Speaker 1: Taiwan is testing its defenses this week as it launches
Speaker 1: its biggest annual military exercises. The Han Kwang Military Exercises
Speaker 1: involves troops on the strategically important pengu Islands rehearsing ways
Speaker 1: of using tanks, artillery, and anti aircraft guns to repel
Speaker 1: a Chinese assault. Reservists are also taking part as Taiwan
Speaker 1: seeks to increase the realism of its wartime preparations for
Speaker 1: the first time, authorities are deliberately slowing mobile internet and
Speaker 1: parts of the island to test how people would cope
Speaker 1: if communications were disrupted during a conflict. Will the drills
Speaker 1: come As Taiwan pushes ahead with a new strategy built
Speaker 1: around drones, unmanned attack boats, and mobile missile units. The
Speaker 1: aim is to make any Chinese invasions so difficult and
Speaker 1: costly that Beijing would be deterred from trying. A concept
Speaker 1: to US military planets have described as creating a hellscape
Speaker 1: around the island. Stacy Petty john fellow and direction of
Speaker 1: the Defense Program at the Center for a New American
Speaker 1: Security that's an independent Washington based national security think tank.
Speaker 1: She co authored a report on Taiwan's drone defense strategy
Speaker 1: this year. Welcome to DW This hellscape idea sounds relatively simple.
Speaker 1: Throw huge numbers of cheap mobile drones in the path
Speaker 1: of the bigger invading force. Is it that simple?
Speaker 2: Not quite that simple, but it does end up being
Speaker 2: simpler than the type of amphibious assault that Chinese forces
Speaker 2: would have to undertake to attack the island, which is
Speaker 2: one of its strengths. It really does rely on using
Speaker 2: lots of small mobile units with cheap drones, air drones,
Speaker 2: sea drones, under sea drones, and trying to attrit an
Speaker 2: invasion force before they actually reached Taiwan shores.
Speaker 1: Okay, so not so much repelling an invasion as is
Speaker 1: trying to stop it before it actually gets started for
Speaker 1: years time.
Speaker 2: Sorry, go on, no, it makes I mean, the point
Speaker 2: at which the Chinese are the most vulnerable is when
Speaker 2: they're on the ocean and they're visible. They have to
Speaker 2: approach Taiwan and concentrate their forces, and there are a
Speaker 2: limited number of beaches that are really favorable for a
Speaker 2: amphibious landing, and so that gives Taiwan the advantage that
Speaker 2: they can leverage with their geography along with these multi
Speaker 2: domain drones to get them when they are exposed.
Speaker 1: Okay, this is all very sneaky. Let's talk about asymmetry
Speaker 1: because we've seen many of the lessons of this what
Speaker 1: they're calling asymmetric warfare, where a smaller, apparently weaker country
Speaker 1: finds itself able to defend itself or indeed resist a
Speaker 1: larger military force. We've seen this play out in Ukraine
Speaker 1: and Iran. I guess are there lessons being learned from
Speaker 1: these conflicts?
Speaker 3: Absolutely.
Speaker 2: I think a lot of the lessons from Ukraine apply
Speaker 2: directly to Taiwan.
Speaker 3: Obviously, the geography is a little bit.
Speaker 2: Different, and it's a maritime theater, and you're worrying about
Speaker 2: China having to cross that straight and move a huge
Speaker 2: number of forces.
Speaker 3: But the idea of using small drones.
Speaker 2: To go after larger forces that have big weapons platforms,
Speaker 2: big ships, aircraft and tanks that are very visible is
Speaker 2: one that is directly applicable. I think it's also important
Speaker 2: to note that drones alone aren't.
Speaker 3: Sufficient to achieve this.
Speaker 2: You need to use drones in concert with more traditional
Speaker 2: weapons like higher end missiles, artillery as well as mines.
Speaker 2: Limiting the mobility of your adversary is something that.
Speaker 3: Has worked well for both Ukraine and Russia.
Speaker 2: They use a lot of mindes on the ground, but
Speaker 2: you can use c minds in the case of Taiwan
Speaker 2: and then also mine the beaches to make it hard
Speaker 2: and to slow down the movement of any Chinese forces,
Speaker 2: which then gives you more opportunities to use aerial drones
Speaker 2: and drone boats to attack them.
Speaker 1: Right, But of course China will also have been watching
Speaker 1: what's going on in Ukraine and Iran, So how much
Speaker 1: will Beijing's offensive playbook have been rewritten because of this technology.
Speaker 2: China's very much observing what's going on and trying to
Speaker 2: learn from it, and I would imagine receiving pretty direct
Speaker 2: feedback from the Russians given some of the assistance that
Speaker 2: they've provided. And I would expect that China is going
Speaker 2: to also be looking at employing drones. We've seen in
Speaker 2: a recent military parade that they also had a lot
Speaker 2: of counterdrone technology. But there's a difference between actually employing
Speaker 2: these new capabilities and doing so in a way when
Speaker 2: you're undertaking a massive operation that is joined and that
Speaker 2: is truly one of the most complex things that any
Speaker 2: military can do.
Speaker 3: That's an amphibious assault, So while I believe.
Speaker 2: They certainly are learning and will adapt and continue to adapt,
Speaker 2: there is no perfect solution that will be durable for
Speaker 2: a long time, because everyone learns and changes in response
Speaker 2: to what they see their adversary doing and what works
Speaker 2: in other places in the world.
Speaker 1: And is there a danger, certainly from the likes of
Speaker 1: me looking on and looking at this from the outside,
Speaker 1: is there a danger of becoming too fixated on the technology?
Speaker 1: Does the effective deployment of this new kit, does it
Speaker 1: demand the sort of shift in thinking and philosophy it does?
Speaker 2: The technology by itself is not at all the solution,
Speaker 2: and there when you ask me in the beginning, is
Speaker 2: as simple as using drones.
Speaker 3: Well, using drones.
Speaker 2: Effectively is not actually that simple, And that is one
Speaker 2: of the big takeaways that the Taiwanese should be learning
Speaker 2: from what is going on in Ukraine. Ukraine spends a
Speaker 2: tremendous amount of time training its drone force and giving
Speaker 2: it real world operational experience, and that is something that will.
Speaker 3: Be hard to develop in peace time, and.
Speaker 2: The Taiwanese are going to need to do that. So
Speaker 2: this involves lots of training and actually keeping people in
Speaker 2: the military long enough that they develop deep enough of
Speaker 2: expertise and become skilled enough at these systems and employing
Speaker 2: them with other weapons at the same time operating a
Speaker 2: small independent units, which typically right now the Taiwanese military
Speaker 2: does not do, and then this probably would portend some
Speaker 2: changes for the organization of the military. The traditional formations
Speaker 2: that they have right now are typical military structures that
Speaker 2: are designed around large platforms, whether they be tanks, you know,
Speaker 2: fighter aircraft, ships, and most of those weapons are going
Speaker 2: to struggle to survive in the first phase of China
Speaker 2: were to attack, because they would begin with a huge
Speaker 2: bombardment of the island and would likely be able to
Speaker 2: find these bigger weapons that are easy to see.
Speaker 1: Okay, so we have a world that has now woken
Speaker 1: up to the potential of this cheaper, more nimble method
Speaker 1: of warfare, and so of course now there is a
Speaker 1: scramble to get hold of the necessary technologies. For example,
Speaker 1: Taiwan says it wants more than two hundred and ten
Speaker 1: thousand airborne and maritime drones. Are they going to be
Speaker 1: bottlenecks in supply?
Speaker 2: There will be a lot of bottlenecks, and they're not
Speaker 2: going to be as cheap as they want them to be,
Speaker 2: because they're not going to be wanting to rely on
Speaker 2: Chinese parts and components. And there are some sectors that
Speaker 2: China really dominates it. Obviously, DGI and ATL are two
Speaker 2: of the biggest drone companies worldwide commercially, but China dominates
Speaker 2: other sectors like brushless motors that are really important, and
Speaker 2: I think it's going to be important for Taiwan to
Speaker 2: find like minded countries where they can pull their demand
Speaker 2: and begin to drive down the price of some of
Speaker 2: these subcomponents, to establish trusted supply chains instead of Chinese ones.
Speaker 2: But Taiwan also actually needs to pass the full budget.
Speaker 2: One of the striking things recently in politics is that
Speaker 2: with the big special defense budget under consideration, it has
Speaker 2: funded the purchase of American drones. But one of the
Speaker 2: areas that the opposition parties rejected was funding the domestic
Speaker 2: Taiwanese industry.
Speaker 3: Which they really need to build up.
Speaker 2: And there's an opportunity there for them to do so
Speaker 2: because they have the labor, they have the knowledge that
Speaker 2: they could build this up relatively easy, unlike some other
Speaker 2: weapons like submarines, where it's really difficult to scale production
Speaker 2: of something that complicated.
Speaker 1: And is it the United States that is the obvious
Speaker 1: first port of call when you're looking to buy this
Speaker 1: technology if it's not China.
Speaker 2: I mean, the US doesn't actually have a robust small
Speaker 2: drone industry right now, it's trying to develop one itself.
Speaker 2: So I know Taiwan has been selling some of the
Speaker 2: drones and manufacturers and entered into some cooperative agreements with
Speaker 2: some countries in Eastern Europe that are very much interested
Speaker 2: in acquiring this technology themselves and providing it to the Ukrainians.
Speaker 2: The US hopefully will begin to improve its own drone
Speaker 2: industry and therefore it would be a natural partner. But
Speaker 2: right now the US is in somewhat of the same
Speaker 2: boat as Taiwan, and it remains to be seen whether
Speaker 2: the Trump administration's drone dominance initiative will result in the
Speaker 2: type of drone industrial ecosystem that the US really needs.
Speaker 1: So if we end where we started, could a hellscaped
Speaker 1: Taiwan realistically stop a Chinese invasion without direct US military intervention?
Speaker 3: I believe that it could.
Speaker 2: When you look at an amphibious assault, it is so
Speaker 2: so hard to do, and it relies on really meticulous
Speaker 2: planning and timing of a large number of forces over
Speaker 2: a huge area, and to get enough troops ashore that
Speaker 2: you can establish a lodgment and then you have to
Speaker 2: move on. All of those factors really are stacked in
Speaker 2: Taiwan's favor, plus its geography of its narrow beaches, its
Speaker 2: limited number of beaches, and then mountainous terrain. I think
Speaker 2: that if Taiwan were to wholeheartedly embrace this change its
Speaker 2: force structure so that it's designed around executing this type
Speaker 2: of concept, train its forces, and acquire this technology, that
Speaker 2: it would be possible. It's enough to make any Chinese
Speaker 2: leader think long and hard about whether they can really
Speaker 2: actually successfully invade the island.
Speaker 1: Good talking, do you? Thanks for talking us through that
Speaker 1: so clearly, Stacy Petty John from the Center for a
Speaker 1: New American Security, Thanks for having me