1 00:00:00,600 --> 00:00:03,359 Speaker 1: I want to welcome everyone back to the Pekanona Show. 2 00:00:03,879 --> 00:00:08,039 Thomas is back and we're still taking a break from 3 00:00:08,119 --> 00:00:12,359 the Continental Philosophy series. We'll be getting back into that soon. 4 00:00:13,320 --> 00:00:18,079 But I asked Thomas to cover a topic that I've 5 00:00:18,120 --> 00:00:21,679 been wanting to cover for a while, and yeah, I 6 00:00:21,719 --> 00:00:23,600 told them he can take as many episodes as he 7 00:00:23,679 --> 00:00:25,640 wants to cover this because I think this is real 8 00:00:25,719 --> 00:00:31,399 important for from the revisionist perspective when World War according 9 00:00:31,399 --> 00:00:36,079 to World War Two, and it's also from podcasts I've 10 00:00:36,119 --> 00:00:39,320 heard in the past talking about it. It's quite controversial 11 00:00:39,520 --> 00:00:41,520 and maybe I'll ask you some questions about that at 12 00:00:41,520 --> 00:00:45,560 the end, Thomas even controversial amongst our guys, and I 13 00:00:45,640 --> 00:00:49,520 have a reason why I think it is. But why 14 00:00:49,560 --> 00:00:51,159 don't you tell us what we're going to talk about today? 15 00:00:52,439 --> 00:00:56,159 Speaker 2: Well, in broad causal terms, we're going to talk about 16 00:00:56,439 --> 00:00:59,039 the role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War. 17 00:01:01,880 --> 00:01:12,799 That's an issue that's mischaracterized. The main minority viewpoint is 18 00:01:12,799 --> 00:01:19,120 presented by Victor Suvarov's Icebreaker. Suvarov is a pseudonym for 19 00:01:19,599 --> 00:01:26,680 the Soviet defector who was deeply insinuated in the gru 20 00:01:28,959 --> 00:01:36,519 which was the military's the Red Armies counterpart to KGB. 21 00:01:38,280 --> 00:01:41,680 KGB was technically a branch of the Soviet military, but 22 00:01:41,879 --> 00:01:51,760 gru was literally army intelligence because it may insisted well 23 00:01:53,159 --> 00:02:03,280 most people in addressing Suverov, they've got to discrete narrow focus. Essentially, 24 00:02:03,280 --> 00:02:06,079 when they begin their analysis is on the eve of 25 00:02:06,120 --> 00:02:10,919 Operation Barbarossa, and they get bogged down in the minutia 26 00:02:11,080 --> 00:02:15,479 of what were Soviet deployments, how are they arrayed? Were 27 00:02:15,479 --> 00:02:23,280 they offensively arrayed? What were the comparative force levels and 28 00:02:23,319 --> 00:02:26,919 capabilities of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. Now these 29 00:02:26,919 --> 00:02:33,319 things are relevant, and I'll address those things, but that's 30 00:02:33,360 --> 00:02:38,400 not an adequate analysis, and Suvarov didn't begin as analysis 31 00:02:38,479 --> 00:02:44,800 there either. Suvarov's claim is that the Soviet Union literally 32 00:02:44,840 --> 00:02:53,960 started World War Two, and I accept that, and it's 33 00:02:54,000 --> 00:02:59,680 not strictly military analysis. Everything about the Second World War 34 00:02:59,759 --> 00:03:03,319 was a dialogue with Soviet power and the Soviet Union. 35 00:03:04,000 --> 00:03:07,319 The entire twentieth century was in dialogue with the Soviet 36 00:03:07,400 --> 00:03:16,280 Union and its existence and the ideology that animated its structure, activity, 37 00:03:17,919 --> 00:03:25,879 decision making, and you know, every imperative related to power, 38 00:03:25,879 --> 00:03:33,319 political activity, they're in so other people there's a subset 39 00:03:33,360 --> 00:03:37,520 of people just don't really understand the issues presented, and 40 00:03:37,800 --> 00:03:45,759 they essentially accept what court historians claim. But then they 41 00:03:45,879 --> 00:03:48,599 diverge or they think that the question is should there 42 00:03:50,159 --> 00:03:53,159 you know, should there be a deeper analysis at this 43 00:03:53,280 --> 00:03:57,360 key juncture in the summer of nineteen forty one, they're 44 00:03:57,400 --> 00:04:02,680 looking at it the wrong way, you know, either out 45 00:04:02,719 --> 00:04:08,639 of ignorance or because they're powed by what they do 46 00:04:08,800 --> 00:04:15,759 as a political consensus among academ and they don't want 47 00:04:15,800 --> 00:04:21,399 to be availed a kind of punitive scrutiny. And I'll 48 00:04:21,399 --> 00:04:25,959 get into what I mean by that, you know, I 49 00:04:25,959 --> 00:04:31,800 if you if you accept the if you accept Suvarov's perspective, 50 00:04:32,120 --> 00:04:37,920 which was also shared by Jakam Hoffman. Jackham Hoffman was 51 00:04:37,959 --> 00:04:43,639 a military historian. He was when he was alive. He 52 00:04:43,759 --> 00:04:47,360 died in middle age in the nineteen nineties early two thousands. 53 00:04:47,399 --> 00:04:52,160 But he wrote this exhaustive book called Stalin's War of Extermination, 54 00:04:53,800 --> 00:05:06,079 and he was essentially uh bundesevel archivist. And he wrote 55 00:05:06,079 --> 00:05:14,279 this exhaustive book about the origins of the Second World War. 56 00:05:14,560 --> 00:05:18,040 And you know, about half of it is dedicated to 57 00:05:18,120 --> 00:05:24,319 the political conditions that gave rise the conflict, and about 58 00:05:24,319 --> 00:05:26,839 half of it deals with kind of hard and fast 59 00:05:28,240 --> 00:05:32,439 military subject matter. But I think that's the best book 60 00:05:32,480 --> 00:05:39,639 written on the topic, and he agreed very much with 61 00:05:39,639 --> 00:05:48,680 with Suvras analysis, but also myself, especially being somebody who 62 00:05:48,720 --> 00:05:58,680 favors direct evidence and the testimony of parties to the 63 00:05:58,720 --> 00:06:02,879 events in question. You know, if you look at what 64 00:06:02,959 --> 00:06:08,839 Stalin said, and if you examine the sort of ontological 65 00:06:08,879 --> 00:06:16,759 aspects the pedigonology of Marxist Leninism, there should be something 66 00:06:16,759 --> 00:06:21,399 of a no brainer. You know, this idea that the 67 00:06:21,439 --> 00:06:28,319 Soviet Union didn't have ambitions of an imperialistic nature, that 68 00:06:28,480 --> 00:06:34,759 it had no interest in exporting its ideology to the 69 00:06:34,879 --> 00:06:41,519 rest of the developed world, that it wasn't possessed of 70 00:06:41,560 --> 00:06:52,360 an expansionist sensibility, that's laughable. I mean, it's laughable because 71 00:06:53,279 --> 00:06:57,759 the only thing that sustains the revolutionary political cultures such 72 00:06:57,800 --> 00:07:06,519 as that that was characteristic of the Soviet Union is 73 00:07:06,560 --> 00:07:10,920 this kind of dynamic revolutionary violence that's got to be 74 00:07:11,399 --> 00:07:19,480 exported once the revolution is consolidated within. But also, you know, 75 00:07:19,519 --> 00:07:30,319 the Soviet Union between nineteen twenty two in nineteen thirty nine, 76 00:07:30,639 --> 00:07:35,120 it conquered a land mass of that was equivalent to 77 00:07:35,160 --> 00:07:38,240 the size of the German Reich in nineteen nineteen something 78 00:07:38,279 --> 00:07:44,480 like four hundred thousand square kilometers. This was a massively aggressive, expansionist, 79 00:07:45,240 --> 00:07:52,240 burgaining superpower. You know, that's indisputable. And this idea that 80 00:07:52,519 --> 00:07:57,439 the world where you're talking about the United Kingdom, which 81 00:07:57,480 --> 00:08:02,519 had conquered twenty three percent of the planet and lorded 82 00:08:02,639 --> 00:08:08,079 over five hundred million people. You got the Soviet Union, 83 00:08:08,120 --> 00:08:14,800 which constitutes one sixth of this planet, and it's animated 84 00:08:14,839 --> 00:08:18,720 by this revolutionary imperative that it calls for the the 85 00:08:18,800 --> 00:08:23,240 bolshivization of the entire developed world. You have the United States, 86 00:08:24,399 --> 00:08:28,959 which is in control as a nineteen thirty nine of 87 00:08:29,079 --> 00:08:32,759 fully half of this planet remaining resources. The idea that 88 00:08:32,799 --> 00:08:36,919 the world was terrified of this comparatively tiny country in Germany, 89 00:08:37,759 --> 00:08:41,200 that's a laughful you know, I mean, that's that's ridiculous. 90 00:08:44,840 --> 00:08:46,759 I don't know how else to characterize it. And the 91 00:08:46,799 --> 00:08:54,480 fact that you know, people suggest that is you know, 92 00:08:55,120 --> 00:09:02,320 is is insane. I'd say it's comical, but there's nothing 93 00:09:02,360 --> 00:09:06,080 funny about it, because this kind of garbage inform's decision making, 94 00:09:06,159 --> 00:09:10,919 and it you know, it's constantly it was a kind 95 00:09:10,960 --> 00:09:22,399 of mass delusion of in the public mind. But you know, 96 00:09:22,480 --> 00:09:26,799 first and foremost it often makes his point really at 97 00:09:26,840 --> 00:09:31,720 the beginning of his study, you know, the the imperialistic 98 00:09:32,000 --> 00:09:34,799 I don't imperialist in the sense Latin has talked about it. 99 00:09:34,840 --> 00:09:39,159 I mean, the Soviet Union was an empire in the 100 00:09:39,200 --> 00:09:43,480 ideological sense make a mistake, and this sort of violent 101 00:09:43,679 --> 00:09:51,639 imperialistic power, political sensibility. It was. It was. It was 102 00:09:51,720 --> 00:09:54,720 this kind of relatory practice. It was baked into every 103 00:09:54,799 --> 00:10:01,240 aspect of the Soviet political system, even even the heraldic 104 00:10:01,360 --> 00:10:05,000 standard of the Soviet Union, which endured until the final 105 00:10:05,080 --> 00:10:08,720 days in nineteen ninety one. It was literally the globe 106 00:10:11,679 --> 00:10:17,080 with the overlaid on the planet Earth is this giant 107 00:10:17,120 --> 00:10:21,480 hammer and sickle, you know. That was That was the 108 00:10:21,480 --> 00:10:27,480 Soviet coat of arms. The symbolism is obvious, you know, 109 00:10:28,080 --> 00:10:32,200 Communism will encircle the whole world, you know, and the 110 00:10:32,240 --> 00:10:36,840 motto of the Soviet Union similarly until the end translates 111 00:10:36,919 --> 00:10:42,200 to proletarians of all countries unite. Yeah, it can't really 112 00:10:42,200 --> 00:10:45,039 be more on the nose than that, you know. But 113 00:10:45,440 --> 00:10:53,759 again intrinsic to in termsic to the Marxist Leninist ethos 114 00:10:55,639 --> 00:10:58,879 as a globalist perspective, that's one of the reasons why 115 00:10:58,879 --> 00:11:02,759 the twentieth century belong so much to the communists because 116 00:11:03,000 --> 00:11:05,759 it was uniquely it was an ideology that was uniquely 117 00:11:05,799 --> 00:11:11,039 suited to the then present, and it was fundamentally ford looking. 118 00:11:11,840 --> 00:11:18,759 They can't be denied, you know, it's it's obsolescence. Oh 119 00:11:18,840 --> 00:11:24,399 do you know the fact that it became a staid 120 00:11:25,799 --> 00:11:32,360 the form of of organization, and it was it was, 121 00:11:32,919 --> 00:11:41,720 it became an obsolescent psychological artifact. But at Zena that 122 00:11:42,360 --> 00:11:47,320 it was very much astride the Zeit guys, and they 123 00:11:47,320 --> 00:11:52,320 can't be denied. And even it was animated by a 124 00:11:52,440 --> 00:11:59,799 uniquely expansionist sensibility. But even hit it not then everybody was. 125 00:11:59,639 --> 00:12:08,159 It was everybody who was, you know, participating in velt 126 00:12:08,279 --> 00:12:11,279 politique at scale had a global perspective. I mean, that 127 00:12:11,360 --> 00:12:17,320 was the reality. The twentieth century was decided what configuration 128 00:12:17,480 --> 00:12:21,080 globalism would take. Okay, it's just this idea of a 129 00:12:21,200 --> 00:12:26,279 kind of insular communism that was narrowly status that in 130 00:12:26,399 --> 00:12:31,440 inward looking, I mean, that's that's ridiculous. And beyond that 131 00:12:31,519 --> 00:12:37,840 Stalin Stalin himself came to characterize the ideological culture of 132 00:12:37,919 --> 00:12:45,720 Marsis Leninism for an entire generation it's not accidentally. You know, 133 00:12:45,759 --> 00:12:49,799 he reigned for over thirty years, and I believe he 134 00:12:49,840 --> 00:12:54,480 was the single most powerful man on earth, and that 135 00:12:55,759 --> 00:13:01,360 is incredible for all kinds of reasons. But you know, 136 00:13:01,440 --> 00:13:07,360 he very much set the tenor of, you know, the 137 00:13:07,480 --> 00:13:13,600 revolutionary culture characteristic of the socialist community and nations as 138 00:13:13,600 --> 00:13:21,120 it was called. And he he was a confidant of Lenin, 139 00:13:21,480 --> 00:13:30,480 and Lenin said repeatedly and often, but most notably Lenin's 140 00:13:30,519 --> 00:13:37,000 famous December sixth, nineteen twenty speech, which was dedicated to 141 00:13:37,279 --> 00:13:42,320 communist practice and the vision for a velt Politique, a 142 00:13:42,440 --> 00:13:48,639 Soviet Velt's politique. He said that to incite the capitalist 143 00:13:48,679 --> 00:13:59,639 states against each other is the main stratagem of communism. 144 00:14:00,279 --> 00:14:03,600 In his words, he said, quote of using the knives 145 00:14:03,600 --> 00:14:08,960 of scoundrels like the capitalist thieves against each other, on 146 00:14:09,080 --> 00:14:12,200 grounds that when quote when two thieves fall out and fight, 147 00:14:12,399 --> 00:14:15,039 the honest man laughs. As soon as we are strong 148 00:14:15,120 --> 00:14:18,360 enough to overthrow capitalism completely, we will grab him by 149 00:14:18,399 --> 00:14:22,120 the throat. Victory of the communist revolution in all countries 150 00:14:22,240 --> 00:14:34,720 is inevitable, and that encapsulates Marxist learness of els polity, 151 00:14:35,440 --> 00:14:41,759 and that defined it until the very end. This was Uh, 152 00:14:42,080 --> 00:14:45,840 this was still the ambition when even amiss the strategic 153 00:14:45,919 --> 00:14:49,200 nuclear stalemate. You know, in the late eighties, they were 154 00:14:49,200 --> 00:14:53,720 still challenging in Latin America to try and rectify the 155 00:14:53,759 --> 00:14:58,960 strategic imbalance, owing the you know, the advantage conferred the 156 00:14:59,039 --> 00:15:05,480 United States and they're uh and its allies, you know, 157 00:15:07,200 --> 00:15:08,919 by the inner German border. 158 00:15:09,679 --> 00:15:09,879 Speaker 1: You know. 159 00:15:12,399 --> 00:15:18,440 Speaker 2: Again, the shouldn't be this shouldn't be mysterious or controversial. Rather, 160 00:15:19,840 --> 00:15:26,080 now what I think of is literally the Stalin doctrine. 161 00:15:30,200 --> 00:15:36,240 This was presented and articulated during a speech Stalin made 162 00:15:36,279 --> 00:15:40,840 to the Central Committee of the All Communist Party in 163 00:15:40,960 --> 00:15:50,679 July nineteen twenty five. And for the Soviets denied that 164 00:15:50,759 --> 00:15:57,360 this speech happened for decades and it was authenticated that 165 00:15:58,919 --> 00:16:02,320 the speech was made. And I'll get into how this 166 00:16:02,480 --> 00:16:06,399 came about as we continue, but we're not there yet. 167 00:16:08,039 --> 00:16:16,240 But what Stalin declared at this speech was quote, should 168 00:16:16,279 --> 00:16:19,840 the war begin, we will not stand by inactively. We 169 00:16:19,879 --> 00:16:21,840 will enter the war, but we will enter as the 170 00:16:21,919 --> 00:16:25,120 last belligerent. We will throw a weight on the scales 171 00:16:25,200 --> 00:16:33,159 that should be decisive. The historian named Alexander Neckridge, he's 172 00:16:34,000 --> 00:16:41,759 he he characterized this as the Stalin doctrine, you know, 173 00:16:41,960 --> 00:16:48,000 and he insisted that this was never abandoned. And that's true. 174 00:16:48,080 --> 00:16:57,840 And subsequent events and Stalin's decision making in the command 175 00:16:57,960 --> 00:17:01,679 role as well as his you know, in Warren peace terms, 176 00:17:01,720 --> 00:17:04,839 as well as in his role as General secretary, bear 177 00:17:04,960 --> 00:17:13,000 that out. You know, Stalin's last parapolitical act was you know, 178 00:17:13,079 --> 00:17:19,160 giving a MAO and Kimmel Sung a green light to 179 00:17:19,240 --> 00:17:26,119 assault on the Korean peninsula, okay, and this this led 180 00:17:26,160 --> 00:17:32,319 to a crisis on order of the Cuba crisis, you know, 181 00:17:32,920 --> 00:17:39,359 less than a decade later. It's a tangent, but I 182 00:17:39,440 --> 00:17:46,279 about every decade subsequent nineteen fifty, nineteen sixty two, nineteen 183 00:17:46,279 --> 00:17:52,640 seventy three, nineteen eighty three, there was a general crisis 184 00:17:55,200 --> 00:18:01,920 wrought by the traversing of a conflict diad in what 185 00:18:02,240 --> 00:18:08,119 was UH a peripheral theater, but that you know, nonetheless 186 00:18:08,920 --> 00:18:14,720 had the potential for escalation to it's a general nuclear war. 187 00:18:14,799 --> 00:18:18,480 And but my point being that it's it's not as if, 188 00:18:18,920 --> 00:18:22,119 you know, Stalin literally at the end of his life 189 00:18:22,279 --> 00:18:28,160 was still making decisions pursuant to this sort of doctrinaire 190 00:18:31,640 --> 00:18:45,039 you know program the UH. And it's that just became 191 00:18:45,240 --> 00:18:52,640 a fixation of Stalin's as the uh as a situation 192 00:18:52,759 --> 00:19:03,079 in Europe became characterized by punctually crises, you know, for 193 00:19:03,119 --> 00:19:07,039 the next decade and a half, subsequent climbating obviously, in 194 00:19:07,119 --> 00:19:15,680 nineteen thirty nine and throughout the nineteen thirties, Stalin undertook 195 00:19:15,720 --> 00:19:24,279 a massive armaments program that was unprecedented, you know, and 196 00:19:25,119 --> 00:19:30,720 based on his rhetoric not just too you know, the 197 00:19:30,720 --> 00:19:37,319 poet Borrow and to the assembled nomenclature of the All 198 00:19:37,359 --> 00:19:40,920 Communist Party, but also these public speeches that he made 199 00:19:42,279 --> 00:19:46,319 for the consumption not just of the Soviet people, but 200 00:19:47,759 --> 00:19:52,359 you know, as a way of signaling to the rest 201 00:19:52,359 --> 00:19:57,640 of the world. It was clear that he was convinced 202 00:19:57,640 --> 00:20:02,839 that a general crisis of had had arrived, you know, 203 00:20:02,880 --> 00:20:09,079 in global capitalism, was was on its way out, you know, 204 00:20:09,440 --> 00:20:12,160 And it was in nineteen thirty nine, early one thirty 205 00:20:12,240 --> 00:20:19,079 nine the British ambassador to the Soviet Union, Stafford Cripps, 206 00:20:19,839 --> 00:20:25,559 and the American ambassador, Lawrence F. Steinhardt, they both were 207 00:20:25,680 --> 00:20:30,039 adamant that Stalin intended to bring about a war not 208 00:20:30,079 --> 00:20:32,759 only in Europe but in East Asia, and that this 209 00:20:33,000 --> 00:20:36,960 was a great threat facing the British Empire in the 210 00:20:37,039 --> 00:20:45,200 United States of America. And this is important, especially the 211 00:20:45,200 --> 00:20:53,000 fact of Stalin's attention to the developing situation in the 212 00:20:53,039 --> 00:20:59,240 Far East. I'd argue that this was an essential aspect 213 00:20:59,319 --> 00:21:05,319 of what became his strategic vision. And we'll get into 214 00:21:05,319 --> 00:21:13,119 what I mean by that in a moment. When around 215 00:21:13,119 --> 00:21:18,680 between about nineteen ninety one and nineteen ninety five, a 216 00:21:18,720 --> 00:21:23,480 lot of documents briefly became available from the Soviet archives. 217 00:21:23,960 --> 00:21:30,880 That's how David Irving got Gebels the microfilm the Gerbels diaries. 218 00:21:31,200 --> 00:21:35,640 That wouldn't be possible anymore obviously today and now if 219 00:21:35,680 --> 00:21:39,519 you even even if they're watching, government viewed you as 220 00:21:39,519 --> 00:21:43,319 basically friendly your view to as a dissident from the 221 00:21:43,359 --> 00:21:46,400 United States, they're not going to give you access to 222 00:21:46,480 --> 00:21:50,079 anything the FSB has, and I mean even something of 223 00:21:50,240 --> 00:21:56,039 exclusively historical interest, you know, from the warriors. They're they're 224 00:21:56,079 --> 00:22:00,160 not gonna let anybody see that, you know from without it. 225 00:22:01,599 --> 00:22:06,119 There's this brief period of openness in the nineteen nineties, 226 00:22:06,160 --> 00:22:11,480 and during that period a bunch of documents that have 227 00:22:11,559 --> 00:22:19,839 been corralled by the People's Commissariate for Foreign Affairs, you know, 228 00:22:22,359 --> 00:22:27,799 that in the form of internal memorandum as well as 229 00:22:29,839 --> 00:22:37,720 literally directives from you know, the desk of Stalin. You know, 230 00:22:38,079 --> 00:22:42,519 obviously it's it's not indicated as such, but reading between 231 00:22:42,519 --> 00:22:47,119 the lines, you know, these are obviously these are obviously 232 00:22:47,160 --> 00:22:57,680 statements from the General Secretary, most notably the People's Commissaria 233 00:22:57,960 --> 00:23:10,240 delegation to Japan, the telegram from Moscow that suggests that 234 00:23:10,279 --> 00:23:17,519 the Soviet diplomatic mission in Japan should agree to any 235 00:23:17,640 --> 00:23:21,279 treaty that tends to bring about hostility between Japan and 236 00:23:21,319 --> 00:23:27,559 the United States. You know, it's very undisguised, all of 237 00:23:27,559 --> 00:23:30,799 these communications are you know, throughout the nineteen thirties that 238 00:23:31,559 --> 00:23:36,920 anything that brings about a Japanese American war should be cultivated. 239 00:23:37,240 --> 00:23:44,319 And this is this is imperative to Soviet ambitions, you know, 240 00:23:47,319 --> 00:23:56,119 the way it was described by one of the archivists 241 00:23:57,480 --> 00:24:02,559 who was involved in this NNGO, which I think still exists. 242 00:24:03,039 --> 00:24:08,400 There's this NGO that was corralled or incorporated rather in 243 00:24:08,480 --> 00:24:10,920 January nineteen eighty nine, you know, this month before the 244 00:24:11,079 --> 00:24:14,920 enduring Border fell like low, less than a year that 245 00:24:15,119 --> 00:24:20,240 was dedicated to documenting human rights abuses as they called it, 246 00:24:20,319 --> 00:24:26,200 and other things. During the Stalin era, and there's interesting 247 00:24:27,880 --> 00:24:32,920 data relating to the power political situation, you know, in 248 00:24:32,960 --> 00:24:37,960 the years prior to nineteen thirty nine that they corralled 249 00:24:38,000 --> 00:24:46,880 as well, and of particular significance, there's this transcribed memo 250 00:24:51,599 --> 00:24:57,119 from years subsequent by a man who served in the 251 00:24:57,119 --> 00:25:03,119 the Chinese or Japanese diplomatic mis Soviet diplomatic mission in 252 00:25:03,119 --> 00:25:07,279 the nineteen thirties, and he said, quote the Soviet Union, 253 00:25:07,359 --> 00:25:10,319 for its part, was interested in distracting British and American 254 00:25:10,319 --> 00:25:17,680 attention from European problems and in Japanese neutrality during the 255 00:25:17,720 --> 00:25:20,400 period of the destruction of Germany and the liberation of 256 00:25:20,440 --> 00:25:23,920 Europe from capitalism. And then, of course it became clear 257 00:25:24,000 --> 00:25:28,160 that Japan was not going to remain neutral or America 258 00:25:28,200 --> 00:25:32,160 was not going to allow it to strike a position 259 00:25:32,240 --> 00:25:40,599 in neutrality. You know, it became imperative to do everything 260 00:25:40,680 --> 00:25:43,759 possible to bring the United States and Japan into collision, 261 00:25:45,119 --> 00:25:47,960 which once it became clear what the you know, the 262 00:25:48,000 --> 00:25:53,720 New Dealer's ambitions were, that sort of resolved itself from 263 00:25:53,720 --> 00:25:59,519 the Soviet perspective. But nevertheless, Japan was at the top 264 00:25:59,640 --> 00:26:03,640 of Stalin's mind, and we're gonna know what I mean 265 00:26:03,680 --> 00:26:10,680 by that in a minute. Now, this is really what's 266 00:26:11,799 --> 00:26:24,960 critical to sub hypothesis and mine own as well as 267 00:26:25,240 --> 00:26:32,720 what Suvarov posited. And again I echo this sentiment. I 268 00:26:35,359 --> 00:26:38,519 the Soviet Union started World War Two in August nineteen 269 00:26:38,559 --> 00:26:44,240 thirty nine when they launched a massive surprise attack at 270 00:26:44,319 --> 00:26:50,720 calcin Gole and knocked out the Japanese Imperial Army okay, 271 00:26:50,920 --> 00:26:54,720 and that changed everything, and that also was literally the 272 00:26:54,720 --> 00:26:59,160 start of World War two. If you look at hostilities 273 00:26:59,200 --> 00:27:01,559 with nineteen thirty nine in nineteen forty five is a 274 00:27:01,599 --> 00:27:09,880 singular conflict, which I think, in broad conceptual terms is 275 00:27:09,880 --> 00:27:15,720 is useful, you know, especially because that's court history claims 276 00:27:15,720 --> 00:27:19,119 that War two began, you know, in September of nineteen 277 00:27:19,119 --> 00:27:26,599 thirty nine, and bizarrely they claim that, you know, Polish 278 00:27:26,720 --> 00:27:31,880 borders were somehow inviolable and any any any traversing of 279 00:27:31,920 --> 00:27:36,880 them was an act of global war. But if we 280 00:27:37,000 --> 00:27:42,599 examined the ambitions and strategic orientatings and objectives of why 281 00:27:42,680 --> 00:27:47,920 the Soviet Union assaulted Japan, it becomes clear that this 282 00:27:48,079 --> 00:27:50,599 was the start of the Second World War, and what 283 00:27:50,680 --> 00:27:53,519 this the reasons why they did that, what this set 284 00:27:53,559 --> 00:28:05,200 in motion it was truly and respect of a global 285 00:28:06,000 --> 00:28:14,559 campaign of revolutionary conquest. But in the days before that, 286 00:28:14,920 --> 00:28:17,680 and this is important too, because, like the nineteen twenty 287 00:28:17,720 --> 00:28:24,599 five speech, the Soviet Union later claimed this never happened, 288 00:28:27,720 --> 00:28:30,920 and it's interesting how the Allies dealt with it in 289 00:28:31,039 --> 00:28:42,279 subsequent years. But on August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, Stalin 290 00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:46,839 called a surprise secret meeting of the Central Committee of 291 00:28:46,880 --> 00:28:56,599 the Poet Buro. During the meeting, Stalin announced that the 292 00:28:56,680 --> 00:28:59,440 time had now come to quote apply the torch of 293 00:28:59,519 --> 00:29:08,240 war to European powder kid. Now, of course, this was 294 00:29:08,319 --> 00:29:16,680 also as the non Aggression Pact was being, you know, 295 00:29:17,519 --> 00:29:22,480 negotiated with the German Reich. What Stalin said to the 296 00:29:22,519 --> 00:29:27,000 assembled Central Committee, quote, if we accept the German proposal, 297 00:29:27,000 --> 00:29:29,599 if the conclusion of a non aggression pact with them, 298 00:29:32,039 --> 00:29:35,880 they would naturally attack Poland, and the intervention of France 299 00:29:35,920 --> 00:29:39,759 and England in this war would be inevitable. The resulting 300 00:29:39,839 --> 00:29:44,720 unrest and disorder will lead to a destabilization of Western 301 00:29:44,759 --> 00:29:50,640 Europe without US, us being the Soviet Union being initially 302 00:29:50,720 --> 00:29:59,119 drawn into the conflict. And again, you know, since nineteen 303 00:29:59,160 --> 00:30:05,559 twenty five, this had been what the Soviet Union was 304 00:30:05,599 --> 00:30:09,400 waiting for, according to the Stalin doctrine, as a catalyst 305 00:30:09,480 --> 00:30:17,839 for you know, exporting the revolution to Western Europe, you know, 306 00:30:17,880 --> 00:30:20,920 and Stalin continued saying, quote, we can hope for an 307 00:30:20,960 --> 00:30:27,559 advantageous entry into the war, and a typical Stalin euphimistic language, 308 00:30:27,599 --> 00:30:30,440 you said, quote a broad field of activity, A broad 309 00:30:30,599 --> 00:30:34,599 field of activity was now opening for the development of 310 00:30:34,640 --> 00:30:40,839 the World Revolution, in other words, for the accomplishments which 311 00:30:40,880 --> 00:30:45,599 had never you know, been abandoned, for the sovietization of 312 00:30:46,400 --> 00:30:55,400 Europe and Communist domination. He concluded this speech by saying, comrades, 313 00:30:56,079 --> 00:30:59,720 in the interest of the Soviet Union, the homeland of 314 00:30:59,720 --> 00:31:04,240 the worlds get busy and work so warm me break 315 00:31:04,319 --> 00:31:08,279 out between the Reich and the capitalistic Anglo French bloc. 316 00:31:10,359 --> 00:31:17,759 Now this was the first stage of the plan for 317 00:31:17,960 --> 00:31:30,200 Bolshevik domination, and you know it then the non aggression 318 00:31:30,240 --> 00:31:39,279 pack the chorus was finalized four days subsequent, and it 319 00:31:39,359 --> 00:31:45,039 becomes clear, you know, I don't want to take us 320 00:31:45,039 --> 00:31:50,000 down another tangent. But it was really Gearing who pushed 321 00:31:50,000 --> 00:31:54,759 really hard for a firm alliance with the Japanese. I mean, 322 00:31:54,839 --> 00:32:01,240 Hitler was already sort of disposed that way. Anyway, Garing 323 00:32:01,279 --> 00:32:05,799 respected the Japanese a lot, and Geary was something of 324 00:32:06,119 --> 00:32:08,559 a terrible snob, and he thought that Japan was like 325 00:32:08,599 --> 00:32:12,799 a high culture, I mean, which is true, but beyond 326 00:32:12,799 --> 00:32:23,640 the aesthetical attraction, you know, the understanding was that Japan 327 00:32:24,000 --> 00:32:28,240 was a great power in its own right, and they'd 328 00:32:28,319 --> 00:32:33,559 smashed the Imperial Russian Navy in nineteen oh five, and 329 00:32:33,880 --> 00:32:37,920 you know, Japan was just you know, the ideal hedge 330 00:32:37,960 --> 00:32:41,440 they have against the Soviet Union the East. So when 331 00:32:41,519 --> 00:32:45,279 the Red Army launched this blitz assault of the Japanese 332 00:32:45,400 --> 00:32:48,960 Army in the Far East and utterly annihilated them, this 333 00:32:49,200 --> 00:32:55,160 terrified people. And it also it really meant that, you know, 334 00:32:55,240 --> 00:32:59,359 the Reich had no choice but sue for temporary peace 335 00:32:59,400 --> 00:33:02,440 with the Soviet Union because then they had no hedge, 336 00:33:03,240 --> 00:33:08,640 you know. And it was clear that and he moved westward, 337 00:33:10,880 --> 00:33:15,960 you know, and uh Hitler was confident that the war, 338 00:33:16,240 --> 00:33:20,200 a war with France, wouldn't be a quagmire. But just 339 00:33:20,279 --> 00:33:22,799 the same, you know, he knew there weren't the forces 340 00:33:22,799 --> 00:33:29,319 in being to fight off as Soviet assault through Poland, 341 00:33:29,920 --> 00:33:36,519 as uh the Reich was you know, fighting Uh in France. 342 00:33:37,559 --> 00:33:42,559 So this was a. This was very much a conspiratorial 343 00:33:42,640 --> 00:33:45,240 master stroke of Stalin. I mean, I'm gonna be wrong. 344 00:33:45,279 --> 00:33:48,960 Stalin wanted to conquer the Far East anyway, but that 345 00:33:49,319 --> 00:33:55,440 timing was ideal, you know, and uh, there's the forces 346 00:33:55,440 --> 00:34:01,640 in being arrayed such that it was a sort of 347 00:34:01,680 --> 00:34:05,720 a perfect opportunity not just to humiliate the Japanese Imperial Army, 348 00:34:06,839 --> 00:34:12,039 but to telegraph a message of the world about Soviet 349 00:34:12,119 --> 00:34:21,239 military might, you know. And it was highly effective in 350 00:34:21,280 --> 00:34:24,960 that regard. Now, the speech that Stalin made where he 351 00:34:25,039 --> 00:34:29,920 outlined his plan for the conquest of Europe in the 352 00:34:29,960 --> 00:34:37,000 midst of you know, a Western European civil war. The 353 00:34:37,079 --> 00:34:46,159 French national news agency HAVAS, they obtained a copy of 354 00:34:46,199 --> 00:34:53,159 this by way of Geneva, presumably from you know, their 355 00:34:53,159 --> 00:34:57,039 own spies are from a friendly intelligence service, and it 356 00:34:57,119 --> 00:35:02,760 was published in early nineteen five thirty nine throughout France 357 00:35:03,719 --> 00:35:09,119 and uh Moscow claimed it was fake and it was 358 00:35:09,159 --> 00:35:13,400 a forgery, and right up to the present day, incredibly 359 00:35:14,920 --> 00:35:19,719 you'll find these dummy court historians and they're apologists claiming 360 00:35:19,760 --> 00:35:28,800 that this this this was somehow a forgery by the 361 00:35:28,920 --> 00:35:36,599 French Havas agency and French intelligence by by by anti communists. 362 00:35:37,280 --> 00:35:44,559 I mean, it's ridiculous. In the official party paper UH 363 00:35:44,840 --> 00:35:50,280 Pravda November thirty, ninety thirty nine, Stalin himself finally came 364 00:35:50,320 --> 00:35:56,079 out and officially denied UH that the speech was UH 365 00:35:56,880 --> 00:36:00,519 was made and and and reiterated this preposterous claim that 366 00:36:00,559 --> 00:36:05,199 it was some forgery by ant by by fascists. You know, 367 00:36:07,639 --> 00:36:14,800 this was demonstrated. It was confirmed to have been a 368 00:36:15,320 --> 00:36:23,039 real speech by Stalin's official biographer, who died only around 369 00:36:23,079 --> 00:36:26,039 nineteen ninety five. Even in nineteen ninety three he gave 370 00:36:26,079 --> 00:36:31,480 an interview where he confirmed for all time that this 371 00:36:31,599 --> 00:36:37,679 speech happened. The language of it was in fact transcribed 372 00:36:40,039 --> 00:36:48,480 perfectly in the you know, a document that was rendered 373 00:36:48,519 --> 00:36:54,800 by French of us, and that should have settled it 374 00:36:54,840 --> 00:37:03,400 for all time. But like I said, regime historians, UH 375 00:37:03,880 --> 00:37:07,840 will will simply argue by assertion and repeat lies over 376 00:37:07,880 --> 00:37:10,320 and over and over and over again, and they'll simply 377 00:37:10,360 --> 00:37:16,440 deny the evidence in rebuttal. But that's UH. This is 378 00:37:16,480 --> 00:37:20,400 important because it became a major This is there was 379 00:37:20,440 --> 00:37:25,039 a major stumbling block for the New Dealers obviously as 380 00:37:25,079 --> 00:37:29,440 well as UH the War Party in the UK. You know, 381 00:37:29,639 --> 00:37:36,559 it was beyond an embarrassment that it stood. The represent 382 00:37:36,639 --> 00:37:47,119 a real crisis with regards to their mandate. But it 383 00:37:47,159 --> 00:37:50,039 goes to show you what kind of bully pulpit had 384 00:37:50,079 --> 00:37:57,840 been devised and erected in uh, you know, the US 385 00:37:57,840 --> 00:37:59,920 and the UK. I mean, part of it was because 386 00:38:00,079 --> 00:38:03,679 it was the it was it was a French news release. 387 00:38:04,159 --> 00:38:09,000 But even so it the ability to lock out and 388 00:38:09,960 --> 00:38:16,760 discredit conflicting information and facts that had a tended to 389 00:38:16,920 --> 00:38:22,280 impeach official narratives is pretty remarkable. And in the case 390 00:38:22,320 --> 00:38:25,039 of the in the case of the focus in the 391 00:38:25,119 --> 00:38:31,719 UK and the new Deal in America. But you know, uh, 392 00:38:33,440 --> 00:38:36,880 and super Off, to his credit, took up the issue 393 00:38:36,920 --> 00:38:43,159 of the August nineteenth speech. But it was a Vokoganov. 394 00:38:44,840 --> 00:38:54,960 Vokoganov was the biographer in question who attested at the 395 00:38:55,000 --> 00:38:59,639 end of his life to the voracity of the speech. 396 00:39:00,199 --> 00:39:12,840 But you know, the it was on January sixteenth, nineteen 397 00:39:12,920 --> 00:39:16,880 ninety three. And again this this was that period of 398 00:39:18,039 --> 00:39:26,119 approximately summer fall nineteen ninety one until probably very early 399 00:39:26,199 --> 00:39:33,840 nineteen ninety six where there was open access to Stalin 400 00:39:34,079 --> 00:39:39,960 era archives in data in the Soviet Union. 401 00:39:40,760 --> 00:39:42,280 Speaker 1: Can we address something right there? 402 00:39:42,519 --> 00:39:44,559 Speaker 2: Yeah, go ahead, Yeah. 403 00:39:44,400 --> 00:39:48,239 Speaker 1: A lot of people will say that, like the Goebbels 404 00:39:48,280 --> 00:39:52,320 draw diaries or forgeries. So you know, why isn't all 405 00:39:52,320 --> 00:39:54,440 of this forgeries as well? 406 00:39:54,480 --> 00:39:58,760 Speaker 2: Because it's a non argument. It's like saying who forged 407 00:39:58,800 --> 00:40:02,239 the Gerbel diaries? What the Soviets did was they went 408 00:40:02,280 --> 00:40:07,159 to Berlin, they forged a bunch of documents. They put 409 00:40:07,199 --> 00:40:10,400 it in a Berlin bank vault, they pretended to discover it. 410 00:40:10,920 --> 00:40:16,760 They took it back to the Soviet Union, the NKVD, 411 00:40:17,079 --> 00:40:21,559 later the KGB. They continued to pretend that Gerbels had 412 00:40:21,599 --> 00:40:27,079 written reams of diary material for fifty years. They lied 413 00:40:27,119 --> 00:40:31,000 about this for no reason. Then David Irving also lied 414 00:40:31,039 --> 00:40:33,639 about this so that he could capture clouts. Like what, 415 00:40:35,360 --> 00:40:39,480 there's there's this kind of stock in trade of simpletons 416 00:40:39,599 --> 00:40:43,519 and idiots to just go around saying things are fake. 417 00:40:44,239 --> 00:40:51,760 You know, Hitler's second book is fake. General Patten's personal 418 00:40:51,800 --> 00:40:57,800 diaries are fake, Gerbel's diaries are fake. Everything is fake, Okay. 419 00:40:57,920 --> 00:41:03,719 I mean, I it's like me saying Donald Trump is 420 00:41:03,800 --> 00:41:08,199 actually of Jewish parentage. I can't prove that. There's no 421 00:41:08,239 --> 00:41:10,679 evidence to that, there's no reason to believe that, but 422 00:41:10,719 --> 00:41:12,760 I'm just gonna keep saying that over and over again. 423 00:41:13,039 --> 00:41:17,440 See Donald Donald Trump is Jewish. Oh you don't think so, Yeah, 424 00:41:17,440 --> 00:41:19,679 well you don't know anything he's Jewish, I say so. 425 00:41:20,360 --> 00:41:24,559 I mean I can do that too. Okay, you know, 426 00:41:24,599 --> 00:41:30,280 the onus is on the declarant you know. And again 427 00:41:30,400 --> 00:41:35,400 I so the Soviets are in the business of just 428 00:41:35,440 --> 00:41:40,360 pretending that Durbles wrote these diaries. I you know, I 429 00:41:40,360 --> 00:41:48,239 don't accept that because it's stupid. But look, Kalganov, he 430 00:41:48,400 --> 00:42:02,679 was Stalin's official biographer. He confirmed in is Vest, which 431 00:42:02,840 --> 00:42:08,559 was an organ of that constellation of NGOs as I 432 00:42:08,559 --> 00:42:12,639 indicated a moment ago dedicated to, you know, kind of 433 00:42:12,679 --> 00:42:21,400 truth and reconciliation about the Stalin era. He went public 434 00:42:22,800 --> 00:42:28,920 in Russian and European media, and he was adamant that 435 00:42:32,079 --> 00:42:35,440 the minutes of the August nineteen, nineteen thirty nine speech 436 00:42:36,519 --> 00:42:40,719 that have been published in France were legitimate, that speech happened, 437 00:42:41,960 --> 00:42:46,440 you know. And again, I'm sure, I'm sure these same 438 00:42:47,760 --> 00:42:51,000 defectors are gonna claim, well that's fake. Okay, fine, everything 439 00:42:51,119 --> 00:42:56,119 is fake. I'm an adult and I'm a white person. 440 00:42:56,159 --> 00:42:59,639 I'm not. I'm not I'm not I'm not a white 441 00:42:59,679 --> 00:43:03,320 in murder like developmently disabled. So I don't entertain that 442 00:43:03,400 --> 00:43:12,239 kind of stuff. But you know, the uh, And there's 443 00:43:12,239 --> 00:43:21,639 a historian, this lady historian, Russian historian ts Busueva. She 444 00:43:22,480 --> 00:43:30,159 undertook this broad scholarly evaluation of Suvarov's books, not just Icebreaker, 445 00:43:30,360 --> 00:43:37,360 kind of his entire body of work. And her account 446 00:43:37,599 --> 00:43:43,239 of his work product was mixed. She was somewhat critical 447 00:43:43,280 --> 00:43:48,039 in acutive way. She praised other stuff, but she was 448 00:43:48,840 --> 00:43:57,360 adamant that the August nineteenth, ninety thirty nine speech was legitimate, 449 00:43:59,039 --> 00:44:06,280 and she claimed that copies of the speech were known 450 00:44:06,440 --> 00:44:12,199 to exist in the special archives of the Central Committee 451 00:44:12,239 --> 00:44:19,159 and the USSR, and she made excerpts of it available 452 00:44:19,159 --> 00:44:26,960 to the public in December nineteen ninety four. And there 453 00:44:27,000 --> 00:44:32,320 was this big deal. The publication was a big deal, 454 00:44:33,760 --> 00:44:41,199 and it was unveiled at this conference of the Quote 455 00:44:41,239 --> 00:44:45,800 Memorial Society. That's the need, that's the umbrella name of 456 00:44:45,800 --> 00:44:50,960 that constellation of NGOs I was talking about. And this 457 00:44:51,000 --> 00:44:56,719 was on August sixteenth, nineteen ninety five. That was this 458 00:44:56,840 --> 00:45:01,360 kind of grand unveiling, you know. But they they and 459 00:45:01,360 --> 00:45:05,599 this might seem silly to make such a big deal 460 00:45:05,679 --> 00:45:09,840 about the release of historical documents. But if you know 461 00:45:09,880 --> 00:45:13,119 about the Soviet system, I mean that it's it was 462 00:45:13,360 --> 00:45:17,039 this is a special case, you know, it's it wasn't 463 00:45:17,039 --> 00:45:22,920 an ordinary political system. And this this document changed everything, 464 00:45:24,239 --> 00:45:27,079 or it should have in the public mind, you know, 465 00:45:27,559 --> 00:45:38,679 because it's essentially uh a standing rebuttal to the entire 466 00:45:41,039 --> 00:45:48,719 court narrative of the war and its origins, you know. 467 00:45:48,800 --> 00:45:52,079 So there's that too. So I mean again, I where 468 00:45:52,480 --> 00:45:55,400 where where's where's the evidence that all this is being faked? 469 00:45:55,760 --> 00:45:58,599 Like I guarantee you the Russian government wasn't happy about this, 470 00:45:59,599 --> 00:46:03,199 you know, I mean and that they still aren't any 471 00:46:03,280 --> 00:46:07,840 anybody who is fluent in Russian and I they're they're 472 00:46:07,880 --> 00:46:13,280 welcome to proper evidence that this is all lected me 473 00:46:13,360 --> 00:46:19,079 and and it's fake. But obviously that won't be forthcoming, 474 00:46:22,239 --> 00:46:24,400 you know. And though it's getting to the kind of 475 00:46:24,519 --> 00:46:33,000 meat of the honset of hostilities, you know, again, suber 476 00:46:33,039 --> 00:46:38,199 Os the core of his theory, you know. Again, it's 477 00:46:38,239 --> 00:46:45,480 it's not just a matter of a discreet revisionist analysis 478 00:46:45,480 --> 00:46:51,400 of Operation Barbarossa and which party combatant their combatants were, 479 00:46:52,360 --> 00:47:00,920 you know, the aggressor. It's far more of a broad 480 00:47:01,599 --> 00:47:09,079 spectrum analysis and that and yak and Hoffman agreed with 481 00:47:09,119 --> 00:47:14,599 this perspective, and I agree with it. Two, Not only 482 00:47:14,719 --> 00:47:19,679 was Stalin the progenitor of World War two, but World 483 00:47:19,719 --> 00:47:22,960 War two began on August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, because 484 00:47:22,960 --> 00:47:27,960 that's the date when Stalin ordered the assault on Chalcan Goal. 485 00:47:30,760 --> 00:47:40,840 Japanese sixth Army was deployed there. Stalin ordered a massive assault. 486 00:47:44,440 --> 00:47:56,559 The Japanese were soundly defeated and routed. Marshall Zukoff stated 487 00:47:56,840 --> 00:48:01,000 on August twenty third, nineteen thirty nine, you know, in 488 00:48:01,039 --> 00:48:04,559 a reference to the Chalcan Gol assault as well as 489 00:48:04,599 --> 00:48:08,159 the non aggression packed with the Reich which had just 490 00:48:08,280 --> 00:48:18,719 been you know, signed Zukov said. Quote Stalin was convinced 491 00:48:18,800 --> 00:48:22,159 that the non aggression pack would enable him to rap 492 00:48:22,280 --> 00:48:28,039 Hitler around his little finger. Quote we have tricked Hitler 493 00:48:28,079 --> 00:48:31,320 for the moment end quote with Stalin's opinion. According to 494 00:48:31,400 --> 00:48:42,800 Nikita Krushchev, Suvarov's take, which should be obvious to those 495 00:48:42,840 --> 00:48:49,239 familiar with the historical record, the non aggression packed on 496 00:48:49,320 --> 00:48:52,960 the heels of Japan being crushed on land in the 497 00:48:53,000 --> 00:49:00,000 Far East. Hitler believed then that he had to attack 498 00:49:00,079 --> 00:49:05,320 at Poland to protect the frontier of the German Reich. 499 00:49:09,199 --> 00:49:12,320 He would not have acted without a guarantee of non 500 00:49:12,400 --> 00:49:15,760 aggression because Germany wasn't in a position to go to 501 00:49:15,840 --> 00:49:22,239 war with the Soviet Union at that moment. People were 502 00:49:22,320 --> 00:49:24,960 terrified of the Soviet Union after it had just crushed 503 00:49:24,960 --> 00:49:28,440 the mighty Japanese Army. So again, I mean, this is laughable, 504 00:49:28,559 --> 00:49:32,400 this idea that this idea that Stalin, who had just 505 00:49:32,599 --> 00:49:40,079 crushed the Japanese Army, who was sitting on the throne 506 00:49:40,119 --> 00:49:45,599 of a burgening superpower that concuted one six of this planet. 507 00:49:46,400 --> 00:49:49,840 The idea that Stalin was terrified of Hitler in comparatively 508 00:49:49,880 --> 00:50:02,719 tiny Germany, that's preposterous. You know. Molotov, you know, obviously 509 00:50:02,840 --> 00:50:07,119 was you know, chief diplomat uh his official title was 510 00:50:07,239 --> 00:50:12,199 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Molotov spoke for 511 00:50:12,280 --> 00:50:17,920 the Supreme Soviet on October thirty first, nineteen thirty nine. 512 00:50:20,320 --> 00:50:23,480 He said, quote a single blow against Poland, first by 513 00:50:23,559 --> 00:50:26,400 the Germans and then by the Red Army, and nothing 514 00:50:27,119 --> 00:50:30,400 will remain of this misbegotten little child of the Versailles Treaty, 515 00:50:31,000 --> 00:50:34,840 which owed its existence to the repression of non Polish nationalities. 516 00:50:35,360 --> 00:50:41,440 You know. So again to the Soviet nomencladur and especially Stalin, 517 00:50:41,480 --> 00:50:44,039 they wanted to they wanted to crush Poland. You know, 518 00:50:44,079 --> 00:50:46,639 among other things the polls were at the Polish Munta 519 00:50:46,719 --> 00:50:50,239 was ethically cleansing Russians, you know, the Russians hated the polls. 520 00:50:51,199 --> 00:50:51,360 Speaker 1: You know. 521 00:50:51,519 --> 00:50:57,559 Speaker 2: Interestingly, you know again, this this this supposedly sacro saanic 522 00:50:57,679 --> 00:51:02,880 Polish democracy, It didn't bother the UK when when when 523 00:51:02,920 --> 00:51:11,519 the Soviets assaulted That's interesting, isn't it. But so and 524 00:51:11,559 --> 00:51:16,679 then of course two within months, the Soviet Union assaulted Finland, 525 00:51:17,960 --> 00:51:25,320 you know, so uh the uh if if Stalin was 526 00:51:25,360 --> 00:51:33,079 this uh isolationist. Oh. And of course meanwhile too, uh, 527 00:51:33,400 --> 00:51:36,960 you know, they the Soviet Union was funding, equipping, arming, 528 00:51:36,960 --> 00:51:44,920 and facilitating the Communist revolution in Spain, which obviously had profound, you, 529 00:51:45,119 --> 00:51:49,480 strategic significance. You know, in the same period the Soviets 530 00:51:49,480 --> 00:51:55,840 had assaulted and conquered Poland, you know, Uh, They'd assaulted 531 00:51:55,920 --> 00:52:03,599 Finland and conquered uh Archangel you know, and through the UH, 532 00:52:03,880 --> 00:52:08,559 the the waging of these aggressive wars against Poland and Finland, 533 00:52:08,880 --> 00:52:19,719 and then essentially the extortionate annexation of the Baltic you know, 534 00:52:19,800 --> 00:52:24,880 and threatening to assault Romania, which all of which gained 535 00:52:25,159 --> 00:52:29,639 territorial concessions out of shopping fire. Because again, every the 536 00:52:29,719 --> 00:52:33,519 Soviet Union's neighbors were in capable of standing up to 537 00:52:33,599 --> 00:52:42,480 its might, you know. So by this time, by uh 538 00:52:45,760 --> 00:52:51,320 the eve of Barbarossa, the Soviet Union had expanded its 539 00:52:51,440 --> 00:52:55,880 territory by four hundred and twenty six thousand square kilometers. 540 00:52:57,360 --> 00:52:59,719 That was equivalent to the service of the entire German 541 00:52:59,800 --> 00:53:03,719 War in nineteen nineteen. And in so doing, as the 542 00:53:03,760 --> 00:53:07,599 Alcaholfen points out, Stalin had ripped away and you know, 543 00:53:07,800 --> 00:53:17,320 buffer states on Germany's frontier. So I mean Europe was defenseless, 544 00:53:19,760 --> 00:53:27,920 you know, in the east, you know, and obviously the 545 00:53:28,800 --> 00:53:35,320 time was nigh for a for an assault on Europe 546 00:53:35,719 --> 00:53:42,679 and where Germany was as of nineteen forty. Despite Germany's 547 00:53:42,719 --> 00:53:50,000 initial military successes, you know, there wasn't anything Germany had 548 00:53:50,079 --> 00:53:55,440 done that Moscow considered particularly impressive or critical, you know, 549 00:53:55,679 --> 00:54:00,280 that would have changed or altered Stalin's ambition. And it's 550 00:54:00,320 --> 00:54:05,239 quite the contrary. There was no longer a chance a 551 00:54:05,360 --> 00:54:09,599 decisive victory against the UK because you know, Sea Lion 552 00:54:09,719 --> 00:54:15,320 was a strategic ruse, the purpose of which was to 553 00:54:15,360 --> 00:54:18,360 deceive Stalin, by the way, not not that, not Churchill, 554 00:54:18,360 --> 00:54:20,840 which I mean, that's that's interesting in its own right, 555 00:54:20,920 --> 00:54:26,159 but the uh, you know, and as Stalin, who was 556 00:54:26,679 --> 00:54:30,639 already by that time had hundreds of spies in the 557 00:54:30,719 --> 00:54:33,119 rows of elements strations, and he knew exactly what America 558 00:54:33,239 --> 00:54:35,400 was thinking, and he knew that the United States was 559 00:54:35,400 --> 00:54:39,039 going to stand behind the UK. German forces were scattered 560 00:54:39,079 --> 00:54:46,079 piece meal all over Europe. The German army was uh 561 00:54:47,320 --> 00:54:52,119 still dependent on uh, you know, on horse drawn transportation. 562 00:54:55,639 --> 00:55:02,159 Germany wasn't even close to being able to realize a 563 00:55:02,199 --> 00:55:06,840 full mobilization on the order of you know, nineteen fourteen, 564 00:55:06,920 --> 00:55:09,760 nineteen fifteen, even if there'd been the political will to 565 00:55:09,840 --> 00:55:14,400 do so. You know, the minute Germany was cut off 566 00:55:14,440 --> 00:55:18,039 from Romania, they their army would stop in his tracks 567 00:55:18,079 --> 00:55:21,000 because that was, you know, their only source of vital petroleum. 568 00:55:21,880 --> 00:55:29,039 I mean, what would would even a layman, looking at 569 00:55:29,280 --> 00:55:34,760 all relevant criteria and variables as of you know, nineteen 570 00:55:34,920 --> 00:55:41,159 forty nineteen forty one, sees Germany and his position a 571 00:55:41,280 --> 00:55:46,280 catastrophic vulnerability. So I mean the idea that the idea 572 00:55:46,360 --> 00:55:49,679 that you know again, the idea that Stalin was afraid 573 00:55:49,760 --> 00:55:53,360 of Germany and afraid of its armed forces. I mean, 574 00:55:53,360 --> 00:55:59,079 that's that's preposterous, beyond belief, you know, and just for 575 00:56:01,679 --> 00:56:10,159 just for comparative purposes. Between November nineteen forty, in the 576 00:56:10,280 --> 00:56:15,840 day of Barbarossa June twenty second, nineteen forty one, there've 577 00:56:15,880 --> 00:56:20,519 been a massive arms build up underway since nineteen twenty five, 578 00:56:20,719 --> 00:56:27,679 but this year and a half or this half the year, 579 00:56:27,719 --> 00:56:32,639 I mean, between you know, the winner in nineteen forty 580 00:56:32,639 --> 00:56:37,679 and summer forty one, this was an unprecedented military build 581 00:56:37,760 --> 00:56:42,840 up in terms of scale, scope and rapidity. On June 582 00:56:42,880 --> 00:56:46,480 twenty second, nineteen forty one, the Soviet Army possessed twenty 583 00:56:46,519 --> 00:56:51,880 four thousand tanks, almost two thousand of which were T 584 00:56:52,119 --> 00:56:56,559 thirty four's, which were technically classed as a medium tank, 585 00:56:56,719 --> 00:57:03,480 but they were probably the best overall tank of the 586 00:57:03,639 --> 00:57:14,719 entire war. The Air force of the Red Army since 587 00:57:14,800 --> 00:57:19,320 nineteen thirty eight had acquired twenty three thousand, two hundred 588 00:57:19,320 --> 00:57:25,880 and forty five military aircraft, including three thousand, seven hundred 589 00:57:27,159 --> 00:57:31,039 that were of the most recent design. The Red Army 590 00:57:31,079 --> 00:57:34,480 had one hundred and forty eight thousand artillery pieces and 591 00:57:34,519 --> 00:57:38,920 mortars the inventory of the Royal Navy. In addition to 592 00:57:39,039 --> 00:57:44,480 its surface fleet, it had two hundred and ninety one submarines, 593 00:57:45,000 --> 00:57:50,239 which were an exclusively offensive platform. This meant that the 594 00:57:50,239 --> 00:57:56,480 Soviet Union had more submarines than any other country on 595 00:57:56,519 --> 00:58:02,199 this planet, had more than four times the number of 596 00:58:02,239 --> 00:58:05,920 submarines that the Royal Navy did, which was the world's 597 00:58:06,000 --> 00:58:12,719 leading maritime state. I mean, this is utterly insane, you know, 598 00:58:15,199 --> 00:58:20,679 and it's unprecedent on it like that, nothing approaching this 599 00:58:22,280 --> 00:58:34,480 sort of scope, scale and character of mobilization had ever 600 00:58:34,599 --> 00:58:44,679 been contemplated, let alone implemented. So, you know, again Germany, 601 00:58:44,760 --> 00:58:52,039 which is over committed, overstretched, outnumbered, engaged in a quagmire, 602 00:58:53,920 --> 00:58:59,159 not mobilized for war. Like the idea that the Soviet Union, 603 00:59:00,679 --> 00:59:07,920 which again had just succeeded in stripping away Germany's buffer 604 00:59:08,000 --> 00:59:14,920 states in the East, and that successfully conquered Poland, and 605 00:59:18,159 --> 00:59:22,079 you know, the territory had covetated in the Arctic after 606 00:59:22,760 --> 00:59:27,519 you know, an unprovoked assault on Finland. This idea that 607 00:59:27,519 --> 00:59:30,400 the Soviet Union was afraid of Hitler, I mean, like it, 608 00:59:30,719 --> 00:59:34,880 it's so stupid it almost doesn't warn't rebuttal because it 609 00:59:36,800 --> 00:59:41,039 you know, it's it's it's an exclusively bad faith argument. 610 00:59:41,559 --> 00:59:47,719 But what a time we got. Yeah, I'm gonna wrap 611 00:59:47,800 --> 00:59:51,320 up there because I was about to get into the 612 00:59:52,360 --> 00:59:55,880 some of the testimony you send the commiss ours about 613 00:59:58,159 --> 01:00:02,039 the ideological culture of the Red Army. It's but yeah, 614 01:00:02,119 --> 01:00:04,039 I hope this was instructive to people. 615 01:00:05,079 --> 01:00:07,639 Speaker 1: Sure, yeah, I can't wait for part two. Uh. One 616 01:00:07,679 --> 01:00:10,760 thing that I would say is I think one of 617 01:00:10,800 --> 01:00:14,400 the reasons that the narrative on Spain had to be 618 01:00:14,559 --> 01:00:20,719 controlled after the war is because if the Republicans would 619 01:00:20,719 --> 01:00:27,880 have won, Spain belonged to the Soviet Union, and you know, 620 01:00:27,960 --> 01:00:30,079 you could you can make the argument Germany should have 621 01:00:30,119 --> 01:00:35,000 never left after victory, but the Soviet Union, in no way, 622 01:00:35,119 --> 01:00:37,519 shape or form, would have left. That would have been 623 01:00:37,559 --> 01:00:39,960 a Soviet satellite state, and they would have had Gibraltzer. 624 01:00:41,159 --> 01:00:43,599 Speaker 2: Oh yeah, well, it's just like the It's just like 625 01:00:43,679 --> 01:00:48,880 when the ideological descendants of these of the traders who 626 01:00:49,360 --> 01:00:51,679 fought for the Communists in Spain, it's like when they 627 01:00:51,719 --> 01:00:54,960 support Islamic it's like when they support al Qaeda and Syria, 628 01:00:55,000 --> 01:00:57,119 they're like, oh, that's not al Kaido. That's these other 629 01:00:57,199 --> 01:01:00,639 guys who don't actually exist or are democrats. It's like 630 01:01:00,679 --> 01:01:03,719 this level of it's like this infantile level of delusion. 631 01:01:04,400 --> 01:01:06,800 I don't even think they actually believe that there's insulting 632 01:01:06,840 --> 01:01:09,840 the intelligence of everybody else, like you know, the Oh 633 01:01:10,079 --> 01:01:13,000 those weren't the communists. There was these imaginary other guys 634 01:01:13,039 --> 01:01:18,039 in Spain who like, what are you talking about? There 635 01:01:18,119 --> 01:01:26,199 was this there was this unusual coalition of syndicolas, fascists, Filangis, Carloss, Uh, 636 01:01:26,239 --> 01:01:30,599 you know, reactionary monarchist types. I'm kind of secular nationalists, 637 01:01:31,559 --> 01:01:36,400 you know that wash who are you know, referred to 638 01:01:36,480 --> 01:01:38,960 with the nationalist side. I mean in anchor as that 639 01:01:39,039 --> 01:01:41,400 may be. This is kind of the umbrella term that's favored. 640 01:01:42,119 --> 01:01:45,119 And uh, there was the common Turn and and and 641 01:01:45,199 --> 01:01:49,039 the Soviet Union and and their proxies. Like there wasn't 642 01:01:49,079 --> 01:01:54,440 this other element there that were uh like gay feminist 643 01:01:54,519 --> 01:01:58,400 liberals or like Ernest Hemingway's buddies who just love freedom 644 01:01:58,519 --> 01:02:03,320 or whatever whatever delusion normis have. You know, it was 645 01:02:03,320 --> 01:02:06,239 a bunch of it was a bunch of communists like 646 01:02:06,440 --> 01:02:10,039 Eric Milke who were busy shooting priests and nuns in 647 01:02:10,039 --> 01:02:14,559 the face and torturing fascists to death, and you know, 648 01:02:17,440 --> 01:02:23,440 preparing to categorically exterminate anybody who wasn't editable, just like 649 01:02:23,480 --> 01:02:27,960 they'd done in the Soviet Union, and just like Bellacoon's 650 01:02:29,119 --> 01:02:32,199 brief tyranny did in Hungary, and and just like the 651 01:02:32,239 --> 01:02:36,960 Communists did everywhere that you know, they were victorious in theater. 652 01:02:39,440 --> 01:02:44,519 Speaker 1: All right, I'll do your plugs for you. Go to 653 01:02:44,559 --> 01:02:49,920 Thomas's substack gets real Thomas seven seven seven dot com 654 01:02:50,000 --> 01:02:54,320 dot substack dot com. Go to his website. That's Thomas 655 01:02:54,760 --> 01:02:57,719 uh Thomas seven seven seven dot com. But the T 656 01:02:58,000 --> 01:03:01,960 is A seven, right, the first T is A and yeah, 657 01:03:02,079 --> 01:03:06,119 you can you can find him sometimes on x under 658 01:03:06,320 --> 01:03:07,440 under his government name. 659 01:03:09,599 --> 01:03:12,000 Speaker 2: Yeah, you can link all that stuff from my you 660 01:03:12,039 --> 01:03:14,400 can read all those links are on my website. 661 01:03:14,519 --> 01:03:17,800 Speaker 1: So yeah, and I'll have the links in the in 662 01:03:17,840 --> 01:03:21,960 the show notes as well. So thank you. Until part two. 663 01:03:22,679 --> 01:03:24,960 I really appreciate you doing this. This is I think 664 01:03:25,000 --> 01:03:25,800 this is important. 665 01:03:26,480 --> 01:03:28,239 Speaker 2: Yeah, likewise, thanks for hosting me. 666 01:03:29,079 --> 01:03:33,920 Speaker 1: Thank you. I want to welcome everyone back to the 667 01:03:33,920 --> 01:03:37,679 Pekingana Show. This is gonna be part two of Thomas 668 01:03:37,719 --> 01:03:43,239 talking about Victor Suveroff and hiking Hoffman's work, So Thomas, 669 01:03:43,400 --> 01:03:44,320 I hand it over to you. 670 01:03:45,840 --> 01:03:50,400 Speaker 2: Yeah, thanks for hosting me. I think I remember where 671 01:03:50,440 --> 01:03:53,360 we left off. But forgive me if this is redundant. 672 01:03:54,239 --> 01:04:00,760 It's something that's fundamentally important as the data Barbarosa Commencement 673 01:04:01,159 --> 01:04:05,480 June twenty second, nineteen forty one. It's important to understand 674 01:04:05,519 --> 01:04:09,159 the strategic situated in as of Stalin and the Soviet Union. 675 01:04:13,239 --> 01:04:17,679 Key was the waging of aggressive war against Poland and Finland. Obviously, 676 01:04:18,800 --> 01:04:24,559 Stalin's plan and this was confirmed by Khrushcheff, was, you know, 677 01:04:24,639 --> 01:04:27,440 in the immediate aftermath of the assault and the Japanese 678 01:04:27,480 --> 01:04:31,960 at Chalcan goal, which, in the opinion of Hoffman and 679 01:04:32,039 --> 01:04:35,079 I agree with this, that's what started World War two, 680 01:04:36,639 --> 01:04:43,360 and the Suvarov without saying it abides that perspective. The 681 01:04:43,400 --> 01:04:47,639 Molotov Ribbentrop packed, which Stalin confided to the polit Burrow 682 01:04:47,960 --> 01:04:54,159 as well as the Kruz Jeff, was that that would 683 01:04:54,159 --> 01:05:01,840 embolden the Hitler to sue for war with pol which 684 01:05:01,840 --> 01:05:04,639 he wouldn't have done had there been the risk of 685 01:05:04,679 --> 01:05:11,920 a two front war. Yet Germany's position was precarious, overextended. 686 01:05:13,920 --> 01:05:21,960 Stalin didn't think that you know Germany could truly stand 687 01:05:22,039 --> 01:05:29,840 up to the UK and France. He grossly underestimated the 688 01:05:29,880 --> 01:05:33,480 Wehrmacht's offensive power. But even in the event of a 689 01:05:33,760 --> 01:05:39,679 German victory, his reasoning was that, you know, the French 690 01:05:39,800 --> 01:05:43,199 army would have its back broken. Germany would be on 691 01:05:43,239 --> 01:05:48,000 this footing a permanent hostility capture, the United Kingdom and 692 01:05:48,280 --> 01:05:52,719 Europe would be the Communists for the taking. You know, 693 01:05:53,000 --> 01:05:57,079 this was, in Stalin's words, to cruise Jeff Hitler was 694 01:05:57,119 --> 01:06:00,760 now wrapped around our little finger. And one of the 695 01:06:00,760 --> 01:06:09,639 reasons for this confidence or overconfidence, you know, and I 696 01:06:09,639 --> 01:06:17,199 think I mentioned before as a barbarossa Stone had increased 697 01:06:17,639 --> 01:06:21,440 expanded the territory of the Soviet Union by four hundred 698 01:06:21,480 --> 01:06:25,159 and twenty six thousand square kilometers. That's equivalent to the 699 01:06:25,239 --> 01:06:27,320 service area of the German right because it stood in 700 01:06:27,400 --> 01:06:34,440 nineteen nineteen, and especially a petular significance the aggressive war 701 01:06:34,559 --> 01:06:39,320 the Soviets waged against Poland and Finland and what amounted 702 01:06:39,360 --> 01:06:44,639 to the extortionate annexation of the Baltics, you know, with 703 01:06:44,719 --> 01:06:53,440 waiting Estonia pressuring Romania into further territorial concessions. You know, 704 01:06:53,480 --> 01:07:02,119 the Soviet Union really on September third, nineteen thirty nine, 705 01:07:02,639 --> 01:07:07,199 it was in the strongest position out of all major powers, 706 01:07:08,119 --> 01:07:13,519 and the Soviet Union became a combatant, you know, on 707 01:07:13,599 --> 01:07:18,880 September seventeenth, when the Soviets also assaulted Poland, and of 708 01:07:18,880 --> 01:07:22,800 course there was a deafening silence eminent from emanating from 709 01:07:22,840 --> 01:07:30,079 London in the wake of that deployment, which is telling 710 01:07:30,119 --> 01:07:39,119 in and of itself. But you know, this myth that 711 01:07:39,280 --> 01:07:44,559 Stalin was somehow afraid of Hitler's preposterous. For the reasons 712 01:07:44,599 --> 01:07:53,320 just enumerated, and it's essential to understand, I mean, demonster 713 01:07:53,480 --> 01:07:57,480 of this is the posture of the Soviet Union diplomatically 714 01:07:57,519 --> 01:08:04,199 and militarily towards the German Reich. And secondly, the pattern 715 01:08:04,239 --> 01:08:08,599 of military deployment. And I'll get into that in a moment, 716 01:08:08,719 --> 01:08:14,559 But in terms of the former November twelfth and thirteenth, 717 01:08:14,639 --> 01:08:21,760 nineteen forty, you know, the view from Moscow was that 718 01:08:21,840 --> 01:08:27,560 the war was going very badly for Germany. Italy was 719 01:08:28,640 --> 01:08:35,439 not performing well in the relevant battle theaters, which was 720 01:08:35,520 --> 01:08:39,720 compromising Germany's position in the Mediterranean, which Hitler had counted 721 01:08:39,720 --> 01:08:42,479 on as a hedge, you know, against the British Empire. 722 01:08:46,920 --> 01:08:49,920 There was no indication of a resolution of the war 723 01:08:49,960 --> 01:08:56,199 with the United Kingdom. You know, Germany's fear of influence 724 01:08:56,359 --> 01:09:02,640 was totally static. You know, Operation Sea Lion was a 725 01:09:02,680 --> 01:09:06,640 strategic ruse, and even were it not, it would have 726 01:09:06,680 --> 01:09:13,479 been a bloodbath. You know. So November twelfth and thirteenth, 727 01:09:15,600 --> 01:09:22,199 Stalin directed Molotov in Berlin to transmit to Hitler through 728 01:09:22,279 --> 01:09:27,720 ribentraup a demand for the expansion of the Soviets fear 729 01:09:27,760 --> 01:09:34,680 of influence. Basically, Stalin said that he demanded freedom to 730 01:09:34,760 --> 01:09:40,840 deploy in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece, as well 731 01:09:40,840 --> 01:09:47,000 as Finland. And he also said that, you know, the 732 01:09:47,039 --> 01:09:50,079 Soviet Union had a right to deploy on the Swedish frontier. 733 01:09:54,239 --> 01:10:00,399 This is incredibly belligerent. Essentially all of southeastern Europe plus 734 01:10:00,520 --> 01:10:04,720 Finland and a piece of scanning Avia proper. Stalin just 735 01:10:04,760 --> 01:10:08,560 declared that this is now my sphere of influence. And 736 01:10:08,800 --> 01:10:13,359 if you meet this challenge with the hostile deployment, its war. 737 01:10:14,039 --> 01:10:15,640 I mean, does that sound like a man who's afraid 738 01:10:15,640 --> 01:10:20,840 of Eatolf Hitler and the German Reich. You know, in 739 01:10:20,880 --> 01:10:26,079 Stalin's mind, there was absolutely no possibility of the Wehrmacht 740 01:10:26,119 --> 01:10:29,920 assaulting the Soviet Union even on terms of parody, let 741 01:10:29,920 --> 01:10:35,520 alone from a position of strategic superiority, which is somewhat 742 01:10:35,520 --> 01:10:39,880 fascinating because this idea that oh, the Germans underestimated the 743 01:10:39,920 --> 01:10:43,119 Soviet Union, they didn't at all, and stowfully gets into 744 01:10:43,159 --> 01:10:47,800 that Holder's report on the eve of Barbarossa, and Holder 745 01:10:47,840 --> 01:10:52,720 had actually written he'd written an assessment in nineteen thirty 746 01:10:52,760 --> 01:10:56,279 seven of Soviet forces and being and capabilities. It was 747 01:10:56,319 --> 01:11:05,159 remarkably accurate, and von Mannstein and good Darien their assessments 748 01:11:06,319 --> 01:11:12,239 quite literally in the month before Barbarossa. The Soviet forces 749 01:11:12,279 --> 01:11:14,720 and being were exactly what they estimated them to be. 750 01:11:15,960 --> 01:11:19,279 In reality, it was Stalin who was looking west and 751 01:11:19,319 --> 01:11:24,039 saying that, you know, Germany has no meaningful offensive capability 752 01:11:24,119 --> 01:11:30,279 in the mighty Soviet Union, has nothing to fear, and 753 01:11:30,319 --> 01:11:34,560 this is the key to why the Soviets took such 754 01:11:34,600 --> 01:11:45,159 horrific attrition during barbaros Further relevant to context here, I 755 01:11:45,199 --> 01:11:49,800 can't remember if I got into this or not. There 756 01:11:49,840 --> 01:11:54,600 was a discreete mobilization phase throughout the Soviet Union Befe 757 01:11:54,680 --> 01:11:59,600 November nineteen forty when this demand that I just the 758 01:11:59,680 --> 01:12:05,439 numeraid was issued to Ribbon traup to deliver to Hitler 759 01:12:05,880 --> 01:12:10,039 by way of Malotov on order of Stalin. Between November 760 01:12:10,079 --> 01:12:14,000 ninety forty and the day of Barbaros, a massive and 761 01:12:14,039 --> 01:12:17,479 unprecedented arms build up took place in the Soviet Union. 762 01:12:20,800 --> 01:12:26,800 This included, as of the onset of hostilities, the Rhetorican 763 01:12:26,840 --> 01:12:31,520 possess no less than twenty four thousand tanks, including close 764 01:12:31,560 --> 01:12:34,600 to two thousand T thirty fours, which were technically a 765 01:12:34,640 --> 01:12:40,000 medium tank, but they were the all around best tank 766 01:12:40,039 --> 01:12:43,720 in the Second World War. I don't think that's arguable, 767 01:12:47,279 --> 01:12:50,640 you know, the the air forces of the Red Army 768 01:12:52,479 --> 01:12:57,359 had over twenty three thousand aircraft, or thirty seven hundred 769 01:12:57,399 --> 01:13:06,239 of which were considered to be cutting edge fighters. The 770 01:13:06,279 --> 01:13:08,680 Red Army had close to one hundred and fifty thousand 771 01:13:08,760 --> 01:13:17,159 artillery pieces. The Red Navy, including a substantial fleet of 772 01:13:17,239 --> 01:13:23,800 surface ships of varying types. They had close to three 773 01:13:23,960 --> 01:13:28,840 hundred submarines, and submarines are expressly offensive. There are no 774 01:13:28,920 --> 01:13:37,800 defensive submarines and this man as Hoffman raises in his book, 775 01:13:38,359 --> 01:13:41,520 the Soviets not only a larger fleet of submarines than 776 01:13:41,560 --> 01:13:45,960 any other country in the world. But they outnumbered the 777 01:13:46,640 --> 01:13:49,520 Royal Navy more than fourfold in terms of their number 778 01:13:49,560 --> 01:13:54,880 of subs. I mean, this is the most powerful offensive 779 01:13:54,960 --> 01:14:02,960 military element the world has ever seen, you know. So 780 01:14:03,079 --> 01:14:06,199 Stalin was essentially fearless and viewed himself as the imminent 781 01:14:06,239 --> 01:14:11,720 master of this planet in geostrategic terms, as of barbaros 782 01:14:11,760 --> 01:14:13,840 as well as of ideological ones. And we're going to 783 01:14:13,880 --> 01:14:19,479 get into that too. Something essential to understand about the 784 01:14:19,520 --> 01:14:26,000 Soviet culture. Stalin was keenly aware of what had befallen 785 01:14:27,560 --> 01:14:31,000 the Jacobin Revolution. He was also keenly aware of the 786 01:14:31,279 --> 01:14:41,039 changing dynamics of of ideological cultures within great powers. You know. 787 01:14:41,079 --> 01:14:46,079 He realized that, for example, Japan was on the ascendency. 788 01:14:46,239 --> 01:14:49,600 He realized that the German Reich had intense energies that 789 01:14:49,600 --> 01:14:51,920 it was drawing from, even though he viewed them as 790 01:14:52,319 --> 01:14:57,880 geostrategically weak and compromised. He understood that the United Kingdom 791 01:14:58,000 --> 01:15:02,960 was undergoing a terrible existential crisis and that their empire 792 01:15:03,039 --> 01:15:06,319 is structured was essentially obsolescent. And this is one of 793 01:15:06,319 --> 01:15:11,399 the reasons why there've been a series of revolts, you know, 794 01:15:11,560 --> 01:15:19,319 nascent as well as well developed and realized. You know, 795 01:15:19,439 --> 01:15:22,880 in the years before the Great War and then in 796 01:15:22,960 --> 01:15:26,600 the Inner War years up to the then president, you know, 797 01:15:26,760 --> 01:15:33,439 and socialism in one country that that was something of 798 01:15:35,840 --> 01:15:41,119 that was something of a propaganda cliche. Down invoked the 799 01:15:41,239 --> 01:15:48,079 sort of give a branding to you know, the kind 800 01:15:48,079 --> 01:15:54,520 of punctuated disturbances of this mass and megacytal restructuring of 801 01:15:54,600 --> 01:15:59,119 Russian society and the Soviet state which was becoming a superpower, 802 01:16:00,079 --> 01:16:05,600 as well as to you know, assuage the Western powers 803 01:16:05,640 --> 01:16:08,039 which were very much doing his bidding at that moment. 804 01:16:09,359 --> 01:16:12,439 Stalin was very much engaged with the common tern that 805 01:16:12,479 --> 01:16:19,560 had not changed and in the planning for what was 806 01:16:19,600 --> 01:16:24,239 to be the assault on Europe. In the aftermath of 807 01:16:24,279 --> 01:16:33,600 the Icebreaker conflict, Stalin he called back the Russian delegation 808 01:16:33,680 --> 01:16:36,000 to the Common Turn and he called the common Terns 809 01:16:36,000 --> 01:16:39,960 representatives to Moscow to advise them of what was imminently 810 01:16:40,000 --> 01:16:45,560 going to happen. You know, the Soviet Union needed to 811 01:16:45,600 --> 01:16:50,199 realize the World Revolution, to survive, as well as to 812 01:16:50,239 --> 01:16:56,680 consolidate its superpower status which was not just burgaining but 813 01:16:57,000 --> 01:17:07,760 was being actively realized also. And I realized I've probably 814 01:17:07,800 --> 01:17:20,159 got a bias for testimonial evidence, especially they're not exclusively 815 01:17:21,119 --> 01:17:27,600 in discerning the motives of men in command roles. But 816 01:17:29,039 --> 01:17:35,760 there's not, there's not. The direct testimony is more reliable 817 01:17:35,800 --> 01:17:42,000 than circumstantial evidence unless it contradicts the manifest weight of 818 01:17:45,279 --> 01:17:53,000 extrinsic material facts outside the parameters those declarations and what 819 01:17:53,159 --> 01:18:04,800 Stalin said his biographer, Colonel General Wolcagano of he word 820 01:18:04,840 --> 01:18:13,159 for word by Lakouv reproduced the speech that Stalin issued 821 01:18:13,520 --> 01:18:25,640 fourth on May fifth, nineteen forty one, And according to Volkoganov, 822 01:18:28,760 --> 01:18:31,560 the leader made it quote. The Leader made it unmistakably clear. 823 01:18:31,880 --> 01:18:34,840 War is inevitable in the future. We must be ready 824 01:18:34,880 --> 01:18:40,720 for the unconditional destruction of German fascism. The worl will 825 01:18:40,760 --> 01:18:44,119 be fought on enemy territory, and victory will be achieved 826 01:18:44,159 --> 01:18:47,560 with a few casualties. And as we got into last week, 827 01:18:47,760 --> 01:18:50,960 and as I think we've raised before in discussion of 828 01:18:50,960 --> 01:18:55,039 World War Two, it was a matter of formal doctrine 829 01:18:55,479 --> 01:19:03,119 that the Red Army was an offensive, perurpsed element. Its 830 01:19:03,439 --> 01:19:09,279 primary mission orientation was as the standard bearer of the revolution, 831 01:19:10,560 --> 01:19:16,800 and it never struck a defensive posture. As a matter 832 01:19:16,880 --> 01:19:25,199 of doctrine, by choice, you know, and I've made the 833 01:19:25,239 --> 01:19:28,399 point before. I believe Stalin is probably the single most 834 01:19:28,399 --> 01:19:37,680 powerful man who ever lived, and the momentum that the 835 01:19:37,720 --> 01:19:44,920 Communist International had at this moment was at zenith. I'd 836 01:19:45,000 --> 01:19:49,359 argue Stalin had to abide that role or he would 837 01:19:49,399 --> 01:19:53,760 have been replaced by a man who would have you know, 838 01:19:56,279 --> 01:20:01,880 it was a convergence of ideological, imperative and geostrategic realities 839 01:20:03,239 --> 01:20:10,199 in a way that is very rare, but was sort 840 01:20:10,199 --> 01:20:20,520 of inextricably and splendidly bound up at this juncture. And 841 01:20:26,479 --> 01:20:29,439 I think we talked before about the secret real I'm 842 01:20:29,479 --> 01:20:32,600 jumping around a bit, but I'm trying to corral the 843 01:20:32,640 --> 01:20:39,960 evidence in categorical capacities. The secret meeting with the polic Bureau, 844 01:20:40,000 --> 01:20:42,399 and this is when the common Tern delegation was also 845 01:20:42,520 --> 01:20:48,960 present in August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, you know, in 846 01:20:49,039 --> 01:20:55,520 the concominant with the assault on the Japanese Imperial Army 847 01:20:55,560 --> 01:20:59,920 at calcum Goal. This meeting that Shtalin called the Poet 848 01:21:00,079 --> 01:21:08,880 Borough and the Russian section of the common Tern, Stalin 849 01:21:08,920 --> 01:21:12,000 declared that the time had come to quote apply the 850 01:21:12,039 --> 01:21:16,039 torch of war to the European powder keg. This is 851 01:21:16,079 --> 01:21:19,560 when Stalin declared, if we accept the German proposal for 852 01:21:19,600 --> 01:21:24,279 the non aggression picked, you know, Hitler will naturally attack Poland. 853 01:21:24,399 --> 01:21:28,279 The intervention of France and England will be inevitable. The resulting, 854 01:21:28,520 --> 01:21:32,800 in Shalin's words, serious and arrest and disorder would lead 855 01:21:32,880 --> 01:21:38,680 to a punctuate a destabilization of Western Europe, yet without 856 01:21:38,720 --> 01:21:42,640 the Soviet Union being drawn into the conflict until they 857 01:21:44,159 --> 01:21:50,880 permissively opted do and Stalin referred to what he declared 858 01:21:50,880 --> 01:21:54,960 in nineteen twenty five with respect to the international strategy. 859 01:21:56,039 --> 01:22:00,760 You know, the moment is nigh that we we we 860 01:22:00,840 --> 01:22:06,439 can pursue the bultimization of Europe by way of an 861 01:22:06,479 --> 01:22:13,079 advantageous entry into the war, through a broad spectrum field 862 01:22:13,079 --> 01:22:18,000 of activity which had now the potential of which had 863 01:22:18,000 --> 01:22:20,840 now opened up for their realization of the World Revolution. 864 01:22:21,840 --> 01:22:25,760 And of course, when uh minutes from this meeting and 865 01:22:25,800 --> 01:22:29,640 the speech were smuggled out and were obtained by the 866 01:22:29,680 --> 01:22:36,960 French news agency Havas by way of Geneva, you know, 867 01:22:37,000 --> 01:22:39,880 and it went, it was, it was, it was published, 868 01:22:39,920 --> 01:22:44,119 and then the Moscow immediately wanted to damage control and 869 01:22:44,479 --> 01:22:48,680 Stalin apologists and propagandas, particularly in London, but also in 870 01:22:48,680 --> 01:22:53,479 the United States, you know, they they started immediately claiming 871 01:22:53,479 --> 01:22:56,079 that this, this is fascist propaganda, and this, this isn't 872 01:22:56,239 --> 01:23:02,520 this isn't true, you know, So I mean this is important. Also, 873 01:23:02,640 --> 01:23:06,560 like when you read books by guys Chris Bellamy comes 874 01:23:06,600 --> 01:23:10,800 to mind. But they're legion these historians who claim, oh 875 01:23:10,840 --> 01:23:14,399 Stuvarov is a liar, there's no evidence for these things. 876 01:23:15,079 --> 01:23:20,079 They're redacting a huge amount of evidence, or they're just 877 01:23:20,239 --> 01:23:22,760 not including it and would question they say, oh that 878 01:23:22,760 --> 01:23:29,600 that's just propaganda. They're just not addressing it. And that's incredible, 879 01:23:31,680 --> 01:23:37,479 you know. I mean, it'd be like, like imagine somewhat 880 01:23:37,520 --> 01:23:41,840 more approximately, like let's say I was writing a history 881 01:23:40,520 --> 01:23:44,399 of the American War in Iraq from two thousand and 882 01:23:44,399 --> 01:23:47,159 three eleven, and it'd be like if I was categorically 883 01:23:47,199 --> 01:23:51,760 redacting things that President Bush and Rumsfeld said in conversations 884 01:23:51,760 --> 01:23:54,880 they had and just declaring that, well, it's not important, 885 01:23:55,000 --> 01:23:58,279 or that that's just something liberals say or allege. I mean, 886 01:23:58,520 --> 01:24:01,520 people would laugh at me, they'd say that's ridiculous. But 887 01:24:01,600 --> 01:24:07,479 in the case of you know, Barbarossa and you know, 888 01:24:07,520 --> 01:24:10,880 the Icebreaker hypothesis, that's exactly what they do you know, 889 01:24:10,920 --> 01:24:15,920 and you're just supposed to accept it. This is this 890 01:24:16,000 --> 01:24:21,520 is very abnormal, even accounting for the fact that research 891 01:24:21,560 --> 01:24:25,840 standards and things are often compromised for ideological and political reasons. 892 01:24:26,560 --> 01:24:34,720 But this seems tangential, but it's essential to understanding Suberov's 893 01:24:34,760 --> 01:24:42,640 and Hoffmann's points. We've got to ask why Barbarossa was 894 01:24:42,680 --> 01:24:48,039 so tactically successful for the Wehrmacht and what that means, 895 01:24:48,760 --> 01:24:53,279 because this is sort of the key, in my opinion, 896 01:24:59,359 --> 01:25:04,760 the Soviet It's we're planning an assault on Romania in 897 01:25:04,800 --> 01:25:11,000 the autumn nineteen forty one, and if you know how 898 01:25:11,000 --> 01:25:16,119 to interpret military deployments, this should be clear. But also, 899 01:25:17,279 --> 01:25:23,239 if you're going to assault Germany from then extant frontiers, 900 01:25:24,840 --> 01:25:27,239 you're gonna do so from the Baltic and you're gonna 901 01:25:27,239 --> 01:25:33,399 do so through Romania. And of course Germany was totally 902 01:25:33,439 --> 01:25:39,880 dependent on Romanian petroleum. That's one of the reasons Hitler 903 01:25:40,800 --> 01:25:45,560 cultivated the friendship of Antoniscu so closely. Antonescu held the 904 01:25:45,640 --> 01:25:48,359 Knights Cross. There was very good offices between him and 905 01:25:48,399 --> 01:25:51,960 Germany anyway, for cultural reasons, for ideological reasons, other things. 906 01:25:52,000 --> 01:25:56,439 But he and Hitler, despite the linguistic barrier. They were 907 01:25:56,560 --> 01:26:01,159 very close friends too, and Antonescu was Hitler's strongest alla, 908 01:26:01,239 --> 01:26:05,960 I believe, you know, and close to a quarter million 909 01:26:06,079 --> 01:26:13,760 Romanians fought, you know, for the Axis cause in the East, 910 01:26:13,800 --> 01:26:16,600 which for a country the size of Romania, that's remarkable. 911 01:26:17,319 --> 01:26:25,119 But army groups South deployed from Romania. And this, if 912 01:26:25,720 --> 01:26:30,000 this was a very delicate issue because Soviet intelligence, which 913 01:26:30,039 --> 01:26:35,560 was actually very good, this the deployment to Romania. The 914 01:26:35,600 --> 01:26:38,680 way Hitler, the ruse Hitler was able to pull off 915 01:26:39,319 --> 01:26:43,159 was that the unstable situation in Yugoslavia was what was 916 01:26:43,279 --> 01:26:47,840 drawing German forces at scale to be deployed there. But 917 01:26:47,920 --> 01:26:54,000 also obviously, through Ledgered Maine and other things, OKW was 918 01:26:54,359 --> 01:26:58,159 effectively able to hide the scale at which forces were 919 01:26:58,159 --> 01:27:00,840 being a mass there. But you know, not only was 920 01:27:00,880 --> 01:27:05,000 it a staging ground for Barbarosa, but Hitler was reacted 921 01:27:05,039 --> 01:27:07,600 with anxiety that the Soviets were in with salt Romania 922 01:27:07,760 --> 01:27:11,680 because they were so these forces down there at a 923 01:27:11,800 --> 01:27:16,399 dual role. They were purposed for an offensive mission, but 924 01:27:16,439 --> 01:27:21,000 they were also there to as a bulwark against amy assault, 925 01:27:21,720 --> 01:27:25,600 you know, at least so that they you know, there'd 926 01:27:25,640 --> 01:27:29,760 be enough time to reinforce and and not just you know, 927 01:27:29,880 --> 01:27:33,720 endure collapse of a critical front, which on top of 928 01:27:33,760 --> 01:27:40,439 the geostrategic menace that also to deprive Germany really of it, 929 01:27:40,920 --> 01:27:46,319 it's only a source of petroleum and represente quantities to 930 01:27:47,520 --> 01:27:50,880 feel the war machine. But what this led to was 931 01:27:51,560 --> 01:27:58,760 there was massive Soviet deployments in the Baltic and in 932 01:27:58,960 --> 01:28:06,279 Ukraine through the Romanian frontier. So when the Wehrmacht assaulted, 933 01:28:06,600 --> 01:28:12,199 the road to Moscow was basically undefended. Okay, that's one 934 01:28:12,199 --> 01:28:19,640 of the reasons why Holder and uh Manstein they were 935 01:28:19,640 --> 01:28:22,319 beside themselves because they were telling Hitler, we need to 936 01:28:22,359 --> 01:28:27,600 move on Moscow now. We can't wait, you know, we 937 01:28:27,640 --> 01:28:31,000 can't wait for the weather to turn, and we can't 938 01:28:31,039 --> 01:28:38,159 wait for the Soviets to reconstitute and affect a deployment 939 01:28:38,199 --> 01:28:45,800 in depth on the path to Moscow, you know. And 940 01:28:45,840 --> 01:28:52,039 as the deployment schema in Ukraine, the jur Oury Group 941 01:28:52,159 --> 01:28:59,119 South was exponentially outnumbered, but the so the Red Army 942 01:28:59,159 --> 01:29:02,880 elements there they were deployed in an offensive pattern. And 943 01:29:02,920 --> 01:29:05,079 if you know anything about the way the Soviet Union 944 01:29:05,680 --> 01:29:07,920 fought and the way the armforce in the Russian Federation 945 01:29:08,079 --> 01:29:10,880 fights and they very much scaled down way to they 946 01:29:10,920 --> 01:29:19,680 obviously and with very different localized combined arms platforms. Deep 947 01:29:19,800 --> 01:29:26,479 battle is its it's dependent upon a fixed deployment schema 948 01:29:26,600 --> 01:29:29,720 for it to work, okay. And the way the Red 949 01:29:29,800 --> 01:29:32,760 Army deployed offensively, and this is what they did when 950 01:29:32,800 --> 01:29:36,439 the tide turned and after Kursk, this is how they 951 01:29:36,479 --> 01:29:42,079 assaulted Berlin. The offensive deployment schema is by heavy use 952 01:29:42,079 --> 01:29:47,600 of shock armies, a Soviet shock army. They were larded 953 01:29:47,640 --> 01:29:53,680 with firepower and totally front loaded. Okay. So when Army 954 01:29:53,680 --> 01:29:58,359 Group South engaged the Red Army through the ky Of Corridor, 955 01:30:00,039 --> 01:30:04,520 they were engaging this forward element that was loaded down 956 01:30:04,560 --> 01:30:07,479 with firepower that was supposed to break through the mainline 957 01:30:07,479 --> 01:30:11,880 of resistance, but that had a limited operational capacity, often 958 01:30:11,920 --> 01:30:15,520 of only a few days. Then they were to be 959 01:30:15,680 --> 01:30:20,279 rapidly reinforced by fresh elements who would continually assault in waves, 960 01:30:20,880 --> 01:30:24,920 and then when that shock element was was re equipped 961 01:30:24,960 --> 01:30:33,000 and refitted, they would smash through again. But obviously, if 962 01:30:33,000 --> 01:30:40,399 the Wehrmacht assaults with mass armored columns, when you're deployed 963 01:30:40,439 --> 01:30:44,760 offensively with your front loaded shock army, as the sharp 964 01:30:44,800 --> 01:30:48,800 punk they're gonna smash that shock army, and then they're 965 01:30:48,800 --> 01:30:53,039 gonna cut through your reinforcement elements like butter, you know. 966 01:30:53,399 --> 01:31:00,399 And as they break through wave after wave, that frontload 967 01:31:00,439 --> 01:31:02,680 of element is going to be fighting on reversed fronts 968 01:31:03,800 --> 01:31:07,600 and they're going to get cut to pieces, which is 969 01:31:07,640 --> 01:31:14,520 exactly what happened. Okay, So the Soviets were taking catastrophic 970 01:31:14,600 --> 01:31:20,039 casualties in the North and in the South. Meanwhile, Army 971 01:31:20,039 --> 01:31:26,239 Group Center was racing to Moscow quite literally, and Hitler 972 01:31:26,239 --> 01:31:33,119 didn't know quite what to make of this because there 973 01:31:33,119 --> 01:31:36,520 were sort of two Hitlers. And Stofally makes this point. 974 01:31:37,279 --> 01:31:42,479 When Hitler felt confident politically and when he had a 975 01:31:42,840 --> 01:31:47,159 what he believed was a firm conceptual grasp of the battlespace, 976 01:31:48,479 --> 01:31:53,119 Hitler was hyper aggressive. When fog of war questions or 977 01:31:54,000 --> 01:32:00,560 political uncertainty clouded that perspective, Hitler developed a siege mentality, 978 01:32:02,119 --> 01:32:09,000 and that's exactly what happened. And Hitler viewed Stalin as 979 01:32:09,000 --> 01:32:17,079 incredibly dangerous as he should have. So Hitler essentially halted 980 01:32:17,239 --> 01:32:24,199 Army Groups Center well Army Group South, surrounded this massive 981 01:32:24,800 --> 01:32:30,600 element plus the reserves that the Kremlin had ordered, like 982 01:32:30,720 --> 01:32:37,039 rushed to the front immediately, and Hitler was afraid to 983 01:32:37,319 --> 01:32:41,520 push the attack for a decisive victory at Moscow until 984 01:32:41,560 --> 01:32:46,039 this element was neutralized. And it was neutralized. The only 985 01:32:46,159 --> 01:32:51,960 casualties the Soviets endured is utterly castrophic and unprecedented. And 986 01:32:53,079 --> 01:32:55,760 the Germans took something like three quarters of a million 987 01:32:55,800 --> 01:33:02,880 prisoners alone. Okay, but by the time, by the time 988 01:33:02,920 --> 01:33:05,560 the FU ordered the attack to be pushed on Moscow 989 01:33:05,720 --> 01:33:10,279 was too late. Okay, that's what happened. People misunderstand that. 990 01:33:10,359 --> 01:33:15,680 It says, you know, oh, the Germans were plotting to 991 01:33:15,720 --> 01:33:20,079 attack all along because the Soviets were weak in some ways. 992 01:33:20,520 --> 01:33:24,199 But then Stalin got it together, and you know, because 993 01:33:24,239 --> 01:33:28,880 the Germans underestimated Soviet capabilities. You know, Hitler lost the war. 994 01:33:28,960 --> 01:33:31,600 That's not true at all. That doesn't make any sense. 995 01:33:32,640 --> 01:33:35,680 And you know, if Stalin was like, look at it 996 01:33:35,760 --> 01:33:41,039 like this. Okay, the Germans were halted at Moscow, but 997 01:33:41,119 --> 01:33:45,039 they reached the gates of Moscow, they reached Leningrad and 998 01:33:45,119 --> 01:33:49,039 lated it to siege, they reached Stalingrad. The German the 999 01:33:49,159 --> 01:33:52,680 very much reached all of its objectives in months. How 1000 01:33:52,680 --> 01:33:58,319 long did it take the Red Army to march on Berlin. 1001 01:33:58,439 --> 01:34:02,000 It took them almost four years. So while was there 1002 01:34:02,039 --> 01:34:05,119 this plotting, grinding blood bath. If the Soviets were this 1003 01:34:05,199 --> 01:34:09,239 grossly underestimated force, you know, and the Germans didn't know 1004 01:34:09,279 --> 01:34:12,760 what they were doing like this, the Germans killed the 1005 01:34:12,800 --> 01:34:20,640 Red Army, you know. Obviously the Russians still had enough 1006 01:34:21,239 --> 01:34:24,560 to hold Moscow and they did, and that was incredibly valiant. 1007 01:34:24,600 --> 01:34:30,000 And Russians are incredibly tough. And there's a simplicity to 1008 01:34:30,119 --> 01:34:33,399 the way the Ivans fight, but it's a simplicity that works, 1009 01:34:33,800 --> 01:34:40,560 you know. I think it's misguided when people suggest otherwise, 1010 01:34:40,600 --> 01:34:45,840 and especially today because people are you know, they've adopted 1011 01:34:46,359 --> 01:34:50,000 prejudices and stuff in this regard. There's really really stupid 1012 01:34:50,079 --> 01:34:51,760 things that come out of the Pentagon in terms of 1013 01:34:51,760 --> 01:34:59,720 their assessment of Russian capabilities and things. And incidentally, Eric VA. 1014 01:35:00,039 --> 01:35:06,119 Einstein's the book it's called Loss of Victories. It's for 1015 01:35:06,319 --> 01:35:08,399 I think it's fascinating, but it's kind of for military 1016 01:35:08,399 --> 01:35:12,159 hounds only. It's you know, not like light Sunday reading. 1017 01:35:13,159 --> 01:35:18,479 But what that book was the US War Department back 1018 01:35:18,520 --> 01:35:20,640 when there was a war department. There's not anymore, no 1019 01:35:20,640 --> 01:35:27,800 matter what, like special needs Hegseth says, but in the 1020 01:35:27,920 --> 01:35:32,319 last months of the Department of War they debriefed Manstein 1021 01:35:32,560 --> 01:35:37,520 on basically on you know, his experience over four years 1022 01:35:37,520 --> 01:35:40,520 of fighting the Soviet Union in the general officer's role. 1023 01:35:41,800 --> 01:35:49,359 And the War Department is soon to be the Defense Department. 1024 01:35:49,640 --> 01:35:54,680 They took this very seriously, and early NATO force structure 1025 01:35:56,079 --> 01:35:59,479 wasn't a substantial on the infantry side, ground on the 1026 01:35:59,479 --> 01:36:04,640 imagery on our side. It was substantially based around what 1027 01:36:04,800 --> 01:36:10,520 von Mannstein had. It's said, Okay, so this book was 1028 01:36:10,880 --> 01:36:14,680 sometime in the fifties, the first edition, it was edited 1029 01:36:14,720 --> 01:36:17,680 and make it more readable, and it's it's literally Managelin 1030 01:36:17,760 --> 01:36:23,800 is debriefing with some added stuff, you know. So and 1031 01:36:23,880 --> 01:36:26,880 that that was one of his core premises is that 1032 01:36:27,479 --> 01:36:31,439 fighting the Russians on Russian territory, they're they're they're they're 1033 01:36:31,520 --> 01:36:35,600 unbelievably and savagely tough, you know, and that that's a 1034 01:36:35,640 --> 01:36:38,960 force multiplier, and it also makes up for some of their shortcomings. 1035 01:36:39,560 --> 01:36:45,640 And the Russians also they they know what they know 1036 01:36:45,720 --> 01:36:50,600 the limits of their capabilities, you know. And on the 1037 01:36:50,640 --> 01:36:53,359 one hand, and super off of his book Inside the 1038 01:36:53,359 --> 01:36:56,680 Red Army, which is very much worth reading too, especially 1039 01:36:56,720 --> 01:36:58,479 if you got an interest in the late Cold War stuff, 1040 01:36:58,520 --> 01:37:03,880 because it's very much a breakdown of you know, the 1041 01:37:03,880 --> 01:37:07,159 the Brison of era the Soviet Army. You know, he 1042 01:37:07,239 --> 01:37:10,000 makes the point, uh, And Harold Coyle made this point 1043 01:37:10,000 --> 01:37:15,560 too that Doctoran in the Soviet Army was almost like regulation. 1044 01:37:16,840 --> 01:37:20,760 There was there were no mission oriented tactics, and the 1045 01:37:20,800 --> 01:37:28,000 whole ethos of the Soviet Army's general staff was to 1046 01:37:28,039 --> 01:37:32,800 eliminate uncertainty wherever and whenever and however possible, so they 1047 01:37:32,800 --> 01:37:39,079 didn't tolerate deviation from the battle plan as emerged from 1048 01:37:39,479 --> 01:37:47,399 you know, superior orders. But nevertheless, the Russian, the Soviets 1049 01:37:47,399 --> 01:37:50,199 and the Russians do very well with what they're good at, 1050 01:37:51,399 --> 01:37:55,800 you know, and deep battle is what they were good at. 1051 01:37:57,479 --> 01:38:01,439 Heavy reliance on on combined arms in a shock element 1052 01:38:01,520 --> 01:38:08,600 capacity went on the offensive. That tended towards the kind 1053 01:38:08,640 --> 01:38:12,000 of inflexibility which I think they later remedied somewhat during 1054 01:38:12,039 --> 01:38:16,560 the Cold War. But the ability to rapidly shift from 1055 01:38:16,600 --> 01:38:20,760 an offensive posture to defending the Behrmacht was very very 1056 01:38:20,760 --> 01:38:23,239 good at that, and the British are pretty good at 1057 01:38:23,239 --> 01:38:28,600 that too. The Soviets were catastrophically bad at it, and 1058 01:38:28,640 --> 01:38:33,319 the French were bad at it. But part of it too, though, 1059 01:38:33,479 --> 01:38:37,880 is that Stalin had every reason to believe that the 1060 01:38:37,920 --> 01:38:40,920 Behmont wasn't capable of what it was capable of as 1061 01:38:40,960 --> 01:38:43,840 of June nineteen forty one. I mean, that was a 1062 01:38:43,840 --> 01:38:48,319 blind spot. But at the same time, you know, the 1063 01:38:48,359 --> 01:38:54,479 Germans tend to surprise people on matters of military affairs. 1064 01:38:55,199 --> 01:38:59,640 But that's key because it's not as internet guys and 1065 01:39:00,159 --> 01:39:05,600 armchair goofballs who claimed, well, Suber was an idiot who's 1066 01:39:05,600 --> 01:39:07,880 a liar like looking out bad the Soviets got mall. 1067 01:39:07,960 --> 01:39:09,960 That's the whole, the whole point, Like that makes his 1068 01:39:10,079 --> 01:39:14,119 point not the opposite. So that's that's key. You know, 1069 01:39:14,159 --> 01:39:19,520 I'm not I'm not just dwelling on minutia to play 1070 01:39:19,600 --> 01:39:25,560 cake the the you know, the the military hounds among 1071 01:39:25,680 --> 01:39:37,279 us or something. But you know it's also you know, 1072 01:39:37,359 --> 01:39:42,640 it was you know the point too that I think 1073 01:39:42,640 --> 01:39:46,119 a lot of lay people don't understand these days. You know, 1074 01:39:46,239 --> 01:39:51,960 modern war resolves rapidly. You know, you don't you know, 1075 01:39:52,000 --> 01:39:55,000 you don't plan for quagmires because then you're planning to 1076 01:39:55,079 --> 01:40:01,960 lose a war. So you know, within ideally in about 1077 01:40:01,960 --> 01:40:10,079 ten weeks in the outer temporal limits six months, you know, 1078 01:40:10,159 --> 01:40:17,640 Moscow had to fall to the Hrmont and Stalin was 1079 01:40:17,720 --> 01:40:25,119 over confident, absolutely, But it stands the reason his kind 1080 01:40:25,119 --> 01:40:27,359 of poor view of the Wehrmacht, not in terms of 1081 01:40:27,399 --> 01:40:31,920 its quality of men or firepower, but the geo strategic 1082 01:40:31,960 --> 01:40:34,800 situation and what he viewed as it's over extended commitments 1083 01:40:34,800 --> 01:40:39,840 and things. You know, he reasoned that, you know, even 1084 01:40:39,880 --> 01:40:43,159 in the very unlikely event of an assault, you know, 1085 01:40:45,119 --> 01:40:48,760 we can hold him at bay long enough to reinforce 1086 01:40:48,840 --> 01:40:53,520 and by then, you know, victory conditions will no longer 1087 01:40:53,560 --> 01:40:57,439 be realizable. You know, this all kind of falls into place, 1088 01:40:57,920 --> 01:41:02,439 is the totality of circumstances. You've got to look at 1089 01:41:02,439 --> 01:41:05,880 this the ssoudieological culture. You gotta take Stalin's own statements, 1090 01:41:05,920 --> 01:41:10,920 you gotta look at the statements of his underlings, including Khrushchev. 1091 01:41:11,560 --> 01:41:14,600 You've got to look at the pattern of deployment. You've 1092 01:41:14,640 --> 01:41:17,640 got to take in if you know what to look for. 1093 01:41:17,840 --> 01:41:22,279 But even I mean it's even more persuasive, or are 1094 01:41:22,279 --> 01:41:27,600 more obvious or other, But you know, taking in totality, 1095 01:41:29,199 --> 01:41:31,439 I mean, it's clear that Suvarov was telling the truth, 1096 01:41:32,520 --> 01:41:35,000 you know, but also mean, well it's not it's not 1097 01:41:35,039 --> 01:41:40,840 clear what what the alternative was. I mean it this 1098 01:41:41,000 --> 01:41:49,520 unprecedented military build up coupled with the transformative, globally transformative 1099 01:41:49,560 --> 01:41:58,880 aspects of the Bolshrirek Revolution, the heart and lungs of 1100 01:41:58,920 --> 01:42:02,840 which paverbially were in the Soviet Union. I mean, what 1101 01:42:02,840 --> 01:42:06,640 what's the alternative Stalin was? He ordered this build up 1102 01:42:06,680 --> 01:42:11,119 for purely defensive purposes, to which would inevitably at some 1103 01:42:11,159 --> 01:42:15,239 point provoke the West into attacking him. I mean, it 1104 01:42:15,279 --> 01:42:22,720 doesn't that that doesn't make any sense. And generally, when 1105 01:42:22,720 --> 01:42:28,600 you're talking about conditions of approximate parody with conventional combined 1106 01:42:28,720 --> 01:42:33,560 arms at scale, or when you're talking about near peer 1107 01:42:36,159 --> 01:42:41,119 strategic planning, you don't wait to be attacked. You always 1108 01:42:41,159 --> 01:42:50,239 push the assault, you know. Then that's I mean, this, 1109 01:42:50,239 --> 01:42:52,640 this this is very basic stuff. 1110 01:42:53,800 --> 01:42:57,880 Speaker 1: Well it also also it doesn't make sense to say 1111 01:42:58,000 --> 01:43:04,600 Stalin was this interested in this social national version of 1112 01:43:04,680 --> 01:43:09,239 socialism that that would emerge out of the Bolsheviks. When 1113 01:43:09,279 --> 01:43:13,600 you send troops and you send advisors and you send 1114 01:43:13,720 --> 01:43:18,600 tanks to Spain, Yeah, I mean you don't, Yeah, you 1115 01:43:18,640 --> 01:43:21,520 don't care about Spain. You don't care what's happening in Spain. 1116 01:43:22,319 --> 01:43:25,800 If if this is supposed to be for Russia only, well. 1117 01:43:25,760 --> 01:43:28,720 Speaker 2: It's also the Soviet Union. Like, don't get me wrong. 1118 01:43:29,960 --> 01:43:33,079 You know, one of the one of the one of 1119 01:43:33,119 --> 01:43:38,800 the living believing people who I I really find common 1120 01:43:38,840 --> 01:43:42,239 ground with and in terms of political theory is in 1121 01:43:42,479 --> 01:43:46,680 an historical subject matter is Krrie Bolton. Like he's just great. 1122 01:43:47,079 --> 01:43:49,039 I don't know the guy. Unfortunately, he doesn't leave New 1123 01:43:49,119 --> 01:43:52,960 Zealand much these days because he's elderly, you know. And uh, 1124 01:43:53,119 --> 01:43:54,880 I think most people know of him because he wrote 1125 01:43:54,880 --> 01:43:59,159 this really great exhaustive biography of Francis Yackey. But he 1126 01:43:59,239 --> 01:44:02,520 wrote a book on Stalin called Stalin the Enduring Legacy, 1127 01:44:03,039 --> 01:44:08,199 and people who haven't read the book, they they they 1128 01:44:08,279 --> 01:44:11,359 panted as some sort of oh he's some Eurasianist. That's like, 1129 01:44:11,399 --> 01:44:14,199 that's not what he's saying at all. He's saying Stalin's 1130 01:44:14,239 --> 01:44:20,279 legacy was complicated. He basically abides the same viewpoint that 1131 01:44:20,319 --> 01:44:23,680 Paul Godfrey does, although for some of different reasons about 1132 01:44:23,680 --> 01:44:27,439 a substantial aspect of the Cold War deriving from the 1133 01:44:28,159 --> 01:44:33,880 Stalin versus Trotsky paradigm. You know, but that doesn't mean 1134 01:44:33,880 --> 01:44:38,560 that Stalin was somehow not an internationalist. And even you know, 1135 01:44:38,600 --> 01:44:42,000 the Soviet Union can name dozens of ethnicities, you know, 1136 01:44:42,439 --> 01:44:47,520 a huge Moslim population, you know, a huge Asiatic population, 1137 01:44:48,279 --> 01:44:53,640 you know, a huge number of Near Eastern people. You know, 1138 01:44:54,199 --> 01:44:58,319 it spanned one fifth or one six of this planets, 1139 01:44:58,840 --> 01:45:03,640 like the Soviet Union was the ultimate international superpower, you know, 1140 01:45:04,039 --> 01:45:09,319 and the only way the Soviet Union survives. And one 1141 01:45:09,359 --> 01:45:13,680 of the reasons why the later Cold War was so 1142 01:45:13,840 --> 01:45:19,199 dangerous as human you know, for technological reasons in historical 1143 01:45:19,239 --> 01:45:22,439 ones and the sidelining of human decision makers and misconditions 1144 01:45:22,439 --> 01:45:25,359 of strategic nucleator parody and things. But the reason why 1145 01:45:25,359 --> 01:45:28,720 I drop of who was a fascinating guy. And I mean, 1146 01:45:28,760 --> 01:45:33,479 like I've said, I believe I'm not a sovietologist and 1147 01:45:33,600 --> 01:45:39,720 I'm not a Russia expert at all, but I do 1148 01:45:39,840 --> 01:45:44,720 know something and it's clear to me that post Khrush 1149 01:45:44,760 --> 01:45:51,399 chief there was a shadow trifecta of and drop of 1150 01:45:51,600 --> 01:45:55,560 Ustanov and Gramigo with a real Soviet executive. Brezhnev was 1151 01:45:55,560 --> 01:45:59,800 a frontman, which made sense because before he became kind 1152 01:45:59,800 --> 01:46:04,720 of do we compromised people liked Breshnev, and he resonated 1153 01:46:04,760 --> 01:46:08,600 with with the people even today, like he's fondly remembered, 1154 01:46:08,880 --> 01:46:13,680 you know, like uh as as as you know, uh, 1155 01:46:14,239 --> 01:46:16,560 it's like a man who was like a like a 1156 01:46:16,560 --> 01:46:21,279 great steward of other Russian people and the nationalities. But 1157 01:46:22,279 --> 01:46:25,199 you know, and drop of I mean Bridsenev was very 1158 01:46:25,279 --> 01:46:28,720 much a Stalinist, you know, and as was in drop 1159 01:46:28,760 --> 01:46:35,199 of but and drop off seminal speech right in eighty two, 1160 01:46:35,520 --> 01:46:41,920 right after he became a general secretary. You know, he 1161 01:46:42,640 --> 01:46:47,560 this is when uh project Rion, which a lot of 1162 01:46:47,560 --> 01:46:52,239 people attribute as contributing substantially to the war Scare of 1163 01:46:52,279 --> 01:46:54,760 eighty three in the able Archer era. I think people 1164 01:46:54,800 --> 01:46:59,000 still misunderstand that aspect of it. But because it may 1165 01:46:59,520 --> 01:47:01,640 there isn't one of the subject of the speech to 1166 01:47:01,760 --> 01:47:06,359 the Presidium he said, we're going to lose the Cold 1167 01:47:06,439 --> 01:47:14,319 War if we don't take drastic measures to countermeasures against Rima, 1168 01:47:14,560 --> 01:47:16,760 you know, the revolution of military affairs. He was being 1169 01:47:16,840 --> 01:47:21,920 specifically of computing power and command and control aspects, which 1170 01:47:22,000 --> 01:47:24,640 was true. There's there's something, there's something insane. There's only 1171 01:47:24,680 --> 01:47:28,039 like five thousand computers in the entire Soviet Union in 1172 01:47:28,119 --> 01:47:30,720 ninety too. It was something that it was some insanely 1173 01:47:30,840 --> 01:47:34,880 primitive state of affairs or regards high tech, you know, 1174 01:47:35,279 --> 01:47:41,720 and you know, it's oh point was basically the risk 1175 01:47:41,800 --> 01:47:46,279 of war based on the strategic paradigm as it's evolving, 1176 01:47:46,439 --> 01:47:50,800 is well as these command and control aspects and and 1177 01:47:50,920 --> 01:47:53,920 the sideline of human decision makers, that the risk of 1178 01:47:53,960 --> 01:47:57,880 war is probably greater than it's ever been since you know, 1179 01:47:57,920 --> 01:48:01,640 the forties. But also so we're going to lose that 1180 01:48:01,800 --> 01:48:09,039 war if we don't find a way to develop meaningful 1181 01:48:09,119 --> 01:48:16,840 countermeasures that you know, are our technologies of parody, or 1182 01:48:16,880 --> 01:48:18,600 unless we find a way out of the Cold War, 1183 01:48:19,720 --> 01:48:22,279 you know. And that was Gorbachev's whole notion, because Gorbachev 1184 01:48:22,359 --> 01:48:26,079 wasn'tna drop off protege. He wasn't some big liberal chevid 1185 01:48:26,159 --> 01:48:34,720 narsee I think was subverting things. But point being, you know, 1186 01:48:34,800 --> 01:48:38,359 Gorbachev was very much the anti Yeltsin quite literally, and 1187 01:48:38,479 --> 01:48:46,000 Yelson was the neocons guy. You know. Gorbachev's notion was, 1188 01:48:48,119 --> 01:48:52,079 you know, to reform the command economy with certain qualifications, 1189 01:48:53,000 --> 01:48:56,239 you know, and and and basically do it with gods 1190 01:48:56,359 --> 01:49:00,760 plan and favor of something else that could abide innovation 1191 01:49:01,159 --> 01:49:05,119 in the high tech sector and to bring about peace 1192 01:49:05,159 --> 01:49:09,319 with the United States. But surrendering to the United States 1193 01:49:09,399 --> 01:49:12,239 or dismantling the Soviet Union that was not at all 1194 01:49:12,359 --> 01:49:17,600 within the cars and one of the reasons why Gorbachev 1195 01:49:19,720 --> 01:49:25,239 was head rapport with Bush and Baker. Bush and Baker 1196 01:49:26,000 --> 01:49:29,119 assured him, we're not gonna try and dismantle the Soviet Union, 1197 01:49:29,159 --> 01:49:32,600 and they weren't for a very specific reason. Bush said, 1198 01:49:33,439 --> 01:49:37,800 where you know, until there's full nuclear disarmament, we're not 1199 01:49:37,840 --> 01:49:41,119 even gonna talk about, you know, a post Soviet future, 1200 01:49:42,319 --> 01:49:47,800 you know. And obviously the Neo count perspective and their 1201 01:49:47,920 --> 01:49:53,760 shoehorning of Yeltsen was, you know, break the Soviet Union 1202 01:49:53,840 --> 01:49:56,560 to piece is now their notion was, and one of 1203 01:49:56,600 --> 01:50:00,439 the reasons for the why this crusading aast Moscow's proceeding 1204 01:50:00,439 --> 01:50:03,439 from Ukraine. Their notion was to break the Soviet Union 1205 01:50:03,479 --> 01:50:08,079 into essentially three discrete like client regimes, you know, like 1206 01:50:08,640 --> 01:50:12,880 the former Soviet Far East. And in those days especially too, 1207 01:50:12,960 --> 01:50:17,239 because the Pentagon was still looking at China as essentially 1208 01:50:17,279 --> 01:50:20,920 friendly and obviously like you know, seed some of that 1209 01:50:21,039 --> 01:50:24,239 territory to the to Pig King, but you know, base 1210 01:50:24,319 --> 01:50:27,720 they'll be like a Ukraine like commissariat. They'll be like, 1211 01:50:27,760 --> 01:50:30,399 you know, the Moscow kind of central Commissariat, and then 1212 01:50:30,399 --> 01:50:35,199 they'll be this like former like Russian Far East that 1213 01:50:35,319 --> 01:50:37,840 can you know, just that's just kind of like, uh, 1214 01:50:38,720 --> 01:50:46,840 this sort of like hyper exploited you know, hinterland for 1215 01:50:48,119 --> 01:50:51,800 the United States and and and the adjacent finance capital and stuff. 1216 01:50:52,520 --> 01:50:57,279 And you know, uh, Bush and Baker realize like, no, 1217 01:50:57,359 --> 01:50:59,760 we're not We're not gonna grind these people's faces into 1218 01:50:59,800 --> 01:51:03,399 the concrete, and we're not going to destabilize the whole region. 1219 01:51:03,520 --> 01:51:07,159 And you know, we're certainly not gonna do anything until 1220 01:51:07,159 --> 01:51:12,560 there's full nuclear disarmament. You know that that was a 1221 01:51:12,600 --> 01:51:17,239 tangential discussion. Should give me. But Baker was a great man, 1222 01:51:17,279 --> 01:51:19,560 and I've got a lot of respect for him and 1223 01:51:20,039 --> 01:51:24,760 Bush forty one, it was not a particularly likable guy, 1224 01:51:24,920 --> 01:51:28,119 leaven It dead, but he had a very serious and 1225 01:51:28,119 --> 01:51:35,520 sophisticated view of geopolitics and political affairs. So that administration 1226 01:51:35,640 --> 01:51:39,000 looks better and better in my opinion. And I mean 1227 01:51:39,039 --> 01:51:41,039 I felt that way at the time. As a teenager, 1228 01:51:43,760 --> 01:51:46,520 I realized his country, I realized something really, really really 1229 01:51:46,600 --> 01:51:51,840 bad was underway. When when when when Clinton was elected. 1230 01:51:52,039 --> 01:51:53,479 I mean, it would have been one thing if it 1231 01:51:53,520 --> 01:51:56,960 was like a twenty twenty steel but the body politically 1232 01:51:57,000 --> 01:51:59,960 excited about this pig, and that was insane, you know. 1233 01:52:00,079 --> 01:52:03,159 And it's not just because he was crushing our people. 1234 01:52:03,720 --> 01:52:06,239 I mean I knew guys who got indicted and with 1235 01:52:06,399 --> 01:52:12,600 the prison under Clinton reno for when they hadn't done anything. 1236 01:52:13,439 --> 01:52:18,159 You know, I'm not just speaking, I mean as a 1237 01:52:18,159 --> 01:52:20,159 matter of law as well as a matter of fact 1238 01:52:20,279 --> 01:52:26,920 or ethics or whatever. But as it may the to 1239 01:52:26,960 --> 01:52:30,399 bring it back a bit, you know, there there's a 1240 01:52:30,439 --> 01:52:36,239 brief moment really from about ninety two to ninety six, 1241 01:52:36,880 --> 01:52:39,720 and that's when that's when these these historians, first another 1242 01:52:39,840 --> 01:52:42,399 David Irving, you know, he got access to the FSB 1243 01:52:42,600 --> 01:52:45,880 archives and there was all this incredible stuff that came 1244 01:52:45,920 --> 01:52:48,319 to like that, you know, the old Soviet system had 1245 01:52:48,640 --> 01:52:55,279 suppressed and kept from probably eyes. But then, I mean 1246 01:52:55,399 --> 01:53:00,199 very quickly the things became even more opaque than in 1247 01:53:00,239 --> 01:53:02,279 some much than they had during the Soviet e because 1248 01:53:02,560 --> 01:53:04,439 the regime will never tell the truth about what's going 1249 01:53:04,439 --> 01:53:07,880 on with Russia, I mean, or with Europe. But this 1250 01:53:08,000 --> 01:53:11,960 is an issue with peculiar sensitivity for reasons that I 1251 01:53:12,000 --> 01:53:15,800 don't think need to be elaborately explicated. But I realized 1252 01:53:15,840 --> 01:53:23,079 I talk more about Hoffman as well as the knowledge 1253 01:53:23,119 --> 01:53:25,520 of Barbara Rose, and I did specifically suber Of. If 1254 01:53:25,520 --> 01:53:27,199 you going to a part three, I'll remedy that and 1255 01:53:27,279 --> 01:53:32,760 i'll speak specifically to suber Off, and I'll include some 1256 01:53:32,840 --> 01:53:35,800 aspects of inside the Red Army. I've got a paperback 1257 01:53:35,800 --> 01:53:37,000 of that. I'm going to take it on the road 1258 01:53:37,000 --> 01:53:37,239 with me. 1259 01:53:39,239 --> 01:53:42,279 Speaker 1: Now that sounds good to me, getting into the ye. 1260 01:53:42,840 --> 01:53:45,239 The thing about reading subar Off is it's just this 1261 01:53:46,159 --> 01:53:52,399 fire hose of just this date, that what was dismantled 1262 01:53:52,439 --> 01:53:55,000 on this date, what was put in this place on 1263 01:53:55,039 --> 01:53:57,640 this date, And it's just like just running down this 1264 01:53:57,760 --> 01:54:01,520 whole list of things, just chapter after chat, where it's 1265 01:54:01,760 --> 01:54:06,760 it's mind boggling. The the mountain of circumstantial evidence he 1266 01:54:07,760 --> 01:54:11,640 is able to provide for his UH, for his thesis, 1267 01:54:11,680 --> 01:54:12,439 which they took. 1268 01:54:13,199 --> 01:54:16,359 Speaker 2: He took a like a lot of Russians, the particularly 1269 01:54:16,359 --> 01:54:21,600 guys who were in intelligence roles for military roles. He 1270 01:54:21,680 --> 01:54:24,199 was a prolific documentary and he wrote down a huge 1271 01:54:24,199 --> 01:54:27,239 amount of things. But also you know, obviously English wasn't 1272 01:54:27,239 --> 01:54:32,119 his first language, and it's written kind of like a debriefing, 1273 01:54:32,640 --> 01:54:36,279 but with like added extensit camery, I mean, which makes sense. 1274 01:54:36,319 --> 01:54:39,479 I mean he was a defector and he he he 1275 01:54:39,560 --> 01:54:46,840 spent literally years being debriefed by American and NATO military people. 1276 01:54:47,000 --> 01:54:51,039 You know, I mean, I get it. That's not that's 1277 01:54:51,119 --> 01:54:54,560 not a fun right, Like the defector actually sucks. 1278 01:54:55,720 --> 01:54:59,840 Speaker 1: What's your take on defectors. I interviewed one once and 1279 01:55:00,000 --> 01:55:03,800 and he was a defector from Soviet Union, like in 1280 01:55:04,039 --> 01:55:10,479 early nineteen eighty nine, And I mean I just caught 1281 01:55:10,560 --> 01:55:17,600 him not exactly lying, just I caught him in not 1282 01:55:17,680 --> 01:55:22,680 being willing to have certain conversations that would just seem like, 1283 01:55:22,880 --> 01:55:24,680 you know, it's like, oh, you know, well, tell me 1284 01:55:24,680 --> 01:55:26,600 what Carl Marx got right. It's one of the things 1285 01:55:26,760 --> 01:55:28,479 I asked him. I said, tell me what Carl Marks 1286 01:55:28,479 --> 01:55:32,880 got right. He's like nothing, absolutely nothing. And I'm like, 1287 01:55:34,560 --> 01:55:37,439 I see these defectors come out of like North Korea, 1288 01:55:38,000 --> 01:55:41,000 and like immediately they get debrief by the State Department, 1289 01:55:41,039 --> 01:55:43,119 and then they get boob jobs and they're driving brand 1290 01:55:43,119 --> 01:55:48,720 new cars and they're in frigging condos. And I'm like, yeah, 1291 01:55:48,920 --> 01:55:51,840 I think I think defectors were a lot different back 1292 01:55:51,880 --> 01:55:52,520 then than they are. 1293 01:55:53,840 --> 01:55:58,199 Speaker 2: To say, Okay, some guy, some DDR guy or some 1294 01:55:58,359 --> 01:56:04,479 Soviet Union like GRU officer who defected in like May 1295 01:56:04,600 --> 01:56:08,199 nineteen eighty nine, totally different than a guy who defected 1296 01:56:08,239 --> 01:56:11,359 in nineteen seventy nine or nineteen sixty nine, night and day, 1297 01:56:12,079 --> 01:56:15,680 because the former is just like some dickhead like looking 1298 01:56:15,680 --> 01:56:17,479 to get paid and like looking for a way out 1299 01:56:17,520 --> 01:56:21,880 of his life in a failing system. Guys like super 1300 01:56:21,920 --> 01:56:25,399 off first of all, they were taking a huge risk, 1301 01:56:27,079 --> 01:56:34,279 you know. And secondly, for regular people man like it 1302 01:56:34,279 --> 01:56:40,239 it pete cold War, you know. Uh, life wasn't that 1303 01:56:40,439 --> 01:56:44,520 different than the Soviet Union or in America. It really wasn't. So. 1304 01:56:44,560 --> 01:56:48,159 I mean, it's not like you're some GRU big shot. 1305 01:56:48,359 --> 01:56:50,640 It's not like you're gonna get great stuff in America. 1306 01:56:50,760 --> 01:56:53,039 You can't back home. I mean, yeah you can. You 1307 01:56:53,119 --> 01:56:54,760 might be able to get like blue jeans for your 1308 01:56:54,800 --> 01:56:59,399 mistress and like good scotch, but there's not some like 1309 01:56:59,720 --> 01:57:02,039 there was some like huge difference in quality of life 1310 01:57:02,119 --> 01:57:07,239 or something. Guys like Stuber defected because they they had 1311 01:57:07,239 --> 01:57:12,079 ethical reasons for it, and they developed a moral contempt 1312 01:57:12,119 --> 01:57:14,640 for the system. I really liked the book, The Hunt 1313 01:57:14,640 --> 01:57:16,760 for at October. It's just like an awesome book, and 1314 01:57:16,800 --> 01:57:21,159 I reread it lately because I I I've forgotten how 1315 01:57:21,199 --> 01:57:26,760 good it was. But you know, the uh, the Captain 1316 01:57:28,760 --> 01:57:32,600 of the Red October, the whole deal. I mean it's 1317 01:57:32,800 --> 01:57:34,800 in parts of character. I mean it's not. It's a 1318 01:57:34,840 --> 01:57:42,840 brilliant meditation on on late Cold War strategic nuclear platforms 1319 01:57:42,880 --> 01:57:45,079 and the deep parodies they're in, but it's under a 1320 01:57:45,159 --> 01:57:50,600 character study. Like the Soviet naval officer, you know, he's uh, 1321 01:57:50,680 --> 01:57:52,840 he's this guy from the He's this Lithuanian guy. He 1322 01:57:52,880 --> 01:57:58,199 doesn't really relate to the Russian culture. His wife needed 1323 01:57:58,199 --> 01:58:02,920 an operation and uh, the doctor who operated on or 1324 01:58:03,039 --> 01:58:05,279 was drunk when he poured in the surgery, so he 1325 01:58:05,359 --> 01:58:07,920 boxed it and she died. But the doctor was the 1326 01:58:07,960 --> 01:58:10,399 sun of some polit baro big shots. They're like, you know, 1327 01:58:10,479 --> 01:58:15,560 you can't stop demanding like vengeance against this man. So 1328 01:58:15,960 --> 01:58:18,119 so this navel off series just like what the hell 1329 01:58:18,159 --> 01:58:21,119 am I doing? You know, like I and also too 1330 01:58:21,119 --> 01:58:23,239 in it he's like deeply religious. He's like, so there's 1331 01:58:23,279 --> 01:58:29,560 like this atheist, uh chauvinistic Russian government that killed my wife, 1332 01:58:29,560 --> 01:58:33,439 and I am I'm supposed to I'm supposed to kill 1333 01:58:33,479 --> 01:58:35,840 fifty million people and event a wharl like on behalf 1334 01:58:35,840 --> 01:58:39,640 of it. Like, no, I'm not doing that. I mean 1335 01:58:39,640 --> 01:58:42,279 there there's there's a deeper moral quag mari too, because 1336 01:58:42,279 --> 01:58:45,680 the Red October it's a Typhoon class sub but it's 1337 01:58:45,720 --> 01:58:49,199 got what's called a caterpillar drive, so it's invisible to 1338 01:58:49,319 --> 01:58:52,560 SOSIS and passive sonar. So basically it's a splendid first 1339 01:58:52,560 --> 01:58:58,119 strike weapon. So he realizes, like the Soviet Union can 1340 01:58:58,159 --> 01:59:02,720 all this strategic balance and basically, uh bring America to 1341 01:59:02,920 --> 01:59:06,920 terms through the threat of through the threat of nuclear assault, 1342 01:59:06,960 --> 01:59:09,279 and like, I mean he've used that as morally fucked. Also, 1343 01:59:09,760 --> 01:59:11,319 you know, like if we're gonna win, like let's win 1344 01:59:11,359 --> 01:59:14,239 the Cold War clean, you know, not not do it 1345 01:59:14,279 --> 01:59:17,880 basically by like holding America hostage with the nuclear trigger. 1346 01:59:18,199 --> 01:59:20,600 I mean that's kind of moralistic. But at the same time, 1347 01:59:20,680 --> 01:59:23,239 I mean, I I don't know, man, like if it's 1348 01:59:23,279 --> 01:59:31,399 no being uh being the captain of a of a 1349 01:59:31,439 --> 01:59:35,720 typhoon class sub that that there was a counter value 1350 01:59:35,800 --> 01:59:39,520 like mega death machine, you know, it's it's it's it's 1351 01:59:39,640 --> 01:59:43,600 role was to assault counter value targets and and kill 1352 01:59:43,640 --> 01:59:46,920 millions of people if you don't believe in the system 1353 01:59:46,960 --> 01:59:50,359 you serve. That's a pretty horrible role to be in. 1354 01:59:51,479 --> 01:59:54,000 You know, you've got to be a true believer to 1355 01:59:54,079 --> 01:59:57,159 do that job. It's not like any other job in 1356 01:59:57,199 --> 01:59:59,439 the military, and it it's not like any other role 1357 01:59:59,600 --> 02:00:07,439 in any era, you know, I commanding it can be 1358 02:00:07,479 --> 02:00:12,439 commanding a first strike platform that that can that can 1359 02:00:12,520 --> 02:00:16,960 kill millions of people, you know. So I obviously that's 1360 02:00:16,960 --> 02:00:20,520 like a fictional example, but what clans he was drawing 1361 02:00:20,600 --> 02:00:23,960 upon was the real ethos of defectors in the Cold War. 1362 02:00:24,159 --> 02:00:27,399 And on the other side, Yeah, guys like the Cambridge five, 1363 02:00:27,439 --> 02:00:31,840 but I think we're pretty disturbed guys. But they were 1364 02:00:31,840 --> 02:00:35,239 true believers. That's totally different than these days. Like some 1365 02:00:35,960 --> 02:00:38,720 I think Snowden is a is a sincere guy. Whatever 1366 02:00:38,760 --> 02:00:43,319 problems he might have, you know, he's basically yeah, I mean, 1367 02:00:43,319 --> 02:00:45,159 he could never leave Russia now, Like it's not a 1368 02:00:45,199 --> 02:00:51,239 happy life, you know. I I think, uh, you can argue, 1369 02:00:51,319 --> 02:00:52,920 I mean, Snowden, I don't want to get into a 1370 02:00:53,680 --> 02:00:56,800 deep meditation on the ethics of what Snouding did, but 1371 02:00:56,840 --> 02:01:00,600 I my point is, like I whatever is motives, I 1372 02:01:00,640 --> 02:01:02,479 don't think if we can say he did that for clout. 1373 02:01:02,560 --> 02:01:04,479 But you know, these people who come the other way, 1374 02:01:04,560 --> 02:01:08,159 like some of these Chinese or North Koreans, they're they're 1375 02:01:08,199 --> 02:01:11,279 just not going to get paid, it's obvious, but they 1376 02:01:11,279 --> 02:01:13,520 think they're not being respected like they should be in, 1377 02:01:13,960 --> 02:01:16,720 you know, whatever role they're in. You know, but the 1378 02:01:16,760 --> 02:01:19,079 Cold War was a Cold War is a different world, 1379 02:01:19,119 --> 02:01:20,840 I mean literally, you know. 1380 02:01:22,359 --> 02:01:26,319 Speaker 1: Yeah, all right, Well we'll pick this up on episode 1381 02:01:26,399 --> 02:01:29,399 three when you uh, when you get back from the 1382 02:01:29,439 --> 02:01:32,199 travels of Thomas on the Road and everything. 1383 02:01:32,680 --> 02:01:36,279 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, everybody about thirty six hours ago. 1384 02:01:36,640 --> 02:01:38,960 Speaker 1: Yeah, remind everybody where they can find your work. 1385 02:01:39,720 --> 02:01:44,399 Speaker 2: Yeah, you should check out my substick. It's real Thomas 1386 02:01:44,439 --> 02:01:48,880 seven seven seven substack dot com. Alternatively, go to the website. 1387 02:01:49,039 --> 02:01:51,720 It's number seven h on me s seven seven seven 1388 02:01:51,760 --> 02:01:54,199 dot com. But that stuff on the show notes so 1389 02:01:54,199 --> 02:02:00,159 people can find it easy. But uh, my website is 1390 02:02:00,199 --> 02:02:04,600 a good one stop and my substick is where the 1391 02:02:04,640 --> 02:02:09,920 podcast and other good stuff is at. And I've I 1392 02:02:09,960 --> 02:02:12,000 just got off the road from DC. Then we had 1393 02:02:12,000 --> 02:02:14,960 the Halloween All Saints Say Cemetery walk. I'm trying to 1394 02:02:14,960 --> 02:02:17,880 make progress. I gotta make substantial progress on this manuscript. 1395 02:02:17,920 --> 02:02:22,000 By December, things have been very hectic, so in good ways, 1396 02:02:22,359 --> 02:02:25,079 and then I injured myself like a fucking idiot. But 1397 02:02:26,319 --> 02:02:30,640 it's uh, the mind Phaser pod. Uh, it's gonna be 1398 02:02:30,680 --> 02:02:33,199 another couple of weeks before a fresh episode drops, so 1399 02:02:33,279 --> 02:02:35,520 forgive me for day. But Jake burd and I will 1400 02:02:35,520 --> 02:02:39,520 continue to drop fresh stuff on his platforms and on 1401 02:02:39,640 --> 02:02:42,600 radio for Chicago. So just bear with me. I promise 1402 02:02:43,600 --> 02:02:48,800 we'll be back to regular uploads when I get back 1403 02:02:48,800 --> 02:02:49,760 from the road. 1404 02:02:51,520 --> 02:02:55,640 Speaker 1: All right until episode three. Thank you, Thomas, Yeah, thank you, man. 1405 02:02:58,439 --> 02:03:01,920 I want to welcome everyone back to the show. We 1406 02:03:02,000 --> 02:03:03,840 had a little bit of a hiatus because you know, 1407 02:03:03,920 --> 02:03:07,319 we did a little traveling and everything. But Thomas is 1408 02:03:07,359 --> 02:03:09,439 back and we're going to finish up the series on 1409 02:03:10,800 --> 02:03:14,920 who started World War Two? Who's responsible? And yeah, so 1410 02:03:15,199 --> 02:03:17,159 take it away, Thomas. 1411 02:03:17,319 --> 02:03:21,720 Speaker 2: Yeah, thanks for hosting me again. There's there's two issues here, 1412 02:03:23,039 --> 02:03:28,319 and if memory serves, in the first episode of this 1413 02:03:28,640 --> 02:03:34,199 little series, we addressed the issue of one exactly the 1414 02:03:34,239 --> 02:03:38,319 Second World War started, which seems pedantic, but it's not. 1415 02:03:38,560 --> 02:03:43,000 It's this is a real matter of contention for anybody 1416 02:03:43,039 --> 02:03:47,720 who's seriously engaged with the subject matter. There's a reason 1417 02:03:48,000 --> 02:03:55,560 why court historians claim the opposite of hostilities was September third, 1418 02:03:55,640 --> 02:04:01,199 nineteen thirty nine, because that represents a discreetly ideologically coded perspective. 1419 02:04:01,960 --> 02:04:10,800 And obviously the intention is to present the global strategic 1420 02:04:11,520 --> 02:04:17,359 and geopolitical situation as being one of relative peace until 1421 02:04:17,399 --> 02:04:22,600 the German Reich violated that peace through make it aggression 1422 02:04:22,640 --> 02:04:30,920 against the Polish state. Okay, that's a problematic perspective for 1423 02:04:30,960 --> 02:04:36,199 all kinds of reasons, you know, some of which are political, 1424 02:04:36,319 --> 02:04:42,239 some of which are purely historical in nature and factual. 1425 02:04:44,560 --> 02:04:52,359 But what I think is irrebuttable. Even if one accepts, 1426 02:04:53,359 --> 02:05:03,880 you know, the mainstream view of a the onset of 1427 02:05:03,880 --> 02:05:07,600 hostility between the German Reich and Poland and the subsequent 1428 02:05:07,640 --> 02:05:11,039 war declaration on the German Reich by France and the 1429 02:05:11,119 --> 02:05:16,920 United Kingdom, the fact of the matter is that weeks prior, 1430 02:05:17,359 --> 02:05:21,159 the Soviet Union assaulted the Japanese Imperial Army at Chalkan Goal. 1431 02:05:22,600 --> 02:05:26,000 This was a massive engagement. This is a massive clash 1432 02:05:26,039 --> 02:05:36,479 of forces, you know, and obviously it represented the onset 1433 02:05:36,479 --> 02:05:39,119 of a state of general hostility. Is between two great powers, 1434 02:05:39,760 --> 02:05:43,039 the Soviet Union and the Empire of Japan. So I 1435 02:05:43,520 --> 02:05:46,920 don't really see how anybody who looks like to be 1436 02:05:46,960 --> 02:05:50,600 taken seriously it can claim that this was some sort 1437 02:05:50,600 --> 02:05:54,840 of insignificant event or somehow not related to the broader 1438 02:05:54,880 --> 02:06:05,520 nexus of causation that you know, also precipitated the agin 1439 02:06:05,600 --> 02:06:15,520 hostilities in Europe. You know, either the Soviet Union going 1440 02:06:15,520 --> 02:06:24,600 to war with Japan in a scale capacity represented the 1441 02:06:24,720 --> 02:06:31,119 onset of general hostilities on a planetary scale, or it didn't. Okay, 1442 02:06:31,760 --> 02:06:40,359 So there's that related to that, but more discreetly political 1443 02:06:40,640 --> 02:06:46,039 in terms of the significance of the subject matter vis 1444 02:06:46,079 --> 02:06:51,720 a vis court history, narratives, and the way that official 1445 02:06:51,760 --> 02:06:56,520 authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom and 1446 02:06:58,520 --> 02:07:08,039 the Buddhist Republic continue to present, you know, and characterize 1447 02:07:08,800 --> 02:07:11,840 the Second World War is the issue of Soviet intentions 1448 02:07:12,359 --> 02:07:19,800 and what exactly the state of power political relations was 1449 02:07:22,720 --> 02:07:28,720 between Moscow and Berlin as of you know, June twenty second, 1450 02:07:28,880 --> 02:07:36,760 nineteen forty one. And it's pretty clear to me, you know, 1451 02:07:36,800 --> 02:07:41,600 and I I draw a lot in substantial measure on 1452 02:07:42,760 --> 02:07:49,479 the laate Yakam Hoffman's exhaustive study of Barbarossa. It's pretty 1453 02:07:49,520 --> 02:07:55,600 clear to me that the Soviet Union was eminently going 1454 02:07:55,640 --> 02:08:05,439 to assault Europe and the German Reich, not just the 1455 02:08:05,600 --> 02:08:11,760 FURE but OKW as well as you know, various command 1456 02:08:11,800 --> 02:08:18,079 elements within the party apparatus, the military and the secular 1457 02:08:18,119 --> 02:08:25,680 state of apparatus recognized this reality, as did myriad heads 1458 02:08:25,680 --> 02:08:31,319 of state who found themselves allied with the German Reich 1459 02:08:32,279 --> 02:08:37,920 for various reasons. You know, this included Croatia, Slovakia, Italy 1460 02:08:38,680 --> 02:08:43,640 and you know France. You know, again there was no 1461 02:08:43,800 --> 02:08:50,079 VSI France. There was the Government of France and it 1462 02:08:50,119 --> 02:08:54,960 it was absolutely on the side of the Axis Powers. 1463 02:08:55,000 --> 02:09:02,239 You know, there were volunteers from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland 1464 02:09:02,960 --> 02:09:11,640 throughout uh this Central Asian Islamic countries. You know, Romania. 1465 02:09:12,279 --> 02:09:16,279 Romania contributed a quarter million men, which is a massive 1466 02:09:16,800 --> 02:09:23,800 contribution for a country the size of Romania. You know, Hungary, Bulgaria, 1467 02:09:24,520 --> 02:09:29,680 the Netherlands, you know, Belgium, Luxembourg. You know, the list 1468 02:09:29,760 --> 02:09:32,840 goes on and on and on. You know, and obviously 1469 02:09:32,840 --> 02:09:40,399 the Spaniards that Leningrad fought incredibly valiantly. But you know, 1470 02:09:40,840 --> 02:09:46,079 there's there's this This wasn't just a matter of zeitgeist, 1471 02:09:46,359 --> 02:09:52,079 some sort of mass hysteria or some sort of desire 1472 02:09:52,159 --> 02:09:56,960 to sacrifice one's life, or some sort of epemeral glory. 1473 02:09:58,039 --> 02:10:03,000 The Soviet Union, UH had a time of the fact 1474 02:10:03,039 --> 02:10:07,800 that it was animated by a revolutionary ideology that was 1475 02:10:07,840 --> 02:10:16,800 truly global in character. It The Soviet Union had built 1476 02:10:17,720 --> 02:10:21,520 a military juggernaut the likes of which the world had 1477 02:10:21,560 --> 02:10:25,159 never seen. It was almost unfathomable, and it was only 1478 02:10:25,239 --> 02:10:34,520 growing larger and more powerful, you know, and the like 1479 02:10:34,560 --> 02:10:40,359 I said to me, this is obvious. Hoffman and Victor 1480 02:10:40,439 --> 02:10:49,119 Suvarov and a few other military historians, all right, Astofe 1481 02:10:49,600 --> 02:10:54,439 is another one. They brought unique insight to the table. 1482 02:10:54,479 --> 02:10:59,920 And Hoffman in particular, his data points were and are exhaustive. 1483 02:11:01,359 --> 02:11:05,720 And Hoffman too he not that I mean, obviously, I 1484 02:11:05,720 --> 02:11:09,239 don't have any prejudice against independent scholars. I am one, 1485 02:11:09,359 --> 02:11:18,239 but such that people are prone to dismissing historians who 1486 02:11:18,279 --> 02:11:23,079 don't have what they view as adequate credential affiliation with 1487 02:11:23,680 --> 02:11:31,199 reputable institutions. Well, Hoffman, when he was alive, he was 1488 02:11:31,199 --> 02:11:41,279 in the employee of the official Historical Records division of 1489 02:11:42,399 --> 02:11:47,239 the Bundespan, you know, and he was considered to be 1490 02:11:49,239 --> 02:11:54,760 probably the seminal German historian on Barbarossa in terms of 1491 02:11:54,760 --> 02:11:58,520 the military aspects. Okay, you can't say that he was 1492 02:11:58,560 --> 02:12:00,600 a crank or that he was some Greek the guy 1493 02:12:00,680 --> 02:12:09,840 who was outside of the establishment of the bundes Republic. 1494 02:12:09,920 --> 02:12:15,359 He was very much insinuated into it. Okay, not that 1495 02:12:15,359 --> 02:12:17,479 that have to make a difference, but such that it does. 1496 02:12:18,399 --> 02:12:24,399 You know, I don't see how people can impeach his credibility, 1497 02:12:24,479 --> 02:12:28,880 you know. And one of the issues that Hoffman takes up, 1498 02:12:29,199 --> 02:12:37,920 because again Hoffman was very focused on the quantitative military 1499 02:12:38,279 --> 02:12:46,520 aspects of Barbarossa. One of the things that he addressed 1500 02:12:47,439 --> 02:12:55,119 was a lot of lay people as well as historians 1501 02:12:55,159 --> 02:12:59,760 and military analysts who know better. But for cynical reasons, 1502 02:13:00,439 --> 02:13:05,079 vand Wagon on this argument, they claim that, well, if 1503 02:13:05,079 --> 02:13:11,880 the Soviet Union was so deeply mobilized and had to 1504 02:13:12,000 --> 02:13:16,720 raise such a massively scaled war machine, why did they 1505 02:13:16,760 --> 02:13:21,840 absorb catastrophic casualties. Well, that's exactly why they did, because 1506 02:13:21,880 --> 02:13:28,000 they were deployed offensively. And when you're talking about combined arms, 1507 02:13:29,159 --> 02:13:32,960 even to this day, I mean, drones and localized autonomous 1508 02:13:33,039 --> 02:13:40,079 firepower are definitely changing things most strategically and tactically and 1509 02:13:40,199 --> 02:13:48,479 nowhere is that more on display than in than in 1510 02:13:48,560 --> 02:13:52,720 various aspects of tactical deployment and depth. But even to 1511 02:13:52,800 --> 02:14:01,560 this day, this remains constant. If we're talking about combined 1512 02:14:01,720 --> 02:14:07,840 arms modern warfare, we're not. You can't just call it 1513 02:14:08,039 --> 02:14:14,760 a proverbial audible in the midst of hostilities, if your 1514 02:14:14,840 --> 02:14:20,239 forces are a rayed to assault and switch to a 1515 02:14:20,319 --> 02:14:27,279 defensive paradigm, so coming under assault when not prepared to 1516 02:14:27,359 --> 02:14:33,199 defend in depth, it can lead to catastrophe, particularly when 1517 02:14:33,199 --> 02:14:37,560 one's opponent is the Wehrmacht. And we're gonna get into 1518 02:14:37,600 --> 02:14:43,600 how exactly that plays out. But not only again, does 1519 02:14:43,640 --> 02:14:55,399 the attrition rate and specifically the skewed nature of that 1520 02:14:55,479 --> 02:14:59,800 attrition rate. Not only does that not tend to rebut 1521 02:15:02,159 --> 02:15:05,960 the claim before us, it actually tends to substantiate it. 1522 02:15:07,640 --> 02:15:10,640 Now I'll get into some of these data points, said, 1523 02:15:10,920 --> 02:15:20,239 you know, to clarify what we're talking about here. I 1524 02:15:20,239 --> 02:15:22,119 can't remember if I got into this or not in 1525 02:15:22,159 --> 02:15:24,399 the first episode. And please tell me if I'm repeating 1526 02:15:24,399 --> 02:15:26,319 myself and know what has need to correct me. I'm 1527 02:15:26,319 --> 02:15:31,600 not gonna be offended. Quite the contrary, You'll be quite gracious. 1528 02:15:33,399 --> 02:15:41,359 Between November nineteen forty and literally the eve of Barbarossa 1529 02:15:43,399 --> 02:15:49,039 in June nineteen forty one, the Soviets undertook a massive 1530 02:15:49,199 --> 02:15:58,520 arms build up. It Now, don't get me wrong, By 1531 02:15:58,560 --> 02:16:04,039 the autumn of nineteen forty the Soviets enjoyed numeric and 1532 02:16:04,159 --> 02:16:12,239 arguably technological superiority pretty much across the entire spectrum of 1533 02:16:12,319 --> 02:16:23,600 combined arms. But this punctuated build up of November nineteen 1534 02:16:23,640 --> 02:16:30,199 forty to June nineteen forty one can really only be 1535 02:16:30,279 --> 02:16:44,920 interpreted as mobilization and anticipation of offensive operations. On the 1536 02:16:44,959 --> 02:16:51,680 outbreak of hostilities in June twenty second, nineteen forty one, 1537 02:16:52,360 --> 02:16:57,639 the Soviet Union had deployed no less than twenty four 1538 02:16:57,760 --> 02:17:03,200 thousand tanks, close to two thousand of which were T 1539 02:17:03,440 --> 02:17:07,760 thirty fours, which you know, in those days there weren't 1540 02:17:07,879 --> 02:17:11,680 main battle tanks. There was light, medium, and heavy tanks 1541 02:17:11,719 --> 02:17:18,280 then arguably super heavy tanks. But the T thirty four 1542 02:17:18,600 --> 02:17:20,879 was I think of it as kind of like the 1543 02:17:21,520 --> 02:17:26,319 the zero of of of armored forces. You know, it 1544 02:17:26,399 --> 02:17:30,600 was probably the most effective armored platform of the entire war. 1545 02:17:31,239 --> 02:17:36,200 And and all are out in terms Okay, yeah, obviously, 1546 02:17:36,520 --> 02:17:39,879 you know, the Tiger was a superior machine. That's not 1547 02:17:39,920 --> 02:17:47,120 what we're talking about, you know, in the the the 1548 02:17:47,159 --> 02:17:49,319 ability of T thirty four is to be rolled off 1549 02:17:49,360 --> 02:17:55,360 the assembly line rapidly, you know, almost like model T 1550 02:17:55,600 --> 02:18:01,639 Fords or something odin that that itself as a force multiplier, 1551 02:18:05,399 --> 02:18:12,840 you know it. Between ninety and thirty eight and June 1552 02:18:12,920 --> 02:18:21,680 twenty second, nineteen forty one, the Red Air Force had 1553 02:18:21,680 --> 02:18:27,719 acquired over twenty three thousand military aircraft, around thirty seven 1554 02:18:27,719 --> 02:18:32,239 one hundred of which could be considered cutting edge. Probably 1555 02:18:32,239 --> 02:18:40,319 about half of those had night fighting capability. The Red 1556 02:18:40,399 --> 02:18:43,319 Army had close to one hundred and fifty thousand field 1557 02:18:43,399 --> 02:18:50,840 artillery pieces and heavy mortars. The Red Navy had over 1558 02:18:50,959 --> 02:18:55,280 two hundred submarines, which I can't remember if I mentioned 1559 02:18:55,360 --> 02:19:01,360 or not, but obviously the submarines are prest league offensive. 1560 02:19:01,520 --> 02:19:05,879 There aren't defensive submarines, you know. And to be clear, 1561 02:19:06,920 --> 02:19:10,760 this alone, I mean, the Soviet Union wasn't known as 1562 02:19:10,799 --> 02:19:16,440 any kind of maritime power. I mean, if anything, you know, 1563 02:19:16,719 --> 02:19:19,360 the the Tsars Navy had been sank by the Japanese 1564 02:19:19,360 --> 02:19:25,239 in nineteen oh five, and that it further compromised the 1565 02:19:25,280 --> 02:19:32,159 prestige actual potential of you know, the Russian Navy is 1566 02:19:32,159 --> 02:19:38,479 a real force. But by June twenty second, nineteen forty one, 1567 02:19:41,680 --> 02:19:44,959 the Soviet Union by far had the largest submarine fleet 1568 02:19:45,120 --> 02:19:50,319 in the world, more than four times that of the 1569 02:19:50,399 --> 02:19:52,760 Royal Navy, you know, in the UK was viewed as 1570 02:19:52,799 --> 02:19:57,680 the foremost naval power on this planet, you know. I mean, 1571 02:19:57,719 --> 02:20:04,120 these data points speak for themselves, you know. And on 1572 02:20:04,159 --> 02:20:07,559 the political side, I know I've gotten into this in 1573 02:20:07,680 --> 02:20:15,479 previous series that we've done. I put a lot of 1574 02:20:15,479 --> 02:20:21,079 emphasis on direct testimony owing I'm sure in part to 1575 02:20:21,120 --> 02:20:26,559 the fact that my background in part is at least 1576 02:20:26,639 --> 02:20:32,000 is that of a lawyer, you know. But also if 1577 02:20:32,000 --> 02:20:42,000 we're talking about intent, particularly of wartime executives, there's a 1578 02:20:42,079 --> 02:20:48,440 tendency to be able to rely upon the statements of 1579 02:20:48,520 --> 02:20:51,959 a wartime executive or an executive who is preparing for war, 1580 02:20:55,360 --> 02:21:03,159 there's a there's insteadive is at telling the truth when 1581 02:21:03,239 --> 02:21:06,479 the chief executives so situated, is talking to his cabinet 1582 02:21:09,079 --> 02:21:15,399 or as a general staff officers, Okay, because what incentive 1583 02:21:15,520 --> 02:21:18,760 or there be to lie number one, and there's there's 1584 02:21:18,879 --> 02:21:22,840 there's active disincentives to lie because that compromises the ability 1585 02:21:22,959 --> 02:21:32,000 of subordinate command elements to effectively execute orders and wage 1586 02:21:32,079 --> 02:21:41,719 war towards victory conditions, you know. And so I put 1587 02:21:41,760 --> 02:21:50,319 a lot of stock in what Stalin said, and a 1588 02:21:50,399 --> 02:21:54,959 lot of this testimony from Stalin himself, you know, that 1589 02:21:55,120 --> 02:21:59,680 which isn't independently documented by you know, the minutes of 1590 02:21:59,760 --> 02:22:09,159 his speeches or by audio recording. You know, A lot 1591 02:22:09,200 --> 02:22:13,399 of Stalin's intimates were the sources of these statements, including 1592 02:22:16,280 --> 02:22:26,319 Colonel Volkaganov, who was Stalin's official biographer, you know. And 1593 02:22:27,600 --> 02:22:33,840 Stalin gave a series of speeches in this in the 1594 02:22:33,959 --> 02:22:39,440 year preceding Barbarossa, but particularly the six to eight months 1595 02:22:39,479 --> 02:22:46,479 immediately proceeding onset of hostilities, which approximately reflects the final 1596 02:22:46,600 --> 02:22:51,399 phase of mobilization that we talked about just now, from 1597 02:22:51,479 --> 02:22:57,879 November nineteen forty to June nineteen forty one. And Volkoganov 1598 02:22:59,159 --> 02:23:06,200 makes the point that that Stalin was very taciturn, but 1599 02:23:06,639 --> 02:23:12,360 he became quite candid and quite open within the cloisters 1600 02:23:12,440 --> 02:23:19,680 of you know, these command element corridors in his discussion 1601 02:23:19,840 --> 02:23:26,440 of you know, what was to be military doctrine in 1602 02:23:27,040 --> 02:23:30,319 the next war, which he increasingly discussed as if it 1603 02:23:30,520 --> 02:23:41,239 was an imminent possibility. In Volkoganov's own words. In describing 1604 02:23:42,280 --> 02:23:46,200 the speech Stalin made on May fifth, nineteen forty one, 1605 02:23:48,200 --> 02:23:52,440 he says, quote, the Leader made it unmistakably, unmistakably clear. 1606 02:23:53,719 --> 02:23:57,479 War is inevitable in the future. One must be ready 1607 02:23:57,600 --> 02:24:04,399 for the quote unconditional destruction of German fascism. The world 1608 02:24:04,399 --> 02:24:07,239 will be fought on enemy territory and victory will be 1609 02:24:07,319 --> 02:24:16,319 achieved with few casualties. And again, this wasn't something that 1610 02:24:20,280 --> 02:24:28,239 Stalin merely devised as a polemical device to embolden forces 1611 02:24:28,319 --> 02:24:34,079 under his command or to overcome any potential or actual 1612 02:24:34,159 --> 02:24:42,319 crises and confidences among the general staff by appeal to 1613 02:24:45,479 --> 02:24:55,280 revolutionary fervor. Lenin made clear in identifying the core doctrinal 1614 02:24:55,360 --> 02:25:01,280 elements of the Red Army, you know, back in nineteen twenty, 1615 02:25:01,440 --> 02:25:05,799 nineteen twenty one, nineteen twenty two, that the Red Army 1616 02:25:05,920 --> 02:25:11,959 was an instrumentality of revolutionary imperatives. It wasn't a defensive element, 1617 02:25:13,120 --> 02:25:16,799 you know, and it was to be deployed offensively at 1618 02:25:16,799 --> 02:25:24,559 all times, you know, because the only rational for its 1619 02:25:24,639 --> 02:25:31,600 existence within the paradigm of Mercist historiography and Leninist revolutionary 1620 02:25:31,680 --> 02:25:39,280 doctrine was to facilitate the advance of history and the 1621 02:25:39,440 --> 02:25:45,559 victory of the proletariat against the class enemy. So there's 1622 02:25:45,600 --> 02:25:53,159 really no there's really no way to interpret Soviet battle 1623 02:25:53,280 --> 02:26:03,719 doctrine as anything other than discreetly ideologically coded and axiomatically offensive, 1624 02:26:05,239 --> 02:26:10,719 you know, And this is this is going on, or 1625 02:26:10,879 --> 02:26:15,559 this is relying upon the strictures of Marxist Leninist ontology 1626 02:26:17,559 --> 02:26:27,760 and the distinct Marxist view of military power and its 1627 02:26:27,879 --> 02:26:38,040 utility and its ethical functions. And the Marxist Leninism was 1628 02:26:38,719 --> 02:26:48,040 in fact a total philosophical and political system, impoverished as 1629 02:26:48,079 --> 02:26:52,440 it may have been intellectually in various capacities, and to 1630 02:26:52,520 --> 02:26:58,120 be fair at what's sophisticated in others, what's irrebuttable or indisputable, 1631 02:26:58,360 --> 02:27:04,120 is that it was a total theory of political and 1632 02:27:05,159 --> 02:27:12,879 social and thus historical antology. So the idea that the 1633 02:27:13,040 --> 02:27:18,079 party state, which to be clear, by nineteen forty one, 1634 02:27:19,920 --> 02:27:28,840 had categorically annihilated millions of people within the Soviet Union 1635 02:27:29,680 --> 02:27:38,120 owing to what was identified as their ineducability, you know, 1636 02:27:38,319 --> 02:27:45,520 the idea that Stalin or the Presidium or the Politburo 1637 02:27:46,000 --> 02:27:52,879 Standing Committee or these surviving command elements in the Red army. 1638 02:27:52,959 --> 02:27:58,920 The idea that they would somehow hesitate to see through 1639 02:27:59,520 --> 02:28:08,879 these doctrinal imperatives is somewhat laughable, you know. And we're 1640 02:28:08,920 --> 02:28:14,120 not in the court of law, so it shouldn't be 1641 02:28:14,200 --> 02:28:22,920 a problem to invoke subsequent as well as prior precedent 1642 02:28:26,760 --> 02:28:35,840 to demonstrate persuasively what the doctrinal character was of Marxist 1643 02:28:35,920 --> 02:28:42,600 Leninist revolutionary military elements. I invoked the case of Cambodia 1644 02:28:42,719 --> 02:28:48,840 a lot, you know, from nineteen seventy five to ninety 1645 02:28:48,879 --> 02:28:53,479 seventy nine. And I know for a fact, because I 1646 02:28:53,520 --> 02:28:58,840 got to hate me all it's affecting things. People suspect 1647 02:28:59,000 --> 02:29:11,319 I only do that for the sake of polemical uh expediency, 1648 02:29:11,479 --> 02:29:17,840 But that's not why. Paul Pott was not some simple 1649 02:29:17,920 --> 02:29:21,639 minded brute. He was actually a very sophisticated political soldier. 1650 02:29:22,639 --> 02:29:26,120 He had a very deep understanding of Marcis Leninism, far 1651 02:29:26,239 --> 02:29:34,600 more than Mao and Democratic Tempuccia. As Paul Pott and 1652 02:29:34,680 --> 02:29:42,959 his cadre branded the country during their brief tenure, was 1653 02:29:43,120 --> 02:29:49,559 a very pure Marcis Leninist stayed in some ways, and 1654 02:29:50,600 --> 02:29:59,920 there was nothing there. There was nothing heterodox an idiot 1655 02:30:00,040 --> 02:30:09,639 logical terms about the way they implemented class warfare adjusting 1656 02:30:09,719 --> 02:30:14,479 for the discrete conditions on the ground in Southeast Asia 1657 02:30:16,079 --> 02:30:20,319 as in nineteen seventy five. So what I'm getting at, 1658 02:30:20,360 --> 02:30:22,600 and I'll move on here in a moment I don't 1659 02:30:22,680 --> 02:30:25,280 quite understand. Are the same people who acknowledge that the 1660 02:30:25,399 --> 02:30:32,920 Soviet Union was this outlier country and that that was 1661 02:30:33,000 --> 02:30:37,200 unusual in every conceivable sense, you know, in terms of 1662 02:30:37,280 --> 02:30:44,120 practice and policy and theoretical foundations and everything else. Yet 1663 02:30:44,159 --> 02:30:47,799 they insist that this this didn't somehow impact military decision 1664 02:30:47,879 --> 02:30:55,200 making or that revolutionary ontology somehow, somehow stopped at the 1665 02:30:56,520 --> 02:31:00,440 at the point of executive decisionism when it came to 1666 02:31:01,399 --> 02:31:09,040 the decision to you know, spread the revolutionary cause to 1667 02:31:09,239 --> 02:31:17,559 Europe and specifically to annihilate the dialectical enemy in the 1668 02:31:17,639 --> 02:31:35,239 German Reich. But you know, the Stalin had spoken again 1669 02:31:35,280 --> 02:31:41,440 and again as well to the Central Committee, most notably 1670 02:31:41,559 --> 02:31:49,600 on January eighth, nineteen forty one, and there was two 1671 02:31:51,040 --> 02:32:01,399 high ranking Air Force officers in attendance, and Stalin apparently 1672 02:32:04,719 --> 02:32:12,000 spoke directly of the ratio and algorithm that was necessary 1673 02:32:12,079 --> 02:32:19,840 to defeat the German Reich. According to the General Staff, 1674 02:32:21,360 --> 02:32:28,280 as well as his own calculations as had been explicated 1675 02:32:28,399 --> 02:32:33,680 to him by authorities that he trusted. He spoke on 1676 02:32:33,719 --> 02:32:38,120 this particular day to quote twofold superiority. He said that, 1677 02:32:38,360 --> 02:32:41,879 as had been explained to him, twofold superiority is a 1678 02:32:42,079 --> 02:32:46,040 law of military science, meaning the two to one ratio 1679 02:32:49,600 --> 02:32:54,639 contra the enemy and offensive operations. You know, whether you're 1680 02:32:54,639 --> 02:32:59,879 talking about raw numbers or you know, force multipliers and 1681 02:33:00,120 --> 02:33:06,360 variables tending to act as force multipliers that magnify the 1682 02:33:06,440 --> 02:33:15,680 effectiveness of offensive elements, you know. And Stalin stated openly 1683 02:33:16,479 --> 02:33:21,079 that quote, this is not a game. The time is 1684 02:33:21,120 --> 02:33:28,840 approaching for military operations, twofold superiority is essential, but greater 1685 02:33:28,959 --> 02:33:38,360 supurity is even better. And he said that he spoke 1686 02:33:38,399 --> 02:33:46,479 specifically of the difficulty of traversing the Carpathians and the 1687 02:33:46,680 --> 02:33:53,840 need to designate at least five thousand attack aircraft in 1688 02:33:54,000 --> 02:33:58,879 order to neutralize defensive positions that infantry and armor aren't 1689 02:33:58,879 --> 02:34:04,319 going to be able to reddle traverse going to the terrain. Now, 1690 02:34:05,600 --> 02:34:08,280 this is hugely important for reasons I'm gonna get into 1691 02:34:08,360 --> 02:34:17,440 in a moment, Okay, But from January of forty one, 1692 02:34:17,600 --> 02:34:27,280 specifically January eighth, until May, you know, only weeks before Barbarossa. 1693 02:34:28,280 --> 02:34:33,159 Stalin talks again and again about waging military operations in 1694 02:34:33,239 --> 02:34:38,959 the Balkans, specifically across the Romanian frontier, and discrete exigencies 1695 02:34:39,079 --> 02:34:46,639 that are presented by waging war in that theater. Okay. 1696 02:34:53,120 --> 02:35:02,799 In a lecture given in the spring, I believe in 1697 02:35:02,879 --> 02:35:07,479 March of forty one, but somehow neglected to sign an 1698 02:35:07,520 --> 02:35:19,040 exec date, he addressed the Soviet Planopotentiary representative in Belgrade, 1699 02:35:21,959 --> 02:35:34,840 which at that time was under the rule briefly of 1700 02:35:35,760 --> 02:35:41,280 a Chetnik junta, which in turn led to the German 1701 02:35:43,399 --> 02:35:49,760 intervention and ultimately the you know, bifurcation of the Kingdom 1702 02:35:49,799 --> 02:35:57,120 of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes. But in addressing the Planopotentiary 1703 02:35:58,600 --> 02:36:04,520 Representative in Belgrade and select members of the Pullet Buro, 1704 02:36:06,719 --> 02:36:09,479 he said, quote, the USSOR will only react at the 1705 02:36:09,559 --> 02:36:14,879 proper time. The powers are scattering their forces more and more. 1706 02:36:15,920 --> 02:36:19,840 The USSR is therefore waiting to act unexpectedly against Germany, 1707 02:36:20,559 --> 02:36:24,360 and doing so, the USSR will cross the Carpathias, which 1708 02:36:24,399 --> 02:36:26,799 will lead to the signal for the revolution in Hungary. 1709 02:36:27,520 --> 02:36:31,920 Soviet troops will penetrate Yugoslavia from Hungary, advance the Adriatic Sea, 1710 02:36:32,520 --> 02:36:37,280 and cut Germany off from the Balkans in the Middle East. Okay, 1711 02:36:37,399 --> 02:36:46,479 so what does this mean in both immedia tactical terms 1712 02:36:47,520 --> 02:36:54,600 and how this impacted the battlefield situation in Operation Barbarossa 1713 02:36:54,639 --> 02:36:59,600 as well as in broader strategic terms. Well, I'll take 1714 02:36:59,600 --> 02:37:08,879 it away better question first, the latter aspect. First, the 1715 02:37:09,000 --> 02:37:16,399 Soviet Union plan to assault Europe through Romania. By capturing Romania, 1716 02:37:16,799 --> 02:37:22,879 it could deprive Germany of essential access to petroleum reserves. 1717 02:37:24,799 --> 02:37:35,000 And also that's commensurate with Soviet deep battle doctrine, which 1718 02:37:37,159 --> 02:37:44,159 presuming forces and being ratios that Stalin described as being 1719 02:37:45,600 --> 02:37:48,799 you know, at least a twofold advantage and preferably double 1720 02:37:48,879 --> 02:37:56,360 or triple that Stalin basically was planning a deep battle 1721 02:37:56,479 --> 02:38:00,639 like pincer flanking maneuver across the entirety of the continent 1722 02:38:02,239 --> 02:38:08,959 in the north through Sweden and then down to assault 1723 02:38:10,760 --> 02:38:15,479 Germany from the north and in the south. The main 1724 02:38:17,600 --> 02:38:21,920 stap punks would be through Romania. And I'll get into 1725 02:38:21,959 --> 02:38:28,040 in a moment. This is why the Army Group Center, 1726 02:38:29,760 --> 02:38:35,120 Army Group South faced savage resistance and Barbarossa Army Group 1727 02:38:35,239 --> 02:38:40,680 Center was moving so fast it was basically like face 1728 02:38:40,760 --> 02:38:43,520 with no more than token opposition on the road to Moscow, 1729 02:38:43,840 --> 02:38:50,639 which doesn't make any sense unless you understand the deployment 1730 02:38:51,120 --> 02:38:57,840 schema of the Red Army, which was totally offensive and 1731 02:38:58,200 --> 02:39:07,639 concentrated in the south in a way that wouldn't be 1732 02:39:07,840 --> 02:39:16,479 rationally in a in a defensive oriented schema. It's uh 1733 02:39:19,079 --> 02:39:27,040 most uh, most significant everyone, I'm jumping around a bit, 1734 02:39:27,200 --> 02:39:33,159 but so please stop me if I'm not being clear. 1735 02:39:36,520 --> 02:39:42,200 Most significant the suber of hypothesis in terms of Stalin's 1736 02:39:42,280 --> 02:39:50,399 declared intentions was probably what's going to be known as 1737 02:39:50,479 --> 02:39:56,600 the secret meeting with the polit Burrow and the Soviet 1738 02:39:56,680 --> 02:39:59,879 representatives of the Common Tern who had been called back 1739 02:40:00,399 --> 02:40:05,239 presumably to be availed for the specific person being availed 1740 02:40:05,280 --> 02:40:12,159 to this speech on August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, which 1741 02:40:12,280 --> 02:40:16,200 obviously coincided with the assault on the Japanese a Kalkin goal. 1742 02:40:17,159 --> 02:40:23,079 But this was a surprise secret meeting, and it was 1743 02:40:23,159 --> 02:40:27,079 unprecedented for the Russian delegation of the Common Turn to 1744 02:40:27,159 --> 02:40:30,000 be called back. Among other things, Stalin didn't have a 1745 02:40:30,040 --> 02:40:33,040 lot of he didn't have a lot of respect for 1746 02:40:33,120 --> 02:40:38,600 the Common turn. I mean in part because the his 1747 02:40:38,840 --> 02:40:49,440 UH rigid command doctrine. He didn't I mean, he wasn't 1748 02:40:49,520 --> 02:41:02,680 comfortable with UH an ideologically coded cadre structure, whereby independent 1749 02:41:02,760 --> 02:41:05,799 of Moscow, just going to the fact of distance and 1750 02:41:07,719 --> 02:41:12,959 you know, remoteness. You know, he didn't want some cadre 1751 02:41:13,479 --> 02:41:18,520 making decisions even superficially on behalf of the Soviet Union 1752 02:41:18,639 --> 02:41:23,799 without his direct oversight. Okay, but nonetheless, you know, the 1753 02:41:23,920 --> 02:41:27,120 common tern still had tremendous clout in ninety thirty nine, 1754 02:41:31,040 --> 02:41:37,040 and especially coming off of the defeat in Spain, there 1755 02:41:37,120 --> 02:41:43,920 was a real danger of a fracturing of a you know, 1756 02:41:44,000 --> 02:41:51,879 the broad international front red front. So this is highly significant. 1757 02:41:53,040 --> 02:41:54,799 You know, I guess what I'm getting at is that 1758 02:41:54,879 --> 02:42:00,680 Stalin wouldn't have called the Russian delegation backed for you know, 1759 02:42:00,719 --> 02:42:02,840 for the sake of putting on airs or to stand 1760 02:42:02,879 --> 02:42:06,959 on ceremony or something. And this is when I think, 1761 02:42:07,000 --> 02:42:11,600 I excuse me, I think I briefly addressed this last episode. 1762 02:42:12,319 --> 02:42:14,879 It was in this it was in this secret meeting 1763 02:42:15,239 --> 02:42:22,479 or secret speech that Stalin declared that uh, you know, 1764 02:42:25,520 --> 02:42:29,639 getting the Germans, to getting the right foreign ministry to 1765 02:42:29,760 --> 02:42:34,200 agree to a non aggression pact, you know, that would 1766 02:42:34,239 --> 02:42:39,319 embolden them to act against Poland, you know, because there 1767 02:42:39,360 --> 02:42:44,600 too for the Berlin and specifically Hitler felt that his 1768 02:42:44,760 --> 02:42:51,840 hands were tied in resolving the Polish issue because an 1769 02:42:51,879 --> 02:42:56,319 assault on Poland, even in the wake of a gross 1770 02:42:56,399 --> 02:43:02,399 provocation or violation at Germany's territorial integrity on the frontier, 1771 02:43:02,520 --> 02:43:05,159 you know, what, would lead to a Soviet counter strike 1772 02:43:05,239 --> 02:43:11,399 that would be devastating. So Stalin's reasoning was, you know, 1773 02:43:11,520 --> 02:43:17,479 we will, uh will lull Germany with this non aggression pact, 1774 02:43:19,520 --> 02:43:22,840 which you know absolutely guarantees that they will assault Poland, 1775 02:43:23,239 --> 02:43:26,040 which will then you know, lead to a war declaration 1776 02:43:26,239 --> 02:43:30,959 by the UK and France. Germany, you'll uh will probably 1777 02:43:31,079 --> 02:43:34,239 be victorious on the Western front, but only at pure 1778 02:43:34,360 --> 02:43:38,040 it cost, you know, and then uh you know and 1779 02:43:38,159 --> 02:43:45,000 that this thus this is the icebreaker that uh will 1780 02:43:45,120 --> 02:43:52,239 uh soften uh what would be Europe's defensive cordon and 1781 02:43:52,239 --> 02:43:54,639 allow the Red Army to you know, just bowl over 1782 02:43:55,440 --> 02:44:02,000 and annihilate resistance in the West and you know, thus 1783 02:44:03,600 --> 02:44:10,600 reverse the reverse the defeat handed to them and Iberia 1784 02:44:10,719 --> 02:44:16,799 and you know, conquer the continent in a rapid and 1785 02:44:16,920 --> 02:44:23,399 devastating operation. And I mean Stalin this is remarkably consistent 1786 02:44:23,479 --> 02:44:26,280 as far back as nineteen twenty five, you know, when 1787 02:44:26,319 --> 02:44:33,000 he was less than three years into his formal ascendancy 1788 02:44:33,079 --> 02:44:39,840 as General Secretary, he spoke openly about the need to 1789 02:44:40,719 --> 02:44:49,920 act militarily against Europe as soon as possible, but not 1790 02:44:50,079 --> 02:44:54,840 until the political climate and the you know, the myriad 1791 02:44:55,959 --> 02:45:02,239 it ever sort of changing alliance structure in the West 1792 02:45:05,879 --> 02:45:11,559 was such that what Don called the quote broad field 1793 02:45:11,600 --> 02:45:18,719 of activity would be realizable in order to you know, 1794 02:45:20,840 --> 02:45:24,479 pursue the imperative of world revolution. And to be clear, 1795 02:45:25,959 --> 02:45:31,520 you know, not only was a Europe along with America 1796 02:45:31,600 --> 02:45:39,680 and Japan, you know, the kind of productive core of 1797 02:45:39,799 --> 02:45:45,760 this planet, but you know, the understanding was that Europe 1798 02:45:45,879 --> 02:45:51,440 was still the inconceptual terms, you know, the political center 1799 02:45:51,559 --> 02:45:58,360 of human affairs. You know, conceptually, you know, every every 1800 02:46:00,879 --> 02:46:06,319 every ideological schema you know, came from Europe, and even 1801 02:46:06,959 --> 02:46:12,520 even things like the anti colonial movement were fully locked 1802 02:46:12,559 --> 02:46:19,319 into dialectical uh engagement you know, with with with European thought. 1803 02:46:19,520 --> 02:46:26,639 So Stalin's notion was that, you know, first last and 1804 02:46:26,680 --> 02:46:30,920 always your Europe needs to be overrun and annihilated, and 1805 02:46:31,680 --> 02:46:35,479 the revolution has to has to be implemented there. You know, 1806 02:46:35,719 --> 02:46:39,879 it's a waste of time and it's self defeating them pursue. Uh, 1807 02:46:41,959 --> 02:46:44,520 there's such imperatives on the periphery. But make no mistake, 1808 02:46:44,680 --> 02:46:48,959 you know where ever revolutionary activity jumped off that had 1809 02:46:49,079 --> 02:46:52,719 historical momentum and forced it in being Stalin absolutely was 1810 02:46:52,760 --> 02:46:55,760 in favor of supporting that and seeing that through. But 1811 02:46:56,559 --> 02:47:01,040 the uh, but but the but the core orientation of 1812 02:47:01,120 --> 02:47:05,000 the Soviet Union had to be you know, the the 1813 02:47:07,159 --> 02:47:11,399 you know, the implementing the World Revolution in Europe, you know, 1814 02:47:11,559 --> 02:47:15,520 first and foremost. And and that's also why the Spanish 1815 02:47:15,600 --> 02:47:18,319 War was so important. You know, it wasn't just uh. 1816 02:47:19,200 --> 02:47:22,799 I've read some court historians claim that Shalin was somehow 1817 02:47:23,200 --> 02:47:25,959 like reluctantly forced into the Spanish War just for the 1818 02:47:26,040 --> 02:47:29,200 sake of appeasing the common term. I mean, that's that's 1819 02:47:29,280 --> 02:47:32,399 that's laughable for all kinds of reasons. But it also 1820 02:47:34,200 --> 02:47:39,399 you know, Shalin wasn't as heterodox of a of a 1821 02:47:39,479 --> 02:47:43,520 Marxist Leninist as he's often portrayed. I mean, Stalin was complicated, 1822 02:47:44,120 --> 02:47:47,520 you know, Like I said, I it's a lean value, 1823 02:47:48,520 --> 02:47:51,319 but it's a great book. Carry Bolton's book stalin the 1824 02:47:51,440 --> 02:47:56,040 enduring legacy. You know, Shalin was a complicated figure, and 1825 02:47:56,280 --> 02:48:04,639 there were heterodox aspects to his worldview and his his 1826 02:48:04,799 --> 02:48:09,920 own Velt politique. But it wasn't a radical divergence or something, 1827 02:48:11,239 --> 02:48:16,319 you know, And that's important, especially because these days even 1828 02:48:17,280 --> 02:48:24,920 even some fairly heterodox political fearis and even some revisionists 1829 02:48:25,040 --> 02:48:36,280 seem to abide that fiction. But yeah, the you can't 1830 02:48:36,399 --> 02:48:41,200 and in other words, this you can't you can't extricate 1831 02:48:42,520 --> 02:48:50,239 the ambition of the Sovietization of Europe from the existence 1832 02:48:50,280 --> 02:48:54,200 of the Soviet Union itself. You know, these these these 1833 02:48:54,239 --> 02:48:59,840 ambitions were synonymous, and that's that's also why the Cold 1834 02:49:00,079 --> 02:49:05,760 War developed the way they did in in raw geo 1835 02:49:05,840 --> 02:49:13,000 strategic terms. But you know, and I think I can't 1836 02:49:13,000 --> 02:49:16,920 remember I mentioned or not this speech and question. You know, 1837 02:49:16,920 --> 02:49:21,319 the August nineteen, nineteen thirty nine speech. It was obtained 1838 02:49:21,760 --> 02:49:30,920 by the French news agency have us and uh, the 1839 02:49:31,079 --> 02:49:36,959 French were kind of notorious for getting a hold of 1840 02:49:38,479 --> 02:49:46,239 these kinds of documents and records, you know, And when 1841 02:49:49,040 --> 02:49:57,479 when the Havas agency by way of Geneva, when when? 1842 02:49:57,520 --> 02:50:02,840 When when they went public with it? It was published 1843 02:50:05,159 --> 02:50:12,319 in ah, some international journal and then in many of 1844 02:50:12,360 --> 02:50:20,200 the major French language newspapers. But Moscow's propagandas immediately went 1845 02:50:20,280 --> 02:50:22,879 into overdrive, you know, and claiming, you know, this is 1846 02:50:22,920 --> 02:50:26,399 a this is a forgery. You know, this, this is 1847 02:50:26,799 --> 02:50:31,399 confabulated by the the enemies of Russia and the Soviet Union. 1848 02:50:32,040 --> 02:50:36,719 You know, it's fascist propaganda. And uh it did not 1849 02:50:36,879 --> 02:50:39,200 make as nearly as big of an impact as one 1850 02:50:39,280 --> 02:50:46,719 might think, you know, which is really interesting because it 1851 02:50:46,799 --> 02:50:50,360 goes to show you too, how you know, And a 1852 02:50:50,399 --> 02:50:53,479 lot of that too had to do with, uh, this 1853 02:50:53,639 --> 02:50:59,040 kind of deafening silence from American news agencies, you know, 1854 02:50:59,040 --> 02:51:05,719 and other than all the major papers in America, I mean, 1855 02:51:05,760 --> 02:51:12,959 other than those brands held by McCormick were basically uh, 1856 02:51:13,639 --> 02:51:17,600 mouthpieces for the New Deal regime, you know. But it's 1857 02:51:17,639 --> 02:51:22,920 still I mean obviously too, I mean this there's a 1858 02:51:23,040 --> 02:51:28,159 kind of nascent, low tech globalism emerging at least between 1859 02:51:28,239 --> 02:51:33,280 America and Europe by way of you know, the UK, 1860 02:51:35,040 --> 02:51:39,239 but even you know, I mean, it's it's, it's it's 1861 02:51:39,239 --> 02:51:44,799 stormans remarkable that there is basically no impact in terms 1862 02:51:44,840 --> 02:51:49,879 of global opinion. And uh I've looked too to see 1863 02:51:49,920 --> 02:51:58,680 if this pops up in any America first literature, and 1864 02:51:58,840 --> 02:52:05,440 I haven't found anything this positive on that question. But 1865 02:52:05,559 --> 02:52:07,639 that again goes to show you to the degree to 1866 02:52:07,680 --> 02:52:16,440 which the psychological environment was being actively manipulated, you know, 1867 02:52:16,920 --> 02:52:20,360 long before the onset of formal hostilities, which might seem 1868 02:52:20,399 --> 02:52:28,440 like an obvious point to you or myself, but people 1869 02:52:28,520 --> 02:52:35,680 are inundated in this country with this idea that you know, 1870 02:52:35,879 --> 02:52:41,719 somehow the New Dealers had no interest in these goings 1871 02:52:41,760 --> 02:52:46,760 on and the European War and the intries from the 1872 02:52:46,840 --> 02:52:49,760 Soviet Union, the German Reich, you know, until Pearl Harbor, 1873 02:52:49,840 --> 02:52:52,200 when America was attacked. Then that changed everything. I mean 1874 02:52:52,239 --> 02:52:57,239 that that could not be more false, from the first 1875 02:52:57,520 --> 02:53:04,159 h to the New Deal regime, which again coincided almost 1876 02:53:04,239 --> 02:53:12,840 precisely with the National Socialist Revolution, which was a totally 1877 02:53:12,959 --> 02:53:22,600 legal revolution again, you know, and Roosevelt from the first 1878 02:53:22,680 --> 02:53:32,280 days of his administration was pursuing an an absolutely radical 1879 02:53:32,360 --> 02:53:41,799 anti fascist imperative as the core mandate of an ambition 1880 02:53:42,159 --> 02:53:47,479 of his administration, you know, And that can't they can't 1881 02:53:47,520 --> 02:53:52,559 be denied, you know, in the I don't want to 1882 02:53:52,600 --> 02:54:00,120 spin this off to tangentially, and I know that a 1883 02:54:00,200 --> 02:54:04,520 lot of people criticize me for my sources, well, yet 1884 02:54:04,559 --> 02:54:09,920 they have yet to directly rebut any of these data 1885 02:54:10,000 --> 02:54:14,760 points that have derived from these sources, namely Robert Conquests 1886 02:54:16,239 --> 02:54:22,680 and Ernst Nolty, and as well as the Black Book 1887 02:54:22,719 --> 02:54:26,600 of Communism, which is a great resource. I'm gonna add, 1888 02:54:27,680 --> 02:54:35,360 but it's indisputable if the Soviet Union exterminated millions of 1889 02:54:35,479 --> 02:54:47,680 people between nineteen seventeen and nineteen forty one, and there 1890 02:54:47,760 --> 02:54:51,440 was a massive series of death camps, actual death camps 1891 02:54:53,200 --> 02:55:01,879 that were employed towards this incredibly gruesome task, and the 1892 02:55:02,000 --> 02:55:06,440 degree to which there was an information blackout about this 1893 02:55:06,639 --> 02:55:14,920 reality can't be overstated, you know. And people who raised 1894 02:55:14,959 --> 02:55:19,639 this issue, you know, not just not just America Firsters, 1895 02:55:19,760 --> 02:55:28,760 but Joseph Schumpeter's wife. Interestingly, she spoke Japanese and and 1896 02:55:28,879 --> 02:55:32,399 she was a big advocate for Japanese people. She was 1897 02:55:32,479 --> 02:55:34,760 kind of a human rights type, but of a genuine sort, 1898 02:55:34,879 --> 02:55:40,840 not like the twenty first century sort. And uh, she 1899 02:55:41,159 --> 02:55:47,799 raised the issue of Soviet annihilation therapy as an ULTI 1900 02:55:47,879 --> 02:55:50,600 called it, and she was she and Schumper were her 1901 02:55:50,680 --> 02:55:54,520 hassled by the FBI. Both were you know, sympathies for 1902 02:55:54,639 --> 02:55:59,079 the Axis vis a vis her, you know, dealings with 1903 02:55:59,360 --> 02:56:02,760 with these people and stuff, and particularly Japanese people are 1904 02:56:02,879 --> 02:56:09,239 being persecuted by the New Dealers, but also you know, 1905 02:56:11,360 --> 02:56:14,559 propagandizing against the Soviet Union, in their view, was this 1906 02:56:14,719 --> 02:56:20,760 big subversive act, you know, which seems kind of an 1907 02:56:20,920 --> 02:56:29,360 incredible I'd imagine that people today, but they don't. I mean, 1908 02:56:29,559 --> 02:56:33,239 but I mean, it only seems incredible if one doesn't 1909 02:56:33,280 --> 02:56:39,479 accept the true nature of a of that regime. But 1910 02:56:40,120 --> 02:56:49,399 that aside, it's remarkable that agree to which these things 1911 02:56:49,479 --> 02:56:56,879 could in fact be could in fact be hidden, you know, 1912 02:57:00,280 --> 02:57:04,280 But that also raised I mean, there's also and obliquely 1913 02:57:05,440 --> 02:57:12,520 and conversely it it also begs the question, you know, 1914 02:57:12,680 --> 02:57:22,719 if there was this mass murder conspiracy hatched in the 1915 02:57:22,840 --> 02:57:27,159 German Reich at Vance in ninety forty two, like why 1916 02:57:27,280 --> 02:57:30,920 wasn't anybody you know, publicizing that? I mean that one 1917 02:57:30,959 --> 02:57:32,639 would think that would be a godsend to the New 1918 02:57:32,719 --> 02:57:40,440 Dealers and a perfect way to portray the Germans as 1919 02:57:41,760 --> 02:57:47,239 these horrific villains, and especially became imperative you know by 1920 02:57:47,840 --> 02:57:54,479 ninety forty four, as the UIs Army was quite literally 1921 02:57:54,559 --> 02:57:57,440 near mutiny, you know, which we've talked about that was 1922 02:57:59,000 --> 02:58:01,799 the real catalyst for the execution of Poort Eddie Slavic. 1923 02:58:01,959 --> 02:58:09,760 You know, it's people so uh, you know, the Walter 1924 02:58:09,879 --> 02:58:13,959 Winschel and uh, the Office of War Information and all 1925 02:58:14,000 --> 02:58:22,360 these myriad anglophone news agencies. They just decided not to 1926 02:58:22,440 --> 02:58:26,399 report on the fact that the German Reich only existed 1927 02:58:26,479 --> 02:58:28,719 to exterminate Jewish people just because they didn't think it 1928 02:58:28,760 --> 02:58:31,639 was important, you know, they did, they didn't think it 1929 02:58:31,719 --> 02:58:37,120 was a useful way to code propaganda. I mean, that's 1930 02:58:37,120 --> 02:58:40,479 like a bit tangential. But moving on real quick, so 1931 02:58:40,520 --> 02:58:48,159 I realize we're running out of time. I mentioned a 1932 02:58:48,280 --> 02:58:53,319 moment ago. Something that's often raised is okay, So why 1933 02:58:53,479 --> 02:58:59,040 why was Barbarossa so tactically so tactically successful? And why 1934 02:58:59,200 --> 02:59:06,479 was the Attrition eight so algorithmically skewed against the Soviet 1935 02:59:06,760 --> 02:59:13,760 Union if in fact the Soviet Union was mobilized for 1936 02:59:13,879 --> 02:59:16,520 war and planning to attack. But that that's exactly why 1937 02:59:17,120 --> 02:59:23,840 these things did develop that way. The Soviets were planning 1938 02:59:23,920 --> 02:59:31,399 to assault Romania by autumn of forty one, and that's 1939 02:59:31,479 --> 02:59:41,399 exactly why, like I said, army groups South encountered comparatively 1940 02:59:41,520 --> 02:59:48,399 savage resistance and that's also why that's also why there 1941 02:59:48,479 --> 02:59:53,120 was a there was powerful reserve elements in Ukraine because 1942 02:59:53,239 --> 02:59:59,639 essentially they were there to rapidly reinforce the shock element 1943 02:59:59,799 --> 03:00:03,399 that was going to assault the Balkans. So there was 1944 03:00:03,440 --> 03:00:09,639 this awkwardly unbalanced deployment scheme of Soviet field armies where 1945 03:00:12,200 --> 03:00:17,120 Soviet forces blocking the corridor to the Moscow Leningrad deployment 1946 03:00:17,239 --> 03:00:21,399 space they were exponentially weaker than those deployed to Ukraine, 1947 03:00:22,159 --> 03:00:25,239 which doesn't make any sense unless you account for the 1948 03:00:25,360 --> 03:00:31,639 fact that they were deployed in offensive posture, the fair 1949 03:00:31,719 --> 03:00:39,200 punk of which was you know, in the south to 1950 03:00:39,319 --> 03:00:47,479 assault Romania through the Carpathians. Now, don't get me wrong, 1951 03:00:48,520 --> 03:00:53,959 the Soviets were sensitive to the fact that Moscow was 1952 03:00:55,799 --> 03:01:06,920 being left relatively undefended. But uh, you know, it doesn't like, 1953 03:01:07,120 --> 03:01:11,280 it doesn't track any other way other than accept what 1954 03:01:11,399 --> 03:01:16,159 I just acknowledged. And it's also you know, again this 1955 03:01:16,360 --> 03:01:20,840 idea that's endlessly banned to this day, that that Stalin 1956 03:01:21,000 --> 03:01:24,200 was afraid of Hitler, or that the Soviet Union was 1957 03:01:24,239 --> 03:01:26,559 afraid of the Vermach. That it's like, well, I mean, okay, 1958 03:01:26,600 --> 03:01:30,319 that's preposterous anyway, But so Stalin was so afraid of 1959 03:01:30,399 --> 03:01:34,559 the Vermach that he he there They're basically was a 1960 03:01:34,639 --> 03:01:44,000 token deployment on the UH path to Moscow. You know, 1961 03:01:44,040 --> 03:01:48,799 I mean, how how is amply does that work? Any uh? 1962 03:01:51,479 --> 03:02:00,600 I mean, any interpretation is uh he can only result 1963 03:02:00,719 --> 03:02:06,959 in a conclusion that the Soviets were poised for exclusively 1964 03:02:07,079 --> 03:02:11,520 offensive operations. I mean, unless you can it's a tortured 1965 03:02:11,600 --> 03:02:13,760 kind of logic. I mean, I guess you could claim 1966 03:02:13,920 --> 03:02:19,920 that the Soviets wanted to draw the Germans in and 1967 03:02:20,120 --> 03:02:23,840 funnel the main line of the funnel under the to 1968 03:02:23,959 --> 03:02:26,959 the main line of resistance at the gates of Moscow 1969 03:02:27,079 --> 03:02:31,159 and stop them their tracks, but that Moscow practically felt 1970 03:02:31,920 --> 03:02:37,799 you know, that doesn't make any sense. I've read people 1971 03:02:37,879 --> 03:02:40,239 who try to make some variation of that argument, but 1972 03:02:40,319 --> 03:02:43,239 it's it's so preposterous. I don't really think it warrants 1973 03:02:43,280 --> 03:02:51,120 to kind of blow by blow rebuttal but that's really, 1974 03:02:52,959 --> 03:03:01,959 you know, an example of extent conditions. Speaking of herself 1975 03:03:02,440 --> 03:03:05,959 and the resistance that IRA Group Center did encounter. To 1976 03:03:06,079 --> 03:03:11,000 be clear, they weren't defensively deployed either. There wasn't any 1977 03:03:11,159 --> 03:03:19,680 depth to their deployment schema and they in fact were 1978 03:03:19,799 --> 03:03:28,840 forward deployed with a heavily armed shock element in the lead, 1979 03:03:30,680 --> 03:03:35,000 you know, which is one reason why our group center 1980 03:03:35,680 --> 03:03:39,280 such as they didn't counter resistance. They got hit with 1981 03:03:39,440 --> 03:03:46,520 a lot of firepower that was immediately exhausted, and then 1982 03:03:48,559 --> 03:03:53,239 when counterattacking the Vermont immediately broke Soviet lines because there 1983 03:03:53,360 --> 03:03:56,879 was again, there wasn't any there wasn't any depth to 1984 03:03:56,959 --> 03:04:01,040 the deployment. You know, if you know anything, I'm not 1985 03:04:01,280 --> 03:04:06,399 any I'm not at all like a military type person, 1986 03:04:06,600 --> 03:04:11,719 but I do know something about the internal logic of 1987 03:04:12,559 --> 03:04:17,680 modern warfare, you know, in an abstract deployment. Since I mean, 1988 03:04:18,840 --> 03:04:22,479 and if you know anything about this just not even 1989 03:04:22,520 --> 03:04:26,840 really deep diving into the numerical data points and stuff, 1990 03:04:26,879 --> 03:04:29,000 but it's literally looking at the map of the deployment 1991 03:04:29,040 --> 03:04:32,239 scheme of this should jump right out at you. It's 1992 03:04:32,479 --> 03:04:37,200 it's almost like you know those a you know, it's 1993 03:04:37,200 --> 03:04:40,319 like illusion pictures. They used to see them a lot, 1994 03:04:40,520 --> 03:04:43,000 like beer companies, and it's like you look at some 1995 03:04:43,159 --> 03:04:46,559 picture and it looks like it's like a bunch of 1996 03:04:46,639 --> 03:04:49,000 old pictures, a Spudge Mackenzie or something. But then you 1997 03:04:49,079 --> 03:04:51,079 see it and it's like a sexy girl or something. 1998 03:04:51,639 --> 03:04:53,680 And then once you see that, like, you can't unsee it. 1999 03:04:54,559 --> 03:04:58,399 What's like that? Okay? I mean you look at you 2000 03:04:58,479 --> 03:05:03,360 look at a deployment map of the Moscow, Leningrad Gorky 2001 03:05:06,479 --> 03:05:14,120 battlespace on June twenty second, ninety forty one, and you 2002 03:05:14,920 --> 03:05:17,959 realize like what it is, and then and then you 2003 03:05:18,079 --> 03:05:21,200 can't undersee it, you know. So the fact anybody who 2004 03:05:22,559 --> 03:05:24,479 makes an argument of the contrary, I got to assume 2005 03:05:24,520 --> 03:05:29,040 they're being dishonest or they're just profoundly ignorant of the 2006 03:05:29,079 --> 03:05:32,840 subject matter. Yeah, it looks like we've gone over an hour. 2007 03:05:33,159 --> 03:05:34,840 I hope that wasn't to skater shot man. 2008 03:05:37,040 --> 03:05:39,879 Speaker 1: Let me let me hit you up with one question 2009 03:05:40,000 --> 03:05:42,879 before we go, and this is this is a little 2010 03:05:42,879 --> 03:05:45,079 bit off topic, but it's a question I wanted to 2011 03:05:45,079 --> 03:05:47,680 ask since we were talking about Stalin so much. Yeah, 2012 03:05:49,280 --> 03:05:51,600 did Stalin take half of Europe at the end of 2013 03:05:51,639 --> 03:05:53,680 the war or was he given half of Europe at 2014 03:05:53,719 --> 03:05:54,319 the end of the war? 2015 03:05:55,200 --> 03:05:59,920 Speaker 2: I mean both, That's what was decided at Yalta. If 2016 03:06:00,000 --> 03:06:06,079 if if Stalin was gonna be precluded from taking Germany, 2017 03:06:06,440 --> 03:06:11,639 that meant that Eisenhower and Montgomery would have had to 2018 03:06:11,680 --> 03:06:15,879 assault Berlin. And had they done that, what would have 2019 03:06:16,000 --> 03:06:27,479 happened was even accounting for the punitive and purely a 2020 03:06:27,559 --> 03:06:34,639 lot purely ideologically motivated and additional surrender demand, vermacht Off 2021 03:06:34,680 --> 03:06:38,520 and SS elements would have basically welcomed them in because 2022 03:06:39,079 --> 03:06:42,840 that would have prevented the literal rape of and destruction 2023 03:06:43,079 --> 03:06:49,920 of the German Reich. And once it was clear that 2024 03:06:51,680 --> 03:06:56,440 Anglo American forces intended to take Berlin, Stalin would have 2025 03:06:56,479 --> 03:07:04,239 immediately shifted to a footing of hostility cat for the 2026 03:07:04,360 --> 03:07:11,079 United States and the UK. And even before that happened, 2027 03:07:11,120 --> 03:07:18,000 it's conceivable that these elements that were driving for Berlin 2028 03:07:19,680 --> 03:07:26,920 on the Soviet side, like first Ukrainian Shock Army, which 2029 03:07:26,920 --> 03:07:30,120 I think was under Rock. I think that I think 2030 03:07:30,159 --> 03:07:34,680 first Ukrainian Shock Army was enter Timoshenko. But whoever whatever 2031 03:07:34,840 --> 03:07:42,760 formation cone Of and Rakasovsky respectively were commanding, it's very 2032 03:07:42,840 --> 03:07:49,120 conceivable that they would have ordered down the company level 2033 03:07:50,079 --> 03:07:54,239 commanders to treat the US and the UK as enemies 2034 03:07:55,000 --> 03:07:58,360 who were literally trying to race to Berlin, as to 2035 03:07:58,479 --> 03:08:01,959 act as a blocking element, and the Soviet view, you know, 2036 03:08:02,159 --> 03:08:09,040 for the Germans so America to found itself at war 2037 03:08:09,159 --> 03:08:16,920 with the Soviet Union. You know, that's the only alternative. 2038 03:08:17,520 --> 03:08:19,479 But I mean, that's what that you like, I said, 2039 03:08:19,520 --> 03:08:22,600 the thing was decided at Yelta. It's I mean, I 2040 03:08:22,639 --> 03:08:33,280 don't you can uh. On the one hand, yeah, it 2041 03:08:33,440 --> 03:08:35,799 was the new It was the New Dealers who kept 2042 03:08:35,840 --> 03:08:41,920 the Soviet Union in the war. But like von Manstein, 2043 03:08:42,000 --> 03:08:46,959 I highly recommend von Manstein's it's marketed as his memoirs, 2044 03:08:47,000 --> 03:08:49,680 it's called Lost Victories, but in reality it was just 2045 03:08:49,840 --> 03:08:53,799 debriefing by the War Department, which obviously was very interested 2046 03:08:54,680 --> 03:08:58,680 in learning as much as they could about fighting the 2047 03:08:58,760 --> 03:09:03,479 Soviet Union with combined conventional combined arms, with an emphasis 2048 03:09:03,559 --> 03:09:10,959 on armored columns. Obviously. But Mannstein, who really was like 2049 03:09:11,040 --> 03:09:14,040 a kind of Prussian martinet and a very prejudiced guy. 2050 03:09:16,079 --> 03:09:22,000 He stipulated that the Soviet army was unbelievably tough. They 2051 03:09:22,040 --> 03:09:29,440 could absorb catastrophic attrition and not fall apart, and much 2052 03:09:29,479 --> 03:09:34,639 as in the Western world, as we might view their 2053 03:09:34,879 --> 03:09:39,360 doctrinal orientation on the battlefield as exhibiting a kind of 2054 03:09:39,440 --> 03:09:48,000 callous disregard for human life, it was and is highly effective. 2055 03:09:49,159 --> 03:09:52,760 And those things are all true. You can't really take 2056 03:09:52,799 --> 03:09:57,639 away from the gameness and just the raw toughness of 2057 03:09:57,799 --> 03:10:00,879 the Red Army. You know. So I'm not gonna sit 2058 03:10:00,959 --> 03:10:04,319 here and say that, oh, Shtalin was just handed a 2059 03:10:04,440 --> 03:10:10,799 gift by you know, the New Dealers and in general Eisenhower. 2060 03:10:11,479 --> 03:10:15,360 You know, because uh, the Soviet Union fought for every 2061 03:10:15,440 --> 03:10:21,239 single inch of ground that uh they won back, and uh, 2062 03:10:23,079 --> 03:10:29,239 the the attrition THEA endured is almost unfathomable. Yet by 2063 03:10:29,280 --> 03:10:31,840 the time they reached Berlin, their morale was great. They 2064 03:10:31,879 --> 03:10:33,879 were acting like they were at a party. I'm not 2065 03:10:33,959 --> 03:10:37,639 being flippant. They were doing utterly horrible, horrible things. By 2066 03:10:37,680 --> 03:10:40,879 my point being, the enronament that arrived in Berlin wasn't 2067 03:10:40,920 --> 03:10:43,719 some broken ragtag for us. It was a very game, 2068 03:10:46,000 --> 03:10:49,799 very aggressive, very high morale element, which is one of 2069 03:10:49,840 --> 03:10:53,520 the reasons why they were so dangerous. Like it's realistic. 2070 03:10:53,680 --> 03:10:59,760 And their Utergang where Troutle young, you know, Uh, she's 2071 03:10:59,799 --> 03:11:02,600 trying to pass through Soviet lines and then like the 2072 03:11:02,680 --> 03:11:04,120 kid runs up and grabs her hand. 2073 03:11:04,600 --> 03:11:04,760 Speaker 1: You know. 2074 03:11:04,879 --> 03:11:09,440 Speaker 2: It's so it's a really poignant scene. But uh there's 2075 03:11:09,479 --> 03:11:12,639 the Soviet infantry men and they're like guzlin vodka and 2076 03:11:12,840 --> 03:11:15,079 like dancing like you're at a party. You know, these 2077 03:11:15,120 --> 03:11:18,760 guys have just been in action for the you know, 2078 03:11:18,959 --> 03:11:21,760 these guys probably were the last they were probably like 2079 03:11:21,799 --> 03:11:23,799 the last element drafted. They were probably the guys who 2080 03:11:23,879 --> 03:11:28,440 turned eighteen, you know in uh in a in the 2081 03:11:29,239 --> 03:11:32,879 in January of nineteen forty five, you know, and then 2082 03:11:33,000 --> 03:11:36,079 took you know, like eighty percent casualties. You know, they're 2083 03:11:36,200 --> 03:11:38,440 and they're they're like the surviving element, and they're they're 2084 03:11:38,440 --> 03:11:42,040 acting like you're at a party. You know, they most 2085 03:11:42,680 --> 03:11:45,479 most people would have fallen apart, you know, even when 2086 03:11:45,520 --> 03:11:48,600 they had the kind of that kind of momentum in 2087 03:11:49,040 --> 03:11:52,799 broad strategic terms, just because it was so it was 2088 03:11:52,879 --> 03:11:56,159 so brutal and so catastrophic. So yeah, I'm not I'm 2089 03:11:56,200 --> 03:11:58,399 not gonna take anything away from the Ivans in terms 2090 03:11:58,399 --> 03:12:01,479 of their toughness and gameness. But it you know, I 2091 03:12:02,159 --> 03:12:09,280 a race to Berlin between Montgomery and Eisenhower and and 2092 03:12:09,559 --> 03:12:15,000 uh the Soviets would have meant war. So that's the 2093 03:12:15,079 --> 03:12:16,040 best answer I can give. 2094 03:12:17,639 --> 03:12:21,280 Speaker 1: Awesome, All right, Well, I will encourage people to go 2095 03:12:21,280 --> 03:12:24,520 over to Thomas's substack that's real Thomas seven seven seven 2096 03:12:24,600 --> 03:12:28,159 dot substack dot com, and you can connect to him 2097 03:12:29,239 --> 03:12:33,319 from from there to anywhere that he's at, and uh 2098 03:12:33,799 --> 03:12:37,840 check him out on Twitter and make sure to subscribe 2099 03:12:37,879 --> 03:12:41,239 to a substack so you can get the episodes and 2100 03:12:41,479 --> 03:12:45,360 hear them. So yeah, that's at Thomas. This was a 2101 03:12:45,639 --> 03:12:47,399 This was a great series. I thought this was a 2102 03:12:47,479 --> 03:12:51,040 series that needed to get out there, especially after reading 2103 03:12:51,319 --> 03:12:55,879 after reading sub Off and getting a little of the 2104 03:12:55,920 --> 03:12:59,879 way through Hoffman and having to finish Hoffman. It's just 2105 03:13:00,200 --> 03:13:05,040 vital information that people are you're not going to hear 2106 03:13:06,399 --> 03:13:11,079 even if you exit court history. This is stuff that's 2107 03:13:11,120 --> 03:13:13,719 hidden and there's a reason why both of those books. 2108 03:13:13,719 --> 03:13:15,799 If you want original copies of both of those books, 2109 03:13:15,840 --> 03:13:17,360 you're paying two three hundred dollars. 2110 03:13:18,120 --> 03:13:20,879 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, no, I agree on all accounts. And yeah, 2111 03:13:21,000 --> 03:13:25,680 thanks thanks for including me man or rather for inviting 2112 03:13:25,760 --> 03:13:29,559 me to participate in lieu of somebody else. That's just great. 2113 03:13:30,719 --> 03:13:33,239 Speaker 1: Really, thank you, Thomas. Take care now.