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Speaker 1: What's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.

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We're going to pick up where we left off in

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the last episode, and that's with Chapter seven, Section four.

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Clearing the ten PM institutional count knowing that it was inaccurate.

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The OIG's Investigation and Review determined that, on August ninth,

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twenty nineteen, MCC New York staff clear the ten PM

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institutional count knowing that the inmate count from two housing

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units were inaccurate. BOP policy and New York Shoe post

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orders require that coos conducting an institutional count relay the

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count verbally to the control Center, which maintains the master

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count of all inmates. If account reported verbally does not

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match the master count, the control center must notify the

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Operations Lieutenant and the staff members must recount the inmates.

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Mcc new York Shoe post orders further provide that count

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slips which appear to be altered will not be accepted.

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As discussed previously, the OIG determined that an internal transfer

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of an inmate, Inmate four from the Shoe to receiving

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and discharge on August ninth, was not documented appropriately at

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the time of the transfer. The failure of the document transfer,

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along with the shoe staff not conducting the required inmate counts,

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resulted in the mcc New York Control Center receiving account

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slip from the Shoe with an incorrect number of inmates

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identified as being present within the shoe at the ten

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PM institutional count. During his OIG interview, Senior Officer Specialist six,

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who was assigned to the Control Center, admitted that he

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amended the ten PM count slips he received from the

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Shoe and receiving in discharge an attempt to reflect the

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correct number of inmates in the shoe following the internal

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inmate transfer that resulted in a Shoe inmate in May

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four being moved to receiving in discharge earlier in the day,

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Senior Officer Specialist six acknowledged that he should have requested

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a recount from the Shoe, but instead he cleared the

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ten PM count. Senior Officer Specialist six explained that the

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actions he took was known as ghost counting, something he

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said he would not have done without authorization from the

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Operations Lieutenant or someone of a higher rank than himself.

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The morning Watch Operations Lieutenant denied having authorized a ghost count,

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and we found no evidence to corroborate Senior Officer Specialist

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six claim that the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant knew of

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and approved the false count. The OIG found that Senior

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Specialist six modified the count slips received from the shoe

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and receiving in discharge, failed to request a recount of

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the shoe inmates, and cleared the ten PM institutional count

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knowing that it was inaccurate and violation of BOP policy

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and mcc new York Shoe Post Orders Part five failure

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to adequately supervised shoe staff and conduct lieutenant rounds. The

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OIG also found that mcc new York supervisory personnel failed

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to effectively perform their duties, which contributed to the fact

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that Epstein was unobserved for many hours before his death.

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As discussed above, federal regulations require that mcc new York

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supervisory personnel put forth honest effort in performance of their duties,

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which includes appropriate supervision of shoe personnel. Additionally, BOP policy

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requires that a lieutenant visit the shoe during each shift

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to ensure that all procedures are being followed. The OIG's

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investigation revealed that the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and the

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morning Watch Operations lieutenant had oversight of the shoe during

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their respective shifts. The evening watch Operations lieutenant told the

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OIG that on August ninth, twenty nineteen, he did not

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supervise the four pm count or conduct any rounds in

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the shoe. He acknowledged that he signed some of the

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pages of the four pm count, but he did not

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sign all of the pages as he should have. Beginning

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at ten pm on August ninth, the morning Watch Operations

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lieutenant was the sole supervisor overseeing the shoe. The morning

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Watch Operations lieutenant told the OIG that she noticed an

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error in the twelve am count on August tenth, which

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was due to shoe staff, including in May four, who

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had been internally transferred to receiving in discharge, among the

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inmates in the shoe. According to the morning Watch Operations lieutenant,

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the shoe staff should have conducted another count and submitted

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a new count slip, but she did not know if

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they actually did so. During her shift, the morning Watch

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Operations Lieutenant conducted one round in the shoe at approximately

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four am on August tenth. The OIG's review of the

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available shoe security camera video revealed that the morning Watch

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Operations Lieutenant was present in the shoe for approximately seven minutes,

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during which time she conferred with Noel and Thomas, who

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were seated at and around the shoe officer's station in

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the common area of the shoe. The morning Watch Operations

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Lieutenant told the OIG that she was not required to

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visit each tier or go to each individual cell during

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a lieutenant round, but rather the purpose of the lieutenant

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round was for her to speak with the officers on duty.

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This description of a lieutenant round is inconsistent with the

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statements of many of the supervisors and BOP lieutenant training,

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all of which emphasized the need for lieutenants to walk

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down all of the shoe tears during around. During their

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interviews with the OIG, the Northeast Regional Director, the Warden Associate,

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Warden I, and the Captain clarified that they expected a

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lieutenant conducting around in the shoe to check in with

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the officers, walk down each of the tears in the shoe,

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speak with the inmates, and address inmate concerns. They explained

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that the lieutenants did not act responsibly if they did

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not walk down each of the tears to check on

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the inmates in the shoe, as the acting Evening Watch

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Activities Lieutenant explained, unlike inmates in general population, shoe inmates

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cannot approach a supervisor because they are confined within a cell. Further,

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the GOP lieutenant training which the Morning Launch Operations Lieutenant

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attended in twenty eleven, taught the operations lieutenants were required

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to visit the shoe at least once during each shift,

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and that this visit it will be substantially more than

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just entering the unit, signing the logbook and talking with staff. Instead,

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operations lieutenants were trained to, among other things, walk through

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each range or tier, inspect logs and reports, observe activities,

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and periodically observe counts within the shoe. The OIG found

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that the failure of the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and

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the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant to adequately supervise shoe staff,

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end of the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant to adequately conduct

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a lieutenant round in the shoe, which contributed to the

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shoe staff's failure to conduct mandatory rounds and counts, constituted

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a job performance failure. Part c mcc New York staff

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allowed Epstein to place an unmonitored telephone call. On August ninth,

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The OIG's investigation and review revealed that on the night

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before or death, Epstein placed an unrecorded, unmonitored telephone call

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using a non inmate telephone system line from six fifty

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eight pm to seven nineteen pm. Other than an mcc

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New York call log, No other BOP records exist regarding

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this unmonitored call, including the identity of the person Epstein called,

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or a summary of the conversation. Federal regulations require that

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the warden of each BOP institution established procedures to monitor

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inmate telephone conversations, which is done to preserve the security

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and orderly management of the institution and to protect the public.

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For safety and security reasons, BOP policy requires that all

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inmate telephone calls be made through the inmate telephone system.

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BOP policy recognizes that, on rare occasion, in times of crisis,

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inmates may be permitted to make a telephone call outside

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of the inmate telephone system. In such circumstances, the telephone

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must be placed in a secure area eg. A loft office,

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and must be set to record telephone calls. Additionally, the

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staff members coordinating the call must notify the BOPS Special

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Investigative Services via email, providing the inmates name and register number,

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the date and time of the call, the number and

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name of the individual called, and the reason for the call.

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The Special Investigative Services must enter this information into the

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telephone recording system within seven days. The OIG's investigation determined

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that on August ninth, twenty nineteen, Epstein asked to call

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his mother. The unit manager told the OIG that after

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Epstein's attorney visited had concluded, he agreed to allow Epstein

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to place a telephone call on an unrecorded legal line.

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The unit manager explained that it was his understanding that

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Epstein he did not have the ability to place a

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telephone call through the Inmate telephone system. The OIG's investigation

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established both that Epstein's mother was deceased at the time

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he asked a telephoner, and that Epstein had been assigned

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the necessary documentation that would have allowed him to place

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calls through the Inmate telephone system, although he did not

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take the necessary steps to complete the setup process that

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would have given him the ability to place calls through

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that system. The captain told the OIG that when the

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unit manager was escorting Epstein from his attorney visit back

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to the shoe and epstein requested call was discussed, he

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told the unit manager that Epstein's telephone call had to

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be monitored and logged. The unit manager told the OIG

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that he escorted Epstein from his attorney visit to the

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shower area of the shoe, where he connected a telephone

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into an unrecorded legal line and dialed the phone number

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provided by Eppstein. The unit manager said that when a

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mail answered the call, he handed the telephone to Epstein

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and then left mcc New York for the day because

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his shift had ended. Before leaving the shoe, the unit

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manager said he told the evening watch shoe officer in charge,

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the material handler, and Noel, who were at the shoe

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officer's station, to make sure Epstein got his fifteen minutes

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on the telephone, but he did not instruct them to

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monitor the telephone call. The unit manager admitted that he

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did not verify the recipient of the telephone call, and

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that neither he nor anyone monitored or logged the telephone

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call as required. The OIG found that the unit manager

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violated BOP policy by allowing Epstein to make an unrecorded

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and unmonitored telephone call and by failing to verify the

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telephone call recipient, monitor and log the call. We further

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found that the unit manager exercised poor judgment when he

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left New York while Epstein was still on the telephone

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call that the unit manager had arranged, and failed to

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instruct the evening watch shoe officer in charge the material

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handler or NOEL to monitor the call. All right, so

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we're gonna wrap it their, folks, and when we pick

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up in the next episode, we're going to look at

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part D mcc new York staff failed to conduct and

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document cell searches and eliminate safety hazards in epstein cell

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on August ninth, leaving Epstein with excessive linens in his cell.

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All of the information that goes with this episode can

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be found in the description box. It's up, everyone, and

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welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're

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going to pick up where we left off with the

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OIG report into the circumstances surrounding the death of Jeffrey Epstein.

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In our last episode, we were talking about how the

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mcc New York staff had to allow Jeffrey Epstein to

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place an unmonitored telephone call on August ninth. So we're

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going to pick up right where we left off at

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Part D. Mcc new York staff failed to conduct and

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document cell searches and eliminate safety hazards in Epstein cell

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on August ninth, leaving Epstein with excessive linens in his cell.

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The OIG's Investigation and Review determined that mcc new York

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staff assigned to the shoe on August ninth, twenty nineteen,

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failed to conduct and document searches of Epstein cell in

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the shoe. BOP policy requires BOP staff routinely and irregularly

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search the housing units.

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Speaker 2: Mcc new York.

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Speaker 1: Shoe post orders require that shoe staff conduct at least

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five cell searches during each shift during daytime and evening

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hours seven forty five am to twelve am, in addition

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to other searches of the shoe cells and common areas

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and BP policy end mcc new York shoe post orders

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require written documentation of cell searches. BOP policy explains that

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the purpose of cell searches is to, among other things,

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maintain sanitary conditions and eliminate safety hazards. To that end,

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mcc new York General Housing Unit post orders provide that

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when an inmate is transferred out of a facility, all

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of the inmates linen should be taken to receiving in discharge.

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Speaker 2: The OIG reviewed.

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Speaker 1: Mcc new York Shoe truscope entries for August ninth and

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identified only one cell search entered by mcc new York

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Shoe staff for the entire day. During his interview with

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the OIG, the day watch shoe officer in charge stated

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that multiple cell searches were conducted in the mcc new

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York Shoe on August ninth. However, the day watch shoe

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officer in charge stated that he failed to docu emit

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the cell searches within the true scope system as required

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because he was too busy with other duties. The day

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watch shoe officer in charge further stated that any of

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the shoe staff could have logged the cell searches into

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truth Scope, but that it was primarily the shoe officer

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in charge's responsibility to do so. The evening watch shoe

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officer in charge told the OIG that he and other

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staff members did not conduct any cell searches during his

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shift in the shoe on August ninth. Additionally, the OIG

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determined that there was an excessive amount of bed linen

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within Epstein's cell. The Captain reviewed photographs of epstein cell

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and told the OIG that the excess of linens were

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a security issue because they could give inmates materials to

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fashion and improvised noose or use as escape paraphernalia. The

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OIG found that on August ninth, twenty nineteen, the day

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watch Shoe Officer in charge either failed to conduct the

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required cell searches or failed to document the cell searches

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that he conducted in the shoe, and that the evening

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watch Shoe Officer in charge failed to ensure that mcc

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new York staff assigned to the shoe conducted cell searches

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and himself fell to log cell searches in violation of

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BOP policy and mcc new.

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Speaker 2: York Shoe post orders.

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Speaker 1: Additionally, the OIG found that it was a performance failure

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for the day watch Shoe Officer in charge, the Evening

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watch Shoe Officer in charge, and Noel, who served as

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the Shoe officer in charge during their respective shifts on

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August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen, to have permitted Epstein

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to have an excessive amount of linens in his cell

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section E. Mcc new York staff failed to ensure that

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the institution's security camera system was fully functional, resulting in

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limited recorded video evidence. The investigation and review revealed long

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standing deficiencies with mcc new york security camera system. These

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deficiencies resulted in nearly all the cameras in and around

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the shoe where Epstein was being housed to not record video,

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starting in late July twenty nineteen and continuing through the

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date of Epstein's death on August tenth, twenty nineteen. According

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to forensic analysis conducted by the FBI after Epstein's death,

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on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, a disc failure in

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mcc new York's DVR two system caused approximately half of

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the institution's cameras, including nearly all of the cameras in

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and around the shoe, to display only live video feed

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with no video recording. Mcc new York personnel did not

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learn of this system failure until eleven days later. On

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August eighth, twenty nineteen, mcc new York personnel determined that

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the DVR two system need to be rebuilt to restore

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recording functionality. Despite the lack of recording functionality, this repair

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was not completed until after Epstein's death. The Warden told

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the OIG that he was generally aware that there were

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problems with the camera system. The warden sought and received

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approval from BOP to replace the entire camera system, and

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in September twenty eighteen, BOP entered into contracts totaling over

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seven hundred and thirty thousand dollars to purchase new equipment

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for the camera replacement project. Although mcc new York Management

273
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procured new DVR components approximately nine months prior to Epstein's death,

274
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the new system was not installed in a timely manner.

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The new cameras were required new conduit and wiring to

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be installed before the camera installation management phase, staffing shortages,

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temporary rotating facility managers, and other competing priorities that did

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not allow the completion of the installation of the wiring

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00:19:03,880 --> 00:19:07,599
or the new camera system. The OIG determined that as

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of August twenty twenty one, nearly three years after mcc

281
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new York contracted for replacement camera equipment, the system upgrade

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still had not been completed. Mcc new York's failure to

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ensure that its security camera system was fully functional and

284
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make timely repairs is consistent with the OIG's previous observations

285
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regarding weaknesses in the goop's overall system of security cameras.

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Dating back to at least twenty thirteen, the OIG has

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repeatedly observed inadequacies in the BP's overall system of security cameras,

288
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including inoperable cameras, an insufficient number of cameras, poor video quality,

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and inadequate video storage. In a twenty sixteen report on

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the BOP's contraband intern a diction efforts, the OIG identified

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specific deficiencies with the camera system and recommended that the

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BOP evaluate the system to determine needed upgrades. In response

293
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to the twenty sixteen recommendation, the BOP assessed the camera

294
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systems at each institution over the next several years and

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determined that forty five of its one hundred twenty two institutions,

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including mcc new York, required camera system upgrades. The BOP

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worked to upgrade the systems at those forty five institutions

298
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between twenty nineteen and twenty twenty one. In June twenty

299
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twenty one, the BOP reported that it had updated all

300
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cameras at the forty five institutions with the latest software

301
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and equipment, and that it had installed additional cameras to

302
00:20:51,759 --> 00:20:56,799
bolster surveillance. However, as reported in October twenty twenty one,

303
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management advisory memorandum issued to the BOP had addressed some

304
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but not all, of the deficiencies described in the twenty

305
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sixteen OIG report. In its twenty twenty one management Advisory memorandum,

306
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the OIG recommended that the BOP develop a comprehensive strategic

307
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plan for transitioning to a fully digital security camera system.

308
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The BOP has provided the OIG with a strategic plan

309
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that includes estimated cost projections and timelines for addressing the

310
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camera system concerns and completing the system upgrades. As of

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twenty twenty three, the OIG's twenty twenty one recommendation remains open.

312
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The BOP's failure to address the issue of functional security

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camera systems across the agency and that individual institutions presents

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an ongoing risk to the safety of BOP staff and

315
00:21:53,680 --> 00:21:58,079
inmates and has the potential to impair the investigation of

316
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an accountability of staff inmate misconduct. It is imperative that

317
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the BOP prioritize the expeditious expansion and modernization of its

318
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security camera system to mitigate security risks. All right, folks,

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So we're gonna end this episode here and we're gonna

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pick back up with part two of Chapter seven, which

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is Recommendations, and we're blazing through this. We're almost done,

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probably another oh, I don't know, three or four episodes

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00:22:28,119 --> 00:22:31,160
or so, and we'll have this whole entire OIG Report

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added to the catalog and then from there we're gonna

325
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go through it and we're gonna deconstruct the whole entire thing.

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So as soon as we have it all added to

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the catalog, that's going to be the next step.

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Speaker 2: All right, folks.

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Speaker 1: All of the information that goes with this episode can

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be found in the description box. Hello, what's up, everyone,

331
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and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode,

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we're gonna dive right back in to the OIG Report

333
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and we're gonna finish it up. We have a little

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bit remaining here, plus the appendix, but we're gonna piecemell

335
00:23:05,440 --> 00:23:09,279
that together and we'll add that later on, because after

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we're done with this last section, we're gonna start going

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through this report, but doing it with commentary, because, as

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you can all imagine, I have a few things to

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say about the contents.

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Speaker 2: Of this report. But before we do that, let's.

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Speaker 1: Finish giving the government a chance to get their narrative

342
00:23:28,720 --> 00:23:35,880
on the record. Part two Recommendations. The OIG investigation identified

343
00:23:35,960 --> 00:23:40,319
multiple shortcomings in BOP policies that should be further assessed

344
00:23:40,359 --> 00:23:44,319
to ensure the BOP can more effectively handle issues that

345
00:23:44,400 --> 00:23:48,799
arise in connection with the custody and care of inmates.

346
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The recommendations address issues related to and the custody in

347
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care of inmates at risk for suicide. Measures designed to

348
00:23:58,599 --> 00:24:03,160
increase safety, such a staff rounds, inmate counts and cell searches,

349
00:24:03,680 --> 00:24:09,119
and institutional security camera systems and staffing shortages, two long

350
00:24:09,160 --> 00:24:14,519
standing issues for the GOP. One, the BOP should implement

351
00:24:14,599 --> 00:24:18,759
a process for assigning a cellmate following suicide watch or

352
00:24:19,119 --> 00:24:24,599
psychological observation, with criteria for exceptions based on the particular

353
00:24:24,640 --> 00:24:30,119
individual or security considerations. According to the mcc New York

354
00:24:30,160 --> 00:24:36,160
Institution Supplement Policy to the Suicide Prevention Program Policy, statement

355
00:24:36,480 --> 00:24:40,599
five thirty two four dot zero eight. Inmates discharge from

356
00:24:40,680 --> 00:24:45,079
suicide Watch will be assigned to cellmate. The supplemental policy

357
00:24:45,119 --> 00:24:49,559
does not, however, describe how long that cellmate requirement should last,

358
00:24:49,759 --> 00:24:53,200
or if any staff must approve the removal of the

359
00:24:53,240 --> 00:24:59,480
cellmate requirement. The Suicide Prevention Program Policy Statement five thirty

360
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two fours dot zero eight does not describe any process

361
00:25:03,720 --> 00:25:07,680
or procedure that requires cell made assignments for inmates coming

362
00:25:07,720 --> 00:25:11,319
off of suicide Watch. The warden stated that there was

363
00:25:11,400 --> 00:25:15,039
no BOP policy mandating that an inmate coming off of

364
00:25:15,079 --> 00:25:18,599
suicide Watch have a cellmate, but that doing so was

365
00:25:18,720 --> 00:25:24,680
sound correctional judgment. The OIG's investigation and review revealed that

366
00:25:24,759 --> 00:25:29,000
there were knowledge gaps among mcc New York staff regarding

367
00:25:29,000 --> 00:25:35,319
Epstein's cellmate requirements, indicating that improved communication with institutional staff

368
00:25:35,599 --> 00:25:40,119
would be beneficial. The OIG therefore recommends that the BOP

369
00:25:40,559 --> 00:25:44,519
implement a requirement that all inmates coming off suicide Watch

370
00:25:44,759 --> 00:25:49,640
or psychological observation to be assigned cellmates, with criteria for

371
00:25:49,839 --> 00:25:55,440
exceptions based on the particular individual or security considerations, providing

372
00:25:55,480 --> 00:25:59,079
guidance for determining when a cellmate is no longer required,

373
00:25:59,480 --> 00:26:04,319
and lament a process for approving, documenting, and communicating to

374
00:26:04,480 --> 00:26:10,880
institutional staff the assignment and removal of cellmates for these inmates. Two,

375
00:26:11,160 --> 00:26:15,039
the BOP should establish procedures to ensure inmates at high

376
00:26:15,119 --> 00:26:18,160
risk for suicide and for whom a cellmate is recommended

377
00:26:18,480 --> 00:26:21,400
will continue to have a cell mat until the recommendation

378
00:26:21,599 --> 00:26:26,559
is changed or rescinded, including establishing a contingency plan for

379
00:26:26,759 --> 00:26:31,279
cellmate reassignment with criteria for exceptions based on the particular

380
00:26:31,599 --> 00:26:38,440
individual or security considerations. The OIG's investigation and review found

381
00:26:38,480 --> 00:26:41,759
that there was no contingency plan in place to assign

382
00:26:41,839 --> 00:26:45,440
Epstein a new cellmate when his then cellmate was transferred

383
00:26:45,759 --> 00:26:49,559
out of mcc New York. Although the failure to assign

384
00:26:49,599 --> 00:26:52,680
a new cellmate was due in part to Shoe staff

385
00:26:52,920 --> 00:26:57,720
failing to make required notifications and supervisory staff failing to

386
00:26:57,839 --> 00:27:02,559
adequately supervise Shoes stefe, the gap in cell made assignment

387
00:27:02,880 --> 00:27:05,519
was also due to the lack of a contingency plan.

388
00:27:06,319 --> 00:27:09,400
The Evening Watch Shoe officer in charge told the OIG

389
00:27:09,839 --> 00:27:12,839
that although he knew that Epstein needed a new cell mate,

390
00:27:13,039 --> 00:27:15,880
he said that Shoe staff did not have the authority

391
00:27:16,079 --> 00:27:20,200
to assign a cellmate, which was consistent with what mcc

392
00:27:20,559 --> 00:27:25,559
new York supervisory personnel told the OIG. A contingency plan,

393
00:27:25,799 --> 00:27:28,799
such as a list of alternate cellmates, would have increased

394
00:27:28,839 --> 00:27:32,039
the likelihood that Epstein would not have been housed alone

395
00:27:32,359 --> 00:27:33,319
at the time.

396
00:27:33,279 --> 00:27:33,960
Speaker 2: Of his death.

397
00:27:34,759 --> 00:27:39,680
Speaker 1: The OIG therefore recommends that the BOP developed contingency plans

398
00:27:39,880 --> 00:27:43,440
for cell made assignment for high risk inmates, with criteria

399
00:27:43,839 --> 00:27:50,920
for exceptions based on the particular individual or security considerations. Three,

400
00:27:51,480 --> 00:27:55,519
The BOP should evaluate its current process for obtaining and

401
00:27:55,640 --> 00:27:59,960
documenting approval for social or legal visits while an inmate

402
00:28:00,119 --> 00:28:04,880
is on suicide watch or psychological observation, which allows for

403
00:28:05,039 --> 00:28:09,920
institution specific variations in the process, and provide guidance on

404
00:28:10,000 --> 00:28:14,559
standard components that each institution should include in its process

405
00:28:14,559 --> 00:28:18,359
to mitigate security issues that can arise when an inmate

406
00:28:18,599 --> 00:28:23,839
is on suicide watch or psychological observation. According to the

407
00:28:23,839 --> 00:28:29,039
GOP's Suicide Prevention Program Policy Statement five thirty two four

408
00:28:29,359 --> 00:28:33,640
dot zero eight and the mcc new York Institution Supplement

409
00:28:33,720 --> 00:28:38,359
to the Suicide Prevention Policy, inmates on suicide watch must

410
00:28:38,400 --> 00:28:43,160
be put under constant observation by staff or trained inmate observers.

411
00:28:44,039 --> 00:28:48,559
The MCC new York Institution Supplement Policy states that only

412
00:28:49,000 --> 00:28:52,799
with rare exceptions that are approved by the Captain as

413
00:28:52,839 --> 00:28:57,000
well as by the Associate Warden of the programs, will visitation,

414
00:28:57,279 --> 00:29:03,640
either social or legal, be permitted for inmates on Suicide Watch. Additionally,

415
00:29:04,039 --> 00:29:09,200
the mcc new York Procedural Memorandum for Psychological Observation states

416
00:29:09,240 --> 00:29:14,000
that inmates on psychological observation will be continuously monitored by

417
00:29:14,039 --> 00:29:18,680
either an inmate companion or a staff member. Mcc new

418
00:29:18,720 --> 00:29:23,519
York Procedural Memorandum for Psychological Observation states that inmates on

419
00:29:23,599 --> 00:29:28,000
psychological observation will be continuously monitored by either an inmate

420
00:29:28,039 --> 00:29:31,319
companion or a staff member. A review of the Suicide

421
00:29:31,359 --> 00:29:36,240
Watch chronological logs for July twenty three, twenty nineteen, revealed

422
00:29:36,240 --> 00:29:39,240
Epstein was allowed to leave the Suicide Watch room to

423
00:29:39,359 --> 00:29:43,000
visit with his attorneys for more than six hours. According

424
00:29:43,000 --> 00:29:47,759
to the psychological reconstruction conducted by the Assistant Director of

425
00:29:47,880 --> 00:29:52,599
the re Entry Services Division during Epstein's psychological observation on

426
00:29:52,680 --> 00:29:57,759
July twenty fourth through July thirtieth, twenty nineteen, Epstein was

427
00:29:57,799 --> 00:30:01,480
allowed to visit with his attorneys between eight and eleven

428
00:30:01,519 --> 00:30:06,319
hours each day without direct observation. Although the NCC New

429
00:30:06,400 --> 00:30:11,039
York supplemental policy described an approval process for social and

430
00:30:11,160 --> 00:30:14,720
legal visits while an inmate is on suicide watch or

431
00:30:14,880 --> 00:30:19,759
psychological observation, the OIG found no evidence that Epstein's legal

432
00:30:19,839 --> 00:30:25,160
visits were approved by the captain or an associate warden. Additionally,

433
00:30:25,200 --> 00:30:30,079
the BOP Suicide Prevention Program Policy Statement fifty three twenty

434
00:30:30,119 --> 00:30:34,039
four dot zero eight does not describe any process or

435
00:30:34,119 --> 00:30:37,799
procedure that allows an inmate to have legal or social

436
00:30:37,880 --> 00:30:43,279
visits while on suicide watch or psychological observation. The OIG

437
00:30:43,480 --> 00:30:47,920
therefore recommends that the BOP evaluate its current process for

438
00:30:48,000 --> 00:30:53,119
such visits to be approved and documented. Four, The BOP

439
00:30:53,519 --> 00:30:57,680
should evaluate its methods of accounting for inmates whereabouts and

440
00:30:57,720 --> 00:31:01,440
well being and make changes as may be appropriate to

441
00:31:01,599 --> 00:31:06,759
improve those methods through policy, training, or other measures. The

442
00:31:06,799 --> 00:31:13,440
OIG's investigation and review revealed many inmate accountability deficiencies, most fundamentally,

443
00:31:13,720 --> 00:31:17,000
mcc New York staff assigned to the Shoe on August

444
00:31:17,119 --> 00:31:21,000
ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen did not conduct many of

445
00:31:21,039 --> 00:31:25,799
the required rounds and inmate counts. Additionally, there was lacking

446
00:31:26,000 --> 00:31:31,759
or delayed documentation regarding inmates, including cell assignments and internal

447
00:31:31,759 --> 00:31:36,079
inmate transfers. Internal reports such as the daily call out

448
00:31:36,119 --> 00:31:39,880
List and the Lieutenant Log are either not retained or

449
00:31:39,920 --> 00:31:47,079
subject to continuous modification, which reduces their utility as accountability tools. Therefore,

450
00:31:47,200 --> 00:31:51,400
the OIG recommends that the BOP evaluate its methods of

451
00:31:51,440 --> 00:31:55,400
accounting for inmate whereabouts and well being and make changes

452
00:31:55,480 --> 00:32:00,119
as appropriate to improve those methods through policy, training.

453
00:31:59,880 --> 00:32:01,200
Speaker 2: Or or other measures.

454
00:32:02,079 --> 00:32:06,359
Speaker 1: Five, BOP policy should clarify what is required of a

455
00:32:06,359 --> 00:32:13,119
lieutenant when conducting around TIS. The OIG's investigation and review

456
00:32:13,440 --> 00:32:16,920
revealed significant gaps in the supervision of the mcc new

457
00:32:17,000 --> 00:32:21,559
York staff assigned to the Shoe. Although BOP policy requires

458
00:32:22,039 --> 00:32:25,559
mcc new York lieutenants to conduct at least one round

459
00:32:25,759 --> 00:32:29,200
in the Shoe during each shift, what was required of

460
00:32:29,240 --> 00:32:32,759
a lieutenant during the round is not specified. During their

461
00:32:32,799 --> 00:32:38,200
interviews with the OIG, experienced mcc new York supervisory personnel

462
00:32:38,559 --> 00:32:41,839
described what should be done during around which is also

463
00:32:41,920 --> 00:32:46,960
reflected in BOP lieutenant training, but this expectation was not

464
00:32:47,079 --> 00:32:52,440
memorialized in any BOP or mcc new York policy or

465
00:32:52,599 --> 00:32:57,559
post order. The OIG recommends that the BOP develop a policy,

466
00:32:57,960 --> 00:33:01,519
either at an agency wide or in institutions specific level,

467
00:33:01,839 --> 00:33:06,160
to define what is expected of supervisory personnel during a

468
00:33:06,240 --> 00:33:09,519
round in the Shoe to better ensure that BOP staff

469
00:33:09,799 --> 00:33:15,759
are appropriately supervised. Six, The BOP should continue to develop

470
00:33:15,960 --> 00:33:20,039
and implement plans to address staffing shortages at its prisons.

471
00:33:21,480 --> 00:33:25,400
Since at least twenty fifteen, the OIG has repeatedly found

472
00:33:25,480 --> 00:33:29,640
the need for BOP to address staffing shortages, including medical

473
00:33:29,680 --> 00:33:35,279
staffing shortages. This investigation and review revealed the direct impact

474
00:33:35,319 --> 00:33:40,279
of staffing deficiencies on inmate safety. For example, the material

475
00:33:40,319 --> 00:33:44,079
handler worked three consecutive shifts twenty four hours straight on

476
00:33:44,119 --> 00:33:48,759
August ninth, twenty nineteen, which was certainly a contributing cause

477
00:33:49,000 --> 00:33:52,200
to the lack of adequate means of accounting for inmate

478
00:33:52,279 --> 00:33:56,720
location and well being in the Shoe. The material handler

479
00:33:56,759 --> 00:34:00,400
told the OIG that no one did the ten pm

480
00:34:00,720 --> 00:34:02,200
schee inmate count.

481
00:34:02,039 --> 00:34:03,160
Speaker 2: Because they were tired.

482
00:34:03,559 --> 00:34:07,960
Speaker 1: Additionally, the OIG's investigation and review found that, in connection

483
00:34:08,239 --> 00:34:12,280
with the MCC New York's upgrade of its security camera system,

484
00:34:12,800 --> 00:34:17,280
the GOP's Northeast Regional Office arranged for technicians from other

485
00:34:17,360 --> 00:34:22,440
BP institutions to perform temporary duty assignments to MCC New

486
00:34:22,519 --> 00:34:27,840
York to perform necessary mechanical, electrical, plumbing, and wiring work.

487
00:34:28,599 --> 00:34:32,119
Yet during the course of the TDY rotations, work was

488
00:34:32,159 --> 00:34:37,360
not consistently conducted on the camera upgrade because sometimes TDY

489
00:34:37,440 --> 00:34:41,480
staff were used to cover shortages at MCC's New York

490
00:34:41,480 --> 00:34:46,400
custody posts. Without adequate staffing, the BOP cannot fulfill its

491
00:34:46,440 --> 00:34:50,800
mandate to insure safe and secure correctional facilities. The OIG

492
00:34:51,000 --> 00:34:55,880
therefore recommends that the BOP continue to develop and implement

493
00:34:56,000 --> 00:35:02,920
plans to address staffing shortages at its institutions. Seven, The

494
00:35:02,960 --> 00:35:07,039
GOP should evaluate its cell search procedures and make changes

495
00:35:07,239 --> 00:35:11,880
as may be appropriate to improve those procedures through policy, training,

496
00:35:12,239 --> 00:35:17,039
or other measures. The OIG's investigation and review found that

497
00:35:17,119 --> 00:35:20,159
there was an excessive amount of linens in Epstein's cell

498
00:35:20,440 --> 00:35:24,440
at the time of his death. BOP policy and MCC

499
00:35:24,599 --> 00:35:28,639
New York shoe post orders require that shoe cells be searched,

500
00:35:29,000 --> 00:35:32,360
but they do not specifically address the issue of excessive

501
00:35:32,360 --> 00:35:35,840
bed linens, which the captain told the OIG present a

502
00:35:35,880 --> 00:35:38,960
safety hazard because an inmate can use them to harm

503
00:35:39,000 --> 00:35:44,400
themselves or escape from the institution. Therefore, the OIG recommends

504
00:35:44,639 --> 00:35:49,280
that the BOP evaluated cell search procedures and make changes

505
00:35:49,360 --> 00:35:54,360
as may be appropriate to improve those procedures through policy, training,

506
00:35:54,719 --> 00:35:59,360
or other measures. And, last, but not least, eight, the

507
00:35:59,440 --> 00:36:05,119
BP should enhance existing policies regarding institutional security camera systems

508
00:36:05,400 --> 00:36:09,199
to ensure they specifically state that such systems must have

509
00:36:09,280 --> 00:36:13,639
the capacity to record video and that Goop institutions must

510
00:36:13,719 --> 00:36:19,880
conduct regular security camera system functionality checks, as discussed in

511
00:36:19,920 --> 00:36:23,719
the conclusion section of this chapter. The OIG found that

512
00:36:24,000 --> 00:36:27,239
even though the highest levels of leadership knew of the

513
00:36:27,360 --> 00:36:32,559
mcc New York security camera system reoccurring deficiencies prior to

514
00:36:32,599 --> 00:36:36,400
Epstein's death, no one was tasked with the responsibility of

515
00:36:36,599 --> 00:36:40,280
checking the security camera system on a routine basis to

516
00:36:40,400 --> 00:36:44,519
ensure that the system was functional. As a result, when

517
00:36:44,559 --> 00:36:49,119
on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, video from approximately half

518
00:36:49,159 --> 00:36:52,760
of the institution security cameras was no longer being recorded,

519
00:36:53,119 --> 00:36:57,920
the problem went undetected for eleven days. The OIG also

520
00:36:58,039 --> 00:37:01,400
found that there was no BOP policy see that specifically

521
00:37:01,440 --> 00:37:05,920
state that security camera systems must have the capacity to record,

522
00:37:06,320 --> 00:37:10,960
or that institutional staff must perform periodic checks to ensure

523
00:37:11,159 --> 00:37:15,079
the camera system is fully functional. Cameras that are failing

524
00:37:15,239 --> 00:37:18,760
to provide good quality or any live video streams put

525
00:37:18,760 --> 00:37:22,159
the safety of BOP staff members and inmates at risk.

526
00:37:22,880 --> 00:37:25,280
Speaker 2: The lack of video.

527
00:37:24,559 --> 00:37:29,760
Speaker 1: Recordings can potentially hinder investigations of wrongdoing by staff and inmates.

528
00:37:30,360 --> 00:37:35,360
The OIG therefore recommends that the BOP enhance existing policies

529
00:37:35,400 --> 00:37:40,440
and protocols, so they specifically state that all institutional security

530
00:37:40,480 --> 00:37:44,199
camera systems must have the capacity to record, and that

531
00:37:44,280 --> 00:37:49,400
the specified staff at each institution must conduct periodic checks

532
00:37:49,440 --> 00:37:53,480
of the security camera system to determine its operational status

533
00:37:53,599 --> 00:37:57,159
and take corrective action as soon as possible when the

534
00:37:57,199 --> 00:38:01,440
system is found to be inoperable. Such routine checks would

535
00:38:01,480 --> 00:38:05,599
help ensure that camera system malfunctions are detected and corrective

536
00:38:05,639 --> 00:38:10,199
actions are initiated in a timely manner. And that, my friends,

537
00:38:10,519 --> 00:38:14,519
is the end of the Inspector General's report into Jeffrey

538
00:38:14,519 --> 00:38:18,199
Epstein's death. And like I said, over the next few days,

539
00:38:18,199 --> 00:38:20,239
over the next couple of weeks, we're going to go

540
00:38:20,280 --> 00:38:24,199
through this whole entire thing again, but with commentary. All Right, folks,

541
00:38:24,239 --> 00:38:26,280
that is going to do it for this one. All

542
00:38:26,360 --> 00:38:28,880
of the information that goes with this episode can be

543
00:38:28,920 --> 00:38:30,760
found in the description box