Speaker 2>more cautious. So they see withdrawing those lines of communication

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<v Speaker 2>in a crisis as a means of getting us to

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<v Speaker 2>back down because we're too worried about about a conflict

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<v Speaker 2>breaking out. So I think they see that in a

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<v Speaker 2>very different way than we do. Uh. You know, I

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<v Speaker 2>oftentimes see writers in the think type space say, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>we should have more we should have more open lines

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<v Speaker 2>of communication with China, and I think everybody agrees. But

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<v Speaker 2>you talk to the Chinese about it, you know, if

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<v Speaker 2>you want, if you want traction on that on that argument,

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<v Speaker 2>write the article in Chinese, because they're the ones that

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<v Speaker 2>really are the one that usually blocking that sort of thing.

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<v Speaker 3>We interviewed an FBI league at at the embassy in

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<v Speaker 3>China years ago, and he had this incredible story about

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<v Speaker 3>how everything with the Chinese is so transactional. And his

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<v Speaker 3>example was they got word, unfortunately, of an American citizen

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<v Speaker 3>at a Chinese school who was abusing children, and they

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<v Speaker 3>went to the Chinese authorities and said, Hey, this guy's

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<v Speaker 3>a bad dude.

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<v Speaker 4>You know, this is a criminal. He's hurting kids. You

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<v Speaker 4>need to go and arrest them. And the Chinese were like, okay,

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<v Speaker 4>you released a couple of our spies. We'll go get them.

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<v Speaker 4>And the guy was.

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<v Speaker 3>Like, what, Like, this isn't like a trade, Like what

401
00:20:34.359 --> 00:20:35.759
<v Speaker 3>are you talking about?

402
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<v Speaker 2>Wow?

403
00:20:38.440 --> 00:20:43.480
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, just very legal attache, right, yeah, yeah, yeah, act.

404
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<v Speaker 5>I want to jump back in, Tommy, you're talking about

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<v Speaker 5>the first and Second Island chain. Some years ago, I

406
00:20:47.920 --> 00:20:49.920
<v Speaker 5>was in the South China see doing some stuff for

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<v Speaker 5>another partner we had, and we were getting daily Chinese

408
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<v Speaker 5>overflights of pairs of Chinese aircraft, basically violating the sovereign

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<v Speaker 5>airspace of that country. And I'm curious from where you

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<v Speaker 5>sit and what you analyze, what do you think the

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<v Speaker 5>role of that second Island Chain will play for China

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<v Speaker 5>if they were to go. If you know, the main

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<v Speaker 5>objective is Taiwan, what are they doing in those envelopes

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<v Speaker 5>around those island chains to kind of enable that operation.

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<v Speaker 2>So China has if you look at China's naval strategy

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<v Speaker 2>over time, they started with the idea of near sea's operations.

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<v Speaker 2>So their first goal was to be able to gain

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<v Speaker 2>sea control inside the first island chain, you know that.

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<v Speaker 2>So for those not familiar, first island chain is basically

420
00:21:29.839 --> 00:21:34.200
<v Speaker 2>Japan down through Taiwan, the Philippines, kind of the first

421
00:21:34.240 --> 00:21:38.079
<v Speaker 2>set of island chains that encompass the Yellow Sea, the

422
00:21:38.279 --> 00:21:42.200
<v Speaker 2>East China Sea, South China Sea. Second island chain is

423
00:21:42.240 --> 00:21:45.440
<v Speaker 2>further out. It's Guam, it's the Marianas. You know, it's

424
00:21:45.480 --> 00:21:48.759
<v Speaker 2>down through maybe parts of Indonesia. I don't know if

425
00:21:48.799 --> 00:21:50.319
<v Speaker 2>I don't know if you call Australia part of it,

426
00:21:50.400 --> 00:21:53.880
<v Speaker 2>but but there. The longer term goal in Chinese naval

427
00:21:53.920 --> 00:21:57.000
<v Speaker 2>strategy has been to between the first and second island chains.

428
00:21:57.000 --> 00:21:59.240
<v Speaker 2>So in the Philippine Sea, for example, at least get

429
00:21:59.240 --> 00:22:00.839
<v Speaker 2>to a point where they had seed denial that they

430
00:22:00.880 --> 00:22:04.440
<v Speaker 2>can prevent operations by others, and they call those far

431
00:22:04.480 --> 00:22:07.119
<v Speaker 2>seas operations. But to be clear, they do have a

432
00:22:07.160 --> 00:22:11.160
<v Speaker 2>goal to gain the gain control of those far seas

433
00:22:11.160 --> 00:22:13.440
<v Speaker 2>and longer term too, just to actually get sea control

434
00:22:13.559 --> 00:22:15.839
<v Speaker 2>in the in between the first and second island chains.

435
00:22:16.880 --> 00:22:18.880
<v Speaker 2>So folks understand what we're talking about here, so they

436
00:22:18.880 --> 00:22:21.279
<v Speaker 2>have so seed denial and sea control those are wor

437
00:22:21.480 --> 00:22:24.720
<v Speaker 2>those are wartime concepts. It's the idea that during the war,

438
00:22:25.079 --> 00:22:27.440
<v Speaker 2>seed denial is you preventing the other side from using

439
00:22:27.480 --> 00:22:30.079
<v Speaker 2>a given area of water, not all the time, but

440
00:22:30.119 --> 00:22:33.000
<v Speaker 2>in most times most places. So right now, for example,

441
00:22:34.240 --> 00:22:37.799
<v Speaker 2>Iran is essentially waging a seed denial campaign in the

442
00:22:37.799 --> 00:22:40.319
<v Speaker 2>Straighterhorn Moves. They're basically trying to deny the use of

443
00:22:40.400 --> 00:22:43.079
<v Speaker 2>that not all the time, but most times most places,

444
00:22:43.680 --> 00:22:46.839
<v Speaker 2>whereas the US is attempting to gain sea control over

445
00:22:46.880 --> 00:22:49.440
<v Speaker 2>the straderh Horn moves, where most times, in most places,

446
00:22:49.759 --> 00:22:52.440
<v Speaker 2>we can use that waterway for our use, and we've

447
00:22:52.440 --> 00:22:56.359
<v Speaker 2>seem to have a limited success there. China would be

448
00:22:56.440 --> 00:23:01.160
<v Speaker 2>trying to basically at the minimum sea control inside the

449
00:23:01.160 --> 00:23:03.640
<v Speaker 2>first island chain seed then aisle out to the second

450
00:23:03.640 --> 00:23:06.200
<v Speaker 2>island chain. Their longer term goals to gain sea control

451
00:23:06.960 --> 00:23:10.160
<v Speaker 2>out to the second island chain as well. So in wartime,

452
00:23:10.240 --> 00:23:13.640
<v Speaker 2>having gained sea control inside the first island chain allows

453
00:23:13.720 --> 00:23:16.119
<v Speaker 2>China to keep its ports open to be able to

454
00:23:16.119 --> 00:23:18.799
<v Speaker 2>get imports in and out of China. I think there

455
00:23:18.799 --> 00:23:22.079
<v Speaker 2>are a lot of folks that kind of assume that

456
00:23:22.079 --> 00:23:26.000
<v Speaker 2>we could shut off China's seaborn imports in wartime, and

457
00:23:26.039 --> 00:23:29.480
<v Speaker 2>I think that's a dangerous assumption to make, because we

458
00:23:29.599 --> 00:23:33.440
<v Speaker 2>have to remember that trade out at sea is highly internationalized.

459
00:23:33.480 --> 00:23:36.799
<v Speaker 2>Like ships that are going to China don't necessarily have

460
00:23:36.839 --> 00:23:38.359
<v Speaker 2>a big sign on the side of it and say

461
00:23:38.359 --> 00:23:40.599
<v Speaker 2>that we're going. I mean, they may be broadcasting something

462
00:23:40.599 --> 00:23:43.559
<v Speaker 2>on AIS, but it could be a lie. Cargoes get

463
00:23:43.599 --> 00:23:47.000
<v Speaker 2>bought and sold and route, so you can't just sink

464
00:23:47.079 --> 00:23:48.920
<v Speaker 2>ships in the middle of the Indian Notion, for example,

465
00:23:48.960 --> 00:23:50.799
<v Speaker 2>or maybe even at Malaca. You may not be able

466
00:23:50.799 --> 00:23:53.000
<v Speaker 2>to reliably tell where something's going even as it goes

467
00:23:53.000 --> 00:23:55.000
<v Speaker 2>thro the shade of Malaca. So the only way to

468
00:23:55.119 --> 00:23:58.640
<v Speaker 2>really stop shipping from going into China is to threaten

469
00:23:59.119 --> 00:24:02.079
<v Speaker 2>the actual entrance is the Chinese ports. Well, if China

470
00:24:02.319 --> 00:24:05.680
<v Speaker 2>gained sea control where they can effectively protect the approaches

471
00:24:05.680 --> 00:24:07.640
<v Speaker 2>to their ports, and it becomes much more difficult to

472
00:24:07.640 --> 00:24:12.240
<v Speaker 2>cut them off from seaborne trade. The perfect example I

473
00:24:12.279 --> 00:24:15.960
<v Speaker 2>give of that how difficult this can be is ever given.

474
00:24:16.039 --> 00:24:18.079
<v Speaker 2>So maye people may remember that that was the ship

475
00:24:18.079 --> 00:24:20.160
<v Speaker 2>that ran aground in the straight hr in the in

476
00:24:20.200 --> 00:24:22.359
<v Speaker 2>the Suez Canal a few years ago, it was a

477
00:24:22.400 --> 00:24:25.720
<v Speaker 2>ship that basically ran aground and was blocking the Suez Canal.

478
00:24:26.240 --> 00:24:29.480
<v Speaker 2>That ship was, let me see if I can remember,

479
00:24:29.960 --> 00:24:35.519
<v Speaker 2>Japanese built, Japanese owned, chartered to a Taiwanese company with

480
00:24:36.599 --> 00:24:41.039
<v Speaker 2>mostly Indian crew, carrying goods from China to Europe. I mean,

481
00:24:41.079 --> 00:24:43.359
<v Speaker 2>do you sink that ship in the in the middle

482
00:24:43.400 --> 00:24:45.839
<v Speaker 2>of the Indian Ocean? Do you stop it and board

483
00:24:45.839 --> 00:24:48.359
<v Speaker 2>it at the straight h horn moves? But it is

484
00:24:48.480 --> 00:24:51.480
<v Speaker 2>carrying trade from China, so so I think I think

485
00:24:51.519 --> 00:24:53.960
<v Speaker 2>that problem is much more difficult than people think it is.

486
00:24:54.400 --> 00:24:56.720
<v Speaker 2>And that's where that first island chain, second island chain

487
00:24:56.720 --> 00:25:00.200
<v Speaker 2>stuff really comes to the four. I think it it's

488
00:25:00.240 --> 00:25:03.799
<v Speaker 2>worth remembering too, we've gotten a pretty good lesson here

489
00:25:03.799 --> 00:25:06.480
<v Speaker 2>with the straighter hard moves that you can't make these

490
00:25:06.519 --> 00:25:10.000
<v Speaker 2>shippers go through right there if they think it's too risky.

491
00:25:10.200 --> 00:25:11.599
<v Speaker 2>And that's been a bit of a surprise, I think

492
00:25:11.640 --> 00:25:13.880
<v Speaker 2>to a lot of people, myself included, because it even

493
00:25:13.880 --> 00:25:16.160
<v Speaker 2>if you say, hey, we'll convoy you, even if you

494
00:25:16.200 --> 00:25:19.880
<v Speaker 2>say we're going to give you insurance, they may still

495
00:25:19.920 --> 00:25:21.759
<v Speaker 2>not go right if they if they think the risk

496
00:25:21.839 --> 00:25:24.119
<v Speaker 2>is too great. And these shipping companies don't owe any

497
00:25:24.160 --> 00:25:26.200
<v Speaker 2>allegiance to the United States, they don't own any allegiance

498
00:25:26.240 --> 00:25:29.079
<v Speaker 2>to allies. They're flagged all kinds of places, they're owned

499
00:25:29.119 --> 00:25:32.200
<v Speaker 2>all kinds of places, so it may be very difficult

500
00:25:32.279 --> 00:25:35.680
<v Speaker 2>to have shipping continued your allies. China is not like that, right,

501
00:25:35.759 --> 00:25:39.640
<v Speaker 2>China has an enormous merchant marine. It's Chinese flagged, it's

502
00:25:39.720 --> 00:25:42.559
<v Speaker 2>Chinese owned, it's crewed by Chinese, and they can make

503
00:25:42.640 --> 00:25:45.200
<v Speaker 2>those guys keep going. And that's where that I think

504
00:25:45.200 --> 00:25:47.839
<v Speaker 2>that physical control inside the first island chain really matters.

505
00:25:48.799 --> 00:25:51.000
<v Speaker 5>We talked a lot about the conventional aspect just now,

506
00:25:51.000 --> 00:25:54.000
<v Speaker 5>but also with the maritime aspect, the merchant marine kind

507
00:25:54.000 --> 00:25:56.279
<v Speaker 5>of moving into the less conventional category or kind of

508
00:25:56.319 --> 00:25:59.519
<v Speaker 5>quasi gray zone. Let's say, what about the actual unconventional

509
00:25:59.599 --> 00:26:02.440
<v Speaker 5>warfare capability in Taiwan if this thing was to go off,

510
00:26:02.759 --> 00:26:06.119
<v Speaker 5>obviously maybe having a very conventional confrontation, whether that's Taiwan

511
00:26:06.279 --> 00:26:09.039
<v Speaker 5>or the US or both against China, what would the

512
00:26:09.319 --> 00:26:13.039
<v Speaker 5>unconventional insurgency or other types of resistance that are non

513
00:26:13.119 --> 00:26:14.839
<v Speaker 5>conventional potentially look like.

514
00:26:16.839 --> 00:26:18.400
<v Speaker 2>That's a tough one for me. You know, I really

515
00:26:18.440 --> 00:26:22.079
<v Speaker 2>am kind of a maritime, air naval analyst for the

516
00:26:22.079 --> 00:26:24.880
<v Speaker 2>most part. I mean, Chinese doctrine certainly talks about what

517
00:26:24.880 --> 00:26:29.160
<v Speaker 2>they call sabotage operations, which would basically be special forces.

518
00:26:29.640 --> 00:26:32.799
<v Speaker 2>You know, there's certainly we see plenty of stories of

519
00:26:32.799 --> 00:26:38.799
<v Speaker 2>Taiwanese former officers and other you know, Taiwanese citizens that

520
00:26:38.880 --> 00:26:42.559
<v Speaker 2>have gotten a foul of the law in basically being

521
00:26:42.559 --> 00:26:46.799
<v Speaker 2>bought out by the Chinese. So I think there, whether

522
00:26:46.839 --> 00:26:51.880
<v Speaker 2>it's money or ethnic cohesion or family ties or whatever,

523
00:26:52.559 --> 00:26:55.079
<v Speaker 2>there's certainly I think of much more risk of fifth

524
00:26:55.079 --> 00:26:59.440
<v Speaker 2>column activities behind the lines than there is potentially with

525
00:27:00.039 --> 00:27:02.079
<v Speaker 2>you know, one nation state versus another nation state, and

526
00:27:02.119 --> 00:27:04.440
<v Speaker 2>you don't have those connections. Are different, different ethnicities that

527
00:27:04.559 --> 00:27:06.440
<v Speaker 2>you know that they're they're different, they look different, you know.

528
00:27:06.799 --> 00:27:08.920
<v Speaker 2>I think there's a lot more risk of that behind

529
00:27:08.920 --> 00:27:11.799
<v Speaker 2>the lines in Taiwan. I think to the Taiwanese should

530
00:27:11.799 --> 00:27:15.319
<v Speaker 2>expect disruptions like that, they should expect some pretty significant

531
00:27:15.640 --> 00:27:18.839
<v Speaker 2>fifth call activities. I do worry about, you know, there

532
00:27:18.839 --> 00:27:22.680
<v Speaker 2>being elements of the Taiwanese society that kind of open

533
00:27:22.720 --> 00:27:24.839
<v Speaker 2>the gates and let you know, let let the invaders

534
00:27:24.839 --> 00:27:27.400
<v Speaker 2>in potentially. I think that that, you know, that's why

535
00:27:27.400 --> 00:27:29.119
<v Speaker 2>I think I think Atomy's government has to be very

536
00:27:29.200 --> 00:27:30.799
<v Speaker 2>very careful about that stuff, and I think they are.

537
00:27:31.720 --> 00:27:34.799
<v Speaker 2>I think they're certainly working hard to try to eliminate

538
00:27:34.839 --> 00:27:37.440
<v Speaker 2>that sort of thing, but it's definitely a risk. I

539
00:27:37.480 --> 00:27:41.279
<v Speaker 2>think that the Chinese military talks about three D island assault,

540
00:27:41.319 --> 00:27:45.200
<v Speaker 2>three dimensional island assault, so there's gonna be a significant

541
00:27:45.240 --> 00:27:49.000
<v Speaker 2>airborne angle to it. There's gonna be a significant helicopter

542
00:27:49.039 --> 00:27:51.559
<v Speaker 2>assault angle to it that could certainly result in a

543
00:27:51.559 --> 00:27:54.039
<v Speaker 2>lot of folks being put down behind the lines. I

544
00:27:54.079 --> 00:27:57.279
<v Speaker 2>think you can see. You know, they've got their own

545
00:27:57.279 --> 00:28:00.000
<v Speaker 2>special operations forces. You know, there's all kinds of things

546
00:28:00.000 --> 00:28:03.640
<v Speaker 2>are probably gonna do with those folks. China has tens

547
00:28:03.640 --> 00:28:05.440
<v Speaker 2>of thousands of fishing boats that they can use to

548
00:28:05.480 --> 00:28:09.440
<v Speaker 2>transport small teams to do things. That's that's another asymmetric

549
00:28:09.440 --> 00:28:13.599
<v Speaker 2>advantage they have that really doesn't exist anywhere else. So

550
00:28:13.720 --> 00:28:15.880
<v Speaker 2>there's plenty of opportunity to have a bit of a

551
00:28:15.880 --> 00:28:19.160
<v Speaker 2>Swiss Cheese effect on the tilings defenses in the manner

552
00:28:19.160 --> 00:28:21.440
<v Speaker 2>that you're talking about. I think that's what if that

553
00:28:21.559 --> 00:28:22.359
<v Speaker 2>answers your question.

554
00:28:22.839 --> 00:28:26.279
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, it's really interesting. Another subject I'd like to touch upon.

555
00:28:26.359 --> 00:28:29.440
<v Speaker 3>I mean maybe this is separate, but related is rare

556
00:28:29.480 --> 00:28:33.400
<v Speaker 3>earth minerals on the seabed and I've seen some papers

557
00:28:33.440 --> 00:28:36.279
<v Speaker 3>about this, and I was wondering what you think about

558
00:28:36.319 --> 00:28:38.920
<v Speaker 3>how those, if any of those deposits play into the

559
00:28:38.960 --> 00:28:42.200
<v Speaker 3>sort of conflict we've been talking about, and if that

560
00:28:42.319 --> 00:28:45.279
<v Speaker 3>relates to you know, sub subsurface warfare as well.

561
00:28:46.720 --> 00:28:49.599
<v Speaker 2>I mean, China clearly has put us in a bit

562
00:28:49.640 --> 00:28:52.200
<v Speaker 2>of a hammer lock with with rare earth. I mean,

563
00:28:52.279 --> 00:28:56.279
<v Speaker 2>we saw how things didn't go well with the trade

564
00:28:56.279 --> 00:28:59.279
<v Speaker 2>war that the President initiated against China. They pretty quickly

565
00:29:00.039 --> 00:29:02.160
<v Speaker 2>pull that lever on rare verse and force force the

566
00:29:02.240 --> 00:29:04.960
<v Speaker 2>US to back down. How does that apply in a

567
00:29:05.000 --> 00:29:08.440
<v Speaker 2>military conflict. I think it matters more for a protracted

568
00:29:08.480 --> 00:29:10.880
<v Speaker 2>conflict than it does for a short term one. You know,

569
00:29:10.920 --> 00:29:14.039
<v Speaker 2>it's that's really something that's going to speak to longer

570
00:29:14.119 --> 00:29:17.160
<v Speaker 2>term industrial production and ability to apply supply munitions and

571
00:29:17.160 --> 00:29:21.519
<v Speaker 2>replacement parts. And that's part of their game plan, you know,

572
00:29:21.559 --> 00:29:26.279
<v Speaker 2>when when they when they their doctrine specifically says for

573
00:29:26.599 --> 00:29:31.079
<v Speaker 2>a campaign against the powerful enemy. And again that's us

574
00:29:31.880 --> 00:29:34.319
<v Speaker 2>that you have to specifically with that enemy. You have

575
00:29:34.359 --> 00:29:37.880
<v Speaker 2>to consider the profit possibility of protracted conflict, which is

576
00:29:37.880 --> 00:29:40.200
<v Speaker 2>then going to be driven in large part by industrial

577
00:29:40.240 --> 00:29:44.680
<v Speaker 2>production and national resilience. So yeah, their ability to have

578
00:29:44.799 --> 00:29:46.599
<v Speaker 2>more of a hammer, even more of a hammer lock

579
00:29:47.359 --> 00:29:49.920
<v Speaker 2>on that area of industrial production is going to matter,

580
00:29:51.119 --> 00:29:53.759
<v Speaker 2>you know, doesn't matter as much in wartime. I don't know.

581
00:29:53.759 --> 00:29:55.440
<v Speaker 2>I'm not sure if that kind of activity you can

582
00:29:55.599 --> 00:29:57.640
<v Speaker 2>can continue on. I mean, many of the places that

583
00:29:57.680 --> 00:29:59.839
<v Speaker 2>they're looking at to do that are in the Central

584
00:30:00.000 --> 00:30:02.359
<v Speaker 2>Acif these are not close to China for the most part,

585
00:30:02.839 --> 00:30:07.559
<v Speaker 2>So can they sustain that in wartime? I doubt it. Now,

586
00:30:07.599 --> 00:30:09.920
<v Speaker 2>are there other angles to it? Sure? I mean a

587
00:30:09.960 --> 00:30:13.240
<v Speaker 2>lot of places where these things exist are areas where

588
00:30:13.359 --> 00:30:15.960
<v Speaker 2>US vessels would be transitting back and forth, both in

589
00:30:15.960 --> 00:30:19.400
<v Speaker 2>peace time and wartime. Reporters have asked me, could they

590
00:30:19.599 --> 00:30:22.000
<v Speaker 2>leave behind things that would be useful for them? Yeah,

591
00:30:22.000 --> 00:30:25.240
<v Speaker 2>they could leave bhind sensors potentially if they've got industrial activity.

592
00:30:25.720 --> 00:30:28.400
<v Speaker 2>We have to remember, like anything that Chinese do, like,

593
00:30:28.440 --> 00:30:31.240
<v Speaker 2>they have a very specific military civil fusion strategy that

594
00:30:31.680 --> 00:30:36.240
<v Speaker 2>leverages their civilian industry for military purposes. They're quite clear

595
00:30:36.279 --> 00:30:38.359
<v Speaker 2>about it, although in recent years that they have kind

596
00:30:38.359 --> 00:30:40.880
<v Speaker 2>of talked a little less about it because it was

597
00:30:40.920 --> 00:30:43.480
<v Speaker 2>so obvious what they were doing. So you should assume

598
00:30:43.519 --> 00:30:46.039
<v Speaker 2>that if there's any industrial activity they're taking that could

599
00:30:46.079 --> 00:30:48.440
<v Speaker 2>have military benefits, that those are being used for military

600
00:30:48.440 --> 00:30:51.279
<v Speaker 2>purposes as well. So let's say they are doing it,

601
00:30:51.400 --> 00:30:53.400
<v Speaker 2>you know, mineral mining on the bottom of the ocean,

602
00:30:53.920 --> 00:30:57.200
<v Speaker 2>If there is a possibility that that activity could have

603
00:30:57.279 --> 00:31:00.920
<v Speaker 2>military benefits by harvesting data, by looking at the bottom type,

604
00:31:01.160 --> 00:31:04.519
<v Speaker 2>by leaving behind sensors, by whatever, I would assume they're

605
00:31:04.519 --> 00:31:05.960
<v Speaker 2>doing it. I mean, there's no reason that they would.

606
00:31:06.000 --> 00:31:08.680
<v Speaker 2>These are not Chinese companies, are not normal companies. They

607
00:31:08.680 --> 00:31:10.599
<v Speaker 2>don't just operate for a profit. They operate at the

608
00:31:10.599 --> 00:31:12.920
<v Speaker 2>behest of the CCP. So if there's a military utility,

609
00:31:12.960 --> 00:31:15.039
<v Speaker 2>is something they're doing, you should just seem they're there.

610
00:31:15.359 --> 00:31:16.680
<v Speaker 2>You should assume that they're getting it.

611
00:31:18.160 --> 00:31:23.359
<v Speaker 1>I have a question talking about a protractive fight, what

612
00:31:23.400 --> 00:31:25.799
<v Speaker 1>would it look like if we weren't a protracted fight

613
00:31:25.880 --> 00:31:30.119
<v Speaker 1>with China? And like, where are like statuses in terms

614
00:31:30.160 --> 00:31:33.440
<v Speaker 1>of shipbuilding is nowhere near. We don't have the capacity

615
00:31:33.480 --> 00:31:36.559
<v Speaker 1>anywhere near China what China does. So let's say a

616
00:31:36.599 --> 00:31:38.759
<v Speaker 1>war does last a couple of years and we lose

617
00:31:38.799 --> 00:31:40.799
<v Speaker 1>a couple of aircraft carriers, or we lose a couple

618
00:31:40.799 --> 00:31:43.480
<v Speaker 1>of destroyers. How do we replenish that?

619
00:31:45.839 --> 00:31:47.559
<v Speaker 2>I mean, I don't know at this point, I don't.

620
00:31:47.640 --> 00:31:50.359
<v Speaker 2>I have a hard time imagining. I guess keeping up. Uh,

621
00:31:50.519 --> 00:31:53.359
<v Speaker 2>they're they've got such a head start in shipbuilding. I mean,

622
00:31:53.680 --> 00:31:56.920
<v Speaker 2>could we improve from where we are? Yes? Absolutely, you

623
00:31:56.960 --> 00:31:59.400
<v Speaker 2>know we could reopen shipyards have been closed, but it

624
00:31:59.400 --> 00:32:01.759
<v Speaker 2>takes time to train the people to do that. We

625
00:32:01.839 --> 00:32:04.440
<v Speaker 2>have to remember the last time we were in a

626
00:32:05.039 --> 00:32:06.480
<v Speaker 2>you know, as I said, it's been a long time

627
00:32:06.519 --> 00:32:10.440
<v Speaker 2>since we were in a peer naval war at sea. Well,

628
00:32:10.440 --> 00:32:12.000
<v Speaker 2>the last time we did that was World War Two.

629
00:32:12.000 --> 00:32:15.039
<v Speaker 2>The last time the US fought a peer competitor at

630
00:32:15.039 --> 00:32:17.400
<v Speaker 2>sea was the Battle of Layte Gulf in October nineteen

631
00:32:17.440 --> 00:32:21.559
<v Speaker 2>forty four. So what did that conflict look like from

632
00:32:21.599 --> 00:32:25.960
<v Speaker 2>a protracted war perspective? Well, everybody knows, right the Chinese,

633
00:32:26.200 --> 00:32:28.799
<v Speaker 2>I'm sorry Chinese. The Japanese executed an attack you know,

634
00:32:28.799 --> 00:32:31.279
<v Speaker 2>it's Pearl Harbor and destroyed a significant portion of the

635
00:32:31.359 --> 00:32:33.920
<v Speaker 2>US Pacific fleet, and yet still lost the war because

636
00:32:34.279 --> 00:32:37.400
<v Speaker 2>there was a tidal wave of American naval production that

637
00:32:37.480 --> 00:32:40.920
<v Speaker 2>had begun in nineteen thirty eight and nineteen forty, you know,

638
00:32:41.119 --> 00:32:46.079
<v Speaker 2>years before that point. The Two Ocean Navy Acts of

639
00:32:46.160 --> 00:32:50.440
<v Speaker 2>nineteen thirty nineteen forty financed humongous increases in the size

640
00:32:50.480 --> 00:32:53.359
<v Speaker 2>of the US Navy, so that that large capital ship

641
00:32:53.359 --> 00:32:55.759
<v Speaker 2>production was already happening at the time the war started.

642
00:32:56.759 --> 00:32:59.599
<v Speaker 2>It didn't really matter if the Japanese lost had won

643
00:32:59.680 --> 00:33:01.400
<v Speaker 2>or lost the Battle of Midway, they still would have

644
00:33:01.440 --> 00:33:04.319
<v Speaker 2>been overwhelmed by US carrier production. It didn't really matter

645
00:33:04.359 --> 00:33:06.119
<v Speaker 2>what happened to the Battle of the Coral Sea. They

646
00:33:06.160 --> 00:33:08.599
<v Speaker 2>still would have been overwhelmed by US uh, you know,

647
00:33:08.680 --> 00:33:12.160
<v Speaker 2>capital ship production. So the thing that's scary to me

648
00:33:12.279 --> 00:33:14.680
<v Speaker 2>about the Chinese at this point is they're the ones

649
00:33:14.680 --> 00:33:17.319
<v Speaker 2>practicing executing the Pearl Harbor attack on the US in

650
00:33:17.359 --> 00:33:20.119
<v Speaker 2>the form of a surprise attack using ballistic missiles and

651
00:33:20.160 --> 00:33:23.279
<v Speaker 2>other and other weapons. But they also have the huge

652
00:33:23.319 --> 00:33:27.319
<v Speaker 2>industrial production on their side. So it's like, I'm worried

653
00:33:27.319 --> 00:33:29.240
<v Speaker 2>about a poor harbor happening to us, and we're the

654
00:33:29.240 --> 00:33:31.440
<v Speaker 2>ones that are going to get out produced after the

655
00:33:31.440 --> 00:33:35.279
<v Speaker 2>attack is over and after we've incurred those losses. So

656
00:33:36.000 --> 00:33:39.000
<v Speaker 2>I am deeply worried about about that capacity. I think

657
00:33:39.039 --> 00:33:42.519
<v Speaker 2>it also when you look at the ability to deal

658
00:33:42.559 --> 00:33:45.599
<v Speaker 2>with battle damage. You know, China has the US Navy

659
00:33:45.640 --> 00:33:48.079
<v Speaker 2>in peace time without any battle damage. It's having a

660
00:33:48.079 --> 00:33:51.799
<v Speaker 2>great deal of difficulty just completing its normal maintenance just

661
00:33:51.839 --> 00:33:55.039
<v Speaker 2>from our ships getting used not necessarily being uh, you know,

662
00:33:55.559 --> 00:33:59.079
<v Speaker 2>caught incurring battle damage. The Chinese ship building industry, it's

663
00:33:59.079 --> 00:34:02.640
<v Speaker 2>again it's dual purpose. The same shipyard pumps out warships

664
00:34:02.640 --> 00:34:05.559
<v Speaker 2>that pumps out commercial vessels, and they also do overhauls

665
00:34:05.559 --> 00:34:08.719
<v Speaker 2>and refits on military vessels as well. So that's more

666
00:34:08.800 --> 00:34:11.440
<v Speaker 2>capacity again than in the event of a conflict, could

667
00:34:11.480 --> 00:34:14.800
<v Speaker 2>be used to repair battle damage as well. So yeah,

668
00:34:14.840 --> 00:34:18.119
<v Speaker 2>I'm deeply worried about that asymmetry in shipyard capacity and

669
00:34:18.119 --> 00:34:19.199
<v Speaker 2>the event up protracted war.

670
00:34:20.800 --> 00:34:24.159
<v Speaker 5>Speaking of ase symmetries, especially in special operations world, a

671
00:34:24.239 --> 00:34:26.840
<v Speaker 5>lot of times we heard about unrestricted warfare. The book

672
00:34:27.079 --> 00:34:31.159
<v Speaker 5>that was written nineteen ninety nine by two plaaf Kernels,

673
00:34:31.920 --> 00:34:33.920
<v Speaker 5>this was kind of like the source document that we

674
00:34:34.000 --> 00:34:36.320
<v Speaker 5>had a lot when especially talking about great power competition

675
00:34:36.360 --> 00:34:38.199
<v Speaker 5>and like how to so com fit into that and

676
00:34:38.239 --> 00:34:40.599
<v Speaker 5>so on. That was like the doctrinal book we had

677
00:34:40.679 --> 00:34:43.639
<v Speaker 5>from the other side. How much weight does that still

678
00:34:43.679 --> 00:34:45.800
<v Speaker 5>actually hold from the other side, if it ever did,

679
00:34:46.199 --> 00:34:46.519
<v Speaker 5>If you.

680
00:34:46.480 --> 00:34:51.039
<v Speaker 2>Know, I tend to focus on the doctrinal texts that

681
00:34:51.079 --> 00:34:53.119
<v Speaker 2>I look at, or the Science of Campaigns from two

682
00:34:53.159 --> 00:34:55.480
<v Speaker 2>thousand and six, because those are more like the joint.

683
00:34:56.119 --> 00:34:58.679
<v Speaker 2>First of all, they're highly authoritative, so they're published by

684
00:34:58.719 --> 00:35:02.800
<v Speaker 2>their National Defense University, So two thousand and six Science

685
00:35:02.800 --> 00:35:05.679
<v Speaker 2>of Campaigns, the twenty thirteen Science of Military Strategy, and

686
00:35:05.679 --> 00:35:08.199
<v Speaker 2>then a twenty twenty version. One problem we have is

687
00:35:08.199 --> 00:35:10.000
<v Speaker 2>that a lot of that production is dropped off, Like

688
00:35:10.000 --> 00:35:12.679
<v Speaker 2>there's fewer of those texts that are now being released

689
00:35:12.960 --> 00:35:16.079
<v Speaker 2>into the open source world, so it's hard to know. Obviously,

690
00:35:16.079 --> 00:35:17.559
<v Speaker 2>there's been a lot of changes and a lot of

691
00:35:17.639 --> 00:35:20.239
<v Speaker 2>lessons that have been learned from the Russo Ukraine War

692
00:35:20.440 --> 00:35:23.320
<v Speaker 2>and drones in the last few years, so I'm sure

693
00:35:23.320 --> 00:35:25.559
<v Speaker 2>there have been changes to the way China is looking

694
00:35:25.920 --> 00:35:28.639
<v Speaker 2>at combat like that, but it's difficult to know because

695
00:35:28.679 --> 00:35:31.719
<v Speaker 2>they don't really replace that. They haven't really released those

696
00:35:31.800 --> 00:35:35.039
<v Speaker 2>the replacements for those texts. That being said, I think

697
00:35:35.159 --> 00:35:40.880
<v Speaker 2>much of the larger, you know, bigger muscle movement military

698
00:35:40.920 --> 00:35:44.360
<v Speaker 2>that we see being in production now is I think

699
00:35:44.360 --> 00:35:47.119
<v Speaker 2>it makes sense to see from a doctrine, from a

700
00:35:47.320 --> 00:35:49.840
<v Speaker 2>document like that from twenty years ago, that's kind of

701
00:35:49.880 --> 00:35:51.679
<v Speaker 2>the timeline for this is how we're going to do

702
00:35:51.760 --> 00:35:54.559
<v Speaker 2>this thing. Okay, let's start working on the product, the

703
00:35:54.599 --> 00:35:57.360
<v Speaker 2>weapons system development and then the testing, and you know,

704
00:35:57.440 --> 00:36:00.079
<v Speaker 2>twenty year timeline is kind of consistent with that. So

705
00:36:00.079 --> 00:36:02.199
<v Speaker 2>it makes sense that we'd be seeing in Chinese military

706
00:36:02.519 --> 00:36:05.440
<v Speaker 2>that in its kind of longer term larger capital investment

707
00:36:05.440 --> 00:36:10.000
<v Speaker 2>areas like ballistic missiles, hypersonics using merchant because they talk

708
00:36:10.039 --> 00:36:13.760
<v Speaker 2>in Science of Campaigns about using merchant merchant, you know,

709
00:36:13.840 --> 00:36:18.159
<v Speaker 2>merchant ships to supplement you know, selift. We see the

710
00:36:19.559 --> 00:36:21.440
<v Speaker 2>carriers being built. I mean, all that kind of stuff

711
00:36:21.480 --> 00:36:23.880
<v Speaker 2>is on that timeline. So those tend to be the

712
00:36:23.920 --> 00:36:27.320
<v Speaker 2>documents that I'm used. There's some fantastic translations by against

713
00:36:27.360 --> 00:36:30.800
<v Speaker 2>c ASI. China Aerospased Studies Institute has translated some of

714
00:36:30.840 --> 00:36:32.920
<v Speaker 2>those documents. The trouble is, again we're not saying much

715
00:36:32.960 --> 00:36:35.039
<v Speaker 2>in recent years. That's really dropped off a lot.

716
00:36:35.719 --> 00:36:38.239
<v Speaker 5>There's a book by Fravel called Active Defense. I don't

717
00:36:38.239 --> 00:36:40.920
<v Speaker 5>know if you've read that at Princeton that talks about

718
00:36:41.000 --> 00:36:43.800
<v Speaker 5>kind of the idea of luring the enemy in deep

719
00:36:43.920 --> 00:36:47.199
<v Speaker 5>and then engulfing them, which is based off like earlier

720
00:36:47.360 --> 00:36:49.960
<v Speaker 5>Maoist thought, but it has for some time remained I

721
00:36:49.960 --> 00:36:50.920
<v Speaker 5>don't know if it still remains.

722
00:36:50.960 --> 00:36:52.159
<v Speaker 2>I'm curious from that.

723
00:36:52.119 --> 00:36:55.719
<v Speaker 5>Strategic perspective, is that still a valid concept for them?

724
00:36:55.760 --> 00:36:58.800
<v Speaker 2>Sure? I mean, after defense, is that is still something

725
00:36:58.840 --> 00:37:01.639
<v Speaker 2>they've at least again the documents we have, they still

726
00:37:01.679 --> 00:37:04.920
<v Speaker 2>do talk about active defense, but they also talk, you know,

727
00:37:04.960 --> 00:37:10.239
<v Speaker 2>more recently have informationized warfare and then intelligentized warfare are

728
00:37:10.239 --> 00:37:13.960
<v Speaker 2>the kind of the more recent expansions to that we're

729
00:37:13.960 --> 00:37:17.559
<v Speaker 2>gonna remember too. Active defense is Shina's way in some

730
00:37:17.639 --> 00:37:20.159
<v Speaker 2>regard of saying that whatever they do is defensive, right.

731
00:37:20.280 --> 00:37:25.519
<v Speaker 2>So so like for example, if let's say Taiwan declared's

732
00:37:25.559 --> 00:37:29.880
<v Speaker 2>independence and they launch a humongous ballistic missile strike on Taiwan,

733
00:37:30.599 --> 00:37:33.880
<v Speaker 2>they would say that was defensive, right they were China.

734
00:37:34.039 --> 00:37:37.039
<v Speaker 2>Taiwan had insulted us, had caused us damage in the

735
00:37:37.039 --> 00:37:40.880
<v Speaker 2>political you know arena, and so we are defending ourselves

736
00:37:40.960 --> 00:37:44.239
<v Speaker 2>politically by launching this huge politic missile strike that is

737
00:37:44.320 --> 00:37:46.199
<v Speaker 2>not something anybody else on the planet. It's going to

738
00:37:46.239 --> 00:37:48.639
<v Speaker 2>be considered a defensive measure. But they will still call

739
00:37:48.679 --> 00:37:51.920
<v Speaker 2>it active defense in that regard. Or let's say that

740
00:37:52.199 --> 00:37:55.519
<v Speaker 2>you know, they saw the US had turned on the

741
00:37:55.519 --> 00:37:58.239
<v Speaker 2>O plan and was spinning up the tip fit to start,

742
00:37:58.559 --> 00:38:00.719
<v Speaker 2>you know, sending getting all our forces out there, and

743
00:38:00.719 --> 00:38:03.280
<v Speaker 2>they launched a strike on our bases in Asia. They

744
00:38:03.280 --> 00:38:05.199
<v Speaker 2>would call that defensive. They would say, they would call

745
00:38:05.239 --> 00:38:07.440
<v Speaker 2>that active defense. So it's kind of the convenient way

746
00:38:07.480 --> 00:38:09.480
<v Speaker 2>politically for them to call whatever it is they're doing

747
00:38:09.559 --> 00:38:10.760
<v Speaker 2>as a defensive thing.

748
00:38:12.639 --> 00:38:16.559
<v Speaker 1>What's O plan and T fib UH.

749
00:38:16.199 --> 00:38:20.000
<v Speaker 2>Plan all plants operational plans, So the theater level operational plan

750
00:38:20.079 --> 00:38:24.519
<v Speaker 2>for whatever you're doing, defensive Korea, defensive Taiwan, and then

751
00:38:24.599 --> 00:38:27.239
<v Speaker 2>the tip fit is the T p F D D

752
00:38:30.360 --> 00:38:33.679
<v Speaker 2>plan for it all stands for you on the spot.

753
00:38:33.920 --> 00:38:37.239
<v Speaker 2>It's basically the giant, the big, you know, canculator plan

754
00:38:37.320 --> 00:38:38.840
<v Speaker 2>of how to get all this stuff over there that

755
00:38:38.880 --> 00:38:40.280
<v Speaker 2>we need to execute the plan.

756
00:38:40.440 --> 00:38:44.239
<v Speaker 1>Essentially, I'm just for the for the audience and me too,

757
00:38:44.280 --> 00:38:47.800
<v Speaker 1>I didn't know what that meant. Sure, talking a little

758
00:38:47.840 --> 00:38:50.559
<v Speaker 1>bit more about the pro like the protracted war that

759
00:38:50.719 --> 00:38:53.400
<v Speaker 1>possible that they're planning for, are you worried at all

760
00:38:53.440 --> 00:38:56.719
<v Speaker 1>about like the D O D And it's like kind

761
00:38:56.719 --> 00:39:00.679
<v Speaker 1>of slow procurement process and able like the ability for

762
00:39:00.719 --> 00:39:02.320
<v Speaker 1>it to adjust, like we're seeing it a bit in

763
00:39:02.320 --> 00:39:05.000
<v Speaker 1>I ran right now with our missile defense. Obviously we

764
00:39:05.000 --> 00:39:06.559
<v Speaker 1>probably would have been in a better spot if we

765
00:39:06.599 --> 00:39:08.719
<v Speaker 1>had some low cost drones to be able to you know,

766
00:39:08.800 --> 00:39:11.159
<v Speaker 1>knock out the ballistic missiles and drones that are heading

767
00:39:11.159 --> 00:39:15.000
<v Speaker 1>over to our bases. Are you worried about something like that.

768
00:39:15.079 --> 00:39:19.320
<v Speaker 1>Let's say a conflict lasted you know years, our our

769
00:39:19.480 --> 00:39:25.239
<v Speaker 1>kind of inability to adjust and improvise, I think that well.

770
00:39:25.159 --> 00:39:28.960
<v Speaker 2>So to some degree, you know, the necessity is the

771
00:39:28.960 --> 00:39:32.360
<v Speaker 2>mother invention. Right, So where do we see the most

772
00:39:32.639 --> 00:39:37.000
<v Speaker 2>aggressive innovation and action happening? And it's in Ukraine. It's

773
00:39:37.000 --> 00:39:40.000
<v Speaker 2>in Russia because they have to write there's nobody gets

774
00:39:40.039 --> 00:39:44.719
<v Speaker 2>bet out of shape about about the you know, relatively

775
00:39:44.719 --> 00:39:47.880
<v Speaker 2>small risks that you might be taking when the larger

776
00:39:47.960 --> 00:39:49.719
<v Speaker 2>risk is that you're going to lose a war and

777
00:39:49.960 --> 00:39:54.199
<v Speaker 2>you know, get killed. So it's it's extremely difficult, I think,

778
00:39:54.280 --> 00:39:56.960
<v Speaker 2>to cause change of the scale that it needs to

779
00:39:57.039 --> 00:40:00.639
<v Speaker 2>happen at in a peacetime military. And yes, we're fighting

780
00:40:00.679 --> 00:40:03.239
<v Speaker 2>a war against Iran and there is innovation happening there,

781
00:40:03.360 --> 00:40:05.480
<v Speaker 2>but it is not an existential war for the United States.

782
00:40:06.960 --> 00:40:09.320
<v Speaker 2>Do you still have bureaucratic comparatives that can over can

783
00:40:09.320 --> 00:40:12.360
<v Speaker 2>override things? You can still have you know, if you're

784
00:40:12.360 --> 00:40:15.000
<v Speaker 2>building a runway somewhere, you know, environmental issues. You can

785
00:40:15.079 --> 00:40:18.960
<v Speaker 2>have all kinds of rules that Congress has has put

786
00:40:18.960 --> 00:40:22.599
<v Speaker 2>in place about sourcing things, buy American rules, like a

787
00:40:22.639 --> 00:40:24.639
<v Speaker 2>lot of that can get in the way of doing things.

788
00:40:25.159 --> 00:40:26.760
<v Speaker 2>That's what we call red tape, right. I mean, it's

789
00:40:26.760 --> 00:40:29.320
<v Speaker 2>all all of it, every every every little bit of

790
00:40:29.360 --> 00:40:32.840
<v Speaker 2>red tape is somebody's good idea, right, I mean, somebody says, hey,

791
00:40:32.840 --> 00:40:35.599
<v Speaker 2>we should make sure we're not buying things that are

792
00:40:35.960 --> 00:40:38.199
<v Speaker 2>or you know, Iranian sourced. Yeah, sounds great, Right, So

793
00:40:38.239 --> 00:40:41.280
<v Speaker 2>that's one more bureaucratic requirement, because the bureaucrat is there

794
00:40:41.320 --> 00:40:44.280
<v Speaker 2>has to be some person that that verifies that, yes,

795
00:40:44.320 --> 00:40:46.119
<v Speaker 2>we are and in fact not buying stuff from that's

796
00:40:46.239 --> 00:40:48.239
<v Speaker 2>Chinese source. Well, that's what we call it bureaucrat, right,

797
00:40:48.239 --> 00:40:49.800
<v Speaker 2>It is some expert that make sure you're actually doing

798
00:40:49.840 --> 00:40:51.320
<v Speaker 2>the way you said the rule. It seems like a

799
00:40:51.320 --> 00:40:53.719
<v Speaker 2>good idea at the time. You know that when you

800
00:40:53.800 --> 00:40:55.719
<v Speaker 2>combine all those things together and it makes it harder

801
00:40:55.760 --> 00:40:58.480
<v Speaker 2>and harder and harder to do things. Ultimately, if you

802
00:40:58.480 --> 00:41:01.199
<v Speaker 2>have a no kidding, existential war, you can say that

803
00:41:01.320 --> 00:41:04.119
<v Speaker 2>is all off the table, all the requirements are waved

804
00:41:04.679 --> 00:41:07.760
<v Speaker 2>declaring emergency and and and you can move forward faster.

805
00:41:07.880 --> 00:41:09.519
<v Speaker 2>But it's difficult to do that in the and the

806
00:41:09.559 --> 00:41:13.519
<v Speaker 2>absence of existential conflict. So I do worry about our

807
00:41:13.559 --> 00:41:16.760
<v Speaker 2>ability to move fast and and there are some good signs,

808
00:41:16.800 --> 00:41:19.320
<v Speaker 2>for sure. You see a lot of defense new defense

809
00:41:19.360 --> 00:41:23.280
<v Speaker 2>startups that are doing interesting things. But what I worry

810
00:41:23.320 --> 00:41:26.960
<v Speaker 2>about is that some of those, certainly in the in

811
00:41:27.239 --> 00:41:29.760
<v Speaker 2>the event of an air and naval dominated conflict, aren't

812
00:41:29.840 --> 00:41:33.960
<v Speaker 2>quite as transformational as people might think they are. You know,

813
00:41:34.000 --> 00:41:36.719
<v Speaker 2>one of my one of my sayings that I semi

814
00:41:36.719 --> 00:41:39.880
<v Speaker 2>famous for in Twitter circles is there are no magic beans. Right,

815
00:41:39.920 --> 00:41:42.920
<v Speaker 2>there's no there's no magic beans. There's no free lunches

816
00:41:44.760 --> 00:41:46.960
<v Speaker 2>like drones, for example, at sea. I mean, they're not

817
00:41:47.039 --> 00:41:48.760
<v Speaker 2>as new at sea as people think they are, right

818
00:41:49.000 --> 00:41:51.800
<v Speaker 2>the US, the US, you know, during the Cold War,

819
00:41:52.400 --> 00:41:55.920
<v Speaker 2>we worried about cruise missiles, right, We're scary Russian cruise

820
00:41:55.920 --> 00:42:00.599
<v Speaker 2>missiles mock three. We worried about homing torpedo right. Those

821
00:42:00.599 --> 00:42:03.519
<v Speaker 2>are basically drone. So you know, you say, hey, there's

822
00:42:03.559 --> 00:42:06.599
<v Speaker 2>a one way attack drone that's going to attack ship

823
00:42:06.679 --> 00:42:08.920
<v Speaker 2>to sea. Well yeah, those are called cruise missiles, right,

824
00:42:09.239 --> 00:42:12.440
<v Speaker 2>And quite honestly, one hundred miles per hour cruise missile

825
00:42:12.480 --> 00:42:14.679
<v Speaker 2>that's propeller powered is not as scary as what we've

826
00:42:14.719 --> 00:42:18.039
<v Speaker 2>been dealing with now for decades. If you look at

827
00:42:18.039 --> 00:42:20.079
<v Speaker 2>the ranges involved in some of those weapons systems, if

828
00:42:20.079 --> 00:42:22.360
<v Speaker 2>you look at the huge blue Pacific, right, they're not

829
00:42:22.519 --> 00:42:24.639
<v Speaker 2>They just don't operate that far in many cases. So

830
00:42:25.159 --> 00:42:27.320
<v Speaker 2>I think things may be a little less transformational than

831
00:42:27.480 --> 00:42:30.159
<v Speaker 2>some folks think. So. So some of those defense startups

832
00:42:30.199 --> 00:42:32.880
<v Speaker 2>that are kind of their shining light of hope may

833
00:42:32.880 --> 00:42:35.840
<v Speaker 2>not be quite as transformational in an high end air

834
00:42:35.880 --> 00:42:39.880
<v Speaker 2>on naval war as people might think. I do think

835
00:42:39.920 --> 00:42:41.800
<v Speaker 2>so if you look at the on the shipbolding question.

836
00:42:41.800 --> 00:42:43.159
<v Speaker 2>You know, one thing I saw pointed out the other

837
00:42:43.239 --> 00:42:45.480
<v Speaker 2>day that where the US actually does have an asymmetric

838
00:42:45.519 --> 00:42:49.320
<v Speaker 2>advantage is in boat production. So if you look at

839
00:42:50.639 --> 00:42:53.360
<v Speaker 2>US boat production, the US is I think the world's

840
00:42:53.400 --> 00:42:56.639
<v Speaker 2>largest producer of boats, not ships, but boats so like,

841
00:42:56.800 --> 00:42:59.519
<v Speaker 2>and a lot of it's driven by US boating the

842
00:42:59.519 --> 00:42:59.920
<v Speaker 2>boating can.

843
00:43:00.360 --> 00:43:01.639
<v Speaker 1>Right, you've got I want to go out in the

844
00:43:01.679 --> 00:43:03.000
<v Speaker 1>lake and you know, yeah, go down.

845
00:43:03.440 --> 00:43:05.800
<v Speaker 2>Well guess what you can take that same whole form

846
00:43:06.199 --> 00:43:08.360
<v Speaker 2>and put a GPS. You know, so I already got

847
00:43:08.360 --> 00:43:10.199
<v Speaker 2>a GPS on it. You know, you could put some

848
00:43:10.239 --> 00:43:12.079
<v Speaker 2>sign up, some sort of autonomist thing on it, load

849
00:43:12.119 --> 00:43:13.679
<v Speaker 2>it full of T and T and now you've got it.

850
00:43:13.719 --> 00:43:15.800
<v Speaker 2>You've got a one way attack drone. And we have

851
00:43:16.000 --> 00:43:18.320
<v Speaker 2>plenty of the world's largest producers of that sort of thing,

852
00:43:18.679 --> 00:43:21.360
<v Speaker 2>personal watercraft and all these all these Ukrainian USVs, a

853
00:43:21.360 --> 00:43:24.079
<v Speaker 2>lot of them are basically modified jet skis. We're actually

854
00:43:24.079 --> 00:43:26.760
<v Speaker 2>pretty well placed to do that. The problem is, how

855
00:43:26.760 --> 00:43:28.679
<v Speaker 2>do you get something like that six thousand miles across

856
00:43:28.679 --> 00:43:32.239
<v Speaker 2>the Pacific? So unless we're fighting a war here and

857
00:43:32.280 --> 00:43:33.679
<v Speaker 2>then we've really got problems.

858
00:43:34.480 --> 00:43:36.559
<v Speaker 5>That power projection problem. That brings up an excellent point

859
00:43:36.599 --> 00:43:38.519
<v Speaker 5>about allies and partners, because you remember, you know, the

860
00:43:38.599 --> 00:43:41.320
<v Speaker 5>twenty twenty one NDS for example, mentioned allies and partners

861
00:43:41.360 --> 00:43:43.000
<v Speaker 5>like one hundred and twenty eight times something like that.

862
00:43:43.360 --> 00:43:47.360
<v Speaker 5>So obviously we have allies and partners Indonesia, Philippines, Australia,

863
00:43:47.519 --> 00:43:49.239
<v Speaker 5>you know, you name it, they're there, we can work

864
00:43:49.239 --> 00:43:51.440
<v Speaker 5>your shoulders shoulder with them, not just Taiwan, but also

865
00:43:51.480 --> 00:43:54.639
<v Speaker 5>obviously Japan with the sofa in a you know, enhanced

866
00:43:54.639 --> 00:43:57.719
<v Speaker 5>defense security co operation agreement with Philippines. All this is

867
00:43:57.719 --> 00:43:59.000
<v Speaker 5>like kind of designed.

868
00:43:58.639 --> 00:44:01.480
<v Speaker 2>Just for that battle. So let's say that.

869
00:44:01.400 --> 00:44:05.199
<v Speaker 5>Battle starts, whatever that looks like, not for our allies

870
00:44:05.199 --> 00:44:07.559
<v Speaker 5>and partners. What about China's allies and partners. You know,

871
00:44:07.599 --> 00:44:10.920
<v Speaker 5>they've got security cooperation agreements with Russia and Iran of

872
00:44:11.000 --> 00:44:14.039
<v Speaker 5>varying degrees, you know, and other countries around, especially you know,

873
00:44:14.079 --> 00:44:17.079
<v Speaker 5>Solomon Islands for example. What's what are the Solomon's going

874
00:44:17.159 --> 00:44:20.039
<v Speaker 5>to do? What kind of basing access and overflight is

875
00:44:20.159 --> 00:44:22.440
<v Speaker 5>China looking for? I'm curious from that kind of perspective.

876
00:44:23.760 --> 00:44:26.360
<v Speaker 2>That's a great question, and it's it's for one thing,

877
00:44:26.360 --> 00:44:28.719
<v Speaker 2>they certainly don't have the same number as we do.

878
00:44:28.800 --> 00:44:31.719
<v Speaker 2>I mean, you know, what's I don't like. I have

879
00:44:31.760 --> 00:44:34.880
<v Speaker 2>a hard time imagining Russia choosing to get into a

880
00:44:34.960 --> 00:44:37.679
<v Speaker 2>kinetic war with the United States just to help China

881
00:44:37.719 --> 00:44:40.519
<v Speaker 2>take Taiwan. But let's say that Russians just send the

882
00:44:40.559 --> 00:44:42.760
<v Speaker 2>Pacific Fleet out right. They don't, they don't. They're not

883
00:44:42.760 --> 00:44:44.880
<v Speaker 2>sending them out to actually shoot at us, but they

884
00:44:44.920 --> 00:44:46.679
<v Speaker 2>just send them out, and all of a sudden, we

885
00:44:46.719 --> 00:44:48.000
<v Speaker 2>have to worry about that, like we have to cover

886
00:44:48.079 --> 00:44:50.199
<v Speaker 2>down on that. So when we've already got our hands

887
00:44:50.239 --> 00:44:52.599
<v Speaker 2>full with the Chinese navy, now you've got there huge

888
00:44:52.599 --> 00:44:54.760
<v Speaker 2>distraction of let's say a bunch of Russian submarines out

889
00:44:54.800 --> 00:44:59.000
<v Speaker 2>rowing around the Central Pacific or Eastern Pacific. You know,

890
00:44:59.039 --> 00:45:01.400
<v Speaker 2>that can certainly make things more more complicated. Let's say

891
00:45:01.400 --> 00:45:05.039
<v Speaker 2>the North Koreans are start rattling their saber and they've

892
00:45:05.360 --> 00:45:07.519
<v Speaker 2>at least doing enough that the South Koreans decide, you

893
00:45:07.559 --> 00:45:10.960
<v Speaker 2>know what, we don't really want you using our airfields

894
00:45:11.679 --> 00:45:14.639
<v Speaker 2>in this conflict over Taiwan because we don't want to

895
00:45:14.639 --> 00:45:17.480
<v Speaker 2>get North Korea into this. They could certainly do things

896
00:45:17.480 --> 00:45:22.000
<v Speaker 2>to make life much more complicated. I don't see them.

897
00:45:22.280 --> 00:45:25.239
<v Speaker 2>I don't think I see those, you know, Russian North

898
00:45:25.320 --> 00:45:28.440
<v Speaker 2>Korea actively engaging in combat operations, but they could certainly

899
00:45:28.519 --> 00:45:31.679
<v Speaker 2>make them already strapped US force, and now US and

900
00:45:31.719 --> 00:45:33.920
<v Speaker 2>Allied force have that much more to worry about at

901
00:45:34.000 --> 00:45:37.079
<v Speaker 2>least cover down on the Central Pacific. I mean, you know,

902
00:45:37.440 --> 00:45:41.440
<v Speaker 2>it's sensible that they would be building building bridges there

903
00:45:41.639 --> 00:45:44.880
<v Speaker 2>for the future, because you know, let's face it, a

904
00:45:45.000 --> 00:45:47.360
<v Speaker 2>Chinese navy that in fifteen or twenty years is the

905
00:45:47.400 --> 00:45:49.840
<v Speaker 2>equal of the US Pacific fleet, that is not a

906
00:45:49.960 --> 00:45:51.800
<v Speaker 2>navy that has to fight the US pacifically in the

907
00:45:51.800 --> 00:45:54.840
<v Speaker 2>Western Pacific. They can push out to the Central Pacific

908
00:45:54.880 --> 00:45:58.320
<v Speaker 2>now at that point, and now those places start to

909
00:45:58.360 --> 00:46:00.599
<v Speaker 2>matter a lot more for the basing and access. Right. So,

910
00:46:01.039 --> 00:46:03.480
<v Speaker 2>the Chinese haven't built a lot of naval bases overseas,

911
00:46:03.840 --> 00:46:06.039
<v Speaker 2>but Chinese contractors have built a lot of ports and

912
00:46:06.079 --> 00:46:11.719
<v Speaker 2>airfields overseas that are ostensibly commercial. And so seeing these

913
00:46:11.800 --> 00:46:13.599
<v Speaker 2>kinds of things in development in places like that that

914
00:46:13.760 --> 00:46:17.320
<v Speaker 2>could someday be a Chinese base, and in some cases

915
00:46:17.400 --> 00:46:19.039
<v Speaker 2>maybe whether the locals want it to be or not.

916
00:46:19.519 --> 00:46:23.079
<v Speaker 5>I remember that, And actually the Gwadar port in Pakistan

917
00:46:23.119 --> 00:46:25.679
<v Speaker 5>that's run by China. I'm curious what role might something

918
00:46:25.719 --> 00:46:27.920
<v Speaker 5>like that far flung or Jibouti, for example, they have

919
00:46:28.119 --> 00:46:30.880
<v Speaker 5>troops there as well. What role might those far fall

920
00:46:30.920 --> 00:46:34.280
<v Speaker 5>on places play if the war like kicked off in Taiwan.

921
00:46:35.679 --> 00:46:39.320
<v Speaker 2>So I think where that matters is. You know, China's

922
00:46:39.360 --> 00:46:42.119
<v Speaker 2>made quite clear in their defense white papers that maintaining

923
00:46:42.119 --> 00:46:44.559
<v Speaker 2>their sea lines of communication is a huge priority, right,

924
00:46:44.679 --> 00:46:47.400
<v Speaker 2>what makes sense, right, they are they're the world's largest

925
00:46:47.440 --> 00:46:50.559
<v Speaker 2>trading nation, they're the world's largest exporter. They have the

926
00:46:50.559 --> 00:46:54.320
<v Speaker 2>world's largest largest bridge of marine so that really matters

927
00:46:54.320 --> 00:46:57.119
<v Speaker 2>to them. And if you look at the sources of

928
00:46:57.360 --> 00:47:00.280
<v Speaker 2>raw materials that China has, like the some of the

929
00:47:00.360 --> 00:47:02.480
<v Speaker 2>key sources are across the Indian Ocean, so it's raw

930
00:47:02.480 --> 00:47:06.760
<v Speaker 2>materials or what not from Africa and energy from the

931
00:47:06.800 --> 00:47:10.440
<v Speaker 2>Middle East. So we should expect to see them, you know,

932
00:47:11.119 --> 00:47:14.559
<v Speaker 2>create infrastructure over time that would allow them in conflict

933
00:47:14.559 --> 00:47:16.199
<v Speaker 2>to be able to try to maintain those tea lines

934
00:47:16.199 --> 00:47:20.480
<v Speaker 2>of communication. So water, that's an example that where there

935
00:47:20.519 --> 00:47:24.280
<v Speaker 2>have been trying to make in roads in the Maldives, Tanzania.

936
00:47:24.920 --> 00:47:28.199
<v Speaker 2>There's plenty of places across those across the Indian Ocean

937
00:47:28.519 --> 00:47:31.079
<v Speaker 2>in particular, that you see them in making investments in

938
00:47:31.119 --> 00:47:33.639
<v Speaker 2>the kinds of places that you would imagine they would

939
00:47:33.639 --> 00:47:35.719
<v Speaker 2>be interested in. You know, one thing I found kind

940
00:47:35.719 --> 00:47:37.559
<v Speaker 2>of interesting in a lot of these places is there

941
00:47:37.679 --> 00:47:39.559
<v Speaker 2>they tend to be a little bit out of the country.

942
00:47:40.599 --> 00:47:42.960
<v Speaker 2>You know, hamp and Tote Port for example, in Sri Lanka.

943
00:47:43.280 --> 00:47:47.639
<v Speaker 2>Water is kind of out there in the country. Why

944
00:47:47.639 --> 00:47:52.039
<v Speaker 2>does that matter? Well, I mean they will. People will

945
00:47:52.039 --> 00:47:54.320
<v Speaker 2>say things like, well, the local host nation has said

946
00:47:54.320 --> 00:47:56.920
<v Speaker 2>that this isn't for military use, Well, what if it

947
00:47:56.920 --> 00:48:00.239
<v Speaker 2>doesn't matter with the locals think? I mean, in World

948
00:48:00.239 --> 00:48:02.239
<v Speaker 2>War two, right, we fought our way across the Pacific.

949
00:48:02.280 --> 00:48:04.320
<v Speaker 2>We've built bases all over the place. Does anybody even

950
00:48:04.360 --> 00:48:07.639
<v Speaker 2>know what the local communities thought about about the bases

951
00:48:07.679 --> 00:48:09.760
<v Speaker 2>that we used to fight our way across the Pacific?

952
00:48:09.960 --> 00:48:12.960
<v Speaker 2>Do you think we asked? I mean, Xiji Ping is

953
00:48:13.000 --> 00:48:14.840
<v Speaker 2>not going to let his own people decide whether he

954
00:48:14.920 --> 00:48:17.880
<v Speaker 2>launches or wins or loses World War three. He certainly

955
00:48:17.880 --> 00:48:19.199
<v Speaker 2>doesn't care what they kind of care what the Sri

956
00:48:19.239 --> 00:48:21.719
<v Speaker 2>Lankans think. If he has a defensible base that he

957
00:48:21.719 --> 00:48:24.320
<v Speaker 2>can use and put pla and marines around it and

958
00:48:24.360 --> 00:48:26.280
<v Speaker 2>tell the locals, hey, we're going to use this for

959
00:48:26.360 --> 00:48:27.960
<v Speaker 2>what we're going to use it for and just stay

960
00:48:27.960 --> 00:48:30.320
<v Speaker 2>out of it. You know, That's how that I think

961
00:48:30.480 --> 00:48:34.320
<v Speaker 2>potentially could work. So, if they've built the facility, if

962
00:48:34.360 --> 00:48:36.119
<v Speaker 2>it's there, if it can be used in the event

963
00:48:36.159 --> 00:48:38.320
<v Speaker 2>of a hind conflict, I would expect it to be used,

964
00:48:38.920 --> 00:48:41.719
<v Speaker 2>regardless of any previous agreements or what anybody said about

965
00:48:41.760 --> 00:48:42.280
<v Speaker 2>what it's for.

966
00:48:43.840 --> 00:48:47.559
<v Speaker 3>Jackie got something, I mean, I guess the last thing

967
00:48:48.280 --> 00:48:51.000
<v Speaker 3>and we touched on it briefly is the subject of

968
00:48:51.039 --> 00:48:54.880
<v Speaker 3>a depletion of stockpiles of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and

969
00:48:54.880 --> 00:48:55.280
<v Speaker 3>so on.

970
00:48:55.920 --> 00:48:57.719
<v Speaker 4>And John and I have talked about this before.

971
00:48:57.800 --> 00:49:00.360
<v Speaker 3>I mean, there's just over the weekend, I believe Mike

972
00:49:00.400 --> 00:49:04.039
<v Speaker 3>Waltz was in the press talking about this, you know,

973
00:49:04.159 --> 00:49:07.599
<v Speaker 3>blaming the last administration for it being depleted and then saying, actually,

974
00:49:07.679 --> 00:49:11.480
<v Speaker 3>it's not depleted, but politics aside. I think that goes

975
00:49:11.519 --> 00:49:16.840
<v Speaker 3>to your procurement and sustainment side of this conversation. Is

976
00:49:17.000 --> 00:49:19.440
<v Speaker 3>what you're seeing in our fight with Iran and the

977
00:49:19.480 --> 00:49:24.039
<v Speaker 3>depletion of weapons stockpiles? Is that concerning for you as

978
00:49:24.159 --> 00:49:27.719
<v Speaker 3>we move into a theoretical conflict with China in the future.

979
00:49:29.039 --> 00:49:33.880
<v Speaker 2>So I have to say that it may surprise people

980
00:49:34.639 --> 00:49:37.679
<v Speaker 2>to hear me say that I'm not quite I don't

981
00:49:37.760 --> 00:49:41.280
<v Speaker 2>think the depletion of stock interceptor of stockpiles makes quite

982
00:49:41.320 --> 00:49:47.280
<v Speaker 2>as big of a difference for you know, for China's

983
00:49:47.320 --> 00:49:50.320
<v Speaker 2>calculus and deciding whether to pull off something, because I'm

984
00:49:50.320 --> 00:49:52.400
<v Speaker 2>not sure those stockpiles are really going to matter much

985
00:49:52.440 --> 00:49:57.239
<v Speaker 2>after the first salvo. Regardless of how deep the magazine is.

986
00:49:57.840 --> 00:50:02.480
<v Speaker 2>At US bases in Asia, I expect the interceptor batteries

987
00:50:02.519 --> 00:50:04.960
<v Speaker 2>to be overwhelmed by the sheer number of Chinese missiles.

988
00:50:05.280 --> 00:50:08.119
<v Speaker 2>I mean, I have a hard time imagining that our

989
00:50:08.199 --> 00:50:10.199
<v Speaker 2>stockpiles are going to get so low that there isn't

990
00:50:10.239 --> 00:50:12.719
<v Speaker 2>one set of missiles on the rails ready to go

991
00:50:12.920 --> 00:50:16.239
<v Speaker 2>for that first shot. But I mean, Chinese doctrine is

992
00:50:16.280 --> 00:50:19.480
<v Speaker 2>pretty straightforward that some of the first things they hit

993
00:50:19.920 --> 00:50:23.079
<v Speaker 2>in a firepower strike is blistic missile defenses. Right they

994
00:50:23.119 --> 00:50:27.480
<v Speaker 2>have They have you know, DF twenty seven hypersonic missiles

995
00:50:27.519 --> 00:50:30.440
<v Speaker 2>that are probably very difficult to shoot down and appear

996
00:50:30.480 --> 00:50:32.519
<v Speaker 2>to be pretty accurate. That's the kind of thing I

997
00:50:32.519 --> 00:50:35.039
<v Speaker 2>would expect them to use to destroy D and D

998
00:50:35.320 --> 00:50:38.599
<v Speaker 2>rather than deplete it. So you know, how many sets

999
00:50:38.599 --> 00:50:41.039
<v Speaker 2>of reloads we have in the magazine on base, I'm

1000
00:50:41.039 --> 00:50:43.159
<v Speaker 2>not sure it matters all that much, to be honest.

1001
00:50:43.159 --> 00:50:44.679
<v Speaker 1>When the launcher is blown up.

1002
00:50:44.960 --> 00:50:47.639
<v Speaker 2>If the launchers are destroyed and the runways are createred

1003
00:50:47.639 --> 00:50:50.239
<v Speaker 2>and you can't fly anything in anyways, and and the

1004
00:50:50.679 --> 00:50:52.559
<v Speaker 2>you know, and the and the crews that operate them

1005
00:50:52.559 --> 00:50:55.920
<v Speaker 2>have been killed by anti personnel air bursts, and I mean, I.

1006
00:50:55.960 --> 00:50:59.639
<v Speaker 3>Just your picture matters, got like our base and Bahrain

1007
00:50:59.760 --> 00:51:01.880
<v Speaker 3>that just overwhelmed and evacuated.

1008
00:51:03.239 --> 00:51:06.679
<v Speaker 2>Far beyond that. I mean, like you know, people, I

1009
00:51:06.679 --> 00:51:09.599
<v Speaker 2>think people look at what the Iranian missiles have done,

1010
00:51:09.639 --> 00:51:12.000
<v Speaker 2>and oh, they shot one hundred missiles at our carrier.

1011
00:51:12.039 --> 00:51:15.599
<v Speaker 2>None of them hit. Okay, Iran is not China, right,

1012
00:51:15.639 --> 00:51:18.800
<v Speaker 2>The PLA Rocket Force is not the IRGC Coods Force.

1013
00:51:18.840 --> 00:51:21.360
<v Speaker 2>They are not the same. Go look at Iran's version

1014
00:51:21.400 --> 00:51:23.800
<v Speaker 2>of a stealth fighter and compared it to China's actual version.

1015
00:51:24.280 --> 00:51:26.960
<v Speaker 2>Go look at Iran's version of a frigate and compared

1016
00:51:26.960 --> 00:51:29.440
<v Speaker 2>it to an actual Chinese frigate. I mean, they're just

1017
00:51:29.679 --> 00:51:31.960
<v Speaker 2>not the same thing. It's harder to tell those differences

1018
00:51:32.000 --> 00:51:34.440
<v Speaker 2>with missiles, I think, because they kind of all look

1019
00:51:34.480 --> 00:51:37.480
<v Speaker 2>the same to people, as opposed to the kind of

1020
00:51:37.480 --> 00:51:41.000
<v Speaker 2>look at cardboard looking stealth fighters at their Anians, you know, parade.

1021
00:51:42.119 --> 00:51:44.599
<v Speaker 2>But I think the differences are just as deep, and

1022
00:51:44.679 --> 00:51:47.559
<v Speaker 2>I think any confidence and we've seen how challenging it

1023
00:51:47.599 --> 00:51:50.480
<v Speaker 2>was even with Iranian missiles to defend our bases, and

1024
00:51:50.719 --> 00:51:54.119
<v Speaker 2>yet we seem to not be refusing to harden anything

1025
00:51:54.119 --> 00:51:56.519
<v Speaker 2>in the Western Pacific. The Air Force isn't budgeting any

1026
00:51:56.519 --> 00:51:59.320
<v Speaker 2>money for it. I beat this drum over and over again.

1027
00:51:59.519 --> 00:52:01.800
<v Speaker 2>That is just say nothing of drones. Like. Let's remember

1028
00:52:02.159 --> 00:52:06.960
<v Speaker 2>China is the world's largest drone producer there. I worry

1029
00:52:07.039 --> 00:52:10.800
<v Speaker 2>deeply about drone strikes. You know, people may recall Operation

1030
00:52:10.880 --> 00:52:14.360
<v Speaker 2>Spider Web right, the Ukrainian attack on Russian air bases.

1031
00:52:15.000 --> 00:52:17.239
<v Speaker 2>I worry a lot about that kind of thing happening

1032
00:52:17.239 --> 00:52:22.880
<v Speaker 2>to us. That can make the Bahrain stuff look relatively

1033
00:52:22.960 --> 00:52:25.960
<v Speaker 2>tame in a lot of ways.

1034
00:52:27.280 --> 00:52:29.559
<v Speaker 1>Tom, we got to get you back, man. This is great,

1035
00:52:29.599 --> 00:52:33.920
<v Speaker 1>great episode. I mean, I don't feel great about it, obviously.

1036
00:52:34.039 --> 00:52:36.199
<v Speaker 2>Everybody says that they talked to me like so much

1037
00:52:36.239 --> 00:52:38.960
<v Speaker 2>fun to talk to you. We're screwed, hopefully not.

1038
00:52:39.000 --> 00:52:43.039
<v Speaker 1>I want everyone to go and check out Tom. If

1039
00:52:43.039 --> 00:52:44.599
<v Speaker 1>you have something to plug men, feel free that I

1040
00:52:44.599 --> 00:52:45.039
<v Speaker 1>hadn't hit.

1041
00:52:46.679 --> 00:52:48.360
<v Speaker 2>I'll provide links to you guys for some of the

1042
00:52:48.360 --> 00:52:50.760
<v Speaker 2>things that I mentioned, and you can feel free to

1043
00:52:50.920 --> 00:52:51.880
<v Speaker 2>put those in there if you want.

1044
00:52:52.079 --> 00:52:54.039
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, the links will be down on the description and

1045
00:52:54.119 --> 00:52:57.960
<v Speaker 1>in the show notes if you're listening on audio. And

1046
00:52:58.000 --> 00:53:00.360
<v Speaker 1>Tom is a great Twitter follow if you're in sitting

1047
00:53:00.400 --> 00:53:02.800
<v Speaker 1>this he is, He's got his ear to the ground.

1048
00:53:02.800 --> 00:53:05.079
<v Speaker 1>You know what's he knows what's going on of course,

1049
00:53:05.159 --> 00:53:07.519
<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Hackett Jack all their links are in the description

1050
00:53:07.599 --> 00:53:09.480
<v Speaker 1>as well, Tom a Pleasure.

1051
00:53:11.039 --> 00:53:12.360
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, thank you, great you.

1052
00:53:16.880 --> 00:53:18.719
<v Speaker 3>Hey guys, I want to take a moment to tell

1053
00:53:18.719 --> 00:53:22.280
<v Speaker 3>you about the Team House Podcast newsletter. If you go

1054
00:53:22.360 --> 00:53:25.559
<v Speaker 3>and subscribe, it's totally free, and what it will do

1055
00:53:25.679 --> 00:53:29.039
<v Speaker 3>is aggregate all of our data, all of our content

1056
00:53:29.079 --> 00:53:31.679
<v Speaker 3>that we put out, uh, the things that are on

1057
00:53:31.760 --> 00:53:36.760
<v Speaker 3>the Team House on our geopolitics podcast, Eyes On, things

1058
00:53:36.800 --> 00:53:40.079
<v Speaker 3>that I write journalistically with Sean Naylor on the high Side,

1059
00:53:41.039 --> 00:53:44.559
<v Speaker 3>anything else that we have going on, books, we recommend

1060
00:53:45.440 --> 00:53:48.320
<v Speaker 3>upcoming guests that we have coming on the show, and

1061
00:53:48.599 --> 00:53:51.079
<v Speaker 3>also you know, filtering in some fun stuff in there

1062
00:53:51.119 --> 00:53:53.679
<v Speaker 3>as well. If you'll go and check it out. We

1063
00:53:53.719 --> 00:53:55.519
<v Speaker 3>send it out just once a week. We don't want

1064
00:53:55.559 --> 00:53:58.079
<v Speaker 3>to spam you guys. It's just a kind of roll

1065
00:53:58.159 --> 00:54:00.079
<v Speaker 3>up of all of our content.

1066
00:53:59.719 --> 00:54:00.960
<v Speaker 4>On a weekly basis.

1067
00:54:01.400 --> 00:54:04.960
<v Speaker 3>You can find our newsletter at Teamhouse Podcast dot kit

1068
00:54:05.239 --> 00:54:09.320
<v Speaker 3>dot com, slash join again. The website for that is

1069
00:54:09.400 --> 00:54:12.880
<v Speaker 3>Teamhouse Podcast dot kit dot com slash join.

1070
00:54:13.320 --> 00:54:13.440
<v Speaker 2>Uh.

1071
00:54:13.519 --> 00:54:14.679
<v Speaker 4>So we hope to see you there.

1072
00:54:15.239 --> 00:54:16.639
<v Speaker 2>The link will be down the description

1073
00:55:00.119 --> 00:55:18.199
<v Speaker 3>Passsssssssssss,