WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.080 --> 00:00:05.240 Imagine your life, moment by moment, becoming this stream of data. Right, 2 00:00:05.320 --> 00:00:08.919 not just you know, your online clicks, but every physical 3 00:00:08.960 --> 00:00:11.519 thing you touch, every step you take in a shop, even. 4 00:00:11.359 --> 00:00:12.560 What's in your medicine cabinet. 5 00:00:12.720 --> 00:00:18.239 Yeah, all quietly broadcasting information about you too. Well, who 6 00:00:18.239 --> 00:00:22.480 knows who these invisible listeners think about walking into a 7 00:00:22.519 --> 00:00:24.839 store and the price of I don't know, peanut butter 8 00:00:25.039 --> 00:00:26.920 just shifts just. 9 00:00:26.879 --> 00:00:29.800 For you based on some hidden profile of your shopping habits. 10 00:00:29.800 --> 00:00:30.519 Its exactly. 11 00:00:31.199 --> 00:00:34.159 It sounds like something out of a Dyscopian movie, really 12 00:00:34.320 --> 00:00:34.719 it does. 13 00:00:35.399 --> 00:00:38.079 But our deep dive today is looking at a technology 14 00:00:38.159 --> 00:00:41.119 that well, according to the authors, we're focusing on holds 15 00:00:41.159 --> 00:00:42.799 exactly that kind of potential, and. 16 00:00:42.719 --> 00:00:45.159 That's radio frequency identification or our FID. 17 00:00:45.359 --> 00:00:47.280 That's the one our guide for This is a really 18 00:00:47.320 --> 00:00:50.960 powerful book. Actually, it's called Spy Chips, How major corporations 19 00:00:51.000 --> 00:00:54.880 and government plan to track your every move with r FID. 20 00:00:54.719 --> 00:00:57.520 Written by Catherine Elbricht and Liz McIntyre, published back in 21 00:00:57.560 --> 00:00:58.240 two thousand and five. 22 00:00:58.439 --> 00:01:01.560 Yeah, quite a while ago now, but still incredibly relevant. 23 00:01:01.799 --> 00:01:05.239 And this isn't some dry technical overview. The authors really 24 00:01:05.280 --> 00:01:07.799 position it as a critical expose. 25 00:01:07.719 --> 00:01:10.480 They call it a masterpiece of technocriticism. 26 00:01:10.560 --> 00:01:13.079 Yeah, they argue it unveils what they see as a 27 00:01:13.159 --> 00:01:17.400 hidden sort of scheme, a plan to infest the entire 28 00:01:17.439 --> 00:01:19.560 physical infrastructure of the planet. 29 00:01:19.400 --> 00:01:22.200 With tracking capabilities. That's the core argument. 30 00:01:22.280 --> 00:01:25.400 They even make this really provocative comparison to Rachel Carson's 31 00:01:25.439 --> 00:01:26.120 Silent Spring. 32 00:01:26.280 --> 00:01:29.319 That's a big claim. And what makes their arguments feel 33 00:01:29.359 --> 00:01:32.799 so grounded is that they weren't just like speculating wildly. 34 00:01:33.120 --> 00:01:36.640 No, Albritton McIntyre did some serious digging. They went through articles, 35 00:01:36.719 --> 00:01:39.439 research papers, apparently, got insider tips. 36 00:01:39.159 --> 00:01:42.640 And thousands of public patent documents. That's key. They use 37 00:01:42.680 --> 00:01:47.120 those patents to piece together this frankly pretty unsettling vision 38 00:01:47.159 --> 00:01:47.799 of our future. 39 00:01:47.959 --> 00:01:51.000 So our mission today really is to unpack the concerns 40 00:01:51.120 --> 00:01:56.239 these authors raised, to try and demystify the RFID technology. 41 00:01:55.680 --> 00:02:00.640 Itself and explore the really far reaching implications warned about 42 00:02:00.680 --> 00:02:04.200 everything from consumer tracking to government surveillance. 43 00:02:04.439 --> 00:02:06.640 Will lay out their arguments, look at the specific examples 44 00:02:06.680 --> 00:02:11.800 they found, and explore those patented plans, plans that even 45 00:02:11.879 --> 00:02:18.120 now nearly two decades later, feel remarkably well unsettling. 46 00:02:18.280 --> 00:02:20.919 Okay, so let's kick things off with the basics for 47 00:02:20.960 --> 00:02:23.560 anyone who maybe needs a quick refresher. Yeah, what is 48 00:02:23.680 --> 00:02:26.879 RFID essentially, and why is it so different from say, 49 00:02:27.360 --> 00:02:28.800 uh standard barcode? 50 00:02:28.879 --> 00:02:32.719 Right? Well, at its simplest, RFID is basically a tiny 51 00:02:32.759 --> 00:02:36.240 computer chip attached to an antenna, okay, and that combination 52 00:02:36.360 --> 00:02:40.000 lets you identify and track almost any physical object. And 53 00:02:40.039 --> 00:02:42.479 when we say tiny, some of these silicon chips are 54 00:02:42.520 --> 00:02:44.960 like zero point two five millimeters. 55 00:02:44.479 --> 00:02:46.080 Square, smaller than a period. 56 00:02:45.800 --> 00:02:48.560 Smaller than the period at the end of a sentence. Yeah, microscopic. 57 00:02:48.759 --> 00:02:52.159 Wow. And these tags, these spike chips, as the authors 58 00:02:52.199 --> 00:02:53.840 call them, they're not all the same, are they not 59 00:02:53.879 --> 00:02:54.159 at all? 60 00:02:54.199 --> 00:02:56.680 You've got two main types. Passive tags are the most 61 00:02:56.719 --> 00:02:59.199 common for this kind of tracking concern. They have no battery, 62 00:02:59.319 --> 00:02:59.960 no internal power. 63 00:03:00.759 --> 00:03:01.319 Do they work. 64 00:03:01.639 --> 00:03:04.199 They get activated by the energy from an RFID reader 65 00:03:04.240 --> 00:03:06.680 when it comes close enough. That energy powers the chip 66 00:03:06.879 --> 00:03:09.159 just long enough for it to send back its ID number. 67 00:03:09.199 --> 00:03:11.240 Okay. So they're cheap, small. 68 00:03:10.960 --> 00:03:15.280 Incredibly chip very small, and they last basically forever. They 69 00:03:15.319 --> 00:03:19.439 can even be woven right into fabric invisible. Yeah, pretty much. 70 00:03:19.680 --> 00:03:20.919 Then you have active tags. 71 00:03:21.039 --> 00:03:23.599 These do have a battery, right like my highway toll 72 00:03:23.680 --> 00:03:25.120 pass exactly like that. 73 00:03:25.479 --> 00:03:28.960 They can transmit further, hold more data, but they're bigger, 74 00:03:29.199 --> 00:03:33.520 more expensive, use more for tracking, say, shipping containers or 75 00:03:33.599 --> 00:03:34.919 those toll transponders. 76 00:03:35.000 --> 00:03:37.719 And the way they can be made, it almost sounds 77 00:03:37.759 --> 00:03:39.080 like they're designed for stealth. 78 00:03:39.400 --> 00:03:41.719 You could certainly argue that these tags can be made 79 00:03:41.800 --> 00:03:45.680 virtually invisible, printed with conductive inc maybe, or even designed 80 00:03:45.680 --> 00:03:49.879 as chipless systems. Shipless, yeah, using the material properties of 81 00:03:49.919 --> 00:03:54.039 the packaging itself to reflect radio waves in a unique pattern, 82 00:03:54.360 --> 00:03:57.080 basically embedded right into the box or the fabric, very 83 00:03:57.080 --> 00:03:58.639 hard to spot without special beer. 84 00:03:58.800 --> 00:04:00.840 Okay, this is where the history goes. It's really interesting 85 00:04:01.120 --> 00:04:04.520 the book connects this modern tech to something much older, 86 00:04:04.599 --> 00:04:08.280 much more covert. Right Leon thereman, the guy with the 87 00:04:08.439 --> 00:04:10.840 musical instrument, the eerie space music. 88 00:04:11.000 --> 00:04:15.400 That's one most people know, But the authors they reveal 89 00:04:15.520 --> 00:04:19.399 this whole other side. Damn his life as a Soviet spy, 90 00:04:19.759 --> 00:04:23.040 a spy and a pioneer in radio wave surveillance. They 91 00:04:23.040 --> 00:04:25.480 actually call him the father of spy chips. 92 00:04:25.720 --> 00:04:27.000 Why what'd she do? 93 00:04:27.240 --> 00:04:31.120 Because of his most well notorious invention, something called the Thing. 94 00:04:31.560 --> 00:04:35.639 The thing sounds like something from a Cold War spy movie. 95 00:04:35.720 --> 00:04:38.879 It absolutely was. Back in nineteen forty five, some Russian 96 00:04:38.879 --> 00:04:41.959 school children gave this gift to the US ambassador in Moscow, 97 00:04:42.800 --> 00:04:45.759 a big carved wooden replica of the Great Seal of 98 00:04:45.759 --> 00:04:46.560 the United States. 99 00:04:46.639 --> 00:04:48.959 Okay, a nice gesture or maybe not. 100 00:04:49.040 --> 00:04:52.959 Definitely not hidden inside was this incredibly clever listening device. 101 00:04:53.279 --> 00:04:54.839 It had no power source. 102 00:04:54.600 --> 00:04:57.240 Of its own, like a passive RFID tag. 103 00:04:57.160 --> 00:04:59.959 Exactly the principle. It was activated by radio waves being 104 00:05:00.160 --> 00:05:02.959 at it from outside and used that energy to transmit 105 00:05:03.079 --> 00:05:06.040 conversations from the ambassador's office back to the Soviets. 106 00:05:06.079 --> 00:05:07.480 Wow, how long did that go on? 107 00:05:07.920 --> 00:05:09.920 For six years they couldn't figure out how it worked. 108 00:05:09.920 --> 00:05:13.360 American intelligence nicknamed it the Thing. Its discovery apparently kicked 109 00:05:13.360 --> 00:05:17.399 off this huge, top secret CIA project just to understand it. 110 00:05:17.759 --> 00:05:20.639 So the authors are drawing a direct line from this 111 00:05:20.839 --> 00:05:24.680 Cold War bugging device to modern RFID. 112 00:05:24.959 --> 00:05:27.920 Yes, that's their chilling point. It's not just some quirky 113 00:05:28.040 --> 00:05:30.879 historical fact. They see it as the conceptual blueprint. 114 00:05:30.560 --> 00:05:33.439 The idea of hidden remotely activated. 115 00:05:32.959 --> 00:05:36.959 Tracking exactly that invisibility, the remote readability. They argue, it's 116 00:05:37.120 --> 00:05:40.160 baked into the DNA of the technology. It suggests that 117 00:05:40.160 --> 00:05:42.639 the privacy risks weren't just some accidental side. 118 00:05:42.439 --> 00:05:46.560 Effect, but maybe potentially part of the original appeal rooted 119 00:05:46.639 --> 00:05:47.319 in surveillance. 120 00:05:47.360 --> 00:05:50.680 That's the unsettling question they raise. Did that original intent 121 00:05:50.720 --> 00:05:54.680 of hidden surveillance sort of subtly guide how it's being 122 00:05:54.759 --> 00:05:55.240 used today? 123 00:05:55.399 --> 00:05:59.639 That really makes you think, Okay, So, how did this tech, 124 00:05:59.720 --> 00:06:03.720 with the let's say interesting origins, transition from spy stuff 125 00:06:03.800 --> 00:06:06.920 to this grand plan for tracking every single object on 126 00:06:06.959 --> 00:06:07.519 the planet. 127 00:06:07.560 --> 00:06:10.439 Well, the authors trace the start of that huge vision 128 00:06:10.759 --> 00:06:14.439 back to a surprisingly mundane problem. Oh yeah, nineteen ninety seven, 129 00:06:14.800 --> 00:06:17.240 a guy named Kevin Ashton, a brand manager at Procter 130 00:06:17.279 --> 00:06:20.160 and Gamble. He couldn't keep a popular shade of oil 131 00:06:20.199 --> 00:06:22.439 of ola lipstick and stock on the shelves, even. 132 00:06:22.279 --> 00:06:24.240 Though there's plenty in the warehouse right. 133 00:06:24.360 --> 00:06:28.439 Standard supply chain issue. But his frustration sparked this well 134 00:06:28.680 --> 00:06:33.480 radical idea, what if we could track every single item individually, 135 00:06:34.120 --> 00:06:36.360 not just the box, but each lipstick. 136 00:06:36.639 --> 00:06:39.480 And that little problem became the seed for something massive. 137 00:06:39.680 --> 00:06:42.800 It really did. Ashton got backing from some huge players, 138 00:06:42.920 --> 00:06:45.519 P and G let, the Uniform Code Council. 139 00:06:45.279 --> 00:06:47.199 The Barcode people, the barcode people. 140 00:06:46.959 --> 00:06:50.879 And in nineteen ninety nine, they founded the MIT auto. 141 00:06:50.680 --> 00:06:52.839 itIt Center, Okay, and their goal. 142 00:06:52.800 --> 00:06:57.120 It was incredibly ambitious. Put low cost RFID tags on 143 00:06:57.199 --> 00:07:01.360 every single manufactured item globally to achieve what they call 144 00:07:01.480 --> 00:07:04.959 near perfect supply chain visibility, eliminate stockouts, reduced theft, to 145 00:07:04.959 --> 00:07:08.720 remove human error, basically know where everything is all the time. 146 00:07:08.839 --> 00:07:11.360 This sounds like the early blueprint for what we now 147 00:07:11.399 --> 00:07:13.000 call the Internet of Things. 148 00:07:12.759 --> 00:07:16.240 Right absolutely, but the authors suggest it was perhaps a 149 00:07:16.279 --> 00:07:19.279 bit more focused than just smart fridges talking to smart speakers. 150 00:07:19.360 --> 00:07:23.560 How So, the autoid Center's vision was that these inanimate objects, 151 00:07:23.800 --> 00:07:26.720 the lipstick, the can of soup, whatever, wouldn't just be connected. 152 00:07:26.759 --> 00:07:30.720 They would actively talk talk to to manufacturers, to retailers, 153 00:07:30.759 --> 00:07:33.560 maybe even to each other, all built on the existing 154 00:07:33.680 --> 00:07:38.439 Internet infrastructure. The really big shift, the authors argue, is 155 00:07:38.439 --> 00:07:41.600 giving a unique identity and a voice not just to 156 00:07:41.639 --> 00:07:45.079 your fancy gadgets, but to the most ordinary physical stuff in. 157 00:07:45.040 --> 00:07:49.319 Your life, letting them report on themselves, their location, their history. 158 00:07:49.079 --> 00:07:50.720 And ultimately their interaction with you. 159 00:07:50.920 --> 00:07:52.959 And the key to that communication is something called the 160 00:07:53.040 --> 00:07:56.839 electronic product code the EPC. How's that different from the 161 00:07:56.839 --> 00:07:58.399 barcode we see everywhere that's. 162 00:07:58.199 --> 00:08:01.439 A really crucial distinction. The author's emphasis. A barcode the 163 00:08:01.519 --> 00:08:05.720 UPC identifies a type of product. All twelve ounce cans 164 00:08:05.720 --> 00:08:09.600 of brand xcorn have the same barcode. The EPC, however, 165 00:08:10.120 --> 00:08:13.360 is a unique serial number for each individual item. Think 166 00:08:13.399 --> 00:08:15.600 of it like a social Security number, but for objects. 167 00:08:15.920 --> 00:08:17.319 That's the analogy the authors use. 168 00:08:17.480 --> 00:08:20.319 So my specific can of corn could have its own 169 00:08:20.439 --> 00:08:22.680 unique digital ID, its own history. 170 00:08:22.759 --> 00:08:26.040 That's exactly the vision with EPCs. Businesses could create a 171 00:08:26.120 --> 00:08:29.319 unique data file like a web page, for every single item, 172 00:08:29.759 --> 00:08:32.720 when it was made, where it traveled, maybe who bought it. 173 00:08:32.799 --> 00:08:35.879 The amount of data atronomical. The authors point out that 174 00:08:35.919 --> 00:08:39.039 back in two thousand and four, Walmart's database was already 175 00:08:39.080 --> 00:08:41.279 twice the size of the entire Internet at the time. 176 00:08:41.519 --> 00:08:41.720 Wow. 177 00:08:42.000 --> 00:08:44.519 So yeah, this wasn't just about managing inventory better. It 178 00:08:44.559 --> 00:08:49.279 was about creating this unprecedented layer of surveillance over physical. 179 00:08:48.840 --> 00:08:52.360 Goods and, by extension, the people using them. Right, And 180 00:08:52.440 --> 00:08:56.320 the authors highlight other key differences beyond just the unique ID. Right, 181 00:08:56.360 --> 00:09:01.519 what makes RFID so much more potent, let's say, than barcodes. 182 00:09:02.080 --> 00:09:04.679 Well, yeah, the unique idea is huge because it allows 183 00:09:04.759 --> 00:09:08.159 linking that specific item to you or your purchase history. 184 00:09:08.600 --> 00:09:11.279 But then there's the remote readability, meaning you don't need 185 00:09:11.320 --> 00:09:14.279 line of sight. RFID tags can be scanned right through 186 00:09:14.279 --> 00:09:17.200 your clothes, your wallet, your backpack without you knowing, without 187 00:09:17.240 --> 00:09:17.679 your consent. 188 00:09:17.879 --> 00:09:20.200 That's the X ray vision they talk about exactly. 189 00:09:20.240 --> 00:09:23.159 It completely changes the game compared to needing to scan 190 00:09:23.240 --> 00:09:24.919 a visible barcode at a checkout. 191 00:09:25.120 --> 00:09:27.919 And they also brought up potential health concerns they did. 192 00:09:28.120 --> 00:09:30.559 They raise questions about the long term effects of chronic 193 00:09:30.600 --> 00:09:35.919 exposure to low levels of electromagnetic radiation, especially if RFID 194 00:09:36.080 --> 00:09:39.919 readers become ubiquitous everywhere. 195 00:09:39.480 --> 00:09:41.919 In stores, homes, workplaces, a. 196 00:09:41.919 --> 00:09:45.960 Constant, low level bath of radio waves. The concern isn't 197 00:09:46.000 --> 00:09:49.799 just about one device, but the cumulative effect of this 198 00:09:49.960 --> 00:09:51.840 invisible tracking infrastructure. 199 00:09:52.279 --> 00:09:54.879 So with all this data being generated, who stands to 200 00:09:54.919 --> 00:09:56.840 gain the most? Who wants this information? 201 00:09:57.080 --> 00:10:00.440 According to the authors, there are three main groups really 202 00:10:00.440 --> 00:10:03.639 interested in secretly getting their hands on this spy ChiPT 203 00:10:03.679 --> 00:10:06.639 beta okay, who marketers, governments, and. 204 00:10:06.559 --> 00:10:07.600 Criminals makes sense. 205 00:10:07.799 --> 00:10:11.480 Marketers want incredibly detailed profiles of what you own, what 206 00:10:11.519 --> 00:10:14.960 you buy, where you go for hyper targeted ads, personalized pricing, 207 00:10:15.039 --> 00:10:18.159 all that stuff. Government they might want hidden scanners for 208 00:10:18.320 --> 00:10:23.879 mass surveillance, tracking movements, identifying people, control easy pickings, potentially 209 00:10:24.200 --> 00:10:27.159 scanning bags to see if you've bought expensive items, Scanning 210 00:10:27.200 --> 00:10:30.559 homes in the street to see what's inside, identifying targets. 211 00:10:30.879 --> 00:10:34.799 Yeah, that's sobering. And the industry promoting RFID, they must 212 00:10:34.799 --> 00:10:36.240 have known this would worry people. 213 00:10:36.039 --> 00:10:39.320 Right, Oh, absolutely, the author's uncovered evidence of a pretty 214 00:10:39.320 --> 00:10:43.679 sophisticated PR strategy Like what they found documents from PR 215 00:10:43.759 --> 00:10:48.200 firms like Fleischmann Hillard advising the RFID industry on how 216 00:10:48.279 --> 00:10:52.440 to and this is a direct quote, pacify consumers. 217 00:10:52.759 --> 00:10:55.799 Pacify, not inform, but pacify exactly. 218 00:10:56.080 --> 00:10:59.759 They suggested rebranding RFID tags with softer names like green 219 00:10:59.759 --> 00:11:04.240 tags or radio barcodes. They could sound less threatening, less intrusive. 220 00:11:03.799 --> 00:11:04.919 And just educate people. 221 00:11:05.080 --> 00:11:08.440 That was the line push the idea that education would 222 00:11:08.480 --> 00:11:12.000 overcome public fears. But the authors argue this was essentially 223 00:11:12.039 --> 00:11:15.919 propaganda designed to downplay the risks and push the technology 224 00:11:15.960 --> 00:11:17.720 forward without full transparency. 225 00:11:17.759 --> 00:11:20.159 Okay, let's make this more concrete. The book talks about 226 00:11:20.279 --> 00:11:22.600 RFID turning up in all sorts of everyday things, from 227 00:11:22.600 --> 00:11:25.799 clothes to well medicine, cabinets. What are some of the 228 00:11:25.840 --> 00:11:26.679 standout examples. 229 00:11:26.759 --> 00:11:28.720 One of the most famous early blow ups they cover 230 00:11:28.879 --> 00:11:30.759 was Benetton back in two thousand and three. 231 00:11:30.720 --> 00:11:33.360 Right, I remember something about that underwear exactly. 232 00:11:34.039 --> 00:11:38.080 They planned to embed RFID chips in women's underwear. It's 233 00:11:38.120 --> 00:11:40.120 caused a massive international backlash. 234 00:11:40.200 --> 00:11:42.120 People were not happy, not at all. 235 00:11:42.519 --> 00:11:44.799 There was this whole I'd rather go naked than wear 236 00:11:44.840 --> 00:11:49.080 a spy chip campaign. Benetton eventually had to scrap the 237 00:11:49.120 --> 00:11:50.399 plan completely. 238 00:11:50.000 --> 00:11:51.399 But that didn't stop it elsewhere. 239 00:11:51.600 --> 00:11:55.039 No shipped work uniforms, for instance, from companies like a Mayor, 240 00:11:55.080 --> 00:11:58.360 Pride or synilyssas they're pretty common now, and they. 241 00:11:58.320 --> 00:12:02.240 Could potentially track what where employees go. 242 00:12:02.240 --> 00:12:05.519 Yeah, potentially track movements around a facility, how long someone 243 00:12:05.519 --> 00:12:08.679 spends in the restroom, chats by the water cooler. The 244 00:12:08.720 --> 00:12:12.519 authors argue it's less about productivity and more about quantifying 245 00:12:12.559 --> 00:12:15.279 and controlling every second of an employee's. 246 00:12:14.840 --> 00:12:18.200 Day, taking workplace surveillance to a completely new level. And 247 00:12:18.240 --> 00:12:21.240 in stores it gets even more specific, right down to 248 00:12:21.639 --> 00:12:23.399 changing prices for individuals. 249 00:12:23.480 --> 00:12:26.080 That's one of the really unsettling scenarios. They describe this 250 00:12:26.200 --> 00:12:28.440 idea of personalized pricing. 251 00:12:28.279 --> 00:12:31.519 So based on my shopping history tracked via RFID. 252 00:12:31.799 --> 00:12:34.399 Right, the system identifies you, maybe pegs you as a 253 00:12:34.519 --> 00:12:37.200 prime customer who doesn't worry much about price, or a 254 00:12:37.240 --> 00:12:39.879 bargain chopper. And then and then the price for that 255 00:12:39.960 --> 00:12:43.279 same jar of peanut butter could literally change on electronic 256 00:12:43.399 --> 00:12:45.639 shelf label just for you. I mean, double the price 257 00:12:45.720 --> 00:12:48.080 for the bargain hunter compared to the prime customer. 258 00:12:48.159 --> 00:12:51.240 Wow, that's not just a sale, that's dynamic pricing based 259 00:12:51.279 --> 00:12:52.919 on perceived wealth exactly. 260 00:12:53.039 --> 00:12:57.080 The book also mentions things like bank employees potentially seeing 261 00:12:57.120 --> 00:12:59.120 your account balance on a screen as soon as you. 262 00:12:59.080 --> 00:13:02.519 Walk in or in checkpoints. Electronic frisking. 263 00:13:02.759 --> 00:13:06.960 Yeah, scanners in doorways or walkways in stores or public spaces, 264 00:13:07.000 --> 00:13:11.120 just silently scanning everything you're carrying without you even knowing. 265 00:13:11.559 --> 00:13:14.919 Let's get into some specific corporate examples. The authors found 266 00:13:15.240 --> 00:13:19.799 patents incidents. IBM had a vision that sounded pretty creepy, 267 00:13:20.080 --> 00:13:21.440 like something out of Minority Report. 268 00:13:21.600 --> 00:13:24.279 It really does have that vibe. IBM patented a system 269 00:13:24.360 --> 00:13:28.440 called Identify and Track Persons using RFID casch items. 270 00:13:28.519 --> 00:13:28.879 Okay. 271 00:13:28.960 --> 00:13:31.399 The idea was to scan people as they enter a store, 272 00:13:32.039 --> 00:13:34.080 not just to see what they carry, but to infer 273 00:13:34.200 --> 00:13:36.919 things about them, right, Like, if this system detects an 274 00:13:36.919 --> 00:13:40.440 expensive watch, say a Rolex, it might categorize you into 275 00:13:40.480 --> 00:13:42.759 a higher income bracket. And the point of that to 276 00:13:42.840 --> 00:13:45.399 monitor your movements through the store and hit you with 277 00:13:45.519 --> 00:13:48.480 highly targeted advertising in real time, just like in the movie. 278 00:13:49.320 --> 00:13:52.320 The author's insight here is it's not just tracking what 279 00:13:52.399 --> 00:13:54.879 you buy, but who you are and how you move. 280 00:13:54.960 --> 00:13:57.000 That becomes the valuable commodity. 281 00:13:57.200 --> 00:13:59.399 And NCR, the cash register Company, if they had a 282 00:13:59.399 --> 00:14:03.039 patent the called cornography. What was that about? 283 00:14:03.360 --> 00:14:06.919 Yeah, that name highlights how detailed and frankly kind of 284 00:14:06.919 --> 00:14:12.159 demeaning it was. This patent described tracking shoppers micro interactions 285 00:14:12.159 --> 00:14:15.080 with products, like picking something up exactly like you pick 286 00:14:15.159 --> 00:14:17.080 up a can of brandex corn, you read the label, 287 00:14:17.120 --> 00:14:18.559 you put it back down, and then you grab the 288 00:14:18.559 --> 00:14:20.000 can of brand Y corn instead. 289 00:14:20.120 --> 00:14:21.159 The system logs all that. 290 00:14:21.360 --> 00:14:24.639 It logs all of it. And NCR apparently used terms 291 00:14:24.679 --> 00:14:27.559 like bottom feeder in their documents to describe shoppers who 292 00:14:27.600 --> 00:14:30.759 compared prices like that. Seriously, that's what the authors report, 293 00:14:31.120 --> 00:14:33.559 and the goal wasn't just understand you, it was to 294 00:14:33.679 --> 00:14:36.840 use that real time data to push other, maybe higher 295 00:14:36.879 --> 00:14:40.919 margin items at you leverage your own behavior against you 296 00:14:40.960 --> 00:14:41.759 in visibly, so at. 297 00:14:41.679 --> 00:14:45.039 Least could all be happening using existing infrastructure like those 298 00:14:45.080 --> 00:14:47.000 anti theft gates at store entrances. 299 00:14:47.320 --> 00:14:50.720 That's a major warning in the book. Those familiar security 300 00:14:50.759 --> 00:14:55.200 portals from companies like Sensormatic or checkpoint systems, they could 301 00:14:55.240 --> 00:14:59.480 potentially be converted almost overnight into RFID readers. 302 00:14:59.200 --> 00:15:01.480 So they wouldn't just beep if you stole something. 303 00:15:01.519 --> 00:15:04.639 They could be silently logging every tagged item you carry 304 00:15:04.639 --> 00:15:06.840 in and out of the store. And if you combine 305 00:15:06.879 --> 00:15:09.960 that with source tagging, where the RFID tags are hidden 306 00:15:10.000 --> 00:15:14.039 inside the product or packaging during manufacturing. 307 00:15:13.360 --> 00:15:15.679 Then the whole system becomes invisible. 308 00:15:15.200 --> 00:15:18.840 Completely invisible, and potentially on to present. Every doorway becomes 309 00:15:18.840 --> 00:15:20.279 a potential data collection point. 310 00:15:20.399 --> 00:15:23.519 Okay, so it's not just public spaces. The book really 311 00:15:23.600 --> 00:15:26.720 emphasizes the potential for RFID to invade our homes, our 312 00:15:26.759 --> 00:15:30.320 private spaces. Tell us about those smart home scenarios. 313 00:15:30.559 --> 00:15:32.759 Yeah, they looked at prototype homes of the future that 314 00:15:32.799 --> 00:15:35.240 were just packed with RFID enabled gadgets. 315 00:15:35.279 --> 00:15:37.000 Any specific examples that stood out. 316 00:15:37.200 --> 00:15:41.000 One that was particularly chilling was from Accenture. They called 317 00:15:41.000 --> 00:15:41.879 it the Caring Plant. 318 00:15:42.120 --> 00:15:42.960 Sounds nice. 319 00:15:43.120 --> 00:15:46.240 The concept was a system to monitor the daily habits 320 00:15:46.320 --> 00:15:50.840 of elderly people living alone. But the goal wasn't just monitoring, 321 00:15:51.320 --> 00:15:56.440 It was subtly nudging them towards good behavior through this continuous, 322 00:15:56.960 --> 00:15:58.759 unseen surveillance and. 323 00:15:58.679 --> 00:16:02.519 Feedback loop, moving beyond convenience into behavioral control. 324 00:16:02.960 --> 00:16:04.200 That's the fear, and. 325 00:16:04.120 --> 00:16:08.559 It gets even more personal. Medicine cabinets fridges absolutely. 326 00:16:09.120 --> 00:16:12.440 The authors describe how these appliances could track your pill consumption. 327 00:16:12.519 --> 00:16:14.840 They call it prescription compliance. 328 00:16:14.600 --> 00:16:17.240 Making sure you take every pill refill on time. 329 00:16:17.200 --> 00:16:20.600 Exactly your medicine cabinet knows, and maybe reports back to 330 00:16:20.639 --> 00:16:23.159 your doctor or pharmacy if you miss a dose. Fridges 331 00:16:23.200 --> 00:16:26.440 could track everything you eat, generate shopping lists automatically, and. 332 00:16:26.399 --> 00:16:29.879 Trigger personalized ads on your TV based on what's running. 333 00:16:29.559 --> 00:16:32.879 Low or based on what you should be eating according 334 00:16:32.919 --> 00:16:36.000 to some profile. They even found patents for home inventory 335 00:16:36.039 --> 00:16:40.799 sniffers RFID readers built into doorways, floors, closets, even your car, 336 00:16:40.879 --> 00:16:43.320 constantly taking inventory of everything you own that has an 337 00:16:43.440 --> 00:16:47.200 rfidtach and reporting that awhere. The patent language said something 338 00:16:47.279 --> 00:16:51.960 like periodically report the inventory automatically to the retailer via 339 00:16:52.000 --> 00:16:53.000 a modem. 340 00:16:52.879 --> 00:16:55.559 So your closet tells the store what clothes you have. 341 00:16:55.720 --> 00:16:59.120 That's the idea. The insight is the transformation of your 342 00:16:59.120 --> 00:17:02.320 private home from a sanctuary into an active data collection 343 00:17:02.399 --> 00:17:03.759 point for outside companies. 344 00:17:04.079 --> 00:17:07.079 It seems nothing is sacred. The book even says your 345 00:17:07.079 --> 00:17:08.160 crash isn't safe. 346 00:17:08.319 --> 00:17:11.519 It's a surprisingly powerful point they make. Think about all 347 00:17:11.519 --> 00:17:14.759 the packaging you throw away. If it has an RFID. 348 00:17:14.440 --> 00:17:15.599 Tag, it's still active. 349 00:17:15.759 --> 00:17:18.960 It's still active. And the authors warned that snoops and 350 00:17:19.039 --> 00:17:22.079 criminals could potentially drive down the street with a reader 351 00:17:22.359 --> 00:17:24.640 and scan the contents of your garbage bins just to. 352 00:17:24.599 --> 00:17:26.079 See what you've bought or thrown away. 353 00:17:26.240 --> 00:17:29.160 Yeah, and it gets worse. They found a Bell salv 354 00:17:29.240 --> 00:17:32.640 patent application the phone company at the time. Yeah, their 355 00:17:32.720 --> 00:17:36.599 patent was for a system to collect, sort, process, and 356 00:17:36.720 --> 00:17:40.480 sell data gathered from RFID tags found on discarded items. 357 00:17:40.519 --> 00:17:41.759 Selling your trash data. 358 00:17:42.200 --> 00:17:44.519 Seriously, that was the plan outlined in the patent. So 359 00:17:44.559 --> 00:17:47.279 not only is your trash talking, someone could be profiting 360 00:17:47.319 --> 00:17:48.599 directly from listening. 361 00:17:48.240 --> 00:17:51.920 To it and even reading habits newspapers magazines. 362 00:17:52.000 --> 00:17:55.839 According to their research, Yes, plans were apparently discussed for 363 00:17:55.920 --> 00:18:00.880 putting RFID tags in newspapers and magazines. Why potentially to 364 00:18:00.920 --> 00:18:02.839 track not just if you read it, but where in 365 00:18:02.880 --> 00:18:05.240 the house you read it. They even mentioned the example 366 00:18:05.440 --> 00:18:07.200 of tracking if it was read in the bathroom. 367 00:18:07.240 --> 00:18:08.640 Okay, that's crossing a line. 368 00:18:08.799 --> 00:18:12.960 The implication is that truly, no aspect of your physical life, 369 00:18:13.000 --> 00:18:17.000 no matter how private or mundane, remains outside the potential 370 00:18:17.000 --> 00:18:18.119 reach of this surveillance. 371 00:18:18.799 --> 00:18:23.880 So we've covered tracking things clothes, food, trash. What about 372 00:18:23.920 --> 00:18:28.119 tracking people directly? The book gets into some really concerning applications, 373 00:18:28.160 --> 00:18:29.319 particularly in healthcare. 374 00:18:29.519 --> 00:18:32.839 Yes, healthcare is a big focus. The authors describe hospitals 375 00:18:32.880 --> 00:18:38.119 considering using RFID tags directly on patients like ristbands. Like wristbands, yeah, 376 00:18:38.160 --> 00:18:42.640 but also potentially on things like bedpans to monitor bodily 377 00:18:42.680 --> 00:18:45.839 outputs automatically serious. That's what they report, and they challenge 378 00:18:45.880 --> 00:18:49.000 the industry claims, like from Precision Dynamics Score, that patient 379 00:18:49.079 --> 00:18:54.680 misidentification is this huge problem justifying RFID tagging. The authors 380 00:18:54.759 --> 00:18:57.680 argue it's actually a relatively minor issue. So the implication 381 00:18:57.839 --> 00:19:00.920 is the implication is that it's less about patient safety 382 00:19:01.119 --> 00:19:04.759 and more about treating patients like inventory, subjecting them to 383 00:19:05.319 --> 00:19:10.240 constant granular monitoring, possibly driven more by efficiency targets or 384 00:19:10.240 --> 00:19:11.759 commercial interests. 385 00:19:11.680 --> 00:19:15.240 And Big Pharma is interested too. For prescriptions. 386 00:19:15.440 --> 00:19:19.960 Definitely plans for putting RFID on individual pills or pill bottles, 387 00:19:20.160 --> 00:19:22.200 things like oxyconton viagra. 388 00:19:21.960 --> 00:19:23.640 To monitor prescription compliance. 389 00:19:23.880 --> 00:19:24.319 Yeah. 390 00:19:24.319 --> 00:19:25.279 No, if you took your. 391 00:19:25.200 --> 00:19:28.799 Mets exactly, did you take every pill? Did you refill 392 00:19:28.799 --> 00:19:33.319 on time? Accenture even floated an online medicine cabinet idea 393 00:19:33.519 --> 00:19:36.400 that would talk directly to your doctor and pharmacy. 394 00:19:35.960 --> 00:19:38.960 Taking away your control over your own medication management. 395 00:19:38.720 --> 00:19:40.880 Essentially, Yeah, removing that autonomy. 396 00:19:40.920 --> 00:19:44.519 They even mention things you ingest chips you swallow, uh huh. 397 00:19:44.599 --> 00:19:48.160 They talk about devices like the Jonah apparently ingestible to 398 00:19:48.240 --> 00:19:50.960 measure internal body temperature, and even, believe it or not, 399 00:19:51.319 --> 00:19:54.319 an RFID enabled tampon detection system. 400 00:19:54.440 --> 00:19:58.640 Wow, Okay. That raises some pretty fundamental questions about bodily autonomy, 401 00:19:58.640 --> 00:19:59.359