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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to the deep dive. You know, think about the

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<v Speaker 1>early vision for cyberspace. It was incredibly optimistic. Wasn't it

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<v Speaker 1>a space to boost human interaction, help us work smarter,

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<v Speaker 1>make decisions, connect the entire world?

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely a truly evolutionary idea.

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<v Speaker 1>But here's the twist, and it's a big one. That

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<v Speaker 1>same human ingenuity, the aggressive part of it, Well, it

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<v Speaker 1>transformed this amazing invention into essentially a new battlefield.

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<v Speaker 2>And that led to the development of what we now

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<v Speaker 2>call cyber arms, right, and that whole transformation is exactly

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<v Speaker 2>what we're diving into today. We're going to trace this

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<v Speaker 2>really astonishing journey. It starts with things that seemed almost

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<v Speaker 2>like pranks, you know, harmless malicious castus well, relatively harmless

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<v Speaker 2>back then, but it evolved into these incredibly sophisticated cyber

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<v Speaker 2>weapons we see now, and it's all about the dual

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<v Speaker 2>nature of these digital tools, how they can defend but

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<v Speaker 2>also cause well devastating offense. The implications for global security

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<v Speaker 2>are critical, sometimes pretty settling.

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<v Speaker 1>It feels like the tech moves so fast.

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<v Speaker 2>It really does. What's striking is just how quickly the

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<v Speaker 2>technology seems to outpace our ethics, our values, our ability

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<v Speaker 2>to set clear rules in this.

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<v Speaker 1>Domain, like we're always playing catch up. So to really

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<v Speaker 1>get our heads around this complex evolution from those first

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<v Speaker 1>digital annoyances to nation state threats, the tools, the escalating dangers,

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<v Speaker 1>and what the world's trying to do about it. We've

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<v Speaker 1>pulled together a whole stack of sources for you.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, lots to untack.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's peel back the layers. So when we talk

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<v Speaker 1>about the very start of cyber arms, it sounds almost

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<v Speaker 1>quaint now, doesn't it, Thinking that something like a digital school.

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<v Speaker 2>Prank I'll be sending apples bouncing across someone's screen.

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<v Speaker 1>Exactly, that could somehow morph into something capable of crippling

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<v Speaker 1>a nation's infrastructure. But our sources point way back to

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<v Speaker 1>elk Clunter in nineteen eighty two.

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<v Speaker 2>Nineteen eighty two, spread by floppy disc.

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<v Speaker 1>By floppy disc, it copied itself into the boot sector.

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<v Speaker 1>Then just a year Latereten three, we get the first

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<v Speaker 1>quote professionally designed virus from a university.

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<v Speaker 2>Experiment, and that's where the term computer virus was formally introduced.

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<v Speaker 2>Really and that early evolution you mentioned elk Cloner, But

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<v Speaker 2>think about viruses like whale that one really showed this

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<v Speaker 2>fundamental cybersecurity problem. It's always a reactive battle. Oh so, well,

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<v Speaker 2>the whale virus could actually mutate, It could rewrite its

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<v Speaker 2>own instructions, making it incredibly hard to track using traditional methods.

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<v Speaker 1>So the old anti virus way looking for a fixed pattern,

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<v Speaker 1>a known signature.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, that became obsolete almost immediately because these things could

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<v Speaker 2>change their own code, you know, always one step ahead.

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<v Speaker 2>It became this constant game of digital cat and mouse.

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<v Speaker 1>And then the whole game just fundamentally shifted. The Internet

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<v Speaker 1>arrives in ninety one, spreads.

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<v Speaker 2>Everywhere into homes, offices.

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<v Speaker 1>And suddenly email and electronic documents are the new prime targets.

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<v Speaker 1>Forget floppy discs.

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<v Speaker 2>They became the most profitable target for malware, as our

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<v Speaker 2>sources put it.

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<v Speaker 1>And then we saw this new type right environmental macroviruses

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<v Speaker 1>like concept in the late nineties.

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<v Speaker 2>Ah yes, concept that was disruptive because it wasn't stuck

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<v Speaker 2>on one type of computer. It could jump between different

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<v Speaker 2>operating systems, made it much harder to contain.

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<v Speaker 1>And this progression, it wasn't just theoretical, It led directly

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<v Speaker 1>to major real world incidents.

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<v Speaker 2>Didn't it absolutely stark examples of our vulnerabilities. Think back

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<v Speaker 2>to two thousand and seven, the attack on Estonia, the

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<v Speaker 2>BDS attack, right, the distributed denial of service not just

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<v Speaker 2>an annoyance, it was a full on assault. Took down

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<v Speaker 2>government banking media services for three weeks.

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<v Speaker 1>Caused by botnets, right, just overwhelming their systems.

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<v Speaker 2>Massive botanets, flooding them with automated requests. Now, later it

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<v Speaker 2>was characterized more as a cyber dispute than a full

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<v Speaker 2>cyber war, but honestly it exposed a massive national vulnerability.

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<v Speaker 2>It signaled a new era.

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<v Speaker 1>And if Estonia showed the potential for disruption, twenty ten

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<v Speaker 1>brought something else, entirely stuck Snitt. Ah.

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<v Speaker 2>Stuck Snitt often called the first cyber weapon of do

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<v Speaker 2>you have political significance?

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<v Speaker 1>What made it so chilling was its precision, its target,

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<v Speaker 1>Iran's Naden's nuclear facility.

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<v Speaker 2>And crucially it got in even without an Internet connection.

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<v Speaker 1>That's the mind bending part.

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<v Speaker 2>How by manipulating Siemens plc's those programmable logic controllers, the

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<v Speaker 2>sort of digital brains running the industrial machinery, to do

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<v Speaker 2>what exactly, To subtlely make the centrifuges the ones enriching

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<v Speaker 2>uranium basically self destruct over time, slow insidious sabotage.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow. Okay. In building on that kind of capability, we

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<v Speaker 1>then saw ransomware just explode.

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<v Speaker 2>Didn't we Oh, absolutely a terrifying evolution. In twenty sixteen

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<v Speaker 2>you had Lockey dozens of strains infecting millions of computers,

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<v Speaker 2>especially in Europe, at one point heading over five thousand

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<v Speaker 2>machines an hour in Germany alone hour.

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<v Speaker 1>That's staggering.

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<v Speaker 2>And then twenty seventeen brought WannaCry that went.

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<v Speaker 1>Global, leveraging that Eternal Blue vulnerability.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, which was leaked from reportedly from a US intelligence

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<v Speaker 2>age andcies cyber arsenal. That single attack hit over three

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<v Speaker 2>hundred thousand systems worldwide, massive disruption, real chaos.

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<v Speaker 1>So this whole history it really hammers home this duality

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<v Speaker 1>you mentioned earlier.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, these tools, they can be used for defense and offense,

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<v Speaker 2>whether it's software or a technique. It's the same toolkit offense.

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<v Speaker 1>Which creates this environment where they can spread easily be misused.

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<v Speaker 2>Precisely, the general accessibility makes it surprisingly easy from malicious

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<v Speaker 2>actors anyone, from loan hackers to organized groups, even nation

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<v Speaker 2>states to get their hands on and launch these cyber arms.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, So understanding that duality, that accessibility, it leads to

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<v Speaker 1>the next question, how do these attacks actually happen. Let's

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<v Speaker 1>let's unpack the stages of a full scale operation, right.

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<v Speaker 2>It usually starts with reconnaissance.

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<v Speaker 1>Intel gathering exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Attackers collect info on their targets, physical locations, network entry points,

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<v Speaker 2>system weaknesses, you name it, our sources even mentioned long

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<v Speaker 2>term recon by.

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<v Speaker 1>Governments like surveillance.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, things like analyzing telephone comms, voiceover IP calls, collecting

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<v Speaker 2>metadata on network traffic patterns over time, building a picture.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, recon first.

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<v Speaker 2>Then what then comes the breach and exploitation phase. This

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<v Speaker 2>is where they actively use vulnerabilities flaws in operating systems,

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<v Speaker 2>applications code to get unauthorized access.

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<v Speaker 1>And there are different kinds of exploits, right.

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<v Speaker 2>We distinguish between remote exploits where they don't need prior access,

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<v Speaker 2>and local exploits where they do. For example, maybe they

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<v Speaker 2>exploit a web application flaw to get a foothold like

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<v Speaker 2>low level access exactly. But then maybe they exploit something deeper,

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<v Speaker 2>like a flaw in a file sharing protocol like SMB

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<v Speaker 2>server message block and that could give them much higher

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<v Speaker 2>privileges within the network.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so they're in now. They use assault.

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<v Speaker 2>Tools, YEP, tools designed to actually change things, alter system configurations,

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<v Speaker 2>environment variables, maybe target hardware settings, and then they.

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<v Speaker 1>Need to get the goods out right data theft.

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<v Speaker 2>That's where exploration tools come in. Think of them as

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<v Speaker 2>digital vacuum cleaners, designed to hide or extract data covertly.

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<v Speaker 2>How do they hide that often by using common everyday

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<v Speaker 2>protocols open VPN, open ssh, FTP, things that might look

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<v Speaker 2>like normal traffic, or they get clever use covert channels.

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<v Speaker 2>Our sources even mentioned sneaking data out through mail protocols,

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<v Speaker 2>encoding it, breaking it up into tiny pieces across multiple packets.

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<v Speaker 1>Trying to fly under the radar. Makes sense.

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<v Speaker 2>Then you have persistence tools, things like hidden malware, backdoors,

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<v Speaker 2>stealth user accounts, all designed to maintain access to stay

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<v Speaker 2>inside the network without being detected, sometimes for long periods.

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<v Speaker 1>And they hide themselves too, not just the data.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, that's oppustation tools, proxy servers, VPNs, the tour network,

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<v Speaker 2>anything to conceal the attacker's real location, their identity, the

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<v Speaker 2>tools they're using.

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<v Speaker 1>Which brings up a huge problem you mentioned attribution. If

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<v Speaker 1>they're so good at hiding, how can anyone ever figure

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<v Speaker 1>out who did it?

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<v Speaker 2>That is the critical challenge. It's incredibly difficult.

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<v Speaker 1>Attribution point is huge, and it makes sense then that

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<v Speaker 1>the final stage often involves covering tracks tools.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, removing all traces they were ever there, manually deleting

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<v Speaker 2>logs using automated wipers, sometimes even causing a permanent denial

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<v Speaker 2>of service, basically bricking the equipment to destroy evidence.

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<v Speaker 1>What's wild is that these same tools, these techniques, security

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<v Speaker 1>professionals use them.

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<v Speaker 2>Too, right, they do in legitimate vulnerability assessments, penetration testing.

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<v Speaker 2>But the key difference is obviously permission caution, strict ethical

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<v Speaker 2>and legal boundaries. It's the intent that differs.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, and this whole world of tools and exploits, it's

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<v Speaker 1>led to this underground marketplace, the cyber bizarre, that's what

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<v Speaker 1>some call.

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<v Speaker 2>It, yes or the black marketplace. What's really striking is

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<v Speaker 2>how zero day vulnerabilities. Those are the flaws attackers find

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<v Speaker 2>before the software makers know about the super valuable, incredibly valuable.

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<v Speaker 2>They're treated like virtual products sold anonymously online, sometimes with

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<v Speaker 2>tech support tutorials. Makes that accessible even if you're not

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<v Speaker 2>a top tier hacker.

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<v Speaker 1>There's that big takedown Darcode Right.

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<v Speaker 2>Twenty fifteen, your poll called it the most prolific English

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<v Speaker 2>speaking cyber criminal forum. Took a huge international effort law

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<v Speaker 2>enforcement from twenty countries.

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<v Speaker 1>There's a legitimate side too, like bounty programs.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, companies like Zerodium offer huge bounties for researchers who

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<v Speaker 2>find and responsibly disclose these high risk vulnerabilities. They pay

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<v Speaker 2>for the information so it can be fixed rather than

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<v Speaker 2>sold on the black market. It's a complex ecosystem.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's shift gears a bit. Let's talk about the

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<v Speaker 1>highest stakes, imaginable critical infrastructure and nuclear systems.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, this is where the potential consequences get truly terrifying.

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<v Speaker 1>So critical infrastructure, that's basically the stuff society needs to

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<v Speaker 1>function right, National safety, economy, public health.

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<v Speaker 2>Power grids, water systems, transportation, finance, communications, all of it.

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<v Speaker 1>And our sources say cyber threats have moved squarely into

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<v Speaker 1>the CBR end industries. That's chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear explosives.

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<v Speaker 2>These sectors obviously require intense national level protection because an

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<v Speaker 2>attack could be devastating.

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<v Speaker 1>The consequences are just unthinkable exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Our sources state attacks on CBRN facilities could lead to

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<v Speaker 2>national and even international level damage and irreversible consequences.

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<v Speaker 1>And it's not just Internet connected systems, is it. Disconnected

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<v Speaker 1>ones are vulnerable, like Ducksnet showed precisely.

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<v Speaker 2>That's what's deeply concerning, and the threat is growing. One

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<v Speaker 2>statistic highlighted was that in twenty sixteen, attacks on industrial

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<v Speaker 2>control systems the ICs, the tech running these plants, jumped

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<v Speaker 2>over one hundred and ten percent compared to just the

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<v Speaker 2>year before.

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<v Speaker 1>Over one hundred and ten percent. Wow. And we've seen

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<v Speaker 1>some well chilling examples related specifically to nuclear systems over

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<v Speaker 1>the years.

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<v Speaker 2>There have been worrying incidents.

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<v Speaker 1>Like the Moonlight Maze attack back in ninety nine, thought

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<v Speaker 1>to be from Russia stealing sensitive files hitting the.

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<v Speaker 2>Pentagon a massive breach back then.

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<v Speaker 1>Or that incident in two thousand and seven where six

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<v Speaker 1>nuclear armed cruise missiles went missing for thirty.

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<v Speaker 2>Six hours, vanished from the tracking systems terrifying laps.

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<v Speaker 1>And in twenty ten, fifty minute Man missiles just disappeared

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<v Speaker 1>from monitors for about an hour. Plus reports in twenty

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<v Speaker 1>seventeen of hackers actively targeting nuclear facilities.

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<v Speaker 2>While the exact causes weren't always definitively linked to cyber attacks,

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<v Speaker 2>in all those older cases, they absolutely underscore the extreme risks,

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<v Speaker 2>the potential for a cyber attack to cause confusion, loss

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<v Speaker 2>of control, or worse. It's unacceptable when you.

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<v Speaker 1>Connect that to the bigger picture, the idea of a

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<v Speaker 1>successful cyber attack on nuclear weapons themselves or their command

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<v Speaker 1>and control planning systems early warning.

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<v Speaker 2>It's not just theoretical anymore. It's considered possible, and if

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<v Speaker 2>it happened, it could completely undermine rational deterrence theory, that

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<v Speaker 2>core idea that mutually assured destruction prevents nuclear war. It

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<v Speaker 2>fundamentally shifts strategic stability.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, that's heavy stuff. Now let's talk about something that's

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<v Speaker 1>changing warfare again. Autonomous weapons systems AWS or law laws,

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<v Speaker 1>lethal economists, weapons systems.

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<v Speaker 2>Right systems that can select and engage targets without direct

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<v Speaker 2>human intervention.

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<v Speaker 1>We have examples already, don't we. Israel's Iron Dome.

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<v Speaker 2>Which automatically tracks and intercepts rockets.

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<v Speaker 1>The usc RAM system counter.

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<v Speaker 2>Rocket artillery and mortar automatically destroys in coming rounds.

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<v Speaker 1>Then there's Israel's Harpy drone, a.

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<v Speaker 2>Fire and forget weapon that hunts radar signals autonomously, the.

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<v Speaker 1>UK's Tyrannus Combat drone, the US Navy's X forty seven

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<v Speaker 1>B Carrier drone, even those Samsung robots in the Korean DMZ, the.

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<v Speaker 2>Sgr A one. Yeah, surveillance robots with an automatic mode

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<v Speaker 2>for target engagement, although the exact parameters of that mode

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<v Speaker 2>are debated.

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<v Speaker 1>This whole area laugibly. Yes, it's sparking intense debate. Some

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<v Speaker 1>call it the third revolution in warfare.

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<v Speaker 2>After gunpowder and nuclear arms. Yes, it's a huge potential shift, and.

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<v Speaker 1>The arguments against them are serious.

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<v Speaker 2>Very serious, violating international humanitarian law? Can a machine make

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<v Speaker 2>life and death calls appropriately lowering the threshold for conflict?

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<v Speaker 2>Does it make war too easy, becoming indiscriminate weapons of terror?

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<v Speaker 2>If they proliferate and a big one, they could be.

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<v Speaker 1>Hackable, turned against their own side.

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<v Speaker 2>Potentially, Yes, which is why you see prominent AI and

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<v Speaker 2>robotics companies writing open letters to the UN urging for

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<v Speaker 2>regulation before these things become widespread.

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<v Speaker 1>And AI itself, artificial intelligence is woven into all of this.

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<v Speaker 2>Isn't it absolutely central, both as a tool for attack

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<v Speaker 2>and defense.

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<v Speaker 1>Our sources predict AI and hand cyber attacks will be

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<v Speaker 1>scary effective, accurately aimed, difficult to.

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<v Speaker 2>Attribute, exploiting AI based vulnerabilities, and crucially having self improvement

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<v Speaker 2>mechanisms they can learn and adapt on their own.

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<v Speaker 1>Like automated spearfishing that gets better at tricking you or

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<v Speaker 1>IBM's deep blocker concept.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, deep blockers showed how AI could hide malware until

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<v Speaker 2>very specific conditions are met, like recognizing a particular face

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<v Speaker 2>or voice, making it ultra targeted and hard to detect beforehand.

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<v Speaker 1>But AI is in fool proof right. It has weaknesses too.

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<v Speaker 2>It can be tricked things like AI pixel poisoning, tiny

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<v Speaker 2>invisible changes to an image that make an AI misclassify

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<v Speaker 2>it completely. It's very much a dual use.

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<v Speaker 1>Technology, so it could be used for defense too.

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<v Speaker 2>Immense potential there. We're talking about intelligent autonomous mobile agents

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<v Speaker 2>that could proactively hunt for threats on networks. NATO is

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<v Speaker 2>exploring this plus using things like game theory and deep

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<v Speaker 2>learning to model threats and develop smarter adaptive defenses.

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<v Speaker 1>And all this potential is kicked off a global AI

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<v Speaker 1>arms race, hasn't It.

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<v Speaker 2>Seems that way. Russia's actively competing their defense minister pushing

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<v Speaker 2>for AI development to counter.

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<v Speaker 1>Threats and China.

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<v Speaker 2>China has that incredibly ambitious plan be the world AI

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<v Speaker 2>leader by twenty thirty. Big focus on cyber sovereignty, which

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<v Speaker 2>means tight control.

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<v Speaker 1>The Great Firewall affecting foreign tech companies.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, and nearly three hundred new national cybersecurity standards, police

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<v Speaker 2>powers to inspect businesses, remote network access. It's a very

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<v Speaker 2>state centric controlled approach.

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<v Speaker 1>In the US.

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<v Speaker 2>Signific investments too, increased DdO D funding for unmanned systems

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<v Speaker 2>offensive cyber capabilities DARP UP pushing the boundaries, though some

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<v Speaker 2>projects like Project Maven involving Google previously sparked controversy about

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<v Speaker 2>ethics and military AI.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, So bringing this all together with this complex, fast

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<v Speaker 1>moving landscape, how do we actually defend cyberspace? What are

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<v Speaker 1>the basic principles?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, it often boils down to the classic CIA triad

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<v Speaker 2>of information.

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<v Speaker 1>Security CIA not the agency, No.

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<v Speaker 2>Not the agency. Confidentiality, integrity and availability okay. Confidentiality protecting

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<v Speaker 2>information from unauthorized access, keeping secret secret, ensuring information is accurate, complete,

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<v Speaker 2>hasn't been tampered with. That's where things like cryptographic hashes

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<v Speaker 2>come in MD five SAHA one like digital fingerprints, though

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<v Speaker 2>it's worth noting some older ones like MD five aren't

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<v Speaker 2>considered fully secure anymore.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, need stronger ones now and.

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<v Speaker 2>Availability making sure information and systems are accessible when you

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<v Speaker 2>need them. Denial of service attacks are a direct threat

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<v Speaker 2>to availability.

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<v Speaker 1>So how do we achieve CI and A What are

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<v Speaker 1>the key defenses?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, encryption is fundamental scrambling rata, so only authorized parties

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<v Speaker 2>can read it.

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<v Speaker 1>Different types, Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>Symmetric encryption uses one key. Asymmetric uses a public key

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<v Speaker 2>and a private key. That's the basis for PKI public

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<v Speaker 2>key infrastructure which manages digital certificates and identities, and hybrid

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<v Speaker 2>methods like s encryption try to get the best of both.

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<v Speaker 1>There was that controversy in Australia about encryption.

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<v Speaker 2>Laws right requiring tech companies to provide law enforcement access

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<v Speaker 2>to encrypted messages. It highlights that constant tension between security

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<v Speaker 2>needs and privacy rights.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, encryption, what else?

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<v Speaker 2>Access control? Basically who gets to access what?

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<v Speaker 1>Like permissions exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>There's discretionary access control, where users control access to their

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<v Speaker 2>own files. Mandatory access control is stricter. The system enforces

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<v Speaker 2>rules based on security labels and a role based access

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<v Speaker 2>control very common in organizations. Grants access based on your

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<v Speaker 2>job role makes sense.

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<v Speaker 1>What about finding weaknesses before they're attacked?

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<v Speaker 2>That's vulnerability management. It's proactive identifying, classifying, fixing, or mitigating

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<v Speaker 2>weaknesses before attackers exploit them.

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<v Speaker 1>And there's a right way to report vulnerabilities.

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<v Speaker 2>You find, yes, responsible disclosure. The best practice is to

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<v Speaker 2>notify the vendor privately first, give them time to fix

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<v Speaker 2>it before you announce it publicly. That protects users.

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<v Speaker 1>Good practice. Okay, what about specific defenses against different malware

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<v Speaker 1>types like those macroviruses.

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<v Speaker 2>Standard antivirus solutions are still key there. For botnets, you

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<v Speaker 2>need specialized anti botnet.

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<v Speaker 1>Tools and passwords. Everyone hates passwords.

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<v Speaker 2>Huh huh, true, but strong policies are crucial. Our sources

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<v Speaker 2>recommend over sixteen symbols. Avoid personal info unique for every

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<v Speaker 2>site or app. Better yet, use alternatives like.

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<v Speaker 1>Fingerprint scanners or multi factor authentication MFA.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly biometrics or MFA adds significant layers, But be aware

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<v Speaker 2>new tools are all always emerging that try to bypass

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<v Speaker 2>even two factor authentication. The arms race continues.

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<v Speaker 1>Always evolving. What about ransomware and that crypto mining stuff?

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<v Speaker 2>Right, ransomware locks your files, demands payment. Crypto mining malware

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<v Speaker 2>secretly uses your computer's power to mine cryptocurrency for the attacker.

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<v Speaker 1>And you said crypto mining is overtaking ransomware.

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<v Speaker 2>Our sources suggest that trend. Yeah, yeah, maybe less direct confrontation,

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<v Speaker 2>more stealthy profit. Countermeasures include good anti malware and maybe

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<v Speaker 2>some browser add ons designed block mining scripts.

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<v Speaker 1>And if an attack does get through, what then.

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<v Speaker 2>Then it's recovery and reporting. You need procedures, evaluate the damage,

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<v Speaker 2>figure out the causes, check those logs, and crucially use

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<v Speaker 2>your backups to restore systems and data. Backups are key,

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<v Speaker 2>absolutely essential, and sometimes you need external experts for non

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<v Speaker 2>technical stuff like legal issues or reputation management. This all

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<v Speaker 2>feeds into digital forensics.

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<v Speaker 1>The detective work.

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<v Speaker 2>Precisely carefully collecting, preserving and analyzing digital evidence to figure

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<v Speaker 2>out what happened, who did it, and document it properly,

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<v Speaker 2>often for legal reasons.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, let's zoom out again. We've talked about attacks and defenses.

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<v Speaker 1>What about global efforts international security?

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<v Speaker 2>This is where it gets really complex, especially as we

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<v Speaker 2>discussed with attribution, figuring out who doing it exactly. Our

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<v Speaker 2>sources call it one of the most important elements for

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<v Speaker 2>decurrents and one of major challenges why Because attackers use

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<v Speaker 2>technical tricks VPNs, tour proxy chains, plus there are strategic, political,

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<v Speaker 2>and legal hurdles. It makes tracing attacks back definitively incredibly hard.

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<v Speaker 1>But you need attribution for deterrence to work right.

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<v Speaker 2>Ideally, yes, if attackers know they'll be caught and face consequences,

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<v Speaker 2>they might think twice. But proving it is tough.

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<v Speaker 1>So how do different nations approach this? The US?

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<v Speaker 2>The US has its DHS Cybersecurity strategy, various executive initiatives,

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<v Speaker 2>the National Security Strategy. We see significant budget increases for

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<v Speaker 2>things like unmanned systems, offensive cyber operations. DARPA is key

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<v Speaker 2>for funding cutting edge tech.

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<v Speaker 1>But there's that tension, right government working with the private sector,

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<v Speaker 1>but also surveillance concerns.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a constant balancing act. Yeah, especially after revelations about

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<v Speaker 2>government surveillance programs. How do you foster innovation and collaboration

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<v Speaker 2>while protecting privacy and civil liberties. It's a critical question.

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<v Speaker 1>What about Russia.

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<v Speaker 2>Russia's approach is guided by its information security doctrine. The

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<v Speaker 2>priority is very much nation state safety, which often translates

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<v Speaker 2>to significant monitoring and control over cyberspace within its borders.

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<v Speaker 1>They have that big Digital Economy program yes.

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<v Speaker 2>Twenty nineteen twenty twenty four trillions of rubles invested in

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<v Speaker 2>regulating the digital environment, building infrastructure. Russia has also been

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<v Speaker 2>very active and pushing for UN activities on international information security,

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<v Speaker 2>advocating for certain norms.

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<v Speaker 1>And China we mentioned their AI ambitions in cyber sovereignty.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, aiming to lead an AI by twenty thirty. Cyber

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<v Speaker 2>sovereignty is central the right to control their own digital space.

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<v Speaker 2>That means the Great Firewall, strict rules for foreign tech companies,

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<v Speaker 2>often requiring data localization or handing over encryption keys.

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<v Speaker 1>And lots of new standards, police inspection powers.

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<v Speaker 2>Nearly three hundred new national cybersecurity standards. Recently police have

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<v Speaker 2>authority to inspect businesses, even access networks remotely to check

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<v Speaker 2>for security loopholes. It's a very comprehensive state controlled model, so.

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<v Speaker 1>Very different national approaches. What about international cooperation? Is anything

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<v Speaker 1>actually getting done?

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<v Speaker 2>There are efforts. The UN Group of Governmental Experts GGE

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<v Speaker 2>on Information and Telecommunications has been important. It managed to

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<v Speaker 2>build some early consensus on applying international law and norms

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<v Speaker 2>of behavior to cyberspace, setting some ground rules exactly baby

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<v Speaker 2>steps but important ones.

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<v Speaker 1>And the Talent Manual that came out.

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<v Speaker 2>Of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence Talent

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<v Speaker 2>Manual two point zero confirms that existing international law, like

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<v Speaker 2>the laws of armed conflict, does apply to cyber operations.

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<v Speaker 2>It helps clarify principles like distinction proportionality in the cyber context.

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<v Speaker 1>Applying old rules to the new domain.

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<v Speaker 2>Essentially yes, and you also have the Buddapest Convention on Cybercrime,

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<v Speaker 2>a major treaty aimed at harmonizing national laws against cybercrime

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<v Speaker 2>and fostering international cooperation in investigations.

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<v Speaker 1>More recently, there was a UN High Level Panel on

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<v Speaker 1>Digital Cooperation.

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<v Speaker 2>Convened in twenty eighteen, Yeah, aiming to boost cooperation between governments,

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<v Speaker 2>the private sector, civil society, academia trying to find ways

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<v Speaker 2>to manage the risks of digital tech and avoid unintended

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<v Speaker 2>negative consequences.

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<v Speaker 1>So lots of talking, some agreements, but the challenges remain huge.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely when you connect it all to the bigger picture

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<v Speaker 2>ensuring a safe, stable cyberspace given its global reach, the

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<v Speaker 2>secrecy of attacks, the attribution problem, the involvement of powerful,

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<v Speaker 2>well funded actors, both state and non state. It's an

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<v Speaker 2>immense ongoing challenge, a global chess game with incredibly high stakes.

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<v Speaker 1>So, after this whole journey from you know, simple prank

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<v Speaker 1>code like Elkloner all the way to nation states, cyber war,

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<v Speaker 1>autonomous weapons AI threats, and what does this all mean

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<v Speaker 1>for you listening right now? It's pretty clear the whole

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<v Speaker 1>landscape of conflict is changing incredibly fast. Those old lines

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<v Speaker 1>between peace and war, they're getting seriously blurred. In cyberspace.

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<v Speaker 2>We've really seen how the tools built to connect us

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<v Speaker 2>well they can be turned into weapons. It just underscores

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<v Speaker 2>how vital robust defenses are, but also ethical frameworks and

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<v Speaker 2>real international cooperation. And it leaves us with a pretty

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<v Speaker 2>fundamental question. I think, as this technology keeps racing ahead,

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<v Speaker 2>can our governance, our laws, our human values ever actually

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<v Speaker 2>keep pace with the power of cyber arms and AI.

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<v Speaker 2>Can we ensure they serve us not threaten us.

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<v Speaker 1>That's a heavy question and maybe a final provocative thought

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<v Speaker 1>for you to chew on. If a modern cyber weapon

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<v Speaker 1>can become useless in just weeks because its vulnerability gets

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<v Speaker 1>discovered and patched, what does that very short lifespan mean

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<v Speaker 1>for long term deterrence strategies, for global stability, and maybe

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<v Speaker 1>closer to home, what role do you think individuals play

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<v Speaker 1>in trying to secure this digital world we all now

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<v Speaker 1>live in.
