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I really appreciate all the support everyone's giving me, and

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I hope to expand the show even more than it

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already has. Thank you so much. I want to welcome

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everyone back to the Pekiniana Show. John field House is back.

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Speaker 2: Hey doing John doing well? Sir?

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Speaker 1: All right, So looks like we're going to dive into

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William s Lyn's understanding fourth generation warfare. This is from

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another compilation called Riding the Red Horse. I guess help

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us out start out talking about lynd and you know

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why this was something they came on your radar.

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Speaker 2: Cool, So start off. This is from Riding the Red Horse,

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edited by Tom Kratman. Cratman just real quick. He's a

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former military offer who writes fiction mostly for Baine Books,

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which where Pornell wrote most of his stuff. He also

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wrote this for Castalia House Box Days Company the Guys

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who brought Back There Will be War. This is more

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or less the same kind of idea and anthology that combines

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fiction with essays with an introduction from the editor. So

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will William S Lynn excuse me? Okay? Bill Linn born

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forty seven. He's an American paleo conservative. He's the guy

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who basically came up with the framework we think of

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his generations of war for a second, third, fourth, and

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fifth was added by others. Very long story, short again.

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He got he was born like right after World War Two.

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Too young for Korea, kind of old for Vietnam, so

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he never got there. He got a master He went

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to Dartmouth and he got a master's from Princeton. Decided

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he didn't want to be a PhD. He wanted to

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go work and train. So, like all semi autistic people,

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he really likes trained. So he tried to get a

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job with Amtrak. He wrote to a senator, and a

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senator who was Robert Taft, the guy that Ron Paul

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talks about a lot. He said basically said, come work

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for me instead, and that's how he got into working

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in legislative offices and working in think tanks and whatnot.

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His work on generations of war largely comes from the

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fact that the senator he was working with at the time,

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who was not Taft, I forget who it was, was

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involved with what was called the Military Reform movement, which

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are all the guys associated with John Boyd. Martin Van

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Krevel is one of those guys. Bill Linn was moved

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in those circles. He was a bunch of other people.

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But basically, these are the guys who were working with

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theories of command and control about how you lead and

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use forces on the battlefield. And I could go into

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a long dissertation about that that nobody wants to hear

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right now. But basically this was an extension of German

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Prussian commands theory into American way of war, and it

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came about largely after the end of the Vietnam War,

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where we said, you know what we were doing didn't work,

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Let's go back to fundamentals and reavout evaluate things. So

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that's how Lynn got into that group. And that's despite

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the fact that Lynn never worked in the military. He

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teaches on, you know, military theory, partly because he was

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part of that group surrounded our surrounding Boyd who also

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built upon his theories. So yeah, he's that guy. If

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anybody knows him, it's probably from either the American Conservative

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magazine or forever. He used to come on Scott Horton's

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podcast all the time because despite being a military theorist,

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he's somebody who definitely he comes again. The whole Boyd

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school is heavily influenced by Sun Sue, and one of

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the fundamental things that people have to understand that Sun

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Sue wanted to make understood is that war is basically

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almost always the wrong choice. Doesn't mean war is not

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always the wrong choice. Sometimes it's necessary, and as Santayana said,

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only the dead of seeing the end of war, So

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war is always going to be here. It's always got

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to be dealt with, which doesn't change the fact that

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war is generally a bad choice, which is why he's

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involved with groups like anti war dot com. He's the

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guy who invented the term cultural Marxism. He wrote a

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bunch of stuff for American Conservative Magazine. Really likes electric railways,

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electric trains, and I mean like real logistics electric trains.

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Used to write stuff for lou Rockwell, you know, despite

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all those you know, being a military theorist, extremely anti war,

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he's kind of famous for being a monarchist, and I

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mean like an honest, you know, no irony American monarchist,

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which is, you know, interesting. What else can I go into?

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But that's the big things that we're dealing with here.

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And part of why I recommended this war work is

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again because you were looking for, you know, short pieces

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in between your other episodes dealing with war and security policy,

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and I said, recommend this one because number one, it's

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only like fifteen pages long. Number two is we use

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a lot of the terminology here, but most people don't

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know what it means. So maya thought was, let's just

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go ahead to read this and talk through it.

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Speaker 1: Awesome, all right, So it looks like the editor's introduction

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is really short. So even though you just gave an introduction,

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I'll I'll give the editors introduction to all right, so cool,

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here we go. This is Understanding Fourth Generation War by

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William Slynd Bill. And has some friends and his enemies,

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his fans and his foes. That's what comes with being

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someone who rocks the boat. An accolade of the late

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Colonel John Boyd. Bill is the author of the Maneuver

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Warfare Handbook, along with more articles, columns, and papers than

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I can fit here, writing for the Marine Corps Gazette,

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Defense and the National Interest, and the American Conservative. He

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was also part of Colorado Senator Gary Hart's military reform movement.

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You can agree with Bill's conceptual framework or disagree me.

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I disagree with some points and positions while agreeing with others,

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I probably agree with more than I disagree. That's just me, though,

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and men of good conscience can, after all, differ. There's

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one thing, though, that I don't think you can disagree with. Brothers, sisters.

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The bloody boats needs rocking. Bill's contribution here is Understanding

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Fourth Generation War, A brief tour of the technological, technical, tactical,

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and attitudinal. Is that attitudinal? I haven't read that word

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in so long.

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Speaker 2: It's just yeah, I think so speaks up on you. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, attitudinal changes in warfare from the sixteen forty

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eight Treaty of Westphalia to the current day. It's worth

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reading in its own right and should spark in your

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you the desire to read his on war as well

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as the upcoming Fourth Generation Warfare handbook co written with

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Marine Lieutenant Colonel Gregory A. Is that deals.

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Speaker 2: Just like Peter Deal or Peter Deal.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, just as any on the end, both coming to

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you from Castilia House. As for Fourth Generational Warfare itself,

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can we beat it? Bill doesn't really directly get into

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that with the present piece, but yes we can. The

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problem is that the only way to beat it that

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we already know how to do involves that involves things

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that bring to mind Ladice, Magburg, Carthage and Corinth. Fourth

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Generational Warfare presents problems to us that would not have

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troubled a Caesar, Acipio or a Genghis Khan for a moment.

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Now we can become the civilization of a Now can

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we become the civilization of a Caesar or a Scipio.

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The blood is in our veins and the meme in

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our hearts and minds. However, for anyone who prefers to

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live in a civilization that is not maintained by building

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mountains of skulls, presuming that's possible, which is an open question.

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At this point, we really ought to be concerned with

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meeting and defeating fourth generational warfare through means other than

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sheer genocide. I'd suggest too, that the people with the

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greatest interest in are finding a way to defeat fourth

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generational warfare short of genocide, should be, in fact, the

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practitioners a fourth generational warfare, the very people whose entire

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gene pools we may have to extinguish if we don't

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find that solution. But I don't think they're either objective

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enough or bright enough to figure that out. So it

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looks like we're going to have to do it our

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own way, do it on our own.

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Speaker 2: I say, as you can tell, Krapman sort of has

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my worldview when it comes to a human organization.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, that is when you think of the term realist,

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that's that's pretty a pretty realist way of looking at

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the world.

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Speaker 2: Absolutely, And before we get going the Treaty of Westphalia,

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is was it thirty years war anyways or one hundred years?

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I think it's thirty Years War. Anyways, the treaty at

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the end of that created the modern nation state system

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as opposed to you know, feudal states or whatever we

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had before that, and that's used as a line of

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demarcation a lot of military theory. And just so everybody's wondering,

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why do we start with first generation war in the

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seventeenth century. That's just because we're only looking at modern

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west in war and the rest of the world when

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it came into the Western sphere. We're not going back

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to the creation of the world as a.

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Speaker 1: War, okay, all right, starting the peace. Rather than commenting

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on the specifics of the war with Iraq, I thought

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it might be a good time to lay out a

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framework for understanding that and other conflicts. I call this

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framework four Generations of Modern War. I developed the framework

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the framework of the first regenerations during the nineteen eighties.

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When I was laboring to introduce maneuver warfare to the

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US Marine Corps. The Marines kept asking what will the

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fourth generation be like. The result was an article I

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co authored for the Marine Corps Gazette in nineteen eighty

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nine entitled the Changing Face of War into the Fourth Generation.

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Our troops reportedly found copies of the article in the

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caves at Tora Bora, the al Qaeda hide out in Afghanistan.

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Heading modern warfare, the four generations began with the Peace

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of Westphalia in Si sixteen forty eight, the treaty that

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ended the Thirty Years War. With that treaty, the state

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established a monopoly on war. Previously, many different entities had

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fought wars, families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises, using many

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different means, not just armies and navies. Now, state militaries

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find it difficult to imagine war in any in any

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way other than fighting state armed forces similar to themselves,

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even though two of those even though two of those means,

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bribery and assassination, are again in vogue. The first generation,

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the first generation of modern war war of line and

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column tactics, where battles were formal and the battlefield was orderly,

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ran roughly from sixteen forty eight to eighteen sixty. The

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relevance of the first generation springs from the fact that

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the battlefield of order created a military culture of order.

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Most of the things that distinguished military from civilian uniforms,

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saluting careful gradations of rank, were products of the first

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generation were intended to reinforce the culture of order. The

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problem is that around the middle of the nineteenth century,

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the battle of order began to break down. Mass armies

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soldiers who actually wanted to fight. An eighteenth century soldier's

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main objective was to was to desert. Rifled muskets, then

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breech loaders and machine guns made the old line and

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column tactics, at first obsolete, then suicidal. The problem since

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then has been a growing contradiction between military culture and

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the increasing disorderliness of the battlefield. The culture of order

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that was once consistent with the environment which had operated

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has become more and more at odds with it. The

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second generation second in Generation War was one answer to

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the contradiction between the culture of order and the military

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environment developed by the French army during and after World

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War One. Second Generation War so sought a solution in

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mass firepower, most of which was indirect artillery fire. The

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goal was attrition, and the doctrine was summed up by

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the French. As the artillery conquers the infantry occupies centrally

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control firepower was carefully synchronized using detailed, specific plans and orders.

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For the infantry, tanks, and artillery in a conducted battle

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where the commander was in effect the conductor of an orchestra.

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Second generation war came as a great relief to soldiers,

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or at least their officers, because it preserved the culture

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of order. The focus was inward on rules, processes, and procedures.

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Obedience was more important than initiative. In fact, initiative was

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not wanted because it endangered synchronization. Discipline was top down

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and imposed. Second Generation war is relevant today because the

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US Army and us USMC learned second generation war from

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the French during and after World War One, and it

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remains the American way of war as we are seeing

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in Afghanistan in Iraq. To Americans, war means putting steel

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on target. Aviation has replaced artillery as a source of

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most firepower. But otherwise, and despite the Marine Corps formal doctrine,

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which is third generation maneuver warfare, the US military today

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is as French as wine, as white wine and cheese.

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At the Marine Corps Desert Warfare Training Center in California,

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the only thing missing is to trycolor and a picture

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of General Maurice Gamlin in the headquarters I pronounce that

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right as a game Gamblin like Gamelin. I think Gamelin AKA.

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The same is true at the Army, at the Army's

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Armors School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, where one instructor began

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his class by saying, I don't know why I have

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to teach you all this old French crap.

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Speaker 2: I do, Yeah, Before we get any further. One of

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the things that Lynn tries to make clear is even

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though we have technology that advances, that leads to the

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development of new conceptual generations of how to fight wars,

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very often many organizations continue to use the old organizational

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managerial practices, and essentially second generational warfare is the managerial

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class running warfare. That's probably the biggest thing to take

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away from it.

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Speaker 1: I wonder, how does you know when Thomas says that

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the modern military is designed to fight the Cold War,

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do you agree with that and how would that apply?

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Speaker 2: Well? I think essentially, because like you said, essentially we

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preserve so much of the French central management approach to war.

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I mean that's exactly a case. I mean, that's largely

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a legacy and for the most part, yeah, excuse me, yeah,

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I do believe that in some ways, the global war

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and terror that we had from nine to eleven until

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you know, the pull out of there was seen by

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lots in the established military establishment military as sort of

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a detour from the quote serious work of fighting wars

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with tanks and bombers and whatnot. And that's part of

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why as soon as we've prepared to get out of Afghanistan,

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you saw everything coming out of the Pentagon talking about

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possible war with China and possible war with Russia. It's

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not just that if you have a tool, you want

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to use that tool. It's that we're desperately looking for

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places where we can use a tool that isn't necessarily

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appropriate anymore, If that makes sense.

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Speaker 1: Understood, all right. The third generation third generation war, also

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a product of World War One, was developed by the

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German Army and as commonly known as blitzkrig or maneuver warfare.

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Third generation war is based not on firepower and attrition,

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but speed, surprise, and mental as well as physical dislocation. Tactically,

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in the attack, the third generation military seeks to get

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into the enemy's rear areas and collapse him from the

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rear forward instead of close with and destroy. The motto

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is bypass and collapse. In the defense, it attempts to

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draw the enemy in then cut him off. War ceases

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to be a shoving contest where forces attempt to hold

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or advance a line. Third generation war is nonlinear. Tactics

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change in third generation war, as does military culture. The

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third generation military focuses outward on the situation, the enemy

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and the results the situation requires, not inward on process

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and method. During nineteenth century wargames, German junior officers routinely

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received problems that could only be solved by disobeying orders.

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Orders themselves specified the result to be achieved, but never

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the method. Initiative was more important than obedience. Mistakes were

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tolerated as long as they came from too much in

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should have rather than too little, and it all depended

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on self discipline, not imposed discipline. The Kaiser here and

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the van Macht could put on great parades, but in

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reality they had broken with the culture of order.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and this is a big part of what Thomas

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talks about, you know, innovations of the Wehrmacht, especially the

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whole approach to how they trained them off in SS

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was about that the German word is off trog stot

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take tactic, which literally translates to mission tactics or mission orders,

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And essentially it's the idea of a commander. At all levels,

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you're supposed to dictate what your objective is, are your

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intent rather that as a commander, this is what I'm

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trying to achieve. So I'm going to give you a

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task and purpose I'm going give with tasks is your mission?

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Your purpose? Why I'm doing this, But I want you

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to know behind that the underlying intent of why I'm

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doing And I do that because as the battlefield changes,

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because again the battlefield or is chaos, I want you,

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as a subordinate to be able to adapt to those

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changes and to continue to pursue my intent long after

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the point that my orders are no longer relevant to

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what's going on at that moment.

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Speaker 1: Understood, the Fourth Generation, characteristics such as decentralization and initiative

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carry over from the third to the fourth generation, but

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in other respects, the fourth generation marks the most radical

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change since the Peace of Westphalia. In Fourth generation war,

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the state loses its monopoly on war all over the world.

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State militaries find themselves fighting non state opponents such as

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al Qaeda, Hamas Hezbela and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

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Colombia almost everywhere the state is losing. Fourth generation war

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is also marked by a return to a world of cultures,

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not merely states in conflict. We now find ourselves facing

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the Christian West old this and most steadfast opponent, Islam.

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After about three centuries on the strategic defensive following the

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failure of the second Turkish Siege of Vienna in sixteen

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eighty three, Islam has resumed the strategic offensive, expanding outward

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in every direction. In fourth generation war, invasion by immigration

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can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a

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state army.

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Speaker 2: Which is exactly our shows is exactly how Lane Lynd

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and Martin van Krebled are, you know, simpatago, how they

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work together.

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Speaker 1: Nor is fourth generation war merely something we import, as

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we did on nine to eleven. At its core lies

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a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and that

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crisis means many countries will evolve fourth generation war on

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their soil. America with a closed political system regardless of

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which party wins, the establishment remains in power and nothing

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really changes, and a poisonous ideology of multiculturalism is a

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prime candidate for the homegrown variety of fourth generation war,

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which is by far the most dangerous kind. Where does

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the war in Iraq fit into this framework? I suggest

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that the war we have seen thus far is merely

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a powder train leading to the magazine. The magazine is

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fourth generation war by a wide variety of Islamic non

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state actors directed at America and Americans and local governments

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friendly to America everywhere. The longer America occupies Iraq, the

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greater the chance the magazine will explode if it does,

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God help us all. For almost two years, a small

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group has been meeting at my house to discuss how

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to fight fourth generation war. The group is made up

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mostly of Marines, but it includes one Army officer, one

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National Guard captain, and one foreign officer. We felt somebody

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should be working on the most difficult questions facing the

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US armed forces, and no one else seemed to be.

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Group members recently decided it was time to go public

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with a few of the ideas. It has come up

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with no magic solutions to offer, only some thoughts. We

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recognize from the outset that the whole task might be hopeless.

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State militaries might not be able to come to grips

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with fourth generation enemies no matter what they do, but

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for what they are worth, here are some of our thoughts.

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It seems like, if you were to try and nail

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down anything so far, it seems like immigration is the

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path they've chosen.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, very much so. And it sort of also

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illustrates the fact that, you know, these issues persist. There

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was a tendency for us to think that, you know,

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as we're pulling out of Afghanistan, that we weren't really

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at war anymore, and we are at war in so

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many ways, whether we we whether the people at war

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with us explicitly say that or not.

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Speaker 1: You know, something that I've been contemplating a lot recently

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is Augustine's just war theory. And you know, his theory

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was it's okay for a Christian to go to war

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if it's to bring about peace. And I think one

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of the biggest problems is, besides infiltration by outside forces

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of most of the Christian sex in the West, is

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the fact that most Christians don't even see that we're.

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Speaker 2: At war exactly.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, all right. Points to ponder if America had some

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third generation ground forces capable of maneuver warfare, we might

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be able to fight battles of encirclement. The inability to

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fight battles of encirclement is what led to the failure

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of Operation a Nakonda in Afghanistan, where Al Kada stood

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fought us and got away suffering few casualties. To fight

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such battles, we need some true light infantry that can

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move farther and faster on its feet than the enemy can,

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has a full tactical repertoire, not just bumping into the

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enemy and calling for fire, and can fight with its

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own weapons instead of depending on supporting arms. We estimate

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that the Marine Corps infantry today has a sustained march

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rate of ten to fifteen kilometers per day. German World

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War two line not light infantry could sustain forty kilometers.

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Fourth generation opponents will not sign up to the Geneva Conventions,

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but some might be open to a chivalric code governing

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how war with them would be fought. This is worth exploring.

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How US forces conduct themselves after the battle might be

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as important in fourth generation war as how they fight

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the battle. What the Marine Corps calls cultural intelligence is

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of vital importance in forth generation war, and it must

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go down to the lowest rank in Iraq. The Marines

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seem to be grasping too, seem to be grasping this

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much better than the US army. What kind of people

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do we need in the special ops forces? We think

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minds are more important than muscles, but it is not clear.

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But it is not all special operations forces understand this.

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One key to success is integrating groups as much as

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possible with the local people. Unfortunately, the US doctrine of

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force protection works against integration and generally hurts us badly.

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A quote from the minutes of one of our meetings says,

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there are two ways to deal with the issue of

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force penetration. One way is the way we are currently

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doing it, which is to separate ourselves from the population

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and to intimidate them with our firepower. A more viable

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alternative might be to take the opposite approach and integrate

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with the community. That way, you find out more of

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what is going on, and the population protects you. The

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British approach of getting the helmets off as soon as

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possible may actually be saving loves. What wins at the

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tactical and physical levels might lose at the operational, strategic, mental,

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and moral levels where fourth generation war is decided. Martin

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van Kreveld argues that one reason the British have not

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lost in Northern Ireland is that the British Army has

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taken more casualties than it has inflicted. That is something

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the second generation US military has great trouble grasping because

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it defines success in terms of comparative attrition rates. We

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00:27:13,519 --> 00:27:17,240
must recognize that in fourth generation war, we are the weaker,

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not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology.

431
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What can the US military learn from police officers? US Army,

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Reserve and National Guard units include lots of cops. Are

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we taking advantage of what they know? One key to

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00:27:35,400 --> 00:27:38,319
success in fourth generation war might be losing to win.

435
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Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraqi

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not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state,

437
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creating a happy hunting ground for fourth generation forces in

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a world where the state is in decline. If you

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00:27:50,960 --> 00:27:54,720
destroy a stage, it is difficult to recreate it. Another

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00:27:54,759 --> 00:27:57,880
quote from the Minutes say, while war against another state

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may be necessary, one should seek to presus of that state.

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Even as one defeats it, grant the opposing armies the

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honors of war. Tell them what a fine job they did.

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Make their defeats civilized, so they can survive the war

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institutionally intact, and then work for your side.

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Speaker 2: Now, when you read that, it almost become or it

447
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becomes very obvious why historically, from most of the twentieth century,

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the US went out of its way to have so

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many monuments and overt honors for the former Confederacy, and

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now suddenly we're destroying all those things.

451
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Speaker 1: Well, it also reminds me that we are. Our occupying

452
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force is one who doesn't seek any of these things

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at all. They just seek to kill. They seek to

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kill everyone, And basically that's what we that's where we're at.

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If we haven't killed everyone, killed all of our enemies

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and not then you'll look at them with honor, look

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at them, look at them as you know you fought

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a good fight.

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Speaker 2: You know.

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Speaker 1: Now now we can trade, Now, we can trade chips,

461
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Now we can do something. But no, because this force there,

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because their whole ideology has basically overtaken us, we have

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to destroy everything. And if we don't destroy everything, we

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don't see that we've won exactly.

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Speaker 2: I mean this historic issue with empires. Are you know

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00:29:23,359 --> 00:29:26,759
there's a reason why you allow honors even as you

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defeat and control the enemy. I mean Rome famously turned

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huge parts of the periphery conquered peoples into their legions

469
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over time. America did that completely with the South. That's

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exactly what happened is essentially, you know, a coastal ruling

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elite outsource the process of fighting their wars, you know,

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to the people they conquered in the interior, in the

473
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south Land, and now they're intentionally trying to destroy them.

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And as you said, the people occupying us, the managerial

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class is a hostile, occupying enemy force that seeks our destruction.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean when every when every enemy you come

477
00:30:05,839 --> 00:30:09,839
up against isamlek and they cannot be reasoned with. They

478
00:30:09,880 --> 00:30:15,599
are you know, they're insane. They're Adolf Hitler. If Adolf

479
00:30:15,640 --> 00:30:18,480
Hitler and Bashar Asad are the same person to be

480
00:30:18,519 --> 00:30:22,720
treated the same way, well what do we do. We're

481
00:30:23,160 --> 00:30:26,279
never going to have honor. They'll never be honor in

482
00:30:26,359 --> 00:30:26,880
war again.

483
00:30:27,200 --> 00:30:30,759
Speaker 2: Exactly. You know, they simultaneously think every enemy is Hitler

484
00:30:30,759 --> 00:30:33,720
that must be utterly destroyed. While also believing we live

485
00:30:33,759 --> 00:30:39,200
in a world that's beyond violence, all right.

486
00:30:39,640 --> 00:30:43,240
Speaker 1: Continuing this would be similar to eighteenth century notions of

487
00:30:43,279 --> 00:30:46,960
civilized war and contribute greatly to propping up a fragile state.

488
00:30:47,480 --> 00:30:50,319
Humiliating the defeated enemy troops, especially in front of their

489
00:30:50,359 --> 00:30:53,359
own population, is always a serious mistake, but one that

490
00:30:53,400 --> 00:30:56,599
Americans are prone to make. The football mentality we have

491
00:30:56,680 --> 00:31:02,319
developed since World War Two works against us in many ways.

492
00:31:02,319 --> 00:31:04,519
The twenty first century will offer a war between the

493
00:31:04,519 --> 00:31:07,200
forces of fourth generation war and those are the brave

494
00:31:07,319 --> 00:31:13,000
New World. Fourth generation forces understand this, while the international

495
00:31:13,000 --> 00:31:16,240
elites to seek the brave New World do not. The

496
00:31:16,319 --> 00:31:19,920
minutes read Osama bin Laden, though reportedly very wealthy, lives

497
00:31:19,960 --> 00:31:22,799
in a cave. Yes, it is for security, but it

498
00:31:22,880 --> 00:31:26,359
is also leadership by example. It may make it harder

499
00:31:26,400 --> 00:31:30,079
to a separate but physically and psychologically fourth generation war

500
00:31:30,200 --> 00:31:34,359
leaders fourth generation war leaders from their troops. It also

501
00:31:34,400 --> 00:31:37,079
makes it harder to discredit those leaders with their followers.

502
00:31:37,839 --> 00:31:40,119
Speaker 2: There's a reason why when we look at just all

503
00:31:40,119 --> 00:31:44,240
of our historic I would say archetypes of leadership in

504
00:31:44,279 --> 00:31:46,680
the West, you know, people in times of great upheaval,

505
00:31:46,759 --> 00:31:49,119
and especially you just think about the whole archetype of

506
00:31:49,200 --> 00:31:52,960
leaders in the Old West or in Britain, think of

507
00:31:52,960 --> 00:31:55,160
the whole art theory and tradition. These are people who

508
00:31:55,200 --> 00:31:58,200
we use titles like king and duke and whatnot. So

509
00:31:58,240 --> 00:32:01,359
they were honest, our nobles understood they were different class.

510
00:32:01,440 --> 00:32:02,960
But at the same time they had to suffer with

511
00:32:03,000 --> 00:32:07,359
their people and they you know, the right of leadership

512
00:32:07,480 --> 00:32:10,279
was earned every day through their suffering and through their leadership,

513
00:32:11,240 --> 00:32:14,000
which is not something the managerial class has at all.

514
00:32:15,680 --> 00:32:18,039
Speaker 1: Well, and let's not forget it's only been one hundred

515
00:32:18,119 --> 00:32:21,519
years since the United States fought a war where a

516
00:32:21,599 --> 00:32:25,200
quarter of the class of Harvard was lost. Yeah, and

517
00:32:25,960 --> 00:32:31,559
you know scores of wasp elite children went to war

518
00:32:31,799 --> 00:32:36,160
and lost their lives. Yeah and yeah yeah.

519
00:32:36,160 --> 00:32:37,920
Speaker 2: I was saying, like one of the things is the

520
00:32:38,880 --> 00:32:42,519
Reserve Act, the one that created the modern National Guard,

521
00:32:42,640 --> 00:32:45,480
created r OTC. And you know there's a carve out

522
00:32:45,480 --> 00:32:48,359
this is ROTC Cadets can't be mobilized and sent abroad

523
00:32:48,359 --> 00:32:50,599
to fight. And it's like, why is that carve out

524
00:32:50,680 --> 00:32:53,160
there now that wasn't in there in the original one.

525
00:32:53,319 --> 00:32:57,039
It's because Norwich University, their entire core cadets was mobilized

526
00:32:57,079 --> 00:32:59,880
and sent to the border to fight Pancho via Via.

527
00:33:00,279 --> 00:33:02,440
And that's a one off example. But we lived in

528
00:33:02,480 --> 00:33:05,759
a world we're literally university students who were you know,

529
00:33:05,920 --> 00:33:08,359
very much of an upper class at that time could

530
00:33:08,400 --> 00:33:11,079
just be mobilized to fight a war even you know,

531
00:33:11,440 --> 00:33:14,079
at a time there wasn't a draft. And that's how

532
00:33:14,160 --> 00:33:15,559
much the world has changed since then.

533
00:33:18,960 --> 00:33:21,920
Speaker 1: This contrast dramatically with the brave New World elites, who

534
00:33:21,920 --> 00:33:25,079
are physically and psychologically separated from their followers by a

535
00:33:25,160 --> 00:33:29,200
huge gap. Even the generals and most conventional armies are

536
00:33:29,240 --> 00:33:32,279
to a great extent separated from their men. The brave

537
00:33:32,319 --> 00:33:35,000
New World elites are in many respects occupying the moral

538
00:33:35,039 --> 00:33:38,319
low ground. But don't know it. I think I've heard this.

539
00:33:40,720 --> 00:33:45,720
I think even Colonel McGregor has said this, that basically

540
00:33:45,880 --> 00:33:52,000
the general class is just managers, is just another branch

541
00:33:52,039 --> 00:33:57,319
of managers. Yeah. And the access occupation of the Balkans

542
00:33:57,359 --> 00:34:00,000
during World War Two, the Italians were in many ways

543
00:34:00,119 --> 00:34:03,000
more effective than the Germans. The key to their success

544
00:34:03,079 --> 00:34:05,720
is that they did not want to fight on Cyprus.

545
00:34:05,759 --> 00:34:09,000
To you, and Commander rated the Argentine Battalion as more

546
00:34:09,039 --> 00:34:12,239
effective than the British or the Austrians because the Argentines

547
00:34:12,280 --> 00:34:15,480
did not want to fight. What lessons can us forces

548
00:34:15,599 --> 00:34:20,400
draw from this? We've been so brainwashed that this sounds

549
00:34:20,400 --> 00:34:23,920
like cowardice, that like, you know, the average person would

550
00:34:24,039 --> 00:34:26,320
read this and it sounds like cowardice to them.

551
00:34:26,480 --> 00:34:28,440
Speaker 2: Yeah. I mean again, there's a time and a place,

552
00:34:28,519 --> 00:34:32,519
right and when you're waging a counterinsurgency, when you're occupying

553
00:34:32,519 --> 00:34:34,960
a force, you know, a desire to go out there

554
00:34:35,000 --> 00:34:36,920
and get in fights is generally not a good thing.

555
00:34:38,039 --> 00:34:41,480
If you talk to any cop who talks about have

556
00:34:41,639 --> 00:34:44,480
to work with new guys on the beat on a

557
00:34:44,519 --> 00:34:47,320
Friday night, a Saturday night, you know, wherever there's bars,

558
00:34:47,320 --> 00:34:49,000
and you're going to occasionally have to get into fights

559
00:34:49,000 --> 00:34:51,400
with guys. The last thing is you want is the

560
00:34:51,480 --> 00:34:53,599
young billy badass who wants to get in a fight

561
00:34:53,639 --> 00:34:56,039
all the time, because you're just going to create new

562
00:34:56,079 --> 00:34:57,079
requirements to fight.

563
00:35:00,599 --> 00:35:03,559
Speaker 1: How would the mafia do an occupation when we have

564
00:35:03,599 --> 00:35:06,280
a coalition? What if we let each country do what

565
00:35:06,440 --> 00:35:09,760
is what it does best. For example, having the Russians

566
00:35:09,800 --> 00:35:14,440
handle operational art, the US firepower and logistics, and the

567
00:35:14,480 --> 00:35:18,159
Italians the occupation how could the US Department of Defense

568
00:35:18,199 --> 00:35:21,440
this concept of transformation be redefined to come to grips

569
00:35:21,440 --> 00:35:25,119
with fourth generation war. If you read the current transformation

570
00:35:25,280 --> 00:35:27,920
planning guidance put out by the Department, you will find

571
00:35:27,920 --> 00:35:31,079
nothing on fourth generation war, indeed nothing that relates to

572
00:35:31,199 --> 00:35:33,639
all at all to either of the two wars we

573
00:35:33,679 --> 00:35:37,039
are now fighting. It is oriented toward fighting state armed

574
00:35:37,039 --> 00:35:39,079
forces that fight us symmetrically.

575
00:35:40,280 --> 00:35:43,559
Speaker 2: Again, it wants to refight the Cold War, which even

576
00:35:43,599 --> 00:35:45,920
during the Cold War wanted to refight World War Two.

577
00:35:46,000 --> 00:35:50,039
We have perenally an army that wanted to do whatever

578
00:35:50,079 --> 00:35:52,920
we did that won last time, but really does not

579
00:35:52,960 --> 00:35:54,679
want to do the fights that we actually have to

580
00:35:54,719 --> 00:35:56,039
engage in now.

581
00:35:59,119 --> 00:36:02,360
Speaker 1: We asked will Saddam's capture market turning point in the

582
00:36:02,360 --> 00:36:05,519
war in Iraq? The conclusion, don't count on it. That

583
00:36:05,840 --> 00:36:09,599
reminds me of now taking out the head of hes

584
00:36:09,639 --> 00:36:12,920
Blah and then taking out his his replacement, and they

585
00:36:12,920 --> 00:36:15,679
think they're winning. They think that because they did that,

586
00:36:15,719 --> 00:36:16,239
they're winning.

587
00:36:17,079 --> 00:36:20,280
Speaker 2: Yeah, And obviously, take eliminating command and control at any

588
00:36:20,360 --> 00:36:23,039
level is what you want to do against your enemies.

589
00:36:24,239 --> 00:36:27,000
But there's always the question how resilient is Hesbalah and

590
00:36:27,039 --> 00:36:30,880
the fact that we're seeing forces repel Israeli forces in

591
00:36:30,920 --> 00:36:34,360
parts of southern Lebanon. We don't know to what degree

592
00:36:34,400 --> 00:36:37,960
that's happening, because you know, the Israelis sure Is are

593
00:36:38,000 --> 00:36:41,480
not telling us anything, you know, concrete, but it really

594
00:36:41,519 --> 00:36:44,440
looks like hes Blah is continuing to function at lower

595
00:36:44,519 --> 00:36:48,320
levels and reforming its layers of chain of command after

596
00:36:48,360 --> 00:36:52,440
they're being killed off. So it looks like they're doing

597
00:36:52,519 --> 00:36:53,559
a very good job at that.

598
00:36:55,119 --> 00:36:59,079
Speaker 1: Yeah, few resistance fighters have been fighting for Saddam personally.

599
00:36:59,400 --> 00:37:02,440
Saddam's capture might lead to a fracturing of the Bath Party,

600
00:37:02,800 --> 00:37:06,199
which would move us further toward a fourth generation situation

601
00:37:06,320 --> 00:37:09,920
where no one can recreate the state. It might also

602
00:37:10,079 --> 00:37:12,719
tell the she IDEs that they no longer need America

603
00:37:12,760 --> 00:37:15,599
to protect them from Saddam, giving them more options in

604
00:37:15,639 --> 00:37:18,719
their struggle for free elections. And that's exactly what happened.

605
00:37:18,679 --> 00:37:23,519
Speaker 2: Yeah, exactly right. They dismantled, well, they actually disbanded the

606
00:37:23,559 --> 00:37:27,519
regular army and all the other security forces, so everybody

607
00:37:27,800 --> 00:37:31,039
person who could went home, took weapons and hid them,

608
00:37:31,159 --> 00:37:33,960
and lots of those guys who again, the Bath Party

609
00:37:34,039 --> 00:37:37,320
was extremely secular. I've been to the old Republican Guard headquarters.

610
00:37:37,519 --> 00:37:40,239
I've been to their bar, you know, and I could

611
00:37:40,280 --> 00:37:42,880
see all the old you know, long since empty bottles

612
00:37:42,880 --> 00:37:45,639
of whiskey in it. So you know, these guys were

613
00:37:45,679 --> 00:37:50,159
not Islamists, but you invaded their country. You took away

614
00:37:50,199 --> 00:37:53,159
all their status, you took away any organization that meant

615
00:37:53,159 --> 00:37:55,880
in anything. And these guys went home with their guns,

616
00:37:55,920 --> 00:37:58,599
and as soon as people started firing the occupation, the

617
00:37:58,639 --> 00:38:01,880
actual professionals happily showed up and provided their training and

618
00:38:01,920 --> 00:38:03,079
disciplined to those people.

619
00:38:05,760 --> 00:38:08,440
Speaker 1: However, if the US Army used to capture of Saddam

620
00:38:08,480 --> 00:38:11,800
to announce the end of tactics that enraged ordinary Iraqis

621
00:38:12,119 --> 00:38:15,239
and drive them toward active resistance, it might buy us

622
00:38:15,280 --> 00:38:18,280
a bit of de escalation. But I do not think

623
00:38:18,320 --> 00:38:20,960
we will be that smart. So you think this is

624
00:38:20,960 --> 00:38:22,800
what around two thousand and five, two thousand and six,

625
00:38:22,840 --> 00:38:25,440
because the redirection was in the redirection was in two

626
00:38:25,440 --> 00:38:28,360
thousand and six, right or two thousand yeah?

627
00:38:27,639 --> 00:38:33,239
Speaker 2: Yeah, was it two thousand and three? Is no? Or four? Anyways,

628
00:38:33,239 --> 00:38:37,039
when we captured Saddam? So yeah, about that timeframe. So yeah,

629
00:38:37,159 --> 00:38:40,079
this hasn't been updated since then, but it's still good

630
00:38:40,800 --> 00:38:41,679
as a peace Yeah.

631
00:38:41,559 --> 00:38:45,960
Speaker 1: Yeah, of course, absolutely getting it. When it comes to

632
00:38:46,000 --> 00:38:48,320
fourth generation war, it seems no one in the US

633
00:38:48,360 --> 00:38:51,679
military gets it. Recently, a faculty member at the National

634
00:38:51,679 --> 00:38:56,800
Defense University wrote to Marine Corps General James Mattis, Commander,

635
00:38:56,960 --> 00:39:01,280
first Marine Division, asking for isn't it insane how he's

636
00:39:01,320 --> 00:39:08,480
just become another manager? Yeah, he meant, well, but yeah,

637
00:39:08,559 --> 00:39:11,280
start over again. Recently, a faculty member at the National

638
00:39:11,280 --> 00:39:15,159
Defense University wrote to Marine Corps General James Maddis, Commander,

639
00:39:15,440 --> 00:39:18,400
first Marine Division, asking for his views on the importance

640
00:39:18,400 --> 00:39:21,840
of reading military history. Matis responded with an eloquent defense

641
00:39:21,880 --> 00:39:24,280
of making time to read history when this should go

642
00:39:24,400 --> 00:39:27,519
up on the wall at all military schools. Thanks to

643
00:39:27,559 --> 00:39:29,920
my reading, I have never been caught flat footed by

644
00:39:29,920 --> 00:39:33,360
any situation. It doesn't give me all the answers, but

645
00:39:33,440 --> 00:39:38,119
it lights what is often a dark path ahead. Still,

646
00:39:38,159 --> 00:39:40,840
even such a capable and well read commander as Madis,

647
00:39:40,840 --> 00:39:45,039
seems to miss the point about fourth generation war. He said, Ultimately,

648
00:39:45,079 --> 00:39:47,719
a real understanding of history means that we face nothing

649
00:39:47,760 --> 00:39:50,480
new under the sun for the fourth generation of war.

650
00:39:50,559 --> 00:39:53,440
Intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of war

651
00:39:53,519 --> 00:39:56,800
is fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new and so on.

652
00:39:57,199 --> 00:39:59,639
I must respectfully say, not really.

653
00:40:01,599 --> 00:40:04,079
Speaker 2: This This gets sort of the issue that you know,

654
00:40:04,159 --> 00:40:08,280
Krappman pushed back in the introduction, and that's part of

655
00:40:08,280 --> 00:40:10,159
the issue too. How much is there new under sun?

656
00:40:10,400 --> 00:40:12,800
Very little? But it doesn't mean that we faced those

657
00:40:12,800 --> 00:40:18,119
situations in the recent past. So again, conceptual frameworks. You know,

658
00:40:18,199 --> 00:40:21,920
nobody doing fourth generation warfare called it fourth generational warfare.

659
00:40:22,880 --> 00:40:27,519
The Vietnamese certainly didn't. But you know, we impose those

660
00:40:27,840 --> 00:40:31,039
concepts in order to understand the world. And that's I

661
00:40:31,079 --> 00:40:33,800
think what Lynd is getting at. It's, yeah, you know,

662
00:40:33,920 --> 00:40:36,079
we're dealing with things that are very ancient, but the

663
00:40:36,079 --> 00:40:38,199
fact that we don't see that there's been a shift

664
00:40:38,199 --> 00:40:41,039
from one thing to another. By ignoring that, you know,

665
00:40:41,119 --> 00:40:44,719
we're ignoring the nuance and that lack of understanding is

666
00:40:44,760 --> 00:40:46,039
going to hurt us.

667
00:40:48,320 --> 00:40:51,800
Speaker 1: Well, that is not quite what fourth generation intellectuals are saying.

668
00:40:51,960 --> 00:40:54,679
On the contrary, we have pointed out over and over

669
00:40:54,719 --> 00:40:57,840
that the Fourth Generation is not a novel but a return,

670
00:40:58,079 --> 00:41:00,719
specifically a return to the way war work before the

671
00:41:00,800 --> 00:41:04,880
rise of the state. Now as then, many different entities

672
00:41:04,960 --> 00:41:08,320
not just governments of states will wage war, and they

673
00:41:08,360 --> 00:41:11,119
will wage war for many different reasons, not just the

674
00:41:11,159 --> 00:41:14,800
extension of politics. By other means, they will use many

675
00:41:14,840 --> 00:41:17,880
different tools to fight war, not restricting themselves to what

676
00:41:17,920 --> 00:41:21,519
we recognize as military forces. When I asked to recommend

677
00:41:21,599 --> 00:41:24,519
a book, a good book describing what a fourth generation

678
00:41:24,719 --> 00:41:28,280
world would look like, I usually suggest Barbara Tukman's A

679
00:41:28,360 --> 00:41:34,840
Distant Mirror the Calamitous fourteenth Century. We also are not

680
00:41:34,880 --> 00:41:38,119
saying the fourth generation tactics are new. On the contrary,

681
00:41:38,239 --> 00:41:40,599
many of the tactics of the fourth generation. Many of

682
00:41:40,599 --> 00:41:44,159
the tactics fourth Generation opponents use are standard guerrilla tactics.

683
00:41:44,719 --> 00:41:47,880
Other tactics, including much of what we call terrorism, are

684
00:41:47,960 --> 00:41:51,559
classic Arab light infantry warfare carried out with modern technology

685
00:41:51,599 --> 00:41:55,760
at the operational and strategic, not just tactical levels. Much

686
00:41:55,760 --> 00:41:57,599
of what we are facing in Iraq today is not

687
00:41:57,679 --> 00:42:01,000
yet fourth generation war, but a war of national liberation

688
00:42:01,800 --> 00:42:04,960
fought by people whose goal is to restore a Bathist state.

689
00:42:05,960 --> 00:42:09,480
But as his goal fades and those forces splinter, fourth

690
00:42:09,599 --> 00:42:12,239
Generation war will come more and more to the four

691
00:42:13,280 --> 00:42:16,320
What will characterize it are not vast changes in how

692
00:42:16,320 --> 00:42:19,239
the enemy fights, but rather in who fights and what

693
00:42:19,320 --> 00:42:22,559
they fight for. The change in who fights makes it

694
00:42:22,639 --> 00:42:25,280
difficult to tell friend from foe.

695
00:42:25,719 --> 00:42:28,880
Speaker 2: A friend of mine used to be an intelligent analyst

696
00:42:28,960 --> 00:42:31,840
for the army before he became an officer, and he

697
00:42:31,880 --> 00:42:35,960
points out that this timeframe, right Islamic state existed. It

698
00:42:36,000 --> 00:42:38,599
was one of the dozens of different groups that were

699
00:42:38,639 --> 00:42:41,800
involved in Iraq at that time, and it wasn't even

700
00:42:41,840 --> 00:42:45,599
seen as particularly relevant because these are the guys talked

701
00:42:45,599 --> 00:42:48,599
about restoring a caliphate when you know these guys couldn't

702
00:42:48,639 --> 00:42:53,000
restore the equivalent of I don't know a city councilor yet.

703
00:42:53,480 --> 00:42:55,480
But the point is, you know, that's it. You know,

704
00:42:55,519 --> 00:42:58,559
things fractured and suddenly we're dealing not just with guys

705
00:42:58,599 --> 00:43:01,840
who are trying to undo the last invasion, they're trying

706
00:43:01,840 --> 00:43:05,880
to recreate the entire world. And we have a myopia,

707
00:43:05,920 --> 00:43:10,360
as especially the Western administrative class, has this myopia that

708
00:43:10,559 --> 00:43:15,119
can't see new emerging threats because we're so convinced number

709
00:43:15,159 --> 00:43:18,119
one in progress in number two that you know, things

710
00:43:18,159 --> 00:43:20,599
that have been this way for the last five minutes

711
00:43:20,760 --> 00:43:22,840
are those two things are the only things that can

712
00:43:22,880 --> 00:43:23,280
ever be.

713
00:43:24,920 --> 00:43:28,440
Speaker 1: Continuing. A good example is the advent of female suicide

714
00:43:28,480 --> 00:43:31,880
bombers to US troops now start forrescing every Muslim moment

715
00:43:31,920 --> 00:43:35,400
they encounter. The change in what our enemies fight for

716
00:43:35,679 --> 00:43:39,440
makes impossible the political compromises that are necessary to ending

717
00:43:39,480 --> 00:43:42,920
any war. We find that when it comes to making peace,

718
00:43:43,000 --> 00:43:45,719
we have no one to talk to and know nothing

719
00:43:45,760 --> 00:43:48,559
to talk about. The end of a war like that

720
00:43:48,599 --> 00:43:52,559
in Iraq becomes inevitable. The local state we attack vanishes,

721
00:43:53,039 --> 00:43:56,360
leaving behind either a stateless region, as in Somalia, or

722
00:43:56,400 --> 00:43:59,440
a facade of a state, as an Afghanistan, within which

723
00:43:59,599 --> 00:44:02,960
more on state actors rise and fight. Mattis is correct

724
00:44:02,960 --> 00:44:05,199
that none of this is new. It is only new

725
00:44:05,280 --> 00:44:08,840
to state armed forces designed to fight other state armed forces.

726
00:44:09,920 --> 00:44:15,199
So in taking out like the head of Hesbelah or

727
00:44:16,719 --> 00:44:21,079
is just just an assumption that that person is not

728
00:44:21,159 --> 00:44:25,920
running Hesbela. So you know, if you were to negotiate

729
00:44:25,960 --> 00:44:30,079
a treaty, if you were to negotiate a peace, you're

730
00:44:30,119 --> 00:44:32,760
not going to be negotiating with them anyway. Or is

731
00:44:32,800 --> 00:44:35,559
this just them saying there is not going to be

732
00:44:35,639 --> 00:44:37,719
any peace until you all are dead and buried.

733
00:44:38,920 --> 00:44:44,239
Speaker 2: Well, it's there's definitely elements that think that, right, we

734
00:44:44,320 --> 00:44:46,639
definitely know within design of state there are people who

735
00:44:46,639 --> 00:44:49,559
want that, though I don't think they're the majority, and

736
00:44:49,599 --> 00:44:52,119
they're not necessarily close to power, just because that's a

737
00:44:52,239 --> 00:44:55,679
very irrational perspective. Though as I say that, I think

738
00:44:55,679 --> 00:44:58,000
that's more or less the exact perspective of the American

739
00:44:58,320 --> 00:45:03,400
rule and class towards us. The big issue I find

740
00:45:03,480 --> 00:45:06,440
is anytime that people start at people in the American

741
00:45:07,159 --> 00:45:10,760
you know, mainstream start talking about assassination as the magical

742
00:45:10,840 --> 00:45:14,800
cure ale, like people were talking about Putin for the

743
00:45:14,800 --> 00:45:17,119
first year and a half in the war in Russia,

744
00:45:17,440 --> 00:45:19,519
or you know, it's like they seem to have this

745
00:45:19,639 --> 00:45:24,559
idea that assassinating a leader is like an Indians game

746
00:45:24,599 --> 00:45:26,480
where they knocked out the mothership and then all the

747
00:45:26,559 --> 00:45:31,480
enemy aliens just collapsed and fell to the ground, you know,

748
00:45:31,519 --> 00:45:34,280
as if you take out one central piece and then

749
00:45:34,360 --> 00:45:39,760
everything collapses. And that might be the case in some cases,

750
00:45:39,960 --> 00:45:44,639
but generally, if you're dealing with an effective, spontaneous insurgency

751
00:45:44,719 --> 00:45:46,760
or a group that you know, acts in a very

752
00:45:46,760 --> 00:45:49,440
decentralized manner, there's no reason for them to do that

753
00:45:49,480 --> 00:45:52,199
because they can keep on fighting, at least at the

754
00:45:52,239 --> 00:45:54,920
local tactical level. So yeah, I think a lot of

755
00:45:54,920 --> 00:45:57,639
that is just this myopia to think that everybody is

756
00:45:57,639 --> 00:45:59,639
suddenly going to shut down when the command and control

757
00:45:59,719 --> 00:46:02,639
note is gonna get sent out or get knocked out,

758
00:46:02,719 --> 00:46:03,599
I guess.

759
00:46:05,199 --> 00:46:07,519
Speaker 1: So when they when they found Saddam in the hole

760
00:46:07,599 --> 00:46:11,719
and they and they handed them over and they hung them,

761
00:46:12,039 --> 00:46:15,400
I mean, that's that's the point where it's like, Okay,

762
00:46:15,719 --> 00:46:18,079
we've done what we've come here to do we leave.

763
00:46:19,840 --> 00:46:23,599
That would have been, yeah, we make we make friends,

764
00:46:23,639 --> 00:46:25,880
We you know, try to figure out who's going to

765
00:46:25,920 --> 00:46:28,159
take over for him and if that person is going

766
00:46:28,199 --> 00:46:31,159
to be friendly or not. A lot I mean, I

767
00:46:31,239 --> 00:46:34,639
don't know, I don't know. I mean, it's their culture

768
00:46:34,880 --> 00:46:39,199
and the way they run things is so there's so

769
00:46:39,280 --> 00:46:44,760
many inner battles between them, between forces there, it's like

770
00:46:44,880 --> 00:46:47,880
what do you to stay? There just doesn't make sense

771
00:46:47,960 --> 00:46:51,679
because you you're you. You may think you're picking the

772
00:46:51,719 --> 00:46:54,199
right guy, and you're picking the wrong guy, and sometimes

773
00:46:54,280 --> 00:46:56,079
it seems like they picked the wrong guy on purpose.

774
00:46:56,800 --> 00:46:59,440
Speaker 2: Yeah, and that's part of the issue. Number one. By

775
00:46:59,440 --> 00:47:03,320
destroying first decapitating the state, I mean, by the time

776
00:47:03,400 --> 00:47:06,760
Saddam was captured, he didn't have any effective control of anything.

777
00:47:07,440 --> 00:47:10,719
You know, he had very limited ability to communicate with anybody,

778
00:47:11,199 --> 00:47:15,320
and he definitely wasn't controlling forces at any level. So

779
00:47:16,039 --> 00:47:19,079
you know, from an operational standpoint, knocking him out, what

780
00:47:19,119 --> 00:47:23,920
does that do, Tomkimander? Control nothing because you've already shattered

781
00:47:23,920 --> 00:47:27,719
it and people only organizing on the local level. And

782
00:47:28,440 --> 00:47:30,159
again it gets back to the issue, like you said,

783
00:47:30,400 --> 00:47:32,599
you want to leave. You don't want to occupy forever.

784
00:47:32,960 --> 00:47:35,599
You don't want to bleed yourself to get You don't

785
00:47:35,599 --> 00:47:40,679
want to bleed yourself to death, imperpetuity occupying somebody else's country.

786
00:47:41,760 --> 00:47:43,559
So yeah, at some point you need this country to

787
00:47:43,599 --> 00:47:47,239
have an administration that is, you know, in terms of

788
00:47:47,280 --> 00:47:51,599
foreign policy, not aggressive towards your side, and hopefully maintain

789
00:47:51,679 --> 00:47:54,000
security and protects his populous there. So it's not going

790
00:47:54,079 --> 00:47:57,880
to get overthrown. But the first few years we basically

791
00:47:57,880 --> 00:48:02,039
did everything we could to stop that. For instance, depathification, right,

792
00:48:02,039 --> 00:48:04,679
we talk about debatification. How horrible was We sent the

793
00:48:04,800 --> 00:48:08,000
army home, you know, and they weren't there to do security.

794
00:48:08,639 --> 00:48:10,960
But it went through so many different layers of society

795
00:48:10,960 --> 00:48:13,480
that generally any person who has any kind of technical

796
00:48:13,480 --> 00:48:16,280
skill in Iraq at that time was probably a member

797
00:48:16,280 --> 00:48:19,039
of the Bath Party. I was in Iraq two thousand

798
00:48:19,079 --> 00:48:21,559
and six, two thousand and seven. The newer Iraqi Army

799
00:48:21,559 --> 00:48:25,559
would periodically have ways of debathification where they would decide

800
00:48:25,599 --> 00:48:28,320
this guy, being an active BATH member, had to be

801
00:48:28,400 --> 00:48:31,239
kicked out at that point. But I understand that basically

802
00:48:31,280 --> 00:48:34,199
meant that not just most experienced officers, but most of

803
00:48:34,239 --> 00:48:37,440
your senior NCOs, all of your technical people like skilled

804
00:48:37,519 --> 00:48:40,079
army mechanics and stuff, would be fired, to the point

805
00:48:40,119 --> 00:48:42,599
that basically we would lose as we were building the

806
00:48:42,599 --> 00:48:46,320
new Iraqi Army, any person with any competency in leadership ability.

807
00:48:46,480 --> 00:48:51,280
So again, it's like what we're seeing internally, this need

808
00:48:51,320 --> 00:48:57,480
to impose the global American empire everywhere, you know, become

809
00:48:57,559 --> 00:49:01,400
self defeating, and what is the solution to it? Well,

810
00:49:01,440 --> 00:49:03,880
I'd say step one, let's not in Maine, Iraq. And

811
00:49:03,960 --> 00:49:06,639
number two, let's not pretend that everybody in the world

812
00:49:07,159 --> 00:49:09,440
you know, has the exact same values as us. You know,

813
00:49:11,400 --> 00:49:13,760
I don't know, It's like, how would I fix this,

814
00:49:14,280 --> 00:49:16,199
It's so far beyond fixing. I don't know.

815
00:49:17,440 --> 00:49:20,480
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, I mean that's basically where we're at so

816
00:49:20,960 --> 00:49:24,440
two more sentences and we're done here. The fact that

817
00:49:24,480 --> 00:49:27,320
no state military has recently succeeded in defeating a non

818
00:49:27,360 --> 00:49:31,320
state enemy reminds us that Cleo, the patroon goddess of history,

819
00:49:31,639 --> 00:49:34,519
has a sense of humor. She teaches us that not

820
00:49:34,599 --> 00:49:39,360
all problems have solutions. For those wishings learn more about

821
00:49:39,400 --> 00:49:42,360
the intellectual framework I call the four generations of modern war.

822
00:49:42,440 --> 00:49:45,280
Some useful resources are available, chief of which is to

823
00:49:45,360 --> 00:49:48,199
four GW. Ken in a list of seven books, which,

824
00:49:48,320 --> 00:49:51,039
if read in the given order, will take the reader

825
00:49:51,079 --> 00:49:54,840
from the first generation into the fourth. So, yeah, he's

826
00:49:54,880 --> 00:49:58,880
got a bibliography here, and they actually have commentary on

827
00:49:58,960 --> 00:50:01,519
each one. Yeah, do we want to want to read

828
00:50:01,559 --> 00:50:03,119
this or just let people find it?

829
00:50:03,199 --> 00:50:06,039
Speaker 2: And uh got to don't have to read Vadim, but

830
00:50:06,119 --> 00:50:07,199
we could talk through it if you like.

831
00:50:08,360 --> 00:50:10,760
Speaker 1: Okay. So the first book is called The Enlightened Soldier

832
00:50:11,360 --> 00:50:16,719
Sharenhorst and the Militarish Gestelschaft in Berlin eighteen oh one

833
00:50:16,800 --> 00:50:23,840
to eighteen oh five by Charles E. White gaesell Schaft. Sorry,

834
00:50:24,079 --> 00:50:30,719
it just means society, okay. Basically he was a reformer

835
00:50:30,760 --> 00:50:36,360
of the Prussian Prussian Army who after a disastrous defeat

836
00:50:36,400 --> 00:50:40,199
of eighteen oh six. His reforms look like they helped

837
00:50:40,199 --> 00:50:45,119
to develop their generational war led to third generational warfare

838
00:50:45,199 --> 00:50:46,039
of World War One.

839
00:50:46,599 --> 00:50:49,760
Speaker 2: Yeah, the whole idea of decentralization in German tradition, that's

840
00:50:49,920 --> 00:50:51,000
where they trace it.

841
00:50:52,199 --> 00:50:55,920
Speaker 1: Okay. Next one is the Seeds of Disaster. The Development

842
00:50:55,960 --> 00:50:59,519
of French Army Doctrine nineteen nineteen to nineteen thirty nine

843
00:50:59,559 --> 00:51:04,400
by Robert A. Dodie, a dry book. Do you know

844
00:51:04,440 --> 00:51:04,880
this book?

845
00:51:05,480 --> 00:51:07,559
Speaker 2: No? But I mean, basically it's the whole issue of

846
00:51:07,559 --> 00:51:11,559
how America adopted French doctrine and even though we claim

847
00:51:11,639 --> 00:51:14,840
we don't, you know, we're still the whole zero defects

848
00:51:15,159 --> 00:51:19,239
mentality that the US Army has basically comes from this movement.

849
00:51:21,639 --> 00:51:25,119
Speaker 1: Stormtroop tactics innovation in the German Army in nineteen fourteen

850
00:51:25,199 --> 00:51:31,599
nineteen eighteen by Bruce Goodmuanson Development of third generational Warfare. Basically,

851
00:51:31,920 --> 00:51:35,719
I guess this details the development of the Blitzkrig method.

852
00:51:36,320 --> 00:51:39,360
Speaker 2: Yeah. So again we tend to think of special operations

853
00:51:39,400 --> 00:51:42,119
and you know blitz creeb as it's being two conceptually

854
00:51:42,159 --> 00:51:45,800
different things. But I would say the whole Boyd military

855
00:51:45,880 --> 00:51:49,119
reformer idea. We basically look at these as both examples

856
00:51:49,159 --> 00:51:51,639
of maneuver warfare in different ways in which you can

857
00:51:51,800 --> 00:51:57,159
use speed and mobility or infiltration tactics in order to

858
00:51:58,280 --> 00:52:01,280
accomplish what you're trying to do third generation warfare. And

859
00:52:01,320 --> 00:52:04,320
this is a good example if you're in the military

860
00:52:04,360 --> 00:52:07,440
history of how you could start adapting you know, those

861
00:52:07,559 --> 00:52:10,239
kind of tactics despite the fact you don't have, you know,

862
00:52:10,360 --> 00:52:12,360
the best tanks and whatnot of the era.

863
00:52:14,320 --> 00:52:18,079
Speaker 1: Command or Control Command, Training and Tactics in the British

864
00:52:18,079 --> 00:52:21,440
and German Armies eighteen eighty eight through nineteen eighteen by

865
00:52:21,480 --> 00:52:27,280
Martin Samuels. Just comparison a second generation British Army with

866
00:52:27,360 --> 00:52:32,119
the Kaiserhaer illustrates the differences between second and third generations.

867
00:52:33,239 --> 00:52:37,280
Fifth book is The Breaking Points Sedan and the Fall

868
00:52:37,400 --> 00:52:39,119
of Is that pronounced Sadan?

869
00:52:40,440 --> 00:52:40,840
Speaker 2: I think?

870
00:52:41,199 --> 00:52:42,760
Speaker 1: Orre's a sheaden Schaden?

871
00:52:42,840 --> 00:52:43,199
Speaker 2: Maybe?

872
00:52:43,599 --> 00:52:45,760
Speaker 1: And the Fall of Front Yeah and the Fall of

873
00:52:45,760 --> 00:52:52,119
France nineteen forty by again Robert Dowdy. Nineteen forty campaign

874
00:52:52,199 --> 00:52:54,599
the second and third generations clashed head on and the

875
00:52:54,679 --> 00:52:57,079
second went down to defeat in six weeks, although the

876
00:52:57,079 --> 00:53:00,639
French had more and better tanks than the German.

877
00:53:01,599 --> 00:53:05,199
Speaker 2: Yeah, and that's again it's the invasion of France, how

878
00:53:05,239 --> 00:53:07,199
they got through the Maginea line, how they defeated the

879
00:53:07,199 --> 00:53:09,480
French army. And again they had more and better equipment,

880
00:53:09,920 --> 00:53:12,119
so you'd think more and better tanks would matter a

881
00:53:12,119 --> 00:53:16,119
lot in Blitzkrieg, and the Germans still won. And this

882
00:53:16,159 --> 00:53:16,960
is how they did it.

883
00:53:19,079 --> 00:53:23,039
Speaker 1: The last two books looked like Van Kreveld Fighting Power

884
00:53:23,159 --> 00:53:26,519
German and US Army Performance thirty nine through forty five.

885
00:53:27,199 --> 00:53:30,639
Speaker 2: Yeah, Fighting Power, I'm sorry to catch you out. So

886
00:53:30,719 --> 00:53:32,639
that's basically what came out of the first book he

887
00:53:32,679 --> 00:53:36,440
did after his PhD dissertation. He actually talks a lot

888
00:53:36,480 --> 00:53:40,199
about in his memoirs because he had a sabbatical to

889
00:53:40,280 --> 00:53:44,559
go to Germany's study and he talked about basically being

890
00:53:45,480 --> 00:53:48,159
writers blocked about what he could write about those two armies,

891
00:53:48,239 --> 00:53:50,800
and sitting in an archive, he laid down the official

892
00:53:51,800 --> 00:53:55,480
US Army history of the war, you know, side by

893
00:53:55,559 --> 00:53:59,760
side with the Wehrmach's official history that was done was

894
00:53:59,760 --> 00:54:02,440
done after the war, and just looking through, you know,

895
00:54:02,559 --> 00:54:04,280
page by page, flipping through that and he said, the

896
00:54:04,280 --> 00:54:09,760
fundamental difference, excuse me, was that the American Army. We

897
00:54:09,800 --> 00:54:13,159
talk about decentralization, we talk about individuality, but it tends

898
00:54:13,199 --> 00:54:16,079
to be a very man in gerial, very centrally planned,

899
00:54:16,199 --> 00:54:19,800
very you know, centrally managed army even to the day.

900
00:54:19,840 --> 00:54:21,559
But you know, so much so world War Two. Why

901
00:54:21,599 --> 00:54:23,599
the Germans, despite the fact that we think of the

902
00:54:23,960 --> 00:54:29,280
stereotypic Nazis being very rigid and regimented, was very decentralized

903
00:54:29,280 --> 00:54:32,840
and very concerned with you know, intent and allowing junior

904
00:54:32,840 --> 00:54:36,239
commanders to lead and being able to lead. And he said,

905
00:54:36,239 --> 00:54:39,159
the most interesting thing, the biggest example of the difference

906
00:54:39,159 --> 00:54:42,320
between those is basically every chapter the US Army would

907
00:54:42,360 --> 00:54:47,039
be these most detailed charts, you know, in meticulous details,

908
00:54:47,039 --> 00:54:49,800
with numbers on everything. You know, the kind of things

909
00:54:49,800 --> 00:54:53,360
we do in Microsoft Exel, but you know, a half

910
00:54:53,400 --> 00:54:56,480
century before Excel was around. Whereas the Germans, Yeah, they

911
00:54:56,480 --> 00:54:59,000
would have the numbers in the appendices, but they didn't

912
00:54:59,320 --> 00:55:02,440
really care a lot about those numbers other than making

913
00:55:02,679 --> 00:55:07,199
key narrative points, and they would use basically paragraph formats

914
00:55:07,239 --> 00:55:10,719
to explain everything. So again that's one of the things

915
00:55:10,800 --> 00:55:13,320
I always harp on that because I always think that's

916
00:55:13,360 --> 00:55:17,679
so important. Yes, numbers matter, but the ability to explain reality,

917
00:55:17,760 --> 00:55:21,000
the ability to make people understand reality, the ability to

918
00:55:21,079 --> 00:55:24,559
make your support and it's understand objectives is more important

919
00:55:24,599 --> 00:55:25,519
than detailed data.

920
00:55:28,480 --> 00:55:31,320
Speaker 1: And then the last book is The Transformation of War

921
00:55:31,440 --> 00:55:32,840
by Van Krebble.

922
00:55:33,320 --> 00:55:35,039
Speaker 2: Yeah, and that's the book I always say you got

923
00:55:35,079 --> 00:55:38,400
to go read, and it's basically about he did two books,

924
00:55:38,440 --> 00:55:40,559
this and Rising to the Klind of State. This one's

925
00:55:40,599 --> 00:55:45,800
about how again warfare is being transit or is transitioning

926
00:55:45,880 --> 00:55:48,480
to nonstate actors. You know, this rise of hes Boil

927
00:55:48,559 --> 00:55:51,559
was at the time, so Gorilla's insurgencies fighting this war.

928
00:55:51,599 --> 00:55:54,599
And then transformation is what does that mean for you know,

929
00:55:54,840 --> 00:55:56,559
politics as a whole. And that's the one that the

930
00:55:56,639 --> 00:55:58,800
Misis Institute did a conference on.

931
00:56:00,960 --> 00:56:05,199
Speaker 1: Awesome. All right, well, do you have any closing comments

932
00:56:05,239 --> 00:56:09,800
on this one? If not, get out of here.

933
00:56:10,000 --> 00:56:13,119
Speaker 2: No. Like I said, I recommend it just because you know,

934
00:56:13,159 --> 00:56:16,280
we all so many people talk about Generations Award. This

935
00:56:16,320 --> 00:56:20,719
is the source material on it, and we all, including myself,

936
00:56:20,719 --> 00:56:23,239
of a tendency to talk about things without knowing the fundamentals.

937
00:56:23,280 --> 00:56:24,440
So that's why I recommend it, sir.

938
00:56:25,559 --> 00:56:28,360
Speaker 1: Yeah, it seems very concise and it also seems like

939
00:56:28,400 --> 00:56:30,840
one of those things that if they can pique enough

940
00:56:30,920 --> 00:56:34,480
interest that people can go to that bibliography if they

941
00:56:34,480 --> 00:56:38,039
want to and start, you know, start going even deeper.

942
00:56:38,280 --> 00:56:42,280
Speaker 2: Yeah, and everything Linn did because he he is he's

943
00:56:42,280 --> 00:56:44,480
got an academic background, but he tends to write thing

944
00:56:45,599 --> 00:56:48,719
sort of hybrid style, things written for you know, normal people,

945
00:56:48,880 --> 00:56:51,920
but with the citation of an academic document. And he

946
00:56:51,960 --> 00:56:53,800
writes most things that are designed to fit in the

947
00:56:53,840 --> 00:56:58,960
standard magazine article size so that it actually can be communicated.

948
00:56:59,039 --> 00:57:01,760
So if you ever go to his blog, he blogs

949
00:57:01,760 --> 00:57:04,079
at traditional right dot com, he's got stuff like this

950
00:57:04,199 --> 00:57:07,599
going back decades. And he's just he's great, he's direct,

951
00:57:07,719 --> 00:57:10,400
he's to the point, he's easy to engage with. He

952
00:57:10,440 --> 00:57:13,519
actually answers his email when he actually chooses to get online.

953
00:57:13,920 --> 00:57:16,280
And if you know somebody, you knows somebody and they

954
00:57:16,280 --> 00:57:18,320
can give you his phone number, he'll even talk to

955
00:57:18,360 --> 00:57:18,920
you on the phone.

956
00:57:20,880 --> 00:57:26,119
Speaker 1: Great, that's awesome, that's old school. Yeah, that's uh, that's

957
00:57:26,159 --> 00:57:28,880
probably why, probably why Horton had him on so many times.

958
00:57:29,159 --> 00:57:33,679
Just reach out, hose yep, all right, I appreciate it,

959
00:57:33,840 --> 00:57:36,280
thanks man, un till the next time, Yes, sir,