Speaker 1: What's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
We're going to pick up where we left off in
the last episode, and that's with Chapter seven, Section four.
Clearing the ten PM institutional count knowing that it was inaccurate.
The OIG's Investigation and Review determined that, on August ninth,
twenty nineteen, MCC New York staff clear the ten PM
institutional count knowing that the inmate count from two housing
units were inaccurate. BOP policy and New York Shoe post
orders require that coos conducting an institutional count relay the
count verbally to the control Center, which maintains the master
count of all inmates. If account reported verbally does not
match the master count, the control center must notify the
Operations Lieutenant and the staff members must recount the inmates.
Mcc new York Shoe post orders further provide that count
slips which appear to be altered will not be accepted.
As discussed previously, the OIG determined that an internal transfer
of an inmate, Inmate four from the Shoe to receiving
and discharge on August ninth, was not documented appropriately at
the time of the transfer. The failure of the document transfer,
along with the shoe staff not conducting the required inmate counts,
resulted in the mcc New York Control Center receiving account
slip from the Shoe with an incorrect number of inmates
identified as being present within the shoe at the ten
PM institutional count. During his OIG interview, Senior Officer Specialist six,
who was assigned to the Control Center, admitted that he
amended the ten PM count slips he received from the
Shoe and receiving in discharge an attempt to reflect the
correct number of inmates in the shoe following the internal
inmate transfer that resulted in a Shoe inmate in May
four being moved to receiving in discharge earlier in the day,
Senior Officer Specialist six acknowledged that he should have requested
a recount from the Shoe, but instead he cleared the
ten PM count. Senior Officer Specialist six explained that the
actions he took was known as ghost counting, something he
said he would not have done without authorization from the
Operations Lieutenant or someone of a higher rank than himself.
The morning Watch Operations Lieutenant denied having authorized a ghost count,
and we found no evidence to corroborate Senior Officer Specialist
six claim that the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant knew of
and approved the false count. The OIG found that Senior
Specialist six modified the count slips received from the shoe
and receiving in discharge, failed to request a recount of
the shoe inmates, and cleared the ten PM institutional count
knowing that it was inaccurate and violation of BOP policy
and mcc new York Shoe Post Orders Part five failure
to adequately supervised shoe staff and conduct lieutenant rounds. The
OIG also found that mcc new York supervisory personnel failed
to effectively perform their duties, which contributed to the fact
that Epstein was unobserved for many hours before his death.
As discussed above, federal regulations require that mcc new York
supervisory personnel put forth honest effort in performance of their duties,
which includes appropriate supervision of shoe personnel. Additionally, BOP policy
requires that a lieutenant visit the shoe during each shift
to ensure that all procedures are being followed. The OIG's
investigation revealed that the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and the
morning Watch Operations lieutenant had oversight of the shoe during
their respective shifts. The evening watch Operations lieutenant told the
OIG that on August ninth, twenty nineteen, he did not
supervise the four pm count or conduct any rounds in
the shoe. He acknowledged that he signed some of the
pages of the four pm count, but he did not
sign all of the pages as he should have. Beginning
at ten pm on August ninth, the morning Watch Operations
lieutenant was the sole supervisor overseeing the shoe. The morning
Watch Operations lieutenant told the OIG that she noticed an
error in the twelve am count on August tenth, which
was due to shoe staff, including in May four, who
had been internally transferred to receiving in discharge, among the
inmates in the shoe. According to the morning Watch Operations lieutenant,
the shoe staff should have conducted another count and submitted
a new count slip, but she did not know if
they actually did so. During her shift, the morning Watch
Operations Lieutenant conducted one round in the shoe at approximately
four am on August tenth. The OIG's review of the
available shoe security camera video revealed that the morning Watch
Operations Lieutenant was present in the shoe for approximately seven minutes,
during which time she conferred with Noel and Thomas, who
were seated at and around the shoe officer's station in
the common area of the shoe. The morning Watch Operations
Lieutenant told the OIG that she was not required to
visit each tier or go to each individual cell during
a lieutenant round, but rather the purpose of the lieutenant
round was for her to speak with the officers on duty.
This description of a lieutenant round is inconsistent with the
statements of many of the supervisors and BOP lieutenant training,
all of which emphasized the need for lieutenants to walk
down all of the shoe tears during around. During their
interviews with the OIG, the Northeast Regional Director, the Warden Associate,
Warden I, and the Captain clarified that they expected a
lieutenant conducting around in the shoe to check in with
the officers, walk down each of the tears in the shoe,
speak with the inmates, and address inmate concerns. They explained
that the lieutenants did not act responsibly if they did
not walk down each of the tears to check on
the inmates in the shoe, as the acting Evening Watch
Activities Lieutenant explained, unlike inmates in general population, shoe inmates
cannot approach a supervisor because they are confined within a cell. Further,
the GOP lieutenant training which the Morning Launch Operations Lieutenant
attended in twenty eleven, taught the operations lieutenants were required
to visit the shoe at least once during each shift,
and that this visit it will be substantially more than
just entering the unit, signing the logbook and talking with staff. Instead,
operations lieutenants were trained to, among other things, walk through
each range or tier, inspect logs and reports, observe activities,
and periodically observe counts within the shoe. The OIG found
that the failure of the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and
the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant to adequately supervise shoe staff,
end of the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant to adequately conduct
a lieutenant round in the shoe, which contributed to the
shoe staff's failure to conduct mandatory rounds and counts, constituted
a job performance failure. Part c mcc New York staff
allowed Epstein to place an unmonitored telephone call. On August ninth,
The OIG's investigation and review revealed that on the night
before or death, Epstein placed an unrecorded, unmonitored telephone call
using a non inmate telephone system line from six fifty
eight pm to seven nineteen pm. Other than an mcc
New York call log, No other BOP records exist regarding
this unmonitored call, including the identity of the person Epstein called,
or a summary of the conversation. Federal regulations require that
the warden of each BOP institution established procedures to monitor
inmate telephone conversations, which is done to preserve the security
and orderly management of the institution and to protect the public.
For safety and security reasons, BOP policy requires that all
inmate telephone calls be made through the inmate telephone system.
BOP policy recognizes that, on rare occasion, in times of crisis,
inmates may be permitted to make a telephone call outside
of the inmate telephone system. In such circumstances, the telephone
must be placed in a secure area eg. A loft office,
and must be set to record telephone calls. Additionally, the
staff members coordinating the call must notify the BOPS Special
Investigative Services via email, providing the inmates name and register number,
the date and time of the call, the number and
name of the individual called, and the reason for the call.
The Special Investigative Services must enter this information into the
telephone recording system within seven days. The OIG's investigation determined
that on August ninth, twenty nineteen, Epstein asked to call
his mother. The unit manager told the OIG that after
Epstein's attorney visited had concluded, he agreed to allow Epstein
to place a telephone call on an unrecorded legal line.
The unit manager explained that it was his understanding that
Epstein he did not have the ability to place a
telephone call through the Inmate telephone system. The OIG's investigation
established both that Epstein's mother was deceased at the time
he asked a telephoner, and that Epstein had been assigned
the necessary documentation that would have allowed him to place
calls through the Inmate telephone system, although he did not
take the necessary steps to complete the setup process that
would have given him the ability to place calls through
that system. The captain told the OIG that when the
unit manager was escorting Epstein from his attorney visit back
to the shoe and epstein requested call was discussed, he
told the unit manager that Epstein's telephone call had to
be monitored and logged. The unit manager told the OIG
that he escorted Epstein from his attorney visit to the
shower area of the shoe, where he connected a telephone
into an unrecorded legal line and dialed the phone number
provided by Eppstein. The unit manager said that when a
mail answered the call, he handed the telephone to Epstein
and then left mcc New York for the day because
his shift had ended. Before leaving the shoe, the unit
manager said he told the evening watch shoe officer in charge,
the material handler, and Noel, who were at the shoe
officer's station, to make sure Epstein got his fifteen minutes
on the telephone, but he did not instruct them to
monitor the telephone call. The unit manager admitted that he
did not verify the recipient of the telephone call, and
that neither he nor anyone monitored or logged the telephone
call as required. The OIG found that the unit manager
violated BOP policy by allowing Epstein to make an unrecorded
and unmonitored telephone call and by failing to verify the
telephone call recipient, monitor and log the call. We further
found that the unit manager exercised poor judgment when he
left New York while Epstein was still on the telephone
call that the unit manager had arranged, and failed to
instruct the evening watch shoe officer in charge the material
handler or NOEL to monitor the call. All right, so
we're gonna wrap it their, folks, and when we pick
up in the next episode, we're going to look at
part D mcc new York staff failed to conduct and
document cell searches and eliminate safety hazards in epstein cell
on August ninth, leaving Epstein with excessive linens in his cell.
All of the information that goes with this episode can
be found in the description box. It's up, everyone, and
welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're
going to pick up where we left off with the
OIG report into the circumstances surrounding the death of Jeffrey Epstein.
In our last episode, we were talking about how the
mcc New York staff had to allow Jeffrey Epstein to
place an unmonitored telephone call on August ninth. So we're
going to pick up right where we left off at
Part D. Mcc new York staff failed to conduct and
document cell searches and eliminate safety hazards in Epstein cell
on August ninth, leaving Epstein with excessive linens in his cell.
The OIG's Investigation and Review determined that mcc new York
staff assigned to the shoe on August ninth, twenty nineteen,
failed to conduct and document searches of Epstein cell in
the shoe. BOP policy requires BOP staff routinely and irregularly
search the housing units.
Speaker 2: Mcc new York.
Speaker 1: Shoe post orders require that shoe staff conduct at least
five cell searches during each shift during daytime and evening
hours seven forty five am to twelve am, in addition
to other searches of the shoe cells and common areas
and BP policy end mcc new York shoe post orders
require written documentation of cell searches. BOP policy explains that
the purpose of cell searches is to, among other things,
maintain sanitary conditions and eliminate safety hazards. To that end,
mcc new York General Housing Unit post orders provide that
when an inmate is transferred out of a facility, all
of the inmates linen should be taken to receiving in discharge.
Speaker 2: The OIG reviewed.
Speaker 1: Mcc new York Shoe truscope entries for August ninth and
identified only one cell search entered by mcc new York
Shoe staff for the entire day. During his interview with
the OIG, the day watch shoe officer in charge stated
that multiple cell searches were conducted in the mcc new
York Shoe on August ninth. However, the day watch shoe
officer in charge stated that he failed to docu emit
the cell searches within the true scope system as required
because he was too busy with other duties. The day
watch shoe officer in charge further stated that any of
the shoe staff could have logged the cell searches into
truth Scope, but that it was primarily the shoe officer
in charge's responsibility to do so. The evening watch shoe
officer in charge told the OIG that he and other
staff members did not conduct any cell searches during his
shift in the shoe on August ninth. Additionally, the OIG
determined that there was an excessive amount of bed linen
within Epstein's cell. The Captain reviewed photographs of epstein cell
and told the OIG that the excess of linens were
a security issue because they could give inmates materials to
fashion and improvised noose or use as escape paraphernalia. The
OIG found that on August ninth, twenty nineteen, the day
watch Shoe Officer in charge either failed to conduct the
required cell searches or failed to document the cell searches
that he conducted in the shoe, and that the evening
watch Shoe Officer in charge failed to ensure that mcc
new York staff assigned to the shoe conducted cell searches
and himself fell to log cell searches in violation of
BOP policy and mcc new.
Speaker 2: York Shoe post orders.
Speaker 1: Additionally, the OIG found that it was a performance failure
for the day watch Shoe Officer in charge, the Evening
watch Shoe Officer in charge, and Noel, who served as
the Shoe officer in charge during their respective shifts on
August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen, to have permitted Epstein
to have an excessive amount of linens in his cell
section E. Mcc new York staff failed to ensure that
the institution's security camera system was fully functional, resulting in
limited recorded video evidence. The investigation and review revealed long
standing deficiencies with mcc new york security camera system. These
deficiencies resulted in nearly all the cameras in and around
the shoe where Epstein was being housed to not record video,
starting in late July twenty nineteen and continuing through the
date of Epstein's death on August tenth, twenty nineteen. According
to forensic analysis conducted by the FBI after Epstein's death,
on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, a disc failure in
mcc new York's DVR two system caused approximately half of
the institution's cameras, including nearly all of the cameras in
and around the shoe, to display only live video feed
with no video recording. Mcc new York personnel did not
learn of this system failure until eleven days later. On
August eighth, twenty nineteen, mcc new York personnel determined that
the DVR two system need to be rebuilt to restore
recording functionality. Despite the lack of recording functionality, this repair
was not completed until after Epstein's death. The Warden told
the OIG that he was generally aware that there were
problems with the camera system. The warden sought and received
approval from BOP to replace the entire camera system, and
in September twenty eighteen, BOP entered into contracts totaling over
seven hundred and thirty thousand dollars to purchase new equipment
for the camera replacement project. Although mcc new York Management
procured new DVR components approximately nine months prior to Epstein's death,
the new system was not installed in a timely manner.
The new cameras were required new conduit and wiring to
be installed before the camera installation management phase, staffing shortages,
temporary rotating facility managers, and other competing priorities that did
not allow the completion of the installation of the wiring
or the new camera system. The OIG determined that as
of August twenty twenty one, nearly three years after mcc
new York contracted for replacement camera equipment, the system upgrade
still had not been completed. Mcc new York's failure to
ensure that its security camera system was fully functional and
make timely repairs is consistent with the OIG's previous observations
regarding weaknesses in the goop's overall system of security cameras.
Dating back to at least twenty thirteen, the OIG has
repeatedly observed inadequacies in the BP's overall system of security cameras,
including inoperable cameras, an insufficient number of cameras, poor video quality,
and inadequate video storage. In a twenty sixteen report on
the BOP's contraband intern a diction efforts, the OIG identified
specific deficiencies with the camera system and recommended that the
BOP evaluate the system to determine needed upgrades. In response
to the twenty sixteen recommendation, the BOP assessed the camera
systems at each institution over the next several years and
determined that forty five of its one hundred twenty two institutions,
including mcc new York, required camera system upgrades. The BOP
worked to upgrade the systems at those forty five institutions
between twenty nineteen and twenty twenty one. In June twenty
twenty one, the BOP reported that it had updated all
cameras at the forty five institutions with the latest software
and equipment, and that it had installed additional cameras to
bolster surveillance. However, as reported in October twenty twenty one,
management advisory memorandum issued to the BOP had addressed some
but not all, of the deficiencies described in the twenty
sixteen OIG report. In its twenty twenty one management Advisory memorandum,
the OIG recommended that the BOP develop a comprehensive strategic
plan for transitioning to a fully digital security camera system.
The BOP has provided the OIG with a strategic plan
that includes estimated cost projections and timelines for addressing the
camera system concerns and completing the system upgrades. As of
twenty twenty three, the OIG's twenty twenty one recommendation remains open.
The BOP's failure to address the issue of functional security
camera systems across the agency and that individual institutions presents
an ongoing risk to the safety of BOP staff and
inmates and has the potential to impair the investigation of
an accountability of staff inmate misconduct. It is imperative that
the BOP prioritize the expeditious expansion and modernization of its
security camera system to mitigate security risks. All right, folks,
So we're gonna end this episode here and we're gonna
pick back up with part two of Chapter seven, which
is Recommendations, and we're blazing through this. We're almost done,
probably another oh, I don't know, three or four episodes
or so, and we'll have this whole entire OIG Report
added to the catalog and then from there we're gonna
go through it and we're gonna deconstruct the whole entire thing.
So as soon as we have it all added to
the catalog, that's going to be the next step.
Speaker 2: All right, folks.
Speaker 1: All of the information that goes with this episode can
be found in the description box. Hello, what's up, everyone,
and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode,
we're gonna dive right back in to the OIG Report
and we're gonna finish it up. We have a little
bit remaining here, plus the appendix, but we're gonna piecemell
that together and we'll add that later on, because after
we're done with this last section, we're gonna start going
through this report, but doing it with commentary, because, as
you can all imagine, I have a few things to
say about the contents.
Speaker 2: Of this report. But before we do that, let's.
Speaker 1: Finish giving the government a chance to get their narrative
on the record. Part two Recommendations. The OIG investigation identified
multiple shortcomings in BOP policies that should be further assessed
to ensure the BOP can more effectively handle issues that
arise in connection with the custody and care of inmates.
The recommendations address issues related to and the custody in
care of inmates at risk for suicide. Measures designed to
increase safety, such a staff rounds, inmate counts and cell searches,
and institutional security camera systems and staffing shortages, two long
standing issues for the GOP. One, the BOP should implement
a process for assigning a cellmate following suicide watch or
psychological observation, with criteria for exceptions based on the particular
individual or security considerations. According to the mcc New York
Institution Supplement Policy to the Suicide Prevention Program Policy, statement
five thirty two four dot zero eight. Inmates discharge from
suicide Watch will be assigned to cellmate. The supplemental policy
does not, however, describe how long that cellmate requirement should last,
or if any staff must approve the removal of the
cellmate requirement. The Suicide Prevention Program Policy Statement five thirty
two fours dot zero eight does not describe any process
or procedure that requires cell made assignments for inmates coming
off of suicide Watch. The warden stated that there was
no BOP policy mandating that an inmate coming off of
suicide Watch have a cellmate, but that doing so was
sound correctional judgment. The OIG's investigation and review revealed that
there were knowledge gaps among mcc New York staff regarding
Epstein's cellmate requirements, indicating that improved communication with institutional staff
would be beneficial. The OIG therefore recommends that the BOP
implement a requirement that all inmates coming off suicide Watch
or psychological observation to be assigned cellmates, with criteria for
exceptions based on the particular individual or security considerations, providing
guidance for determining when a cellmate is no longer required,
and lament a process for approving, documenting, and communicating to
institutional staff the assignment and removal of cellmates for these inmates. Two,
the BOP should establish procedures to ensure inmates at high
risk for suicide and for whom a cellmate is recommended
will continue to have a cell mat until the recommendation
is changed or rescinded, including establishing a contingency plan for
cellmate reassignment with criteria for exceptions based on the particular
individual or security considerations. The OIG's investigation and review found
that there was no contingency plan in place to assign
Epstein a new cellmate when his then cellmate was transferred
out of mcc New York. Although the failure to assign
a new cellmate was due in part to Shoe staff
failing to make required notifications and supervisory staff failing to
adequately supervise Shoes stefe, the gap in cell made assignment
was also due to the lack of a contingency plan.
The Evening Watch Shoe officer in charge told the OIG
that although he knew that Epstein needed a new cell mate,
he said that Shoe staff did not have the authority
to assign a cellmate, which was consistent with what mcc
new York supervisory personnel told the OIG. A contingency plan,
such as a list of alternate cellmates, would have increased
the likelihood that Epstein would not have been housed alone
at the time.
Speaker 2: Of his death.
Speaker 1: The OIG therefore recommends that the BOP developed contingency plans
for cell made assignment for high risk inmates, with criteria
for exceptions based on the particular individual or security considerations. Three,
The BOP should evaluate its current process for obtaining and
documenting approval for social or legal visits while an inmate
is on suicide watch or psychological observation, which allows for
institution specific variations in the process, and provide guidance on
standard components that each institution should include in its process
to mitigate security issues that can arise when an inmate
is on suicide watch or psychological observation. According to the
GOP's Suicide Prevention Program Policy Statement five thirty two four
dot zero eight and the mcc new York Institution Supplement
to the Suicide Prevention Policy, inmates on suicide watch must
be put under constant observation by staff or trained inmate observers.
The MCC new York Institution Supplement Policy states that only
with rare exceptions that are approved by the Captain as
well as by the Associate Warden of the programs, will visitation,
either social or legal, be permitted for inmates on Suicide Watch. Additionally,
the mcc new York Procedural Memorandum for Psychological Observation states
that inmates on psychological observation will be continuously monitored by
either an inmate companion or a staff member. Mcc new
York Procedural Memorandum for Psychological Observation states that inmates on
psychological observation will be continuously monitored by either an inmate
companion or a staff member. A review of the Suicide
Watch chronological logs for July twenty three, twenty nineteen, revealed
Epstein was allowed to leave the Suicide Watch room to
visit with his attorneys for more than six hours. According
to the psychological reconstruction conducted by the Assistant Director of
the re Entry Services Division during Epstein's psychological observation on
July twenty fourth through July thirtieth, twenty nineteen, Epstein was
allowed to visit with his attorneys between eight and eleven
hours each day without direct observation. Although the NCC New
York supplemental policy described an approval process for social and
legal visits while an inmate is on suicide watch or
psychological observation, the OIG found no evidence that Epstein's legal
visits were approved by the captain or an associate warden. Additionally,
the BOP Suicide Prevention Program Policy Statement fifty three twenty
four dot zero eight does not describe any process or
procedure that allows an inmate to have legal or social
visits while on suicide watch or psychological observation. The OIG
therefore recommends that the BOP evaluate its current process for
such visits to be approved and documented. Four, The BOP
should evaluate its methods of accounting for inmates whereabouts and
well being and make changes as may be appropriate to
improve those methods through policy, training, or other measures. The
OIG's investigation and review revealed many inmate accountability deficiencies, most fundamentally,
mcc New York staff assigned to the Shoe on August
ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen did not conduct many of
the required rounds and inmate counts. Additionally, there was lacking
or delayed documentation regarding inmates, including cell assignments and internal
inmate transfers. Internal reports such as the daily call out
List and the Lieutenant Log are either not retained or
subject to continuous modification, which reduces their utility as accountability tools. Therefore,
the OIG recommends that the BOP evaluate its methods of
accounting for inmate whereabouts and well being and make changes
as appropriate to improve those methods through policy, training.
Speaker 2: Or or other measures.
Speaker 1: Five, BOP policy should clarify what is required of a
lieutenant when conducting around TIS. The OIG's investigation and review
revealed significant gaps in the supervision of the mcc new
York staff assigned to the Shoe. Although BOP policy requires
mcc new York lieutenants to conduct at least one round
in the Shoe during each shift, what was required of
a lieutenant during the round is not specified. During their
interviews with the OIG, experienced mcc new York supervisory personnel
described what should be done during around which is also
reflected in BOP lieutenant training, but this expectation was not
memorialized in any BOP or mcc new York policy or
post order. The OIG recommends that the BOP develop a policy,
either at an agency wide or in institutions specific level,
to define what is expected of supervisory personnel during a
round in the Shoe to better ensure that BOP staff
are appropriately supervised. Six, The BOP should continue to develop
and implement plans to address staffing shortages at its prisons.
Since at least twenty fifteen, the OIG has repeatedly found
the need for BOP to address staffing shortages, including medical
staffing shortages. This investigation and review revealed the direct impact
of staffing deficiencies on inmate safety. For example, the material
handler worked three consecutive shifts twenty four hours straight on
August ninth, twenty nineteen, which was certainly a contributing cause
to the lack of adequate means of accounting for inmate
location and well being in the Shoe. The material handler
told the OIG that no one did the ten pm
schee inmate count.
Speaker 2: Because they were tired.
Speaker 1: Additionally, the OIG's investigation and review found that, in connection
with the MCC New York's upgrade of its security camera system,
the GOP's Northeast Regional Office arranged for technicians from other
BP institutions to perform temporary duty assignments to MCC New
York to perform necessary mechanical, electrical, plumbing, and wiring work.
Yet during the course of the TDY rotations, work was
not consistently conducted on the camera upgrade because sometimes TDY
staff were used to cover shortages at MCC's New York
custody posts. Without adequate staffing, the BOP cannot fulfill its
mandate to insure safe and secure correctional facilities. The OIG
therefore recommends that the BOP continue to develop and implement
plans to address staffing shortages at its institutions. Seven, The
GOP should evaluate its cell search procedures and make changes
as may be appropriate to improve those procedures through policy, training,
or other measures. The OIG's investigation and review found that
there was an excessive amount of linens in Epstein's cell
at the time of his death. BOP policy and MCC
New York shoe post orders require that shoe cells be searched,
but they do not specifically address the issue of excessive
bed linens, which the captain told the OIG present a
safety hazard because an inmate can use them to harm
themselves or escape from the institution. Therefore, the OIG recommends
that the BOP evaluated cell search procedures and make changes
as may be appropriate to improve those procedures through policy, training,
or other measures. And, last, but not least, eight, the
BP should enhance existing policies regarding institutional security camera systems
to ensure they specifically state that such systems must have
the capacity to record video and that Goop institutions must
conduct regular security camera system functionality checks, as discussed in
the conclusion section of this chapter. The OIG found that
even though the highest levels of leadership knew of the
mcc New York security camera system reoccurring deficiencies prior to
Epstein's death, no one was tasked with the responsibility of
checking the security camera system on a routine basis to
ensure that the system was functional. As a result, when
on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, video from approximately half
of the institution security cameras was no longer being recorded,
the problem went undetected for eleven days. The OIG also
found that there was no BOP policy see that specifically
state that security camera systems must have the capacity to record,
or that institutional staff must perform periodic checks to ensure
the camera system is fully functional. Cameras that are failing
to provide good quality or any live video streams put
the safety of BOP staff members and inmates at risk.
Speaker 2: The lack of video.
Speaker 1: Recordings can potentially hinder investigations of wrongdoing by staff and inmates.
The OIG therefore recommends that the BOP enhance existing policies
and protocols, so they specifically state that all institutional security
camera systems must have the capacity to record, and that
the specified staff at each institution must conduct periodic checks
of the security camera system to determine its operational status
and take corrective action as soon as possible when the
system is found to be inoperable. Such routine checks would
help ensure that camera system malfunctions are detected and corrective
actions are initiated in a timely manner. And that, my friends,
is the end of the Inspector General's report into Jeffrey
Epstein's death. And like I said, over the next few days,
over the next couple of weeks, we're going to go
through this whole entire thing again, but with commentary. All Right, folks,
that is going to do it for this one. All
of the information that goes with this episode can be
found in the description box