WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.120 --> 00:00:02.399 I found out this step, I have to say not me. 2 00:00:04.360 --> 00:00:07.719 All right, folks, here we are episode forty of the 3 00:00:07.759 --> 00:00:10.480 Team House. I can't believe we got the forty already. 4 00:00:10.599 --> 00:00:14.119 I'm Jack Murphy here. I think a few screens over, 5 00:00:14.240 --> 00:00:17.000 Depending on how your view is organized, you'll see co 6 00:00:17.120 --> 00:00:20.679 host Dave Park and you will also see our guest 7 00:00:20.719 --> 00:00:26.480 for tonight, Sergeant Major retired Mike Vining. Sergeant Major Vining 8 00:00:26.839 --> 00:00:30.239 is you know, honestly, you're one of my favorite veterans 9 00:00:30.280 --> 00:00:33.759 to interview. I've had the opportunity to twice before and 10 00:00:33.799 --> 00:00:36.960 it's always really a lot of fun. Sargeant Major Vining 11 00:00:37.679 --> 00:00:41.159 entered into US Army Basic training in nineteen sixty eight 12 00:00:41.439 --> 00:00:45.679 and became an explosive ordnance disposal technician. He was deployed 13 00:00:45.679 --> 00:00:49.399 to Vietnam and received the Bronze Star in nineteen seventy one, 14 00:00:50.000 --> 00:00:53.000 and in nineteen seventy eight he volunteered for a new 15 00:00:53.079 --> 00:00:55.679 unit that was being formed. He became one of the 16 00:00:55.679 --> 00:00:59.359 original members of Delta Force, and when the unit was 17 00:00:59.439 --> 00:01:02.880 validated and stood up in nineteen eighty, Sergeant Major Vining 18 00:01:03.560 --> 00:01:07.120 was one of the participants in Operation Eagle Claw. This 19 00:01:07.200 --> 00:01:09.439 is the operation we're going to talk about the most tonight, 20 00:01:09.840 --> 00:01:12.239 I think that the bulk of this stream will be 21 00:01:12.319 --> 00:01:15.799 talking about Eagle Claw, because just on the twenty fourth 22 00:01:15.879 --> 00:01:18.680 last week, we came up on the fortieth anniversary of 23 00:01:18.799 --> 00:01:21.920 Eagle Claw, and that was a Delta Force mission to 24 00:01:22.079 --> 00:01:25.079 attempt to rescue fifty two American hostages being held at 25 00:01:25.120 --> 00:01:29.319 the US Embassy in Tehran. Now, Sergeant Major Vining went 26 00:01:29.359 --> 00:01:32.120 on to do much more in his career. He was 27 00:01:32.159 --> 00:01:36.560 also an Operation Urgent Fury, the Invasion of Grenada. He 28 00:01:36.879 --> 00:01:39.760 went back to Delta Force where he served as the 29 00:01:39.840 --> 00:01:43.280 chief EOD Technician, the Research and Development Sergeant major, in 30 00:01:43.319 --> 00:01:46.560 the Breaching Sergeant Major, and then he rounded out his 31 00:01:46.680 --> 00:01:50.719 career at Jaysock as the Special Plans Sergeant Major. On 32 00:01:50.799 --> 00:01:52.599 top of that, as we were talking just before the 33 00:01:52.640 --> 00:01:58.719 stream started, Mike Vining is also an avid mountaineering and climbing, 34 00:01:58.799 --> 00:02:03.000 rock climbing enthusiasm and spelunker. Just really so many amazing 35 00:02:03.040 --> 00:02:06.120 things that that Mike has done in life, and we're 36 00:02:06.159 --> 00:02:09.719 really honored to have them here tonight. We can't possibly 37 00:02:09.759 --> 00:02:11.280 get to all of it, so we're really not going 38 00:02:11.360 --> 00:02:13.280 to try. We're going to try to focus on Eagle 39 00:02:13.360 --> 00:02:16.560 Class since it is the fortieth anniversary to hear about 40 00:02:16.639 --> 00:02:21.000 Mike's experience there and you know what the legacy is 41 00:02:21.439 --> 00:02:23.960 of that operation all these years later and the impact 42 00:02:24.000 --> 00:02:27.120 it had on special operations. And then we'll take some 43 00:02:27.439 --> 00:02:30.080 questions from the viewers. I think many of you will 44 00:02:30.080 --> 00:02:33.680 probably have questions for Sergeant Major Binding, so we'll try 45 00:02:33.719 --> 00:02:35.680 to get to as many of those as possible. So 46 00:02:36.599 --> 00:02:38.879 Sergeant Major, thank you again for joining us tonight. 47 00:02:39.439 --> 00:02:45.520 Well, thanks Jack, and thanks Dave. Well Eagle cost I 48 00:02:45.520 --> 00:02:49.639 guess it started on four November of nineteen seventy nine 49 00:02:49.719 --> 00:02:53.439 when the US Embassy in Tehran was taken over for 50 00:02:53.479 --> 00:02:57.960 the second time, and this time it was a more 51 00:02:58.039 --> 00:03:03.719 permanent takeover. I was with B Squadron and we were 52 00:03:03.759 --> 00:03:09.639 out in Breckenridge, Colorado during this time, and we were 53 00:03:09.680 --> 00:03:15.840 on a ski trip winter training and skiing at a 54 00:03:15.919 --> 00:03:22.039 Rapahoe Keystone Love One at the time, and when we 55 00:03:22.120 --> 00:03:24.879 got the word that we need to get back to 56 00:03:24.960 --> 00:03:28.759 the unit. So we didn't know what was going on, 57 00:03:29.439 --> 00:03:32.759 So we got in Colorado Springs, took a flight out, 58 00:03:32.919 --> 00:03:37.439 landed at McCall, got picked up at Camp McCall, and 59 00:03:37.520 --> 00:03:41.439 got into the unit. It was briefed that the US 60 00:03:41.479 --> 00:03:45.759 Embassy was taken over, and we started the planning immediately 61 00:03:46.680 --> 00:03:52.240 to retake the embassy. We went into isolation up at 62 00:03:52.280 --> 00:03:59.639 Camp Perry, Virginia, place called the Farm. It was also 63 00:04:00.639 --> 00:04:04.039 like the facilities that we stayed at was were some 64 00:04:04.080 --> 00:04:06.759 of the people that participated in the Bay of Pigs, 65 00:04:06.840 --> 00:04:14.280 the Cuban operation that didn't go so well either. So 66 00:04:14.400 --> 00:04:17.800 we did the training there. We got the embassy layouts. 67 00:04:18.279 --> 00:04:22.240 We had a three D model of the whole embassy compound, 68 00:04:22.279 --> 00:04:26.160 the buildings you could take apart. The Agency built this 69 00:04:26.519 --> 00:04:30.279 model for us. It was like ten foot by ten 70 00:04:30.360 --> 00:04:34.560 foot model of the facility. Then every day we would 71 00:04:34.600 --> 00:04:38.879 go and lay out and use an engineer tape the 72 00:04:39.000 --> 00:04:41.759 layout of the buildings and stuff like that, and go 73 00:04:41.839 --> 00:04:48.079 through the steps and then we'd have to take the 74 00:04:48.120 --> 00:04:52.360 engineer tape down because of any Russian Soviet satellites that 75 00:04:52.399 --> 00:04:56.160 would come over. And that was most of the thing. 76 00:04:56.279 --> 00:04:58.720 We would do all our training and sleep during the day, 77 00:04:58.759 --> 00:05:05.360 do our training at night, and so that was the start. 78 00:05:05.879 --> 00:05:08.759 Then we went out in December time frame. We went 79 00:05:08.839 --> 00:05:12.240 up to Ume approving grounds. They're out in the remote 80 00:05:12.240 --> 00:05:15.399 area where there's this hangar out there and then we 81 00:05:15.439 --> 00:05:20.959 started working with the helicopters out there. Now, these were 82 00:05:21.160 --> 00:05:27.920 the RH fifty three helicopters, and we had Navy crew 83 00:05:28.160 --> 00:05:34.360 that crew these. The RH fifty three D helicopter is 84 00:05:35.120 --> 00:05:39.519 Navy helicopter used for countermining, and what they normally do 85 00:05:39.560 --> 00:05:44.160 is fly during daylight hours. They do a grid pattern search. 86 00:05:44.319 --> 00:05:50.279 They have a some type of sensor that they dragged 87 00:05:50.439 --> 00:05:55.000 in water behind the helicopter to search for these mines, 88 00:05:55.199 --> 00:05:58.279 and so they just do grid patterns. And these are 89 00:05:58.319 --> 00:06:01.399 the crew and pilots that we had. They were not 90 00:06:01.680 --> 00:06:07.560 used to flying desert night time and with night vision goggles, 91 00:06:07.560 --> 00:06:09.240 and that was a totally new experience. 92 00:06:09.399 --> 00:06:11.720 Just to point out real quick, Mike, For some of 93 00:06:11.759 --> 00:06:15.399 our younger viewers, they're thinking, what about one sixtieth the 94 00:06:15.519 --> 00:06:19.120 night Stalkers, What about all those cool helicopters nineteen eighty 95 00:06:19.240 --> 00:06:23.000 That unit did not exist. Those helicopters literally did not exist. 96 00:06:23.439 --> 00:06:28.160 Yeah, that's a good point, Jack. In the US inventory, 97 00:06:29.160 --> 00:06:33.519 the fifty three was the only helicopter that had the 98 00:06:33.560 --> 00:06:37.680 lift capacity and the distance with an internal fuel to 99 00:06:37.759 --> 00:06:40.680 do the mission, to carry the number of people. We 100 00:06:40.720 --> 00:06:43.279 didn't have those CH forty sevens that we could do 101 00:06:43.399 --> 00:06:48.160 aerial refuel and you know, like the late model CH 102 00:06:48.240 --> 00:06:52.399 forty sevens, and so we were stuck with the fifty 103 00:06:52.839 --> 00:06:56.560 fifty threes. Well, we had problems with the Navy crew. 104 00:06:57.279 --> 00:07:03.600 They just couldn't learn fast enough to operate. So they 105 00:07:04.160 --> 00:07:09.639 we got Marine crews Navy helicopters, but this was a 106 00:07:09.680 --> 00:07:14.879 mixed group of airmen from the Marine Corps. These were 107 00:07:14.920 --> 00:07:19.279 not people that worked together. So it was just people 108 00:07:19.319 --> 00:07:23.639 from the various Marine Corps crew members pilots, and then 109 00:07:23.680 --> 00:07:26.240 they had to start to work together as a team. 110 00:07:27.160 --> 00:07:30.680 And we still always had problems with the fifty threes. 111 00:07:31.519 --> 00:07:36.000 They would I don't get lost, they wouldn't land where 112 00:07:36.040 --> 00:07:40.319 we wanted them to land, and just had difficulty with 113 00:07:40.399 --> 00:07:44.319 the fifty threes. And that was always been the issue 114 00:07:44.360 --> 00:07:46.560 we had. And a lot of times we'd be flying 115 00:07:46.600 --> 00:07:50.800 into fifty threes and it's just like while they were learning, 116 00:07:51.000 --> 00:07:54.040 and we just felt like sandbags. We didn't really need 117 00:07:54.120 --> 00:07:56.120 to be in those fifty threes while they were learning 118 00:07:56.160 --> 00:07:58.639 how to fly at night with night vision goggles, but 119 00:07:58.759 --> 00:08:06.120 we were. And so then we went out to Ford, Irwin. 120 00:08:06.439 --> 00:08:12.040 We did a rehearsal lot for Irwin with the aircraft. 121 00:08:12.120 --> 00:08:17.720 The the MC one thirties and the well we used 122 00:08:17.720 --> 00:08:24.279 the MC one thirty models. And we also did exercises 123 00:08:24.319 --> 00:08:29.560 out there at Nevada test site. We set up at 124 00:08:29.639 --> 00:08:33.919 Area twenty five. We set up a wall to assimulate 125 00:08:34.080 --> 00:08:39.919 the embassy wall and we would practice going over the wall. 126 00:08:40.120 --> 00:08:43.320 We would have ladders with ropes on them and we 127 00:08:43.360 --> 00:08:45.360 would put the ladders up, throw the ropes over, and 128 00:08:45.399 --> 00:08:50.039 then hand climb down the knotted ropes. And we did 129 00:08:50.080 --> 00:08:53.120 that every day. We'd put our kid on in practice 130 00:08:53.159 --> 00:08:55.879 going over, putting ladders up and going over the wall. 131 00:08:56.559 --> 00:09:00.159 We even had a wall built and still there in 132 00:09:00.200 --> 00:09:03.600 the old stockade on button A Road at Fort Bragg, 133 00:09:04.519 --> 00:09:06.879 and every day we'd have to go over that wall. 134 00:09:07.840 --> 00:09:10.799 Could you talk a little bit about the kit you 135 00:09:10.840 --> 00:09:15.639 were wearing and as far as rehearsals, your what the 136 00:09:15.679 --> 00:09:17.799 projection was, that, what your role would be, you know, 137 00:09:17.840 --> 00:09:20.279 what building you were going to, what the actions on were. 138 00:09:21.000 --> 00:09:23.360 Because also I think it's interesting that like a lot 139 00:09:23.360 --> 00:09:26.759 of the kit was kind of custom designed for this operation. 140 00:09:27.279 --> 00:09:30.480 Yeah. Well, our vests were each of us made our 141 00:09:30.519 --> 00:09:33.159 own vest. You know, I could sew and we had 142 00:09:33.159 --> 00:09:35.159 a lot of people it could sew and we would 143 00:09:35.200 --> 00:09:38.639 sew up our own vest, customize our vest to fit 144 00:09:38.759 --> 00:09:41.960 whatever kit we were carrying. We would have like a 145 00:09:42.000 --> 00:09:48.320 fourteen everybody carried a fourteen foot sling rope nylon sling rope. 146 00:09:50.600 --> 00:09:55.480 So we basically our uniform was blue jeans, civilian shirt, 147 00:09:56.159 --> 00:09:59.919 and then we all had a dyed green field jacket. 148 00:10:00.519 --> 00:10:04.399 We had American flag that we could expose put on 149 00:10:04.559 --> 00:10:07.759 with velcro on time came so that they would know 150 00:10:07.840 --> 00:10:12.000 that we were Americans. We had watch caps, we had 151 00:10:12.360 --> 00:10:19.039 we grew beards, let her hair grow long, and and 152 00:10:19.039 --> 00:10:22.159 and that's kind of our uniform. And we would have 153 00:10:22.240 --> 00:10:26.679 to practice crawling with on the floor so that we 154 00:10:26.720 --> 00:10:32.279 wouldn't make any noise. Everything had dummy cords tied to 155 00:10:32.360 --> 00:10:36.879 it so we wouldn't lose it. We had three elements. 156 00:10:36.919 --> 00:10:42.480 The delta had we had a white, red, and blue element. 157 00:10:43.279 --> 00:10:47.200 The red element was a squadron, The white element I 158 00:10:47.360 --> 00:10:50.480 was in was was B squadron. And we had a 159 00:10:50.480 --> 00:10:55.600 blue element which was the sniper observers support. 160 00:10:56.159 --> 00:11:02.639 Element, and and and then we divided up the different 161 00:11:02.720 --> 00:11:08.120 things for the For the white element, one of our 162 00:11:08.240 --> 00:11:14.519 areas was the ambassador residence, and so my team once. 163 00:11:14.320 --> 00:11:18.679 We went over the wall. We would approach the ambassador's residence, 164 00:11:19.559 --> 00:11:22.320 go through the kitchen door, and then there was a 165 00:11:22.360 --> 00:11:26.200 stairway since we entered the kitchen, we would stairway led 166 00:11:26.320 --> 00:11:31.279 up to the second floor and we would my team 167 00:11:31.559 --> 00:11:34.559 that I was a four man team. Bill Zumont was 168 00:11:34.600 --> 00:11:38.480 the team leader. We would clear the second floor of 169 00:11:38.519 --> 00:11:43.120 the ambassador's residence and once that we felt that there 170 00:11:43.200 --> 00:11:48.159 was hostages there. And then once that was cleared, Bill 171 00:11:48.200 --> 00:11:49.960 and I would go up to the roof of the 172 00:11:50.000 --> 00:11:55.080 Ambassador's residence and we had like one hundred and twenty 173 00:11:55.080 --> 00:11:59.279 foot now on rope that we would throw over the 174 00:11:58.919 --> 00:12:04.440 the Bill and then Bucky Burriss, Lieutenant Colonel Burris, was 175 00:12:04.480 --> 00:12:09.360 down at the bottom and people that had seventy two's laws. 176 00:12:10.200 --> 00:12:14.360 We dropped those off there and we would then tie 177 00:12:14.399 --> 00:12:16.159 them to our rope and we'd pull them up on 178 00:12:16.279 --> 00:12:19.559 roof and we build and I would overwatch the main 179 00:12:19.639 --> 00:12:23.000 gate in case anybody came in through the main gate 180 00:12:23.960 --> 00:12:29.639 with the laws. The chancery was another area where hostages 181 00:12:29.720 --> 00:12:33.840 were that was the red element. There was a building 182 00:12:33.879 --> 00:12:37.159 called the warehouse called the mushroom. We believed there was 183 00:12:37.240 --> 00:12:40.440 hostages in those areas, so those are some of there. 184 00:12:40.519 --> 00:12:45.679 It was a big compound. Mike, how old? How old 185 00:12:45.720 --> 00:12:50.080 was Delta at this point in time? How old was Delta? 186 00:12:50.240 --> 00:12:59.360 We so we became activated just I would say just 187 00:12:59.399 --> 00:13:05.000 a few We were only a few months activated. Delta 188 00:13:05.039 --> 00:13:11.080 Form started going together in October of nineteen seventy seven. 189 00:13:12.279 --> 00:13:16.240 I got there in February of seventy eight, So but 190 00:13:16.480 --> 00:13:19.080 we did not you know, we had There was another 191 00:13:19.080 --> 00:13:22.559 element with Fifth Special Forces. It was called Blue Light. Now, 192 00:13:23.480 --> 00:13:26.360 back then, the news media and a lot of people 193 00:13:26.399 --> 00:13:29.120 even today do not know the difference. They think blue 194 00:13:29.200 --> 00:13:33.360 Light and Delta is the same thing. But blue Light 195 00:13:33.559 --> 00:13:36.559 was set up with Fifth Group guys as an interim 196 00:13:36.679 --> 00:13:40.600 rescue force until we stood up, And then once we 197 00:13:40.639 --> 00:13:44.399 stood up, blue Light then went down. Some of the 198 00:13:44.440 --> 00:13:48.879 Blue Light people then went through our selection course and 199 00:13:48.960 --> 00:13:53.960 came into the unit. So we had several Blue Light members. 200 00:13:53.960 --> 00:13:57.159 But blue Light and Delta was two different or weren't they? 201 00:13:57.440 --> 00:13:58.799 Weren't they somewhat? 202 00:13:59.279 --> 00:14:01.759 I heard they were somewhat competitive at one point in 203 00:14:01.799 --> 00:14:04.919 time where it was a question of who who was 204 00:14:04.960 --> 00:14:05.840 going to stick around? 205 00:14:05.960 --> 00:14:09.600 Or is that accurate? Or no, Jack, you want me, 206 00:14:09.840 --> 00:14:10.519 you want to answer it? 207 00:14:10.559 --> 00:14:13.320 You want me I mean, I just based on my 208 00:14:13.399 --> 00:14:17.360 interviews with Blue Light members, Uh, they were a stop gap. 209 00:14:17.480 --> 00:14:21.559 They were never going to fill that role. So but 210 00:14:21.679 --> 00:14:24.000 the members, they did feel competitive, like it was a 211 00:14:24.039 --> 00:14:27.840 competition between this new these new upstarts in Delta Force 212 00:14:28.240 --> 00:14:30.879 and these Blue Light guys who and honestly many of 213 00:14:30.919 --> 00:14:34.879 those Blue Light guys were macbe soag Mike for SUTA Raiders. 214 00:14:35.159 --> 00:14:37.039 I mean they were real guys, they were the real deals. 215 00:14:37.120 --> 00:14:39.919 So they did feel like it was very competitive. But 216 00:14:40.000 --> 00:14:42.240 Blue Light was never going to be the permanent c 217 00:14:42.440 --> 00:14:43.200 T unit. 218 00:14:43.399 --> 00:14:46.399 Now, but I think they had visions that they may 219 00:14:47.039 --> 00:14:54.399 right there, and then a lot of them beckw went 220 00:14:54.440 --> 00:14:57.480 and talked to them about coming once they were standing 221 00:14:57.519 --> 00:15:00.600 down to come over it, and a lot didn't think 222 00:15:00.639 --> 00:15:03.639 they would have to go through the selection process that 223 00:15:03.679 --> 00:15:06.759 they should just be able to go into because of 224 00:15:07.000 --> 00:15:11.399 their background their history. But everybody had to go through selection. 225 00:15:12.279 --> 00:15:16.759 So was Blue Lights still around when when the whole 226 00:15:16.879 --> 00:15:22.759 Iran Iran hostage thing kicked off. Yeah, they were still 227 00:15:24.000 --> 00:15:27.720 I would say, yeah, I don't know exactly when they 228 00:15:27.759 --> 00:15:30.879 were deactivated, but I think they thought that they would 229 00:15:30.960 --> 00:15:34.440 have a part in the mission, right. 230 00:15:34.159 --> 00:15:37.200 But so so Delta was new, so it was all 231 00:15:37.279 --> 00:15:39.399 it was all very conceptual at that point in time. 232 00:15:40.159 --> 00:15:42.759 What was was this. 233 00:15:42.840 --> 00:15:48.000 Hostage rescue mission something that had sort of been not 234 00:15:48.000 --> 00:15:51.879 not obviously not in Iran, but but had this how. 235 00:15:51.759 --> 00:15:53.559 Do you how do you trained for this? Prior? 236 00:15:53.799 --> 00:15:56.159 Was this part of the concept of of what Delta 237 00:15:56.200 --> 00:15:57.279 would be when it stood up. 238 00:15:57.799 --> 00:16:02.360 Well, we had one uncle classified mission and that was 239 00:16:02.840 --> 00:16:09.399 that was POW rescue uh. And there was always felt 240 00:16:09.399 --> 00:16:15.000 that there were maybe people held in Laos, North Vietnam 241 00:16:15.720 --> 00:16:20.639 still from the Vietnam War. So our unofficial thing was 242 00:16:20.759 --> 00:16:25.759 like a Sante type mission. That was our unclassified mission. 243 00:16:26.080 --> 00:16:30.159 Other things, this is the all the terrace hijacking airliners 244 00:16:30.240 --> 00:16:33.519 and take buildings and stuff. And that's what we practice 245 00:16:33.559 --> 00:16:41.200 on was hostage rescue against terrorists in buildings, trains, buses, 246 00:16:42.240 --> 00:16:45.440 uh and that kind of stuff. We even brought it. 247 00:16:45.519 --> 00:16:50.600 We brought a train in and practice on trains there 248 00:16:50.600 --> 00:16:51.360 at Fort. 249 00:16:51.120 --> 00:16:55.159 Bragg For the younger viewers, like the seventies was was 250 00:16:55.200 --> 00:16:58.039 a hotspot of like when we thought of terrorism in 251 00:16:58.080 --> 00:17:01.559 the seventies, it was it was general like aircraft hijackings 252 00:17:01.679 --> 00:17:03.279 and things, you know, uh. 253 00:17:03.799 --> 00:17:05.279 You know train you know that. 254 00:17:05.200 --> 00:17:10.119 They would take over something and demand, you know, or 255 00:17:10.519 --> 00:17:13.319 take over a vehicle that political demands. 256 00:17:13.599 --> 00:17:17.960 Yeah. Right, And then we had different scenarios that these 257 00:17:18.319 --> 00:17:22.119 missions would be in whether they be permissive, that we 258 00:17:22.160 --> 00:17:25.880 would have the permission from the government to go in 259 00:17:25.960 --> 00:17:29.640 and do that hostage rescue, they'd be semi permissive. I 260 00:17:29.640 --> 00:17:32.680 don't know exactly what you call semi permissive. But then 261 00:17:32.720 --> 00:17:37.079 there was non permissive and and you know, we really 262 00:17:37.079 --> 00:17:40.759 didn't think we would have a non permissive mission. And 263 00:17:40.799 --> 00:17:44.599 of course the hostage rescue in Tehran was a non 264 00:17:44.680 --> 00:17:50.039 permissive mission, and it was just difficult. You know, a 265 00:17:50.039 --> 00:17:53.319 lot of people compare try to do comparisons between what 266 00:17:53.359 --> 00:18:00.240 the Israelis did it in in Tebbi Uganda, but we 267 00:18:00.480 --> 00:18:04.960 we had more. It was just much more difficult on 268 00:18:05.000 --> 00:18:10.279 a skill than the type mission. So how long did 269 00:18:10.319 --> 00:18:12.440 it take? How long did it take? 270 00:18:12.519 --> 00:18:15.000 Because you're right, because and Temmy, what was kind of 271 00:18:15.000 --> 00:18:17.359 a it was permission and I'm right where the Israelis 272 00:18:17.559 --> 00:18:19.200 went in there with the permission. 273 00:18:18.720 --> 00:18:21.720 On the No, they didn't, I'm sure they know. They 274 00:18:22.000 --> 00:18:26.400 they flew in landed. They they had uh some Lemo 275 00:18:26.519 --> 00:18:29.359 cars that like ed I mean, would you know, so 276 00:18:29.400 --> 00:18:31.480 they didn't know what was going on, whether it was 277 00:18:31.720 --> 00:18:35.960 ed I mean coming in there or what. So, yeah, 278 00:18:36.000 --> 00:18:36.319 it was. 279 00:18:37.480 --> 00:18:40.359 It was much more streamlined in the sense that they 280 00:18:40.400 --> 00:18:42.680 flew like what like one or two C one thirties 281 00:18:42.720 --> 00:18:46.200 down the Red Sea, turned into Uganda, landed did the 282 00:18:46.240 --> 00:18:49.039 operation and the mission you guys planned, I mean maybe 283 00:18:49.119 --> 00:18:52.119 and talk about it like the scheme of maneuver developed 284 00:18:52.119 --> 00:18:55.079 throughout planning. Eagle Club was very complicated. 285 00:18:55.319 --> 00:19:00.799 Yeah, because Yeah, so we picked out a desert one 286 00:19:00.960 --> 00:19:03.599 site that would be a refill site, and we'd looked 287 00:19:03.599 --> 00:19:08.240 at different scenarios in how to refill these helicopters. One 288 00:19:08.279 --> 00:19:12.240 was doing an aerial drop with fuel bladders that didn't 289 00:19:12.279 --> 00:19:15.680 we did test on that and like some of the 290 00:19:15.720 --> 00:19:20.519 parachutes didn't open and the bladders hit and exploded, and 291 00:19:22.000 --> 00:19:25.480 so it was that we decided to have three MC 292 00:19:25.559 --> 00:19:31.279 one thirties lead in, followed by three EC one thirties, 293 00:19:31.920 --> 00:19:37.240 which is a command electronics bird that has an electronics 294 00:19:37.319 --> 00:19:39.559 module in there, but we just took he took that 295 00:19:39.680 --> 00:19:42.160 out and then you put in a three thousand or 296 00:19:42.319 --> 00:19:46.680 three thousand and five thousand gallon JP five fuel bladder. 297 00:19:46.759 --> 00:19:51.119 So it was like a giant WATERBD inside of the 298 00:19:51.160 --> 00:19:54.680 EC one thirty, so we had those who come in there, 299 00:19:55.000 --> 00:19:57.759 and then we would have the eight helicopters come in 300 00:19:57.799 --> 00:20:03.440 from the aircraft, carry the nimics and fly into the 301 00:20:03.440 --> 00:20:10.200 Desert one site. We would refill the helicopters. The EC's 302 00:20:10.240 --> 00:20:13.160 and mcs would take off back. They go to Oman 303 00:20:13.480 --> 00:20:19.319 Masorea in Oman and wait for us, and then we 304 00:20:19.359 --> 00:20:22.039 would take After the helicopters are fueled off, we'd go 305 00:20:22.079 --> 00:20:25.319 to a Desert two site hide site. There was a 306 00:20:25.359 --> 00:20:28.200 warehouse that would they would put us up into. The 307 00:20:28.240 --> 00:20:31.039 helicopters would go someplace else and we just put camel 308 00:20:31.160 --> 00:20:33.799 net up there and we'd wait during the next day 309 00:20:33.920 --> 00:20:38.279 like hours there. Then the following night trucks would come 310 00:20:38.319 --> 00:20:42.000 in that had already been arranged. Dick Meadows and his 311 00:20:42.119 --> 00:20:45.480 group had trucks that were already in there. They would 312 00:20:45.519 --> 00:20:47.880 come and pick us up and we take these trucks 313 00:20:48.079 --> 00:20:52.480 to the embassy. While we're doing that, the rangers are 314 00:20:52.480 --> 00:20:58.799 coming in. Then they're taking an airfield and so then 315 00:20:58.880 --> 00:21:01.319 when we get the hospit, we take them over to 316 00:21:01.359 --> 00:21:07.119 the Stadium soccer stadium across the Roosevelt Road, and once 317 00:21:07.160 --> 00:21:11.240 we got on that we go to the Ranger airfield 318 00:21:12.000 --> 00:21:15.920 and then get onto the fixed wing aircraft and go 319 00:21:15.960 --> 00:21:19.400 on go on out with the hostages. So it was 320 00:21:19.440 --> 00:21:22.960 a two night operation inside of Iran. 321 00:21:25.920 --> 00:21:28.599 And could you speak a little bit to the to 322 00:21:28.680 --> 00:21:32.240 the intelligence piece and how that developed as this operation 323 00:21:32.400 --> 00:21:34.480 went on. I mean, I think wade Ishi Moto was 324 00:21:34.519 --> 00:21:36.880 the chief intel officer for the unit at the time. 325 00:21:38.279 --> 00:21:40.720 But as I think we've also talked about in the past, 326 00:21:40.880 --> 00:21:44.480 there was a problem with getting reliable information out of Teurin. 327 00:21:45.440 --> 00:21:52.039 Yeah. Well, the CIA people that were part of the 328 00:21:52.039 --> 00:21:56.880 embassy were trapped. We're now hostages. We really didn't have 329 00:21:57.000 --> 00:22:00.680 any country, any in country assets that we were getting 330 00:22:00.720 --> 00:22:09.920 intelligence from because they were now hostages. So there was 331 00:22:10.000 --> 00:22:13.640 a lot of you know, that was a big lack 332 00:22:13.680 --> 00:22:20.400 of intelligence. That was a big failure. Another thing was 333 00:22:20.480 --> 00:22:26.200 the weather conditions at this time of year. You know, 334 00:22:26.359 --> 00:22:33.519 I've experienced the dust storms, the haboos, and somehow I 335 00:22:33.559 --> 00:22:36.960 don't know, that piece of the puzzle got really the 336 00:22:36.960 --> 00:22:41.359 weather part got really explained to the weather conditions to 337 00:22:41.599 --> 00:22:45.720 the Marines and what to do if they run into 338 00:22:45.799 --> 00:22:49.839 a dust storm. So when we ran into the dust storm, 339 00:22:49.960 --> 00:22:52.759 I was on the lead MC one thirty when we 340 00:22:52.839 --> 00:22:57.119 ran into the dust doorm. The the fixed wings all 341 00:22:57.160 --> 00:23:00.359 flew on top of the dust storm. We were gonna 342 00:23:00.640 --> 00:23:05.079 fly low because there was Iran. Iran had some radar. 343 00:23:05.279 --> 00:23:08.519 We knew where their radar was. We was also worried 344 00:23:08.519 --> 00:23:12.680 about getting picked up by the Soviets the Russians uh, 345 00:23:12.720 --> 00:23:16.039 and that they would tip off Iran that we were coming. 346 00:23:16.519 --> 00:23:18.279 So we were going to plant. They were going to 347 00:23:18.319 --> 00:23:22.559 fly in low nap of the earth. But dust storms 348 00:23:22.680 --> 00:23:28.640 obscure radar and so you so, what the helicopters should 349 00:23:28.640 --> 00:23:31.359 have done when they encountered the dust storm is just 350 00:23:31.440 --> 00:23:34.559 try to get above the dust dorm and keep keep booking. 351 00:23:34.599 --> 00:23:38.680 But they just kept flying through that, and they flew 352 00:23:38.720 --> 00:23:44.119 through two dust storms and they that was pretty tough 353 00:23:44.160 --> 00:23:47.880 on them. And we did not have any communications with 354 00:23:47.960 --> 00:23:52.920 the helicopters because we were all, you know, radio silence, 355 00:23:53.079 --> 00:23:56.759 But we did have satcom radios and the helicopters had 356 00:23:57.160 --> 00:24:01.880 sacked secure satcom radios. But back then, in order for 357 00:24:01.920 --> 00:24:04.839 them to use the sackcom they would have had to 358 00:24:04.960 --> 00:24:09.200 land the helicopter, set the radio up and you get 359 00:24:09.240 --> 00:24:13.119 the antenna the right Asthmas and nang all that and 360 00:24:13.240 --> 00:24:17.200 then talk to us. They did not have it mobile 361 00:24:17.279 --> 00:24:22.160 on the aircraft, so they did carry I think a 362 00:24:22.160 --> 00:24:28.319 few of the helicopters did carry U Satcom Radio one. 363 00:24:28.640 --> 00:24:31.680 You want me to go when to desert one and 364 00:24:31.839 --> 00:24:35.400 when we land landed and seen all the headlights. 365 00:24:35.759 --> 00:24:39.880 I would But I would also like to ask, of course, 366 00:24:39.880 --> 00:24:41.759 if this is a loaded question, you know, Mike, was 367 00:24:41.799 --> 00:24:45.559 there ever a full mission rehearsal that brought all the 368 00:24:45.599 --> 00:24:48.960 elements together before you guys kicked off the mission in April. 369 00:24:49.960 --> 00:24:53.759 We never had a full mission rehearsal. One reason that 370 00:24:54.039 --> 00:24:59.680 was I heard was because of operational security. We just 371 00:24:59.799 --> 00:25:04.880 did pieces of the mission and and that was probably 372 00:25:04.880 --> 00:25:11.680 a big failure. But there was never a full rehearsal 373 00:25:11.759 --> 00:25:17.759 with everything. Yeah, that was that was somebody's judgment call. 374 00:25:18.519 --> 00:25:22.720 There Another little interesting sidebar that I don't think many 375 00:25:22.720 --> 00:25:25.319 people are aware of is that dead A had a 376 00:25:25.359 --> 00:25:28.440 small presence also on the mission. 377 00:25:28.799 --> 00:25:34.400 Right the Berlin detachment. Dead A beck With just wanted 378 00:25:34.599 --> 00:25:39.000 our group to focus on the embassy. Uh there was 379 00:25:41.160 --> 00:25:43.960 I mean was there three others that were held over 380 00:25:44.000 --> 00:25:48.480 there at the chancel the m f A. Yeah, yeah, 381 00:25:48.880 --> 00:25:53.960 And so that was given to dead A people and 382 00:25:55.119 --> 00:26:00.240 they had. They were carrying MP fives and we were 383 00:26:00.279 --> 00:26:05.359 all carrying CAR fifteens, so that that piece was given 384 00:26:05.400 --> 00:26:11.240 to them and they had some suppressed MP five's two 385 00:26:12.839 --> 00:26:17.400 and so yeah, our mission was just focused on the embassy, 386 00:26:17.720 --> 00:26:20.839 so there was another those other guys that were over 387 00:26:20.880 --> 00:26:22.000 there at the other place. 388 00:26:24.240 --> 00:26:27.359 And so then what happened when the unit got spun 389 00:26:27.480 --> 00:26:30.759 up and they said this is going forward and you 390 00:26:30.839 --> 00:26:34.839 guys launched. I think the first location was Egypt, Yeah, 391 00:26:34.960 --> 00:26:40.359 we are. We flew into Watakenya, Egypt, which was an. 392 00:26:40.240 --> 00:26:47.599 Old Soviet base had had hangars for meg aircraft and 393 00:26:47.680 --> 00:26:52.279 it was in pretty bad shape the so but we 394 00:26:52.319 --> 00:26:55.640 took it over and so that was our staging area 395 00:26:55.680 --> 00:27:00.000 to get everybody flew into there. And then that'd because 396 00:27:00.279 --> 00:27:04.200 your is B intermit staging area and our forward staging 397 00:27:04.279 --> 00:27:11.240 by base was in mass Area, Oman and it's an 398 00:27:11.240 --> 00:27:15.960 island and the Brits had a base air base on 399 00:27:16.400 --> 00:27:20.640 there that we took over or shared with the Brits 400 00:27:21.240 --> 00:27:23.880 and then from there's where we launched. So we took 401 00:27:23.960 --> 00:27:27.960 CE one forty one to Mass Area and then from 402 00:27:27.960 --> 00:27:36.160 there we picked up our one thirties and so that 403 00:27:36.400 --> 00:27:38.759 was it. Then we launched. 404 00:27:39.319 --> 00:27:39.440 Uh. 405 00:27:40.720 --> 00:27:44.720 And when we got to Desert one, the Desert One site, 406 00:27:44.759 --> 00:27:48.039 there was headlights down on the road. This road was 407 00:27:48.079 --> 00:27:51.160 supposed to be a dirt road, that it was dirt 408 00:27:51.240 --> 00:27:58.759 road that very little travel on it, and but then 409 00:27:58.839 --> 00:28:01.880 we saw a head lights down below. So we actually 410 00:28:01.880 --> 00:28:04.960 had to circle a few times before we did land. 411 00:28:05.480 --> 00:28:08.839 As soon as we landed, opened up the ramp and everything. 412 00:28:09.279 --> 00:28:11.839 Here we see a pair of headlights coming down the 413 00:28:11.920 --> 00:28:15.680 road and beck With says stop. It was a bus 414 00:28:15.759 --> 00:28:20.359 and said it says stop that bus. So one of 415 00:28:20.440 --> 00:28:24.480 the somebody fired a forty milimeter in front of the 416 00:28:24.519 --> 00:28:27.839 bus and the bus stopped and the next thing you know, 417 00:28:28.640 --> 00:28:33.000 there's forty four Iranians on there. So we had forty 418 00:28:33.039 --> 00:28:38.799 four Iranian detainees. I just learned that they were everybody 419 00:28:38.839 --> 00:28:42.799 on that bus was actually related to each other they 420 00:28:42.880 --> 00:28:47.000 and I just learned this recently. Was that a family reunion? Yeah, 421 00:28:47.000 --> 00:28:49.799 that's what they were going to, is a family event. 422 00:28:50.359 --> 00:28:50.720 Uh. 423 00:28:50.759 --> 00:28:53.359 And they were traveled from one city to another city, 424 00:28:53.440 --> 00:28:56.799 and so they were all So once they stopped the bus, 425 00:28:57.079 --> 00:28:59.599 we got everybody off there had to go through their 426 00:28:59.640 --> 00:29:02.640 bag to make sure that nothing there was nothing that 427 00:29:03.079 --> 00:29:05.920 they carrying they could be a threat to us. And 428 00:29:06.000 --> 00:29:08.359 so for a while then our team and a couple 429 00:29:08.400 --> 00:29:12.400 of other teams, we were guarding these detainees because you know, 430 00:29:12.440 --> 00:29:16.920 as Americans, we do not take hostages. We we just 431 00:29:17.200 --> 00:29:20.559 detained people for a period of time. So they were detainees, 432 00:29:20.640 --> 00:29:25.319 not so we had forty four of our own, and 433 00:29:25.359 --> 00:29:30.599 I can they were just they were just scared. Aircraft 434 00:29:30.599 --> 00:29:34.960 were landing, people were walking by, and it just to them, 435 00:29:35.039 --> 00:29:37.839 I don't know what was going they thought was happening. 436 00:29:37.920 --> 00:29:42.039 And then yeah, well then down the road comes to 437 00:29:42.079 --> 00:29:45.160 this fuel truck, and so the ranger, the road ish 438 00:29:45.240 --> 00:29:48.839 and the ranger roadblock team went out there and they 439 00:29:49.039 --> 00:29:52.440 fired a couple few rounds in the radiator of the 440 00:29:52.480 --> 00:29:55.519 fuel truck and then one of the rangers shot along 441 00:29:56.640 --> 00:29:59.440 and that hit underneath the fuel truck and caught the 442 00:29:59.480 --> 00:30:02.319 fuel truck on fire. So that's the field truck sat 443 00:30:02.359 --> 00:30:07.799 there burning. The guy in the oil tanker truck he 444 00:30:07.880 --> 00:30:11.079 got out and ran into a vehicle that was behind him, 445 00:30:11.079 --> 00:30:14.279 and then they took off. So now we got a 446 00:30:15.440 --> 00:30:18.400 bus with forty four people, we got a fuel truck 447 00:30:18.640 --> 00:30:24.440 that's burning, and the final they then eventually the fueld 448 00:30:24.440 --> 00:30:29.279 truck explodes and it's a big, huge firebone in the dark, 449 00:30:29.799 --> 00:30:33.319 mid dark sky and just lights up the whole area. 450 00:30:34.279 --> 00:30:38.359 And then the other airs, some of the aircraft that 451 00:30:38.400 --> 00:30:40.680 were coming in when the fuel truck was burning, that 452 00:30:40.880 --> 00:30:45.279 was affecting their night vision goggles. And then finally the 453 00:30:45.319 --> 00:30:48.920 helicopters seeing a fuel truck on fire, so the helicopters 454 00:30:48.920 --> 00:30:52.480 started landing, and of course they were like forty least 455 00:30:52.559 --> 00:30:59.759 forty five minutes light landing there, and of the eight helicopters, 456 00:31:00.200 --> 00:31:02.480 we only got six on the ground, and the sixth 457 00:31:02.640 --> 00:31:05.960 is the minimum that we had determined to do the mission. 458 00:31:07.000 --> 00:31:11.559 One helicopter turned back to the mnemens. Another helicopter was 459 00:31:11.599 --> 00:31:14.319 a band It had a blade indicator light came on, 460 00:31:14.839 --> 00:31:19.279 so they abandoned that helicopter, and then another helicopter landed 461 00:31:19.319 --> 00:31:23.279 and that crew jumped down to that. So there was 462 00:31:23.319 --> 00:31:27.000 only six helicopters that arrived there. The one that turned 463 00:31:27.039 --> 00:31:31.039 back was having some kind of problems with heat overheat, 464 00:31:31.119 --> 00:31:36.480 something was overheating, so now we have six there, and 465 00:31:36.519 --> 00:31:40.279 then they find out that the one of the helicopters 466 00:31:40.319 --> 00:31:46.359 has a hydraulic some kind of hydraulic issue. Which is 467 00:31:46.559 --> 00:31:51.319 a that's it, you know, it's grounded. So it was made. 468 00:31:51.319 --> 00:31:55.880 The determination was made that now we only have five helicopters, 469 00:31:56.759 --> 00:32:01.240 which is not enough to do the mission is at 470 00:32:01.240 --> 00:32:05.200 that point, it was determined that because we said we 471 00:32:05.319 --> 00:32:10.440 needed six, and the thing is, we also estimated we 472 00:32:10.480 --> 00:32:14.519 could have lost another helicopter at the hide site, like 473 00:32:14.599 --> 00:32:17.319 the next night when they would start the helicopters up 474 00:32:17.480 --> 00:32:21.000 for some reason, one won't start up. Then we'd be 475 00:32:21.079 --> 00:32:25.559 down to four helicopters, so that we would have had 476 00:32:25.599 --> 00:32:29.920 to leave some of our rescue force behind to get 477 00:32:29.920 --> 00:32:33.160 the hostages out. And that was. 478 00:32:33.680 --> 00:32:36.119 Colonel Beckwith had to make a pretty difficult decision at 479 00:32:36.160 --> 00:32:36.720 that point. 480 00:32:37.000 --> 00:32:39.799 Right of course Carter went along with it. It was 481 00:32:39.839 --> 00:32:44.519 the criteria, you needed six and mission would be a 482 00:32:44.559 --> 00:32:47.839 boart at five, and that's what it was. So but 483 00:32:48.039 --> 00:32:52.119 now you know, trying to get all the stuff around 484 00:32:52.960 --> 00:32:56.720 the fix wing, now we're running very low on Phiel. 485 00:32:56.960 --> 00:33:01.079 They had the fixed wing aircraft needed to leave. The 486 00:33:01.200 --> 00:33:06.279 helicopters had all been refueled. So what so we got 487 00:33:06.319 --> 00:33:09.000 into one of these EC one thirties, I think it's 488 00:33:09.079 --> 00:33:14.680 EC one thirty number five, and and we get in 489 00:33:14.720 --> 00:33:19.079 there and we're we're heading back. We're gonna The plan 490 00:33:19.319 --> 00:33:21.960 was that maybe we could restart the mission in forty 491 00:33:22.000 --> 00:33:26.240 eight hours. We would take the we would take the 492 00:33:26.279 --> 00:33:31.200 Iranians that we have with us, and you know, later on, 493 00:33:32.960 --> 00:33:35.880 you know, get they get find their way back to Iran, 494 00:33:37.079 --> 00:33:39.680 but we would take up everybody with us and we 495 00:33:39.720 --> 00:33:43.440 would try to do the mission again. So what they 496 00:33:43.519 --> 00:33:47.680 needed to do was the two helicopters was behind our aircraft. 497 00:33:47.960 --> 00:33:51.160 They needed to move them. But the one helicopter that 498 00:33:51.400 --> 00:33:57.240 was to our left rear behind us. When it landed, 499 00:33:57.640 --> 00:34:02.319 it landed hard. It had flattenous, so it could not 500 00:34:02.920 --> 00:34:07.359 it could not move on its wheels, so it had 501 00:34:07.599 --> 00:34:11.800 so the CCT CCT guy had to tell it to 502 00:34:12.239 --> 00:34:14.679 because we were our prop wash was blowing dust on 503 00:34:14.719 --> 00:34:18.360 these two helicopters. We wanted to take off, so the 504 00:34:18.360 --> 00:34:23.639 CCT directed that helicopter to leave to reposition. Well, when 505 00:34:23.639 --> 00:34:27.039 it took off, it kicked up dust. The pilot got 506 00:34:27.199 --> 00:34:31.639 vertigo and he came around and he ran into our 507 00:34:32.880 --> 00:34:39.599 front left side and crashed into us. And we were 508 00:34:39.639 --> 00:34:42.760 inside the helicopter, I mean inside the aircraft. I was 509 00:34:42.840 --> 00:34:46.599 up near the front of the aircraft and some of 510 00:34:46.599 --> 00:34:48.960 the guys had took We had taken off all of 511 00:34:49.000 --> 00:34:53.360 our equipment. I had a besides, I was carrying a 512 00:34:53.360 --> 00:34:55.960 five gallon water can on my back. I had a 513 00:34:56.039 --> 00:34:59.440 rucksack frame with a five gallon and so I took 514 00:34:59.519 --> 00:35:02.800 my kavlar off and put it on top of the 515 00:35:03.000 --> 00:35:06.880 five gallon water can, and then we all carried We 516 00:35:06.920 --> 00:35:10.159 had everybody had E and E kits and sewed into 517 00:35:10.280 --> 00:35:14.440 our jackets with maps and everything. We had ten thousand 518 00:35:14.480 --> 00:35:17.760 everybody was carrying ten thousand dollars. I had five thousand 519 00:35:17.880 --> 00:35:22.000 dollars in Iranian money and five thousand dollars in US money. 520 00:35:23.239 --> 00:35:25.519 And so but where I'm going to carry I put 521 00:35:25.559 --> 00:35:30.840 it between the my kavlar, the different parts of my cavlar. 522 00:35:30.880 --> 00:35:35.239 I had my money stuffed in there. But then when 523 00:35:35.239 --> 00:35:39.000 the helicopter crashed into us, the rotor blades cut into 524 00:35:39.079 --> 00:35:44.519 the top of the fuselage. But we didn't have a 525 00:35:44.559 --> 00:35:46.800 clue what was going on. What was that? And the 526 00:35:46.800 --> 00:35:49.400 next thing I knew, there was like this rocking motion 527 00:35:50.000 --> 00:35:56.159 as we rocked, and then there was an explosion and 528 00:35:56.239 --> 00:36:01.679 the left front cockpit door blows in, just boom and 529 00:36:01.719 --> 00:36:05.800 nothing but fire flames just come in what happened was 530 00:36:05.840 --> 00:36:09.320 the internal fuel tank on that RH fifty three D 531 00:36:09.760 --> 00:36:16.639 had ruptured, and the pilot and co pilot of the 532 00:36:16.719 --> 00:36:21.360 fifty three actually made it out of their helicopter through 533 00:36:21.440 --> 00:36:25.440 their cockpit windows, but they were burned pretty bad. They 534 00:36:25.480 --> 00:36:28.719 had up to third degree burns. They had inhaled this 535 00:36:28.920 --> 00:36:33.920 hot gas and fumes, and so they crawled out from 536 00:36:33.920 --> 00:36:38.320 their helicopters. But the three marine crewmen were trapped inside 537 00:36:38.400 --> 00:36:43.519 the back of the helicopter and they perished. And then 538 00:36:43.840 --> 00:36:48.199 in the front of our cockpit, the five crewmen up 539 00:36:48.239 --> 00:36:50.719 at the Air Force up in the front, they were 540 00:36:50.760 --> 00:36:55.599 trapped in there and they all were killed and saw 541 00:36:55.719 --> 00:37:00.039 this fire. Just flames came in. So one of the 542 00:37:00.079 --> 00:37:05.639 airmen crew members tried to open the left rear paratrooper door, 543 00:37:06.800 --> 00:37:10.199 that's the side that the helicopter crashed on. When he 544 00:37:10.280 --> 00:37:12.400 opened the door, cracked it a little bit. There was 545 00:37:12.440 --> 00:37:16.880 nothing but flames there. So he shuts the door and 546 00:37:16.920 --> 00:37:19.800 then they opened up the right rear paratrooper door, and 547 00:37:20.079 --> 00:37:24.199 the flames are intermediate. There's flames and then there's not flames. 548 00:37:24.719 --> 00:37:28.000 When they cracked. When that helicopter crashed into us, the 549 00:37:28.079 --> 00:37:31.039 observers on the ground that were watching this whole thing. 550 00:37:32.960 --> 00:37:37.000 That fireball completely engulfed our aircraft and they thought that 551 00:37:38.000 --> 00:37:41.760 everything was gone to the observers on the ground, and 552 00:37:41.840 --> 00:37:46.280 so we just started bailing out of that right rear 553 00:37:46.320 --> 00:37:51.960 paratrooper door. Somebody hollered, don't panic. I thought it was 554 00:37:52.880 --> 00:37:56.400 Dave Cheney, that Sergeant Major Cheney that hollered at, but 555 00:37:56.960 --> 00:38:01.440 maybe one of the air force LoadMasters said that. But anyway, 556 00:38:01.679 --> 00:38:04.760 just people were not no panic, just getting on out. 557 00:38:05.480 --> 00:38:08.679 And you're on this giant fuel bladder that you're bouncing 558 00:38:08.800 --> 00:38:13.639 up and down. I remember Chris Abel stood up and 559 00:38:13.679 --> 00:38:17.440 he says hall Assnick saying, I know he's flat on 560 00:38:17.519 --> 00:38:21.320 his face down, he's on the ground on the fuel bladder. 561 00:38:22.079 --> 00:38:25.079 And it just was difficult. And then you could hear 562 00:38:25.239 --> 00:38:30.679 small arms start cooking off, just popping off inside the aircraft. 563 00:38:30.840 --> 00:38:33.760 And then when I didn't think I would make the door, 564 00:38:34.000 --> 00:38:37.960 I thought it was impossible because the flames are still 565 00:38:38.000 --> 00:38:41.760 coming towards you. There's flames inside the aircraft and we 566 00:38:41.840 --> 00:38:47.039 were on the giant fuel bladder and I thought, I said, 567 00:38:47.079 --> 00:38:50.519 oh God, is this how it's going to end? You know, 568 00:38:50.639 --> 00:38:54.280 because I just thought that I only had seconds to 569 00:38:54.599 --> 00:38:58.679 live that I didn't make the door, and then when 570 00:38:58.719 --> 00:39:02.079 I got to the door, I just dove out and 571 00:39:02.760 --> 00:39:05.159 rolled there was some hot metal there, rolled on some 572 00:39:05.280 --> 00:39:09.880 hot metal and got onto my feet and uh just ran. 573 00:39:09.960 --> 00:39:15.400 I could hear hangarnads cooking off, the exploded hangernads and 574 00:39:15.440 --> 00:39:18.079 then not getting very far. We had six red Eye 575 00:39:18.119 --> 00:39:22.960 missiles on board that on board our aircraft, and the 576 00:39:22.960 --> 00:39:25.679 Red Eye missiles were our air defense if we were 577 00:39:25.719 --> 00:39:29.760 at Desert one and our Iranians came in and spotted 578 00:39:29.880 --> 00:39:32.079 us or whatever. We did have some red. 579 00:39:31.880 --> 00:39:34.639 Eye missiles, the predecessor to the Stinger missile. 580 00:39:34.920 --> 00:39:38.960 Yeah. Sweet, And then those started cooking off and going 581 00:39:39.119 --> 00:39:42.760 out into the desert. These red Eye missiles started shooting off. 582 00:39:43.599 --> 00:39:46.239 And then the first aircraft I tried to get on, 583 00:39:47.039 --> 00:39:50.079 they waved me away. They were all the aircraft were 584 00:39:50.159 --> 00:39:53.159 moved because there was stuff coming flying through the air 585 00:39:53.920 --> 00:39:56.159 so that all the aircraft were just trying to clear 586 00:39:56.199 --> 00:40:01.400 out away from the carnage here. And so eventually I 587 00:40:01.440 --> 00:40:07.199 got on another EASTC one thirty and then there was 588 00:40:07.239 --> 00:40:10.719 the pilot for the marine. Pilot was on the ramp 589 00:40:10.760 --> 00:40:14.119 of the somebody had helped carried him and put him 590 00:40:14.159 --> 00:40:19.519 on the aircraft and he he was having difficulty breathing. 591 00:40:20.079 --> 00:40:23.440 He had an eylon cord around his neck that was 592 00:40:23.480 --> 00:40:26.880 burnt into his neck. I took the cord off his 593 00:40:27.000 --> 00:40:32.239 neck and and so I stayed with the pilot and 594 00:40:32.320 --> 00:40:37.320 worked with him at the four hour flight back to Oman, 595 00:40:38.320 --> 00:40:42.079 just trying to comfort him. And we did not have 596 00:40:42.280 --> 00:40:45.679 each I don't know why we didn't have a medical 597 00:40:45.840 --> 00:40:49.760 pack on each aircraft. All they had was these little 598 00:40:49.800 --> 00:40:54.400 first aid things that the on the the one thirties 599 00:40:54.719 --> 00:40:58.480 that didn't have nothing but dressings and different other things. 600 00:40:58.880 --> 00:41:02.960 We needed a medical we needed IVS, we needed morphine, 601 00:41:03.039 --> 00:41:06.199 We needed all this stuff. And every aircraft should have 602 00:41:06.280 --> 00:41:09.320 had a medical package on it because we're trained to 603 00:41:09.440 --> 00:41:12.000 use it. I was. I had go already, I had 604 00:41:12.280 --> 00:41:15.119 prior to going to Delta. I had gone through EMT training, 605 00:41:15.880 --> 00:41:20.440 so I was nationally certified as an EMT. But we 606 00:41:20.519 --> 00:41:24.840 just didn't have any of this stuff. And then so 607 00:41:24.960 --> 00:41:30.000 when we did so, the dead A guys actually were 608 00:41:30.039 --> 00:41:34.559 carrying morphine. So we got morphine from the dead A 609 00:41:34.719 --> 00:41:38.119 guys and we started getting injecting the pilot and the 610 00:41:38.119 --> 00:41:43.519 copilot with morphine and give them water. I mean, they 611 00:41:43.559 --> 00:41:46.599 were burned they got there, one of the air force 612 00:41:46.639 --> 00:41:51.000 guys said, take off his gloves because his hands were burned. 613 00:41:51.039 --> 00:41:53.719 The pilot's hands were. I says, no, we're not taking 614 00:41:53.760 --> 00:41:56.239 off his gloves. Take off his gloves. His skins coming 615 00:41:56.280 --> 00:42:02.599 off too. And so we did get that, and when 616 00:42:02.599 --> 00:42:06.760 we took off. We never had accountability at desert one 617 00:42:06.840 --> 00:42:10.000 of who was there and who wasn't there. When we 618 00:42:10.199 --> 00:42:13.639 our aircraft and we took off, we ran into that 619 00:42:14.559 --> 00:42:17.599 next to the road was a dirt burnt bank burm. 620 00:42:18.400 --> 00:42:22.119 We hit that burm really hard, our aircraft did, and 621 00:42:22.159 --> 00:42:25.559 we learnted up into air and came down and then 622 00:42:26.360 --> 00:42:30.039 kept going. But then once we got airborne, they came 623 00:42:30.079 --> 00:42:33.719 over and said over the speaker saying that we may 624 00:42:33.760 --> 00:42:36.679 have damaged our landing gear and we may not have 625 00:42:36.719 --> 00:42:39.280 any good landing gear when we get ready to land 626 00:42:39.320 --> 00:42:45.480 and oman and then when we get to flying for 627 00:42:45.719 --> 00:42:48.400 and it's a four hour flight. We were flying for 628 00:42:48.400 --> 00:42:50.119 a little bit and they said, well, we may not 629 00:42:50.280 --> 00:42:52.960 have enough fuel to get back. We may have to 630 00:42:53.000 --> 00:42:57.119 ditch at sea. So and I wow, what a night. 631 00:42:57.280 --> 00:43:00.760 You know, no landing gear. Now we're have to make 632 00:43:00.880 --> 00:43:02.800 ditch to see but we made it back. 633 00:43:04.360 --> 00:43:06.639 The landing gear did come out of the aircraft. 634 00:43:06.519 --> 00:43:08.440 And they are landing gear did come back. 635 00:43:09.599 --> 00:43:14.159 Did the guys when obviously you guys didn't know what happened? 636 00:43:14.559 --> 00:43:17.360 When when everything started, did you did you think you 637 00:43:17.400 --> 00:43:19.280 were like did you think you were under attack? 638 00:43:19.519 --> 00:43:19.639 Like? 639 00:43:19.719 --> 00:43:22.920 What what was going through your mind when all that 640 00:43:23.159 --> 00:43:23.920 started off? 641 00:43:24.639 --> 00:43:28.480 Initially thought we got hit by something, but didn't know what, 642 00:43:28.760 --> 00:43:31.880 you know that yeah, like we might have got attack 643 00:43:32.360 --> 00:43:36.280 at first, that being a helicopter running into us. That 644 00:43:36.480 --> 00:43:40.079 wasn't in their mind. Wasn't in my mind that we 645 00:43:40.119 --> 00:43:44.039 got hit by a helicopter at first, but it soon 646 00:43:44.159 --> 00:43:46.440 became apparent that that's what happened. 647 00:43:46.760 --> 00:43:50.760 And how many how many uh one thirties which are 648 00:43:50.800 --> 00:43:53.480 the planes for those of our viewers who don't know 649 00:43:53.480 --> 00:43:56.719 there there you know, cargo planes or TRANCSPT planes. How 650 00:43:56.719 --> 00:43:58.519 many of those were on the ground at the time 651 00:43:58.599 --> 00:44:02.159 at Desert one Because you said you have six. 652 00:44:02.079 --> 00:44:05.159 We had six. We had six aircraft. We had three 653 00:44:05.320 --> 00:44:08.719 MC one thirty E models and we had three EC 654 00:44:08.920 --> 00:44:12.559 one thirty E models, So we had six aircraft on 655 00:44:12.599 --> 00:44:23.199 the ground and roughly how many personnel I think our 656 00:44:23.239 --> 00:44:27.760 assault force was around one hundred and twenty some people 657 00:44:28.400 --> 00:44:33.000 are totals. I don't know the numbers. All of Bee 658 00:44:33.079 --> 00:44:36.880 Squadron was on that helicopter, on that EC one thirty 659 00:44:36.960 --> 00:44:41.159 that the helicopter ran into and so we all made 660 00:44:41.239 --> 00:44:44.559 it out of there. The loadmaster made it. The loadmaster 661 00:44:44.719 --> 00:44:49.039 was burke, pretty bad air Force load master. A couple 662 00:44:49.119 --> 00:44:52.119 guys helped him out. He was kind of on fire, 663 00:44:52.960 --> 00:44:56.679 and Paul Lawrence was one of the people that helped 664 00:44:56.760 --> 00:44:59.760 him out of the aircraft. And I think he was 665 00:44:59.800 --> 00:45:03.920 the last person out of the aircraft, was the loadmaster. 666 00:45:06.519 --> 00:45:12.559 So so now we have, you know, five fixed wing 667 00:45:12.679 --> 00:45:16.920 on the ground and immediately, I don't know why, but 668 00:45:17.079 --> 00:45:25.880 the the helicopter crews abandoned their helicopters and their rots 669 00:45:25.920 --> 00:45:30.000 are running everything. They abandoned them first thing and jumped 670 00:45:30.000 --> 00:45:31.599 in on the on the fixed wing. 671 00:45:32.079 --> 00:45:34.440 So all the helicopter crews got out of the helicopters, 672 00:45:34.519 --> 00:45:36.760 left and running and got on the fixed wings. 673 00:45:37.039 --> 00:45:43.480 True, yeah, I don't know why they did that. They 674 00:45:43.480 --> 00:45:46.679 had they had been refilled, they could have flew back 675 00:45:47.119 --> 00:45:53.360 to the aircraft carrier. Also, we provided each aircraft with 676 00:45:53.800 --> 00:45:57.000 a destruct charges that we had an animal can. They 677 00:45:57.000 --> 00:46:01.559 had C four thermicronades. We had time time fuse in there. 678 00:46:01.800 --> 00:46:06.039 So if helicopter had to be abandoned, it was supposed 679 00:46:06.079 --> 00:46:12.280 to be destroyed, and none of those were destroyed. Those helicopters. 680 00:46:12.920 --> 00:46:16.079 Now the thought was that they might call some fixed 681 00:46:16.079 --> 00:46:19.800 wing off the mnemens to come in there and destroy 682 00:46:19.880 --> 00:46:26.000 those helicopters, but they decided against bringing in the fixed wings. 683 00:46:26.679 --> 00:46:31.519 And then they had the helicopter crews. They had documents 684 00:46:31.639 --> 00:46:35.840 that they shouldn't have had on those helicopters. There was 685 00:46:36.000 --> 00:46:41.039 and I've seen some of these documents with Iranian markings 686 00:46:41.079 --> 00:46:46.599 on them explaining in farcie of what these documents are for. 687 00:46:46.719 --> 00:46:51.039 But they had all the routes and everything, and which 688 00:46:51.119 --> 00:46:55.920 would have revealed Desert two as well. I imagine. Yeah, yes, yes, 689 00:46:56.360 --> 00:47:00.119 it had all had our hide sight. It had they 690 00:47:00.719 --> 00:47:03.079 had there where they were going to go, had the 691 00:47:03.159 --> 00:47:06.199 approached to the embassy, how to leave the embassy, where 692 00:47:06.239 --> 00:47:09.239 we were, the arranger airfield. They had all that information 693 00:47:09.360 --> 00:47:12.480 that they had left behind. It was a treasure trove 694 00:47:12.599 --> 00:47:17.039 of documents and information. So of course, you know we 695 00:47:17.119 --> 00:47:22.159 had the Dick Meadows and his crew, Uh they're in 696 00:47:22.239 --> 00:47:25.719 Tehran that was supporting us. So they you know, they 697 00:47:25.800 --> 00:47:28.960 had to get out of Tehran because they know that 698 00:47:29.079 --> 00:47:33.400 they had inside, you know, inside help that inside in 699 00:47:33.519 --> 00:47:38.920 the country. So I don't know why all that stuff 700 00:47:38.960 --> 00:47:41.679 was there, why it wasn't destroyed or taken with them, 701 00:47:41.760 --> 00:47:44.880 or why even some of that stuff was even present 702 00:47:45.320 --> 00:47:47.079 on those helicopters. 703 00:47:47.440 --> 00:47:52.239 But yeah, and this is probably before like Group a ARS, 704 00:47:52.320 --> 00:47:56.639 we were a thing where where these were these helicopter 705 00:47:56.760 --> 00:47:58.440 pilots or crews would stand up in front of the 706 00:47:58.440 --> 00:48:06.360 group and say, yeah, well we let the helicopters because right, 707 00:48:06.559 --> 00:48:09.920 I mean they there was nobody. I mean, you never 708 00:48:09.960 --> 00:48:11.239 found out why no. 709 00:48:11.719 --> 00:48:15.639 They I can tell you I saw the helicopter crews 710 00:48:15.679 --> 00:48:18.320 when they came in there, the pilots and co pilots, 711 00:48:19.280 --> 00:48:22.360 they were they were wiped out. That I can tell 712 00:48:22.400 --> 00:48:25.719 you that that those dust storms took a lot out 713 00:48:25.760 --> 00:48:30.320 of them. They struggled through that, they were mentally I 714 00:48:30.360 --> 00:48:36.519 think whipped uh when they got to Desert one and 715 00:48:36.559 --> 00:48:39.920 the thought of getting back in a helicopter and flying 716 00:48:40.079 --> 00:48:43.760 back to the aircraft carrier, they they didn't want no 717 00:48:43.920 --> 00:48:47.880 part of that. So I can't know, I don't know 718 00:48:47.920 --> 00:48:51.599 who gave them permission, yeah, to abandon us when and 719 00:48:51.639 --> 00:48:57.239 why they weren't destroyed. Our guys were considering going there 720 00:48:57.280 --> 00:49:00.480 to destroy those helicopters, but they were told to just 721 00:49:01.079 --> 00:49:04.559 we need to get out of here, uh because like 722 00:49:04.639 --> 00:49:07.280 I say, the air the fixed wing, we're running low 723 00:49:07.360 --> 00:49:10.960 on fuel. And of course this even the accident delayed 724 00:49:10.960 --> 00:49:15.320 the aircraft there longer. So it was. 725 00:49:17.039 --> 00:49:20.519 There's one story that you had shared with me that 726 00:49:20.840 --> 00:49:25.480 is not in colonel Colonel Beckwith's book, which would be 727 00:49:25.599 --> 00:49:27.639 kind of funny except you know, for the loss of 728 00:49:27.679 --> 00:49:32.000 life on the mission where Colonel Colonel Beckwith is ordering 729 00:49:32.039 --> 00:49:33.800 people onto the back of the sea one thirty and 730 00:49:33.800 --> 00:49:35.960 then the crew chief and the plane or ordering them out. 731 00:49:36.000 --> 00:49:38.320 So they're all going in like a circle up the 732 00:49:38.400 --> 00:49:40.360 ramp and then out the side door and around and 733 00:49:40.360 --> 00:49:42.320 around as they get yelled at by two people. 734 00:49:42.519 --> 00:49:44.679 Yeah, that was in Oman when we got to Omar. 735 00:49:45.519 --> 00:49:50.000 When we got to Oman and they had one of 736 00:49:50.039 --> 00:49:57.000 the was set up as a metavac and so we 737 00:49:57.000 --> 00:49:59.800 were told so we got to o'mon, that's when we 738 00:49:59.840 --> 00:50:03.159 did the head count who was here, who was there? 739 00:50:03.199 --> 00:50:06.719 We determined that we left eight people behind, you know, 740 00:50:06.760 --> 00:50:11.760 the five Air Force, three Marines and so and like 741 00:50:12.000 --> 00:50:16.320 my team got split up during the accident, and so 742 00:50:16.480 --> 00:50:19.920 I didn't know who Bill's, Eric Haney and Bill Zoomwalt 743 00:50:20.519 --> 00:50:23.880 where they were. Chris, Abel and I were together on 744 00:50:24.039 --> 00:50:27.159 our aircraft. So not until we got to Aman did 745 00:50:27.199 --> 00:50:34.599 I see Bill Zoomwant and Eric Haney to know that 746 00:50:34.639 --> 00:50:37.800 they made it out okay. And so then we had 747 00:50:37.840 --> 00:50:39.880 to get on and so they told us, you know, 748 00:50:40.000 --> 00:50:44.920 we only had few medical casualties, the air Force loadmaster 749 00:50:45.280 --> 00:50:49.280 and the two marines pilot copilot Marines, but they had 750 00:50:49.360 --> 00:50:53.119 the whole with stretchers and stuff. We were told to 751 00:50:53.159 --> 00:50:56.000 get on that aircraft. Somebody on the ground told us 752 00:50:56.000 --> 00:50:58.440 to get that's the aircraft were taken back to Egypt. 753 00:50:58.960 --> 00:51:02.679 So as we get on had aircraft, they're screaming at 754 00:51:02.760 --> 00:51:05.239 us and telling us to get out. So we go. 755 00:51:05.440 --> 00:51:08.079 We go in the aircraft and up the ramp and 756 00:51:08.119 --> 00:51:11.079 then we're leaving out the front door, and then they 757 00:51:11.159 --> 00:51:13.280 were told to get back in line. So there's a 758 00:51:13.320 --> 00:51:17.079 continuous circle of people getting the aircraft and getting out. 759 00:51:18.000 --> 00:51:21.039 And also beck With I was with it, standing next 760 00:51:21.039 --> 00:51:25.039 to beck With with Don Feeney, and beck was says 761 00:51:25.239 --> 00:51:28.679 looks at Don and me and says, where's your weapon. 762 00:51:29.960 --> 00:51:33.719 I said, my weapon is on at EC one thirty. 763 00:51:34.000 --> 00:51:37.000 You know everything I I just this is all I 764 00:51:37.079 --> 00:51:41.480 got out with. You know, I didn't grab my weapon 765 00:51:41.639 --> 00:51:46.840 or anything. Uh And he said, and a lot of 766 00:51:46.880 --> 00:51:49.760 people just bend and if you had had your weapon 767 00:51:49.800 --> 00:51:53.400 physically in your hand, then you might have got out 768 00:51:53.440 --> 00:51:56.760 with it. But he said that, Well, you're you're stupid. 769 00:51:57.760 --> 00:52:02.320 Was called Don Feenie and I stud and we're like, 770 00:52:02.679 --> 00:52:05.760 well we may be stupid, but we're alive, you know. 771 00:52:06.639 --> 00:52:10.800 And he had heard that somebody had gone back into 772 00:52:10.840 --> 00:52:15.400 that aircraft and got their weapon out. He had heard 773 00:52:15.440 --> 00:52:20.000 that nobody that left had aircraft went back in that aircraft. 774 00:52:20.119 --> 00:52:25.519 But you know, that's just that's back with He's a character. 775 00:52:25.880 --> 00:52:28.119 He'd fire you in a minute and then hire you back. 776 00:52:28.599 --> 00:52:31.960 Did did you leave your kevlar with the ten thousand 777 00:52:32.000 --> 00:52:36.440 dollars on the air I did my cavelar. When everybody 778 00:52:36.440 --> 00:52:38.360 else heard that story, did they all leave their ten 779 00:52:38.360 --> 00:52:39.639 thousand dollars on theraf to? 780 00:52:40.000 --> 00:52:42.719 Yeah? I had to sign a statement that's what happened. 781 00:52:42.719 --> 00:52:47.679 But yeah, it truly it got burned up. Yeah. 782 00:52:47.880 --> 00:52:50.639 Was there an anecdotal story of somebody who had fallen 783 00:52:50.639 --> 00:52:52.800 asleep and thought that the plane was airborn. 784 00:52:53.280 --> 00:52:56.079 Frank mckinna, Well, see, as we got in the aircraft, 785 00:52:56.440 --> 00:53:02.639 it August was dark and the props running, and when 786 00:53:02.679 --> 00:53:05.199 that helicopter, it almost felt like the brakes were being 787 00:53:05.320 --> 00:53:09.119 released when the helicopter ran into us. At first I 788 00:53:09.159 --> 00:53:12.119 thought that that's the we're releasing the brakes, that we're 789 00:53:12.159 --> 00:53:15.320 going to start to move. But yeah, people were whipped 790 00:53:15.320 --> 00:53:18.960 and stuff. And Frank mckinna he since pat Frank since 791 00:53:19.000 --> 00:53:23.719 passed away with cancer. But Frank woke up and then 792 00:53:23.960 --> 00:53:26.719 saw the commotion. He saw the fire, and he saw 793 00:53:26.800 --> 00:53:29.840 the people running out, and he said to himself, what 794 00:53:30.000 --> 00:53:33.079 are these fools doing, because he thought we were actually 795 00:53:33.239 --> 00:53:36.800 in the air and we were jumping out. We didn't 796 00:53:36.800 --> 00:53:40.960 have parachutes, and but he got in line with the 797 00:53:41.000 --> 00:53:43.920 rest of us and he just thought, you know, he's 798 00:53:44.199 --> 00:53:47.679 gonna worry about getting out of this aircraft and he'll 799 00:53:47.719 --> 00:53:51.280 worry about landing Nicks one thing at a time. So 800 00:53:51.360 --> 00:53:54.159 when he jumped out, he went out and he got 801 00:53:54.199 --> 00:53:58.840 flat and stable. Well, he hit the ground and it 802 00:53:58.920 --> 00:54:01.880 knocked the wind out of him, and of course people 803 00:54:01.920 --> 00:54:04.719 were walking over the top of him. He had rolled 804 00:54:04.719 --> 00:54:07.519 out of the way but yeah, he actually thought we 805 00:54:07.519 --> 00:54:09.480 were in the air but he jumped out with us 806 00:54:09.519 --> 00:54:14.880 because it wasn't no fun, you know, staying in that airplane. 807 00:54:15.400 --> 00:54:21.679 So that was Frank. And then then another funny incident 808 00:54:21.760 --> 00:54:24.920 whence we we got in with the you know, with 809 00:54:24.920 --> 00:54:27.840 the pilot and co pilot, and we're looking for something 810 00:54:27.880 --> 00:54:30.800 to give them. The only thing that we had that 811 00:54:30.840 --> 00:54:34.639 they gave us in our survival kit was percocet or 812 00:54:34.840 --> 00:54:40.679 perkadan and so so I think it was Glenn Nicol 813 00:54:40.920 --> 00:54:43.920 hollered out and said, uh, somebody checked their E and 814 00:54:43.960 --> 00:54:49.559 E kit for any perkadan, you know, and uh, Bruno, 815 00:54:49.599 --> 00:54:55.400 your baniac turns to forget who he turns to, turns 816 00:54:55.440 --> 00:54:59.360 to oh, Jim Sweeters, I think, and says Nick. Nick 817 00:54:59.440 --> 00:55:02.960 says we need to E and need to Perkadan and 818 00:55:03.039 --> 00:55:06.880 uh and Jim says, well, I'm not leaving this aircraft. 819 00:55:07.079 --> 00:55:11.880 So luckily Bruno you know, didn't get off the airplane 820 00:55:11.880 --> 00:55:16.920 and head to Perkadan wherever that was. But anyway, we 821 00:55:17.000 --> 00:55:20.199 got the morphine and that's what we needed instead of pills. 822 00:55:22.320 --> 00:55:25.519 So after after you know what blew up in the 823 00:55:25.559 --> 00:55:29.159 press and was called the Debacle at Desert one. You 824 00:55:29.239 --> 00:55:34.199 guys almost immediately went into planning a second attempt to 825 00:55:34.280 --> 00:55:35.719 go in and rescue the hostages. 826 00:55:36.599 --> 00:55:41.000 Yeah, we did this. I think it's called Honey Badger. Well, 827 00:55:41.559 --> 00:55:46.639 let me get these. We had different operational names. For example, 828 00:55:47.480 --> 00:55:50.559 the planning for the Iran hostage rescue mission was called 829 00:55:50.639 --> 00:55:54.760 Rice Bowl in the beginning. And there's a confusion with 830 00:55:54.840 --> 00:55:57.760 all these different names. But the reason we called it 831 00:55:57.840 --> 00:56:00.480 Rice Bowl was that if anybody picked up on what 832 00:56:00.519 --> 00:56:04.800 we're doing, they might associate it was submission in Southeast Asia. 833 00:56:05.480 --> 00:56:09.400 So so initially the planning phase was Operation Rice Bull, 834 00:56:10.119 --> 00:56:14.519 and then the the operational phase was Eagle Claw, and 835 00:56:14.559 --> 00:56:17.920 then we had the Honey Badger, which was the follow up. 836 00:56:17.920 --> 00:56:21.440 And there was another code name to Snowbird Baby. Yeah, 837 00:56:21.480 --> 00:56:24.599 snow Bird, Yeah, And I think Snowbird was the part 838 00:56:24.760 --> 00:56:32.000 with the putting the rocket motors on UH one thirty. 839 00:56:32.400 --> 00:56:37.679 That was Snowbird. And of course that that plane they 840 00:56:37.760 --> 00:56:40.719 put these rocket motors on, I think, and tried to 841 00:56:40.800 --> 00:56:44.159 lift off with it, and not all their rocket career. Yeah, 842 00:56:44.760 --> 00:56:48.559 not all the rocket motors fired, and they just completely 843 00:56:48.599 --> 00:56:51.320 destroyed that C one thirty. They had all the rocket 844 00:56:51.360 --> 00:56:54.000 motors on. That was they were going to land ad 845 00:56:54.039 --> 00:56:57.519 in there and take it off with this. That was 846 00:56:57.559 --> 00:57:02.280 one plan. But they took the hostages and took them 847 00:57:02.320 --> 00:57:06.079 and moved them out to different areas, different prisons, and 848 00:57:06.159 --> 00:57:12.199 we never had intelligence to you to do a second mission. 849 00:57:12.719 --> 00:57:15.559 How did the press find out to call it the 850 00:57:15.559 --> 00:57:17.840 debacle Desert one one? They had to know of the 851 00:57:17.840 --> 00:57:20.039 mission and two they had to know Desert one. How 852 00:57:20.039 --> 00:57:24.639 did they find out? Well, of course the Iranian press 853 00:57:25.039 --> 00:57:29.239 was the first group of people there at the Desert 854 00:57:29.320 --> 00:57:33.760 one site. Today it's a very popular tourist site. There's 855 00:57:33.800 --> 00:57:38.000 a building there, there's commemorative in this time on April 856 00:57:38.119 --> 00:57:43.360 twenty fourth every year they have a big celebration there. 857 00:57:43.519 --> 00:57:45.840 It's a big deal. And you can see the wreckage 858 00:57:45.880 --> 00:57:50.800 of still there, the helicopter and this EC one thirty, 859 00:57:51.719 --> 00:57:56.039 and so the press were there, and of course in 860 00:57:56.039 --> 00:58:01.559 initial press reports they said that the C one thirty 861 00:58:01.679 --> 00:58:06.119 ran into the helicopter. When you when you first news recovered, 862 00:58:06.280 --> 00:58:09.719 they were trying to figure out what took place here, 863 00:58:10.000 --> 00:58:13.159 trying to put the pieces together, and in the beginning 864 00:58:13.239 --> 00:58:15.679 they had it really all messed up when they were 865 00:58:15.679 --> 00:58:19.400 first reporting what was what took actually took place there? 866 00:58:22.840 --> 00:58:28.719 So yeah, I don't know again, how you know, Jimmy 867 00:58:28.719 --> 00:58:34.039 Carter came on and explained to the American people that 868 00:58:34.119 --> 00:58:37.400 he gave the order to do the mission, and the 869 00:58:37.440 --> 00:58:45.559 mission there was casualties and eight servicemen died, and of 870 00:58:45.559 --> 00:58:51.480 course Jimmy Carter took full responsibility. I know. One of 871 00:58:51.480 --> 00:58:53.920 the things is we we went there to get fifty 872 00:58:53.920 --> 00:58:57.480 three hostages, not fifty two hostages. And I always hear 873 00:58:57.559 --> 00:59:02.199 fifty two, fifty fifty two, because US fifty two was 874 00:59:02.239 --> 00:59:05.960 the end number that was released forty four days later. 875 00:59:07.400 --> 00:59:12.599 What in this mission took place in April twenty fourth 876 00:59:12.960 --> 00:59:15.440 night of the twenty fourth morning of the twenty fifth. 877 00:59:16.400 --> 00:59:19.880 In July, one of the hostages, and his last name 878 00:59:19.960 --> 00:59:27.000 was Queen, got really really sick and they released him. 879 00:59:27.599 --> 00:59:33.599 He had MS. I think he was later diagnosed with MS. 880 00:59:34.159 --> 00:59:38.840 So he was released in July. And then now there 881 00:59:38.880 --> 00:59:44.199 was fifty two hostages. So on the inauguration day when 882 00:59:44.679 --> 00:59:48.400 forty four days there was fifty two hostages that were 883 00:59:48.440 --> 00:59:52.000 released at that point, but Queen was there when we 884 00:59:52.000 --> 00:59:54.519 were doing it. We were after fifty three of them. 885 00:59:56.159 --> 00:59:58.519 And just for viewers who were interested, it might also 886 00:59:58.599 --> 01:00:00.800 be worth pointing out that this is when the whole 887 01:00:00.880 --> 01:00:02.679 Argo incident happened as well. 888 01:00:03.400 --> 01:00:07.840 Yeah, yeah, because some of the embassy employees were not 889 01:00:07.960 --> 01:00:11.119 in the embassy at the time of the takeover, and 890 01:00:11.159 --> 01:00:14.800 so they went they had some safe houses and eventually 891 01:00:14.840 --> 01:00:20.039 they seeked help with the Canadian Embassy and the and 892 01:00:20.079 --> 01:00:25.480 then the Canadian Embassy assisted in getting these others that Americans, 893 01:00:25.719 --> 01:00:28.840 what was nine of them, nine of them eight or nine? 894 01:00:29.039 --> 01:00:32.519 It was a Tony Mendez that went and got them out, 895 01:00:32.559 --> 01:00:36.920 I believe, right, And it's yeah, the movie Argo is 896 01:00:37.039 --> 01:00:39.920 very accurate and at that part of the mission. 897 01:00:41.920 --> 01:00:45.960 Was so at this time, Delta is a kind of 898 01:00:45.960 --> 01:00:50.440 a fledgling organization and and I think that will probably 899 01:00:50.440 --> 01:00:54.000 go into like how this affected the whole Jaysack idea 900 01:00:54.000 --> 01:00:58.320 and things like that. But obviously this was a pilot 901 01:00:58.480 --> 01:01:02.360 error that caused it. But were there any repercussion, I mean, 902 01:01:03.480 --> 01:01:06.079 did did any of this fall on Delta immediately? 903 01:01:06.199 --> 01:01:12.880 Like? Okay? So there was a Holloway commission was formed 904 01:01:13.000 --> 01:01:20.199 up to investigate what happened, and they made a bunch 905 01:01:20.239 --> 01:01:26.519 of determination. It was mostly command and control, inner operability, 906 01:01:26.679 --> 01:01:31.039 be able to communicate with different forces and to have 907 01:01:31.119 --> 01:01:35.039 a unified joint force that's trained together. So they made 908 01:01:35.360 --> 01:01:38.719 so they came up with all these what some of 909 01:01:38.719 --> 01:01:41.519 the stuff that went wrong, you know, by putting all 910 01:01:41.519 --> 01:01:47.280 these different organizations together, and so that was the genesis 911 01:01:47.320 --> 01:01:51.920 for the Joint Special Operations Command. So Jaysocks stood up 912 01:01:53.199 --> 01:02:00.079 on Pope Air Force Base, which adjoint Sport Bragg, and 913 01:02:00.400 --> 01:02:04.840 that's where JAYSAK formed up. And then nineteen ninety two 914 01:02:05.840 --> 01:02:08.639 I went over to I served in Jaysock from ninety 915 01:02:08.679 --> 01:02:11.840 two to ninety nine. I was still signed to Delta, 916 01:02:11.920 --> 01:02:18.480 but I was duty at Jaysack. And so because of 917 01:02:18.519 --> 01:02:22.840 the mission JAYSAK stood up to that was the Joint 918 01:02:22.840 --> 01:02:29.400 Counter Terrorist Organization and JAYSAK one of the things they 919 01:02:29.480 --> 01:02:33.440 did was they did quarterly exercises, the Joint re Training 920 01:02:33.519 --> 01:02:41.039 Readiness exercises, and they did IDRIS emergency exercises. And so 921 01:02:41.119 --> 01:02:45.079 we put all these pieces together and had one headquarters, 922 01:02:45.159 --> 01:02:51.480 you know, Air Force, Marine, Navy, and Army in Jaysack. 923 01:02:52.360 --> 01:02:55.760 And so in ninety two I went over and I 924 01:02:55.840 --> 01:02:58.719 was a sergeant major from ninety two to ninety six 925 01:02:59.239 --> 01:03:04.039 in Jaysck. The exercise sergeant major. My job was to 926 01:03:04.280 --> 01:03:08.400 go out and find training sites, to exercise sites, to 927 01:03:08.480 --> 01:03:14.079 do these joint quarterly exercises involved everybody, Rangers, Air Force, 928 01:03:15.519 --> 01:03:19.880 all the players, the Navy Seals, Seal Team six, UH, 929 01:03:21.280 --> 01:03:27.840 Navy Dev Group, and then I was always going to 930 01:03:28.199 --> 01:03:30.800 when I was there, I was always the controller on 931 01:03:30.880 --> 01:03:33.920 the Ranger target, so I was the safety controller for 932 01:03:34.480 --> 01:03:38.159 the Rangers, which I had. That was always a pleasure 933 01:03:38.239 --> 01:03:41.599 for me to work with the Rangers and it was 934 01:03:41.599 --> 01:03:45.199 a really great bunch of guys, So I really liked that. 935 01:03:46.079 --> 01:03:49.360 How did I was just gonna ask Mike, how did 936 01:03:49.519 --> 01:03:53.320 your experience from eagle Claw, your lessons learned? How did 937 01:03:53.320 --> 01:03:56.599 that impact how you ran the training exercises and He's 938 01:03:56.639 --> 01:04:00.119 readiness exercises down the line. 939 01:04:01.000 --> 01:04:04.400 Yeah, I wish we would have. I would always wanted 940 01:04:04.440 --> 01:04:09.840 to do a joint training exercise that was eagle Claw, 941 01:04:10.440 --> 01:04:14.320 the whole, to redo eagle Claw all over again. That 942 01:04:14.400 --> 01:04:17.360 was I would have liked that to have been done. 943 01:04:17.599 --> 01:04:20.920 We never did that when I was there. I would 944 01:04:20.960 --> 01:04:26.320 have liked to see how, say, ten fifteen years later, 945 01:04:27.280 --> 01:04:32.559 how we would do eagle Claw today at that time, 946 01:04:33.280 --> 01:04:35.480 and I think that would have been a great experiment 947 01:04:35.679 --> 01:04:39.440 to do, but we never did that. Most of our 948 01:04:39.679 --> 01:04:43.639 joint exercises was you know, the Rangers always did the 949 01:04:43.679 --> 01:04:48.000 airfield seizure. That was always there's piece of pie. And 950 01:04:48.039 --> 01:04:54.280 we always had a seal target, an adulta target, and 951 01:04:54.760 --> 01:05:01.280 seal targets could be a ship that was underway. We 952 01:05:01.320 --> 01:05:08.639 did a lot of you know, improvised nuclear devices type exercise. 953 01:05:08.719 --> 01:05:13.360 A terrorist group has a improvised nuclear device, or they've 954 01:05:13.679 --> 01:05:18.320 they've captured a real nuclear device, uh and fixed it 955 01:05:18.400 --> 01:05:21.639 up to make it and improvised nuclear device. So we 956 01:05:21.719 --> 01:05:24.440 would have to go in there and we take that. 957 01:05:24.639 --> 01:05:28.119 And of course NEST and the NEST the Department of 958 01:05:28.280 --> 01:05:32.840 Energy Nuclear Emergency Search Teams would be involved in those 959 01:05:32.880 --> 01:05:38.440 type of exercises. We did several like SunDog was one 960 01:05:38.480 --> 01:05:42.519 of a Mighty Derringer was another NEST with a new 961 01:05:43.639 --> 01:05:47.679 type scenario and we do you know a biological you know, 962 01:05:47.840 --> 01:05:51.719 we might be a chemical biological facility that we have 963 01:05:51.920 --> 01:05:56.320 to take and destroy. Uh. So those were some of 964 01:05:56.360 --> 01:05:57.360 our j r x's. 965 01:06:00.079 --> 01:06:06.480 And this is one sixtieth the Specialation wing got was 966 01:06:06.519 --> 01:06:09.119 stood up around after after Claw. 967 01:06:09.400 --> 01:06:15.280 Yeah, yes, the one six sixty Special Operation Special Operations Regument. 968 01:06:15.679 --> 01:06:19.760 Yeah, it just stood up and was that. I mean, 969 01:06:20.079 --> 01:06:24.079 I don't know how because you are airwing. But was 970 01:06:24.079 --> 01:06:26.440 was that a competitive thing for the Army to get 971 01:06:26.480 --> 01:06:33.039 what I mean? Did I mean obviously the Navy, the Marine, 972 01:06:33.239 --> 01:06:36.840 you know, the marine pilots on a Navy bird didn't 973 01:06:36.960 --> 01:06:39.000 didn't work out, and they were in experience, and it's 974 01:06:39.039 --> 01:06:40.679 not it's not really their fault because they didn't have 975 01:06:40.719 --> 01:06:41.719 that training at that point. 976 01:06:42.199 --> 01:06:46.719 That's true, because maybe fifty threes are different than Marine 977 01:06:46.760 --> 01:06:50.639 fifty threes, and they were. And when you have a 978 01:06:51.679 --> 01:06:54.079 if you're in a Marine fifty three and you have 979 01:06:54.119 --> 01:06:57.760 a blade indicator malfunction, like, come on, what they have 980 01:06:57.920 --> 01:07:03.599 nitrogen in the rotors and the blades, and if there's 981 01:07:03.639 --> 01:07:06.760 a crack, the nitrogen leaks out. I guess it's a 982 01:07:07.079 --> 01:07:10.559 radioactive nitrogen. A sensor goes off saying, you got to 983 01:07:10.639 --> 01:07:15.679 crack rotor blade Marine helicopters, you got you got a 984 01:07:15.760 --> 01:07:19.639 land that immediately land that helicopter to the blade indicate 985 01:07:20.440 --> 01:07:23.360 not So I guess with the Navy ones you could 986 01:07:23.400 --> 01:07:26.719 still fly the Navy ones with a blade indicated. That's 987 01:07:26.760 --> 01:07:27.760 what I've been told. 988 01:07:29.559 --> 01:07:34.079 So how how did the arm I mean, was it 989 01:07:34.079 --> 01:07:36.719 ever competitive or do you know how the Army got 990 01:07:36.920 --> 01:07:40.559 the gig or was it just because it was the 991 01:07:40.679 --> 01:07:44.280 Army working with a primarily army. You have the seals, 992 01:07:44.320 --> 01:07:47.159 but but it's primarily Delta and rangers. 993 01:07:47.519 --> 01:07:51.679 I think they looked at the CH forty sevens and 994 01:07:52.280 --> 01:07:58.000 figured that they could modify the CH forty sevens, make 995 01:07:58.039 --> 01:08:03.559 them air refuelable, make them so that they have a 996 01:08:03.639 --> 01:08:09.639 larger carrying capacity, cover a greater distance. So you know, 997 01:08:09.920 --> 01:08:13.760 only the Army was flying H forty seven, so I 998 01:08:13.800 --> 01:08:16.680 think they it was mainly I would think it was 999 01:08:16.760 --> 01:08:23.079 aircraft driven. And then, of course, and after that, Blackhawks 1000 01:08:23.159 --> 01:08:27.239 came online after and so we had we used black 1001 01:08:27.279 --> 01:08:32.159 Hawks for the first time in Grenada, and that's another story. 1002 01:08:32.199 --> 01:08:35.560 We went in with six helic Blackhawk helicopters there at 1003 01:08:35.640 --> 01:08:39.199 Richmond Hill Prison, and I tell you we lost one 1004 01:08:39.239 --> 01:08:43.920 of our helicopter, Number four was shot down. But had 1005 01:08:43.960 --> 01:08:49.600 those been six Huey helicopters there in Grenada, all six 1006 01:08:49.640 --> 01:08:52.239 of those helicopters would have we would have crashed all 1007 01:08:52.279 --> 01:08:55.800 six helicopters because they shot us up pretty bad. They 1008 01:08:55.800 --> 01:08:59.319 had ZSU twenty threes that they were shooting at us 1009 01:09:00.960 --> 01:09:05.640 twelve point sevens and seven point six to two. We 1010 01:09:05.640 --> 01:09:10.760 were hitting from both from the Fort Frederick that was 1011 01:09:10.800 --> 01:09:14.199 shooting to us at Richmond Hill Prison and then that 1012 01:09:14.279 --> 01:09:16.720 people came out from the prison and were shooting up 1013 01:09:17.079 --> 01:09:19.760 at the bottom of our helicopters, and bullets were going 1014 01:09:19.760 --> 01:09:23.439 through our helicopters. But we had self sealing fuel tanks 1015 01:09:23.479 --> 01:09:28.079 in those black Hawks and that was amazing those hell 1016 01:09:28.359 --> 01:09:32.600 I really liked the Blackhawk helicopters compared to the Hugheys. 1017 01:09:33.239 --> 01:09:36.600 That was our first use with those. And of course 1018 01:09:36.640 --> 01:09:40.720 after Grenada, you know, we had still had interoperability problems 1019 01:09:40.720 --> 01:09:46.359 with Grenada talking to the Marines, talking to the Navy. So, 1020 01:09:47.479 --> 01:09:51.520 and that's where US so COM was. They did another 1021 01:09:51.560 --> 01:09:57.560 investigation and formed the US Special Operations Command formed after that. 1022 01:09:58.600 --> 01:10:00.760 So what is the difference for for our viewers? What 1023 01:10:00.880 --> 01:10:01.439 is the difference? 1024 01:10:01.439 --> 01:10:05.600 So Joint Special Operations Command stood up after Eagle Claw 1025 01:10:06.119 --> 01:10:06.920 and then Grenada. 1026 01:10:06.960 --> 01:10:11.359 Happens was that eighty four eighty three, eighty October eighty three, 1027 01:10:13.279 --> 01:10:15.079 three October twenty third. 1028 01:10:16.119 --> 01:10:21.279 So that happens in October eighty three, and then what 1029 01:10:21.560 --> 01:10:25.399 and then so then they come up with, uh, so, 1030 01:10:25.800 --> 01:10:29.239 what's the difference between the two organizations? Why why the 1031 01:10:29.279 --> 01:10:30.239 need for the two of them? 1032 01:10:31.279 --> 01:10:36.560 Well, USL comes as a is a JAYSK is basically 1033 01:10:37.760 --> 01:10:43.640 a black unit. Okay, it's it's primarily assets are what 1034 01:10:43.680 --> 01:10:49.159 we call black cod that black units what black sauce. 1035 01:10:50.319 --> 01:10:54.159 Us SO COM is both black and white. It's a 1036 01:10:54.239 --> 01:10:59.520 broader spectrum. And JAYSK you really have the like Seal 1037 01:10:59.600 --> 01:11:03.279 Teams X, you got Delta, you got the Rangers. Whereas 1038 01:11:03.319 --> 01:11:06.880 with us SO COM you've got the US Army Special 1039 01:11:06.920 --> 01:11:11.159 Operations Command, You've got all of the seals. It's and 1040 01:11:11.199 --> 01:11:16.840 it's a four star position. Uh, Jaysack, I believe now 1041 01:11:17.039 --> 01:11:21.920 is a two star position? Is that I think today? 1042 01:11:22.720 --> 01:11:25.479 I believe yes, it's a two star Whereas us SO 1043 01:11:25.640 --> 01:11:26.920 comes the four star. 1044 01:11:28.279 --> 01:11:32.319 So so Jason is a smaller it's a smaller element. 1045 01:11:32.840 --> 01:11:36.520 Do the out did the units in Jasock do they 1046 01:11:36.520 --> 01:11:39.399 also fall under so calm or are they two separate things? 1047 01:11:39.680 --> 01:11:43.439 Yeah? We fall under us SO come, Uh JAYSK does. 1048 01:11:43.960 --> 01:11:52.640 JAYSK is more of an operational organization. It controls whatever 1049 01:11:52.720 --> 01:11:56.680 missions are going on on the ground, whereas us SO 1050 01:11:56.920 --> 01:12:02.479 COM is the larger four star Uh sink command and 1051 01:12:04.359 --> 01:12:11.760 you know it it it lets like Jaysack run the missions. Uh. 1052 01:12:12.079 --> 01:12:18.199 There's a real good book out about Jaysuck. I'm trying 1053 01:12:18.239 --> 01:12:22.359 to think of the title of the book, but I 1054 01:12:22.840 --> 01:12:27.600 read it and it's an excellent Are you talking about 1055 01:12:27.880 --> 01:12:32.640 Relentless Strike? Relentless Strike as an excellent book? Have you 1056 01:12:32.720 --> 01:12:37.439 read it? Yeah, yeah, that's Sean Nilard's book. Yeah, yeah, 1057 01:12:37.840 --> 01:12:41.159 great book. If so, I recommend if you want to 1058 01:12:41.159 --> 01:12:44.079 know more about Jaysack, that's the book to read. 1059 01:12:44.680 --> 01:12:46.800 And you also mentioned that there's a new book out 1060 01:12:46.800 --> 01:12:50.039 about Eagle Claw that really fleshes out the operation in 1061 01:12:50.039 --> 01:12:51.760 a way that's never really been done before. 1062 01:12:52.479 --> 01:12:55.520 Yeah, I have we go and get a copy of right. 1063 01:12:55.439 --> 01:13:01.399 Sure, guys, thank you for watching the Live with Sergeant 1064 01:13:01.479 --> 01:13:04.079 Major Mike Vining. We're going to get right back to him. 1065 01:13:04.880 --> 01:13:07.560 But again thanks for joining us live, and please remember 1066 01:13:07.560 --> 01:13:08.319 to subscribe. 1067 01:13:08.720 --> 01:13:12.119 Okay, this is it. That's that's the book right there, 1068 01:13:12.760 --> 01:13:15.960 and it is a by Osprey. It's part of the 1069 01:13:16.119 --> 01:13:21.520 Raid series, which excellent Raid series and Justin Williamson put 1070 01:13:21.560 --> 01:13:26.119 this together. It's got a lot of photographs in it, illustrations, 1071 01:13:28.039 --> 01:13:31.079 you know. So this is this book came out for 1072 01:13:31.159 --> 01:13:36.760 the fortieth anniversary of Eagle Claw and Colonel Nightingale. Do 1073 01:13:36.800 --> 01:13:42.479 you you know Ningale? Huh? Keith Nightingale. He's got a 1074 01:13:42.520 --> 01:13:47.079 brand new book I think comes out in August. Really yeah, 1075 01:13:47.199 --> 01:13:50.680 and it's it's on Amazon. You can pre order. I can't. 1076 01:13:50.880 --> 01:13:53.880 I got it on my want list because I knew 1077 01:13:53.960 --> 01:13:57.640 him working with the Rangers and he's got Eagle Claw 1078 01:13:57.840 --> 01:14:01.439 and all the other you know, Green Aida and and 1079 01:14:01.439 --> 01:14:03.600 and and books. And I think that one comes out 1080 01:14:03.600 --> 01:14:04.199 in August. 1081 01:14:04.479 --> 01:14:07.960 All right, his name's going on my list for potential guests, 1082 01:14:08.800 --> 01:14:13.399 August guest. But we have some questions that we should 1083 01:14:13.399 --> 01:14:16.479 probably get to because I haven't been. Uh So, Alex, 1084 01:14:17.000 --> 01:14:21.279 thank you Alex. First off, thank you everybody for joining us. 1085 01:14:22.279 --> 01:14:24.279 Please subscribe to the channel for you have already and 1086 01:14:24.319 --> 01:14:27.840 hit the little belfer in your notifications. Alex, thank you, 1087 01:14:28.119 --> 01:14:32.319 uh Alex Uh. Alex wants to know what is it 1088 01:14:32.520 --> 01:14:35.159 like being the ultimate life form. 1089 01:14:36.319 --> 01:14:40.720 Life for I'm just an average guy, but you know, 1090 01:14:43.439 --> 01:14:45.640 I just wanted to do something different. When I was 1091 01:14:45.680 --> 01:14:48.800 in the Army and I had spent ten years in 1092 01:14:48.880 --> 01:14:52.800 e O D. I wanted to go into Special Forces. 1093 01:14:52.960 --> 01:14:55.640 I had put in for Special Forces as a medic. 1094 01:14:55.800 --> 01:14:59.319 I had a school day to be a Special Forces medic. 1095 01:15:00.039 --> 01:15:02.399 But then I got the phone call that they formed 1096 01:15:02.479 --> 01:15:05.119 up the unit in the Fort Bragg, a new unit. 1097 01:15:05.479 --> 01:15:09.920 They wanted six EO D people as part of the 1098 01:15:10.159 --> 01:15:14.800 unit to be operate or qualified. So I put, you know, 1099 01:15:14.920 --> 01:15:17.600 being a Special Forces medic and I went to Fort 1100 01:15:17.600 --> 01:15:22.279 Bragg for the interview, and two weeks later I was 1101 01:15:22.319 --> 01:15:24.279 in starting OTC. 1102 01:15:26.119 --> 01:15:30.960 Course And I mean, how did they sell the unit 1103 01:15:31.000 --> 01:15:33.079 to you? I mean were you aware of blue Light 1104 01:15:33.119 --> 01:15:35.960 at the time, Like, how how did they differentiate themselves 1105 01:15:35.960 --> 01:15:40.039 between you know, Delta and uh Special Forces. 1106 01:15:41.039 --> 01:15:44.680 Well, I called up and talked to somebody there at 1107 01:15:44.680 --> 01:15:48.880 the stockade, and I just knew that they were forming 1108 01:15:48.880 --> 01:15:51.159 a special unit, and they wanted six e O D 1109 01:15:51.319 --> 01:15:55.680 people And you know peacetime, you know, I've been Vietnam, 1110 01:15:55.800 --> 01:15:59.680 and this is post Vietnam EO D. We're doing ring 1111 01:15:59.760 --> 01:16:03.159 you know, you know, dud grenades at the grenade range 1112 01:16:03.199 --> 01:16:09.479 at Fort Leonard Wood. I wanted something different, and so 1113 01:16:09.560 --> 01:16:13.119 I went for the interview, flew there, and then they 1114 01:16:13.199 --> 01:16:15.640 talked to me about what they were trying to do. 1115 01:16:16.640 --> 01:16:21.079 And so two weeks later I got PCs orders to 1116 01:16:21.399 --> 01:16:27.399 Fort Brag. It sounded really interesting. We had in OTC one, 1117 01:16:27.520 --> 01:16:30.880 we had six EO D guys try out only two. 1118 01:16:30.960 --> 01:16:34.560 Two of us made it through OTC one, and then 1119 01:16:34.560 --> 01:16:37.319 in OTC two we had another six E O D 1120 01:16:37.560 --> 01:16:41.840 guys and only two made it through that part, and 1121 01:16:42.000 --> 01:16:44.640 of course we went to We got there late. They 1122 01:16:44.640 --> 01:16:47.680 had already run the selection Assessment course and we were 1123 01:16:47.680 --> 01:16:51.680 going into the operator training course. But under the thing 1124 01:16:51.920 --> 01:16:54.279 we had to go through the selection assessment. We had 1125 01:16:54.319 --> 01:16:56.960 to pass that. So in the fall of seventy eight 1126 01:16:58.000 --> 01:17:01.119 we all went through the Selection Asessment course and only 1127 01:17:01.159 --> 01:17:03.319 three of us passed the selection. 1128 01:17:04.239 --> 01:17:06.640 So you went to OTC before you went to the 1129 01:17:06.640 --> 01:17:07.680 Operated Trainer course. 1130 01:17:07.760 --> 01:17:10.960 Before that, we did it backwards. We went to OTC 1131 01:17:11.279 --> 01:17:15.920 first five months of OTC, then I. Then I went 1132 01:17:16.000 --> 01:17:18.600 to the fall of seventy eight went to select I did. 1133 01:17:19.159 --> 01:17:22.079 We had two back to back selection courses in fall 1134 01:17:22.199 --> 01:17:25.840 seventy eight. I got polled on the first selection course 1135 01:17:26.319 --> 01:17:29.359 after about five days because my times were slow, so 1136 01:17:29.439 --> 01:17:31.560 I got pulled. I had to go in and talk 1137 01:17:31.600 --> 01:17:34.640 to Colonel Backcourt. Colonel Beckwith says do you want to 1138 01:17:34.640 --> 01:17:37.720 stay here? And I says yes I do. He says, well, 1139 01:17:37.720 --> 01:17:40.800 you're going to have to go through selection again. So 1140 01:17:40.960 --> 01:17:44.680 we then the next selection course I went through and 1141 01:17:44.760 --> 01:17:48.479 I passed it. Wow. And then I went to Airborne 1142 01:17:48.479 --> 01:17:52.199 School because we were all legs. So and then so 1143 01:17:52.319 --> 01:17:55.680 in the spring of seventy nine, I went to seventh 1144 01:17:55.720 --> 01:17:59.239 Group at Fort Bragg was actually running an airborne course. 1145 01:17:59.720 --> 01:18:02.399 So I went through air Warn School at Fort Bragg 1146 01:18:02.760 --> 01:18:08.800 with seventh Group. That's amazing. We did things a little backwards. Uh, 1147 01:18:09.199 --> 01:18:11.000 David Maynor, Thank you, David. Uh. 1148 01:18:11.560 --> 01:18:13.840 When the Chuck Norris movie came out, I'm assuming you 1149 01:18:13.960 --> 01:18:16.479 means delth Force. When Chuck Norris movie came out, did 1150 01:18:16.479 --> 01:18:18.439 you guys know about it and did you get a 1151 01:18:18.479 --> 01:18:19.520 group together to see it? 1152 01:18:20.000 --> 01:18:24.479 Yeah, we we knew about it. Uh. Chuck Norris, you know, 1153 01:18:24.600 --> 01:18:30.000 John Wayne was an iconic figure and Martha Ray were 1154 01:18:30.239 --> 01:18:34.680 kind for Special Forces, right Uh. Uh. Chuck Norris wanted 1155 01:18:34.760 --> 01:18:40.399 to be our special movie star and Beckworth had nothing 1156 01:18:40.439 --> 01:18:43.760 to do with Chuck Norris. Chuck Norris tried to contact us, 1157 01:18:44.520 --> 01:18:49.199 and beckw just didn't want anything to do. Of course. 1158 01:18:49.279 --> 01:18:52.920 You also, Uh, after Eagle Claw, we got a lot 1159 01:18:52.960 --> 01:18:56.439 of letters actually came to the unit, people writing and 1160 01:18:56.479 --> 01:18:59.960 thanking us. So when you we had staff duty, we 1161 01:19:00.039 --> 01:19:02.640 would go through all the letters and read them. There's 1162 01:19:02.720 --> 01:19:06.880 people that wanted back with autograph. Uh, but he did 1163 01:19:06.880 --> 01:19:08.600 not do any autographs. 1164 01:19:08.880 --> 01:19:12.000 Now, you were a top secret unit and people were 1165 01:19:12.119 --> 01:19:13.319 sending you letters, but. 1166 01:19:13.439 --> 01:19:15.920 Yeah, I don't know, I don't know how they addressed him. 1167 01:19:15.920 --> 01:19:18.199 But you know that we had the regular post office 1168 01:19:18.239 --> 01:19:23.560 box there at Fort Bragg and so we, yeah, we 1169 01:19:23.640 --> 01:19:25.600 get all these letters and we read them when we 1170 01:19:25.640 --> 01:19:29.479 had staff duty at night. That's pretty So you. 1171 01:19:29.520 --> 01:19:32.680 Had John Wayne as the iconic SF guy, then Chuck 1172 01:19:32.720 --> 01:19:34.199 Norris wanted to be the Delta guy, and then we 1173 01:19:34.199 --> 01:19:37.159 had what Nicholas Cage as the ranger and Aaron or 1174 01:19:37.279 --> 01:19:42.359 not Aaron America but con AerR uh huh. 1175 01:19:42.520 --> 01:19:46.399 But yeah, we Chuck Norris never got through the door. Now, 1176 01:19:47.399 --> 01:19:51.880 so was the movie not well received? It's pretty hokey. Uh, 1177 01:19:52.199 --> 01:19:55.600 you know, it had nothing to do with Eagle Claw. 1178 01:19:56.399 --> 01:19:59.119 It had more like, you know, there was some hostage 1179 01:19:59.239 --> 01:20:04.960 Plaine Hijen backing some hostages. But yeah, it was it 1180 01:20:05.039 --> 01:20:05.880 was entertaining. 1181 01:20:07.359 --> 01:20:11.079 Yeah, uh, Matt, thank you very much, Dak, thank you 1182 01:20:11.159 --> 01:20:13.760 very much. They just donated with no questions, I don't think. 1183 01:20:13.800 --> 01:20:18.560 And then Jonathan w did Mike know Ronnie Strahan s 1184 01:20:18.560 --> 01:20:20.199 t R A H A N. 1185 01:20:21.039 --> 01:20:25.039 Yeah, the name sounds familiar. He told me he's a 1186 01:20:25.199 --> 01:20:30.840 Jonathan's cousin. Yeah, the the name sounds very familiar, but 1187 01:20:30.920 --> 01:20:35.560 I can't say how I can place him. Uh. DJ 1188 01:20:35.680 --> 01:20:39.119 thank you very much for a twenty dollars donation at stort. UH. 1189 01:20:40.279 --> 01:20:42.520 Thank you for sharing your experience. Is there anything you 1190 01:20:42.560 --> 01:20:45.600 can share about the rumors about a possible Louise mission 1191 01:20:45.640 --> 01:20:49.279 for m I as in the early nineteen eighties, UH 1192 01:20:49.520 --> 01:20:53.000 Commander Major Hani mentioned in his book as after concurrent 1193 01:20:53.000 --> 01:20:57.079 with Desert one. Yeah, that was always uh. We always 1194 01:20:57.119 --> 01:20:58.239 had that mission. 1195 01:20:58.960 --> 01:21:03.359 Uh. We had a a planning cell for the pow 1196 01:21:04.039 --> 01:21:07.159 if we ever found in Southeast Asia any of our 1197 01:21:07.199 --> 01:21:11.960 POWs were still being held for whatever reason, because they 1198 01:21:12.000 --> 01:21:14.199 may not have been We felt that they may not 1199 01:21:14.239 --> 01:21:17.760 have been considered POWs. If they had committed a crime, 1200 01:21:18.840 --> 01:21:21.880 then they would be charged. You say, they killed the 1201 01:21:21.920 --> 01:21:25.880 guard or something like that, then you lose your POW 1202 01:21:26.039 --> 01:21:32.199 status and you're a criminal and or whatever for whatever reason. 1203 01:21:32.359 --> 01:21:36.680 So we always had a cell that was looking into 1204 01:21:37.119 --> 01:21:40.319 I was never part of that planning cell, but we 1205 01:21:40.399 --> 01:21:44.159 had several of these planning cells for different all different kinds, 1206 01:21:44.000 --> 01:21:48.960 and our unit, only a small number of people would 1207 01:21:49.000 --> 01:21:55.199 be privy to these any of these operations, they would 1208 01:21:55.199 --> 01:21:58.119 be read into the program and then when you left 1209 01:21:58.159 --> 01:22:04.239 the program, you have to be read out. So yeah, 1210 01:22:04.279 --> 01:22:08.000 but I as far as you know, because who was 1211 01:22:08.039 --> 01:22:19.800 that the ex Special Forces guy when yeah, Bo Grits. Yeah, 1212 01:22:21.439 --> 01:22:24.319 I don't think we ever got anywhere. None of that 1213 01:22:24.359 --> 01:22:27.560 stuff ever panned out. We had a lot of missions 1214 01:22:27.600 --> 01:22:31.600 that we would spin up for uh, you know, like 1215 01:22:31.680 --> 01:22:38.560 that lost pilot during uh the first desert storm with 1216 01:22:38.720 --> 01:22:43.840 whether or not he was being held prisoner. Yes, I'm 1217 01:22:43.840 --> 01:22:47.520 trying to remember his name. And we would always plan 1218 01:22:47.640 --> 01:22:49.960 on that. We were even planning on going to the 1219 01:22:50.319 --> 01:22:56.159 his aircraft crash site and searching that in Iraq, uh, 1220 01:22:56.159 --> 01:22:59.079 but we never we never did do that. But that 1221 01:22:59.239 --> 01:23:02.760 was but he was determined that he was killed in 1222 01:23:02.760 --> 01:23:03.720 that plane crash. 1223 01:23:04.399 --> 01:23:09.039 Did did Did you have many Sane raiders either in 1224 01:23:09.119 --> 01:23:12.640 the unit or or that were part of that had 1225 01:23:12.640 --> 01:23:14.159 the input or we had two? 1226 01:23:15.760 --> 01:23:20.600 Jack Joplin was our medic, a chief medic and he 1227 01:23:20.720 --> 01:23:24.680 was a SANTE on SANTE mission and we also had 1228 01:23:24.800 --> 01:23:29.520 dig meadows, uh. And those were the two Sante people 1229 01:23:29.600 --> 01:23:30.279 that we had. 1230 01:23:32.439 --> 01:23:34.760 And for I mean, for those who don't know on 1231 01:23:34.840 --> 01:23:37.479 the what's the book on Sante is No, that's Sentenctic, 1232 01:23:37.720 --> 01:23:39.600 but it is Sante, right. 1233 01:23:40.239 --> 01:23:44.640 Yeah, there's a good operation Ivory Coast, I think, yeah, 1234 01:23:44.680 --> 01:23:50.319 it sounds right. Yeah, so yeah, about the Sante raid. 1235 01:23:50.399 --> 01:23:55.439 And there's also uh, there's also a book out that 1236 01:23:55.479 --> 01:23:59.760 I just became aware of about Jaysk planning a potential 1237 01:23:59.800 --> 01:24:02.840 p O W rescue mission and laws for you know, 1238 01:24:02.920 --> 01:24:04.680 POWs from the Vietnam. 1239 01:24:04.279 --> 01:24:06.479 War, and I ordered it. I haven't read it. 1240 01:24:06.479 --> 01:24:09.640 Yet, but I guess i'll. Uh, I'll get back to 1241 01:24:09.680 --> 01:24:12.159 you with if there's anything out there that's useful. 1242 01:24:13.039 --> 01:24:15.880 Thank you very much, thanks so much starting me here 1243 01:24:16.199 --> 01:24:17.560 for sharing your experience with us. 1244 01:24:17.880 --> 01:24:20.279 We truly appreciate it. Hopefully understand. 1245 01:24:21.000 --> 01:24:24.359 G Watt humor here goes, could you beat Chuck Norris 1246 01:24:24.359 --> 01:24:25.800 in a fight, because. 1247 01:24:26.000 --> 01:24:29.560 Yes, no, I don't think so. I think he's got 1248 01:24:29.600 --> 01:24:32.840 more moves than I got. I'm a I'm a demo guy. 1249 01:24:33.439 --> 01:24:36.760 You know. If it has to do with explosives, that's 1250 01:24:37.960 --> 01:24:41.720 that's it. I could out demo Chuck Norris with explosives, 1251 01:24:41.800 --> 01:24:44.359 I know. So there you go. 1252 01:24:45.039 --> 01:24:47.000 Chester Brown, thank you very much, and he just said, 1253 01:24:47.000 --> 01:24:51.399 thank you guys for your service. Gordon Bradberry, thank you. Uh, 1254 01:24:51.560 --> 01:24:55.720 good day. It's an Australian it's an Australian donation. So 1255 01:24:55.960 --> 01:25:00.640 he starts out with good day. 1256 01:25:00.680 --> 01:25:03.760 Who can do? Good day? Good day mate, good day mate? Right, 1257 01:25:05.039 --> 01:25:07.239 I just know. Uh, look at the site of that guana. 1258 01:25:08.119 --> 01:25:12.720 Any Atlanta. Did you get any TV? 1259 01:25:13.560 --> 01:25:17.000 Did you get any tdy trips to Hereford, UK or 1260 01:25:17.039 --> 01:25:19.880 down to Perth, Australia for some decent aussy beer. 1261 01:25:20.479 --> 01:25:25.119 Uh, yeah, Herford. I've been to Hereford several times working 1262 01:25:25.159 --> 01:25:27.319 with the SAS. I did a lot of stuff. The 1263 01:25:27.319 --> 01:25:31.359 first time I climbed Mount Danale Mount McKinley at the 1264 01:25:31.399 --> 01:25:36.000 time Dnale today was with nine guys from the SAS. 1265 01:25:36.119 --> 01:25:40.199 They invited a couple of US got Americans to go 1266 01:25:40.239 --> 01:25:43.520 with them from Delta. I was the only one. So 1267 01:25:43.520 --> 01:25:46.600 so the first time I climbed it in nineteen ninety 1268 01:25:47.279 --> 01:25:50.079 was with nine Aussies, I mean nine Brits from the 1269 01:25:50.199 --> 01:25:55.840 essay to t SAS. I've worked with the New Zealand SAS, 1270 01:25:56.680 --> 01:26:00.319 been to New Zealand twice working with them. When I 1271 01:26:00.399 --> 01:26:04.520 was in Uh it used to have an exercise every 1272 01:26:04.560 --> 01:26:08.439 other year called gone from On. So it's a joint 1273 01:26:08.520 --> 01:26:14.399 exercise between the Malaysian Scouts, the Australian s A S, 1274 01:26:14.640 --> 01:26:19.119 the New Zealand s A S, the British s A S. 1275 01:26:19.159 --> 01:26:24.319 They had British sbs UH and then we had the CC, 1276 01:26:24.960 --> 01:26:31.840 the Air Force c CT guys and we had the 1277 01:26:31.960 --> 01:26:38.520 Seals and Special Forces Delta and every so we used 1278 01:26:38.520 --> 01:26:41.439 to have those exercises and so I went on one 1279 01:26:41.520 --> 01:26:44.880 of those in New Zealand and worked with the New 1280 01:26:44.960 --> 01:26:47.560 Zealand s A S and did some climbing with the 1281 01:26:47.600 --> 01:26:51.000 New Zealand SA S down in the South Island, did 1282 01:26:51.039 --> 01:26:54.520 mountain training. When I was in B Squadron, we had 1283 01:26:54.560 --> 01:26:58.680 different troops, different teams. In B Squadron, I was an 1284 01:26:58.680 --> 01:27:03.359 Assault troop, but we had like Mobility troop, Air troop, 1285 01:27:03.640 --> 01:27:08.000 water troop, mountain troop, and so I was on a 1286 01:27:08.039 --> 01:27:12.119 mountain team in in Delta and so we did mountain 1287 01:27:12.159 --> 01:27:16.319 training all the time. So we were doing skiing when 1288 01:27:17.439 --> 01:27:22.119 Eagle Claw happened. I was out when Grenada happened. I 1289 01:27:22.119 --> 01:27:27.439 was out rock climbing at Leavenworth, Washington, doing rock climbing 1290 01:27:27.439 --> 01:27:31.800 when we got called back for Grenada. So did you 1291 01:27:32.039 --> 01:27:33.159 UH for. 1292 01:27:35.239 --> 01:27:40.159 What were the similarities and differences between Delta, the Australian 1293 01:27:40.279 --> 01:27:42.880 S s and the British SAS. 1294 01:27:45.199 --> 01:27:49.600 Hmmm, Uh, I really don't know too much with the 1295 01:27:49.600 --> 01:27:54.279 difference between the two Australian and UH British s A S. 1296 01:27:54.760 --> 01:27:57.520 They all have their selection in sessment things in the 1297 01:27:57.720 --> 01:28:02.760 but the New Zealand UH SAS guys, a lot of them, 1298 01:28:02.840 --> 01:28:08.079 great majority of were of Maori descent. They did really 1299 01:28:08.199 --> 01:28:13.960 well for selection assessment and they did you know, of course, 1300 01:28:14.199 --> 01:28:17.319 the British SAS does it in the Beacon Hills. They 1301 01:28:17.760 --> 01:28:22.680 and we copied, We copied everything from the britge Delta 1302 01:28:22.720 --> 01:28:27.000 did from the SBS. During OTC one we had instructors 1303 01:28:27.039 --> 01:28:31.960 from the the SAS teaching us how to shoot and 1304 01:28:32.640 --> 01:28:36.680 a lot of things. And so our selection assessment was 1305 01:28:36.760 --> 01:28:41.039 modeled under THEIRS. The New Zealand SAS they do it 1306 01:28:41.119 --> 01:28:43.520 more in the North Island and the more of the 1307 01:28:43.600 --> 01:28:49.560 tropic swampy areas and stuff like that. But I was 1308 01:28:49.600 --> 01:28:53.000 really impressed with the New Zealand SAS guys that I 1309 01:28:53.079 --> 01:28:54.960 worked with. Fascinating. 1310 01:28:55.359 --> 01:28:58.119 Oh and since you have been to Hereford, can you 1311 01:28:58.159 --> 01:29:01.359 answer the universe question of what color is the boat house? 1312 01:29:02.399 --> 01:29:06.079 What color is the what the boat house? I don't know, 1313 01:29:07.159 --> 01:29:10.840 never mind Rod of God thank you for the donation 1314 01:29:10.920 --> 01:29:11.199 and that. 1315 01:29:13.119 --> 01:29:16.000 The oh no and Alex thank you. What was it 1316 01:29:16.119 --> 01:29:20.159 like to work with Kate McBriar and Larry Vickers? What 1317 01:29:20.199 --> 01:29:23.319 does Delta do better than other spec OP units in 1318 01:29:23.359 --> 01:29:27.159 the US or other or any other military Yeah. 1319 01:29:26.960 --> 01:29:31.800 I knew, I knew Larry Vickers. And who's the other one, Katy? 1320 01:29:32.000 --> 01:29:37.359 Katy was in blue Light, So I don't think, Okay, 1321 01:29:37.640 --> 01:29:42.800 I know Larry Vickers. What we do different? You know, 1322 01:29:43.000 --> 01:29:47.840 we work closely with the Sealed Team six in two areas. 1323 01:29:48.079 --> 01:29:54.319 We work closely with our sniper observers across train with 1324 01:29:55.159 --> 01:29:59.159 both units and our breachers. And so I was a breacher, 1325 01:29:59.279 --> 01:30:01.439 I was e O D. But I was also a 1326 01:30:01.439 --> 01:30:05.279 master breacher in Delta, and I was for a while 1327 01:30:05.319 --> 01:30:07.479 for many years, I was in charge of the breaching 1328 01:30:07.600 --> 01:30:11.960 R and D research. And when we did a breaching 1329 01:30:12.239 --> 01:30:16.479 trip research trip, whether it was Seal Team six was 1330 01:30:16.520 --> 01:30:20.960 doing it, Delta was doing it, or the FBI Hostage 1331 01:30:21.000 --> 01:30:24.800 Rescue Team was doing it, all three of us worked together. 1332 01:30:25.000 --> 01:30:27.319 So if I did a breaching R and D trip 1333 01:30:27.399 --> 01:30:30.279 of how to get through, I'm looking at getting through 1334 01:30:30.319 --> 01:30:33.520 some concrete walls with reebar and stuff like that. Coming 1335 01:30:33.560 --> 01:30:39.359 ways to defeat that, then the Seal Teams six breachers 1336 01:30:39.439 --> 01:30:42.600 and the HRT breachers would be on the same trip. 1337 01:30:44.000 --> 01:30:52.000 So we cross trained in those areas really well, you know, 1338 01:30:52.399 --> 01:30:55.920 Seal Team six guys, you know, their forte is you know, 1339 01:30:56.680 --> 01:31:01.960 all water ops and look up right and close to 1340 01:31:02.000 --> 01:31:08.119 the shore and you know, and and of course we 1341 01:31:08.319 --> 01:31:11.359 you know, our our stuff is more inland stuff. But 1342 01:31:11.399 --> 01:31:14.279 we you know, we did have water teams and we 1343 01:31:14.359 --> 01:31:18.920 did a little bit of water stuff, but we you know, 1344 01:31:18.960 --> 01:31:24.560 we just have our own niche Uh do you. 1345 01:31:27.840 --> 01:31:32.159 How how I mean when when Jaysock was being formed 1346 01:31:32.239 --> 01:31:36.399 or maybe later on, because there's a lot of mission 1347 01:31:36.399 --> 01:31:38.720 creep now, but was it still was Was there a 1348 01:31:38.760 --> 01:31:41.359 lot of mission creep then? Were people competing for the 1349 01:31:41.399 --> 01:31:44.239 same job, you know, different units? 1350 01:31:45.560 --> 01:31:48.479 Yeah, there was some of that, you know, whether they 1351 01:31:48.520 --> 01:31:51.560 felt that, you know, Delta was being favorite or you know, 1352 01:31:51.600 --> 01:31:54.399 Seal Team six might have felt that Delta was being 1353 01:31:54.439 --> 01:31:59.359 favored for certain missions over them. Uh, but you know, 1354 01:31:59.439 --> 01:32:03.840 we all had our special thing and so you know, 1355 01:32:04.000 --> 01:32:08.239 it's you put the right unit to do the mission. 1356 01:32:08.319 --> 01:32:11.760 And if it was more of what how we were training, 1357 01:32:12.319 --> 01:32:14.960 we would never think of trying to do a maritime mission. 1358 01:32:15.079 --> 01:32:20.359 We're trying to board some cruise ship that was cruising. 1359 01:32:20.920 --> 01:32:25.000 You know, it's fourteen to fifteen knots and try to 1360 01:32:24.479 --> 01:32:30.239 board on a cruise ship. And you know, so we 1361 01:32:30.319 --> 01:32:33.840 all had our different specialties, but certain things that we 1362 01:32:34.000 --> 01:32:37.760 cross changed. Like I said, with the snipers observers and 1363 01:32:37.800 --> 01:32:42.319 with the breachers, those two we we we trained together, 1364 01:32:43.199 --> 01:32:45.760 and we did a lot of training. 1365 01:32:48.000 --> 01:32:53.119 So Mike, uh, you know, before we move on, and 1366 01:32:53.159 --> 01:32:54.880 I don't know if there'll be a few more questions, 1367 01:32:54.880 --> 01:32:58.359 but I definitely wanted to get in there. Going back 1368 01:32:58.399 --> 01:33:00.760 to Eagle Claw on you know, now that we've come 1369 01:33:00.840 --> 01:33:03.600 up on forty years, what do you think the legacy 1370 01:33:03.760 --> 01:33:06.720 of that mission is all these years later, you know, 1371 01:33:07.399 --> 01:33:10.800 both for special operations and maybe for you and you 1372 01:33:10.840 --> 01:33:13.920 know your fellow operators personally when you look back on it. 1373 01:33:15.039 --> 01:33:18.800 Well, you know it was you know, we felt confident 1374 01:33:18.880 --> 01:33:22.279 in Eagle Claw are part of the mission. We knew 1375 01:33:22.279 --> 01:33:25.760 if we could get to the embassy, we would be successful. 1376 01:33:25.840 --> 01:33:29.760 We trained so hard in that I even would dream 1377 01:33:29.880 --> 01:33:32.520 about it at night when I was asleep, you know, 1378 01:33:32.600 --> 01:33:36.640 going through and up that stairs and you know, on 1379 01:33:36.680 --> 01:33:43.520 the second floor and searching the rooms. So it was 1380 01:33:43.720 --> 01:33:46.920 real disappointing when we knew we could be successful and 1381 01:33:46.920 --> 01:33:49.279 we never got a chance to do what we were 1382 01:33:49.319 --> 01:33:57.359 trained to do. And but the legacy, of course was 1383 01:33:57.479 --> 01:33:59.840 there was a lot of pro We had a lot 1384 01:33:59.840 --> 01:34:03.239 of issues, a lot of problems, and of course you 1385 01:34:03.359 --> 01:34:07.079 we already talked about Jaysok being formed to solve some 1386 01:34:07.159 --> 01:34:13.000 of those joint issues that we had interoperability issues. And 1387 01:34:12.560 --> 01:34:17.039 then of course after Grenada we had USO com and 1388 01:34:17.119 --> 01:34:21.319 so you know, when Desert Storm came out, you know, 1389 01:34:21.520 --> 01:34:24.960 we were given the scud hunting mission in western Iraq 1390 01:34:25.319 --> 01:34:30.239 along with the with the British sas. So they divided, 1391 01:34:30.399 --> 01:34:33.439 we divided to pie up between them and us to 1392 01:34:33.520 --> 01:34:37.520 do the scud hunting. Uh what you know, we were 1393 01:34:37.520 --> 01:34:42.199 not very successful in finding the scuds and having them 1394 01:34:42.279 --> 01:34:47.319 taken out, but just our presence there on the ground 1395 01:34:48.560 --> 01:34:54.000 really prevented them from exposing those scud launchers. We were afraid. 1396 01:34:54.119 --> 01:34:57.800 We wanted to keep Israel out of the conflict, and 1397 01:34:58.000 --> 01:34:59.920 if they would have launched a couple of scuds and 1398 01:35:00.079 --> 01:35:03.119 hit Israel, then Israel got in and that would have 1399 01:35:03.199 --> 01:35:06.880 made things messy. But I think we did pretty good. 1400 01:35:06.960 --> 01:35:12.760 We had an accident. The helicopter. Helicopter crashed into it 1401 01:35:13.079 --> 01:35:15.560 just outside the airfield. We were at place called in 1402 01:35:15.640 --> 01:35:19.840 Saudi Araba called our Ur had a small hill about 1403 01:35:19.840 --> 01:35:24.279 the only hill round and it was really visibility was 1404 01:35:24.359 --> 01:35:28.479 really poor. The helicopter came in, it was metavacing. One 1405 01:35:28.479 --> 01:35:31.640 of our guys, Sergeant Major Pat Hurley, had injured his 1406 01:35:31.840 --> 01:35:36.800 back and so we had two Delta medics on that flight, 1407 01:35:37.520 --> 01:35:43.560 at Otto Clark and Rodriguez, and the the helicopter ran 1408 01:35:43.640 --> 01:35:47.560 into the mountain and everybody on that mission and that 1409 01:35:47.680 --> 01:35:51.880 helicopter died. Uh Yeah, I had to go in and 1410 01:35:52.039 --> 01:35:54.399 clean up that all the animal they had on that 1411 01:35:54.479 --> 01:36:00.359 helicopter and destroy it. But you know then now you 1412 01:36:00.399 --> 01:36:04.680 know after that, probably the next mission we had was Haiti, 1413 01:36:06.119 --> 01:36:10.399 and we operated off the aircraft carrier USS America CV 1414 01:36:10.600 --> 01:36:15.800 sixty six I, so that was the Joint Task Force headquarters. 1415 01:36:15.880 --> 01:36:22.840 We had two star General Peter Peter Shoemaker. Schoomaker was 1416 01:36:23.319 --> 01:36:25.840 the commander of the thing, and we were going to 1417 01:36:25.920 --> 01:36:30.720 invade Haiti and put the re established the government in Haiti. 1418 01:36:31.760 --> 01:36:37.039 So we had had uh two teams of Seal Team 1419 01:36:37.199 --> 01:36:42.840 six on board that held on the aircraft carrier. We had. 1420 01:36:43.520 --> 01:36:47.560 We had a whole battalion of rangers from one battalion 1421 01:36:47.720 --> 01:36:52.520 on board, a company from another battalion, and a platoon 1422 01:36:52.560 --> 01:36:56.920 I think from a third battalion on that aircraft carrier, 1423 01:36:57.119 --> 01:37:01.600 and we had course Task Force once sixty one sixtieth 1424 01:37:02.119 --> 01:37:07.159 on there. And so I was the senior enlisted advisor. 1425 01:37:07.560 --> 01:37:11.760 I was a senior ranking person enlisted on the aircraft 1426 01:37:11.800 --> 01:37:15.720 carrier for the Joint Task Force. And that was interesting. 1427 01:37:17.000 --> 01:37:21.119 We spent forty four days on aircraft carrier operating off that. 1428 01:37:21.920 --> 01:37:24.279 Of course, you know that we did not have to 1429 01:37:24.279 --> 01:37:30.760 do a forceful seizure of Haiti. Former President Jimmy Carter. 1430 01:37:32.199 --> 01:37:34.239 I'm trying to think who else was involved. Was a 1431 01:37:34.319 --> 01:37:39.560 colon Powell was involved. Anyway, they convinced the government that 1432 01:37:40.479 --> 01:37:46.760 for a peaceful, peaceful they would go to exile someplace 1433 01:37:46.920 --> 01:37:52.119 and reinstate the government. And so that went pretty well. 1434 01:37:52.119 --> 01:37:56.039 That was the first time we operated on a float 1435 01:37:56.680 --> 01:37:59.840 forward support base on USA, and when that was a 1436 01:37:59.880 --> 01:38:02.960 lot lot of lessons learned to operate on an aircraft carrier, 1437 01:38:04.199 --> 01:38:10.359 and that was in nineteen ninety four four. You know, 1438 01:38:10.840 --> 01:38:14.560 my opinion we should have been operating on an aircraft 1439 01:38:14.600 --> 01:38:19.119 carrier during Somalia in eighty ninety three. We should not 1440 01:38:19.319 --> 01:38:22.680 have been at that air base in Somalia, and that 1441 01:38:22.840 --> 01:38:26.600 was a big mistake because every movement we made operating 1442 01:38:26.640 --> 01:38:30.359 off that was we were watched and we should have 1443 01:38:30.399 --> 01:38:37.199 been offshore and been flying missions in from offshore. But 1444 01:38:37.279 --> 01:38:40.760 that's a lesson learned. Well. 1445 01:38:41.119 --> 01:38:43.199 When you said there were a lot of lessons learned 1446 01:38:43.600 --> 01:38:47.760 working off an aircraft carr or floating for an operating base, like, 1447 01:38:48.039 --> 01:38:50.199 what are some examples of those lessons learned? 1448 01:38:50.800 --> 01:38:53.600 Well, we were like the air wing, the air component 1449 01:38:53.800 --> 01:38:57.840 on the aircraft carrier. So when you we had to 1450 01:38:57.960 --> 01:39:00.920 you know, we had to provide I had to provide 1451 01:39:01.000 --> 01:39:07.800 twenty four KPIs for the for the for the galleys 1452 01:39:07.840 --> 01:39:11.359 there on. The ship had at twenty four hours ship, 1453 01:39:11.399 --> 01:39:13.600 you know, twenty four hours, seven days a week. I 1454 01:39:13.680 --> 01:39:17.520 had to have twenty four of our guys. So the 1455 01:39:17.600 --> 01:39:21.840 rangers came to me and every day I'd have two meetings. 1456 01:39:22.279 --> 01:39:24.439 I take all the senior enlisted from all of the 1457 01:39:24.520 --> 01:39:28.399 Jaysak elements and all the ship's chiefs from the different 1458 01:39:28.399 --> 01:39:31.079 compartments on the chief and twice a day we would 1459 01:39:31.119 --> 01:39:33.520 have a meeting and we would iron out all the 1460 01:39:33.560 --> 01:39:37.359 problems we would have. And so the Rangers said that 1461 01:39:37.520 --> 01:39:40.640 they would provide the KPS if I didn't as sign 1462 01:39:40.760 --> 01:39:45.359 them any other details on the ship. So the rangers 1463 01:39:45.359 --> 01:39:49.560 took over that we had to do underway unreps on 1464 01:39:49.640 --> 01:39:53.199 the ship. So the Seals said that they would do 1465 01:39:53.479 --> 01:39:56.199 all the unreps. They we'd have to move the cargo 1466 01:39:56.319 --> 01:39:59.279 from the hangar bays to where they needed to go 1467 01:39:59.319 --> 01:40:01.880 into store, and so I had the Seals do that. 1468 01:40:02.199 --> 01:40:04.760 So everybody stepped up their part. But you know, we 1469 01:40:04.800 --> 01:40:07.760 had to work out laundry issues because we've spent forty 1470 01:40:07.760 --> 01:40:11.359 four days on the ship, so we had and forty 1471 01:40:11.560 --> 01:40:16.039 so we had laundry issues, we had library issues, we 1472 01:40:16.119 --> 01:40:20.720 had the weight room. You know the gym. Our guys 1473 01:40:20.720 --> 01:40:24.079 were actually breaking the JIM equipment. And you know the 1474 01:40:24.159 --> 01:40:27.880 only difference between a prison gym and an aircraft carrier 1475 01:40:28.000 --> 01:40:30.159 JIM is the prison gym is the better gym than 1476 01:40:30.199 --> 01:40:34.039 the aircraft carrier JIM. Because our guys kept breaking all 1477 01:40:34.079 --> 01:40:36.600 the JIM equipment. So I told this guy, I says, 1478 01:40:36.640 --> 01:40:39.680 you give me a list of all broken equipment, what 1479 01:40:39.840 --> 01:40:43.000 parts you need, and I'll get them to you. The 1480 01:40:43.039 --> 01:40:46.279 library guys wanted our guys to leave their ID cards 1481 01:40:46.319 --> 01:40:48.600 when they've checked out a book, to leave the ID cards. 1482 01:40:48.760 --> 01:40:51.119 Any minute we could be calling people up on deck 1483 01:40:51.199 --> 01:40:54.640 and we can't be going around. I said, I guarantee 1484 01:40:55.239 --> 01:40:57.760 that if a guy checks out the book, you're going 1485 01:40:57.800 --> 01:41:00.600 to get that book back. I guarante. And then I 1486 01:41:00.680 --> 01:41:03.560 told all the ranger sergeant majors that book. If you 1487 01:41:03.640 --> 01:41:06.119 get your guys check out a book, it's going back. 1488 01:41:07.079 --> 01:41:13.359 Uh and and so that kind of stuff. The ship 1489 01:41:13.399 --> 01:41:20.319 has no tobacco policy ship. Well, the rangers are dipping 1490 01:41:20.439 --> 01:41:25.359 and chewing and stuff like that. Yeah, yeah, and so 1491 01:41:25.640 --> 01:41:28.880 what they were doing when they were on the flight deck, 1492 01:41:28.960 --> 01:41:31.960 the rangers were, and this is in the beginning, they 1493 01:41:31.960 --> 01:41:34.279 have what you call pad eyes on a flight deck. 1494 01:41:35.199 --> 01:41:39.800 A pad eye is where you lock down secure aircraft machinery. 1495 01:41:40.920 --> 01:41:43.800 A couple they got a crossbar thing with a whole, 1496 01:41:44.319 --> 01:41:47.159 and that's where you connect to Well, the rangers were 1497 01:41:47.239 --> 01:41:51.800 spitting in the pad eyes with their tobacco stuff. Well, 1498 01:41:52.079 --> 01:41:55.319 before any air operations, you have to do a FOD 1499 01:41:55.399 --> 01:41:58.760 walk for an object damage walk. So anybody up on 1500 01:41:58.800 --> 01:42:01.560 the flight deck when you all when they call a fodwalk, 1501 01:42:01.960 --> 01:42:05.319 everybody gets online and you walk the flight deck to 1502 01:42:05.439 --> 01:42:09.720 look for washers, nuts, screws, anything and every pad I 1503 01:42:09.800 --> 01:42:12.800 has got to be searched in case there's a nut 1504 01:42:12.880 --> 01:42:16.760 or screw because you know that could during air operations. 1505 01:42:16.800 --> 01:42:18.800 That could be the world or wash or a jet 1506 01:42:18.880 --> 01:42:22.520 could take that and that could kill somebody or damage equipment. 1507 01:42:22.560 --> 01:42:25.720 So you do a fidwalk. Well in the beginning, Uh, 1508 01:42:26.039 --> 01:42:29.399 when they called a fodwalk, everybody would head down below deck. 1509 01:42:29.520 --> 01:42:34.119 Cannot do it. You're on deck when a fodwalk calls. Uh, 1510 01:42:34.560 --> 01:42:36.439 you got to do a fodwalk. You got to walk 1511 01:42:36.479 --> 01:42:39.760 the deck. Well, it's when you're searching those padiyes with 1512 01:42:39.840 --> 01:42:43.720 tobacco juice. Was a so I said to it, said 1513 01:42:43.720 --> 01:42:47.239 that we cannot stop the rangers from chewing and dipping 1514 01:42:47.560 --> 01:42:50.720 at this time. You do not want to have a 1515 01:42:50.760 --> 01:42:53.960 bunch of rangers on board the ship without you know, 1516 01:42:54.840 --> 01:42:58.880 going through nicotine withdraws. So we set up a special 1517 01:42:59.000 --> 01:43:02.479 area on the ship up Sponsor six at the back 1518 01:43:02.520 --> 01:43:04.640 of the ship. Or the rangers could chew and dip 1519 01:43:05.720 --> 01:43:08.560 all they wanted. We had events on it. We had 1520 01:43:08.600 --> 01:43:11.000 like a little Olympic, had to set Olympic up. We 1521 01:43:11.000 --> 01:43:13.520 had to keep the rangers. Rangers, you have to keep 1522 01:43:13.640 --> 01:43:19.800 busy just into trouble. So we had different things to 1523 01:43:19.880 --> 01:43:25.760 keep rangers busy, you know, different things like like a 1524 01:43:25.800 --> 01:43:29.920 scavenger hunt type thing. Also where they can learn how 1525 01:43:29.960 --> 01:43:32.439 to get around and move in the ship from one 1526 01:43:32.560 --> 01:43:36.279 location to another, because the aircraft carrier can be quite confusing. 1527 01:43:37.600 --> 01:43:41.399 You got all the different markings that you have in 1528 01:43:41.439 --> 01:43:45.720 the ship because you where you are. And so it 1529 01:43:45.760 --> 01:43:51.520 was a learning curve. So some of our one sixtieth 1530 01:43:51.560 --> 01:43:54.640 guys were putting decals on some of the Navy equipment, 1531 01:43:54.760 --> 01:43:58.479 some of the stickers on Navy equipment. So then so 1532 01:43:58.520 --> 01:44:02.960 then the Navy started putting stickers on the helicopters, and 1533 01:44:03.039 --> 01:44:06.439 I said, you got to cut that stuff out. Nobody's 1534 01:44:06.479 --> 01:44:12.079 putting stickers on anything. And yeah, so whenever my telephone 1535 01:44:12.079 --> 01:44:15.720 would ring, I always got bad news. I never got 1536 01:44:15.800 --> 01:44:19.760 good news. I had. I had fights in the kitchens, 1537 01:44:20.279 --> 01:44:26.439 some some cookie too telling the range spec for ranger 1538 01:44:27.359 --> 01:44:29.920 to do something and that ranger wasn't going to do it, 1539 01:44:29.960 --> 01:44:33.119 and next thing you know, they go, they start fighting. 1540 01:44:34.159 --> 01:44:38.039 How did how did the the army, the especially rangers 1541 01:44:38.039 --> 01:44:40.960 and young privates. 1542 01:44:39.680 --> 01:44:42.960 How did they adjust to maybe culture. 1543 01:44:42.640 --> 01:44:46.000 Because it's very it's very different, you know, like the 1544 01:44:46.039 --> 01:44:48.239 officers and the army and the officers in the navy. 1545 01:44:48.479 --> 01:44:54.039 On board a ship, it's a different culture. Yeah, it is. 1546 01:44:54.399 --> 01:44:56.600 It was problems, but we got a lot of them 1547 01:44:56.680 --> 01:44:59.560 sorted out. It was a big learning curve. 1548 01:45:00.359 --> 01:45:00.600 Uh. 1549 01:45:00.680 --> 01:45:02.800 And we had to figure out laundry. You know. We'd 1550 01:45:02.840 --> 01:45:05.199 sign people to go down to the ship's laundry and 1551 01:45:05.279 --> 01:45:08.319 do do the laundry for your group and stuff like that. 1552 01:45:08.840 --> 01:45:12.079 I did. I did. I did every detail on the ship. 1553 01:45:12.279 --> 01:45:15.800 I personally, I did, went down did laundry, so I 1554 01:45:15.880 --> 01:45:19.640 knew how the process went so that I could be 1555 01:45:20.199 --> 01:45:22.520 to say, okay, you know, I did it, so you 1556 01:45:22.560 --> 01:45:28.520 guys can do it. Yeah. The rangers were good. You 1557 01:45:28.600 --> 01:45:31.079 just got to keep you know, keep them busy. 1558 01:45:31.600 --> 01:45:31.880 Uh. 1559 01:45:31.920 --> 01:45:36.680 And that's the biggest thing. Uh. You know, it's all 1560 01:45:36.720 --> 01:45:39.600 about rank on a ship. Like you know, if you 1561 01:45:39.680 --> 01:45:43.680 were like the ship store, for example, there's only so 1562 01:45:43.760 --> 01:45:46.000 many people allowed in a ship store. I don't know, 1563 01:45:46.079 --> 01:45:48.439 maybe three people can go in a ship store, and 1564 01:45:48.479 --> 01:45:51.680 everybody waits outside the ship store in the line. Except 1565 01:45:51.920 --> 01:45:54.479 if you're a chief, if you're you know, East seven 1566 01:45:54.600 --> 01:45:57.760 or above, you don't have to wait in line, you 1567 01:45:57.840 --> 01:46:00.760 if you can go and up there. So we were 1568 01:46:00.800 --> 01:46:03.520 all standing out there. I mean, this is Seal Team, 1569 01:46:03.600 --> 01:46:06.479 this is myself, a bunch of Seal Team, six guys. 1570 01:46:06.840 --> 01:46:10.560 Everybody standing out there is E seven or above. And 1571 01:46:10.600 --> 01:46:12.960 this navy chief tries to cut in front of us, 1572 01:46:12.960 --> 01:46:15.800 and he said, hey, hey, hey, you know, get in 1573 01:46:15.800 --> 01:46:18.560 the back of the line. And the guy says, you know, 1574 01:46:18.560 --> 01:46:22.600 we're not wearing rank. And the guy says, chiefs, chiefs 1575 01:46:22.640 --> 01:46:25.319 can cut in front of the line. We're all chiefs here, 1576 01:46:25.880 --> 01:46:27.359 get in the back of the line. 1577 01:46:27.680 --> 01:46:30.199 Well, because not only are they wearing their rank, but 1578 01:46:30.239 --> 01:46:33.399 they're wearing a different uniform. Yeah, and everybody else. 1579 01:46:34.000 --> 01:46:38.760 Yeah, it was, it was. It was interesting. I spent 1580 01:46:38.840 --> 01:46:40.960 a lot of time with the ship's captain. We would 1581 01:46:41.039 --> 01:46:45.239 actually him and I would then would get out when 1582 01:46:45.279 --> 01:46:47.880 there's no air ops going on. We'd walk the flight 1583 01:46:48.000 --> 01:46:52.079 deck and just talk with the ship's captain. I had 1584 01:46:52.560 --> 01:46:56.800 I dined with the ship's captain several times, got to 1585 01:46:56.840 --> 01:47:00.000 really know him. And at the end of the day, 1586 01:47:00.239 --> 01:47:02.680 when this thing was done, so what we did was 1587 01:47:02.880 --> 01:47:09.960 we you know, we we left it parted Norfolk, Virginia 1588 01:47:10.119 --> 01:47:15.199 on aircraft carrier without the air any air component. So 1589 01:47:15.239 --> 01:47:18.640 then we flew down the Georgia coast and then then 1590 01:47:19.039 --> 01:47:23.880 one sixtieth flew onto the aircraft carrier off the Georgia coast, 1591 01:47:24.680 --> 01:47:27.760 and then we steamed down to Haiti and then we 1592 01:47:27.840 --> 01:47:31.319 did different drills. We had to do like man overboard 1593 01:47:31.399 --> 01:47:35.039 drills where you had to count for everybody, had to 1594 01:47:35.079 --> 01:47:38.960 do battle stations, we had to go through all that 1595 01:47:39.079 --> 01:47:42.600 kind of stuff. So it was really different. And so 1596 01:47:43.119 --> 01:47:46.399 I was like the senior enlisted advisor for the Joint 1597 01:47:46.439 --> 01:47:51.520 Task Force, but I was also safety during air operations. 1598 01:47:51.560 --> 01:47:54.600 I put on a white jersey, had a helmet on, 1599 01:47:54.840 --> 01:47:59.560 had my ears, and I would be up monitoring safety 1600 01:47:59.600 --> 01:48:03.680 on the floor for any operations for our guys, because 1601 01:48:03.720 --> 01:48:05.800 you know, we have a bunch of army guys now 1602 01:48:05.880 --> 01:48:09.720 flying helicopters on and off, and I make sure everybody's 1603 01:48:09.720 --> 01:48:14.680 got the right equipment on there. And and uh so 1604 01:48:15.119 --> 01:48:19.640 I've got a picture hanging up on the wall with 1605 01:48:19.640 --> 01:48:25.239 with the USS America and all of our army helicopters. 1606 01:48:25.479 --> 01:48:30.760 Yeah, Mike, we got a couple more questions here, Jonathan. 1607 01:48:30.840 --> 01:48:32.319 He said he wanted to add a little bit more 1608 01:48:32.359 --> 01:48:36.640 context about Ronnie Strahan he was a retired CSM out 1609 01:48:36.680 --> 01:48:41.560 of Socom. Yeah and uh and he said, uh, he 1610 01:48:41.760 --> 01:48:44.399 was a son. He was also a Suntay raider. So 1611 01:48:44.399 --> 01:48:45.800 he figured you guys knew each other. 1612 01:48:46.119 --> 01:48:48.840 Yeah, I did. I knew the name. I heard of him, 1613 01:48:49.199 --> 01:48:51.640 but we never met. I don't think we've met. 1614 01:48:52.840 --> 01:48:55.880 David Asks. Did you learn to breach with a Knight 1615 01:48:56.000 --> 01:48:57.039 Armaments master? 1616 01:48:57.159 --> 01:48:57.399 Key? 1617 01:48:57.840 --> 01:49:00.000 Do you know where the idea of putting a shotgun 1618 01:49:00.239 --> 01:49:05.159 under the barrel of a rifle came from? 1619 01:49:05.560 --> 01:49:05.800 Shock? 1620 01:49:06.079 --> 01:49:11.560 Well, we we had we did. We carried we carried 1621 01:49:12.000 --> 01:49:17.279 twelve gage shotguns and we had some ten gage shotguns 1622 01:49:18.119 --> 01:49:22.000 that we would do for breaching, shooting locks and set 1623 01:49:22.199 --> 01:49:25.720 forth like that. We used, you know, we came up 1624 01:49:25.720 --> 01:49:29.520 with different explosive breaching charges using linear of shape charge 1625 01:49:29.640 --> 01:49:35.199 FLEXI linear of shaped charges. We used. One of the 1626 01:49:35.239 --> 01:49:39.239 things we use is cavetor belt material good Year three 1627 01:49:39.239 --> 01:49:44.960 point thirty B rubber cavetor belt material to absorb the 1628 01:49:45.359 --> 01:49:48.439 using that to we put the explosives on top of that. 1629 01:49:49.119 --> 01:49:54.039 The explosives then compresses the rubber. It distributes the force 1630 01:49:54.279 --> 01:49:58.680 evenly out. Uh and so, and we would do different 1631 01:49:58.760 --> 01:50:03.960 charges a planner charge, well, yeah, like a stript charge. Yeah, 1632 01:50:04.039 --> 01:50:09.039 but using conveyor belt rubber. Yeah, and it is did 1633 01:50:09.039 --> 01:50:12.840 you call it with that, because like just applying the the. 1634 01:50:13.359 --> 01:50:17.920 Whatever it was for two whatever you guys using would 1635 01:50:17.960 --> 01:50:20.520 blow through the door. So so you came up with 1636 01:50:20.560 --> 01:50:23.640 the idea of using the lubber stript charge. 1637 01:50:24.039 --> 01:50:27.920 Yeah. It's more of a kinetic thing. It distributes the 1638 01:50:30.319 --> 01:50:34.479 force out evenly. You know, sometimes there's like maybe metal 1639 01:50:34.520 --> 01:50:38.800 and reinforcing underneath that metal. Well, otherwise you put explosives 1640 01:50:38.800 --> 01:50:40.960 on top, it's just going to punch through that, right, 1641 01:50:41.159 --> 01:50:44.640 using a medium such as the carvertor belt rubber. And 1642 01:50:44.680 --> 01:50:47.039 we found out that was the best kind of rubbers 1643 01:50:47.039 --> 01:50:49.359 the Good Year three p. Thirty B. It had three 1644 01:50:49.439 --> 01:50:55.279 layers of nylon cord through it, and sometimes we'd make 1645 01:50:55.359 --> 01:50:58.479 fancy stuff. We would cut through certain areas, add more 1646 01:50:58.520 --> 01:51:02.239 explosives to different parts of it. We'd make a sandwich 1647 01:51:02.359 --> 01:51:07.439 type thing with it, and so that worked really well. 1648 01:51:07.520 --> 01:51:14.119 We've so we hostage rescue. The FBI. They like to 1649 01:51:14.159 --> 01:51:17.720 do a lot of water impulse charges using explosives in water. 1650 01:51:18.479 --> 01:51:21.560 But you know that's in a permissive environment where you've 1651 01:51:21.600 --> 01:51:24.319 got water and you're right next to your structure and 1652 01:51:24.359 --> 01:51:27.680 you can just take your bunch of water and fill 1653 01:51:27.680 --> 01:51:30.520 it up. But if you're in a non permissive environment, 1654 01:51:30.840 --> 01:51:33.439 you're not going to be carrying extra water around. You're 1655 01:51:33.439 --> 01:51:38.439 going to be drinking it to so we we our 1656 01:51:38.479 --> 01:51:43.239 stuff is more designed for non permissive environments. So different 1657 01:51:43.279 --> 01:51:44.680 thinking between the FBI. 1658 01:51:45.279 --> 01:51:49.000 Well, like using like an IV bag, I mean it's heavier, right, 1659 01:51:49.079 --> 01:51:51.760 It's heavier than just using the like a good year 1660 01:51:51.840 --> 01:51:53.960 strip charge or something like that, which is just a 1661 01:51:54.039 --> 01:51:59.079 really flexible charge. That's fascinating because you guys probably developed 1662 01:51:59.199 --> 01:52:02.079 so many of the charges that are just like standard. 1663 01:52:02.119 --> 01:52:06.199 Now. Yeah, it was, it was, I you know, initially 1664 01:52:06.239 --> 01:52:09.680 Beckwith did not want us to write anything down during 1665 01:52:09.720 --> 01:52:14.439 his tenure as commander. He did not want I don't know, 1666 01:52:14.520 --> 01:52:17.159 he didn't want us to document anything, Mike. 1667 01:52:17.319 --> 01:52:20.000 If you read in his memoir, he got that from 1668 01:52:20.039 --> 01:52:23.479 the SAS because when he was over there, they believed 1669 01:52:23.479 --> 01:52:25.159 you had to have it all up here and if 1670 01:52:25.199 --> 01:52:28.000 you couldn't hold it in your brain, then you didn't 1671 01:52:28.000 --> 01:52:28.880 need to be in the unit. 1672 01:52:29.920 --> 01:52:32.920 Yeah, but that doesn't good when you start losing people. 1673 01:52:33.079 --> 01:52:35.920 People are leaving. No, Yeah, you don't have the knowledge. 1674 01:52:36.279 --> 01:52:38.399 The institutional knowledge gets lost. 1675 01:52:38.479 --> 01:52:42.279 Right, so I actually put together the first breaching book 1676 01:52:42.319 --> 01:52:48.640 in Delta, actually assembled it, and every every team breacher 1677 01:52:49.199 --> 01:52:52.840 had a copy of the breaching book. Because our charges 1678 01:52:52.880 --> 01:52:56.680 became so sophisticated. You know, we had different levels. We 1679 01:52:56.760 --> 01:53:00.199 had four different levels of breaching charges. We had what 1680 01:53:00.319 --> 01:53:05.359 level one breaching charge is a charge that's open source thing, 1681 01:53:05.600 --> 01:53:09.159 you know at the law enforcement doesn't every You can 1682 01:53:09.319 --> 01:53:13.600 find level one breaching charges on the Internet and stuff 1683 01:53:13.640 --> 01:53:17.279 like that, and so, you know, so that was our 1684 01:53:17.359 --> 01:53:20.279 level one. Level two stuff was starting to get more 1685 01:53:20.319 --> 01:53:24.159 specialized where you know, some of our wall charges and 1686 01:53:24.239 --> 01:53:28.920 stuff like that. Then we had level three charges where 1687 01:53:28.960 --> 01:53:32.319 they were more complicated. We had we have stuff that 1688 01:53:32.359 --> 01:53:37.840 we can use two open doors on passenger aircraft for example, 1689 01:53:38.000 --> 01:53:43.159 if the doors are denied, if they tie down the doors, 1690 01:53:44.359 --> 01:53:48.199 like one aircraft they took the neck ties. The Egyptian 1691 01:53:49.199 --> 01:53:52.800 aircraft they took nick ties off the passengers and the 1692 01:53:53.319 --> 01:53:56.800 exit overwing exits they used the neck ties and tied 1693 01:53:56.840 --> 01:54:00.000 them up. But we had charges that you could put 1694 01:54:00.039 --> 01:54:02.319 on there and if they had them tied up, it 1695 01:54:02.319 --> 01:54:05.520 would just snap the handle and the door would go in. 1696 01:54:06.079 --> 01:54:08.479 So you know, that was kind of like our level 1697 01:54:08.560 --> 01:54:13.119 three stuff. Then we had level four stuff, which is 1698 01:54:13.720 --> 01:54:16.880 limited to know stuff. Only a few people in the 1699 01:54:17.000 --> 01:54:21.239 unit were privy to our breaching charges that we considered 1700 01:54:21.319 --> 01:54:24.640 level four information charge. And that's I'll leave it at that. 1701 01:54:25.319 --> 01:54:27.119 Were you were you doing? 1702 01:54:27.600 --> 01:54:31.479 Obviously you were exchanging techniques with like the FBI's HRT 1703 01:54:31.680 --> 01:54:35.239 and the SAS, yes, and then experimenting. But then were 1704 01:54:35.239 --> 01:54:40.119 you also consulting I don't know, professor, Like, how were 1705 01:54:40.159 --> 01:54:41.760 you gaining all this knowledge? 1706 01:54:42.039 --> 01:54:48.000 Oh? Yeah, I also I belonged to the I also 1707 01:54:48.079 --> 01:54:51.399 became a member of the Society of Explosive Engineers when 1708 01:54:51.439 --> 01:54:54.439 I was in the unit, and we had access to 1709 01:54:54.479 --> 01:55:04.920 all the scientists like it, Lawrence liver More, Sanda uh 1710 01:55:06.279 --> 01:55:09.359 and uh. So we had all these enginees, you know, 1711 01:55:09.479 --> 01:55:14.279 doctor Cooper, uh, all these experts. We did a lot 1712 01:55:14.319 --> 01:55:18.079 of testing out at Nevada test site. We'd do a 1713 01:55:18.159 --> 01:55:23.880 little testing out there. We did testing at sequorl New Mexico, 1714 01:55:24.439 --> 01:55:29.319 out at New Mexico Tech. Uh And so we worked 1715 01:55:29.319 --> 01:55:32.720 with different people, and of course we got to the 1716 01:55:32.760 --> 01:55:36.319 point where all of our stuff was instrumented. We would 1717 01:55:36.319 --> 01:55:40.640 have a high speed cameras, we'd have pressure sensors and 1718 01:55:40.680 --> 01:55:44.079 stuff like that. So we hired the Army Corps of 1719 01:55:44.119 --> 01:55:52.560 Engineers Waterways Experiment Station out of Vicksburg, Mississippi. And so 1720 01:55:52.640 --> 01:55:55.840 when we did any breaching R and D things, the 1721 01:55:55.840 --> 01:56:00.880 Corps of Engineers instrumented all of our tests. Fascinating. Yeah, 1722 01:56:00.960 --> 01:56:05.560 and science. My budget was several million dollars. I had 1723 01:56:05.640 --> 01:56:07.880 seven to eight million dollar breaching budget. 1724 01:56:08.079 --> 01:56:09.760 Well, you must have been like a kid in a 1725 01:56:09.800 --> 01:56:12.439 candy store. Yeah, like, because I mean, this is your 1726 01:56:12.640 --> 01:56:14.640 this is your thing, this is your passion. 1727 01:56:14.760 --> 01:56:17.680 Right, Yeah, it was. It's really neat to be able 1728 01:56:17.720 --> 01:56:20.359 to come up with this stuff. I mean we had 1729 01:56:21.039 --> 01:56:25.840 one of our things was in Libya. Have you guys 1730 01:56:26.000 --> 01:56:31.159 heard of Tarhunah? In Libya? Kadaffi had these head and 1731 01:56:31.199 --> 01:56:35.119 in the mountains, the Tarhunah Mountains. He had bought two 1732 01:56:35.199 --> 01:56:38.600 Swiss tunnel boring machines, you know like they did the 1733 01:56:38.680 --> 01:56:43.000 channel under the English Channel. Kadaffi bought two of them 1734 01:56:43.399 --> 01:56:47.800 and he dug two parallel tunnels in this Tarhunah with 1735 01:56:47.880 --> 01:56:51.079 his tunnel boring machine. And what he was going to 1736 01:56:51.159 --> 01:56:58.560 do is set up a chemical production underground chemical production facility. 1737 01:56:58.720 --> 01:57:02.520 One cut out. Kadaffie was there. He had one set 1738 01:57:02.600 --> 01:57:06.600 up at rafta Rafta was a small scale chemical. He 1739 01:57:06.680 --> 01:57:09.399 made some mustard and different other things, but it was 1740 01:57:09.479 --> 01:57:14.239 small scale. It was open. But he wanted to take 1741 01:57:14.279 --> 01:57:19.439 this big, big production chemical agents underground. And we knew 1742 01:57:19.479 --> 01:57:22.159 all this was going on. We could see the construction 1743 01:57:22.319 --> 01:57:25.680 at Tarhoona and stuff like that. Now he told the 1744 01:57:25.720 --> 01:57:29.920 world that this was the great man made water project. 1745 01:57:30.199 --> 01:57:32.560 He told the reason he bought these two tunnel boring 1746 01:57:32.640 --> 01:57:37.000 machines was going to make water reservoirs for the town, 1747 01:57:37.359 --> 01:57:40.479 you know, for Tripoli and all that kind of stuff. 1748 01:57:40.520 --> 01:57:42.680 But we knew that he was going to do these 1749 01:57:42.720 --> 01:57:45.119 two things. He's going to make side channels in there 1750 01:57:45.159 --> 01:57:48.800 and put it under So the plan was when I 1751 01:57:48.880 --> 01:57:51.760 was in jaysck J three Special Plan Stars at Major 1752 01:57:52.319 --> 01:57:55.000 I was in charge of target the feet of hardened targets. 1753 01:57:56.000 --> 01:57:58.119 Our goal was before he would set up a chemical 1754 01:57:58.119 --> 01:58:00.680 production facility, we were going to go in and destroy 1755 01:58:00.760 --> 01:58:04.720 his tunnels. We were. And so you know, tunnel boring 1756 01:58:04.760 --> 01:58:08.079 machines are huge and as they go in, they do 1757 01:58:08.199 --> 01:58:11.439 the concrete, the reinforcing steel and stuff as they go 1758 01:58:11.560 --> 01:58:15.439 in to the tunnel, and there wouldn't be nothing to 1759 01:58:15.520 --> 01:58:19.359 destroy except for the tunnel itself. We would have to 1760 01:58:19.720 --> 01:58:23.880 implode the tunnels. So we found the right and this 1761 01:58:23.960 --> 01:58:28.399 was all sandstone. So we found the right sandstone out 1762 01:58:28.399 --> 01:58:32.199 at New Mexico Tech at SoCoRo. I went all over 1763 01:58:32.239 --> 01:58:35.199 the country looking at sandstone with the Corps of engineers 1764 01:58:35.600 --> 01:58:39.039 and we picked the sandstone there. So we set up 1765 01:58:39.319 --> 01:58:43.279 concrete just exactly like the tunnel boring machines, and we'd 1766 01:58:43.319 --> 01:58:48.319 go in with drilling machines and drill parallel holes outside 1767 01:58:48.319 --> 01:58:51.199 of the concrete between the concrete and the sandstone with 1768 01:58:51.279 --> 01:58:55.199 these drilling rigs, and then we would pump in bulk 1769 01:58:55.319 --> 01:59:00.199 explosives and actually implode these tunnels. It'd be a big operation. 1770 01:59:01.159 --> 01:59:04.079 We would have had to gone in with hovercraft. We 1771 01:59:04.119 --> 01:59:08.920 would we planned on having garbage trucks full of slurry explosives, 1772 01:59:09.319 --> 01:59:13.039 we would have drilling rigs, so we would go and 1773 01:59:13.079 --> 01:59:15.720 so this was we were planning on doing all this 1774 01:59:16.279 --> 01:59:18.720 and then actually going in and taking all the tunnels 1775 01:59:18.760 --> 01:59:24.520 and imploding them. But anyway, somebody decided that better to 1776 01:59:24.560 --> 01:59:28.399 tell the world what Kadaffi's up to, and so it 1777 01:59:28.479 --> 01:59:33.000 was announced to the world what he was doing, and 1778 01:59:33.199 --> 01:59:38.960 Kadaffi ceased operations because of the publicity and and stuff 1779 01:59:39.000 --> 01:59:41.920 like that, but that was going to be a major operation. 1780 01:59:42.119 --> 01:59:50.399 I was going into Libya and imploding, So we were 1781 01:59:50.439 --> 01:59:53.399 trained on how to do. Now you know today now 1782 01:59:53.439 --> 01:59:56.600 we have what we call a heavy breaching cell in 1783 01:59:56.640 --> 01:59:59.960 the in the unit and people because it started getting 1784 02:00:00.399 --> 02:00:02.119 preaching started to be a big thing. 1785 02:00:05.720 --> 02:00:08.199 On that note, actually, someone asks if you have any 1786 02:00:08.199 --> 02:00:11.039 experiences in Africa that you might be able to speak of. 1787 02:00:11.439 --> 02:00:12.680 I guess aside from Libya. 1788 02:00:13.279 --> 02:00:15.960 Yeah, the only thing I did, I did a couple 1789 02:00:16.000 --> 02:00:18.680 of tours in Sudan when I was in the unit 1790 02:00:19.000 --> 02:00:27.720 in the early eighties. The president of Sudan was a 1791 02:00:27.720 --> 02:00:33.720 guy named Namari at the time, and his vice president 1792 02:00:33.760 --> 02:00:37.520 came over and talked to the United States and stuff. 1793 02:00:37.720 --> 02:00:40.199 He wanted somebody to go a team to go over 1794 02:00:40.239 --> 02:00:46.640 and evaluate the presidential security of Sudan. So there's two 1795 02:00:46.680 --> 02:00:49.079 of us from the unit that were part of that detail, 1796 02:00:49.680 --> 02:00:54.119 Bud Morgan and myself. So we went with team and 1797 02:00:54.319 --> 02:01:00.800 the other guys were from a unit called ISAT. This 1798 02:01:01.840 --> 02:01:07.800 is a is an intelligence security agency. It's the It 1799 02:01:07.840 --> 02:01:11.840 was a intell military intelligence cell that was set up 1800 02:01:12.640 --> 02:01:17.319 at the time, and so we went in and we 1801 02:01:17.439 --> 02:01:23.399 evalue weighted his security, all of his his looked at 1802 02:01:23.479 --> 02:01:27.199 his palace and his you know, all this stuff. And 1803 02:01:27.239 --> 02:01:31.119 then when I was there, they realized my background. And 1804 02:01:31.159 --> 02:01:34.720 so I went and I looked at all the storage facilities. 1805 02:01:35.199 --> 02:01:39.760 They had a plant there in Cartoon that made nine 1806 02:01:39.840 --> 02:01:43.640 millimeters and shotgun twelve gate shotgun shells. So I went 1807 02:01:43.680 --> 02:01:48.239 there and looked at the production safety, look at safety 1808 02:01:48.319 --> 02:01:53.000 and all that, and they had two ammunition storage areas there, 1809 02:01:53.159 --> 02:01:56.199 and I tell you that was a mess. You know, 1810 02:01:56.239 --> 02:02:01.960 they you know, nothing, everything was. I went into this 1811 02:02:02.159 --> 02:02:07.600 powder magazine and I go in there. There's no lightning protection, 1812 02:02:08.439 --> 02:02:11.960 there's I go in there and there's palettes, wooden pallettes 1813 02:02:12.000 --> 02:02:15.520 with nails on it. There's there's powder on the floor, 1814 02:02:15.880 --> 02:02:19.840 loose powder on the floor, there's no static no static 1815 02:02:19.880 --> 02:02:23.399 electricity precautions where you have to ground yourself and wear 1816 02:02:23.840 --> 02:02:26.520 non sparking shoes and all this kind of stuff. And 1817 02:02:26.560 --> 02:02:29.439 I go. I walked in there, and I'm like, oh 1818 02:02:29.439 --> 02:02:35.359 my gosh, just one spark, this whole thing would go 1819 02:02:35.359 --> 02:02:41.119 go off in Sudan. And so I made in the 1820 02:02:41.199 --> 02:02:45.239 head and then they showed me some Russian blasting caps 1821 02:02:45.239 --> 02:02:49.600 and stuff like that. Well, they the Russians don't shunt 1822 02:02:49.600 --> 02:02:54.159 their blasting electric blasting caps. Well, whatever reason these were, 1823 02:02:54.279 --> 02:03:00.520 these were electric blasting caps, all unshunned, unshunted, and it's 1824 02:03:00.560 --> 02:03:04.239 just so I made a lot of safety recommendations and 1825 02:03:04.319 --> 02:03:07.840 stuff like that. So we did this thing, and I 1826 02:03:08.640 --> 02:03:13.239 set up a I propose that they have a vip 1827 02:03:14.439 --> 02:03:20.600 ied search team that does presidential security suites looking for 1828 02:03:20.840 --> 02:03:24.159 improvise explosives. And I sent all this stuff up and 1829 02:03:24.239 --> 02:03:27.680 told them what they needed. So when we left there, 1830 02:03:28.079 --> 02:03:33.239 and normally the the the agency goes in and would 1831 02:03:33.279 --> 02:03:37.079 do the next phases, go in there and train take 1832 02:03:37.119 --> 02:03:39.439 these people, whether they bring him back here to the 1833 02:03:39.479 --> 02:03:43.000 States in a secure location or go there. They would train. 1834 02:03:43.199 --> 02:03:46.479 They would agencies responsible for training that. But the agency 1835 02:03:46.600 --> 02:03:49.439 was busy. So I was asked to go back into 1836 02:03:49.439 --> 02:03:53.760 Sudan and train an army team to search for IEDs 1837 02:03:53.960 --> 02:03:57.199 and to be able to dispose of IEDs. And so 1838 02:03:57.560 --> 02:04:00.880 I went back into Sudan and at this time in 1839 02:04:01.000 --> 02:04:05.199 Khartom they were having terrorist attacks. There were problems, that 1840 02:04:05.279 --> 02:04:09.199 civil war was going on in Chad, and there they 1841 02:04:09.319 --> 02:04:13.600 was electronic timers, sophisticated electronic timer devices going off in 1842 02:04:13.640 --> 02:04:17.439 the city of Khartoon at this time. So I worked 1843 02:04:17.439 --> 02:04:21.840 with the Army EO D team there in Sudan. We 1844 02:04:21.920 --> 02:04:24.600 had a call. They had a great intel network. I 1845 02:04:24.640 --> 02:04:27.560 don't know if anything, the Sudanese had a good intel 1846 02:04:28.159 --> 02:04:32.399 got a call where there's two suitcases of explosives coming 1847 02:04:32.439 --> 02:04:35.239 into the airport. So we go over to the airport 1848 02:04:35.960 --> 02:04:41.199 and they find these two suitcases their international airport and 1849 02:04:41.479 --> 02:04:44.479 they take them into this room and big suitcases. They 1850 02:04:44.479 --> 02:04:47.399 go click click, and they open up the suitcases and 1851 02:04:47.439 --> 02:04:54.199 they're full of Semtex explosives, just packed full, nothing but 1852 02:04:54.279 --> 02:04:59.000 Semtics explosives, these two suitcases. And I'm standing watching them 1853 02:04:59.039 --> 02:05:01.720 do this, and I'm saying, you know, you intercept very 1854 02:05:01.760 --> 02:05:05.399 many of these. Next time you go click, click and open, 1855 02:05:05.680 --> 02:05:09.159 it's going to go boom, you know. So I, you know, 1856 02:05:09.479 --> 02:05:11.359 we had to bring in X ray. They didn't have 1857 02:05:11.560 --> 02:05:16.359 X ray machines. We brought in X ray machines, and 1858 02:05:16.439 --> 02:05:19.800 I told him how to remotely open suitcases like these. 1859 02:05:20.359 --> 02:05:23.239 I told him how to remotely open to search cars, 1860 02:05:23.239 --> 02:05:26.840 and how to remotely open and search cars, and how 1861 02:05:26.880 --> 02:05:30.159 to do all this kind of stuff. So I taught 1862 02:05:30.199 --> 02:05:32.640 them all that stuff. And then of course as soon 1863 02:05:32.680 --> 02:05:35.800 as Numari went to Egypt, they had a coup and 1864 02:05:35.840 --> 02:05:36.439 he was out. 1865 02:05:39.000 --> 02:05:41.920 I'm gonna I mean, you've been very generous with your time, Mike. 1866 02:05:42.039 --> 02:05:44.039 I'm gonna get try to get through just a couple 1867 02:05:44.039 --> 02:05:46.479 more questions here real quick, and then we still have 1868 02:05:46.520 --> 02:05:48.680 the bonus segment to do, so thank you for being 1869 02:05:48.720 --> 02:05:53.039 patient with us. One guy here is asking is it 1870 02:05:53.079 --> 02:05:57.239 accurate to say that the Brits trained Delta. 1871 02:05:57.399 --> 02:05:59.760 I would say that would be good because we had 1872 02:06:00.199 --> 02:06:05.159 instructors come in here. We had one guy named Ginger Flynn. 1873 02:06:05.840 --> 02:06:10.920 He was a shooting instructor. They taught us how to shoot, 1874 02:06:11.000 --> 02:06:14.720 how to double tap. That was a big thing that 1875 02:06:14.960 --> 02:06:18.760 every when we every target, we would have to put 1876 02:06:18.800 --> 02:06:22.039 two rounds into every target before we transition to the 1877 02:06:22.079 --> 02:06:26.560 next target to ensure that we had to kill. That 1878 02:06:26.600 --> 02:06:31.479 came from the the sas One of the things we 1879 02:06:31.560 --> 02:06:34.079 had to shoot is instinctive. We had to learn to 1880 02:06:34.520 --> 02:06:37.199 They took off our sites on our weapons, so like 1881 02:06:37.239 --> 02:06:41.079 we had. Our first weapon was an M three sub 1882 02:06:41.119 --> 02:06:45.479 machine gun forty five. That was our first assault weapons, 1883 02:06:45.479 --> 02:06:49.000 and they took our sites off that and with an 1884 02:06:49.159 --> 02:06:53.319 M three you can trigger control two rounds really easy, 1885 02:06:53.479 --> 02:06:56.920 go to two rounds, two rounds, two rounds. It's really 1886 02:06:56.920 --> 02:06:59.600 easy to trigger once you learn to shoot at M 1887 02:06:59.640 --> 02:07:04.600 three and so that was our first assault weapon. And 1888 02:07:04.640 --> 02:07:07.159 we had to shoot three by five inch cards, so 1889 02:07:07.199 --> 02:07:11.720 they would have instinctively shoot three by fives. Wow, at 1890 02:07:11.800 --> 02:07:16.159 what range? It's close. It was all instinctive like your 1891 02:07:16.239 --> 02:07:19.039 room clearing. So it was all close quarter battle type 1892 02:07:19.079 --> 02:07:23.640 instinctive shooting. But our targets were three by five inch cards. 1893 02:07:23.720 --> 02:07:27.119 Max asks search at Major Vining. Do you have any 1894 02:07:27.159 --> 02:07:30.520 advice for someone who plans on enlisting in the army. 1895 02:07:32.920 --> 02:07:39.399 Oh, well, it depends on your passion. You know, you know, 1896 02:07:41.199 --> 02:07:45.119 you know what you know. I have a grandson in 1897 02:07:45.199 --> 02:07:48.920 the Army right now. He's with fifth Group. He's in 1898 02:07:48.960 --> 02:07:54.000 a supports, he's in a one of the fifth Group battalions, 1899 02:07:54.479 --> 02:07:58.159 but he's a ninety one B. He's a wheel vehicle 1900 02:07:58.239 --> 02:08:01.119 mechanic with fifth Group at four AM. So I have 1901 02:08:01.159 --> 02:08:05.199 a grandson there. He wanted to His passion was to 1902 02:08:06.479 --> 02:08:09.399 work on vehicles, learn the trade so that when he 1903 02:08:09.439 --> 02:08:12.600 gets out of the army. He had a scholarship to 1904 02:08:12.680 --> 02:08:16.279 go to a tech school as a mechanic, but he 1905 02:08:16.399 --> 02:08:20.239 choose to learn want to the school at Fort Lee 1906 02:08:20.600 --> 02:08:25.159 and Strange. He's a ninety one B vehicle wheel mechanic. 1907 02:08:25.239 --> 02:08:27.600 When I was in a ninety one B was a medic. 1908 02:08:28.359 --> 02:08:33.239 Yeah, uh al, I'm sorry, go ahead, Michael, but but 1909 02:08:33.880 --> 02:08:36.920 what you can make that I made the army whatever 1910 02:08:36.960 --> 02:08:38.479 you want to make and I think you go in 1911 02:08:38.600 --> 02:08:41.920 with the right attitude, you can make it whatever you 1912 02:08:42.000 --> 02:08:42.800 want to make it. 1913 02:08:43.319 --> 02:08:45.960 And it's a great learning experience. 1914 02:08:47.840 --> 02:08:52.319 Alex asks, what's your favorite thing that goes boom? 1915 02:08:52.680 --> 02:08:58.479 Large stuff? Big stuff? The biggest thing I blew up 1916 02:08:58.680 --> 02:09:02.520 was in uh it was about fifty years ago, coming 1917 02:09:02.600 --> 02:09:07.239 up to fifty years ago today. Was the largest enemy. Yeah, 1918 02:09:07.439 --> 02:09:11.399 it was the largest enemy ammunition weapons cash found in 1919 02:09:11.439 --> 02:09:15.880 the Vietnam War in Cambodia during May and June of 1920 02:09:16.000 --> 02:09:23.199 nineteen seventy. Nixson authorized us to go into Cambodia and 1921 02:09:23.319 --> 02:09:25.960 so that so we went in there and of course 1922 02:09:26.000 --> 02:09:29.640 they had all their staging areas, their stockpiles and stuff. 1923 02:09:30.119 --> 02:09:35.079 And this one cash was found by the first calf 1924 02:09:35.239 --> 02:09:38.439 second of the twelfth was well, it was a it 1925 02:09:38.479 --> 02:09:40.880 was the first of the ninth Pink team actually found 1926 02:09:40.880 --> 02:09:46.600 the cash site from a from an oh WASH six 1927 02:09:47.159 --> 02:09:54.039 helicopter and they found the stacks of ammunition in the jungle, 1928 02:09:54.479 --> 02:09:58.399 and the second of the twelfth captured. The thing became 1929 02:09:58.520 --> 02:10:02.199 known as Rock Island East, you know, named after the 1930 02:10:02.199 --> 02:10:07.479 famous artsen on Iowa Rock Island. There was over three 1931 02:10:07.560 --> 02:10:12.119 hundred tons three hundred and twenty tons of weapons and 1932 02:10:12.199 --> 02:10:18.399 ammunition in these caches. There was a several stacks of site. 1933 02:10:18.399 --> 02:10:21.840 I think there was twenty eight stacks in the jungle 1934 02:10:21.960 --> 02:10:24.439 on a court trail that was a quarter mile long. 1935 02:10:25.279 --> 02:10:27.840 And then we had to set up a perimeter and 1936 02:10:27.880 --> 02:10:29.760 we had to set it up and blow. I was 1937 02:10:30.119 --> 02:10:32.960 part of a seven man EOD team that flew in 1938 02:10:33.920 --> 02:10:36.920 and we blew that up. It took us about six 1939 02:10:37.039 --> 02:10:40.359 days to set put explosives on it and set it 1940 02:10:40.479 --> 02:10:45.319 up to blow. And now some of the ammunition and 1941 02:10:45.720 --> 02:10:50.560 weapons were back called out. But yeah, that we used 1942 02:10:50.560 --> 02:10:55.399 three three hundred cases of C four and we used 1943 02:10:55.399 --> 02:10:59.800 twelve cases of detonating court. There's three thousand feet and 1944 02:11:00.159 --> 02:11:03.079 each case. And so we had we buried the detonating 1945 02:11:03.199 --> 02:11:08.680 chord lines underground and then and then when we would withdraw, 1946 02:11:08.760 --> 02:11:12.239 we had a two ship HLZ and we set up 1947 02:11:12.479 --> 02:11:16.279 charges around the perimeter to go off at interval times 1948 02:11:16.640 --> 02:11:19.279 to keep the enemy because the enemy was out there 1949 02:11:19.319 --> 02:11:22.600 wanting to retake back the rock the cash site. So 1950 02:11:22.640 --> 02:11:25.560 we had these charges to go off, and then when 1951 02:11:25.600 --> 02:11:30.279 the last two helicopters came down, then we had ten 1952 02:11:30.359 --> 02:11:34.600 priming systems of fifteen minutes each to make sure this 1953 02:11:34.640 --> 02:11:36.800 whole thing go. And if they came in and cut 1954 02:11:36.840 --> 02:11:40.039 one of our detonating chord lines, we had another detonating 1955 02:11:40.119 --> 02:11:45.159 cord line to go. So we pull our our fifteen 1956 02:11:45.199 --> 02:11:49.039 minute fuses. The eaight and myself we run to the 1957 02:11:49.039 --> 02:11:54.359 helicopter and as we get to the helicopter, the captain 1958 02:11:54.880 --> 02:11:58.800 and the helicopter says, cut the fuse. Cut the fuse, 1959 02:11:58.880 --> 02:12:01.560 cut the fuse. We run back out and we just 1960 02:12:01.600 --> 02:12:04.640 cut fuses. So cut all our lines. We don't know 1961 02:12:04.680 --> 02:12:08.039 what's going on. Go back to the helicopter and they 1962 02:12:08.119 --> 02:12:12.159 says light it, light it, you know, and that we 1963 02:12:12.199 --> 02:12:15.920 didn't have no more fusing nighters, you know, so we 1964 02:12:15.960 --> 02:12:18.439 had to go back over. Now our fifteen minute lines 1965 02:12:18.439 --> 02:12:20.800 are cut. We don't know what kind of time we got, 1966 02:12:20.840 --> 02:12:24.359 so we're splitting. We're splitting time. Fuse are putting a 1967 02:12:24.359 --> 02:12:27.279 match head in and lighting lighting it and when you 1968 02:12:27.319 --> 02:12:29.720 get a spit back, you can light a second one quickly. 1969 02:12:29.800 --> 02:12:33.079 Office So we light a bunch of them, and then 1970 02:12:33.119 --> 02:12:36.239 we get on the helicopter and while we're lighting this stuff, 1971 02:12:36.359 --> 02:12:40.039 are now our primitive charges are going off, and so 1972 02:12:40.199 --> 02:12:44.119 there's an explosion. Well, these helicopter people have don't have 1973 02:12:44.239 --> 02:12:47.840 no idea what's going on. They think we're being mortared, 1974 02:12:48.600 --> 02:12:51.279 and you can see they're bouncing. They're ready to leave, 1975 02:12:51.439 --> 02:12:55.279 you know, and because they think we're taking incoming. So 1976 02:12:55.560 --> 02:12:59.119 we light the things, we get on the helicopters, and 1977 02:12:59.159 --> 02:13:02.600 then the helicopter can't lift off that we're too overloaded 1978 02:13:02.720 --> 02:13:05.960 and and stuff. So the door guy taps me on 1979 02:13:06.000 --> 02:13:08.920 the shoulder says, you you you get off. You have 1980 02:13:09.000 --> 02:13:11.560 to get on the helicopter behind me. Well, we get 1981 02:13:11.560 --> 02:13:15.119 off on the ground and and they have the same problem. 1982 02:13:15.119 --> 02:13:17.079 They drop off a couple of people and then these 1983 02:13:17.119 --> 02:13:19.840 two helicopters take off. There's like five of us on 1984 02:13:19.880 --> 02:13:22.920 the ground, and you know, I'm the only U D 1985 02:13:23.039 --> 02:13:24.640 guy on the ground. The rest of the guys are 1986 02:13:24.920 --> 02:13:28.520 infantry echo recon guys. On the ground. We got the 1987 02:13:28.600 --> 02:13:32.600 charges of burning and no other than their helicopters just 1988 02:13:32.680 --> 02:13:35.000 took off. So I was getting ready to go back 1989 02:13:35.039 --> 02:13:37.119 and cut fuses again because I don't want to be 1990 02:13:37.239 --> 02:13:41.039 on the ground when this thing's off. And this other 1991 02:13:41.119 --> 02:13:44.760 helicopter comes in and I don't he was in orbit 1992 02:13:44.800 --> 02:13:47.119 out there, comes in and picks us up and takes 1993 02:13:47.199 --> 02:13:50.760 us out and we're not very far away when it 1994 02:13:50.800 --> 02:13:56.439 goes off, and it was pretty impressive. Uh. We did 1995 02:13:56.560 --> 02:14:00.920 take some ground fire on taking off and then it 1996 02:14:01.039 --> 02:14:05.199 blew up. I have slides of this too, and they 1997 02:14:05.199 --> 02:14:08.760 could see our mushroom cloud from fifty miles away and 1998 02:14:08.840 --> 02:14:11.960 that was rocking on the east largest amy up from. 1999 02:14:14.760 --> 02:14:18.720 The last question, then we get we uh, we should 2000 02:14:18.800 --> 02:14:21.399 probably start wrapping this up. Do you have any funny 2001 02:14:21.439 --> 02:14:25.680 stories about inexperienced officers? 2002 02:14:26.319 --> 02:14:31.279 Yeah, let's see. It sounds like you just told one. Actually, yeah, 2003 02:14:31.760 --> 02:14:35.479 I have a funny teammate, this guy. I'm gonna mention 2004 02:14:35.600 --> 02:14:39.279 his name, these great guy and stuff like that. His 2005 02:14:39.399 --> 02:14:43.800 name is Don Dreer. He reminds me so much of 2006 02:14:43.880 --> 02:14:49.079 Wily Coyote, you know the character in Wily Coyote. When 2007 02:14:49.119 --> 02:14:52.239 we were in New Zealand we had to go. I 2008 02:14:52.359 --> 02:14:55.319 was working with him. He was a sniper observer and 2009 02:14:55.359 --> 02:14:59.119 we were doing recount on targets. We're dressed in civilian clothes, 2010 02:14:59.520 --> 02:15:02.159 are cover was. We were two school teachers from the 2011 02:15:02.239 --> 02:15:06.880 United States. We were on bicycles and we were recounting 2012 02:15:06.920 --> 02:15:12.159 different military sites and stuff like that. And down one 2013 02:15:12.199 --> 02:15:14.800 of the things we had to cut across. There's this 2014 02:15:15.680 --> 02:15:19.680 creek or river with this big clay bank, and we 2015 02:15:19.720 --> 02:15:22.960 had to cut sneak, had to traverse across this thing 2016 02:15:24.479 --> 02:15:27.159 to get to our target site, you know, without it 2017 02:15:27.199 --> 02:15:33.399 being exposed, to stay concealed. So Down starts going across 2018 02:15:33.399 --> 02:15:36.279 this clay bank and it was just like Wally coyote. 2019 02:15:36.319 --> 02:15:39.920 You could see him climb and as he starts to slide, 2020 02:15:40.000 --> 02:15:42.479 his fingers were digging in and his toes were digging in, 2021 02:15:42.880 --> 02:15:47.479 and he was climbing and sliding, and eventually he just 2022 02:15:47.520 --> 02:15:54.000 went down into the waters. Flash. And just I tell you, 2023 02:15:54.560 --> 02:15:58.079 I was laughing so hard up on the hill, I 2024 02:15:58.119 --> 02:16:01.600 was my stomach was hurting. It was the funniest thing. 2025 02:16:01.720 --> 02:16:04.199 It reminded me so much of while it with something 2026 02:16:04.239 --> 02:16:07.720 while a coyote would do, and there were some other 2027 02:16:07.800 --> 02:16:11.239 things like that that it was. It had a blast 2028 02:16:11.279 --> 02:16:17.119 with him. Mike, Thank you. We also want you so much. 2029 02:16:17.319 --> 02:16:21.119 DJ Real quick dj DJ left a comment thank you. 2030 02:16:21.159 --> 02:16:23.840 My father spent time in Sudan in the eighties as 2031 02:16:23.880 --> 02:16:26.479 well as a member of the African Nations Peacekeeper mission 2032 02:16:26.840 --> 02:16:29.319 as well as the Congo and he has similar stories 2033 02:16:29.319 --> 02:16:30.680 about the craziness there too. 2034 02:16:31.279 --> 02:16:35.879 Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, Thanks so much for joining 2035 02:16:35.920 --> 02:16:38.399 us tonight, Mike. It's always a pleasure and really a 2036 02:16:38.399 --> 02:16:41.079 lot of fun to speak with you, and and he 2037 02:16:41.079 --> 02:16:44.719 hears some of these stories. Especially it has especial importance 2038 02:16:44.760 --> 02:16:48.120 because of the fortieth anniversary and Eagle Claw. I'm really 2039 02:16:48.159 --> 02:16:50.319 glad we got to have you here and talk about that. 2040 02:16:52.280 --> 02:16:53.959 We kind of blew right through what I wanted to 2041 02:16:54.040 --> 02:16:56.719 talk about for the bonus segment, so maybe like for that, 2042 02:16:57.000 --> 02:16:59.719 if you don't mind, Mike, we could talk about the 2043 02:16:59.760 --> 02:17:02.559 Joy to Prison riot and Operation Pocket Planner. 2044 02:17:03.559 --> 02:17:05.040 Yeah, that was really interesting. 2045 02:17:05.000 --> 02:17:08.000 Well we'll start that in the after we finish here. 2046 02:17:08.360 --> 02:17:10.799 If that's okay and you want to. 2047 02:17:10.799 --> 02:17:13.600 See that, join us on Patreon one dollar a month, 2048 02:17:14.040 --> 02:17:15.040 one dollar a month. 2049 02:17:15.319 --> 02:17:16.280 It's there. 2050 02:17:17.079 --> 02:17:20.079 So yeah, thank you everyone who joined us live. Thanks Dave, 2051 02:17:20.280 --> 02:17:23.719 Thanks again, Mike. If you like what we're doing here, 2052 02:17:23.799 --> 02:17:26.440 please subscribe to the channel. The little subscriptions right down 2053 02:17:26.479 --> 02:17:28.799 there and you give us a little thumbs up and 2054 02:17:28.920 --> 02:17:31.440 hit the belt icons so you get notified when we 2055 02:17:31.479 --> 02:17:35.920 go live next time next week. And on that note, 2056 02:17:36.079 --> 02:17:38.719 our guest next week is a veteran of third Special 2057 02:17:38.719 --> 02:17:42.040 Forces Group, served a lot of time in Afghanistan. Has 2058 02:17:42.120 --> 02:17:45.840 some really hairy stories. Guy, I know, really good dude, 2059 02:17:46.639 --> 02:17:50.200 and I'm excited to have him here next Friday. And 2060 02:17:50.479 --> 02:17:52.559 just the very last thing I have to say is, 2061 02:17:52.959 --> 02:17:56.200 please go and visit our sponsor for this podcast. It 2062 02:17:56.280 --> 02:18:00.440 is High Speed Daddy and they make tactical equipment for 2063 02:18:00.760 --> 02:18:04.719 today's dad. If you need lunch pails, if you need 2064 02:18:04.760 --> 02:18:06.840 diaper bags, things like that that are made out of 2065 02:18:06.879 --> 02:18:09.680 tactical nylon, they have all of it for you. It 2066 02:18:09.760 --> 02:18:13.040 is at high speed daddy dot com and if you 2067 02:18:13.079 --> 02:18:16.239 go there you will get a fifteen percent discount if 2068 02:18:16.239 --> 02:18:19.760 you enter the discount code on your order. It's it's 2069 02:18:19.840 --> 02:18:24.399 just my name, It's Jack jac K. So yeah, go 2070 02:18:24.479 --> 02:18:27.120 check them out. And again, the link to our Patreon 2071 02:18:27.239 --> 02:18:29.159 is down the description as well. If you like what 2072 02:18:29.200 --> 02:18:31.200 we're doing and you'd like to see us keep doing it, 2073 02:18:33.120 --> 02:18:33.840 Thanks guys,