WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.600 --> 00:00:03.359 I want to welcome everyone back to the Pekanona Show. 2 00:00:03.879 --> 00:00:08.039 Thomas is back and we're still taking a break from 3 00:00:08.119 --> 00:00:12.359 the Continental Philosophy series. We'll be getting back into that soon. 4 00:00:13.320 --> 00:00:18.079 But I asked Thomas to cover a topic that I've 5 00:00:18.120 --> 00:00:21.679 been wanting to cover for a while, and yeah, I 6 00:00:21.719 --> 00:00:23.600 told them he can take as many episodes as he 7 00:00:23.679 --> 00:00:25.640 wants to cover this because I think this is real 8 00:00:25.719 --> 00:00:31.399 important for from the revisionist perspective when World War according 9 00:00:31.399 --> 00:00:36.079 to World War Two, and it's also from podcasts I've 10 00:00:36.119 --> 00:00:39.320 heard in the past talking about it. It's quite controversial 11 00:00:39.520 --> 00:00:41.520 and maybe I'll ask you some questions about that at 12 00:00:41.520 --> 00:00:45.560 the end, Thomas even controversial amongst our guys, and I 13 00:00:45.640 --> 00:00:49.520 have a reason why I think it is. But why 14 00:00:49.560 --> 00:00:51.159 don't you tell us what we're going to talk about today? 15 00:00:52.439 --> 00:00:56.159 Well, in broad causal terms, we're going to talk about 16 00:00:56.439 --> 00:00:59.039 the role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War. 17 00:01:01.880 --> 00:01:12.799 That's an issue that's mischaracterized. The main minority viewpoint is 18 00:01:12.799 --> 00:01:19.120 presented by Victor Suvarov's Icebreaker. Suvarov is a pseudonym for 19 00:01:19.599 --> 00:01:26.680 the Soviet defector who was deeply insinuated in the gru 20 00:01:28.959 --> 00:01:36.519 which was the military's the Red Armies counterpart to KGB. 21 00:01:38.280 --> 00:01:41.680 KGB was technically a branch of the Soviet military, but 22 00:01:41.879 --> 00:01:51.760 gru was literally army intelligence because it may insisted well 23 00:01:53.159 --> 00:02:03.280 most people in addressing Suverov, they've got to discrete narrow focus. Essentially, 24 00:02:03.280 --> 00:02:06.079 when they begin their analysis is on the eve of 25 00:02:06.120 --> 00:02:10.919 Operation Barbarossa, and they get bogged down in the minutia 26 00:02:11.080 --> 00:02:15.479 of what were Soviet deployments, how are they arrayed? Were 27 00:02:15.479 --> 00:02:23.280 they offensively arrayed? What were the comparative force levels and 28 00:02:23.319 --> 00:02:26.919 capabilities of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. Now these 29 00:02:26.919 --> 00:02:33.319 things are relevant, and I'll address those things, but that's 30 00:02:33.360 --> 00:02:38.400 not an adequate analysis, and Suvarov didn't begin as analysis 31 00:02:38.479 --> 00:02:44.800 there either. Suvarov's claim is that the Soviet Union literally 32 00:02:44.840 --> 00:02:53.960 started World War Two, and I accept that, and it's 33 00:02:54.000 --> 00:02:59.680 not strictly military analysis. Everything about the Second World War 34 00:02:59.759 --> 00:03:03.319 was a dialogue with Soviet power and the Soviet Union. 35 00:03:04.000 --> 00:03:07.319 The entire twentieth century was in dialogue with the Soviet 36 00:03:07.400 --> 00:03:16.280 Union and its existence and the ideology that animated its structure, activity, 37 00:03:17.919 --> 00:03:25.879 decision making, and you know, every imperative related to power, 38 00:03:25.879 --> 00:03:33.319 political activity, they're in so other people there's a subset 39 00:03:33.360 --> 00:03:37.520 of people just don't really understand the issues presented, and 40 00:03:37.800 --> 00:03:45.759 they essentially accept what court historians claim. But then they 41 00:03:45.879 --> 00:03:48.599 diverge or they think that the question is should there 42 00:03:50.159 --> 00:03:53.159 you know, should there be a deeper analysis at this 43 00:03:53.280 --> 00:03:57.360 key juncture in the summer of nineteen forty one, they're 44 00:03:57.400 --> 00:04:02.680 looking at it the wrong way, you know, either out 45 00:04:02.719 --> 00:04:08.639 of ignorance or because they're powed by what they do 46 00:04:08.800 --> 00:04:15.759 as a political consensus among academ and they don't want 47 00:04:15.800 --> 00:04:21.399 to be availed a kind of punitive scrutiny. And I'll 48 00:04:21.399 --> 00:04:25.959 get into what I mean by that, you know, I 49 00:04:25.959 --> 00:04:31.800 if you if you accept the if you accept Suvarov's perspective, 50 00:04:32.120 --> 00:04:37.920 which was also shared by Jakam Hoffman. Jackham Hoffman was 51 00:04:37.959 --> 00:04:43.639 a military historian. He was when he was alive. He 52 00:04:43.759 --> 00:04:47.360 died in middle age in the nineteen nineties early two thousands. 53 00:04:47.399 --> 00:04:52.160 But he wrote this exhaustive book called Stalin's War of Extermination, 54 00:04:53.800 --> 00:05:06.079 and he was essentially uh bundesevel archivist. And he wrote 55 00:05:06.079 --> 00:05:14.279 this exhaustive book about the origins of the Second World War. 56 00:05:14.560 --> 00:05:18.040 And you know, about half of it is dedicated to 57 00:05:18.120 --> 00:05:24.319 the political conditions that gave rise the conflict, and about 58 00:05:24.319 --> 00:05:26.839 half of it deals with kind of hard and fast 59 00:05:28.240 --> 00:05:32.439 military subject matter. But I think that's the best book 60 00:05:32.480 --> 00:05:39.639 written on the topic, and he agreed very much with 61 00:05:39.639 --> 00:05:48.680 with Suvras analysis, but also myself, especially being somebody who 62 00:05:48.720 --> 00:05:58.680 favors direct evidence and the testimony of parties to the 63 00:05:58.720 --> 00:06:02.879 events in question. You know, if you look at what 64 00:06:02.959 --> 00:06:08.839 Stalin said, and if you examine the sort of ontological 65 00:06:08.879 --> 00:06:16.759 aspects the pedigonology of Marxist Leninism, there should be something 66 00:06:16.759 --> 00:06:21.399 of a no brainer. You know, this idea that the 67 00:06:21.439 --> 00:06:28.319 Soviet Union didn't have ambitions of an imperialistic nature, that 68 00:06:28.480 --> 00:06:34.759 it had no interest in exporting its ideology to the 69 00:06:34.879 --> 00:06:41.519 rest of the developed world, that it wasn't possessed of 70 00:06:41.560 --> 00:06:52.360 an expansionist sensibility, that's laughable. I mean, it's laughable because 71 00:06:53.279 --> 00:06:57.759 the only thing that sustains the revolutionary political cultures such 72 00:06:57.800 --> 00:07:06.519 as that that was characteristic of the Soviet Union is 73 00:07:06.560 --> 00:07:10.920 this kind of dynamic revolutionary violence that's got to be 74 00:07:11.399 --> 00:07:19.480 exported once the revolution is consolidated within. But also, you know, 75 00:07:19.519 --> 00:07:30.319 the Soviet Union between nineteen twenty two in nineteen thirty nine, 76 00:07:30.639 --> 00:07:35.120 it conquered a land mass of that was equivalent to 77 00:07:35.160 --> 00:07:38.240 the size of the German Reich in nineteen nineteen something 78 00:07:38.279 --> 00:07:44.480 like four hundred thousand square kilometers. This was a massively aggressive, expansionist, 79 00:07:45.240 --> 00:07:52.240 burgaining superpower. You know, that's indisputable. And this idea that 80 00:07:52.519 --> 00:07:57.439 the world where you're talking about the United Kingdom, which 81 00:07:57.480 --> 00:08:02.519 had conquered twenty three percent of the planet and lorded 82 00:08:02.639 --> 00:08:08.079 over five hundred million people. You got the Soviet Union, 83 00:08:08.120 --> 00:08:14.800 which constitutes one sixth of this planet, and it's animated 84 00:08:14.839 --> 00:08:18.720 by this revolutionary imperative that it calls for the the 85 00:08:18.800 --> 00:08:23.240 bolshivization of the entire developed world. You have the United States, 86 00:08:24.399 --> 00:08:28.959 which is in control as a nineteen thirty nine of 87 00:08:29.079 --> 00:08:32.759 fully half of this planet remaining resources. The idea that 88 00:08:32.799 --> 00:08:36.919 the world was terrified of this comparatively tiny country in Germany, 89 00:08:37.759 --> 00:08:41.200 that's a laughful you know, I mean, that's that's ridiculous. 90 00:08:44.840 --> 00:08:46.759 I don't know how else to characterize it. And the 91 00:08:46.799 --> 00:08:54.480 fact that you know, people suggest that is you know, 92 00:08:55.120 --> 00:09:02.320 is is insane. I'd say it's comical, but there's nothing 93 00:09:02.360 --> 00:09:06.080 funny about it, because this kind of garbage inform's decision making, 94 00:09:06.159 --> 00:09:10.919 and it you know, it's constantly it was a kind 95 00:09:10.960 --> 00:09:22.399 of mass delusion of in the public mind. But you know, 96 00:09:22.480 --> 00:09:26.799 first and foremost it often makes his point really at 97 00:09:26.840 --> 00:09:31.720 the beginning of his study, you know, the the imperialistic 98 00:09:32.000 --> 00:09:34.799 I don't imperialist in the sense Latin has talked about it. 99 00:09:34.840 --> 00:09:39.159 I mean, the Soviet Union was an empire in the 100 00:09:39.200 --> 00:09:43.480 ideological sense make a mistake, and this sort of violent 101 00:09:43.679 --> 00:09:51.639 imperialistic power, political sensibility. It was. It was. It was 102 00:09:51.720 --> 00:09:54.720 this kind of relatory practice. It was baked into every 103 00:09:54.799 --> 00:10:01.240 aspect of the Soviet political system, even even the heraldic 104 00:10:01.360 --> 00:10:05.000 standard of the Soviet Union, which endured until the final 105 00:10:05.080 --> 00:10:08.720 days in nineteen ninety one. It was literally the globe 106 00:10:11.679 --> 00:10:17.080 with the overlaid on the planet Earth is this giant 107 00:10:17.120 --> 00:10:21.480 hammer and sickle, you know. That was That was the 108 00:10:21.480 --> 00:10:27.480 Soviet coat of arms. The symbolism is obvious, you know, 109 00:10:28.080 --> 00:10:32.200 Communism will encircle the whole world, you know, and the 110 00:10:32.240 --> 00:10:36.840 motto of the Soviet Union similarly until the end translates 111 00:10:36.919 --> 00:10:42.200 to proletarians of all countries unite. Yeah, it can't really 112 00:10:42.200 --> 00:10:45.039 be more on the nose than that, you know. But 113 00:10:45.440 --> 00:10:53.759 again intrinsic to in termsic to the Marxist Leninist ethos 114 00:10:55.639 --> 00:10:58.879 as a globalist perspective, that's one of the reasons why 115 00:10:58.879 --> 00:11:02.759 the twentieth century belong so much to the communists because 116 00:11:03.000 --> 00:11:05.759 it was uniquely it was an ideology that was uniquely 117 00:11:05.799 --> 00:11:11.039 suited to the then present, and it was fundamentally ford looking. 118 00:11:11.840 --> 00:11:18.759 They can't be denied, you know, it's it's obsolescence. Oh 119 00:11:18.840 --> 00:11:24.399 do you know the fact that it became a staid 120 00:11:25.799 --> 00:11:32.360 the form of of organization, and it was it was, 121 00:11:32.919 --> 00:11:41.720 it became an obsolescent psychological artifact. But at Zena that 122 00:11:42.360 --> 00:11:47.320 it was very much astride the Zeit guys, and they 123 00:11:47.320 --> 00:11:52.320 can't be denied. And even it was animated by a 124 00:11:52.440 --> 00:11:59.799 uniquely expansionist sensibility. But even hit it not then everybody was. 125 00:11:59.639 --> 00:12:08.159 It was everybody who was, you know, participating in velt 126 00:12:08.279 --> 00:12:11.279 politique at scale had a global perspective. I mean, that 127 00:12:11.360 --> 00:12:17.320 was the reality. The twentieth century was decided what configuration 128 00:12:17.480 --> 00:12:21.080 globalism would take. Okay, it's just this idea of a 129 00:12:21.200 --> 00:12:26.279 kind of insular communism that was narrowly status that in 130 00:12:26.399 --> 00:12:31.440 inward looking, I mean, that's that's ridiculous. And beyond that 131 00:12:31.519 --> 00:12:37.840 Stalin Stalin himself came to characterize the ideological culture of 132 00:12:37.919 --> 00:12:45.720 Marsis Leninism for an entire generation it's not accidentally. You know, 133 00:12:45.759 --> 00:12:49.799 he reigned for over thirty years, and I believe he 134 00:12:49.840 --> 00:12:54.480 was the single most powerful man on earth, and that 135 00:12:55.759 --> 00:13:01.360 is incredible for all kinds of reasons. But you know, 136 00:13:01.440 --> 00:13:07.360 he very much set the tenor of, you know, the 137 00:13:07.480 --> 00:13:13.600 revolutionary culture characteristic of the socialist community and nations as 138 00:13:13.600 --> 00:13:21.120 it was called. And he he was a confidant of Lenin, 139 00:13:21.480 --> 00:13:30.480 and Lenin said repeatedly and often, but most notably Lenin's 140 00:13:30.519 --> 00:13:37.000 famous December sixth, nineteen twenty speech, which was dedicated to 141 00:13:37.279 --> 00:13:42.320 communist practice and the vision for a velt Politique, a 142 00:13:42.440 --> 00:13:48.639 Soviet Velt's politique. He said that to incite the capitalist 143 00:13:48.679 --> 00:13:59.639 states against each other is the main stratagem of communism. 144 00:14:00.279 --> 00:14:03.600 In his words, he said, quote of using the knives 145 00:14:03.600 --> 00:14:08.960 of scoundrels like the capitalist thieves against each other, on 146 00:14:09.080 --> 00:14:12.200 grounds that when quote when two thieves fall out and fight, 147 00:14:12.399 --> 00:14:15.039 the honest man laughs. As soon as we are strong 148 00:14:15.120 --> 00:14:18.360 enough to overthrow capitalism completely, we will grab him by 149 00:14:18.399 --> 00:14:22.120 the throat. Victory of the communist revolution in all countries 150 00:14:22.240 --> 00:14:34.720 is inevitable, and that encapsulates Marxist learness of els polity, 151 00:14:35.440 --> 00:14:41.759 and that defined it until the very end. This was Uh, 152 00:14:42.080 --> 00:14:45.840 this was still the ambition when even amiss the strategic 153 00:14:45.919 --> 00:14:49.200 nuclear stalemate. You know, in the late eighties, they were 154 00:14:49.200 --> 00:14:53.720 still challenging in Latin America to try and rectify the 155 00:14:53.759 --> 00:14:58.960 strategic imbalance, owing the you know, the advantage conferred the 156 00:14:59.039 --> 00:15:05.480 United States and they're uh and its allies, you know, 157 00:15:07.200 --> 00:15:08.919 by the inner German border. 158 00:15:09.679 --> 00:15:09.879 You know. 159 00:15:12.399 --> 00:15:18.440 Again, the shouldn't be this shouldn't be mysterious or controversial. Rather, 160 00:15:19.840 --> 00:15:26.080 now what I think of is literally the Stalin doctrine. 161 00:15:30.200 --> 00:15:36.240 This was presented and articulated during a speech Stalin made 162 00:15:36.279 --> 00:15:40.840 to the Central Committee of the All Communist Party in 163 00:15:40.960 --> 00:15:50.679 July nineteen twenty five. And for the Soviets denied that 164 00:15:50.759 --> 00:15:57.360 this speech happened for decades and it was authenticated that 165 00:15:58.919 --> 00:16:02.320 the speech was made. And I'll get into how this 166 00:16:02.480 --> 00:16:06.399 came about as we continue, but we're not there yet. 167 00:16:08.039 --> 00:16:16.240 But what Stalin declared at this speech was quote, should 168 00:16:16.279 --> 00:16:19.840 the war begin, we will not stand by inactively. We 169 00:16:19.879 --> 00:16:21.840 will enter the war, but we will enter as the 170 00:16:21.919 --> 00:16:25.120 last belligerent. We will throw a weight on the scales 171 00:16:25.200 --> 00:16:33.159 that should be decisive. The historian named Alexander Neckridge, he's 172 00:16:34.000 --> 00:16:41.759 he he characterized this as the Stalin doctrine, you know, 173 00:16:41.960 --> 00:16:48.000 and he insisted that this was never abandoned. And that's true. 174 00:16:48.080 --> 00:16:57.840 And subsequent events and Stalin's decision making in the command 175 00:16:57.960 --> 00:17:01.679 role as well as his you know, in Warren peace terms, 176 00:17:01.720 --> 00:17:04.839 as well as in his role as General secretary, bear 177 00:17:04.960 --> 00:17:13.000 that out. You know, Stalin's last parapolitical act was you know, 178 00:17:13.079 --> 00:17:19.160 giving a MAO and Kimmel Sung a green light to 179 00:17:19.240 --> 00:17:26.119 assault on the Korean peninsula, okay, and this this led 180 00:17:26.160 --> 00:17:32.319 to a crisis on order of the Cuba crisis, you know, 181 00:17:32.920 --> 00:17:39.359 less than a decade later. It's a tangent, but I 182 00:17:39.440 --> 00:17:46.279 about every decade subsequent nineteen fifty, nineteen sixty two, nineteen 183 00:17:46.279 --> 00:17:52.640 seventy three, nineteen eighty three, there was a general crisis 184 00:17:55.200 --> 00:18:01.920 wrought by the traversing of a conflict diad in what 185 00:18:02.240 --> 00:18:08.119 was UH a peripheral theater, but that you know, nonetheless 186 00:18:08.920 --> 00:18:14.720 had the potential for escalation to it's a general nuclear war. 187 00:18:14.799 --> 00:18:18.480 And but my point being that it's it's not as if, 188 00:18:18.920 --> 00:18:22.119 you know, Stalin literally at the end of his life 189 00:18:22.279 --> 00:18:28.160 was still making decisions pursuant to this sort of doctrinaire 190 00:18:31.640 --> 00:18:45.039 you know program the UH. And it's that just became 191 00:18:45.240 --> 00:18:52.640 a fixation of Stalin's as the uh as a situation 192 00:18:52.759 --> 00:19:03.079 in Europe became characterized by punctually crises, you know, for 193 00:19:03.119 --> 00:19:07.039 the next decade and a half, subsequent climbating obviously, in 194 00:19:07.119 --> 00:19:15.680 nineteen thirty nine and throughout the nineteen thirties, Stalin undertook 195 00:19:15.720 --> 00:19:24.279 a massive armaments program that was unprecedented, you know, and 196 00:19:25.119 --> 00:19:30.720 based on his rhetoric not just too you know, the 197 00:19:30.720 --> 00:19:37.319 poet Borrow and to the assembled nomenclature of the All 198 00:19:37.359 --> 00:19:40.920 Communist Party, but also these public speeches that he made 199 00:19:42.279 --> 00:19:46.319 for the consumption not just of the Soviet people, but 200 00:19:47.759 --> 00:19:52.359 you know, as a way of signaling to the rest 201 00:19:52.359 --> 00:19:57.640 of the world. It was clear that he was convinced 202 00:19:57.640 --> 00:20:02.839 that a general crisis of had had arrived, you know, 203 00:20:02.880 --> 00:20:09.079 in global capitalism, was was on its way out, you know, 204 00:20:09.440 --> 00:20:12.160 And it was in nineteen thirty nine, early one thirty 205 00:20:12.240 --> 00:20:19.079 nine the British ambassador to the Soviet Union, Stafford Cripps, 206 00:20:19.839 --> 00:20:25.559 and the American ambassador, Lawrence F. Steinhardt, they both were 207 00:20:25.680 --> 00:20:30.039 adamant that Stalin intended to bring about a war not 208 00:20:30.079 --> 00:20:32.759 only in Europe but in East Asia, and that this 209 00:20:33.000 --> 00:20:36.960 was a great threat facing the British Empire in the 210 00:20:37.039 --> 00:20:45.200 United States of America. And this is important, especially the 211 00:20:45.200 --> 00:20:53.000 fact of Stalin's attention to the developing situation in the 212 00:20:53.039 --> 00:20:59.240 Far East. I'd argue that this was an essential aspect 213 00:20:59.319 --> 00:21:05.319 of what became his strategic vision. And we'll get into 214 00:21:05.319 --> 00:21:13.119 what I mean by that in a moment. When around 215 00:21:13.119 --> 00:21:18.680 between about nineteen ninety one and nineteen ninety five, a 216 00:21:18.720 --> 00:21:23.480 lot of documents briefly became available from the Soviet archives. 217 00:21:23.960 --> 00:21:30.880 That's how David Irving got Gebels the microfilm the Gerbels diaries. 218 00:21:31.200 --> 00:21:35.640 That wouldn't be possible anymore obviously today and now if 219 00:21:35.680 --> 00:21:39.519 you even even if they're watching, government viewed you as 220 00:21:39.519 --> 00:21:43.319 basically friendly your view to as a dissident from the 221 00:21:43.359 --> 00:21:46.400 United States, they're not going to give you access to 222 00:21:46.480 --> 00:21:50.079 anything the FSB has, and I mean even something of 223 00:21:50.240 --> 00:21:56.039 exclusively historical interest, you know, from the warriors. They're they're 224 00:21:56.079 --> 00:22:00.160 not gonna let anybody see that, you know from without it. 225 00:22:01.599 --> 00:22:06.119 There's this brief period of openness in the nineteen nineties, 226 00:22:06.160 --> 00:22:11.480 and during that period a bunch of documents that have 227 00:22:11.559 --> 00:22:19.839 been corralled by the People's Commissariate for Foreign Affairs, you know, 228 00:22:22.359 --> 00:22:27.799 that in the form of internal memorandum as well as 229 00:22:29.839 --> 00:22:37.720 literally directives from you know, the desk of Stalin. You know, 230 00:22:38.079 --> 00:22:42.519 obviously it's it's not indicated as such, but reading between 231 00:22:42.519 --> 00:22:47.119 the lines, you know, these are obviously these are obviously 232 00:22:47.160 --> 00:22:57.680 statements from the General Secretary, most notably the People's Commissaria 233 00:22:57.960 --> 00:23:10.240 delegation to Japan, the telegram from Moscow that suggests that 234 00:23:10.279 --> 00:23:17.519 the Soviet diplomatic mission in Japan should agree to any 235 00:23:17.640 --> 00:23:21.279 treaty that tends to bring about hostility between Japan and 236 00:23:21.319 --> 00:23:27.559 the United States. You know, it's very undisguised, all of 237 00:23:27.559 --> 00:23:30.799 these communications are you know, throughout the nineteen thirties that 238 00:23:31.559 --> 00:23:36.920 anything that brings about a Japanese American war should be cultivated. 239 00:23:37.240 --> 00:23:44.319 And this is this is imperative to Soviet ambitions, you know, 240 00:23:47.319 --> 00:23:56.119 the way it was described by one of the archivists 241 00:23:57.480 --> 00:24:02.559 who was involved in this NNGO, which I think still exists. 242 00:24:03.039 --> 00:24:08.400 There's this NGO that was corralled or incorporated rather in 243 00:24:08.480 --> 00:24:10.920 January nineteen eighty nine, you know, this month before the 244 00:24:11.079 --> 00:24:14.920 enduring Border fell like low, less than a year that 245 00:24:15.119 --> 00:24:20.240 was dedicated to documenting human rights abuses as they called it, 246 00:24:20.319 --> 00:24:26.200 and other things. During the Stalin era, and there's interesting 247 00:24:27.880 --> 00:24:32.920 data relating to the power political situation, you know, in 248 00:24:32.960 --> 00:24:37.960 the years prior to nineteen thirty nine that they corralled 249 00:24:38.000 --> 00:24:46.880 as well, and of particular significance, there's this transcribed memo 250 00:24:51.599 --> 00:24:57.119 from years subsequent by a man who served in the 251 00:24:57.119 --> 00:25:03.119 the Chinese or Japanese diplomatic mis Soviet diplomatic mission in 252 00:25:03.119 --> 00:25:07.279 the nineteen thirties, and he said, quote the Soviet Union, 253 00:25:07.359 --> 00:25:10.319 for its part, was interested in distracting British and American 254 00:25:10.319 --> 00:25:17.680 attention from European problems and in Japanese neutrality during the 255 00:25:17.720 --> 00:25:20.400 period of the destruction of Germany and the liberation of 256 00:25:20.440 --> 00:25:23.920 Europe from capitalism. And then, of course it became clear 257 00:25:24.000 --> 00:25:28.160 that Japan was not going to remain neutral or America 258 00:25:28.200 --> 00:25:32.160 was not going to allow it to strike a position 259 00:25:32.240 --> 00:25:40.599 in neutrality. You know, it became imperative to do everything 260 00:25:40.680 --> 00:25:43.759 possible to bring the United States and Japan into collision, 261 00:25:45.119 --> 00:25:47.960 which once it became clear what the you know, the 262 00:25:48.000 --> 00:25:53.720 New Dealer's ambitions were, that sort of resolved itself from 263 00:25:53.720 --> 00:25:59.519 the Soviet perspective. But nevertheless, Japan was at the top 264 00:25:59.640 --> 00:26:03.640 of Stalin's mind, and we're gonna know what I mean 265 00:26:03.680 --> 00:26:10.680 by that in a minute. Now, this is really what's 266 00:26:11.799 --> 00:26:24.960 critical to sub hypothesis and mine own as well as 267 00:26:25.240 --> 00:26:32.720 what Suvarov posited. And again I echo this sentiment. I 268 00:26:35.359 --> 00:26:38.519 the Soviet Union started World War Two in August nineteen 269 00:26:38.559 --> 00:26:44.240 thirty nine when they launched a massive surprise attack at 270 00:26:44.319 --> 00:26:50.720 calcin Gole and knocked out the Japanese Imperial Army okay, 271 00:26:50.920 --> 00:26:54.720 and that changed everything, and that also was literally the 272 00:26:54.720 --> 00:26:59.160 start of World War two. If you look at hostilities 273 00:26:59.200 --> 00:27:01.559 with nineteen thirty nine in nineteen forty five is a 274 00:27:01.599 --> 00:27:09.880 singular conflict, which I think, in broad conceptual terms is 275 00:27:09.880 --> 00:27:15.720 is useful, you know, especially because that's court history claims 276 00:27:15.720 --> 00:27:19.119 that War two began, you know, in September of nineteen 277 00:27:19.119 --> 00:27:26.599 thirty nine, and bizarrely they claim that, you know, Polish 278 00:27:26.720 --> 00:27:31.880 borders were somehow inviolable and any any any traversing of 279 00:27:31.920 --> 00:27:36.880 them was an act of global war. But if we 280 00:27:37.000 --> 00:27:42.599 examined the ambitions and strategic orientatings and objectives of why 281 00:27:42.680 --> 00:27:47.920 the Soviet Union assaulted Japan, it becomes clear that this 282 00:27:48.079 --> 00:27:50.599 was the start of the Second World War, and what 283 00:27:50.680 --> 00:27:53.519 this the reasons why they did that, what this set 284 00:27:53.559 --> 00:28:05.200 in motion it was truly and respect of a global 285 00:28:06.000 --> 00:28:14.559 campaign of revolutionary conquest. But in the days before that, 286 00:28:14.920 --> 00:28:17.680 and this is important too, because, like the nineteen twenty 287 00:28:17.720 --> 00:28:24.599 five speech, the Soviet Union later claimed this never happened, 288 00:28:27.720 --> 00:28:30.920 and it's interesting how the Allies dealt with it in 289 00:28:31.039 --> 00:28:42.279 subsequent years. But on August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, Stalin 290 00:28:42.400 --> 00:28:46.839 called a surprise secret meeting of the Central Committee of 291 00:28:46.880 --> 00:28:56.599 the Poet Buro. During the meeting, Stalin announced that the 292 00:28:56.680 --> 00:28:59.440 time had now come to quote apply the torch of 293 00:28:59.519 --> 00:29:08.240 war to European powder kid. Now, of course, this was 294 00:29:08.319 --> 00:29:16.680 also as the non Aggression Pact was being, you know, 295 00:29:17.519 --> 00:29:22.480 negotiated with the German Reich. What Stalin said to the 296 00:29:22.519 --> 00:29:27.000 assembled Central Committee, quote, if we accept the German proposal, 297 00:29:27.000 --> 00:29:29.599 if the conclusion of a non aggression pact with them, 298 00:29:32.039 --> 00:29:35.880 they would naturally attack Poland, and the intervention of France 299 00:29:35.920 --> 00:29:39.759 and England in this war would be inevitable. The resulting 300 00:29:39.839 --> 00:29:44.720 unrest and disorder will lead to a destabilization of Western 301 00:29:44.759 --> 00:29:50.640 Europe without US, us being the Soviet Union being initially 302 00:29:50.720 --> 00:29:59.119 drawn into the conflict. And again, you know, since nineteen 303 00:29:59.160 --> 00:30:05.559 twenty five, this had been what the Soviet Union was 304 00:30:05.599 --> 00:30:09.400 waiting for, according to the Stalin doctrine, as a catalyst 305 00:30:09.480 --> 00:30:17.839 for you know, exporting the revolution to Western Europe, you know, 306 00:30:17.880 --> 00:30:20.920 and Stalin continued saying, quote, we can hope for an 307 00:30:20.960 --> 00:30:27.559 advantageous entry into the war, and a typical Stalin euphimistic language, 308 00:30:27.599 --> 00:30:30.440 you said, quote a broad field of activity, A broad 309 00:30:30.599 --> 00:30:34.599 field of activity was now opening for the development of 310 00:30:34.640 --> 00:30:40.839 the World Revolution, in other words, for the accomplishments which 311 00:30:40.880 --> 00:30:45.599 had never you know, been abandoned, for the sovietization of 312 00:30:46.400 --> 00:30:55.400 Europe and Communist domination. He concluded this speech by saying, comrades, 313 00:30:56.079 --> 00:30:59.720 in the interest of the Soviet Union, the homeland of 314 00:30:59.720 --> 00:31:04.240 the worlds get busy and work so warm me break 315 00:31:04.319 --> 00:31:08.279 out between the Reich and the capitalistic Anglo French bloc. 316 00:31:10.359 --> 00:31:17.759 Now this was the first stage of the plan for 317 00:31:17.960 --> 00:31:30.200 Bolshevik domination, and you know it then the non aggression 318 00:31:30.240 --> 00:31:39.279 pack the chorus was finalized four days subsequent, and it 319 00:31:39.359 --> 00:31:45.039 becomes clear, you know, I don't want to take us 320 00:31:45.039 --> 00:31:50.000 down another tangent. But it was really Gearing who pushed 321 00:31:50.000 --> 00:31:54.759 really hard for a firm alliance with the Japanese. I mean, 322 00:31:54.839 --> 00:32:01.240 Hitler was already sort of disposed that way. Anyway, Garing 323 00:32:01.279 --> 00:32:05.799 respected the Japanese a lot, and Geary was something of 324 00:32:06.119 --> 00:32:08.559 a terrible snob, and he thought that Japan was like 325 00:32:08.599 --> 00:32:12.799 a high culture, I mean, which is true, but beyond 326 00:32:12.799 --> 00:32:23.640 the aesthetical attraction, you know, the understanding was that Japan 327 00:32:24.000 --> 00:32:28.240 was a great power in its own right, and they'd 328 00:32:28.319 --> 00:32:33.559 smashed the Imperial Russian Navy in nineteen oh five, and 329 00:32:33.880 --> 00:32:37.920 you know, Japan was just you know, the ideal hedge 330 00:32:37.960 --> 00:32:41.440 they have against the Soviet Union the East. So when 331 00:32:41.519 --> 00:32:45.279 the Red Army launched this blitz assault of the Japanese 332 00:32:45.400 --> 00:32:48.960 Army in the Far East and utterly annihilated them, this 333 00:32:49.200 --> 00:32:55.160 terrified people. And it also it really meant that, you know, 334 00:32:55.240 --> 00:32:59.359 the Reich had no choice but sue for temporary peace 335 00:32:59.400 --> 00:33:02.440 with the Soviet Union because then they had no hedge, 336 00:33:03.240 --> 00:33:08.640 you know. And it was clear that and he moved westward, 337 00:33:10.880 --> 00:33:15.960 you know, and uh Hitler was confident that the war, 338 00:33:16.240 --> 00:33:20.200 a war with France, wouldn't be a quagmire. But just 339 00:33:20.279 --> 00:33:22.799 the same, you know, he knew there weren't the forces 340 00:33:22.799 --> 00:33:29.319 in being to fight off as Soviet assault through Poland, 341 00:33:29.920 --> 00:33:36.519 as uh the Reich was you know, fighting Uh in France. 342 00:33:37.559 --> 00:33:42.559 So this was a. This was very much a conspiratorial 343 00:33:42.640 --> 00:33:45.240 master stroke of Stalin. I mean, I'm gonna be wrong. 344 00:33:45.279 --> 00:33:48.960 Stalin wanted to conquer the Far East anyway, but that 345 00:33:49.319 --> 00:33:55.440 timing was ideal, you know, and uh, there's the forces 346 00:33:55.440 --> 00:34:01.640 in being arrayed such that it was a sort of 347 00:34:01.680 --> 00:34:05.720 a perfect opportunity not just to humiliate the Japanese Imperial Army, 348 00:34:06.839 --> 00:34:12.039 but to telegraph a message of the world about Soviet 349 00:34:12.119 --> 00:34:21.239 military might, you know. And it was highly effective in 350 00:34:21.280 --> 00:34:24.960 that regard. Now, the speech that Stalin made where he 351 00:34:25.039 --> 00:34:29.920 outlined his plan for the conquest of Europe in the 352 00:34:29.960 --> 00:34:37.000 midst of you know, a Western European civil war. The 353 00:34:37.079 --> 00:34:46.159 French national news agency HAVAS, they obtained a copy of 354 00:34:46.199 --> 00:34:53.159 this by way of Geneva, presumably from you know, their 355 00:34:53.159 --> 00:34:57.039 own spies are from a friendly intelligence service, and it 356 00:34:57.119 --> 00:35:02.760 was published in early nineteen five thirty nine throughout France 357 00:35:03.719 --> 00:35:09.119 and uh Moscow claimed it was fake and it was 358 00:35:09.159 --> 00:35:13.400 a forgery, and right up to the present day, incredibly 359 00:35:14.920 --> 00:35:19.719 you'll find these dummy court historians and they're apologists claiming 360 00:35:19.760 --> 00:35:28.800 that this this this was somehow a forgery by the 361 00:35:28.920 --> 00:35:36.599 French Havas agency and French intelligence by by by anti communists. 362 00:35:37.280 --> 00:35:44.559 I mean, it's ridiculous. In the official party paper UH 363 00:35:44.840 --> 00:35:50.280 Pravda November thirty, ninety thirty nine, Stalin himself finally came 364 00:35:50.320 --> 00:35:56.079 out and officially denied UH that the speech was UH 365 00:35:56.880 --> 00:36:00.519 was made and and and reiterated this preposterous claim that 366 00:36:00.559 --> 00:36:05.199 it was some forgery by ant by by fascists. You know, 367 00:36:07.639 --> 00:36:14.800 this was demonstrated. It was confirmed to have been a 368 00:36:15.320 --> 00:36:23.039 real speech by Stalin's official biographer, who died only around 369 00:36:23.079 --> 00:36:26.039 nineteen ninety five. Even in nineteen ninety three he gave 370 00:36:26.079 --> 00:36:31.480 an interview where he confirmed for all time that this 371 00:36:31.599 --> 00:36:37.679 speech happened. The language of it was in fact transcribed 372 00:36:40.039 --> 00:36:48.480 perfectly in the you know, a document that was rendered 373 00:36:48.519 --> 00:36:54.800 by French of us, and that should have settled it 374 00:36:54.840 --> 00:37:03.400 for all time. But like I said, regime historians, UH 375 00:37:03.880 --> 00:37:07.840 will will simply argue by assertion and repeat lies over 376 00:37:07.880 --> 00:37:10.320 and over and over and over again, and they'll simply 377 00:37:10.360 --> 00:37:16.440 deny the evidence in rebuttal. But that's UH. This is 378 00:37:16.480 --> 00:37:20.400 important because it became a major This is there was 379 00:37:20.440 --> 00:37:25.039 a major stumbling block for the New Dealers obviously as 380 00:37:25.079 --> 00:37:29.440 well as UH the War Party in the UK. You know, 381 00:37:29.639 --> 00:37:36.559 it was beyond an embarrassment that it stood. The represent 382 00:37:36.639 --> 00:37:47.119 a real crisis with regards to their mandate. But it 383 00:37:47.159 --> 00:37:50.039 goes to show you what kind of bully pulpit had 384 00:37:50.079 --> 00:37:57.840 been devised and erected in uh, you know, the US 385 00:37:57.840 --> 00:37:59.920 and the UK. I mean, part of it was because 386 00:38:00.079 --> 00:38:03.679 it was the it was it was a French news release. 387 00:38:04.159 --> 00:38:09.000 But even so it the ability to lock out and 388 00:38:09.960 --> 00:38:16.760 discredit conflicting information and facts that had a tended to 389 00:38:16.920 --> 00:38:22.280 impeach official narratives is pretty remarkable. And in the case 390 00:38:22.320 --> 00:38:25.039 of the in the case of the focus in the 391 00:38:25.119 --> 00:38:31.719 UK and the new Deal in America. But you know, uh, 392 00:38:33.440 --> 00:38:36.880 and super Off, to his credit, took up the issue 393 00:38:36.920 --> 00:38:43.159 of the August nineteenth speech. But it was a Vokoganov. 394 00:38:44.840 --> 00:38:54.960 Vokoganov was the biographer in question who attested at the 395 00:38:55.000 --> 00:38:59.639 end of his life to the voracity of the speech. 396 00:39:00.199 --> 00:39:12.840 But you know, the it was on January sixteenth, nineteen 397 00:39:12.920 --> 00:39:16.880 ninety three. And again this this was that period of 398 00:39:18.039 --> 00:39:26.119 approximately summer fall nineteen ninety one until probably very early 399 00:39:26.199 --> 00:39:33.840 nineteen ninety six where there was open access to Stalin 400 00:39:34.079 --> 00:39:39.960 era archives in data in the Soviet Union. 401 00:39:40.760 --> 00:39:42.280 Can we address something right there? 402 00:39:42.519 --> 00:39:44.559 Yeah, go ahead, Yeah. 403 00:39:44.400 --> 00:39:48.239 A lot of people will say that, like the Goebbels 404 00:39:48.280 --> 00:39:52.320 draw diaries or forgeries. So you know, why isn't all 405 00:39:52.320 --> 00:39:54.440 of this forgeries as well? 406 00:39:54.480 --> 00:39:58.760 Because it's a non argument. It's like saying who forged 407 00:39:58.800 --> 00:40:02.239 the Gerbel diaries? What the Soviets did was they went 408 00:40:02.280 --> 00:40:07.159 to Berlin, they forged a bunch of documents. They put 409 00:40:07.199 --> 00:40:10.400 it in a Berlin bank vault, they pretended to discover it. 410 00:40:10.920 --> 00:40:16.760 They took it back to the Soviet Union, the NKVD, 411 00:40:17.079 --> 00:40:21.559 later the KGB. They continued to pretend that Gerbels had 412 00:40:21.599 --> 00:40:27.079 written reams of diary material for fifty years. They lied 413 00:40:27.119 --> 00:40:31.000 about this for no reason. Then David Irving also lied 414 00:40:31.039 --> 00:40:33.639 about this so that he could capture clouts. Like what, 415 00:40:35.360 --> 00:40:39.480 there's there's this kind of stock in trade of simpletons 416 00:40:39.599 --> 00:40:43.519 and idiots to just go around saying things are fake. 417 00:40:44.239 --> 00:40:51.760 You know, Hitler's second book is fake. General Patten's personal 418 00:40:51.800 --> 00:40:57.800 diaries are fake, Gerbel's diaries are fake. Everything is fake, Okay. 419 00:40:57.920 --> 00:41:03.719 I mean, I it's like me saying Donald Trump is 420 00:41:03.800 --> 00:41:08.199 actually of Jewish parentage. I can't prove that. There's no 421 00:41:08.239 --> 00:41:10.679 evidence to that, there's no reason to believe that, but 422 00:41:10.719 --> 00:41:12.760 I'm just gonna keep saying that over and over again. 423 00:41:13.039 --> 00:41:17.440 See Donald Donald Trump is Jewish. Oh you don't think so, Yeah, 424 00:41:17.440 --> 00:41:19.679 well you don't know anything he's Jewish, I say so. 425 00:41:20.360 --> 00:41:24.559 I mean I can do that too. Okay, you know, 426 00:41:24.599 --> 00:41:30.280 the onus is on the declarant you know. And again 427 00:41:30.400 --> 00:41:35.400 I so the Soviets are in the business of just 428 00:41:35.440 --> 00:41:40.360 pretending that Durbles wrote these diaries. I you know, I 429 00:41:40.360 --> 00:41:48.239 don't accept that because it's stupid. But look, Kalganov, he 430 00:41:48.400 --> 00:42:02.679 was Stalin's official biographer. He confirmed in is Vest, which 431 00:42:02.840 --> 00:42:08.559 was an organ of that constellation of NGOs as I 432 00:42:08.559 --> 00:42:12.639 indicated a moment ago dedicated to, you know, kind of 433 00:42:12.679 --> 00:42:21.400 truth and reconciliation about the Stalin era. He went public 434 00:42:22.800 --> 00:42:28.920 in Russian and European media, and he was adamant that 435 00:42:32.079 --> 00:42:35.440 the minutes of the August nineteen, nineteen thirty nine speech 436 00:42:36.519 --> 00:42:40.719 that have been published in France were legitimate, that speech happened, 437 00:42:41.960 --> 00:42:46.440 you know. And again, I'm sure, I'm sure these same 438 00:42:47.760 --> 00:42:51.000 defectors are gonna claim, well that's fake. Okay, fine, everything 439 00:42:51.119 --> 00:42:56.119 is fake. I'm an adult and I'm a white person. 440 00:42:56.159 --> 00:42:59.639 I'm not. I'm not I'm not I'm not a white 441 00:42:59.679 --> 00:43:03.320 in murder like developmently disabled. So I don't entertain that 442 00:43:03.400 --> 00:43:12.239 kind of stuff. But you know, the uh, And there's 443 00:43:12.239 --> 00:43:21.639 a historian, this lady historian, Russian historian ts Busueva. She 444 00:43:22.480 --> 00:43:30.159 undertook this broad scholarly evaluation of Suvarov's books, not just Icebreaker, 445 00:43:30.360 --> 00:43:37.360 kind of his entire body of work. And her account 446 00:43:37.599 --> 00:43:43.239 of his work product was mixed. She was somewhat critical 447 00:43:43.280 --> 00:43:48.039 in acutive way. She praised other stuff, but she was 448 00:43:48.840 --> 00:43:57.360 adamant that the August nineteenth, ninety thirty nine speech was legitimate, 449 00:43:59.039 --> 00:44:06.280 and she claimed that copies of the speech were known 450 00:44:06.440 --> 00:44:12.199 to exist in the special archives of the Central Committee 451 00:44:12.239 --> 00:44:19.159 and the USSR, and she made excerpts of it available 452 00:44:19.159 --> 00:44:26.960 to the public in December nineteen ninety four. And there 453 00:44:27.000 --> 00:44:32.320 was this big deal. The publication was a big deal, 454 00:44:33.760 --> 00:44:41.199 and it was unveiled at this conference of the Quote 455 00:44:41.239 --> 00:44:45.800 Memorial Society. That's the need, that's the umbrella name of 456 00:44:45.800 --> 00:44:50.960 that constellation of NGOs I was talking about. And this 457 00:44:51.000 --> 00:44:56.719 was on August sixteenth, nineteen ninety five. That was this 458 00:44:56.840 --> 00:45:01.360 kind of grand unveiling, you know. But they they and 459 00:45:01.360 --> 00:45:05.599 this might seem silly to make such a big deal 460 00:45:05.679 --> 00:45:09.840 about the release of historical documents. But if you know 461 00:45:09.880 --> 00:45:13.119 about the Soviet system, I mean that it's it was 462 00:45:13.360 --> 00:45:17.039 this is a special case, you know, it's it wasn't 463 00:45:17.039 --> 00:45:22.920 an ordinary political system. And this this document changed everything, 464 00:45:24.239 --> 00:45:27.079 or it should have in the public mind, you know, 465 00:45:27.559 --> 00:45:38.679 because it's essentially uh a standing rebuttal to the entire 466 00:45:41.039 --> 00:45:48.719 court narrative of the war and its origins, you know. 467 00:45:48.800 --> 00:45:52.079 So there's that too. So I mean again, I where 468 00:45:52.480 --> 00:45:55.400 where where's where's the evidence that all this is being faked? 469 00:45:55.760 --> 00:45:58.599 Like I guarantee you the Russian government wasn't happy about this, 470 00:45:59.599 --> 00:46:03.199 you know, I mean and that they still aren't any 471 00:46:03.280 --> 00:46:07.840 anybody who is fluent in Russian and I they're they're 472 00:46:07.880 --> 00:46:13.280 welcome to proper evidence that this is all lected me 473 00:46:13.360 --> 00:46:19.079 and and it's fake. But obviously that won't be forthcoming, 474 00:46:22.239 --> 00:46:24.400 you know. And though it's getting to the kind of 475 00:46:24.519 --> 00:46:33.000 meat of the honset of hostilities, you know, again, suber 476 00:46:33.039 --> 00:46:38.199 Os the core of his theory, you know. Again, it's 477 00:46:38.239 --> 00:46:45.480 it's not just a matter of a discreet revisionist analysis 478 00:46:45.480 --> 00:46:51.400 of Operation Barbarossa and which party combatant their combatants were, 479 00:46:52.360 --> 00:47:00.920 you know, the aggressor. It's far more of a broad 480 00:47:01.599 --> 00:47:09.079 spectrum analysis and that and yak and Hoffman agreed with 481 00:47:09.119 --> 00:47:14.599 this perspective, and I agree with it. Two, Not only 482 00:47:14.719 --> 00:47:19.679 was Stalin the progenitor of World War two, but World 483 00:47:19.719 --> 00:47:22.960 War two began on August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, because 484 00:47:22.960 --> 00:47:27.960 that's the date when Stalin ordered the assault on Chalcan Goal. 485 00:47:30.760 --> 00:47:40.840 Japanese sixth Army was deployed there. Stalin ordered a massive assault. 486 00:47:44.440 --> 00:47:56.559 The Japanese were soundly defeated and routed. Marshall Zukoff stated 487 00:47:56.840 --> 00:48:01.000 on August twenty third, nineteen thirty nine, you know, in 488 00:48:01.039 --> 00:48:04.559 a reference to the Chalcan Gol assault as well as 489 00:48:04.599 --> 00:48:08.159 the non aggression packed with the Reich which had just 490 00:48:08.280 --> 00:48:18.719 been you know, signed Zukov said. Quote Stalin was convinced 491 00:48:18.800 --> 00:48:22.159 that the non aggression pack would enable him to rap 492 00:48:22.280 --> 00:48:28.039 Hitler around his little finger. Quote we have tricked Hitler 493 00:48:28.079 --> 00:48:31.320 for the moment end quote with Stalin's opinion. According to 494 00:48:31.400 --> 00:48:42.800 Nikita Krushchev, Suvarov's take, which should be obvious to those 495 00:48:42.840 --> 00:48:49.239 familiar with the historical record, the non aggression packed on 496 00:48:49.320 --> 00:48:52.960 the heels of Japan being crushed on land in the 497 00:48:53.000 --> 00:49:00.000 Far East. Hitler believed then that he had to attack 498 00:49:00.079 --> 00:49:05.320 at Poland to protect the frontier of the German Reich. 499 00:49:09.199 --> 00:49:12.320 He would not have acted without a guarantee of non 500 00:49:12.400 --> 00:49:15.760 aggression because Germany wasn't in a position to go to 501 00:49:15.840 --> 00:49:22.239 war with the Soviet Union at that moment. People were 502 00:49:22.320 --> 00:49:24.960 terrified of the Soviet Union after it had just crushed 503 00:49:24.960 --> 00:49:28.440 the mighty Japanese Army. So again, I mean, this is laughable, 504 00:49:28.559 --> 00:49:32.400 this idea that this idea that Stalin, who had just 505 00:49:32.599 --> 00:49:40.079 crushed the Japanese Army, who was sitting on the throne 506 00:49:40.119 --> 00:49:45.599 of a burgening superpower that concuted one six of this planet. 507 00:49:46.400 --> 00:49:49.840 The idea that Stalin was terrified of Hitler in comparatively 508 00:49:49.880 --> 00:50:02.719 tiny Germany, that's preposterous. You know. Molotov, you know, obviously 509 00:50:02.840 --> 00:50:07.119 was you know, chief diplomat uh his official title was 510 00:50:07.239 --> 00:50:12.199 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Molotov spoke for 511 00:50:12.280 --> 00:50:17.920 the Supreme Soviet on October thirty first, nineteen thirty nine. 512 00:50:20.320 --> 00:50:23.480 He said, quote a single blow against Poland, first by 513 00:50:23.559 --> 00:50:26.400 the Germans and then by the Red Army, and nothing 514 00:50:27.119 --> 00:50:30.400 will remain of this misbegotten little child of the Versailles Treaty, 515 00:50:31.000 --> 00:50:34.840 which owed its existence to the repression of non Polish nationalities. 516 00:50:35.360 --> 00:50:41.440 You know. So again to the Soviet nomencladur and especially Stalin, 517 00:50:41.480 --> 00:50:44.039 they wanted to they wanted to crush Poland. You know, 518 00:50:44.079 --> 00:50:46.639 among other things the polls were at the Polish Munta 519 00:50:46.719 --> 00:50:50.239 was ethically cleansing Russians, you know, the Russians hated the polls. 520 00:50:51.199 --> 00:50:51.360 You know. 521 00:50:51.519 --> 00:50:57.559 Interestingly, you know again, this this this supposedly sacro saanic 522 00:50:57.679 --> 00:51:02.880 Polish democracy, It didn't bother the UK when when when 523 00:51:02.920 --> 00:51:11.519 the Soviets assaulted That's interesting, isn't it. But so and 524 00:51:11.559 --> 00:51:16.679 then of course two within months, the Soviet Union assaulted Finland, 525 00:51:17.960 --> 00:51:25.320 you know, so uh the uh if if Stalin was 526 00:51:25.360 --> 00:51:33.079 this uh isolationist. Oh. And of course meanwhile too, uh, 527 00:51:33.400 --> 00:51:36.960 you know, they the Soviet Union was funding, equipping, arming, 528 00:51:36.960 --> 00:51:44.920 and facilitating the Communist revolution in Spain, which obviously had profound, you, 529 00:51:45.119 --> 00:51:49.480 strategic significance. You know, in the same period the Soviets 530 00:51:49.480 --> 00:51:55.840 had assaulted and conquered Poland, you know, Uh, They'd assaulted 531 00:51:55.920 --> 00:52:03.599 Finland and conquered uh Archangel you know, and through the UH, 532 00:52:03.880 --> 00:52:08.559 the the waging of these aggressive wars against Poland and Finland, 533 00:52:08.880 --> 00:52:19.719 and then essentially the extortionate annexation of the Baltic you know, 534 00:52:19.800 --> 00:52:24.880 and threatening to assault Romania, which all of which gained 535 00:52:25.159 --> 00:52:29.639 territorial concessions out of shopping fire. Because again, every the 536 00:52:29.719 --> 00:52:33.519 Soviet Union's neighbors were in capable of standing up to 537 00:52:33.599 --> 00:52:42.480 its might, you know. So by this time, by uh 538 00:52:45.760 --> 00:52:51.320 the eve of Barbarossa, the Soviet Union had expanded its 539 00:52:51.440 --> 00:52:55.880 territory by four hundred and twenty six thousand square kilometers. 540 00:52:57.360 --> 00:52:59.719 That was equivalent to the service of the entire German 541 00:52:59.800 --> 00:53:03.719 War in nineteen nineteen. And in so doing, as the 542 00:53:03.760 --> 00:53:07.599 Alcaholfen points out, Stalin had ripped away and you know, 543 00:53:07.800 --> 00:53:17.320 buffer states on Germany's frontier. So I mean Europe was defenseless, 544 00:53:19.760 --> 00:53:27.920 you know, in the east, you know, and obviously the 545 00:53:28.800 --> 00:53:35.320 time was nigh for a for an assault on Europe 546 00:53:35.719 --> 00:53:42.679 and where Germany was as of nineteen forty. Despite Germany's 547 00:53:42.719 --> 00:53:50.000 initial military successes, you know, there wasn't anything Germany had 548 00:53:50.079 --> 00:53:55.440 done that Moscow considered particularly impressive or critical, you know, 549 00:53:55.679 --> 00:54:00.280 that would have changed or altered Stalin's ambition. And it's 550 00:54:00.320 --> 00:54:05.239 quite the contrary. There was no longer a chance a 551 00:54:05.360 --> 00:54:09.599 decisive victory against the UK because you know, Sea Lion 552 00:54:09.719 --> 00:54:15.320 was a strategic ruse, the purpose of which was to 553 00:54:15.360 --> 00:54:18.360 deceive Stalin, by the way, not not that, not Churchill, 554 00:54:18.360 --> 00:54:20.840 which I mean, that's that's interesting in its own right, 555 00:54:20.920 --> 00:54:26.159 but the uh, you know, and as Stalin, who was 556 00:54:26.679 --> 00:54:30.639 already by that time had hundreds of spies in the 557 00:54:30.719 --> 00:54:33.119 rows of elements strations, and he knew exactly what America 558 00:54:33.239 --> 00:54:35.400 was thinking, and he knew that the United States was 559 00:54:35.400 --> 00:54:39.039 going to stand behind the UK. German forces were scattered 560 00:54:39.079 --> 00:54:46.079 piece meal all over Europe. The German army was uh 561 00:54:47.320 --> 00:54:52.119 still dependent on uh, you know, on horse drawn transportation. 562 00:54:55.639 --> 00:55:02.159 Germany wasn't even close to being able to realize a 563 00:55:02.199 --> 00:55:06.840 full mobilization on the order of you know, nineteen fourteen, 564 00:55:06.920 --> 00:55:09.760 nineteen fifteen, even if there'd been the political will to 565 00:55:09.840 --> 00:55:14.400 do so. You know, the minute Germany was cut off 566 00:55:14.440 --> 00:55:18.039 from Romania, they their army would stop in his tracks 567 00:55:18.079 --> 00:55:21.000 because that was, you know, their only source of vital petroleum. 568 00:55:21.880 --> 00:55:29.039 I mean, what would would even a layman, looking at 569 00:55:29.280 --> 00:55:34.760 all relevant criteria and variables as of you know, nineteen 570 00:55:34.920 --> 00:55:41.159 forty nineteen forty one, sees Germany and his position a 571 00:55:41.280 --> 00:55:46.280 catastrophic vulnerability. So I mean the idea that the idea 572 00:55:46.360 --> 00:55:49.679 that you know again, the idea that Stalin was afraid 573 00:55:49.760 --> 00:55:53.360 of Germany and afraid of its armed forces. I mean, 574 00:55:53.360 --> 00:55:59.079 that's that's preposterous, beyond belief, you know, and just for 575 00:56:01.679 --> 00:56:10.159 just for comparative purposes. Between November nineteen forty, in the 576 00:56:10.280 --> 00:56:15.840 day of Barbarossa June twenty second, nineteen forty one, there've 577 00:56:15.880 --> 00:56:20.519 been a massive arms build up underway since nineteen twenty five, 578 00:56:20.719 --> 00:56:27.679 but this year and a half or this half the year, 579 00:56:27.719 --> 00:56:32.639 I mean, between you know, the winner in nineteen forty 580 00:56:32.639 --> 00:56:37.679 and summer forty one, this was an unprecedented military build 581 00:56:37.760 --> 00:56:42.840 up in terms of scale, scope and rapidity. On June 582 00:56:42.880 --> 00:56:46.480 twenty second, nineteen forty one, the Soviet Army possessed twenty 583 00:56:46.519 --> 00:56:51.880 four thousand tanks, almost two thousand of which were T 584 00:56:52.119 --> 00:56:56.559 thirty four's, which were technically classed as a medium tank, 585 00:56:56.719 --> 00:57:03.480 but they were probably the best overall tank of the 586 00:57:03.639 --> 00:57:14.719 entire war. The Air force of the Red Army since 587 00:57:14.800 --> 00:57:19.320 nineteen thirty eight had acquired twenty three thousand, two hundred 588 00:57:19.320 --> 00:57:25.880 and forty five military aircraft, including three thousand, seven hundred 589 00:57:27.159 --> 00:57:31.039 that were of the most recent design. The Red Army 590 00:57:31.079 --> 00:57:34.480 had one hundred and forty eight thousand artillery pieces and 591 00:57:34.519 --> 00:57:38.920 mortars the inventory of the Royal Navy. In addition to 592 00:57:39.039 --> 00:57:44.480 its surface fleet, it had two hundred and ninety one submarines, 593 00:57:45.000 --> 00:57:50.239 which were an exclusively offensive platform. This meant that the 594 00:57:50.239 --> 00:57:56.480 Soviet Union had more submarines than any other country on 595 00:57:56.519 --> 00:58:02.199 this planet, had more than four times the number of 596 00:58:02.239 --> 00:58:05.920 submarines that the Royal Navy did, which was the world's 597 00:58:06.000 --> 00:58:12.719 leading maritime state. I mean, this is utterly insane, you know, 598 00:58:15.199 --> 00:58:20.679 and it's unprecedent on it like that, nothing approaching this 599 00:58:22.280 --> 00:58:34.480 sort of scope, scale and character of mobilization had ever 600 00:58:34.599 --> 00:58:44.679 been contemplated, let alone implemented. So, you know, again Germany, 601 00:58:44.760 --> 00:58:52.039 which is over committed, overstretched, outnumbered, engaged in a quagmire, 602 00:58:53.920 --> 00:58:59.159 not mobilized for war. Like the idea that the Soviet Union, 603 00:59:00.679 --> 00:59:07.920 which again had just succeeded in stripping away Germany's buffer 604 00:59:08.000 --> 00:59:14.920 states in the East, and that successfully conquered Poland, and 605 00:59:18.159 --> 00:59:22.079 you know, the territory had covetated in the Arctic after 606 00:59:22.760 --> 00:59:27.519 you know, an unprovoked assault on Finland. This idea that 607 00:59:27.519 --> 00:59:30.400 the Soviet Union was afraid of Hitler, I mean, like it, 608 00:59:30.719 --> 00:59:34.880 it's so stupid it almost doesn't warn't rebuttal because it 609 00:59:36.800 --> 00:59:41.039 you know, it's it's it's an exclusively bad faith argument. 610 00:59:41.559 --> 00:59:47.719 But what a time we got. Yeah, I'm gonna wrap 611 00:59:47.800 --> 00:59:51.320 up there because I was about to get into the 612 00:59:52.360 --> 00:59:55.880 some of the testimony you send the commiss ours about 613 00:59:58.159 --> 01:00:02.039 the ideological culture of the Red Army. It's but yeah, 614 01:00:02.119 --> 01:00:04.039 I hope this was instructive to people. 615 01:00:05.079 --> 01:00:07.639 Sure, yeah, I can't wait for part two. Uh. One 616 01:00:07.679 --> 01:00:10.760 thing that I would say is I think one of 617 01:00:10.800 --> 01:00:14.400 the reasons that the narrative on Spain had to be 618 01:00:14.559 --> 01:00:20.719 controlled after the war is because if the Republicans would 619 01:00:20.719 --> 01:00:27.880 have won, Spain belonged to the Soviet Union, and you know, 620 01:00:27.960 --> 01:00:30.079 you could you can make the argument Germany should have 621 01:00:30.119 --> 01:00:35.000 never left after victory, but the Soviet Union, in no way, 622 01:00:35.119 --> 01:00:37.519 shape or form, would have left. That would have been 623 01:00:37.559 --> 01:00:39.960 a Soviet satellite state, and they would have had Gibraltzer. 624 01:00:41.159 --> 01:00:43.599 Oh yeah, well, it's just like the It's just like 625 01:00:43.679 --> 01:00:48.880 when the ideological descendants of these of the traders who 626 01:00:49.360 --> 01:00:51.679 fought for the Communists in Spain, it's like when they 627 01:00:51.719 --> 01:00:54.960 support Islamic it's like when they support al Qaeda and Syria, 628 01:00:55.000 --> 01:00:57.119 they're like, oh, that's not al Kaido. That's these other 629 01:00:57.199 --> 01:01:00.639 guys who don't actually exist or are democrats. It's like 630 01:01:00.679 --> 01:01:03.719 this level of it's like this infantile level of delusion. 631 01:01:04.400 --> 01:01:06.800 I don't even think they actually believe that there's insulting 632 01:01:06.840 --> 01:01:09.840 the intelligence of everybody else, like you know, the Oh 633 01:01:10.079 --> 01:01:13.000 those weren't the communists. There was these imaginary other guys 634 01:01:13.039 --> 01:01:18.039 in Spain who like, what are you talking about? There 635 01:01:18.119 --> 01:01:26.199 was this there was this unusual coalition of syndicolas, fascists, Filangis, Carloss, Uh, 636 01:01:26.239 --> 01:01:30.599 you know, reactionary monarchist types. I'm kind of secular nationalists, 637 01:01:31.559 --> 01:01:36.400 you know that wash who are you know, referred to 638 01:01:36.480 --> 01:01:38.960 with the nationalist side. I mean in anchor as that 639 01:01:39.039 --> 01:01:41.400 may be. This is kind of the umbrella term that's favored. 640 01:01:42.119 --> 01:01:45.119 And uh, there was the common Turn and and and 641 01:01:45.199 --> 01:01:49.039 the Soviet Union and and their proxies. Like there wasn't 642 01:01:49.079 --> 01:01:54.440 this other element there that were uh like gay feminist 643 01:01:54.519 --> 01:01:58.400 liberals or like Ernest Hemingway's buddies who just love freedom 644 01:01:58.519 --> 01:02:03.320 or whatever whatever delusion normis have. You know, it was 645 01:02:03.320 --> 01:02:06.239 a bunch of it was a bunch of communists like 646 01:02:06.440 --> 01:02:10.039 Eric Milke who were busy shooting priests and nuns in 647 01:02:10.039 --> 01:02:14.559 the face and torturing fascists to death, and you know, 648 01:02:17.440 --> 01:02:23.440 preparing to categorically exterminate anybody who wasn't editable, just like 649 01:02:23.480 --> 01:02:27.960 they'd done in the Soviet Union, and just like Bellacoon's 650 01:02:29.119 --> 01:02:32.199 brief tyranny did in Hungary, and and just like the 651 01:02:32.239 --> 01:02:36.960 Communists did everywhere that you know, they were victorious in theater. 652 01:02:39.440 --> 01:02:44.519 All right, I'll do your plugs for you. Go to 653 01:02:44.559 --> 01:02:49.920 Thomas's substack gets real Thomas seven seven seven dot com 654 01:02:50.000 --> 01:02:54.320 dot substack dot com. Go to his website. That's Thomas 655 01:02:54.760 --> 01:02:57.719 uh Thomas seven seven seven dot com. But the T 656 01:02:58.000 --> 01:03:01.960 is A seven, right, the first T is A and yeah, 657 01:03:02.079 --> 01:03:06.119 you can you can find him sometimes on x under 658 01:03:06.320 --> 01:03:07.440 under his government name. 659 01:03:09.599 --> 01:03:12.000 Yeah, you can link all that stuff from my you 660 01:03:12.039 --> 01:03:14.400 can read all those links are on my website. 661 01:03:14.519 --> 01:03:17.800 So yeah, and I'll have the links in the in 662 01:03:17.840 --> 01:03:21.960 the show notes as well. So thank you. Until part two. 663 01:03:22.679 --> 01:03:24.960 I really appreciate you doing this. This is I think 664 01:03:25.000 --> 01:03:25.800 this is important. 665 01:03:26.480 --> 01:03:28.239 Yeah, likewise, thanks for hosting me. 666 01:03:29.079 --> 01:03:33.920 Thank you. I want to welcome everyone back to the 667 01:03:33.920 --> 01:03:37.679 Pekingana Show. This is gonna be part two of Thomas 668 01:03:37.719 --> 01:03:43.239 talking about Victor Suveroff and hiking Hoffman's work, So Thomas, 669 01:03:43.400 --> 01:03:44.320 I hand it over to you. 670 01:03:45.840 --> 01:03:50.400 Yeah, thanks for hosting me. I think I remember where 671 01:03:50.440 --> 01:03:53.360 we left off. But forgive me if this is redundant. 672 01:03:54.239 --> 01:04:00.760 It's something that's fundamentally important as the data Barbarosa Commencement 673 01:04:01.159 --> 01:04:05.480 June twenty second, nineteen forty one. It's important to understand 674 01:04:05.519 --> 01:04:09.159 the strategic situated in as of Stalin and the Soviet Union. 675 01:04:13.239 --> 01:04:17.679 Key was the waging of aggressive war against Poland and Finland. Obviously, 676 01:04:18.800 --> 01:04:24.559 Stalin's plan and this was confirmed by Khrushcheff, was, you know, 677 01:04:24.639 --> 01:04:27.440 in the immediate aftermath of the assault and the Japanese 678 01:04:27.480 --> 01:04:31.960 at Chalcan goal, which, in the opinion of Hoffman and 679 01:04:32.039 --> 01:04:35.079 I agree with this, that's what started World War two, 680 01:04:36.639 --> 01:04:43.360 and the Suvarov without saying it abides that perspective. The 681 01:04:43.400 --> 01:04:47.639 Molotov Ribbentrop packed, which Stalin confided to the polit Burrow 682 01:04:47.960 --> 01:04:54.159 as well as the Kruz Jeff, was that that would 683 01:04:54.159 --> 01:05:01.840 embolden the Hitler to sue for war with pol which 684 01:05:01.840 --> 01:05:04.639 he wouldn't have done had there been the risk of 685 01:05:04.679 --> 01:05:11.920 a two front war. Yet Germany's position was precarious, overextended. 686 01:05:13.920 --> 01:05:21.960 Stalin didn't think that you know Germany could truly stand 687 01:05:22.039 --> 01:05:29.840 up to the UK and France. He grossly underestimated the 688 01:05:29.880 --> 01:05:33.480 Wehrmacht's offensive power. But even in the event of a 689 01:05:33.760 --> 01:05:39.679 German victory, his reasoning was that, you know, the French 690 01:05:39.800 --> 01:05:43.199 army would have its back broken. Germany would be on 691 01:05:43.239 --> 01:05:48.000 this footing a permanent hostility capture, the United Kingdom and 692 01:05:48.280 --> 01:05:52.719 Europe would be the Communists for the taking. You know, 693 01:05:53.000 --> 01:05:57.079 this was, in Stalin's words, to cruise Jeff Hitler was 694 01:05:57.119 --> 01:06:00.760 now wrapped around our little finger. And one of the 695 01:06:00.760 --> 01:06:09.639 reasons for this confidence or overconfidence, you know, and I 696 01:06:09.639 --> 01:06:17.199 think I mentioned before as a barbarossa Stone had increased 697 01:06:17.639 --> 01:06:21.440 expanded the territory of the Soviet Union by four hundred 698 01:06:21.480 --> 01:06:25.159 and twenty six thousand square kilometers. That's equivalent to the 699 01:06:25.239 --> 01:06:27.320 service area of the German right because it stood in 700 01:06:27.400 --> 01:06:34.440 nineteen nineteen, and especially a petular significance the aggressive war 701 01:06:34.559 --> 01:06:39.320 the Soviets waged against Poland and Finland and what amounted 702 01:06:39.360 --> 01:06:44.639 to the extortionate annexation of the Baltics, you know, with 703 01:06:44.719 --> 01:06:53.440 waiting Estonia pressuring Romania into further territorial concessions. You know, 704 01:06:53.480 --> 01:07:02.119 the Soviet Union really on September third, nineteen thirty nine, 705 01:07:02.639 --> 01:07:07.199 it was in the strongest position out of all major powers, 706 01:07:08.119 --> 01:07:13.519 and the Soviet Union became a combatant, you know, on 707 01:07:13.599 --> 01:07:18.880 September seventeenth, when the Soviets also assaulted Poland, and of 708 01:07:18.880 --> 01:07:22.800 course there was a deafening silence eminent from emanating from 709 01:07:22.840 --> 01:07:30.079 London in the wake of that deployment, which is telling 710 01:07:30.119 --> 01:07:39.119 in and of itself. But you know, this myth that 711 01:07:39.280 --> 01:07:44.559 Stalin was somehow afraid of Hitler's preposterous. For the reasons 712 01:07:44.599 --> 01:07:53.320 just enumerated, and it's essential to understand, I mean, demonster 713 01:07:53.480 --> 01:07:57.480 of this is the posture of the Soviet Union diplomatically 714 01:07:57.519 --> 01:08:04.199 and militarily towards the German Reich. And secondly, the pattern 715 01:08:04.239 --> 01:08:08.599 of military deployment. And I'll get into that in a moment, 716 01:08:08.719 --> 01:08:14.559 But in terms of the former November twelfth and thirteenth, 717 01:08:14.639 --> 01:08:21.760 nineteen forty, you know, the view from Moscow was that 718 01:08:21.840 --> 01:08:27.560 the war was going very badly for Germany. Italy was 719 01:08:28.640 --> 01:08:35.439 not performing well in the relevant battle theaters, which was 720 01:08:35.520 --> 01:08:39.720 compromising Germany's position in the Mediterranean, which Hitler had counted 721 01:08:39.720 --> 01:08:42.479 on as a hedge, you know, against the British Empire. 722 01:08:46.920 --> 01:08:49.920 There was no indication of a resolution of the war 723 01:08:49.960 --> 01:08:56.199 with the United Kingdom. You know, Germany's fear of influence 724 01:08:56.359 --> 01:09:02.640 was totally static. You know, Operation Sea Lion was a 725 01:09:02.680 --> 01:09:06.640 strategic ruse, and even were it not, it would have 726 01:09:06.680 --> 01:09:13.479 been a bloodbath. You know. So November twelfth and thirteenth, 727 01:09:15.600 --> 01:09:22.199 Stalin directed Molotov in Berlin to transmit to Hitler through 728 01:09:22.279 --> 01:09:27.720 ribentraup a demand for the expansion of the Soviets fear 729 01:09:27.760 --> 01:09:34.680 of influence. Basically, Stalin said that he demanded freedom to 730 01:09:34.760 --> 01:09:40.840 deploy in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece, as well 731 01:09:40.840 --> 01:09:47.000 as Finland. And he also said that, you know, the 732 01:09:47.039 --> 01:09:50.079 Soviet Union had a right to deploy on the Swedish frontier. 733 01:09:54.239 --> 01:10:00.399 This is incredibly belligerent. Essentially all of southeastern Europe plus 734 01:10:00.520 --> 01:10:04.720 Finland and a piece of scanning Avia proper. Stalin just 735 01:10:04.760 --> 01:10:08.560 declared that this is now my sphere of influence. And 736 01:10:08.800 --> 01:10:13.359 if you meet this challenge with the hostile deployment, its war. 737 01:10:14.039 --> 01:10:15.640 I mean, does that sound like a man who's afraid 738 01:10:15.640 --> 01:10:20.840 of Eatolf Hitler and the German Reich. You know, in 739 01:10:20.880 --> 01:10:26.079 Stalin's mind, there was absolutely no possibility of the Wehrmacht 740 01:10:26.119 --> 01:10:29.920 assaulting the Soviet Union even on terms of parody, let 741 01:10:29.920 --> 01:10:35.520 alone from a position of strategic superiority, which is somewhat 742 01:10:35.520 --> 01:10:39.880 fascinating because this idea that oh, the Germans underestimated the 743 01:10:39.920 --> 01:10:43.119 Soviet Union, they didn't at all, and stowfully gets into 744 01:10:43.159 --> 01:10:47.800 that Holder's report on the eve of Barbarossa, and Holder 745 01:10:47.840 --> 01:10:52.720 had actually written he'd written an assessment in nineteen thirty 746 01:10:52.760 --> 01:10:56.279 seven of Soviet forces and being and capabilities. It was 747 01:10:56.319 --> 01:11:05.159 remarkably accurate, and von Mannstein and good Darien their assessments 748 01:11:06.319 --> 01:11:12.239 quite literally in the month before Barbarossa. The Soviet forces 749 01:11:12.279 --> 01:11:14.720 and being were exactly what they estimated them to be. 750 01:11:15.960 --> 01:11:19.279 In reality, it was Stalin who was looking west and 751 01:11:19.319 --> 01:11:24.039 saying that, you know, Germany has no meaningful offensive capability 752 01:11:24.119 --> 01:11:30.279 in the mighty Soviet Union, has nothing to fear, and 753 01:11:30.319 --> 01:11:34.560 this is the key to why the Soviets took such 754 01:11:34.600 --> 01:11:45.159 horrific attrition during barbaros Further relevant to context here, I 755 01:11:45.199 --> 01:11:49.800 can't remember if I got into this or not. There 756 01:11:49.840 --> 01:11:54.600 was a discreete mobilization phase throughout the Soviet Union Befe 757 01:11:54.680 --> 01:11:59.600 November nineteen forty when this demand that I just the 758 01:11:59.680 --> 01:12:05.439 numeraid was issued to Ribbon traup to deliver to Hitler 759 01:12:05.880 --> 01:12:10.039 by way of Malotov on order of Stalin. Between November 760 01:12:10.079 --> 01:12:14.000 ninety forty and the day of Barbaros, a massive and 761 01:12:14.039 --> 01:12:17.479 unprecedented arms build up took place in the Soviet Union. 762 01:12:20.800 --> 01:12:26.800 This included, as of the onset of hostilities, the Rhetorican 763 01:12:26.840 --> 01:12:31.520 possess no less than twenty four thousand tanks, including close 764 01:12:31.560 --> 01:12:34.600 to two thousand T thirty fours, which were technically a 765 01:12:34.640 --> 01:12:40.000 medium tank, but they were the all around best tank 766 01:12:40.039 --> 01:12:43.720 in the Second World War. I don't think that's arguable, 767 01:12:47.279 --> 01:12:50.640 you know, the the air forces of the Red Army 768 01:12:52.479 --> 01:12:57.359 had over twenty three thousand aircraft, or thirty seven hundred 769 01:12:57.399 --> 01:13:06.239 of which were considered to be cutting edge fighters. The 770 01:13:06.279 --> 01:13:08.680 Red Army had close to one hundred and fifty thousand 771 01:13:08.760 --> 01:13:17.159 artillery pieces. The Red Navy, including a substantial fleet of 772 01:13:17.239 --> 01:13:23.800 surface ships of varying types. They had close to three 773 01:13:23.960 --> 01:13:28.840 hundred submarines, and submarines are expressly offensive. There are no 774 01:13:28.920 --> 01:13:37.800 defensive submarines and this man as Hoffman raises in his book, 775 01:13:38.359 --> 01:13:41.520 the Soviets not only a larger fleet of submarines than 776 01:13:41.560 --> 01:13:45.960 any other country in the world. But they outnumbered the 777 01:13:46.640 --> 01:13:49.520 Royal Navy more than fourfold in terms of their number 778 01:13:49.560 --> 01:13:54.880 of subs. I mean, this is the most powerful offensive 779 01:13:54.960 --> 01:14:02.960 military element the world has ever seen, you know. So 780 01:14:03.079 --> 01:14:06.199 Stalin was essentially fearless and viewed himself as the imminent 781 01:14:06.239 --> 01:14:11.720 master of this planet in geostrategic terms, as of barbaros 782 01:14:11.760 --> 01:14:13.840 as well as of ideological ones. And we're going to 783 01:14:13.880 --> 01:14:19.479 get into that too. Something essential to understand about the 784 01:14:19.520 --> 01:14:26.000 Soviet culture. Stalin was keenly aware of what had befallen 785 01:14:27.560 --> 01:14:31.000 the Jacobin Revolution. He was also keenly aware of the 786 01:14:31.279 --> 01:14:41.039 changing dynamics of of ideological cultures within great powers. You know. 787 01:14:41.079 --> 01:14:46.079 He realized that, for example, Japan was on the ascendency. 788 01:14:46.239 --> 01:14:49.600 He realized that the German Reich had intense energies that 789 01:14:49.600 --> 01:14:51.920 it was drawing from, even though he viewed them as 790 01:14:52.319 --> 01:14:57.880 geostrategically weak and compromised. He understood that the United Kingdom 791 01:14:58.000 --> 01:15:02.960 was undergoing a terrible existential crisis and that their empire 792 01:15:03.039 --> 01:15:06.319 is structured was essentially obsolescent. And this is one of 793 01:15:06.319 --> 01:15:11.399 the reasons why there've been a series of revolts, you know, 794 01:15:11.560 --> 01:15:19.319 nascent as well as well developed and realized. You know, 795 01:15:19.439 --> 01:15:22.880 in the years before the Great War and then in 796 01:15:22.960 --> 01:15:26.600 the Inner War years up to the then president, you know, 797 01:15:26.760 --> 01:15:33.439 and socialism in one country that that was something of 798 01:15:35.840 --> 01:15:41.119 that was something of a propaganda cliche. Down invoked the 799 01:15:41.239 --> 01:15:48.079 sort of give a branding to you know, the kind 800 01:15:48.079 --> 01:15:54.520 of punctuated disturbances of this mass and megacytal restructuring of 801 01:15:54.600 --> 01:15:59.119 Russian society and the Soviet state which was becoming a superpower, 802 01:16:00.079 --> 01:16:05.600 as well as to you know, assuage the Western powers 803 01:16:05.640 --> 01:16:08.039 which were very much doing his bidding at that moment. 804 01:16:09.359 --> 01:16:12.439 Stalin was very much engaged with the common tern that 805 01:16:12.479 --> 01:16:19.560 had not changed and in the planning for what was 806 01:16:19.600 --> 01:16:24.239 to be the assault on Europe. In the aftermath of 807 01:16:24.279 --> 01:16:33.600 the Icebreaker conflict, Stalin he called back the Russian delegation 808 01:16:33.680 --> 01:16:36.000 to the Common Turn and he called the common Terns 809 01:16:36.000 --> 01:16:39.960 representatives to Moscow to advise them of what was imminently 810 01:16:40.000 --> 01:16:45.560 going to happen. You know, the Soviet Union needed to 811 01:16:45.600 --> 01:16:50.199 realize the World Revolution, to survive, as well as to 812 01:16:50.239 --> 01:16:56.680 consolidate its superpower status which was not just burgaining but 813 01:16:57.000 --> 01:17:07.760 was being actively realized also. And I realized I've probably 814 01:17:07.800 --> 01:17:20.159 got a bias for testimonial evidence, especially they're not exclusively 815 01:17:21.119 --> 01:17:27.600 in discerning the motives of men in command roles. But 816 01:17:29.039 --> 01:17:35.760 there's not, there's not. The direct testimony is more reliable 817 01:17:35.800 --> 01:17:42.000 than circumstantial evidence unless it contradicts the manifest weight of 818 01:17:45.279 --> 01:17:53.000 extrinsic material facts outside the parameters those declarations and what 819 01:17:53.159 --> 01:18:04.800 Stalin said his biographer, Colonel General Wolcagano of he word 820 01:18:04.840 --> 01:18:13.159 for word by Lakouv reproduced the speech that Stalin issued 821 01:18:13.520 --> 01:18:25.640 fourth on May fifth, nineteen forty one, And according to Volkoganov, 822 01:18:28.760 --> 01:18:31.560 the leader made it quote. The Leader made it unmistakably clear. 823 01:18:31.880 --> 01:18:34.840 War is inevitable in the future. We must be ready 824 01:18:34.880 --> 01:18:40.720 for the unconditional destruction of German fascism. The worl will 825 01:18:40.760 --> 01:18:44.119 be fought on enemy territory, and victory will be achieved 826 01:18:44.159 --> 01:18:47.560 with a few casualties. And as we got into last week, 827 01:18:47.760 --> 01:18:50.960 and as I think we've raised before in discussion of 828 01:18:50.960 --> 01:18:55.039 World War Two, it was a matter of formal doctrine 829 01:18:55.479 --> 01:19:03.119 that the Red Army was an offensive, perurpsed element. Its 830 01:19:03.439 --> 01:19:09.279 primary mission orientation was as the standard bearer of the revolution, 831 01:19:10.560 --> 01:19:16.800 and it never struck a defensive posture. As a matter 832 01:19:16.880 --> 01:19:25.199 of doctrine, by choice, you know, and I've made the 833 01:19:25.239 --> 01:19:28.399 point before. I believe Stalin is probably the single most 834 01:19:28.399 --> 01:19:37.680 powerful man who ever lived, and the momentum that the 835 01:19:37.720 --> 01:19:44.920 Communist International had at this moment was at zenith. I'd 836 01:19:45.000 --> 01:19:49.359 argue Stalin had to abide that role or he would 837 01:19:49.399 --> 01:19:53.760 have been replaced by a man who would have you know, 838 01:19:56.279 --> 01:20:01.880 it was a convergence of ideological, imperative and geostrategic realities 839 01:20:03.239 --> 01:20:10.199 in a way that is very rare, but was sort 840 01:20:10.199 --> 01:20:20.520 of inextricably and splendidly bound up at this juncture. And 841 01:20:26.479 --> 01:20:29.439 I think we talked before about the secret real I'm 842 01:20:29.479 --> 01:20:32.600 jumping around a bit, but I'm trying to corral the 843 01:20:32.640 --> 01:20:39.960 evidence in categorical capacities. The secret meeting with the polic Bureau, 844 01:20:40.000 --> 01:20:42.399 and this is when the common Tern delegation was also 845 01:20:42.520 --> 01:20:48.960 present in August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, you know, in 846 01:20:49.039 --> 01:20:55.520 the concominant with the assault on the Japanese Imperial Army 847 01:20:55.560 --> 01:20:59.920 at calcum Goal. This meeting that Shtalin called the Poet 848 01:21:00.079 --> 01:21:08.880 Borough and the Russian section of the common Tern, Stalin 849 01:21:08.920 --> 01:21:12.000 declared that the time had come to quote apply the 850 01:21:12.039 --> 01:21:16.039 torch of war to the European powder keg. This is 851 01:21:16.079 --> 01:21:19.560 when Stalin declared, if we accept the German proposal for 852 01:21:19.600 --> 01:21:24.279 the non aggression picked, you know, Hitler will naturally attack Poland. 853 01:21:24.399 --> 01:21:28.279 The intervention of France and England will be inevitable. The resulting, 854 01:21:28.520 --> 01:21:32.800 in Shalin's words, serious and arrest and disorder would lead 855 01:21:32.880 --> 01:21:38.680 to a punctuate a destabilization of Western Europe, yet without 856 01:21:38.720 --> 01:21:42.640 the Soviet Union being drawn into the conflict until they 857 01:21:44.159 --> 01:21:50.880 permissively opted do and Stalin referred to what he declared 858 01:21:50.880 --> 01:21:54.960 in nineteen twenty five with respect to the international strategy. 859 01:21:56.039 --> 01:22:00.760 You know, the moment is nigh that we we we 860 01:22:00.840 --> 01:22:06.439 can pursue the bultimization of Europe by way of an 861 01:22:06.479 --> 01:22:13.079 advantageous entry into the war, through a broad spectrum field 862 01:22:13.079 --> 01:22:18.000 of activity which had now the potential of which had 863 01:22:18.000 --> 01:22:20.840 now opened up for their realization of the World Revolution. 864 01:22:21.840 --> 01:22:25.760 And of course, when uh minutes from this meeting and 865 01:22:25.800 --> 01:22:29.640 the speech were smuggled out and were obtained by the 866 01:22:29.680 --> 01:22:36.960 French news agency Havas by way of Geneva, you know, 867 01:22:37.000 --> 01:22:39.880 and it went, it was, it was, it was published, 868 01:22:39.920 --> 01:22:44.119 and then the Moscow immediately wanted to damage control and 869 01:22:44.479 --> 01:22:48.680 Stalin apologists and propagandas, particularly in London, but also in 870 01:22:48.680 --> 01:22:53.479 the United States, you know, they they started immediately claiming 871 01:22:53.479 --> 01:22:56.079 that this, this is fascist propaganda, and this, this isn't 872 01:22:56.239 --> 01:23:02.520 this isn't true, you know, So I mean this is important. Also, 873 01:23:02.640 --> 01:23:06.560 like when you read books by guys Chris Bellamy comes 874 01:23:06.600 --> 01:23:10.800 to mind. But they're legion these historians who claim, oh 875 01:23:10.840 --> 01:23:14.399 Stuvarov is a liar, there's no evidence for these things. 876 01:23:15.079 --> 01:23:20.079 They're redacting a huge amount of evidence, or they're just 877 01:23:20.239 --> 01:23:22.760 not including it and would question they say, oh that 878 01:23:22.760 --> 01:23:29.600 that's just propaganda. They're just not addressing it. And that's incredible, 879 01:23:31.680 --> 01:23:37.479 you know. I mean, it'd be like, like imagine somewhat 880 01:23:37.520 --> 01:23:41.840 more approximately, like let's say I was writing a history 881 01:23:40.520 --> 01:23:44.399 of the American War in Iraq from two thousand and 882 01:23:44.399 --> 01:23:47.159 three eleven, and it'd be like if I was categorically 883 01:23:47.199 --> 01:23:51.760 redacting things that President Bush and Rumsfeld said in conversations 884 01:23:51.760 --> 01:23:54.880 they had and just declaring that, well, it's not important, 885 01:23:55.000 --> 01:23:58.279 or that that's just something liberals say or allege. I mean, 886 01:23:58.520 --> 01:24:01.520 people would laugh at me, they'd say that's ridiculous. But 887 01:24:01.600 --> 01:24:07.479 in the case of you know, Barbarossa and you know, 888 01:24:07.520 --> 01:24:10.880 the Icebreaker hypothesis, that's exactly what they do you know, 889 01:24:10.920 --> 01:24:15.920 and you're just supposed to accept it. This is this 890 01:24:16.000 --> 01:24:21.520 is very abnormal, even accounting for the fact that research 891 01:24:21.560 --> 01:24:25.840 standards and things are often compromised for ideological and political reasons. 892 01:24:26.560 --> 01:24:34.720 But this seems tangential, but it's essential to understanding Suberov's 893 01:24:34.760 --> 01:24:42.640 and Hoffmann's points. We've got to ask why Barbarossa was 894 01:24:42.680 --> 01:24:48.039 so tactically successful for the Wehrmacht and what that means, 895 01:24:48.760 --> 01:24:53.279 because this is sort of the key, in my opinion, 896 01:24:59.359 --> 01:25:04.760 the Soviet It's we're planning an assault on Romania in 897 01:25:04.800 --> 01:25:11.000 the autumn nineteen forty one, and if you know how 898 01:25:11.000 --> 01:25:16.119 to interpret military deployments, this should be clear. But also, 899 01:25:17.279 --> 01:25:23.239 if you're going to assault Germany from then extant frontiers, 900 01:25:24.840 --> 01:25:27.239 you're gonna do so from the Baltic and you're gonna 901 01:25:27.239 --> 01:25:33.399 do so through Romania. And of course Germany was totally 902 01:25:33.439 --> 01:25:39.880 dependent on Romanian petroleum. That's one of the reasons Hitler 903 01:25:40.800 --> 01:25:45.560 cultivated the friendship of Antoniscu so closely. Antonescu held the 904 01:25:45.640 --> 01:25:48.359 Knights Cross. There was very good offices between him and 905 01:25:48.399 --> 01:25:51.960 Germany anyway, for cultural reasons, for ideological reasons, other things. 906 01:25:52.000 --> 01:25:56.439 But he and Hitler, despite the linguistic barrier. They were 907 01:25:56.560 --> 01:26:01.159 very close friends too, and Antonescu was Hitler's strongest alla, 908 01:26:01.239 --> 01:26:05.960 I believe, you know, and close to a quarter million 909 01:26:06.079 --> 01:26:13.760 Romanians fought, you know, for the Axis cause in the East, 910 01:26:13.800 --> 01:26:16.600 which for a country the size of Romania, that's remarkable. 911 01:26:17.319 --> 01:26:25.119 But army groups South deployed from Romania. And this, if 912 01:26:25.720 --> 01:26:30.000 this was a very delicate issue because Soviet intelligence, which 913 01:26:30.039 --> 01:26:35.560 was actually very good, this the deployment to Romania. The 914 01:26:35.600 --> 01:26:38.680 way Hitler, the ruse Hitler was able to pull off 915 01:26:39.319 --> 01:26:43.159 was that the unstable situation in Yugoslavia was what was 916 01:26:43.279 --> 01:26:47.840 drawing German forces at scale to be deployed there. But 917 01:26:47.920 --> 01:26:54.000 also obviously, through Ledgered Maine and other things, OKW was 918 01:26:54.359 --> 01:26:58.159 effectively able to hide the scale at which forces were 919 01:26:58.159 --> 01:27:00.840 being a mass there. But you know, not only was 920 01:27:00.880 --> 01:27:05.000 it a staging ground for Barbarosa, but Hitler was reacted 921 01:27:05.039 --> 01:27:07.600 with anxiety that the Soviets were in with salt Romania 922 01:27:07.760 --> 01:27:11.680 because they were so these forces down there at a 923 01:27:11.800 --> 01:27:16.399 dual role. They were purposed for an offensive mission, but 924 01:27:16.439 --> 01:27:21.000 they were also there to as a bulwark against amy assault, 925 01:27:21.720 --> 01:27:25.600 you know, at least so that they you know, there'd 926 01:27:25.640 --> 01:27:29.760 be enough time to reinforce and and not just you know, 927 01:27:29.880 --> 01:27:33.720 endure collapse of a critical front, which on top of 928 01:27:33.760 --> 01:27:40.439 the geostrategic menace that also to deprive Germany really of it, 929 01:27:40.920 --> 01:27:46.319 it's only a source of petroleum and represente quantities to 930 01:27:47.520 --> 01:27:50.880 feel the war machine. But what this led to was 931 01:27:51.560 --> 01:27:58.760 there was massive Soviet deployments in the Baltic and in 932 01:27:58.960 --> 01:28:06.279 Ukraine through the Romanian frontier. So when the Wehrmacht assaulted, 933 01:28:06.600 --> 01:28:12.199 the road to Moscow was basically undefended. Okay, that's one 934 01:28:12.199 --> 01:28:19.640 of the reasons why Holder and uh Manstein they were 935 01:28:19.640 --> 01:28:22.319 beside themselves because they were telling Hitler, we need to 936 01:28:22.359 --> 01:28:27.600 move on Moscow now. We can't wait, you know, we 937 01:28:27.640 --> 01:28:31.000 can't wait for the weather to turn, and we can't 938 01:28:31.039 --> 01:28:38.159 wait for the Soviets to reconstitute and affect a deployment 939 01:28:38.199 --> 01:28:45.800 in depth on the path to Moscow, you know. And 940 01:28:45.840 --> 01:28:52.039 as the deployment schema in Ukraine, the jur Oury Group 941 01:28:52.159 --> 01:28:59.119 South was exponentially outnumbered, but the so the Red Army 942 01:28:59.159 --> 01:29:02.880 elements there they were deployed in an offensive pattern. And 943 01:29:02.920 --> 01:29:05.079 if you know anything about the way the Soviet Union 944 01:29:05.680 --> 01:29:07.920 fought and the way the armforce in the Russian Federation 945 01:29:08.079 --> 01:29:10.880 fights and they very much scaled down way to they 946 01:29:10.920 --> 01:29:19.680 obviously and with very different localized combined arms platforms. Deep 947 01:29:19.800 --> 01:29:26.479 battle is its it's dependent upon a fixed deployment schema 948 01:29:26.600 --> 01:29:29.720 for it to work, okay. And the way the Red 949 01:29:29.800 --> 01:29:32.760 Army deployed offensively, and this is what they did when 950 01:29:32.800 --> 01:29:36.439 the tide turned and after Kursk, this is how they 951 01:29:36.479 --> 01:29:42.079 assaulted Berlin. The offensive deployment schema is by heavy use 952 01:29:42.079 --> 01:29:47.600 of shock armies, a Soviet shock army. They were larded 953 01:29:47.640 --> 01:29:53.680 with firepower and totally front loaded. Okay. So when Army 954 01:29:53.680 --> 01:29:58.359 Group South engaged the Red Army through the ky Of Corridor, 955 01:30:00.039 --> 01:30:04.520 they were engaging this forward element that was loaded down 956 01:30:04.560 --> 01:30:07.479 with firepower that was supposed to break through the mainline 957 01:30:07.479 --> 01:30:11.880 of resistance, but that had a limited operational capacity, often 958 01:30:11.920 --> 01:30:15.520 of only a few days. Then they were to be 959 01:30:15.680 --> 01:30:20.279 rapidly reinforced by fresh elements who would continually assault in waves, 960 01:30:20.880 --> 01:30:24.920 and then when that shock element was was re equipped 961 01:30:24.960 --> 01:30:33.000 and refitted, they would smash through again. But obviously, if 962 01:30:33.000 --> 01:30:40.399 the Wehrmacht assaults with mass armored columns, when you're deployed 963 01:30:40.439 --> 01:30:44.760 offensively with your front loaded shock army, as the sharp 964 01:30:44.800 --> 01:30:48.800 punk they're gonna smash that shock army, and then they're 965 01:30:48.800 --> 01:30:53.039 gonna cut through your reinforcement elements like butter, you know. 966 01:30:53.399 --> 01:31:00.399 And as they break through wave after wave, that frontload 967 01:31:00.439 --> 01:31:02.680 of element is going to be fighting on reversed fronts 968 01:31:03.800 --> 01:31:07.600 and they're going to get cut to pieces, which is 969 01:31:07.640 --> 01:31:14.520 exactly what happened. Okay, So the Soviets were taking catastrophic 970 01:31:14.600 --> 01:31:20.039 casualties in the North and in the South. Meanwhile, Army 971 01:31:20.039 --> 01:31:26.239 Group Center was racing to Moscow quite literally, and Hitler 972 01:31:26.239 --> 01:31:33.119 didn't know quite what to make of this because there 973 01:31:33.119 --> 01:31:36.520 were sort of two Hitlers. And Stofally makes this point. 974 01:31:37.279 --> 01:31:42.479 When Hitler felt confident politically and when he had a 975 01:31:42.840 --> 01:31:47.159 what he believed was a firm conceptual grasp of the battlespace, 976 01:31:48.479 --> 01:31:53.119 Hitler was hyper aggressive. When fog of war questions or 977 01:31:54.000 --> 01:32:00.560 political uncertainty clouded that perspective, Hitler developed a siege mentality, 978 01:32:02.119 --> 01:32:09.000 and that's exactly what happened. And Hitler viewed Stalin as 979 01:32:09.000 --> 01:32:17.079 incredibly dangerous as he should have. So Hitler essentially halted 980 01:32:17.239 --> 01:32:24.199 Army Groups Center well Army Group South, surrounded this massive 981 01:32:24.800 --> 01:32:30.600 element plus the reserves that the Kremlin had ordered, like 982 01:32:30.720 --> 01:32:37.039 rushed to the front immediately, and Hitler was afraid to 983 01:32:37.319 --> 01:32:41.520 push the attack for a decisive victory at Moscow until 984 01:32:41.560 --> 01:32:46.039 this element was neutralized. And it was neutralized. The only 985 01:32:46.159 --> 01:32:51.960 casualties the Soviets endured is utterly castrophic and unprecedented. And 986 01:32:53.079 --> 01:32:55.760 the Germans took something like three quarters of a million 987 01:32:55.800 --> 01:33:02.880 prisoners alone. Okay, but by the time, by the time 988 01:33:02.920 --> 01:33:05.560 the FU ordered the attack to be pushed on Moscow 989 01:33:05.720 --> 01:33:10.279 was too late. Okay, that's what happened. People misunderstand that. 990 01:33:10.359 --> 01:33:15.680 It says, you know, oh, the Germans were plotting to 991 01:33:15.720 --> 01:33:20.079 attack all along because the Soviets were weak in some ways. 992 01:33:20.520 --> 01:33:24.199 But then Stalin got it together, and you know, because 993 01:33:24.239 --> 01:33:28.880 the Germans underestimated Soviet capabilities. You know, Hitler lost the war. 994 01:33:28.960 --> 01:33:31.600 That's not true at all. That doesn't make any sense. 995 01:33:32.640 --> 01:33:35.680 And you know, if Stalin was like, look at it 996 01:33:35.760 --> 01:33:41.039 like this. Okay, the Germans were halted at Moscow, but 997 01:33:41.119 --> 01:33:45.039 they reached the gates of Moscow, they reached Leningrad and 998 01:33:45.119 --> 01:33:49.039 lated it to siege, they reached Stalingrad. The German the 999 01:33:49.159 --> 01:33:52.680 very much reached all of its objectives in months. How 1000 01:33:52.680 --> 01:33:58.319 long did it take the Red Army to march on Berlin. 1001 01:33:58.439 --> 01:34:02.000 It took them almost four years. So while was there 1002 01:34:02.039 --> 01:34:05.119 this plotting, grinding blood bath. If the Soviets were this 1003 01:34:05.199 --> 01:34:09.239 grossly underestimated force, you know, and the Germans didn't know 1004 01:34:09.279 --> 01:34:12.760 what they were doing like this, the Germans killed the 1005 01:34:12.800 --> 01:34:20.640 Red Army, you know. Obviously the Russians still had enough 1006 01:34:21.239 --> 01:34:24.560 to hold Moscow and they did, and that was incredibly valiant. 1007 01:34:24.600 --> 01:34:30.000 And Russians are incredibly tough. And there's a simplicity to 1008 01:34:30.119 --> 01:34:33.399 the way the Ivans fight, but it's a simplicity that works, 1009 01:34:33.800 --> 01:34:40.560 you know. I think it's misguided when people suggest otherwise, 1010 01:34:40.600 --> 01:34:45.840 and especially today because people are you know, they've adopted 1011 01:34:46.359 --> 01:34:50.000 prejudices and stuff in this regard. There's really really stupid 1012 01:34:50.079 --> 01:34:51.760 things that come out of the Pentagon in terms of 1013 01:34:51.760 --> 01:34:59.720 their assessment of Russian capabilities and things. And incidentally, Eric VA. 1014 01:35:00.039 --> 01:35:06.119 Einstein's the book it's called Loss of Victories. It's for 1015 01:35:06.319 --> 01:35:08.399 I think it's fascinating, but it's kind of for military 1016 01:35:08.399 --> 01:35:12.159 hounds only. It's you know, not like light Sunday reading. 1017 01:35:13.159 --> 01:35:18.479 But what that book was the US War Department back 1018 01:35:18.520 --> 01:35:20.640 when there was a war department. There's not anymore, no 1019 01:35:20.640 --> 01:35:27.800 matter what, like special needs Hegseth says, but in the 1020 01:35:27.920 --> 01:35:32.319 last months of the Department of War they debriefed Manstein 1021 01:35:32.560 --> 01:35:37.520 on basically on you know, his experience over four years 1022 01:35:37.520 --> 01:35:40.520 of fighting the Soviet Union in the general officer's role. 1023 01:35:41.800 --> 01:35:49.359 And the War Department is soon to be the Defense Department. 1024 01:35:49.640 --> 01:35:54.680 They took this very seriously, and early NATO force structure 1025 01:35:56.079 --> 01:35:59.479 wasn't a substantial on the infantry side, ground on the 1026 01:35:59.479 --> 01:36:04.640 imagery on our side. It was substantially based around what 1027 01:36:04.800 --> 01:36:10.520 von Mannstein had. It's said, Okay, so this book was 1028 01:36:10.880 --> 01:36:14.680 sometime in the fifties, the first edition, it was edited 1029 01:36:14.720 --> 01:36:17.680 and make it more readable, and it's it's literally Managelin 1030 01:36:17.760 --> 01:36:23.800 is debriefing with some added stuff, you know. So and 1031 01:36:23.880 --> 01:36:26.880 that that was one of his core premises is that 1032 01:36:27.479 --> 01:36:31.439 fighting the Russians on Russian territory, they're they're they're they're 1033 01:36:31.520 --> 01:36:35.600 unbelievably and savagely tough, you know, and that that's a 1034 01:36:35.640 --> 01:36:38.960 force multiplier, and it also makes up for some of their shortcomings. 1035 01:36:39.560 --> 01:36:45.640 And the Russians also they they know what they know 1036 01:36:45.720 --> 01:36:50.600 the limits of their capabilities, you know. And on the 1037 01:36:50.640 --> 01:36:53.359 one hand, and super off of his book Inside the 1038 01:36:53.359 --> 01:36:56.680 Red Army, which is very much worth reading too, especially 1039 01:36:56.720 --> 01:36:58.479 if you got an interest in the late Cold War stuff, 1040 01:36:58.520 --> 01:37:03.880 because it's very much a breakdown of you know, the 1041 01:37:03.880 --> 01:37:07.159 the Brison of era the Soviet Army. You know, he 1042 01:37:07.239 --> 01:37:10.000 makes the point, uh, And Harold Coyle made this point 1043 01:37:10.000 --> 01:37:15.560 too that Doctoran in the Soviet Army was almost like regulation. 1044 01:37:16.840 --> 01:37:20.760 There was there were no mission oriented tactics, and the 1045 01:37:20.800 --> 01:37:28.000 whole ethos of the Soviet Army's general staff was to 1046 01:37:28.039 --> 01:37:32.800 eliminate uncertainty wherever and whenever and however possible, so they 1047 01:37:32.800 --> 01:37:39.079 didn't tolerate deviation from the battle plan as emerged from 1048 01:37:39.479 --> 01:37:47.399 you know, superior orders. But nevertheless, the Russian, the Soviets 1049 01:37:47.399 --> 01:37:50.199 and the Russians do very well with what they're good at, 1050 01:37:51.399 --> 01:37:55.800 you know, and deep battle is what they were good at. 1051 01:37:57.479 --> 01:38:01.439 Heavy reliance on on combined arms in a shock element 1052 01:38:01.520 --> 01:38:08.600 capacity went on the offensive. That tended towards the kind 1053 01:38:08.640 --> 01:38:12.000 of inflexibility which I think they later remedied somewhat during 1054 01:38:12.039 --> 01:38:16.560 the Cold War. But the ability to rapidly shift from 1055 01:38:16.600 --> 01:38:20.760 an offensive posture to defending the Behrmacht was very very 1056 01:38:20.760 --> 01:38:23.239 good at that, and the British are pretty good at 1057 01:38:23.239 --> 01:38:28.600 that too. The Soviets were catastrophically bad at it, and 1058 01:38:28.640 --> 01:38:33.319 the French were bad at it. But part of it too, though, 1059 01:38:33.479 --> 01:38:37.880 is that Stalin had every reason to believe that the 1060 01:38:37.920 --> 01:38:40.920 Behmont wasn't capable of what it was capable of as 1061 01:38:40.960 --> 01:38:43.840 of June nineteen forty one. I mean, that was a 1062 01:38:43.840 --> 01:38:48.319 blind spot. But at the same time, you know, the 1063 01:38:48.359 --> 01:38:54.479 Germans tend to surprise people on matters of military affairs. 1064 01:38:55.199 --> 01:38:59.640 But that's key because it's not as internet guys and 1065 01:39:00.159 --> 01:39:05.600 armchair goofballs who claimed, well, Suber was an idiot who's 1066 01:39:05.600 --> 01:39:07.880 a liar like looking out bad the Soviets got mall. 1067 01:39:07.960 --> 01:39:09.960 That's the whole, the whole point, Like that makes his 1068 01:39:10.079 --> 01:39:14.119 point not the opposite. So that's that's key. You know, 1069 01:39:14.159 --> 01:39:19.520 I'm not I'm not just dwelling on minutia to play 1070 01:39:19.600 --> 01:39:25.560 cake the the you know, the the military hounds among 1071 01:39:25.680 --> 01:39:37.279 us or something. But you know it's also you know, 1072 01:39:37.359 --> 01:39:42.640 it was you know the point too that I think 1073 01:39:42.640 --> 01:39:46.119 a lot of lay people don't understand these days. You know, 1074 01:39:46.239 --> 01:39:51.960 modern war resolves rapidly. You know, you don't you know, 1075 01:39:52.000 --> 01:39:55.000 you don't plan for quagmires because then you're planning to 1076 01:39:55.079 --> 01:40:01.960 lose a war. So you know, within ideally in about 1077 01:40:01.960 --> 01:40:10.079 ten weeks in the outer temporal limits six months, you know, 1078 01:40:10.159 --> 01:40:17.640 Moscow had to fall to the Hrmont and Stalin was 1079 01:40:17.720 --> 01:40:25.119 over confident, absolutely, But it stands the reason his kind 1080 01:40:25.119 --> 01:40:27.359 of poor view of the Wehrmacht, not in terms of 1081 01:40:27.399 --> 01:40:31.920 its quality of men or firepower, but the geo strategic 1082 01:40:31.960 --> 01:40:34.800 situation and what he viewed as it's over extended commitments 1083 01:40:34.800 --> 01:40:39.840 and things. You know, he reasoned that, you know, even 1084 01:40:39.880 --> 01:40:43.159 in the very unlikely event of an assault, you know, 1085 01:40:45.119 --> 01:40:48.760 we can hold him at bay long enough to reinforce 1086 01:40:48.840 --> 01:40:53.520 and by then, you know, victory conditions will no longer 1087 01:40:53.560 --> 01:40:57.439 be realizable. You know, this all kind of falls into place, 1088 01:40:57.920 --> 01:41:02.439 is the totality of circumstances. You've got to look at 1089 01:41:02.439 --> 01:41:05.880 this the ssoudieological culture. You gotta take Stalin's own statements, 1090 01:41:05.920 --> 01:41:10.920 you gotta look at the statements of his underlings, including Khrushchev. 1091 01:41:11.560 --> 01:41:14.600 You've got to look at the pattern of deployment. You've 1092 01:41:14.640 --> 01:41:17.640 got to take in if you know what to look for. 1093 01:41:17.840 --> 01:41:22.279 But even I mean it's even more persuasive, or are 1094 01:41:22.279 --> 01:41:27.600 more obvious or other, But you know, taking in totality, 1095 01:41:29.199 --> 01:41:31.439 I mean, it's clear that Suvarov was telling the truth, 1096 01:41:32.520 --> 01:41:35.000 you know, but also mean, well it's not it's not 1097 01:41:35.039 --> 01:41:40.840 clear what what the alternative was. I mean it this 1098 01:41:41.000 --> 01:41:49.520 unprecedented military build up coupled with the transformative, globally transformative 1099 01:41:49.560 --> 01:41:58.880 aspects of the Bolshrirek Revolution, the heart and lungs of 1100 01:41:58.920 --> 01:42:02.840 which paverbially were in the Soviet Union. I mean, what 1101 01:42:02.840 --> 01:42:06.640 what's the alternative Stalin was? He ordered this build up 1102 01:42:06.680 --> 01:42:11.119 for purely defensive purposes, to which would inevitably at some 1103 01:42:11.159 --> 01:42:15.239 point provoke the West into attacking him. I mean, it 1104 01:42:15.279 --> 01:42:22.720 doesn't that that doesn't make any sense. And generally, when 1105 01:42:22.720 --> 01:42:28.600 you're talking about conditions of approximate parody with conventional combined 1106 01:42:28.720 --> 01:42:33.560 arms at scale, or when you're talking about near peer 1107 01:42:36.159 --> 01:42:41.119 strategic planning, you don't wait to be attacked. You always 1108 01:42:41.159 --> 01:42:50.239 push the assault, you know. Then that's I mean, this, 1109 01:42:50.239 --> 01:42:52.640 this this is very basic stuff. 1110 01:42:53.800 --> 01:42:57.880 Well it also also it doesn't make sense to say 1111 01:42:58.000 --> 01:43:04.600 Stalin was this interested in this social national version of 1112 01:43:04.680 --> 01:43:09.239 socialism that that would emerge out of the Bolsheviks. When 1113 01:43:09.279 --> 01:43:13.600 you send troops and you send advisors and you send 1114 01:43:13.720 --> 01:43:18.600 tanks to Spain, Yeah, I mean you don't, Yeah, you 1115 01:43:18.640 --> 01:43:21.520 don't care about Spain. You don't care what's happening in Spain. 1116 01:43:22.319 --> 01:43:25.800 If if this is supposed to be for Russia only, well. 1117 01:43:25.760 --> 01:43:28.720 It's also the Soviet Union. Like, don't get me wrong. 1118 01:43:29.960 --> 01:43:33.079 You know, one of the one of the one of 1119 01:43:33.119 --> 01:43:38.800 the living believing people who I I really find common 1120 01:43:38.840 --> 01:43:42.239 ground with and in terms of political theory is in 1121 01:43:42.479 --> 01:43:46.680 an historical subject matter is Krrie Bolton. Like he's just great. 1122 01:43:47.079 --> 01:43:49.039 I don't know the guy. Unfortunately, he doesn't leave New 1123 01:43:49.119 --> 01:43:52.960 Zealand much these days because he's elderly, you know. And uh, 1124 01:43:53.119 --> 01:43:54.880 I think most people know of him because he wrote 1125 01:43:54.880 --> 01:43:59.159 this really great exhaustive biography of Francis Yackey. But he 1126 01:43:59.239 --> 01:44:02.520 wrote a book on Stalin called Stalin the Enduring Legacy, 1127 01:44:03.039 --> 01:44:08.199 and people who haven't read the book, they they they 1128 01:44:08.279 --> 01:44:11.359 panted as some sort of oh he's some Eurasianist. That's like, 1129 01:44:11.399 --> 01:44:14.199 that's not what he's saying at all. He's saying Stalin's 1130 01:44:14.239 --> 01:44:20.279 legacy was complicated. He basically abides the same viewpoint that 1131 01:44:20.319 --> 01:44:23.680 Paul Godfrey does, although for some of different reasons about 1132 01:44:23.680 --> 01:44:27.439 a substantial aspect of the Cold War deriving from the 1133 01:44:28.159 --> 01:44:33.880 Stalin versus Trotsky paradigm. You know, but that doesn't mean 1134 01:44:33.880 --> 01:44:38.560 that Stalin was somehow not an internationalist. And even you know, 1135 01:44:38.600 --> 01:44:42.000 the Soviet Union can name dozens of ethnicities, you know, 1136 01:44:42.439 --> 01:44:47.520 a huge Moslim population, you know, a huge Asiatic population, 1137 01:44:48.279 --> 01:44:53.640 you know, a huge number of Near Eastern people. You know, 1138 01:44:54.199 --> 01:44:58.319 it spanned one fifth or one six of this planets, 1139 01:44:58.840 --> 01:45:03.640 like the Soviet Union was the ultimate international superpower, you know, 1140 01:45:04.039 --> 01:45:09.319 and the only way the Soviet Union survives. And one 1141 01:45:09.359 --> 01:45:13.680 of the reasons why the later Cold War was so 1142 01:45:13.840 --> 01:45:19.199 dangerous as human you know, for technological reasons in historical 1143 01:45:19.239 --> 01:45:22.439 ones and the sidelining of human decision makers and misconditions 1144 01:45:22.439 --> 01:45:25.359 of strategic nucleator parody and things. But the reason why 1145 01:45:25.359 --> 01:45:28.720 I drop of who was a fascinating guy. And I mean, 1146 01:45:28.760 --> 01:45:33.479 like I've said, I believe I'm not a sovietologist and 1147 01:45:33.600 --> 01:45:39.720 I'm not a Russia expert at all, but I do 1148 01:45:39.840 --> 01:45:44.720 know something and it's clear to me that post Khrush 1149 01:45:44.760 --> 01:45:51.399 chief there was a shadow trifecta of and drop of 1150 01:45:51.600 --> 01:45:55.560 Ustanov and Gramigo with a real Soviet executive. Brezhnev was 1151 01:45:55.560 --> 01:45:59.800 a frontman, which made sense because before he became kind 1152 01:45:59.800 --> 01:46:04.720 of do we compromised people liked Breshnev, and he resonated 1153 01:46:04.760 --> 01:46:08.600 with with the people even today, like he's fondly remembered, 1154 01:46:08.880 --> 01:46:13.680 you know, like uh as as as you know, uh, 1155 01:46:14.239 --> 01:46:16.560 it's like a man who was like a like a 1156 01:46:16.560 --> 01:46:21.279 great steward of other Russian people and the nationalities. But 1157 01:46:22.279 --> 01:46:25.199 you know, and drop of I mean Bridsenev was very 1158 01:46:25.279 --> 01:46:28.720 much a Stalinist, you know, and as was in drop 1159 01:46:28.760 --> 01:46:35.199 of but and drop off seminal speech right in eighty two, 1160 01:46:35.520 --> 01:46:41.920 right after he became a general secretary. You know, he 1161 01:46:42.640 --> 01:46:47.560 this is when uh project Rion, which a lot of 1162 01:46:47.560 --> 01:46:52.239 people attribute as contributing substantially to the war Scare of 1163 01:46:52.279 --> 01:46:54.760 eighty three in the able Archer era. I think people 1164 01:46:54.800 --> 01:46:59.000 still misunderstand that aspect of it. But because it may 1165 01:46:59.520 --> 01:47:01.640 there isn't one of the subject of the speech to 1166 01:47:01.760 --> 01:47:06.359 the Presidium he said, we're going to lose the Cold 1167 01:47:06.439 --> 01:47:14.319 War if we don't take drastic measures to countermeasures against Rima, 1168 01:47:14.560 --> 01:47:16.760 you know, the revolution of military affairs. He was being 1169 01:47:16.840 --> 01:47:21.920 specifically of computing power and command and control aspects, which 1170 01:47:22.000 --> 01:47:24.640 was true. There's there's something, there's something insane. There's only 1171 01:47:24.680 --> 01:47:28.039 like five thousand computers in the entire Soviet Union in 1172 01:47:28.119 --> 01:47:30.720 ninety too. It was something that it was some insanely 1173 01:47:30.840 --> 01:47:34.880 primitive state of affairs or regards high tech, you know, 1174 01:47:35.279 --> 01:47:41.720 and you know, it's oh point was basically the risk 1175 01:47:41.800 --> 01:47:46.279 of war based on the strategic paradigm as it's evolving, 1176 01:47:46.439 --> 01:47:50.800 is well as these command and control aspects and and 1177 01:47:50.920 --> 01:47:53.920 the sideline of human decision makers, that the risk of 1178 01:47:53.960 --> 01:47:57.880 war is probably greater than it's ever been since you know, 1179 01:47:57.920 --> 01:48:01.640 the forties. But also so we're going to lose that 1180 01:48:01.800 --> 01:48:09.039 war if we don't find a way to develop meaningful 1181 01:48:09.119 --> 01:48:16.840 countermeasures that you know, are our technologies of parody, or 1182 01:48:16.880 --> 01:48:18.600 unless we find a way out of the Cold War, 1183 01:48:19.720 --> 01:48:22.279 you know. And that was Gorbachev's whole notion, because Gorbachev 1184 01:48:22.359 --> 01:48:26.079 wasn'tna drop off protege. He wasn't some big liberal chevid 1185 01:48:26.159 --> 01:48:34.720 narsee I think was subverting things. But point being, you know, 1186 01:48:34.800 --> 01:48:38.359 Gorbachev was very much the anti Yeltsin quite literally, and 1187 01:48:38.479 --> 01:48:46.000 Yelson was the neocons guy. You know. Gorbachev's notion was, 1188 01:48:48.119 --> 01:48:52.079 you know, to reform the command economy with certain qualifications, 1189 01:48:53.000 --> 01:48:56.239 you know, and and and basically do it with gods 1190 01:48:56.359 --> 01:49:00.760 plan and favor of something else that could abide innovation 1191 01:49:01.159 --> 01:49:05.119 in the high tech sector and to bring about peace 1192 01:49:05.159 --> 01:49:09.319 with the United States. But surrendering to the United States 1193 01:49:09.399 --> 01:49:12.239 or dismantling the Soviet Union that was not at all 1194 01:49:12.359 --> 01:49:17.600 within the cars and one of the reasons why Gorbachev 1195 01:49:19.720 --> 01:49:25.239 was head rapport with Bush and Baker. Bush and Baker 1196 01:49:26.000 --> 01:49:29.119 assured him, we're not gonna try and dismantle the Soviet Union, 1197 01:49:29.159 --> 01:49:32.600 and they weren't for a very specific reason. Bush said, 1198 01:49:33.439 --> 01:49:37.800 where you know, until there's full nuclear disarmament, we're not 1199 01:49:37.840 --> 01:49:41.119 even gonna talk about, you know, a post Soviet future, 1200 01:49:42.319 --> 01:49:47.800 you know. And obviously the Neo count perspective and their 1201 01:49:47.920 --> 01:49:53.760 shoehorning of Yeltsen was, you know, break the Soviet Union 1202 01:49:53.840 --> 01:49:56.560 to piece is now their notion was, and one of 1203 01:49:56.600 --> 01:50:00.439 the reasons for the why this crusading aast Moscow's proceeding 1204 01:50:00.439 --> 01:50:03.439 from Ukraine. Their notion was to break the Soviet Union 1205 01:50:03.479 --> 01:50:08.079 into essentially three discrete like client regimes, you know, like 1206 01:50:08.640 --> 01:50:12.880 the former Soviet Far East. And in those days especially too, 1207 01:50:12.960 --> 01:50:17.239 because the Pentagon was still looking at China as essentially 1208 01:50:17.279 --> 01:50:20.920 friendly and obviously like you know, seed some of that 1209 01:50:21.039 --> 01:50:24.239 territory to the to Pig King, but you know, base 1210 01:50:24.319 --> 01:50:27.720 they'll be like a Ukraine like commissariat. They'll be like, 1211 01:50:27.760 --> 01:50:30.399 you know, the Moscow kind of central Commissariat, and then 1212 01:50:30.399 --> 01:50:35.199 they'll be this like former like Russian Far East that 1213 01:50:35.319 --> 01:50:37.840 can you know, just that's just kind of like, uh, 1214 01:50:38.720 --> 01:50:46.840 this sort of like hyper exploited you know, hinterland for 1215 01:50:48.119 --> 01:50:51.800 the United States and and and the adjacent finance capital and stuff. 1216 01:50:52.520 --> 01:50:57.279 And you know, uh, Bush and Baker realize like, no, 1217 01:50:57.359 --> 01:50:59.760 we're not We're not gonna grind these people's faces into 1218 01:50:59.800 --> 01:51:03.399 the concrete, and we're not going to destabilize the whole region. 1219 01:51:03.520 --> 01:51:07.159 And you know, we're certainly not gonna do anything until 1220 01:51:07.159 --> 01:51:12.560 there's full nuclear disarmament. You know that that was a 1221 01:51:12.600 --> 01:51:17.239 tangential discussion. Should give me. But Baker was a great man, 1222 01:51:17.279 --> 01:51:19.560 and I've got a lot of respect for him and 1223 01:51:20.039 --> 01:51:24.760 Bush forty one, it was not a particularly likable guy, 1224 01:51:24.920 --> 01:51:28.119 leaven It dead, but he had a very serious and 1225 01:51:28.119 --> 01:51:35.520 sophisticated view of geopolitics and political affairs. So that administration 1226 01:51:35.640 --> 01:51:39.000 looks better and better in my opinion. And I mean 1227 01:51:39.039 --> 01:51:41.039 I felt that way at the time. As a teenager, 1228 01:51:43.760 --> 01:51:46.520 I realized his country, I realized something really, really really 1229 01:51:46.600 --> 01:51:51.840 bad was underway. When when when when Clinton was elected. 1230 01:51:52.039 --> 01:51:53.479 I mean, it would have been one thing if it 1231 01:51:53.520 --> 01:51:56.960 was like a twenty twenty steel but the body politically 1232 01:51:57.000 --> 01:51:59.960 excited about this pig, and that was insane, you know. 1233 01:52:00.079 --> 01:52:03.159 And it's not just because he was crushing our people. 1234 01:52:03.720 --> 01:52:06.239 I mean I knew guys who got indicted and with 1235 01:52:06.399 --> 01:52:12.600 the prison under Clinton reno for when they hadn't done anything. 1236 01:52:13.439 --> 01:52:18.159 You know, I'm not just speaking, I mean as a 1237 01:52:18.159 --> 01:52:20.159 matter of law as well as a matter of fact 1238 01:52:20.279 --> 01:52:26.920 or ethics or whatever. But as it may the to 1239 01:52:26.960 --> 01:52:30.399 bring it back a bit, you know, there there's a 1240 01:52:30.439 --> 01:52:36.239 brief moment really from about ninety two to ninety six, 1241 01:52:36.880 --> 01:52:39.720 and that's when that's when these these historians, first another 1242 01:52:39.840 --> 01:52:42.399 David Irving, you know, he got access to the FSB 1243 01:52:42.600 --> 01:52:45.880 archives and there was all this incredible stuff that came 1244 01:52:45.920 --> 01:52:48.319 to like that, you know, the old Soviet system had 1245 01:52:48.640 --> 01:52:55.279 suppressed and kept from probably eyes. But then, I mean 1246 01:52:55.399 --> 01:53:00.199 very quickly the things became even more opaque than in 1247 01:53:00.239 --> 01:53:02.279 some much than they had during the Soviet e because 1248 01:53:02.560 --> 01:53:04.439 the regime will never tell the truth about what's going 1249 01:53:04.439 --> 01:53:07.880 on with Russia, I mean, or with Europe. But this 1250 01:53:08.000 --> 01:53:11.960 is an issue with peculiar sensitivity for reasons that I 1251 01:53:12.000 --> 01:53:15.800 don't think need to be elaborately explicated. But I realized 1252 01:53:15.840 --> 01:53:23.079 I talk more about Hoffman as well as the knowledge 1253 01:53:23.119 --> 01:53:25.520 of Barbara Rose, and I did specifically suber Of. If 1254 01:53:25.520 --> 01:53:27.199 you going to a part three, I'll remedy that and 1255 01:53:27.279 --> 01:53:32.760 i'll speak specifically to suber Off, and I'll include some 1256 01:53:32.840 --> 01:53:35.800 aspects of inside the Red Army. I've got a paperback 1257 01:53:35.800 --> 01:53:37.000 of that. I'm going to take it on the road 1258 01:53:37.000 --> 01:53:37.239 with me. 1259 01:53:39.239 --> 01:53:42.279 Now that sounds good to me, getting into the ye. 1260 01:53:42.840 --> 01:53:45.239 The thing about reading subar Off is it's just this 1261 01:53:46.159 --> 01:53:52.399 fire hose of just this date, that what was dismantled 1262 01:53:52.439 --> 01:53:55.000 on this date, what was put in this place on 1263 01:53:55.039 --> 01:53:57.640 this date, And it's just like just running down this 1264 01:53:57.760 --> 01:54:01.520 whole list of things, just chapter after chat, where it's 1265 01:54:01.760 --> 01:54:06.760 it's mind boggling. The the mountain of circumstantial evidence he 1266 01:54:07.760 --> 01:54:11.640 is able to provide for his UH, for his thesis, 1267 01:54:11.680 --> 01:54:12.439 which they took. 1268 01:54:13.199 --> 01:54:16.359 He took a like a lot of Russians, the particularly 1269 01:54:16.359 --> 01:54:21.600 guys who were in intelligence roles for military roles. He 1270 01:54:21.680 --> 01:54:24.199 was a prolific documentary and he wrote down a huge 1271 01:54:24.199 --> 01:54:27.239 amount of things. But also you know, obviously English wasn't 1272 01:54:27.239 --> 01:54:32.119 his first language, and it's written kind of like a debriefing, 1273 01:54:32.640 --> 01:54:36.279 but with like added extensit camery, I mean, which makes sense. 1274 01:54:36.319 --> 01:54:39.479 I mean he was a defector and he he he 1275 01:54:39.560 --> 01:54:46.840 spent literally years being debriefed by American and NATO military people. 1276 01:54:47.000 --> 01:54:51.039 You know, I mean, I get it. That's not that's 1277 01:54:51.119 --> 01:54:54.560 not a fun right, Like the defector actually sucks. 1278 01:54:55.720 --> 01:54:59.840 What's your take on defectors. I interviewed one once and 1279 01:55:00.000 --> 01:55:03.800 and he was a defector from Soviet Union, like in 1280 01:55:04.039 --> 01:55:10.479 early nineteen eighty nine, And I mean I just caught 1281 01:55:10.560 --> 01:55:17.600 him not exactly lying, just I caught him in not 1282 01:55:17.680 --> 01:55:22.680 being willing to have certain conversations that would just seem like, 1283 01:55:22.880 --> 01:55:24.680 you know, it's like, oh, you know, well, tell me 1284 01:55:24.680 --> 01:55:26.600 what Carl Marx got right. It's one of the things 1285 01:55:26.760 --> 01:55:28.479 I asked him. I said, tell me what Carl Marks 1286 01:55:28.479 --> 01:55:32.880 got right. He's like nothing, absolutely nothing. And I'm like, 1287 01:55:34.560 --> 01:55:37.439 I see these defectors come out of like North Korea, 1288 01:55:38.000 --> 01:55:41.000 and like immediately they get debrief by the State Department, 1289 01:55:41.039 --> 01:55:43.119 and then they get boob jobs and they're driving brand 1290 01:55:43.119 --> 01:55:48.720 new cars and they're in frigging condos. And I'm like, yeah, 1291 01:55:48.920 --> 01:55:51.840 I think I think defectors were a lot different back 1292 01:55:51.880 --> 01:55:52.520 then than they are. 1293 01:55:53.840 --> 01:55:58.199 To say, Okay, some guy, some DDR guy or some 1294 01:55:58.359 --> 01:56:04.479 Soviet Union like GRU officer who defected in like May 1295 01:56:04.600 --> 01:56:08.199 nineteen eighty nine, totally different than a guy who defected 1296 01:56:08.239 --> 01:56:11.359 in nineteen seventy nine or nineteen sixty nine, night and day, 1297 01:56:12.079 --> 01:56:15.680 because the former is just like some dickhead like looking 1298 01:56:15.680 --> 01:56:17.479 to get paid and like looking for a way out 1299 01:56:17.520 --> 01:56:21.880 of his life in a failing system. Guys like super 1300 01:56:21.920 --> 01:56:25.399 off first of all, they were taking a huge risk, 1301 01:56:27.079 --> 01:56:34.279 you know. And secondly, for regular people man like it 1302 01:56:34.279 --> 01:56:40.239 it pete cold War, you know. Uh, life wasn't that 1303 01:56:40.439 --> 01:56:44.520 different than the Soviet Union or in America. It really wasn't. So. 1304 01:56:44.560 --> 01:56:48.159 I mean, it's not like you're some GRU big shot. 1305 01:56:48.359 --> 01:56:50.640 It's not like you're gonna get great stuff in America. 1306 01:56:50.760 --> 01:56:53.039 You can't back home. I mean, yeah you can. You 1307 01:56:53.119 --> 01:56:54.760 might be able to get like blue jeans for your 1308 01:56:54.800 --> 01:56:59.399 mistress and like good scotch, but there's not some like 1309 01:56:59.720 --> 01:57:02.039 there was some like huge difference in quality of life 1310 01:57:02.119 --> 01:57:07.239 or something. Guys like Stuber defected because they they had 1311 01:57:07.239 --> 01:57:12.079 ethical reasons for it, and they developed a moral contempt 1312 01:57:12.119 --> 01:57:14.640 for the system. I really liked the book, The Hunt 1313 01:57:14.640 --> 01:57:16.760 for at October. It's just like an awesome book, and 1314 01:57:16.800 --> 01:57:21.159 I reread it lately because I I I've forgotten how 1315 01:57:21.199 --> 01:57:26.760 good it was. But you know, the uh, the Captain 1316 01:57:28.760 --> 01:57:32.600 of the Red October, the whole deal. I mean it's 1317 01:57:32.800 --> 01:57:34.800 in parts of character. I mean it's not. It's a 1318 01:57:34.840 --> 01:57:42.840 brilliant meditation on on late Cold War strategic nuclear platforms 1319 01:57:42.880 --> 01:57:45.079 and the deep parodies they're in, but it's under a 1320 01:57:45.159 --> 01:57:50.600 character study. Like the Soviet naval officer, you know, he's uh, 1321 01:57:50.680 --> 01:57:52.840 he's this guy from the He's this Lithuanian guy. He 1322 01:57:52.880 --> 01:57:58.199 doesn't really relate to the Russian culture. His wife needed 1323 01:57:58.199 --> 01:58:02.920 an operation and uh, the doctor who operated on or 1324 01:58:03.039 --> 01:58:05.279 was drunk when he poured in the surgery, so he 1325 01:58:05.359 --> 01:58:07.920 boxed it and she died. But the doctor was the 1326 01:58:07.960 --> 01:58:10.399 sun of some polit baro big shots. They're like, you know, 1327 01:58:10.479 --> 01:58:15.560 you can't stop demanding like vengeance against this man. So 1328 01:58:15.960 --> 01:58:18.119 so this navel off series just like what the hell 1329 01:58:18.159 --> 01:58:21.119 am I doing? You know, like I and also too 1330 01:58:21.119 --> 01:58:23.239 in it he's like deeply religious. He's like, so there's 1331 01:58:23.279 --> 01:58:29.560 like this atheist, uh chauvinistic Russian government that killed my wife, 1332 01:58:29.560 --> 01:58:33.439 and I am I'm supposed to I'm supposed to kill 1333 01:58:33.479 --> 01:58:35.840 fifty million people and event a wharl like on behalf 1334 01:58:35.840 --> 01:58:39.640 of it. Like, no, I'm not doing that. I mean 1335 01:58:39.640 --> 01:58:42.279 there there's there's a deeper moral quag mari too, because 1336 01:58:42.279 --> 01:58:45.680 the Red October it's a Typhoon class sub but it's 1337 01:58:45.720 --> 01:58:49.199 got what's called a caterpillar drive, so it's invisible to 1338 01:58:49.319 --> 01:58:52.560 SOSIS and passive sonar. So basically it's a splendid first 1339 01:58:52.560 --> 01:58:58.119 strike weapon. So he realizes, like the Soviet Union can 1340 01:58:58.159 --> 01:59:02.720 all this strategic balance and basically, uh bring America to 1341 01:59:02.920 --> 01:59:06.920 terms through the threat of through the threat of nuclear assault, 1342 01:59:06.960 --> 01:59:09.279 and like, I mean he've used that as morally fucked. Also, 1343 01:59:09.760 --> 01:59:11.319 you know, like if we're gonna win, like let's win 1344 01:59:11.359 --> 01:59:14.239 the Cold War clean, you know, not not do it 1345 01:59:14.279 --> 01:59:17.880 basically by like holding America hostage with the nuclear trigger. 1346 01:59:18.199 --> 01:59:20.600 I mean that's kind of moralistic. But at the same time, 1347 01:59:20.680 --> 01:59:23.239 I mean, I I don't know, man, like if it's 1348 01:59:23.279 --> 01:59:31.399 no being uh being the captain of a of a 1349 01:59:31.439 --> 01:59:35.720 typhoon class sub that that there was a counter value 1350 01:59:35.800 --> 01:59:39.520 like mega death machine, you know, it's it's it's it's 1351 01:59:39.640 --> 01:59:43.600 role was to assault counter value targets and and kill 1352 01:59:43.640 --> 01:59:46.920 millions of people if you don't believe in the system 1353 01:59:46.960 --> 01:59:50.359 you serve. That's a pretty horrible role to be in. 1354 01:59:51.479 --> 01:59:54.000 You know, you've got to be a true believer to 1355 01:59:54.079 --> 01:59:57.159 do that job. It's not like any other job in 1356 01:59:57.199 --> 01:59:59.439 the military, and it it's not like any other role 1357 01:59:59.600 --> 02:00:07.439 in any era, you know, I commanding it can be 1358 02:00:07.479 --> 02:00:12.439 commanding a first strike platform that that can that can 1359 02:00:12.520 --> 02:00:16.960 kill millions of people, you know. So I obviously that's 1360 02:00:16.960 --> 02:00:20.520 like a fictional example, but what clans he was drawing 1361 02:00:20.600 --> 02:00:23.960 upon was the real ethos of defectors in the Cold War. 1362 02:00:24.159 --> 02:00:27.399 And on the other side, Yeah, guys like the Cambridge five, 1363 02:00:27.439 --> 02:00:31.840 but I think we're pretty disturbed guys. But they were 1364 02:00:31.840 --> 02:00:35.239 true believers. That's totally different than these days. Like some 1365 02:00:35.960 --> 02:00:38.720 I think Snowden is a is a sincere guy. Whatever 1366 02:00:38.760 --> 02:00:43.319 problems he might have, you know, he's basically yeah, I mean, 1367 02:00:43.319 --> 02:00:45.159 he could never leave Russia now, Like it's not a 1368 02:00:45.199 --> 02:00:51.239 happy life, you know. I I think, uh, you can argue, 1369 02:00:51.319 --> 02:00:52.920 I mean, Snowden, I don't want to get into a 1370 02:00:53.680 --> 02:00:56.800 deep meditation on the ethics of what Snouding did, but 1371 02:00:56.840 --> 02:01:00.600 I my point is, like I whatever is motives, I 1372 02:01:00.640 --> 02:01:02.479 don't think if we can say he did that for clout. 1373 02:01:02.560 --> 02:01:04.479 But you know, these people who come the other way, 1374 02:01:04.560 --> 02:01:08.159 like some of these Chinese or North Koreans, they're they're 1375 02:01:08.199 --> 02:01:11.279 just not going to get paid, it's obvious, but they 1376 02:01:11.279 --> 02:01:13.520 think they're not being respected like they should be in, 1377 02:01:13.960 --> 02:01:16.720 you know, whatever role they're in. You know, but the 1378 02:01:16.760 --> 02:01:19.079 Cold War was a Cold War is a different world, 1379 02:01:19.119 --> 02:01:20.840 I mean literally, you know. 1380 02:01:22.359 --> 02:01:26.319 Yeah, all right, Well we'll pick this up on episode 1381 02:01:26.399 --> 02:01:29.399 three when you uh, when you get back from the 1382 02:01:29.439 --> 02:01:32.199 travels of Thomas on the Road and everything. 1383 02:01:32.680 --> 02:01:36.279 Yeah, yeah, everybody about thirty six hours ago. 1384 02:01:36.640 --> 02:01:38.960 Yeah, remind everybody where they can find your work. 1385 02:01:39.720 --> 02:01:44.399 Yeah, you should check out my substick. It's real Thomas 1386 02:01:44.439 --> 02:01:48.880 seven seven seven substack dot com. Alternatively, go to the website. 1387 02:01:49.039 --> 02:01:51.720 It's number seven h on me s seven seven seven 1388 02:01:51.760 --> 02:01:54.199 dot com. But that stuff on the show notes so 1389 02:01:54.199 --> 02:02:00.159 people can find it easy. But uh, my website is 1390 02:02:00.199 --> 02:02:04.600 a good one stop and my substick is where the 1391 02:02:04.640 --> 02:02:09.920 podcast and other good stuff is at. And I've I 1392 02:02:09.960 --> 02:02:12.000 just got off the road from DC. Then we had 1393 02:02:12.000 --> 02:02:14.960 the Halloween All Saints Say Cemetery walk. I'm trying to 1394 02:02:14.960 --> 02:02:17.880 make progress. I gotta make substantial progress on this manuscript. 1395 02:02:17.920 --> 02:02:22.000 By December, things have been very hectic, so in good ways, 1396 02:02:22.359 --> 02:02:25.079 and then I injured myself like a fucking idiot. But 1397 02:02:26.319 --> 02:02:30.640 it's uh, the mind Phaser pod. Uh, it's gonna be 1398 02:02:30.680 --> 02:02:33.199 another couple of weeks before a fresh episode drops, so 1399 02:02:33.279 --> 02:02:35.520 forgive me for day. But Jake burd and I will 1400 02:02:35.520 --> 02:02:39.520 continue to drop fresh stuff on his platforms and on 1401 02:02:39.640 --> 02:02:42.600 radio for Chicago. So just bear with me. I promise 1402 02:02:43.600 --> 02:02:48.800 we'll be back to regular uploads when I get back 1403 02:02:48.800 --> 02:02:49.760 from the road. 1404 02:02:51.520 --> 02:02:55.640 All right until episode three. Thank you, Thomas, Yeah, thank you, man. 1405 02:02:58.439 --> 02:03:01.920 I want to welcome everyone back to the show. We 1406 02:03:02.000 --> 02:03:03.840 had a little bit of a hiatus because you know, 1407 02:03:03.920 --> 02:03:07.319 we did a little traveling and everything. But Thomas is 1408 02:03:07.359 --> 02:03:09.439 back and we're going to finish up the series on 1409 02:03:10.800 --> 02:03:14.920 who started World War Two? Who's responsible? And yeah, so 1410 02:03:15.199 --> 02:03:17.159 take it away, Thomas. 1411 02:03:17.319 --> 02:03:21.720 Yeah, thanks for hosting me again. There's there's two issues here, 1412 02:03:23.039 --> 02:03:28.319 and if memory serves, in the first episode of this 1413 02:03:28.640 --> 02:03:34.199 little series, we addressed the issue of one exactly the 1414 02:03:34.239 --> 02:03:38.319 Second World War started, which seems pedantic, but it's not. 1415 02:03:38.560 --> 02:03:43.000 It's this is a real matter of contention for anybody 1416 02:03:43.039 --> 02:03:47.720 who's seriously engaged with the subject matter. There's a reason 1417 02:03:48.000 --> 02:03:55.560 why court historians claim the opposite of hostilities was September third, 1418 02:03:55.640 --> 02:04:01.199 nineteen thirty nine, because that represents a discreetly ideologically coded perspective. 1419 02:04:01.960 --> 02:04:10.800 And obviously the intention is to present the global strategic 1420 02:04:11.520 --> 02:04:17.359 and geopolitical situation as being one of relative peace until 1421 02:04:17.399 --> 02:04:22.600 the German Reich violated that peace through make it aggression 1422 02:04:22.640 --> 02:04:30.920 against the Polish state. Okay, that's a problematic perspective for 1423 02:04:30.960 --> 02:04:36.199 all kinds of reasons, you know, some of which are political, 1424 02:04:36.319 --> 02:04:42.239 some of which are purely historical in nature and factual. 1425 02:04:44.560 --> 02:04:52.359 But what I think is irrebuttable. Even if one accepts, 1426 02:04:53.359 --> 02:05:03.880 you know, the mainstream view of a the onset of 1427 02:05:03.880 --> 02:05:07.600 hostility between the German Reich and Poland and the subsequent 1428 02:05:07.640 --> 02:05:11.039 war declaration on the German Reich by France and the 1429 02:05:11.119 --> 02:05:16.920 United Kingdom, the fact of the matter is that weeks prior, 1430 02:05:17.359 --> 02:05:21.159 the Soviet Union assaulted the Japanese Imperial Army at Chalkan Goal. 1431 02:05:22.600 --> 02:05:26.000 This was a massive engagement. This is a massive clash 1432 02:05:26.039 --> 02:05:36.479 of forces, you know, and obviously it represented the onset 1433 02:05:36.479 --> 02:05:39.119 of a state of general hostility. Is between two great powers, 1434 02:05:39.760 --> 02:05:43.039 the Soviet Union and the Empire of Japan. So I 1435 02:05:43.520 --> 02:05:46.920 don't really see how anybody who looks like to be 1436 02:05:46.960 --> 02:05:50.600 taken seriously it can claim that this was some sort 1437 02:05:50.600 --> 02:05:54.840 of insignificant event or somehow not related to the broader 1438 02:05:54.880 --> 02:06:05.520 nexus of causation that you know, also precipitated the agin 1439 02:06:05.600 --> 02:06:15.520 hostilities in Europe. You know, either the Soviet Union going 1440 02:06:15.520 --> 02:06:24.600 to war with Japan in a scale capacity represented the 1441 02:06:24.720 --> 02:06:31.119 onset of general hostilities on a planetary scale, or it didn't. Okay, 1442 02:06:31.760 --> 02:06:40.359 So there's that related to that, but more discreetly political 1443 02:06:40.640 --> 02:06:46.039 in terms of the significance of the subject matter vis 1444 02:06:46.079 --> 02:06:51.720 a vis court history, narratives, and the way that official 1445 02:06:51.760 --> 02:06:56.520 authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom and 1446 02:06:58.520 --> 02:07:08.039 the Buddhist Republic continue to present, you know, and characterize 1447 02:07:08.800 --> 02:07:11.840 the Second World War is the issue of Soviet intentions 1448 02:07:12.359 --> 02:07:19.800 and what exactly the state of power political relations was 1449 02:07:22.720 --> 02:07:28.720 between Moscow and Berlin as of you know, June twenty second, 1450 02:07:28.880 --> 02:07:36.760 nineteen forty one. And it's pretty clear to me, you know, 1451 02:07:36.800 --> 02:07:41.600 and I I draw a lot in substantial measure on 1452 02:07:42.760 --> 02:07:49.479 the laate Yakam Hoffman's exhaustive study of Barbarossa. It's pretty 1453 02:07:49.520 --> 02:07:55.600 clear to me that the Soviet Union was eminently going 1454 02:07:55.640 --> 02:08:05.439 to assault Europe and the German Reich, not just the 1455 02:08:05.600 --> 02:08:11.760 FURE but OKW as well as you know, various command 1456 02:08:11.800 --> 02:08:18.079 elements within the party apparatus, the military and the secular 1457 02:08:18.119 --> 02:08:25.680 state of apparatus recognized this reality, as did myriad heads 1458 02:08:25.680 --> 02:08:31.319 of state who found themselves allied with the German Reich 1459 02:08:32.279 --> 02:08:37.920 for various reasons. You know, this included Croatia, Slovakia, Italy 1460 02:08:38.680 --> 02:08:43.640 and you know France. You know, again there was no 1461 02:08:43.800 --> 02:08:50.079 VSI France. There was the Government of France and it 1462 02:08:50.119 --> 02:08:54.960 it was absolutely on the side of the Axis Powers. 1463 02:08:55.000 --> 02:09:02.239 You know, there were volunteers from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland 1464 02:09:02.960 --> 02:09:11.640 throughout uh this Central Asian Islamic countries. You know, Romania. 1465 02:09:12.279 --> 02:09:16.279 Romania contributed a quarter million men, which is a massive 1466 02:09:16.800 --> 02:09:23.800 contribution for a country the size of Romania. You know, Hungary, Bulgaria, 1467 02:09:24.520 --> 02:09:29.680 the Netherlands, you know, Belgium, Luxembourg. You know, the list 1468 02:09:29.760 --> 02:09:32.840 goes on and on and on. You know, and obviously 1469 02:09:32.840 --> 02:09:40.399 the Spaniards that Leningrad fought incredibly valiantly. But you know, 1470 02:09:40.840 --> 02:09:46.079 there's there's this This wasn't just a matter of zeitgeist, 1471 02:09:46.359 --> 02:09:52.079 some sort of mass hysteria or some sort of desire 1472 02:09:52.159 --> 02:09:56.960 to sacrifice one's life, or some sort of epemeral glory. 1473 02:09:58.039 --> 02:10:03.000 The Soviet Union, UH had a time of the fact 1474 02:10:03.039 --> 02:10:07.800 that it was animated by a revolutionary ideology that was 1475 02:10:07.840 --> 02:10:16.800 truly global in character. It The Soviet Union had built 1476 02:10:17.720 --> 02:10:21.520 a military juggernaut the likes of which the world had 1477 02:10:21.560 --> 02:10:25.159 never seen. It was almost unfathomable, and it was only 1478 02:10:25.239 --> 02:10:34.520 growing larger and more powerful, you know, and the like 1479 02:10:34.560 --> 02:10:40.359 I said to me, this is obvious. Hoffman and Victor 1480 02:10:40.439 --> 02:10:49.119 Suvarov and a few other military historians, all right, Astofe 1481 02:10:49.600 --> 02:10:54.439 is another one. They brought unique insight to the table. 1482 02:10:54.479 --> 02:10:59.920 And Hoffman in particular, his data points were and are exhaustive. 1483 02:11:01.359 --> 02:11:05.720 And Hoffman too he not that I mean, obviously, I 1484 02:11:05.720 --> 02:11:09.239 don't have any prejudice against independent scholars. I am one, 1485 02:11:09.359 --> 02:11:18.239 but such that people are prone to dismissing historians who 1486 02:11:18.279 --> 02:11:23.079 don't have what they view as adequate credential affiliation with 1487 02:11:23.680 --> 02:11:31.199 reputable institutions. Well, Hoffman, when he was alive, he was 1488 02:11:31.199 --> 02:11:41.279 in the employee of the official Historical Records division of 1489 02:11:42.399 --> 02:11:47.239 the Bundespan, you know, and he was considered to be 1490 02:11:49.239 --> 02:11:54.760 probably the seminal German historian on Barbarossa in terms of 1491 02:11:54.760 --> 02:11:58.520 the military aspects. Okay, you can't say that he was 1492 02:11:58.560 --> 02:12:00.600 a crank or that he was some Greek the guy 1493 02:12:00.680 --> 02:12:09.840 who was outside of the establishment of the bundes Republic. 1494 02:12:09.920 --> 02:12:15.359 He was very much insinuated into it. Okay, not that 1495 02:12:15.359 --> 02:12:17.479 that have to make a difference, but such that it does. 1496 02:12:18.399 --> 02:12:24.399 You know, I don't see how people can impeach his credibility, 1497 02:12:24.479 --> 02:12:28.880 you know. And one of the issues that Hoffman takes up, 1498 02:12:29.199 --> 02:12:37.920 because again Hoffman was very focused on the quantitative military 1499 02:12:38.279 --> 02:12:46.520 aspects of Barbarossa. One of the things that he addressed 1500 02:12:47.439 --> 02:12:55.119 was a lot of lay people as well as historians 1501 02:12:55.159 --> 02:12:59.760 and military analysts who know better. But for cynical reasons, 1502 02:13:00.439 --> 02:13:05.079 vand Wagon on this argument, they claim that, well, if 1503 02:13:05.079 --> 02:13:11.880 the Soviet Union was so deeply mobilized and had to 1504 02:13:12.000 --> 02:13:16.720 raise such a massively scaled war machine, why did they 1505 02:13:16.760 --> 02:13:21.840 absorb catastrophic casualties. Well, that's exactly why they did, because 1506 02:13:21.880 --> 02:13:28.000 they were deployed offensively. And when you're talking about combined arms, 1507 02:13:29.159 --> 02:13:32.960 even to this day, I mean, drones and localized autonomous 1508 02:13:33.039 --> 02:13:40.079 firepower are definitely changing things most strategically and tactically and 1509 02:13:40.199 --> 02:13:48.479 nowhere is that more on display than in than in 1510 02:13:48.560 --> 02:13:52.720 various aspects of tactical deployment and depth. But even to 1511 02:13:52.800 --> 02:14:01.560 this day, this remains constant. If we're talking about combined 1512 02:14:01.720 --> 02:14:07.840 arms modern warfare, we're not. You can't just call it 1513 02:14:08.039 --> 02:14:14.760 a proverbial audible in the midst of hostilities, if your 1514 02:14:14.840 --> 02:14:20.239 forces are a rayed to assault and switch to a 1515 02:14:20.319 --> 02:14:27.279 defensive paradigm, so coming under assault when not prepared to 1516 02:14:27.359 --> 02:14:33.199 defend in depth, it can lead to catastrophe, particularly when 1517 02:14:33.199 --> 02:14:37.560 one's opponent is the Wehrmacht. And we're gonna get into 1518 02:14:37.600 --> 02:14:43.600 how exactly that plays out. But not only again, does 1519 02:14:43.640 --> 02:14:55.399 the attrition rate and specifically the skewed nature of that 1520 02:14:55.479 --> 02:14:59.800 attrition rate. Not only does that not tend to rebut 1521 02:15:02.159 --> 02:15:05.960 the claim before us, it actually tends to substantiate it. 1522 02:15:07.640 --> 02:15:10.640 Now I'll get into some of these data points, said, 1523 02:15:10.920 --> 02:15:20.239 you know, to clarify what we're talking about here. I 1524 02:15:20.239 --> 02:15:22.119 can't remember if I got into this or not in 1525 02:15:22.159 --> 02:15:24.399 the first episode. And please tell me if I'm repeating 1526 02:15:24.399 --> 02:15:26.319 myself and know what has need to correct me. I'm 1527 02:15:26.319 --> 02:15:31.600 not gonna be offended. Quite the contrary, You'll be quite gracious. 1528 02:15:33.399 --> 02:15:41.359 Between November nineteen forty and literally the eve of Barbarossa 1529 02:15:43.399 --> 02:15:49.039 in June nineteen forty one, the Soviets undertook a massive 1530 02:15:49.199 --> 02:15:58.520 arms build up. It Now, don't get me wrong, By 1531 02:15:58.560 --> 02:16:04.039 the autumn of nineteen forty the Soviets enjoyed numeric and 1532 02:16:04.159 --> 02:16:12.239 arguably technological superiority pretty much across the entire spectrum of 1533 02:16:12.319 --> 02:16:23.600 combined arms. But this punctuated build up of November nineteen 1534 02:16:23.640 --> 02:16:30.199 forty to June nineteen forty one can really only be 1535 02:16:30.279 --> 02:16:44.920 interpreted as mobilization and anticipation of offensive operations. On the 1536 02:16:44.959 --> 02:16:51.680 outbreak of hostilities in June twenty second, nineteen forty one, 1537 02:16:52.360 --> 02:16:57.639 the Soviet Union had deployed no less than twenty four 1538 02:16:57.760 --> 02:17:03.200 thousand tanks, close to two thousand of which were T 1539 02:17:03.440 --> 02:17:07.760 thirty fours, which you know, in those days there weren't 1540 02:17:07.879 --> 02:17:11.680 main battle tanks. There was light, medium, and heavy tanks 1541 02:17:11.719 --> 02:17:18.280 then arguably super heavy tanks. But the T thirty four 1542 02:17:18.600 --> 02:17:20.879 was I think of it as kind of like the 1543 02:17:21.520 --> 02:17:26.319 the zero of of of armored forces. You know, it 1544 02:17:26.399 --> 02:17:30.600 was probably the most effective armored platform of the entire war. 1545 02:17:31.239 --> 02:17:36.200 And and all are out in terms Okay, yeah, obviously, 1546 02:17:36.520 --> 02:17:39.879 you know, the Tiger was a superior machine. That's not 1547 02:17:39.920 --> 02:17:47.120 what we're talking about, you know, in the the the 1548 02:17:47.159 --> 02:17:49.319 ability of T thirty four is to be rolled off 1549 02:17:49.360 --> 02:17:55.360 the assembly line rapidly, you know, almost like model T 1550 02:17:55.600 --> 02:18:01.639 Fords or something odin that that itself as a force multiplier, 1551 02:18:05.399 --> 02:18:12.840 you know it. Between ninety and thirty eight and June 1552 02:18:12.920 --> 02:18:21.680 twenty second, nineteen forty one, the Red Air Force had 1553 02:18:21.680 --> 02:18:27.719 acquired over twenty three thousand military aircraft, around thirty seven 1554 02:18:27.719 --> 02:18:32.239 one hundred of which could be considered cutting edge. Probably 1555 02:18:32.239 --> 02:18:40.319 about half of those had night fighting capability. The Red 1556 02:18:40.399 --> 02:18:43.319 Army had close to one hundred and fifty thousand field 1557 02:18:43.399 --> 02:18:50.840 artillery pieces and heavy mortars. The Red Navy had over 1558 02:18:50.959 --> 02:18:55.280 two hundred submarines, which I can't remember if I mentioned 1559 02:18:55.360 --> 02:19:01.360 or not, but obviously the submarines are prest league offensive. 1560 02:19:01.520 --> 02:19:05.879 There aren't defensive submarines, you know. And to be clear, 1561 02:19:06.920 --> 02:19:10.760 this alone, I mean, the Soviet Union wasn't known as 1562 02:19:10.799 --> 02:19:16.440 any kind of maritime power. I mean, if anything, you know, 1563 02:19:16.719 --> 02:19:19.360 the the Tsars Navy had been sank by the Japanese 1564 02:19:19.360 --> 02:19:25.239 in nineteen oh five, and that it further compromised the 1565 02:19:25.280 --> 02:19:32.159 prestige actual potential of you know, the Russian Navy is 1566 02:19:32.159 --> 02:19:38.479 a real force. But by June twenty second, nineteen forty one, 1567 02:19:41.680 --> 02:19:44.959 the Soviet Union by far had the largest submarine fleet 1568 02:19:45.120 --> 02:19:50.319 in the world, more than four times that of the 1569 02:19:50.399 --> 02:19:52.760 Royal Navy, you know, in the UK was viewed as 1570 02:19:52.799 --> 02:19:57.680 the foremost naval power on this planet, you know. I mean, 1571 02:19:57.719 --> 02:20:04.120 these data points speak for themselves, you know. And on 1572 02:20:04.159 --> 02:20:07.559 the political side, I know I've gotten into this in 1573 02:20:07.680 --> 02:20:15.479 previous series that we've done. I put a lot of 1574 02:20:15.479 --> 02:20:21.079 emphasis on direct testimony owing I'm sure in part to 1575 02:20:21.120 --> 02:20:26.559 the fact that my background in part is at least 1576 02:20:26.639 --> 02:20:32.000 is that of a lawyer, you know. But also if 1577 02:20:32.000 --> 02:20:42.000 we're talking about intent, particularly of wartime executives, there's a 1578 02:20:42.079 --> 02:20:48.440 tendency to be able to rely upon the statements of 1579 02:20:48.520 --> 02:20:51.959 a wartime executive or an executive who is preparing for war, 1580 02:20:55.360 --> 02:21:03.159 there's a there's insteadive is at telling the truth when 1581 02:21:03.239 --> 02:21:06.479 the chief executives so situated, is talking to his cabinet 1582 02:21:09.079 --> 02:21:15.399 or as a general staff officers, Okay, because what incentive 1583 02:21:15.520 --> 02:21:18.760 or there be to lie number one, and there's there's 1584 02:21:18.879 --> 02:21:22.840 there's active disincentives to lie because that compromises the ability 1585 02:21:22.959 --> 02:21:32.000 of subordinate command elements to effectively execute orders and wage 1586 02:21:32.079 --> 02:21:41.719 war towards victory conditions, you know. And so I put 1587 02:21:41.760 --> 02:21:50.319 a lot of stock in what Stalin said, and a 1588 02:21:50.399 --> 02:21:54.959 lot of this testimony from Stalin himself, you know, that 1589 02:21:55.120 --> 02:21:59.680 which isn't independently documented by you know, the minutes of 1590 02:21:59.760 --> 02:22:09.159 his speeches or by audio recording. You know, A lot 1591 02:22:09.200 --> 02:22:13.399 of Stalin's intimates were the sources of these statements, including 1592 02:22:16.280 --> 02:22:26.319 Colonel Volkaganov, who was Stalin's official biographer, you know. And 1593 02:22:27.600 --> 02:22:33.840 Stalin gave a series of speeches in this in the 1594 02:22:33.959 --> 02:22:39.440 year preceding Barbarossa, but particularly the six to eight months 1595 02:22:39.479 --> 02:22:46.479 immediately proceeding onset of hostilities, which approximately reflects the final 1596 02:22:46.600 --> 02:22:51.399 phase of mobilization that we talked about just now, from 1597 02:22:51.479 --> 02:22:57.879 November nineteen forty to June nineteen forty one. And Volkoganov 1598 02:22:59.159 --> 02:23:06.200 makes the point that that Stalin was very taciturn, but 1599 02:23:06.639 --> 02:23:12.360 he became quite candid and quite open within the cloisters 1600 02:23:12.440 --> 02:23:19.680 of you know, these command element corridors in his discussion 1601 02:23:19.840 --> 02:23:26.440 of you know, what was to be military doctrine in 1602 02:23:27.040 --> 02:23:30.319 the next war, which he increasingly discussed as if it 1603 02:23:30.520 --> 02:23:41.239 was an imminent possibility. In Volkoganov's own words. In describing 1604 02:23:42.280 --> 02:23:46.200 the speech Stalin made on May fifth, nineteen forty one, 1605 02:23:48.200 --> 02:23:52.440 he says, quote, the Leader made it unmistakably, unmistakably clear. 1606 02:23:53.719 --> 02:23:57.479 War is inevitable in the future. One must be ready 1607 02:23:57.600 --> 02:24:04.399 for the quote unconditional destruction of German fascism. The world 1608 02:24:04.399 --> 02:24:07.239 will be fought on enemy territory and victory will be 1609 02:24:07.319 --> 02:24:16.319 achieved with few casualties. And again, this wasn't something that 1610 02:24:20.280 --> 02:24:28.239 Stalin merely devised as a polemical device to embolden forces 1611 02:24:28.319 --> 02:24:34.079 under his command or to overcome any potential or actual 1612 02:24:34.159 --> 02:24:42.319 crises and confidences among the general staff by appeal to 1613 02:24:45.479 --> 02:24:55.280 revolutionary fervor. Lenin made clear in identifying the core doctrinal 1614 02:24:55.360 --> 02:25:01.280 elements of the Red Army, you know, back in nineteen twenty, 1615 02:25:01.440 --> 02:25:05.799 nineteen twenty one, nineteen twenty two, that the Red Army 1616 02:25:05.920 --> 02:25:11.959 was an instrumentality of revolutionary imperatives. It wasn't a defensive element, 1617 02:25:13.120 --> 02:25:16.799 you know, and it was to be deployed offensively at 1618 02:25:16.799 --> 02:25:24.559 all times, you know, because the only rational for its 1619 02:25:24.639 --> 02:25:31.600 existence within the paradigm of Mercist historiography and Leninist revolutionary 1620 02:25:31.680 --> 02:25:39.280 doctrine was to facilitate the advance of history and the 1621 02:25:39.440 --> 02:25:45.559 victory of the proletariat against the class enemy. So there's 1622 02:25:45.600 --> 02:25:53.159 really no there's really no way to interpret Soviet battle 1623 02:25:53.280 --> 02:26:03.719 doctrine as anything other than discreetly ideologically coded and axiomatically offensive, 1624 02:26:05.239 --> 02:26:10.719 you know, And this is this is going on, or 1625 02:26:10.879 --> 02:26:15.559 this is relying upon the strictures of Marxist Leninist ontology 1626 02:26:17.559 --> 02:26:27.760 and the distinct Marxist view of military power and its 1627 02:26:27.879 --> 02:26:38.040 utility and its ethical functions. And the Marxist Leninism was 1628 02:26:38.719 --> 02:26:48.040 in fact a total philosophical and political system, impoverished as 1629 02:26:48.079 --> 02:26:52.440 it may have been intellectually in various capacities, and to 1630 02:26:52.520 --> 02:26:58.120 be fair at what's sophisticated in others, what's irrebuttable or indisputable, 1631 02:26:58.360 --> 02:27:04.120 is that it was a total theory of political and 1632 02:27:05.159 --> 02:27:12.879 social and thus historical antology. So the idea that the 1633 02:27:13.040 --> 02:27:18.079 party state, which to be clear, by nineteen forty one, 1634 02:27:19.920 --> 02:27:28.840 had categorically annihilated millions of people within the Soviet Union 1635 02:27:29.680 --> 02:27:38.120 owing to what was identified as their ineducability, you know, 1636 02:27:38.319 --> 02:27:45.520 the idea that Stalin or the Presidium or the Politburo 1637 02:27:46.000 --> 02:27:52.879 Standing Committee or these surviving command elements in the Red army. 1638 02:27:52.959 --> 02:27:58.920 The idea that they would somehow hesitate to see through 1639 02:27:59.520 --> 02:28:08.879 these doctrinal imperatives is somewhat laughable, you know. And we're 1640 02:28:08.920 --> 02:28:14.120 not in the court of law, so it shouldn't be 1641 02:28:14.200 --> 02:28:22.920 a problem to invoke subsequent as well as prior precedent 1642 02:28:26.760 --> 02:28:35.840 to demonstrate persuasively what the doctrinal character was of Marxist 1643 02:28:35.920 --> 02:28:42.600 Leninist revolutionary military elements. I invoked the case of Cambodia 1644 02:28:42.719 --> 02:28:48.840 a lot, you know, from nineteen seventy five to ninety 1645 02:28:48.879 --> 02:28:53.479 seventy nine. And I know for a fact, because I 1646 02:28:53.520 --> 02:28:58.840 got to hate me all it's affecting things. People suspect 1647 02:28:59.000 --> 02:29:11.319 I only do that for the sake of polemical uh expediency, 1648 02:29:11.479 --> 02:29:17.840 But that's not why. Paul Pott was not some simple 1649 02:29:17.920 --> 02:29:21.639 minded brute. He was actually a very sophisticated political soldier. 1650 02:29:22.639 --> 02:29:26.120 He had a very deep understanding of Marcis Leninism, far 1651 02:29:26.239 --> 02:29:34.600 more than Mao and Democratic Tempuccia. As Paul Pott and 1652 02:29:34.680 --> 02:29:42.959 his cadre branded the country during their brief tenure, was 1653 02:29:43.120 --> 02:29:49.559 a very pure Marcis Leninist stayed in some ways, and 1654 02:29:50.600 --> 02:29:59.920 there was nothing there. There was nothing heterodox an idiot 1655 02:30:00.040 --> 02:30:09.639 logical terms about the way they implemented class warfare adjusting 1656 02:30:09.719 --> 02:30:14.479 for the discrete conditions on the ground in Southeast Asia 1657 02:30:16.079 --> 02:30:20.319 as in nineteen seventy five. So what I'm getting at, 1658 02:30:20.360 --> 02:30:22.600 and I'll move on here in a moment I don't 1659 02:30:22.680 --> 02:30:25.280 quite understand. Are the same people who acknowledge that the 1660 02:30:25.399 --> 02:30:32.920 Soviet Union was this outlier country and that that was 1661 02:30:33.000 --> 02:30:37.200 unusual in every conceivable sense, you know, in terms of 1662 02:30:37.280 --> 02:30:44.120 practice and policy and theoretical foundations and everything else. Yet 1663 02:30:44.159 --> 02:30:47.799 they insist that this this didn't somehow impact military decision 1664 02:30:47.879 --> 02:30:55.200 making or that revolutionary ontology somehow, somehow stopped at the 1665 02:30:56.520 --> 02:31:00.440 at the point of executive decisionism when it came to 1666 02:31:01.399 --> 02:31:09.040 the decision to you know, spread the revolutionary cause to 1667 02:31:09.239 --> 02:31:17.559 Europe and specifically to annihilate the dialectical enemy in the 1668 02:31:17.639 --> 02:31:35.239 German Reich. But you know, the Stalin had spoken again 1669 02:31:35.280 --> 02:31:41.440 and again as well to the Central Committee, most notably 1670 02:31:41.559 --> 02:31:49.600 on January eighth, nineteen forty one, and there was two 1671 02:31:51.040 --> 02:32:01.399 high ranking Air Force officers in attendance, and Stalin apparently 1672 02:32:04.719 --> 02:32:12.000 spoke directly of the ratio and algorithm that was necessary 1673 02:32:12.079 --> 02:32:19.840 to defeat the German Reich. According to the General Staff, 1674 02:32:21.360 --> 02:32:28.280 as well as his own calculations as had been explicated 1675 02:32:28.399 --> 02:32:33.680 to him by authorities that he trusted. He spoke on 1676 02:32:33.719 --> 02:32:38.120 this particular day to quote twofold superiority. He said that, 1677 02:32:38.360 --> 02:32:41.879 as had been explained to him, twofold superiority is a 1678 02:32:42.079 --> 02:32:46.040 law of military science, meaning the two to one ratio 1679 02:32:49.600 --> 02:32:54.639 contra the enemy and offensive operations. You know, whether you're 1680 02:32:54.639 --> 02:32:59.879 talking about raw numbers or you know, force multipliers and 1681 02:33:00.120 --> 02:33:06.360 variables tending to act as force multipliers that magnify the 1682 02:33:06.440 --> 02:33:15.680 effectiveness of offensive elements, you know. And Stalin stated openly 1683 02:33:16.479 --> 02:33:21.079 that quote, this is not a game. The time is 1684 02:33:21.120 --> 02:33:28.840 approaching for military operations, twofold superiority is essential, but greater 1685 02:33:28.959 --> 02:33:38.360 supurity is even better. And he said that he spoke 1686 02:33:38.399 --> 02:33:46.479 specifically of the difficulty of traversing the Carpathians and the 1687 02:33:46.680 --> 02:33:53.840 need to designate at least five thousand attack aircraft in 1688 02:33:54.000 --> 02:33:58.879 order to neutralize defensive positions that infantry and armor aren't 1689 02:33:58.879 --> 02:34:04.319 going to be able to reddle traverse going to the terrain. Now, 1690 02:34:05.600 --> 02:34:08.280 this is hugely important for reasons I'm gonna get into 1691 02:34:08.360 --> 02:34:17.440 in a moment, Okay, But from January of forty one, 1692 02:34:17.600 --> 02:34:27.280 specifically January eighth, until May, you know, only weeks before Barbarossa. 1693 02:34:28.280 --> 02:34:33.159 Stalin talks again and again about waging military operations in 1694 02:34:33.239 --> 02:34:38.959 the Balkans, specifically across the Romanian frontier, and discrete exigencies 1695 02:34:39.079 --> 02:34:46.639 that are presented by waging war in that theater. Okay. 1696 02:34:53.120 --> 02:35:02.799 In a lecture given in the spring, I believe in 1697 02:35:02.879 --> 02:35:07.479 March of forty one, but somehow neglected to sign an 1698 02:35:07.520 --> 02:35:19.040 exec date, he addressed the Soviet Planopotentiary representative in Belgrade, 1699 02:35:21.959 --> 02:35:34.840 which at that time was under the rule briefly of 1700 02:35:35.760 --> 02:35:41.280 a Chetnik junta, which in turn led to the German 1701 02:35:43.399 --> 02:35:49.760 intervention and ultimately the you know, bifurcation of the Kingdom 1702 02:35:49.799 --> 02:35:57.120 of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes. But in addressing the Planopotentiary 1703 02:35:58.600 --> 02:36:04.520 Representative in Belgrade and select members of the Pullet Buro, 1704 02:36:06.719 --> 02:36:09.479 he said, quote, the USSOR will only react at the 1705 02:36:09.559 --> 02:36:14.879 proper time. The powers are scattering their forces more and more. 1706 02:36:15.920 --> 02:36:19.840 The USSR is therefore waiting to act unexpectedly against Germany, 1707 02:36:20.559 --> 02:36:24.360 and doing so, the USSR will cross the Carpathias, which 1708 02:36:24.399 --> 02:36:26.799 will lead to the signal for the revolution in Hungary. 1709 02:36:27.520 --> 02:36:31.920 Soviet troops will penetrate Yugoslavia from Hungary, advance the Adriatic Sea, 1710 02:36:32.520 --> 02:36:37.280 and cut Germany off from the Balkans in the Middle East. Okay, 1711 02:36:37.399 --> 02:36:46.479 so what does this mean in both immedia tactical terms 1712 02:36:47.520 --> 02:36:54.600 and how this impacted the battlefield situation in Operation Barbarossa 1713 02:36:54.639 --> 02:36:59.600 as well as in broader strategic terms. Well, I'll take 1714 02:36:59.600 --> 02:37:08.879 it away better question first, the latter aspect. First, the 1715 02:37:09.000 --> 02:37:16.399 Soviet Union plan to assault Europe through Romania. By capturing Romania, 1716 02:37:16.799 --> 02:37:22.879 it could deprive Germany of essential access to petroleum reserves. 1717 02:37:24.799 --> 02:37:35.000 And also that's commensurate with Soviet deep battle doctrine, which 1718 02:37:37.159 --> 02:37:44.159 presuming forces and being ratios that Stalin described as being 1719 02:37:45.600 --> 02:37:48.799 you know, at least a twofold advantage and preferably double 1720 02:37:48.879 --> 02:37:56.360 or triple that Stalin basically was planning a deep battle 1721 02:37:56.479 --> 02:38:00.639 like pincer flanking maneuver across the entirety of the continent 1722 02:38:02.239 --> 02:38:08.959 in the north through Sweden and then down to assault 1723 02:38:10.760 --> 02:38:15.479 Germany from the north and in the south. The main 1724 02:38:17.600 --> 02:38:21.920 stap punks would be through Romania. And I'll get into 1725 02:38:21.959 --> 02:38:28.040 in a moment. This is why the Army Group Center, 1726 02:38:29.760 --> 02:38:35.120 Army Group South faced savage resistance and Barbarossa Army Group 1727 02:38:35.239 --> 02:38:40.680 Center was moving so fast it was basically like face 1728 02:38:40.760 --> 02:38:43.520 with no more than token opposition on the road to Moscow, 1729 02:38:43.840 --> 02:38:50.639 which doesn't make any sense unless you understand the deployment 1730 02:38:51.120 --> 02:38:57.840 schema of the Red Army, which was totally offensive and 1731 02:38:58.200 --> 02:39:07.639 concentrated in the south in a way that wouldn't be 1732 02:39:07.840 --> 02:39:16.479 rationally in a in a defensive oriented schema. It's uh 1733 02:39:19.079 --> 02:39:27.040 most uh, most significant everyone, I'm jumping around a bit, 1734 02:39:27.200 --> 02:39:33.159 but so please stop me if I'm not being clear. 1735 02:39:36.520 --> 02:39:42.200 Most significant the suber of hypothesis in terms of Stalin's 1736 02:39:42.280 --> 02:39:50.399 declared intentions was probably what's going to be known as 1737 02:39:50.479 --> 02:39:56.600 the secret meeting with the polit Burrow and the Soviet 1738 02:39:56.680 --> 02:39:59.879 representatives of the Common Tern who had been called back 1739 02:40:00.399 --> 02:40:05.239 presumably to be availed for the specific person being availed 1740 02:40:05.280 --> 02:40:12.159 to this speech on August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, which 1741 02:40:12.280 --> 02:40:16.200 obviously coincided with the assault on the Japanese a Kalkin goal. 1742 02:40:17.159 --> 02:40:23.079 But this was a surprise secret meeting, and it was 1743 02:40:23.159 --> 02:40:27.079 unprecedented for the Russian delegation of the Common Turn to 1744 02:40:27.159 --> 02:40:30.000 be called back. Among other things, Stalin didn't have a 1745 02:40:30.040 --> 02:40:33.040 lot of he didn't have a lot of respect for 1746 02:40:33.120 --> 02:40:38.600 the Common turn. I mean in part because the his 1747 02:40:38.840 --> 02:40:49.440 UH rigid command doctrine. He didn't I mean, he wasn't 1748 02:40:49.520 --> 02:41:02.680 comfortable with UH an ideologically coded cadre structure, whereby independent 1749 02:41:02.760 --> 02:41:05.799 of Moscow, just going to the fact of distance and 1750 02:41:07.719 --> 02:41:12.959 you know, remoteness. You know, he didn't want some cadre 1751 02:41:13.479 --> 02:41:18.520 making decisions even superficially on behalf of the Soviet Union 1752 02:41:18.639 --> 02:41:23.799 without his direct oversight. Okay, but nonetheless, you know, the 1753 02:41:23.920 --> 02:41:27.120 common tern still had tremendous clout in ninety thirty nine, 1754 02:41:31.040 --> 02:41:37.040 and especially coming off of the defeat in Spain, there 1755 02:41:37.120 --> 02:41:43.920 was a real danger of a fracturing of a you know, 1756 02:41:44.000 --> 02:41:51.879 the broad international front red front. So this is highly significant. 1757 02:41:53.040 --> 02:41:54.799 You know, I guess what I'm getting at is that 1758 02:41:54.879 --> 02:42:00.680 Stalin wouldn't have called the Russian delegation backed for you know, 1759 02:42:00.719 --> 02:42:02.840 for the sake of putting on airs or to stand 1760 02:42:02.879 --> 02:42:06.959 on ceremony or something. And this is when I think, 1761 02:42:07.000 --> 02:42:11.600 I excuse me, I think I briefly addressed this last episode. 1762 02:42:12.319 --> 02:42:14.879 It was in this it was in this secret meeting 1763 02:42:15.239 --> 02:42:22.479 or secret speech that Stalin declared that uh, you know, 1764 02:42:25.520 --> 02:42:29.639 getting the Germans, to getting the right foreign ministry to 1765 02:42:29.760 --> 02:42:34.200 agree to a non aggression pact, you know, that would 1766 02:42:34.239 --> 02:42:39.319 embolden them to act against Poland, you know, because there 1767 02:42:39.360 --> 02:42:44.600 too for the Berlin and specifically Hitler felt that his 1768 02:42:44.760 --> 02:42:51.840 hands were tied in resolving the Polish issue because an 1769 02:42:51.879 --> 02:42:56.319 assault on Poland, even in the wake of a gross 1770 02:42:56.399 --> 02:43:02.399 provocation or violation at Germany's territorial integrity on the frontier, 1771 02:43:02.520 --> 02:43:05.159 you know, what, would lead to a Soviet counter strike 1772 02:43:05.239 --> 02:43:11.399 that would be devastating. So Stalin's reasoning was, you know, 1773 02:43:11.520 --> 02:43:17.479 we will, uh will lull Germany with this non aggression pact, 1774 02:43:19.520 --> 02:43:22.840 which you know absolutely guarantees that they will assault Poland, 1775 02:43:23.239 --> 02:43:26.040 which will then you know, lead to a war declaration 1776 02:43:26.239 --> 02:43:30.959 by the UK and France. Germany, you'll uh will probably 1777 02:43:31.079 --> 02:43:34.239 be victorious on the Western front, but only at pure 1778 02:43:34.360 --> 02:43:38.040 it cost, you know, and then uh you know and 1779 02:43:38.159 --> 02:43:45.000 that this thus this is the icebreaker that uh will 1780 02:43:45.120 --> 02:43:52.239 uh soften uh what would be Europe's defensive cordon and 1781 02:43:52.239 --> 02:43:54.639 allow the Red Army to you know, just bowl over 1782 02:43:55.440 --> 02:44:02.000 and annihilate resistance in the West and you know, thus 1783 02:44:03.600 --> 02:44:10.600 reverse the reverse the defeat handed to them and Iberia 1784 02:44:10.719 --> 02:44:16.799 and you know, conquer the continent in a rapid and 1785 02:44:16.920 --> 02:44:23.399 devastating operation. And I mean Stalin this is remarkably consistent 1786 02:44:23.479 --> 02:44:26.280 as far back as nineteen twenty five, you know, when 1787 02:44:26.319 --> 02:44:33.000 he was less than three years into his formal ascendancy 1788 02:44:33.079 --> 02:44:39.840 as General Secretary, he spoke openly about the need to 1789 02:44:40.719 --> 02:44:49.920 act militarily against Europe as soon as possible, but not 1790 02:44:50.079 --> 02:44:54.840 until the political climate and the you know, the myriad 1791 02:44:55.959 --> 02:45:02.239 it ever sort of changing alliance structure in the West 1792 02:45:05.879 --> 02:45:11.559 was such that what Don called the quote broad field 1793 02:45:11.600 --> 02:45:18.719 of activity would be realizable in order to you know, 1794 02:45:20.840 --> 02:45:24.479 pursue the imperative of world revolution. And to be clear, 1795 02:45:25.959 --> 02:45:31.520 you know, not only was a Europe along with America 1796 02:45:31.600 --> 02:45:39.680 and Japan, you know, the kind of productive core of 1797 02:45:39.799 --> 02:45:45.760 this planet, but you know, the understanding was that Europe 1798 02:45:45.879 --> 02:45:51.440 was still the inconceptual terms, you know, the political center 1799 02:45:51.559 --> 02:45:58.360 of human affairs. You know, conceptually, you know, every every 1800 02:46:00.879 --> 02:46:06.319 every ideological schema you know, came from Europe, and even 1801 02:46:06.959 --> 02:46:12.520 even things like the anti colonial movement were fully locked 1802 02:46:12.559 --> 02:46:19.319 into dialectical uh engagement you know, with with with European thought. 1803 02:46:19.520 --> 02:46:26.639 So Stalin's notion was that, you know, first last and 1804 02:46:26.680 --> 02:46:30.920 always your Europe needs to be overrun and annihilated, and 1805 02:46:31.680 --> 02:46:35.479 the revolution has to has to be implemented there. You know, 1806 02:46:35.719 --> 02:46:39.879 it's a waste of time and it's self defeating them pursue. Uh, 1807 02:46:41.959 --> 02:46:44.520 there's such imperatives on the periphery. But make no mistake, 1808 02:46:44.680 --> 02:46:48.959 you know where ever revolutionary activity jumped off that had 1809 02:46:49.079 --> 02:46:52.719 historical momentum and forced it in being Stalin absolutely was 1810 02:46:52.760 --> 02:46:55.760 in favor of supporting that and seeing that through. But 1811 02:46:56.559 --> 02:47:01.040 the uh, but but the but the core orientation of 1812 02:47:01.120 --> 02:47:05.000 the Soviet Union had to be you know, the the 1813 02:47:07.159 --> 02:47:11.399 you know, the implementing the World Revolution in Europe, you know, 1814 02:47:11.559 --> 02:47:15.520 first and foremost. And and that's also why the Spanish 1815 02:47:15.600 --> 02:47:18.319 War was so important. You know, it wasn't just uh. 1816 02:47:19.200 --> 02:47:22.799 I've read some court historians claim that Shalin was somehow 1817 02:47:23.200 --> 02:47:25.959 like reluctantly forced into the Spanish War just for the 1818 02:47:26.040 --> 02:47:29.200 sake of appeasing the common term. I mean, that's that's 1819 02:47:29.280 --> 02:47:32.399 that's laughable for all kinds of reasons. But it also 1820 02:47:34.200 --> 02:47:39.399 you know, Shalin wasn't as heterodox of a of a 1821 02:47:39.479 --> 02:47:43.520 Marxist Leninist as he's often portrayed. I mean, Stalin was complicated, 1822 02:47:44.120 --> 02:47:47.520 you know, Like I said, I it's a lean value, 1823 02:47:48.520 --> 02:47:51.319 but it's a great book. Carry Bolton's book stalin the 1824 02:47:51.440 --> 02:47:56.040 enduring legacy. You know, Shalin was a complicated figure, and 1825 02:47:56.280 --> 02:48:04.639 there were heterodox aspects to his worldview and his his 1826 02:48:04.799 --> 02:48:09.920 own Velt politique. But it wasn't a radical divergence or something, 1827 02:48:11.239 --> 02:48:16.319 you know, And that's important, especially because these days even 1828 02:48:17.280 --> 02:48:24.920 even some fairly heterodox political fearis and even some revisionists 1829 02:48:25.040 --> 02:48:36.280 seem to abide that fiction. But yeah, the you can't 1830 02:48:36.399 --> 02:48:41.200 and in other words, this you can't you can't extricate 1831 02:48:42.520 --> 02:48:50.239 the ambition of the Sovietization of Europe from the existence 1832 02:48:50.280 --> 02:48:54.200 of the Soviet Union itself. You know, these these these 1833 02:48:54.239 --> 02:48:59.840 ambitions were synonymous, and that's that's also why the Cold 1834 02:49:00.079 --> 02:49:05.760 War developed the way they did in in raw geo 1835 02:49:05.840 --> 02:49:13.000 strategic terms. But you know, and I think I can't 1836 02:49:13.000 --> 02:49:16.920 remember I mentioned or not this speech and question. You know, 1837 02:49:16.920 --> 02:49:21.319 the August nineteen, nineteen thirty nine speech. It was obtained 1838 02:49:21.760 --> 02:49:30.920 by the French news agency have us and uh, the 1839 02:49:31.079 --> 02:49:36.959 French were kind of notorious for getting a hold of 1840 02:49:38.479 --> 02:49:46.239 these kinds of documents and records, you know, And when 1841 02:49:49.040 --> 02:49:57.479 when the Havas agency by way of Geneva, when when? 1842 02:49:57.520 --> 02:50:02.840 When when they went public with it? It was published 1843 02:50:05.159 --> 02:50:12.319 in ah, some international journal and then in many of 1844 02:50:12.360 --> 02:50:20.200 the major French language newspapers. But Moscow's propagandas immediately went 1845 02:50:20.280 --> 02:50:22.879 into overdrive, you know, and claiming, you know, this is 1846 02:50:22.920 --> 02:50:26.399 a this is a forgery. You know, this, this is 1847 02:50:26.799 --> 02:50:31.399 confabulated by the the enemies of Russia and the Soviet Union. 1848 02:50:32.040 --> 02:50:36.719 You know, it's fascist propaganda. And uh it did not 1849 02:50:36.879 --> 02:50:39.200 make as nearly as big of an impact as one 1850 02:50:39.280 --> 02:50:46.719 might think, you know, which is really interesting because it 1851 02:50:46.799 --> 02:50:50.360 goes to show you too, how you know, And a 1852 02:50:50.399 --> 02:50:53.479 lot of that too had to do with, uh, this 1853 02:50:53.639 --> 02:50:59.040 kind of deafening silence from American news agencies, you know, 1854 02:50:59.040 --> 02:51:05.719 and other than all the major papers in America, I mean, 1855 02:51:05.760 --> 02:51:12.959 other than those brands held by McCormick were basically uh, 1856 02:51:13.639 --> 02:51:17.600 mouthpieces for the New Deal regime, you know. But it's 1857 02:51:17.639 --> 02:51:22.920 still I mean obviously too, I mean this there's a 1858 02:51:23.040 --> 02:51:28.159 kind of nascent, low tech globalism emerging at least between 1859 02:51:28.239 --> 02:51:33.280 America and Europe by way of you know, the UK, 1860 02:51:35.040 --> 02:51:39.239 but even you know, I mean, it's it's, it's it's 1861 02:51:39.239 --> 02:51:44.799 stormans remarkable that there is basically no impact in terms 1862 02:51:44.840 --> 02:51:49.879 of global opinion. And uh I've looked too to see 1863 02:51:49.920 --> 02:51:58.680 if this pops up in any America first literature, and 1864 02:51:58.840 --> 02:52:05.440 I haven't found anything this positive on that question. But 1865 02:52:05.559 --> 02:52:07.639 that again goes to show you to the degree to 1866 02:52:07.680 --> 02:52:16.440 which the psychological environment was being actively manipulated, you know, 1867 02:52:16.920 --> 02:52:20.360 long before the onset of formal hostilities, which might seem 1868 02:52:20.399 --> 02:52:28.440 like an obvious point to you or myself, but people 1869 02:52:28.520 --> 02:52:35.680 are inundated in this country with this idea that you know, 1870 02:52:35.879 --> 02:52:41.719 somehow the New Dealers had no interest in these goings 1871 02:52:41.760 --> 02:52:46.760 on and the European War and the intries from the 1872 02:52:46.840 --> 02:52:49.760 Soviet Union, the German Reich, you know, until Pearl Harbor, 1873 02:52:49.840 --> 02:52:52.200 when America was attacked. Then that changed everything. I mean 1874 02:52:52.239 --> 02:52:57.239 that that could not be more false, from the first 1875 02:52:57.520 --> 02:53:04.159 h to the New Deal regime, which again coincided almost 1876 02:53:04.239 --> 02:53:12.840 precisely with the National Socialist Revolution, which was a totally 1877 02:53:12.959 --> 02:53:22.600 legal revolution again, you know, and Roosevelt from the first 1878 02:53:22.680 --> 02:53:32.280 days of his administration was pursuing an an absolutely radical 1879 02:53:32.360 --> 02:53:41.799 anti fascist imperative as the core mandate of an ambition 1880 02:53:42.159 --> 02:53:47.479 of his administration, you know, And that can't they can't 1881 02:53:47.520 --> 02:53:52.559 be denied, you know, in the I don't want to 1882 02:53:52.600 --> 02:54:00.120 spin this off to tangentially, and I know that a 1883 02:54:00.200 --> 02:54:04.520 lot of people criticize me for my sources, well, yet 1884 02:54:04.559 --> 02:54:09.920 they have yet to directly rebut any of these data 1885 02:54:10.000 --> 02:54:14.760 points that have derived from these sources, namely Robert Conquests 1886 02:54:16.239 --> 02:54:22.680 and Ernst Nolty, and as well as the Black Book 1887 02:54:22.719 --> 02:54:26.600 of Communism, which is a great resource. I'm gonna add, 1888 02:54:27.680 --> 02:54:35.360 but it's indisputable if the Soviet Union exterminated millions of 1889 02:54:35.479 --> 02:54:47.680 people between nineteen seventeen and nineteen forty one, and there 1890 02:54:47.760 --> 02:54:51.440 was a massive series of death camps, actual death camps 1891 02:54:53.200 --> 02:55:01.879 that were employed towards this incredibly gruesome task, and the 1892 02:55:02.000 --> 02:55:06.440 degree to which there was an information blackout about this 1893 02:55:06.639 --> 02:55:14.920 reality can't be overstated, you know. And people who raised 1894 02:55:14.959 --> 02:55:19.639 this issue, you know, not just not just America Firsters, 1895 02:55:19.760 --> 02:55:28.760 but Joseph Schumpeter's wife. Interestingly, she spoke Japanese and and 1896 02:55:28.879 --> 02:55:32.399 she was a big advocate for Japanese people. She was 1897 02:55:32.479 --> 02:55:34.760 kind of a human rights type, but of a genuine sort, 1898 02:55:34.879 --> 02:55:40.840 not like the twenty first century sort. And uh, she 1899 02:55:41.159 --> 02:55:47.799 raised the issue of Soviet annihilation therapy as an ULTI 1900 02:55:47.879 --> 02:55:50.600 called it, and she was she and Schumper were her 1901 02:55:50.680 --> 02:55:54.520 hassled by the FBI. Both were you know, sympathies for 1902 02:55:54.639 --> 02:55:59.079 the Axis vis a vis her, you know, dealings with 1903 02:55:59.360 --> 02:56:02.760 with these people and stuff, and particularly Japanese people are 1904 02:56:02.879 --> 02:56:09.239 being persecuted by the New Dealers, but also you know, 1905 02:56:11.360 --> 02:56:14.559 propagandizing against the Soviet Union, in their view, was this 1906 02:56:14.719 --> 02:56:20.760 big subversive act, you know, which seems kind of an 1907 02:56:20.920 --> 02:56:29.360 incredible I'd imagine that people today, but they don't. I mean, 1908 02:56:29.559 --> 02:56:33.239 but I mean, it only seems incredible if one doesn't 1909 02:56:33.280 --> 02:56:39.479 accept the true nature of a of that regime. But 1910 02:56:40.120 --> 02:56:49.399 that aside, it's remarkable that agree to which these things 1911 02:56:49.479 --> 02:56:56.879 could in fact be could in fact be hidden, you know, 1912 02:57:00.280 --> 02:57:04.280 But that also raised I mean, there's also and obliquely 1913 02:57:05.440 --> 02:57:12.520 and conversely it it also begs the question, you know, 1914 02:57:12.680 --> 02:57:22.719 if there was this mass murder conspiracy hatched in the 1915 02:57:22.840 --> 02:57:27.159 German Reich at Vance in ninety forty two, like why 1916 02:57:27.280 --> 02:57:30.920 wasn't anybody you know, publicizing that? I mean that one 1917 02:57:30.959 --> 02:57:32.639 would think that would be a godsend to the New 1918 02:57:32.719 --> 02:57:40.440 Dealers and a perfect way to portray the Germans as 1919 02:57:41.760 --> 02:57:47.239 these horrific villains, and especially became imperative you know by 1920 02:57:47.840 --> 02:57:54.479 ninety forty four, as the UIs Army was quite literally 1921 02:57:54.559 --> 02:57:57.440 near mutiny, you know, which we've talked about that was 1922 02:57:59.000 --> 02:58:01.799 the real catalyst for the execution of Poort Eddie Slavic. 1923 02:58:01.959 --> 02:58:09.760 You know, it's people so uh, you know, the Walter 1924 02:58:09.879 --> 02:58:13.959 Winschel and uh, the Office of War Information and all 1925 02:58:14.000 --> 02:58:22.360 these myriad anglophone news agencies. They just decided not to 1926 02:58:22.440 --> 02:58:26.399 report on the fact that the German Reich only existed 1927 02:58:26.479 --> 02:58:28.719 to exterminate Jewish people just because they didn't think it 1928 02:58:28.760 --> 02:58:31.639 was important, you know, they did, they didn't think it 1929 02:58:31.719 --> 02:58:37.120 was a useful way to code propaganda. I mean, that's 1930 02:58:37.120 --> 02:58:40.479 like a bit tangential. But moving on real quick, so 1931 02:58:40.520 --> 02:58:48.159 I realize we're running out of time. I mentioned a 1932 02:58:48.280 --> 02:58:53.319 moment ago. Something that's often raised is okay, So why 1933 02:58:53.479 --> 02:58:59.040 why was Barbarossa so tactically so tactically successful? And why 1934 02:58:59.200 --> 02:59:06.479 was the Attrition eight so algorithmically skewed against the Soviet 1935 02:59:06.760 --> 02:59:13.760 Union if in fact the Soviet Union was mobilized for 1936 02:59:13.879 --> 02:59:16.520 war and planning to attack. But that that's exactly why 1937 02:59:17.120 --> 02:59:23.840 these things did develop that way. The Soviets were planning 1938 02:59:23.920 --> 02:59:31.399 to assault Romania by autumn of forty one, and that's 1939 02:59:31.479 --> 02:59:41.399 exactly why, like I said, army groups South encountered comparatively 1940 02:59:41.520 --> 02:59:48.399 savage resistance and that's also why that's also why there 1941 02:59:48.479 --> 02:59:53.120 was a there was powerful reserve elements in Ukraine because 1942 02:59:53.239 --> 02:59:59.639 essentially they were there to rapidly reinforce the shock element 1943 02:59:59.799 --> 03:00:03.399 that was going to assault the Balkans. So there was 1944 03:00:03.440 --> 03:00:09.639 this awkwardly unbalanced deployment scheme of Soviet field armies where 1945 03:00:12.200 --> 03:00:17.120 Soviet forces blocking the corridor to the Moscow Leningrad deployment 1946 03:00:17.239 --> 03:00:21.399 space they were exponentially weaker than those deployed to Ukraine, 1947 03:00:22.159 --> 03:00:25.239 which doesn't make any sense unless you account for the 1948 03:00:25.360 --> 03:00:31.639 fact that they were deployed in offensive posture, the fair 1949 03:00:31.719 --> 03:00:39.200 punk of which was you know, in the south to 1950 03:00:39.319 --> 03:00:47.479 assault Romania through the Carpathians. Now, don't get me wrong, 1951 03:00:48.520 --> 03:00:53.959 the Soviets were sensitive to the fact that Moscow was 1952 03:00:55.799 --> 03:01:06.920 being left relatively undefended. But uh, you know, it doesn't like, 1953 03:01:07.120 --> 03:01:11.280 it doesn't track any other way other than accept what 1954 03:01:11.399 --> 03:01:16.159 I just acknowledged. And it's also you know, again this 1955 03:01:16.360 --> 03:01:20.840 idea that's endlessly banned to this day, that that Stalin 1956 03:01:21.000 --> 03:01:24.200 was afraid of Hitler, or that the Soviet Union was 1957 03:01:24.239 --> 03:01:26.559 afraid of the Vermach. That it's like, well, I mean, okay, 1958 03:01:26.600 --> 03:01:30.319 that's preposterous anyway, But so Stalin was so afraid of 1959 03:01:30.399 --> 03:01:34.559 the Vermach that he he there They're basically was a 1960 03:01:34.639 --> 03:01:44.000 token deployment on the UH path to Moscow. You know, 1961 03:01:44.040 --> 03:01:48.799 I mean, how how is amply does that work? Any uh? 1962 03:01:51.479 --> 03:02:00.600 I mean, any interpretation is uh he can only result 1963 03:02:00.719 --> 03:02:06.959 in a conclusion that the Soviets were poised for exclusively 1964 03:02:07.079 --> 03:02:11.520 offensive operations. I mean, unless you can it's a tortured 1965 03:02:11.600 --> 03:02:13.760 kind of logic. I mean, I guess you could claim 1966 03:02:13.920 --> 03:02:19.920 that the Soviets wanted to draw the Germans in and 1967 03:02:20.120 --> 03:02:23.840 funnel the main line of the funnel under the to 1968 03:02:23.959 --> 03:02:26.959 the main line of resistance at the gates of Moscow 1969 03:02:27.079 --> 03:02:31.159 and stop them their tracks, but that Moscow practically felt 1970 03:02:31.920 --> 03:02:37.799 you know, that doesn't make any sense. I've read people 1971 03:02:37.879 --> 03:02:40.239 who try to make some variation of that argument, but 1972 03:02:40.319 --> 03:02:43.239 it's it's so preposterous. I don't really think it warrants 1973 03:02:43.280 --> 03:02:51.120 to kind of blow by blow rebuttal but that's really, 1974 03:02:52.959 --> 03:03:01.959 you know, an example of extent conditions. Speaking of herself 1975 03:03:02.440 --> 03:03:05.959 and the resistance that IRA Group Center did encounter. To 1976 03:03:06.079 --> 03:03:11.000 be clear, they weren't defensively deployed either. There wasn't any 1977 03:03:11.159 --> 03:03:19.680 depth to their deployment schema and they in fact were 1978 03:03:19.799 --> 03:03:28.840 forward deployed with a heavily armed shock element in the lead, 1979 03:03:30.680 --> 03:03:35.000 you know, which is one reason why our group center 1980 03:03:35.680 --> 03:03:39.280 such as they didn't counter resistance. They got hit with 1981 03:03:39.440 --> 03:03:46.520 a lot of firepower that was immediately exhausted, and then 1982 03:03:48.559 --> 03:03:53.239 when counterattacking the Vermont immediately broke Soviet lines because there 1983 03:03:53.360 --> 03:03:56.879 was again, there wasn't any there wasn't any depth to 1984 03:03:56.959 --> 03:04:01.040 the deployment. You know, if you know anything, I'm not 1985 03:04:01.280 --> 03:04:06.399 any I'm not at all like a military type person, 1986 03:04:06.600 --> 03:04:11.719 but I do know something about the internal logic of 1987 03:04:12.559 --> 03:04:17.680 modern warfare, you know, in an abstract deployment. Since I mean, 1988 03:04:18.840 --> 03:04:22.479 and if you know anything about this just not even 1989 03:04:22.520 --> 03:04:26.840 really deep diving into the numerical data points and stuff, 1990 03:04:26.879 --> 03:04:29.000 but it's literally looking at the map of the deployment 1991 03:04:29.040 --> 03:04:32.239 scheme of this should jump right out at you. It's 1992 03:04:32.479 --> 03:04:37.200 it's almost like you know those a you know, it's 1993 03:04:37.200 --> 03:04:40.319 like illusion pictures. They used to see them a lot, 1994 03:04:40.520 --> 03:04:43.000 like beer companies, and it's like you look at some 1995 03:04:43.159 --> 03:04:46.559 picture and it looks like it's like a bunch of 1996 03:04:46.639 --> 03:04:49.000 old pictures, a Spudge Mackenzie or something. But then you 1997 03:04:49.079 --> 03:04:51.079 see it and it's like a sexy girl or something. 1998 03:04:51.639 --> 03:04:53.680 And then once you see that, like, you can't unsee it. 1999 03:04:54.559 --> 03:04:58.399 What's like that? Okay? I mean you look at you 2000 03:04:58.479 --> 03:05:03.360 look at a deployment map of the Moscow, Leningrad Gorky 2001 03:05:06.479 --> 03:05:14.120 battlespace on June twenty second, ninety forty one, and you 2002 03:05:14.920 --> 03:05:17.959 realize like what it is, and then and then you 2003 03:05:18.079 --> 03:05:21.200 can't undersee it, you know. So the fact anybody who 2004 03:05:22.559 --> 03:05:24.479 makes an argument of the contrary, I got to assume 2005 03:05:24.520 --> 03:05:29.040 they're being dishonest or they're just profoundly ignorant of the 2006 03:05:29.079 --> 03:05:32.840 subject matter. Yeah, it looks like we've gone over an hour. 2007 03:05:33.159 --> 03:05:34.840 I hope that wasn't to skater shot man. 2008 03:05:37.040 --> 03:05:39.879 Let me let me hit you up with one question 2009 03:05:40.000 --> 03:05:42.879 before we go, and this is this is a little 2010 03:05:42.879 --> 03:05:45.079 bit off topic, but it's a question I wanted to 2011 03:05:45.079 --> 03:05:47.680 ask since we were talking about Stalin so much. Yeah, 2012 03:05:49.280 --> 03:05:51.600 did Stalin take half of Europe at the end of 2013 03:05:51.639 --> 03:05:53.680 the war or was he given half of Europe at 2014 03:05:53.719 --> 03:05:54.319 the end of the war? 2015 03:05:55.200 --> 03:05:59.920 I mean both, That's what was decided at Yalta. If 2016 03:06:00.000 --> 03:06:06.079 if if Stalin was gonna be precluded from taking Germany, 2017 03:06:06.440 --> 03:06:11.639 that meant that Eisenhower and Montgomery would have had to 2018 03:06:11.680 --> 03:06:15.879 assault Berlin. And had they done that, what would have 2019 03:06:16.000 --> 03:06:27.479 happened was even accounting for the punitive and purely a 2020 03:06:27.559 --> 03:06:34.639 lot purely ideologically motivated and additional surrender demand, vermacht Off 2021 03:06:34.680 --> 03:06:38.520 and SS elements would have basically welcomed them in because 2022 03:06:39.079 --> 03:06:42.840 that would have prevented the literal rape of and destruction 2023 03:06:43.079 --> 03:06:49.920 of the German Reich. And once it was clear that 2024 03:06:51.680 --> 03:06:56.440 Anglo American forces intended to take Berlin, Stalin would have 2025 03:06:56.479 --> 03:07:04.239 immediately shifted to a footing of hostility cat for the 2026 03:07:04.360 --> 03:07:11.079 United States and the UK. And even before that happened, 2027 03:07:11.120 --> 03:07:18.000 it's conceivable that these elements that were driving for Berlin 2028 03:07:19.680 --> 03:07:26.920 on the Soviet side, like first Ukrainian Shock Army, which 2029 03:07:26.920 --> 03:07:30.120 I think was under Rock. I think that I think 2030 03:07:30.159 --> 03:07:34.680 first Ukrainian Shock Army was enter Timoshenko. But whoever whatever 2031 03:07:34.840 --> 03:07:42.760 formation cone Of and Rakasovsky respectively were commanding, it's very 2032 03:07:42.840 --> 03:07:49.120 conceivable that they would have ordered down the company level 2033 03:07:50.079 --> 03:07:54.239 commanders to treat the US and the UK as enemies 2034 03:07:55.000 --> 03:07:58.360 who were literally trying to race to Berlin, as to 2035 03:07:58.479 --> 03:08:01.959 act as a blocking element, and the Soviet view, you know, 2036 03:08:02.159 --> 03:08:09.040 for the Germans so America to found itself at war 2037 03:08:09.159 --> 03:08:16.920 with the Soviet Union. You know, that's the only alternative. 2038 03:08:17.520 --> 03:08:19.479 But I mean, that's what that you like, I said, 2039 03:08:19.520 --> 03:08:22.600 the thing was decided at Yelta. It's I mean, I 2040 03:08:22.639 --> 03:08:33.280 don't you can uh. On the one hand, yeah, it 2041 03:08:33.440 --> 03:08:35.799 was the new It was the New Dealers who kept 2042 03:08:35.840 --> 03:08:41.920 the Soviet Union in the war. But like von Manstein, 2043 03:08:42.000 --> 03:08:46.959 I highly recommend von Manstein's it's marketed as his memoirs, 2044 03:08:47.000 --> 03:08:49.680 it's called Lost Victories, but in reality it was just 2045 03:08:49.840 --> 03:08:53.799 debriefing by the War Department, which obviously was very interested 2046 03:08:54.680 --> 03:08:58.680 in learning as much as they could about fighting the 2047 03:08:58.760 --> 03:09:03.479 Soviet Union with combined conventional combined arms, with an emphasis 2048 03:09:03.559 --> 03:09:10.959 on armored columns. Obviously. But Mannstein, who really was like 2049 03:09:11.040 --> 03:09:14.040 a kind of Prussian martinet and a very prejudiced guy. 2050 03:09:16.079 --> 03:09:22.000 He stipulated that the Soviet army was unbelievably tough. They 2051 03:09:22.040 --> 03:09:29.440 could absorb catastrophic attrition and not fall apart, and much 2052 03:09:29.479 --> 03:09:34.639 as in the Western world, as we might view their 2053 03:09:34.879 --> 03:09:39.360 doctrinal orientation on the battlefield as exhibiting a kind of 2054 03:09:39.440 --> 03:09:48.000 callous disregard for human life, it was and is highly effective. 2055 03:09:49.159 --> 03:09:52.760 And those things are all true. You can't really take 2056 03:09:52.799 --> 03:09:57.639 away from the gameness and just the raw toughness of 2057 03:09:57.799 --> 03:10:00.879 the Red Army. You know. So I'm not gonna sit 2058 03:10:00.959 --> 03:10:04.319 here and say that, oh, Shtalin was just handed a 2059 03:10:04.440 --> 03:10:10.799 gift by you know, the New Dealers and in general Eisenhower. 2060 03:10:11.479 --> 03:10:15.360 You know, because uh, the Soviet Union fought for every 2061 03:10:15.440 --> 03:10:21.239 single inch of ground that uh they won back, and uh, 2062 03:10:23.079 --> 03:10:29.239 the the attrition THEA endured is almost unfathomable. Yet by 2063 03:10:29.280 --> 03:10:31.840 the time they reached Berlin, their morale was great. They 2064 03:10:31.879 --> 03:10:33.879 were acting like they were at a party. I'm not 2065 03:10:33.959 --> 03:10:37.639 being flippant. They were doing utterly horrible, horrible things. By 2066 03:10:37.680 --> 03:10:40.879 my point being, the enronament that arrived in Berlin wasn't 2067 03:10:40.920 --> 03:10:43.719 some broken ragtag for us. It was a very game, 2068 03:10:46.000 --> 03:10:49.799 very aggressive, very high morale element, which is one of 2069 03:10:49.840 --> 03:10:53.520 the reasons why they were so dangerous. Like it's realistic. 2070 03:10:53.680 --> 03:10:59.760 And their Utergang where Troutle young, you know, Uh, she's 2071 03:10:59.799 --> 03:11:02.600 trying to pass through Soviet lines and then like the 2072 03:11:02.680 --> 03:11:04.120 kid runs up and grabs her hand. 2073 03:11:04.600 --> 03:11:04.760 You know. 2074 03:11:04.879 --> 03:11:09.440 It's so it's a really poignant scene. But uh there's 2075 03:11:09.479 --> 03:11:12.639 the Soviet infantry men and they're like guzlin vodka and 2076 03:11:12.840 --> 03:11:15.079 like dancing like you're at a party. You know, these 2077 03:11:15.120 --> 03:11:18.760 guys have just been in action for the you know, 2078 03:11:18.959 --> 03:11:21.760 these guys probably were the last they were probably like 2079 03:11:21.799 --> 03:11:23.799 the last element drafted. They were probably the guys who 2080 03:11:23.879 --> 03:11:28.440 turned eighteen, you know in uh in a in the 2081 03:11:29.239 --> 03:11:32.879 in January of nineteen forty five, you know, and then 2082 03:11:33.000 --> 03:11:36.079 took you know, like eighty percent casualties. You know, they're 2083 03:11:36.200 --> 03:11:38.440 and they're they're like the surviving element, and they're they're 2084 03:11:38.440 --> 03:11:42.040 acting like you're at a party. You know, they most 2085 03:11:42.680 --> 03:11:45.479 most people would have fallen apart, you know, even when 2086 03:11:45.520 --> 03:11:48.600 they had the kind of that kind of momentum in 2087 03:11:49.040 --> 03:11:52.799 broad strategic terms, just because it was so it was 2088 03:11:52.879 --> 03:11:56.159 so brutal and so catastrophic. So yeah, I'm not I'm 2089 03:11:56.200 --> 03:11:58.399 not gonna take anything away from the Ivans in terms 2090 03:11:58.399 --> 03:12:01.479 of their toughness and gameness. But it you know, I 2091 03:12:02.159 --> 03:12:09.280 a race to Berlin between Montgomery and Eisenhower and and 2092 03:12:09.559 --> 03:12:15.000 uh the Soviets would have meant war. So that's the 2093 03:12:15.079 --> 03:12:16.040 best answer I can give. 2094 03:12:17.639 --> 03:12:21.280 Awesome, All right, Well, I will encourage people to go 2095 03:12:21.280 --> 03:12:24.520 over to Thomas's substack that's real Thomas seven seven seven 2096 03:12:24.600 --> 03:12:28.159 dot substack dot com, and you can connect to him 2097 03:12:29.239 --> 03:12:33.319 from from there to anywhere that he's at, and uh 2098 03:12:33.799 --> 03:12:37.840 check him out on Twitter and make sure to subscribe 2099 03:12:37.879 --> 03:12:41.239 to a substack so you can get the episodes and 2100 03:12:41.479 --> 03:12:45.360 hear them. So yeah, that's at Thomas. This was a 2101 03:12:45.639 --> 03:12:47.399 This was a great series. I thought this was a 2102 03:12:47.479 --> 03:12:51.040 series that needed to get out there, especially after reading 2103 03:12:51.319 --> 03:12:55.879 after reading sub Off and getting a little of the 2104 03:12:55.920 --> 03:12:59.879 way through Hoffman and having to finish Hoffman. It's just 2105 03:13:00.200 --> 03:13:05.040 vital information that people are you're not going to hear 2106 03:13:06.399 --> 03:13:11.079 even if you exit court history. This is stuff that's 2107 03:13:11.120 --> 03:13:13.719 hidden and there's a reason why both of those books. 2108 03:13:13.719 --> 03:13:15.799 If you want original copies of both of those books, 2109 03:13:15.840 --> 03:13:17.360 you're paying two three hundred dollars. 2110 03:13:18.120 --> 03:13:20.879 Yeah, yeah, no, I agree on all accounts. And yeah, 2111 03:13:21.000 --> 03:13:25.680 thanks thanks for including me man or rather for inviting 2112 03:13:25.760 --> 03:13:29.559 me to participate in lieu of somebody else. That's just great. 2113 03:13:30.719 --> 03:13:33.239 Really, thank you, Thomas. Take care now.