WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.840 --> 00:00:03.960 Hey, everybody, welcome to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics. 2 00:00:04.000 --> 00:00:07.440 I'm here today with Jonathan Hackett and Andy Milburn. Mick 3 00:00:07.559 --> 00:00:11.199 Moulroy may possibly will likely be joining us in a 4 00:00:11.199 --> 00:00:14.560 little bit. Uh, you guys are seeing the same stuff 5 00:00:14.599 --> 00:00:18.160 I'm seeing. Uh, ceasefire seems to have completely collapsed. We're 6 00:00:18.160 --> 00:00:24.559 on like day eight of American strikes, you know, on 7 00:00:24.879 --> 00:00:29.839 whether it's Iranian shipping or Iranian you know, islands, different 8 00:00:30.000 --> 00:00:36.600 different targets. Iran has responded with shooting cruise missiles, ballistic 9 00:00:36.679 --> 00:00:41.719 missiles and drones at all of our bases in the region, 10 00:00:42.079 --> 00:00:45.719 which means and you know, shooting missiles against all of 11 00:00:45.759 --> 00:00:47.159 their neighbors. 12 00:00:47.719 --> 00:00:48.000 Uh. 13 00:00:48.039 --> 00:00:52.759 Two service members died in Jordan from that attack, from 14 00:00:52.759 --> 00:00:53.560 one of the attacks. 15 00:00:54.119 --> 00:00:55.119 One is missing. 16 00:00:55.359 --> 00:00:58.520 So you know, this is like a real this, you 17 00:00:58.600 --> 00:01:00.359 know for people who think this is you know, obviously 18 00:01:00.479 --> 00:01:02.439 is so far away, but this is like real people's 19 00:01:02.479 --> 00:01:06.599 lives that are being lost on the Iranian side as well. Like, 20 00:01:06.719 --> 00:01:09.079 let's be frank, right, I'm sure we're not one hundred 21 00:01:09.079 --> 00:01:10.640 percent accurate where we're shooting. 22 00:01:10.719 --> 00:01:15.280 So yeah, some bits. 23 00:01:15.120 --> 00:01:19.079 Like the one quote that really like like stuck to 24 00:01:19.159 --> 00:01:23.159 Mike crawl a little bit was Caitlin Collins, a CNN 25 00:01:23.239 --> 00:01:25.480 who I think is probably one of the better White 26 00:01:25.519 --> 00:01:28.560 House reporters, asked Trump. 27 00:01:28.959 --> 00:01:30.439 What did she ask? Trump? But the hell did I 28 00:01:30.439 --> 00:01:31.079 have it? Hold on? 29 00:01:32.959 --> 00:01:38.200 This is a pretty glaring fucking quote. Frankly, She asked, 30 00:01:38.239 --> 00:01:40.719 you know what, the United States is bombing Iran again? Uh, 31 00:01:40.760 --> 00:01:43.680 you've been bombing Iran for months now? Is this just 32 00:01:43.719 --> 00:01:46.359 a new normal for the American people? Which I feel 33 00:01:46.359 --> 00:01:48.159 like is like a completely fair fucking question. 34 00:01:48.920 --> 00:01:49.480 Uh. 35 00:01:49.519 --> 00:01:52.640 And the President replied, we were in Vietnam for nineteen 36 00:01:52.719 --> 00:01:55.159 year years. We're here for four months, so I think 37 00:01:55.159 --> 00:02:00.239 we've done a lot. That kind of shit coming from 38 00:02:00.280 --> 00:02:05.359 the president is one of the I know, obviously it's Trump, 39 00:02:05.439 --> 00:02:07.879 so like we're desentitized to the crazy shit he says, 40 00:02:09.599 --> 00:02:12.680 but he's talking about like actual fucking war, and Uh, 41 00:02:12.960 --> 00:02:15.039 the way he's just so blase about it to me, 42 00:02:15.800 --> 00:02:18.960 frankly as offensive And I'm being as as generous as 43 00:02:18.960 --> 00:02:20.639 I can be because I have other words that I 44 00:02:20.639 --> 00:02:27.120 could totally use. Yeah, it's a fucking joke frankly that 45 00:02:27.240 --> 00:02:30.120 this guy's the president and he's leading us into this 46 00:02:30.159 --> 00:02:31.039 fucking abyss. 47 00:02:31.639 --> 00:02:32.000 Uh. 48 00:02:32.120 --> 00:02:35.159 The escalation ladder seems to be getting longer and longer 49 00:02:35.240 --> 00:02:38.400 every day. The city doesn't seem to be no end 50 00:02:38.439 --> 00:02:43.680 in sight. So yeah, what are you guys tracking Milburn? 51 00:02:43.800 --> 00:02:46.199 Let's let's I want you to go first. I missed you. 52 00:02:47.080 --> 00:02:51.080 I miss you too, Dean, thank you so you No, 53 00:02:51.280 --> 00:02:55.719 I I think not, I think you know, we've we've 54 00:02:55.759 --> 00:03:00.400 talked about the strategy lacked off before in this UH program. 55 00:03:00.599 --> 00:03:06.479 It isn't simply us throwing rocks, you know. In fact, 56 00:03:07.159 --> 00:03:10.159 I know at least a couple of us were involved 57 00:03:10.199 --> 00:03:16.719 in planning for war with Iran before, and I'm wondering 58 00:03:16.759 --> 00:03:18.919 why some of the assumptions and some of the risks 59 00:03:18.960 --> 00:03:24.240 identified in you know, almost a decade of planning had 60 00:03:24.240 --> 00:03:29.159 been thrown out of the window, namely the anticipation that 61 00:03:30.240 --> 00:03:35.800 Iran would close the straits of All Moose, but also 62 00:03:36.960 --> 00:03:43.800 understanding the limits of an air campaign and through no 63 00:03:43.840 --> 00:03:46.960 one's fault, it's just very difficult to track down the 64 00:03:47.000 --> 00:03:53.759 assets which trying to track down rocket launchers and now 65 00:03:54.879 --> 00:04:01.960 small boats, drone places where drones are being stored specifically, 66 00:04:02.840 --> 00:04:05.599 you know, to leap ahead, what has changed about this 67 00:04:05.680 --> 00:04:09.520 phase of the wall To answer the question that's been 68 00:04:09.560 --> 00:04:12.439 asked the administration where you hope to gain out these strikes. 69 00:04:12.520 --> 00:04:18.480 The list of targets are specifically focused on Uranian assets 70 00:04:18.639 --> 00:04:21.800 that that could end up It was shipping in the 71 00:04:21.839 --> 00:04:26.439 straits of all moves, at least until until last night. Right, 72 00:04:26.680 --> 00:04:35.040 So those who were specifically radar sites acquisition radar in 73 00:04:35.079 --> 00:04:39.839 the southern part of the country, and again missile launchers 74 00:04:40.680 --> 00:04:45.519 places where intelligence was suggesting the ranges were storing drones. 75 00:04:45.800 --> 00:04:49.240 And although I haven't seen this specifically, I assume also 76 00:04:49.439 --> 00:04:54.560 small boats. But all those assets are easy to move 77 00:04:54.600 --> 00:04:57.839 around and hide and decoy and disperse, and especially in 78 00:04:57.920 --> 00:05:00.800 the country like Iran, and the long the war goes on, 79 00:05:01.040 --> 00:05:03.120 the easy it is to do for them to disperse 80 00:05:03.199 --> 00:05:07.879 the remaining assets. And so you know, the strike against 81 00:05:08.000 --> 00:05:13.959 Jordan last night, the strikes against Kuwait are not a surprise. 82 00:05:14.160 --> 00:05:18.240 What is perhaps surprising in this phase, and John can 83 00:05:18.279 --> 00:05:22.279 perhaps jump in to add more amplification on this, is 84 00:05:22.279 --> 00:05:30.240 the increased accuracy of Iranian missiles, right, And that is 85 00:05:30.319 --> 00:05:34.480 I understand mostly attributed to the fact that the Chinese 86 00:05:35.000 --> 00:05:41.560 are providing navigation system. It's no longer a GPS. John, 87 00:05:41.600 --> 00:05:45.040 what's do you remember the term? And it's b h 88 00:05:45.399 --> 00:05:48.120 it's by DO three or something. 89 00:05:48.240 --> 00:05:51.079 It's that it's the frequent GPS alternative. 90 00:05:51.199 --> 00:05:54.680 It's the Chinese frequency hopping version of the GPS, and 91 00:05:54.759 --> 00:05:58.240 I should probably google that. And we have various student 92 00:05:58.240 --> 00:06:01.720 members of our audience who will who will be able 93 00:06:01.720 --> 00:06:06.360 to jump in. But it's but anyway, B three A 94 00:06:06.600 --> 00:06:11.879 is what we call it. It's it's and the network 95 00:06:11.959 --> 00:06:15.879 is called the Baydoo three the millions military military grade 96 00:06:15.920 --> 00:06:19.759 signal we call B three A. And so very quickly, 97 00:06:19.800 --> 00:06:23.000 my understanding is that civilian GPS is you know, obviously 98 00:06:23.040 --> 00:06:27.360 it's a fixed known frequency. It's very jammable. In the 99 00:06:27.399 --> 00:06:31.240 Twelfth Day War and June twenty twenty five, both Israel 100 00:06:31.240 --> 00:06:37.439 and the US were jamming Iranian GPS guided munitions very 101 00:06:37.439 --> 00:06:41.040 hard and at worked. GPS guided systems reportedly failing at 102 00:06:41.040 --> 00:06:43.720 the rates of over seventy percent early in the conflict. 103 00:06:44.639 --> 00:06:49.560 Now ninety eight percent of them are getting through, So 104 00:06:49.600 --> 00:06:52.879 that is that's a concern. So although we're in a 105 00:06:52.879 --> 00:06:56.199 new phase of the wall, although we've narrowed our targeting options, 106 00:06:56.720 --> 00:07:00.399 the targets themselves are easy to disperse, and on the 107 00:07:00.439 --> 00:07:04.160 Iranian side, they're getting more accurate, so so that is 108 00:07:04.800 --> 00:07:09.439 that's certainly a concern. And you know, the last thing 109 00:07:09.480 --> 00:07:16.879 I'll say is that piling on more strikes again might 110 00:07:16.920 --> 00:07:19.680 give us a feeling of satisfaction. But as we've seen, 111 00:07:19.720 --> 00:07:24.560 we've also amped up the risk and the Ranians are 112 00:07:24.560 --> 00:07:27.279 going after and I haven't got confirmation of this, and 113 00:07:27.360 --> 00:07:31.040 the strike on the base in Jordan yesterday, I forget 114 00:07:31.079 --> 00:07:35.279 the name of the base. It's about sixty clicks from 115 00:07:35.759 --> 00:07:42.759 from Aman. But the Ranians are going after specific assets 116 00:07:42.800 --> 00:07:45.920 that we have, not strike aircraft on the ground, but 117 00:07:46.000 --> 00:07:56.519 they're going after the the A Wax, the easy two centuries, 118 00:07:57.920 --> 00:08:00.959 They're going after the KC one thirty five tankers, just 119 00:08:01.000 --> 00:08:04.720 like they did in Saudi Arabia. So for those of 120 00:08:04.759 --> 00:08:09.839 you who like CenTra gravity analysis, these are the critical requirements, 121 00:08:09.920 --> 00:08:14.639 right the high value, low density assets that we have. 122 00:08:14.759 --> 00:08:17.360 And we've got about seventy five percent of these assets 123 00:08:17.360 --> 00:08:19.639 in the region right now, so they're all vulnerable and 124 00:08:19.680 --> 00:08:21.839 we only have a limited number of them. So the 125 00:08:21.920 --> 00:08:25.480 Uranians know what they're doing. They're going after these assets 126 00:08:25.519 --> 00:08:29.240 and increased accuracy. And I'm not being chicken little here, 127 00:08:29.279 --> 00:08:34.000 I'm just saying that last all of this suggests that 128 00:08:34.039 --> 00:08:36.840 this last round of the war isn't going to be 129 00:08:36.919 --> 00:08:39.960 quite as easy as perhaps some people think to simply 130 00:08:40.000 --> 00:08:44.559 shut down the Uranians by piling on more munitions. And 131 00:08:44.600 --> 00:08:46.879 at the end of the day, you know what's our 132 00:08:46.919 --> 00:08:49.879 first priority. Our first priority is hormuse. We're not even 133 00:08:49.919 --> 00:08:53.200 talking about enriched uranium anymore. We're not even talking about 134 00:08:53.240 --> 00:08:57.519 the proxies, even though, by the way, the Iraqi Iranian 135 00:08:57.559 --> 00:09:01.799 backed proxies have only grown stronger this wall. And if 136 00:09:02.120 --> 00:09:05.519 anyone who's observed the after Martha Commanie's funeral, well we'll 137 00:09:05.559 --> 00:09:07.840 see a lot of the traffic control in a Raq 138 00:09:08.759 --> 00:09:11.679 was these militias. We're not even talking about those things. 139 00:09:11.720 --> 00:09:15.000 We're talking specifically about Hall moves. And the thing is, 140 00:09:16.559 --> 00:09:20.600 even if even if we manage through all our naval 141 00:09:20.600 --> 00:09:24.919 assets in the region, two carriers, over twenty surface vessels, 142 00:09:25.279 --> 00:09:28.279 untold number of aircraft, et cetera, et cetera, even if 143 00:09:28.279 --> 00:09:30.600 we managed to force an opening and the straits of 144 00:09:30.639 --> 00:09:35.200 Wall moves, the effect on the global economy remains because 145 00:09:35.200 --> 00:09:38.600 commercial we're talking about commercial ships. It's still high risk. 146 00:09:39.080 --> 00:09:42.960 Until the Iranians agree not to strike ships and there's 147 00:09:43.000 --> 00:09:47.080 some kind of negotiated settlement, the problem continues, and that 148 00:09:47.240 --> 00:09:51.039 is the issue I think we're facing right now. So again, 149 00:09:51.519 --> 00:09:58.639 the tactics don't fit in any coherent, overarching policy, and 150 00:09:58.720 --> 00:10:02.559 that's the bottom line, any overlaunching policy that can be 151 00:10:02.639 --> 00:10:05.240 achieved through the tactics that we're using. 152 00:10:07.519 --> 00:10:08.759 Yeah, and I would also add on to that, In 153 00:10:08.799 --> 00:10:11.559 addition to the center of gravity component of this targeting 154 00:10:11.600 --> 00:10:14.240 that we're seeing, people are asking why are there these 155 00:10:14.279 --> 00:10:16.600 tip for TAT strikes going on? Why are they hitting 156 00:10:16.600 --> 00:10:20.440 bridges in Iran? Why is Iran hitting US bases in Jordan? 157 00:10:20.759 --> 00:10:23.159 Like this question is from the public. I'm trying to understand, 158 00:10:23.200 --> 00:10:26.279 you know, why are these targets the targets. One part 159 00:10:26.320 --> 00:10:28.799 of it is what you mentioned, Andy, that they're doing 160 00:10:29.039 --> 00:10:32.159 operational level analysis of target packages and deciding, both the 161 00:10:32.240 --> 00:10:34.720 US and Iran both deciding about you know, if I 162 00:10:34.759 --> 00:10:37.360 strike a bridge that links this base to this base, 163 00:10:37.639 --> 00:10:39.519 that has a stronger impact than if I just hit 164 00:10:39.559 --> 00:10:42.159 an aircraft at that base. And at the same time, 165 00:10:42.559 --> 00:10:45.120 if you look back to Operation Allied Force in nineteen 166 00:10:45.159 --> 00:10:48.399 ninety nine and Kosovo and in the Balkans generally, you know, 167 00:10:48.440 --> 00:10:53.720 Bosnia and so on, we had a multi discipline intelligence 168 00:10:53.720 --> 00:10:57.039 approach to targeting. In that conflict, we had not only 169 00:10:57.080 --> 00:11:00.639 air assets, which is a massive air campaign in Kosovo, 170 00:11:00.919 --> 00:11:03.879 we also had a very extensive human intelligence network inside 171 00:11:03.879 --> 00:11:08.080 of Kosovo that was helping us to identify and validate targets. 172 00:11:08.360 --> 00:11:10.039 So there were some targets that we already knew about, 173 00:11:10.120 --> 00:11:14.559 like military bases, which are fixed and pretty slow to 174 00:11:14.639 --> 00:11:17.279 change on a spreadsheet, but we also had new locations 175 00:11:17.320 --> 00:11:19.759 like point of origin sites when the enemy would be 176 00:11:19.840 --> 00:11:23.960 launching mortars or artillery, which they can move around very easily. 177 00:11:24.320 --> 00:11:26.720 In relation to bases, we'd have human sources on the 178 00:11:26.720 --> 00:11:29.080 ground who would say, Hey, that truck, although it was 179 00:11:29.120 --> 00:11:31.960 at X location today, now it's at Y location right now. 180 00:11:32.360 --> 00:11:34.279 So we'd be able to tell the pilots in the air, hey, 181 00:11:34.279 --> 00:11:37.399 adjust fire dynamically and go strike this point of origin 182 00:11:37.440 --> 00:11:40.360 site that we've noticed. With our imagery intelligence and with 183 00:11:40.360 --> 00:11:43.360 our signals intelligence, we also have human intelligence telling us 184 00:11:43.360 --> 00:11:45.159 that that's actually where they are, and that's actually what 185 00:11:45.240 --> 00:11:47.200 it is that we think it is. In Iran, we 186 00:11:47.240 --> 00:11:50.440 don't have this, so we're relying very heavily on signals 187 00:11:50.480 --> 00:11:54.320 intelligence and imagery intelligence to say that looks like a transporter. 188 00:11:54.399 --> 00:11:56.720 Erector launcher, it looks like it's there right now, and 189 00:11:56.799 --> 00:11:58.519 it looks like it has a weapon on it, We 190 00:11:58.600 --> 00:12:00.639 strike it, and then we don't really know what that 191 00:12:00.679 --> 00:12:02.679 strike did to it because we can't go validate with 192 00:12:02.720 --> 00:12:05.399 battle damage assessant, and we can't also say how many 193 00:12:05.399 --> 00:12:06.879 more they have left and other things like that that 194 00:12:06.960 --> 00:12:09.159 human intelligence can tell us, but that the other two 195 00:12:09.200 --> 00:12:12.879 disciplines alone have a hard time being really forceful on. 196 00:12:13.879 --> 00:12:15.519 The reason I mentioned that is because you look at 197 00:12:15.519 --> 00:12:18.240 why did Jordan hit Wafak Salty Air Base or MSAB, 198 00:12:18.279 --> 00:12:21.480 which is in Jordan. This base is well known. When 199 00:12:21.480 --> 00:12:22.960 I was in Jordan, we used to joke that this 200 00:12:23.080 --> 00:12:25.279 was the largest land based aircraft carrier that the United 201 00:12:25.320 --> 00:12:27.360 States has in the Middle East, because most of our 202 00:12:27.399 --> 00:12:31.200 air assets were at Waffak Salty Air Base separately from Qatar, 203 00:12:31.279 --> 00:12:33.240 which is where Air Force's Central Command is at, and 204 00:12:33.240 --> 00:12:35.519 there's a lot of air assets in Katark. Katar has 205 00:12:35.559 --> 00:12:39.080 been hit multiple times during this conflict, but MSAB, that 206 00:12:39.120 --> 00:12:41.240 base has been there a very long time. That's a 207 00:12:41.279 --> 00:12:44.879 well known target. There's plenty of open source satellite imagery 208 00:12:44.879 --> 00:12:47.120 of Waffak Salty Air Base. You can look it up 209 00:12:47.159 --> 00:12:50.000 on Google and see it the huge airfield. There lots 210 00:12:50.039 --> 00:12:54.200 of US military infrastructure there. So from an Iranian perspective, 211 00:12:54.320 --> 00:12:57.120 it's kind of a low cost strike in terms of 212 00:12:57.120 --> 00:13:00.519 intelligence because they don't really need to validate much to 213 00:13:00.600 --> 00:13:03.639 know that if they lob an intermediate range ballistic missile 214 00:13:03.639 --> 00:13:06.600 at it, they're going to hit something that's American. Now, 215 00:13:06.639 --> 00:13:09.000 the problem here is they don't know what exactly they're 216 00:13:09.000 --> 00:13:11.200 going to hit, and my suspicion is they did not 217 00:13:11.240 --> 00:13:13.799 intend to kill Americans in the strike. They probably meant 218 00:13:13.840 --> 00:13:17.320 to hit American assets, fixed assets, and that was not 219 00:13:17.480 --> 00:13:20.480 the goal because they know that by killing Americans. American 220 00:13:20.519 --> 00:13:24.600 military forces are highly sensitive to casualties. When Americans die, 221 00:13:24.799 --> 00:13:27.679 we tend to respond with overwhelming force. They know this 222 00:13:28.000 --> 00:13:31.639 firsthand because the reason cost some Solamani is dead is 223 00:13:31.679 --> 00:13:36.039 because two months before that Americans were killed in Syria, 224 00:13:36.279 --> 00:13:39.679 a contractor and active duty members were killed, and we 225 00:13:39.840 --> 00:13:43.279 launched an assassinated their most important military commander in response. 226 00:13:43.960 --> 00:13:46.480 And we have typically done that not just against Iran, 227 00:13:46.519 --> 00:13:49.679 but against many other examples, including in Vietnam, where most 228 00:13:49.679 --> 00:13:52.559 of our overwhelming responses that were dynamic in nature, not 229 00:13:52.840 --> 00:13:56.000 planned ahead, but by dynamic in nature were in response 230 00:13:56.039 --> 00:13:59.240 to US casualties like this, so I would expect to 231 00:13:59.240 --> 00:14:03.960 see a larger US response than we expect. Over the evening, 232 00:14:04.360 --> 00:14:06.840 we saw a strike on a couple of facilities, an 233 00:14:06.840 --> 00:14:09.440 IRGC facility. I don't think that's the end of the story. 234 00:14:09.840 --> 00:14:13.799 I think there will probably be increases in retaliation from 235 00:14:13.799 --> 00:14:15.600 this that the US is probably trying to put together 236 00:14:15.679 --> 00:14:18.279 right now to consider, Okay, how do we respond to 237 00:14:18.320 --> 00:14:22.159 this proportionally based on how we understand proportional, not how 238 00:14:22.200 --> 00:14:24.399 the adversary understands it, but how does the US military 239 00:14:24.480 --> 00:14:27.200 understand that? So I wouldn't think this is over yet. 240 00:14:27.840 --> 00:14:31.000 And on the tit for tat part of it, those 241 00:14:31.039 --> 00:14:34.679 intel limitations are real, so the US can only hit 242 00:14:34.720 --> 00:14:38.320 what it understands. So if the US doesn't understand let's 243 00:14:38.320 --> 00:14:41.559 say a underground facility, we can't just bomb it. We 244 00:14:41.639 --> 00:14:43.480 have to know what we're hitting. Like when you're putting 245 00:14:43.519 --> 00:14:45.759 a weaponeering package together and you're having the air officer 246 00:14:45.799 --> 00:14:47.679 actually sit there with you and talk through the targeting. 247 00:14:47.919 --> 00:14:50.639 As far as the intel side, you're actually picking strike points. 248 00:14:50.720 --> 00:14:52.879 You're saying, what are the locations on this facility that 249 00:14:52.879 --> 00:14:55.399 are the best the weakest to hit, or the locations 250 00:14:55.440 --> 00:14:56.879 that if we hit it will cause damage in a 251 00:14:56.919 --> 00:14:59.919 particular direction. There are lots of considerations. It's not just 252 00:15:00.080 --> 00:15:02.919 dropping a bomb. So a lot of these facilities we 253 00:15:03.000 --> 00:15:04.919 might not be able to strike now because we lack 254 00:15:05.240 --> 00:15:07.679 knowledge of what's going on inside that facility and around 255 00:15:07.720 --> 00:15:11.519 that facility, So we won't hit everything that's as valuable 256 00:15:11.559 --> 00:15:14.440 as we want to hit yet without that human intelligence 257 00:15:14.480 --> 00:15:16.279 on the ground. So that's going to be a limitation 258 00:15:16.320 --> 00:15:19.720 where you're going to see probably a lot of infrastructure strikes, bridges, 259 00:15:20.639 --> 00:15:25.519 water purification barracks, fixed military assets, because those are things 260 00:15:25.519 --> 00:15:28.879 we understand with limited information. You're not going to see 261 00:15:28.919 --> 00:15:32.279 strikes on let's say, a G two intelligence headquarters in Tehran, 262 00:15:33.000 --> 00:15:35.759 because even though we are striking a lot, we are 263 00:15:35.799 --> 00:15:38.519 still trying to limit civilian casualties as much as we can. 264 00:15:38.759 --> 00:15:40.919 And when you're looking at that G two headquarters, you 265 00:15:40.919 --> 00:15:43.480 don't really know what's in the buildings around it, so 266 00:15:43.559 --> 00:15:45.240 you don't know which kind of weapon to use to 267 00:15:45.279 --> 00:15:47.559 destroy that building, to make a blow up, to make 268 00:15:47.600 --> 00:15:49.799 an implode versus explode, and things like that. So you're 269 00:15:49.799 --> 00:15:53.480 going to probably see those larger headquarters entities left off 270 00:15:53.519 --> 00:15:56.600 the target list for now until we understand more about 271 00:15:56.600 --> 00:15:58.720 those targets so that we can ensure that we're hitting 272 00:15:58.720 --> 00:16:02.080 them the right way with what our doctrine says. And 273 00:16:02.600 --> 00:16:05.279 next to that the GPS issue that you mentioned, Andy, 274 00:16:05.639 --> 00:16:09.879 So there's actually three different major GPS like networks in 275 00:16:09.919 --> 00:16:13.919 the world. There's the free world GPS, which is GPS 276 00:16:14.039 --> 00:16:17.919 Global Positioning System. There's the Russian version, which is the GNSS, 277 00:16:18.480 --> 00:16:20.879 which is just like our GPS, but it's a Russian 278 00:16:20.879 --> 00:16:24.159 controlled satellite array that the Russians can use. Even if 279 00:16:24.200 --> 00:16:26.639 our GPS goes down, the Russians will still have GPS, 280 00:16:26.639 --> 00:16:30.720 and vice versa. This is a Cold War development. As 281 00:16:30.720 --> 00:16:33.240 we were developing our space program, which was a cover 282 00:16:33.279 --> 00:16:36.840 for our nuclear program, our intercontinental ballistic missile nuclear delivery program, 283 00:16:36.919 --> 00:16:39.159 the Russians are doing the same thing. You need GPS 284 00:16:39.159 --> 00:16:42.440 for that, so the Russians had GNSS for that. China 285 00:16:42.519 --> 00:16:45.039 was a late to the game. But China also had BDS, 286 00:16:45.440 --> 00:16:47.559 which is the bidy that you were talking about, Andy. 287 00:16:47.799 --> 00:16:52.559 So these are three different independent arrays of GPS controlled networks. 288 00:16:53.080 --> 00:16:55.600 Iran is relying on China's network, not on Russia's, but 289 00:16:55.639 --> 00:16:58.240 on China's network to get a lot of accurate information. 290 00:16:58.360 --> 00:17:02.039 So even if we try to jam Iran using our GPS, 291 00:17:02.080 --> 00:17:04.960 which sometimes they do depending on what the equipment is 292 00:17:04.960 --> 00:17:08.000 that they're using, there are areas that we can't jam 293 00:17:08.039 --> 00:17:11.680 as easily because it would require whenever you jam something, 294 00:17:11.839 --> 00:17:13.960 there's a diplomatic component to that. If we jam a 295 00:17:14.039 --> 00:17:17.039 Chinese system, we are technically in an active war with 296 00:17:17.119 --> 00:17:19.880 China by blocking their communication system. So there's going to 297 00:17:19.920 --> 00:17:23.599 be a calculation made. Is it worth blocking China's GPS 298 00:17:23.640 --> 00:17:25.799 for us to harm Iran? And if we could harm 299 00:17:25.839 --> 00:17:29.559 Iran somehow without blocking the GPS, maybe we choose the 300 00:17:29.599 --> 00:17:32.079 somehow option, even though it's less because we don't want 301 00:17:32.079 --> 00:17:34.799 to implicate China into this consideration. So there will be 302 00:17:34.839 --> 00:17:37.680 some calculation there going on with what's the cost and 303 00:17:37.720 --> 00:17:40.759 benefit of using this now? And also some of these 304 00:17:40.799 --> 00:17:44.240 technologies we have to work with GPS in particular, we 305 00:17:44.279 --> 00:17:46.039 don't want to use it in a conflict like this 306 00:17:46.480 --> 00:17:48.839 because we're saving it for later in a bigger conflict, 307 00:17:49.160 --> 00:17:51.319 because some of these things are very very technical and 308 00:17:51.359 --> 00:17:54.440 sophisticated and depend on the enemy not knowing we have it, 309 00:17:55.119 --> 00:17:57.200 and if we use it now we can never really 310 00:17:57.319 --> 00:17:59.359 use it effectively. Again, we could still use it, but 311 00:17:59.400 --> 00:18:02.319 just wouldn't be surprising and overwhelming and important as it 312 00:18:02.359 --> 00:18:05.039 would be if we waited, say in a nuclear war 313 00:18:05.079 --> 00:18:08.960 with Russia, for example. So there's also that calculation being made, 314 00:18:09.000 --> 00:18:11.319 just like Winston Churchill decided not to announce that we 315 00:18:11.359 --> 00:18:15.200 had broken Enigma as early as we had, and British 316 00:18:15.200 --> 00:18:17.720 civilians died because of this, because the importance of just 317 00:18:17.759 --> 00:18:20.519 having that as a secret was way more powerful than 318 00:18:20.599 --> 00:18:22.720 just telling the world that we had done so. And 319 00:18:22.759 --> 00:18:24.680 so there are still things like that in the world, 320 00:18:24.799 --> 00:18:27.640 including zero day vulnerabilities. We haven't seen very much talk 321 00:18:27.640 --> 00:18:30.920 about cyber attacks against Iran right now, and there's probably 322 00:18:30.960 --> 00:18:35.039 a degree of keeping those zero day vulnerabilities secret until 323 00:18:35.039 --> 00:18:37.160 the future time when we actually need to use these 324 00:18:37.200 --> 00:18:40.359 more powerful tools, and we've just calculated this is not 325 00:18:40.480 --> 00:18:43.279 the time, which at the operational level is a very 326 00:18:43.279 --> 00:18:46.079 wise move, I think, because it's always about measuring risk. 327 00:18:46.359 --> 00:18:49.039 You can never eliminate it, and you can never use 328 00:18:49.079 --> 00:18:51.200 everything you've got right now, because the value of it 329 00:18:51.240 --> 00:18:53.720 goes away the moment you use it, just like nuclear weapons. 330 00:18:54.039 --> 00:18:57.440 A nuclear weapon is powerful because it's not used the 331 00:18:57.480 --> 00:18:59.680 moment you use it, the threat is completely understood and 332 00:18:59.720 --> 00:19:02.279 completely on the table, and it changes the game, and 333 00:19:02.559 --> 00:19:04.200 the game is only good in your favor if you 334 00:19:04.240 --> 00:19:05.119 don't use your nukes. 335 00:19:08.960 --> 00:19:10.839 Hey, guys, I want to tell you tonight about my 336 00:19:10.880 --> 00:19:14.000 new novel, The Most Dangerous Man, coming out June ninth. 337 00:19:14.720 --> 00:19:17.359 I think, like a lot of you, I read in 338 00:19:17.559 --> 00:19:21.000 high school the short story The Greatest Game, which is 339 00:19:21.400 --> 00:19:24.559 almost a century old at this point, but it's the 340 00:19:24.640 --> 00:19:29.880 classic premise of man hunting man for sport. This book 341 00:19:30.160 --> 00:19:33.160 is based off of that a little bit, but also 342 00:19:33.279 --> 00:19:36.160 on stories that I have heard over the years about 343 00:19:36.319 --> 00:19:40.400 Safari guides that have actually taken hunting parties, wealthy people 344 00:19:40.640 --> 00:19:45.519 hunting poachers in West Africa. That idea kind of cooked 345 00:19:45.519 --> 00:19:48.359 off in my mind when I was asked to write 346 00:19:48.400 --> 00:19:51.279 a novel and get back into writing fiction again. And 347 00:19:51.519 --> 00:19:54.680 this book is about a ranger with the Ranger Reconnaissance 348 00:19:54.720 --> 00:19:57.440 Company who's on a mission in West Africa and gets 349 00:19:57.519 --> 00:20:00.839 kidnapped and hunted for sport by a group of wealthy 350 00:20:00.960 --> 00:20:03.960 tech billionaires. I had a lot of fun writ in 351 00:20:03.960 --> 00:20:05.839 this book, and I think you'll have a good time 352 00:20:05.880 --> 00:20:10.880 reading it. It's quick, fast and furious, fast paced action 353 00:20:11.480 --> 00:20:14.680 action novel, and I hope you all check it out. 354 00:20:14.759 --> 00:20:15.559 It's up there. 355 00:20:16.079 --> 00:20:18.519 You can find it wherever books are sold, the hard copy, 356 00:20:19.079 --> 00:20:22.359 the hard back, the soft cover, and also the Kindle 357 00:20:22.519 --> 00:20:25.279 e book edition. We'll have some links down in the 358 00:20:25.319 --> 00:20:28.839 description for you. The book comes out June ninth, and 359 00:20:29.119 --> 00:20:30.640 I hope you all let me know what you think 360 00:20:30.680 --> 00:20:30.960 of it. 361 00:20:43.279 --> 00:20:48.039 It's a great, great point about cyber, you know, the 362 00:20:49.920 --> 00:20:55.160 one assumes that that is something that we would be 363 00:20:55.200 --> 00:20:58.119 integrating at this level, you know, Johnna, I mean to 364 00:20:58.160 --> 00:21:03.039 your point though about not using cyber because we're worried 365 00:21:03.079 --> 00:21:09.480 about exposing methods. I mean, I'm not sure, you know, 366 00:21:09.519 --> 00:21:11.319 explain that one to me. I'm not sure I buy that. 367 00:21:11.480 --> 00:21:15.680 You know, surely we would integrate cyber regardless. We've already 368 00:21:16.359 --> 00:21:21.240 conducted cyber operations against Iran in conjunction with Israel right 369 00:21:21.279 --> 00:21:25.039 in the past. Why why would we not do so now, 370 00:21:25.480 --> 00:21:29.599 especially especially now that we know that the Chinese have 371 00:21:29.720 --> 00:21:33.799 given them that you know BYD systems. I mean, we're 372 00:21:33.799 --> 00:21:37.359 trying to right, we're trying to side step. We realized 373 00:21:37.440 --> 00:21:41.000 jamming is no longer as effective. I think I assume 374 00:21:41.119 --> 00:21:45.400 that's one of the reasons why we've changed our targeting. 375 00:21:45.920 --> 00:21:49.400 I say, we collectively in the United States to a 376 00:21:49.480 --> 00:21:54.559 kind of node by no targeting, going after the surveillance towers, 377 00:21:54.599 --> 00:21:57.680 like the other day to hit the Chabaha surveillance tower 378 00:21:57.960 --> 00:22:04.279 in southern Iran. So you know, we realize obviously what 379 00:22:04.480 --> 00:22:08.960 is happening. I just can't. I mean, I just don't. 380 00:22:09.000 --> 00:22:12.839 I'm not sure I buy that were waiting on. We're 381 00:22:12.839 --> 00:22:16.559 reluctant to use cyber at some level. Surely we can 382 00:22:16.680 --> 00:22:23.000 use cyber operationally without perhaps exposing our methods. 383 00:22:23.640 --> 00:22:27.599 I think the more normal, let's say cyber operations are 384 00:22:27.599 --> 00:22:30.880 probably going on what I'm talking about, are the more exquisite, 385 00:22:30.920 --> 00:22:34.039 one time use things like we saw in Venezuela when 386 00:22:34.359 --> 00:22:38.839 the president was taken There is a massive cyber attack 387 00:22:38.880 --> 00:22:41.720 that night that blacked out the city. That's the kind 388 00:22:41.720 --> 00:22:43.559 of thing that you can only use one time because 389 00:22:43.559 --> 00:22:45.480 the way that it's used, the way that it's implanted. 390 00:22:45.839 --> 00:22:49.279 Once it's used, now it's known, and I would not 391 00:22:49.319 --> 00:22:52.119 be surprised if there were things in Iran that could 392 00:22:52.160 --> 00:22:53.960 be switched on and off in a way that would 393 00:22:54.000 --> 00:22:56.559 spectacularly turn the country off in a way that be 394 00:22:56.599 --> 00:22:59.599 advantageous for us in various ways, but the moment that 395 00:22:59.599 --> 00:23:02.279 we use we can't use it against Russia and we 396 00:23:02.319 --> 00:23:05.880 can't use it against China anymore because it will be understood, analyzed, 397 00:23:05.880 --> 00:23:08.640 exploited turned around. We had the same problem with stucks 398 00:23:08.640 --> 00:23:11.839 net when we attacked Natons the cyber attack in two 399 00:23:11.839 --> 00:23:16.000 thousand and seven. The reason Iran developed an offensive cyber 400 00:23:16.039 --> 00:23:20.240 capability that is very formidable is because they reverse engineered 401 00:23:20.279 --> 00:23:22.319