WEBVTT

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<v Speaker 1>The Team House.

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<v Speaker 2>With your hope, Jack Murphy and David bark.

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<v Speaker 3>Hey.

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<v Speaker 2>Folks, Welcome to the Team House podcast. I'm Jack Murphy

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<v Speaker 2>here today with two guests, Matthew Cole and Dave Phillips.

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<v Speaker 2>They collaborated on an article in The New York Times

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<v Speaker 2>called how at top secret Seal Team six mission into

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<v Speaker 2>North Korea fell apart. Dave Phillips is a reporter at

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<v Speaker 2>the New York Times. He's the author of Alpha. We've

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<v Speaker 2>interviewed him on the show before you guys can go

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<v Speaker 2>find that. And Matthew Cole is the author of Code

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<v Speaker 2>Over Country. We've also had him on the show to

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<v Speaker 2>talk about his book. So I hope you guys will

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<v Speaker 2>go back and take a look at those. So the

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<v Speaker 2>story that they published in the Times is one of

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<v Speaker 2>the biggest special operations stories we've seen in sometime, I think,

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<v Speaker 2>detailing a Sealed Team six clandestine operation into North Korea

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<v Speaker 2>and how it kind of went sideways. A little bit

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<v Speaker 2>of preamble before we'll jump into it, some of the

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<v Speaker 2>background North Korea as I understand it really is sort

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<v Speaker 2>of an intelligence black hole. I've had in the past.

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<v Speaker 2>Seals tell me that they can't do ops because they

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<v Speaker 2>have North Koreans out there literally raking the beaches every morning,

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<v Speaker 2>so like there's just no way that you're gonna clandestinely

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<v Speaker 2>infiltrate the area. I've had CIA people tell me that

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<v Speaker 2>when the Chinese send their diplomats and so forth abroad,

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<v Speaker 2>they always have to travel in pairs to make it

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<v Speaker 2>harder for the agency to recruit them as a source.

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<v Speaker 2>With the North Koreans, apparently they have to travel in trios,

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<v Speaker 2>they have to travel as a three to make it

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<v Speaker 2>like literally impossible to recruit these guys as CIA sources.

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<v Speaker 2>So I just say this to kind of give a

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<v Speaker 2>little bit a thumbnail sketch of how difficult it has

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<v Speaker 2>been for the United States government to penetrate North Korea

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<v Speaker 2>from an intelligence perspective. So, Matthew Dave, thank you for

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<v Speaker 2>joining us today. Let's start off a little bit talking

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<v Speaker 2>about the further political background with President Trump during the

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<v Speaker 2>first Trump administration and the nuclear talks that he had

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<v Speaker 2>going on at that time that sort of formed the

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<v Speaker 2>overall premise of why this operation came about.

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<v Speaker 1>You want to take it first, So yeah, let me

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<v Speaker 1>take you back to the teens.

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<v Speaker 3>So this is when President Trump had first taken office,

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<v Speaker 3>and Kim John Un was also a fairly new and

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<v Speaker 3>unknown leader of North Korea, and it didn't start out well.

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<v Speaker 4>Uh, The relationship between the two swung between like fawning

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<v Speaker 4>letters of friendship and like outright threats of nuclear war

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<v Speaker 4>where they were both saying that they could annihilate each other.

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<v Speaker 3>And famously President Trump was was bragging that his big

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<v Speaker 3>red nuclear button was much bigger than Cam's. And it

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<v Speaker 3>was a bad situation. But then President Trump did something

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<v Speaker 3>that other presidents had never done, which was to open

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<v Speaker 3>one on one talks with no pre conditions with North Korean.

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<v Speaker 3>I think he really thought, and this is of course

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<v Speaker 3>the Trump that we've come to know quite well, that

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<v Speaker 3>he could personally make a deal that other people couldn't.

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<v Speaker 3>And so they were going to meet and he was

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<v Speaker 3>just going to work stuff out, and and you know,

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<v Speaker 3>there were some really encouraging signs. The North Koreans, in

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<v Speaker 3>a sort of a good will gesture, stopped all of

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<v Speaker 3>their nuclear testing and missile testing. They released some remains

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<v Speaker 3>of POW's that had been held for decades, and the

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<v Speaker 3>two did start meeting and talking, and the two countries

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<v Speaker 3>started meeting at a pretty high level. So that brings

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<v Speaker 3>you up to twenty nineteen, where they still hadn't come

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<v Speaker 3>to any deal, but they were actively planning summits. They

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<v Speaker 3>had a summit planned in Vietnam for the February twenty nineteen. Things.

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<v Speaker 3>You couldn't say that they were going well, but they

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<v Speaker 3>were certainly going better than they had been for years,

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<v Speaker 3>and there seemed to be at least a possibility of

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<v Speaker 3>coming to a real breakthrough that could lead to a

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<v Speaker 3>d escalation of tensions.

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<v Speaker 2>We really appreciate you guys. Thank you. And so, how

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<v Speaker 2>did or why did in twenty eighteen Jaysock sort of

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<v Speaker 2>pitch this plan to the White House and say, hey,

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<v Speaker 2>we have this other option that perhaps we can use

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<v Speaker 2>to give the president the presidency a leg up in

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<v Speaker 2>some of these talks.

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<v Speaker 3>Well, I think, honestly, like you said, it had the

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<v Speaker 3>North Korea had been a black holl for a long

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<v Speaker 3>time and so independent of anything that Trump was trying

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<v Speaker 3>to do with the deal, the intelligence apparats in the

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<v Speaker 3>United States had been developing long term solutions, and one

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<v Speaker 3>of these solutions finally came to a point where it

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<v Speaker 3>was ready. It was essentially a listing device, but not

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<v Speaker 3>something that's that's new at all the world of espionage,

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<v Speaker 3>but something that they had refined in technology. We're not

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<v Speaker 3>going to say too much about it, but that gave

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<v Speaker 3>them an opportunity to bug a sensitive place where they

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<v Speaker 3>could potentially at least listening on very high level conversations

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<v Speaker 3>between Kim and the leadership of North Korea and so

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<v Speaker 3>so again, we think this all happened independently. But on

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<v Speaker 3>the one hand, Trump and his diplomatic efforts are trying

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<v Speaker 3>to publicly reach out to mister Kim. On the other hands,

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<v Speaker 3>the intelligence agencies are, you know, very clandescently developing this

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<v Speaker 3>program to slip a listening device onto North Korean shores.

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<v Speaker 3>And eventually those two things meet in the White House

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<v Speaker 3>and President Trump, you know, is probably one of the

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<v Speaker 3>very few people that understands all the things that are

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<v Speaker 3>going on, and he has a decision to make, Okay,

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<v Speaker 3>should I let this mission go ahead, knowing that planting

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<v Speaker 3>this device could give me insight that would be super

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<v Speaker 3>helpful in these negotiations, while at the same time it

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<v Speaker 3>could you know, potentially cause a crisis that would destroy

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<v Speaker 3>these negotiations all together, or worse right, I mean, really

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<v Speaker 3>the worst case scenario here is an escalation towards war.

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<v Speaker 3>You know, what should I do? And he decided, okay,

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<v Speaker 3>I have a choice sending the seals to plant listening

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<v Speaker 3>to device or not. And he decided personally to send

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<v Speaker 3>in the seals.

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<v Speaker 1>There's another one point of correction or just nuance, which

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<v Speaker 1>is check from your question. Jaysok didn't generate the idea

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<v Speaker 1>of the listening device in North Korea. The intelligence community did,

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<v Speaker 1>and that was based on the technology and the creation

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<v Speaker 1>of the device. And so at the White House level,

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<v Speaker 1>the question became, we've got this thing, we do with

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<v Speaker 1>it and I don't when Jaysack says, you know, send me, sir,

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<v Speaker 1>And then you get further down, you know, beneath Jaysack,

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<v Speaker 1>inside Jaysak, the competition and the sort of challenge of

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<v Speaker 1>you know, who's going to take it in, how we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to get it in, and so that that's where

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<v Speaker 1>it unefoolds as Dave described.

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<v Speaker 2>And so the the I mean, we'll get into a

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<v Speaker 2>little bit of the concept of the operation, but you

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<v Speaker 2>guys also reveal in the article that something sort of

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<v Speaker 2>similar had been done in two thousand and five, where

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<v Speaker 2>the seals came upon a shore on an island off

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<v Speaker 2>the coast of North Korea. So there's sort of like

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<v Speaker 2>an idea template that this can be done.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, the the wasn't I mean, I don't know, we

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<v Speaker 1>know that it's specific a specific island. We know is

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<v Speaker 1>that there was a previous mission done by Seals Delivery

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<v Speaker 1>Team one to penetrate North Korea in two thousand and five,

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<v Speaker 1>and it was successful. They got on land. There was

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<v Speaker 1>although we didn't I think we pulled this apart from

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<v Speaker 1>the storage just from editing, not reasons. But the commander

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<v Speaker 1>of that mission got a Silver Star, which the reasons

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<v Speaker 1>for us remained classified, but got a silver Star for

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<v Speaker 1>leading that mission into North Korea. And as I understood it,

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of that mission had to do with using

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<v Speaker 1>the Sealed Delivery vehicle that was new at the time

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<v Speaker 1>was essentially a prototype that they wanted to use to

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<v Speaker 1>test and see if they could get them get into

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<v Speaker 1>North Korea and back, which they did. But it was

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<v Speaker 1>a prototype also of the operation that Seal Team six

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<v Speaker 1>used in twenty nineteen to study what they should do

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<v Speaker 1>and how they should get in and out.

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<v Speaker 2>And so this mission is ultimately giving to one of

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<v Speaker 2>the SDV teams working in conjunction with Red Squadron from

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<v Speaker 2>Development Group or Seal Team six. Why was that decision made?

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<v Speaker 3>I don't understanding is that it was first given to

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<v Speaker 3>Seal Team six, or rather they they ran into it

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<v Speaker 3>and raised their hands as Matt Cole said and said,

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<v Speaker 3>stand me, sir. Uh. And then of course, uh, they

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<v Speaker 3>had to connect with it with the unit that really

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<v Speaker 3>specializes in using mini subs, and and the premiere unit

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<v Speaker 3>for that is Sealed Delivery Vehicle H Team one and

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<v Speaker 3>and seal Delivery Vehicle is just a fancy name for

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<v Speaker 3>a mini sub. These things are about the size of

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<v Speaker 3>a killer whale. They're a wet sub, so you're you know,

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<v Speaker 3>the passengers inside are actually using scuba gear. There's no

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<v Speaker 3>air in there, and and they're they're pretty short range

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<v Speaker 3>and they're pretty slow, so they have to get delivered

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<v Speaker 3>themselves by a larger vehicle, either a submarine or or

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<v Speaker 3>there are some other things that can deliver them.

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<v Speaker 2>There's a newer, you know, modernized mini sub that's dry,

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<v Speaker 2>where the seals are actually inside it breathing oxygen. I

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<v Speaker 2>don't know if that's operational yet or not. But the

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<v Speaker 2>ones we're talking about in this mission, I mean, the

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<v Speaker 2>guys were in open water freezing their asses off.

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<v Speaker 1>Frankly, Yeah, that version that you're describing, the dry sub

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<v Speaker 1>is actually the one. The first generation of it is

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<v Speaker 1>what was used in two thousand and five really into

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<v Speaker 1>North Korea.

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<v Speaker 2>Interesting, there's a there's.

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<v Speaker 1>A backstory on all of that. But the those those

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<v Speaker 1>were not available for this operation, and it had to

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<v Speaker 1>do with the fact that the second generation were made

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<v Speaker 1>without There was an error NSW did not put in

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<v Speaker 1>its proposal that they that the dry subs had to

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<v Speaker 1>attach to a to a larger sub and so as

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<v Speaker 1>a result, they were manufactured without the ability to be

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<v Speaker 1>brought in by a submarine. And so now that that

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<v Speaker 1>problem has been fixed, but for this vision, it meant

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<v Speaker 1>that they had to go old school and bring in

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<v Speaker 1>the sdvs, which, as you describe, are wet and cold

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<v Speaker 1>and slow.

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<v Speaker 3>And well like they've been using these things since Vietnam. Now,

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<v Speaker 3>obviously they've been updated, but the basic concept and shape

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<v Speaker 3>of these things is not new at all. This is

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<v Speaker 3>an old, old technology and yeah, and a really like

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<v Speaker 3>risky one.

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<v Speaker 2>And next, as these guys start to conduct mission rehearsals,

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<v Speaker 2>what's the concept of the operation that they come up with,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, sort of like logistically, piece by piece, how

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<v Speaker 2>we want this to work.

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<v Speaker 3>So it's complex and bold, as many Navy seal missions are.

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<v Speaker 3>But basically, a nuclear powered Ohio class submarine, which is

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<v Speaker 3>a really big submarine. These things. This is the longest

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<v Speaker 3>sub in our fleet. They're about two foot fill field.

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<v Speaker 3>It's long. That's going to sneak into North Korean waters

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<v Speaker 3>and carrying it on its back. It has too what

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<v Speaker 3>they call dry docks, essentially a little airlocks that are

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<v Speaker 3>carrying mini subs. The Navy seals are going to go

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<v Speaker 3>into those mini subs, those sdvs that we talked about,

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<v Speaker 3>and once they're close to the shore in North Korea,

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<v Speaker 3>the sdvs are going to leave the nuclear powered sub

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<v Speaker 3>and go to the shore maybe one hundred meters off shore.

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<v Speaker 3>The seals are going to come out, swim to shore

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<v Speaker 3>and plant the device, the listening device we talked about,

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<v Speaker 3>and their target is only a couple hundred meters from

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<v Speaker 3>the beach. So it's supposed to be quick in, quick out,

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<v Speaker 3>and it's absolutely vital that no one gets sneen. Now

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<v Speaker 3>this sounds pretty simple, right, but it's not. Of course,

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<v Speaker 3>you have to get a sneak a nuclear sub close

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<v Speaker 3>to North Korea and then sneak mini subs right up

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<v Speaker 3>to the shore. The seals riding those many stubs are

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<v Speaker 3>crammed into these little vehicles surrounded by cold water water.

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<v Speaker 3>That's what we were told is about forty degrees, you know,

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<v Speaker 3>which which could easily kill you if you were submerged

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<v Speaker 3>in that without protection. So they have to wear heated suits.

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<v Speaker 3>They're crammed into the dark. They're breathing off of essentially

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<v Speaker 3>scuba gear that's hooked to the subs for you know,

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<v Speaker 3>at least an hour, maybe a couple hours as they

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<v Speaker 3>sneak up to the shore. Now, once you get to

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<v Speaker 3>the shore, there's all sorts of security apparatus. Remember North

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<v Speaker 3>Korea and South Korea have been in open conflict for

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<v Speaker 3>decades and they built up pretty fortified shores with all

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<v Speaker 3>sorts of obstacles that keep this type of stuff from happening.

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<v Speaker 3>So you have to get through that, and you have

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<v Speaker 3>to get on and off of the shore without being

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<v Speaker 3>seen at all or even having your footprints show up

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<v Speaker 3>on the beach, because in order for this intelligence stuff

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<v Speaker 3>to work, no one can know that you planted this

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<v Speaker 3>listening device. So that's essentially the plan and some of

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<v Speaker 3>the other challenges with this mission. Special Operations that's gotten

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<v Speaker 3>very used to using ISR or drones and having that

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<v Speaker 3>up for every single mission that they do. That wasn't

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<v Speaker 3>available in this case because of the nature it's a

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<v Speaker 3>you know, denied operation and a denied area, and.

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<v Speaker 2>Then the communications issues too. I mean, we're also very

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<v Speaker 2>used to having comms up at all times, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>real time communications, and it doesn't sound like that was

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<v Speaker 2>available on this operation either.

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<v Speaker 1>It wasn't you know. The overall scene for this is

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<v Speaker 1>something you know there were This was you know, what

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<v Speaker 1>they call a no fail mission, but you're really talking

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<v Speaker 1>about inserting US personnel behind enemy lines in a place

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<v Speaker 1>that has a total communications blackout with no overhead satellite. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>So even leading up to mission in the way that

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<v Speaker 1>they studied to the location of where they were coming

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<v Speaker 1>into to see what the possibilities were that those were

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<v Speaker 1>limited because it was still done mostly by satellite. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>They didn't have people on the ground, They don't have

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<v Speaker 1>anything local on the ground to give them, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>additional intelligence and information about what's going on on the

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<v Speaker 1>land side of where they inserted. And so you're in

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00:17:28.359 --> 00:17:32.079
<v Speaker 1>this sort of retro you know, you imagine that there

296
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<v Speaker 1>are so many people who sign up dream of becoming

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<v Speaker 1>special operators seals in particular for a mission just like this.

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<v Speaker 1>The nation sends them on something that the president has

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<v Speaker 1>authorized that is meant to you know, fill a strategic

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<v Speaker 1>gap in its intelligence collection against an adversary, a nuclear

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<v Speaker 1>armed adversary, and they're going to be sent, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>they're going to go in these sub to a mini

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<v Speaker 1>sub and then and you know, go in peeking their

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00:18:02.359 --> 00:18:05.039
<v Speaker 1>head up every now and again above water to see,

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00:18:05.480 --> 00:18:08.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, if they've been if they're clear, and make

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00:18:08.200 --> 00:18:10.799
<v Speaker 1>it to shore, you know, in the middle of the night,

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00:18:10.960 --> 00:18:14.359
<v Speaker 1>plant a device, and then get back out the same way,

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00:18:14.720 --> 00:18:17.599
<v Speaker 1>all without the ability to ever speak to a commander

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00:18:18.359 --> 00:18:20.880
<v Speaker 1>or have any kind of warning, for instance, if there

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00:18:21.000 --> 00:18:24.359
<v Speaker 1>was some kind of security element that was approaching them.

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<v Speaker 1>And so the level of a degree of risk and

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<v Speaker 1>difficulty here is, you know, in that the realm of

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00:18:32.039 --> 00:18:35.920
<v Speaker 1>special operations about as high as it can get. And

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00:18:36.039 --> 00:18:41.319
<v Speaker 1>given you know, the twenty years or so of the

315
00:18:41.400 --> 00:18:44.720
<v Speaker 1>g Watt post nine to eleven Global War on tearror,

316
00:18:44.960 --> 00:18:49.119
<v Speaker 1>totally different from the way in which Seals Seal Team six,

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00:18:49.599 --> 00:18:54.839
<v Speaker 1>regular Seals and special operations have been operating anywhere around

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<v Speaker 1>the world.

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<v Speaker 2>And as we get into early two nineteen, the White

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<v Speaker 2>House approves this mission. What were were there any additional

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<v Speaker 2>factors that went into President Trump's final decision to give

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<v Speaker 2>this thing the green light.

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<v Speaker 3>You know, that's a really great question, and I wish

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00:19:13.799 --> 00:19:15.839
<v Speaker 3>I knew the answer. I wish we'd been able to

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00:19:15.880 --> 00:19:20.400
<v Speaker 3>sit down with President Trump or his National security advisor

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<v Speaker 3>Michael Bolton, Sorry not Michael Bolton, different man, John Bulton,

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00:19:27.200 --> 00:19:33.079
<v Speaker 3>John Bolton, But that would be great too, And but

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00:19:33.160 --> 00:19:36.480
<v Speaker 3>we didn't. So what Trump thought in the moment when

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00:19:36.480 --> 00:19:39.519
<v Speaker 3>he decided to give this thumbs up is really a mystery.

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<v Speaker 3>Does we do know that he was only weeks away

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<v Speaker 3>from meeting with Kim Jong un in Vietnam. Maybe he

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<v Speaker 3>hoped that he could learn something for that, or maybe

333
00:19:52.160 --> 00:19:56.200
<v Speaker 3>this was a much long, much longer term deal where

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00:19:56.240 --> 00:19:59.880
<v Speaker 3>they thought, hey, whatever happens in Vietnam, we're gonna want

335
00:20:00.039 --> 00:20:03.720
<v Speaker 3>to know what the North Koreans are thinking afterwards. So

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00:20:04.079 --> 00:20:08.119
<v Speaker 3>it could be completely independent. We just don't know. But yeah,

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00:20:08.200 --> 00:20:10.559
<v Speaker 3>bottom line, I mean, the bottom line is that the

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00:20:10.680 --> 00:20:15.279
<v Speaker 3>nuclear power sub was in the water, headed towards North

339
00:20:15.359 --> 00:20:17.880
<v Speaker 3>Korea when he had the final window to say go,

340
00:20:18.119 --> 00:20:21.799
<v Speaker 3>no go, And then you can imagine the stub sinking

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00:20:22.680 --> 00:20:25.559
<v Speaker 3>beneath the surface and heading in Well.

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<v Speaker 2>Let's talk about that now about you know, beyond the

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00:20:28.039 --> 00:20:31.400
<v Speaker 2>concept of the operation, how the actual operation unfolded.

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<v Speaker 3>Matthew, you want to.

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<v Speaker 1>Take sure we're going to be a little bit. We're

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<v Speaker 1>gonna we're not going to go too far beyond what

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00:20:42.480 --> 00:20:48.440
<v Speaker 1>we published. But in essence, a contingent of Seal Team

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<v Speaker 1>six got on this sub. They had the two mini subs.

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<v Speaker 1>They bring themselves the sub. Once it gets the go

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<v Speaker 1>order from the president or as it's relayed, the sub

351
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<v Speaker 1>goes dark and it gets into North Korean waters. They then,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, the seals get out underwater, they load into

353
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<v Speaker 1>the stvs. They take a and as Dave said, an

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<v Speaker 1>hour to two hours from the nuclear sub towards their

355
00:21:22.240 --> 00:21:27.960
<v Speaker 1>insertion point in a North Korean bay, and those two

356
00:21:28.000 --> 00:21:33.559
<v Speaker 1>many subs get to their location and stop. But unfortunately

357
00:21:33.720 --> 00:21:38.200
<v Speaker 1>one of the mini subs missed its mark just slightly

358
00:21:38.880 --> 00:21:46.359
<v Speaker 1>and there had to be turned around and they released

359
00:21:46.400 --> 00:21:49.559
<v Speaker 1>the seals from the mini sub. At that point, they're

360
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<v Speaker 1>in about I believe, about one hundred and fifty meters

361
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<v Speaker 1>from shore. Water is relatively shallow, it's not super deep,

362
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<v Speaker 1>clear water, still evening, no weather issues, and the seals

363
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<v Speaker 1>start to make their way with their breathing equipment and

364
00:22:09.119 --> 00:22:13.400
<v Speaker 1>every few minutes are popping up to a century to

365
00:22:13.880 --> 00:22:17.359
<v Speaker 1>see what's going on in the bay and make their

366
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<v Speaker 1>way towards shore, and they get to sure, they're sort

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<v Speaker 1>of you know, I think we had multiple descriptions, but

368
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<v Speaker 1>water being standing in water between you know, knee and

369
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<v Speaker 1>waste high as they're taking off their diving gear or

370
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<v Speaker 1>parts of their gear, when they believe that they're spotted,

371
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<v Speaker 1>when at least they noticed that there's a fishing skiff

372
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<v Speaker 1>that's made its way through the bay that they had missed,

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<v Speaker 1>and the mini subs had also missed its sonar had

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<v Speaker 1>not picked it up. And at that point that's sort

375
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<v Speaker 1>of your critical moment when the mission essentially falls apart

376
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<v Speaker 1>because the what you know, in the end we realize,

377
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<v Speaker 1>or what we know is that they were North Korean fishermen,

378
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<v Speaker 1>divers who were diving for shellfish in the bay in

379
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<v Speaker 1>the middle of the night, but from the perspective of

380
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<v Speaker 1>the operators on the shore, that was not at all

381
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<v Speaker 1>clear to them. And so what they see are North

382
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<v Speaker 1>Koreans in diving suits, speaking hurriedly and excitedly with flashlights,

383
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<v Speaker 1>and what they believe, you know, they think the skiff

384
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<v Speaker 1>is up over the STVS in the water, and they've

385
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<v Speaker 1>got these flashlights and they're they're shining them around into

386
00:23:37.759 --> 00:23:41.480
<v Speaker 1>the water, and then one of the North Koreans dives

387
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<v Speaker 1>into the water, and so the assumptions running through at

388
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<v Speaker 1>least one of the members of Seal Team six was

389
00:23:50.720 --> 00:23:53.480
<v Speaker 1>that they had been compromised. The mission was compromised, and

390
00:23:53.519 --> 00:23:59.960
<v Speaker 1>so when the diver pops back up, the seal decided

391
00:24:00.119 --> 00:24:03.799
<v Speaker 1>to open fire, and once that first shot is fired,

392
00:24:03.880 --> 00:24:06.599
<v Speaker 1>the mission is aborted. And so the rest of the

393
00:24:06.640 --> 00:24:10.880
<v Speaker 1>seals fire on the North Koreans in the boat, and

394
00:24:10.920 --> 00:24:13.960
<v Speaker 1>then they have to make the mission is totally aborted

395
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<v Speaker 1>in the sense that there's not even going to attempt

396
00:24:16.160 --> 00:24:20.440
<v Speaker 1>to place the listening device, and they make their way

397
00:24:21.039 --> 00:24:25.359
<v Speaker 1>to the fishing boat. Inspect the boat, find no survivors,

398
00:24:25.400 --> 00:24:29.359
<v Speaker 1>but also no weapons and no communication gear. These are

399
00:24:29.799 --> 00:24:33.640
<v Speaker 1>no evidence that this is North Korean military or militia

400
00:24:33.880 --> 00:24:38.039
<v Speaker 1>or any kind of security team. It's just fishermen and

401
00:24:38.079 --> 00:24:41.559
<v Speaker 1>they ditch the bodies. They stab the We have one

402
00:24:42.240 --> 00:24:46.759
<v Speaker 1>account which they use their knives to puncture the lungs

403
00:24:46.799 --> 00:24:49.880
<v Speaker 1>of the North Korean so that the bodies would sink,

404
00:24:51.039 --> 00:24:53.799
<v Speaker 1>and then they make their way back to the STVS

405
00:24:53.960 --> 00:24:56.680
<v Speaker 1>and call in a distress signal to the large sub

406
00:24:57.920 --> 00:25:00.880
<v Speaker 1>and make their way out. And so so you know,

407
00:25:00.960 --> 00:25:07.319
<v Speaker 1>what should have been a two hour mission didn't even

408
00:25:07.400 --> 00:25:11.680
<v Speaker 1>last that long because of how quickly the mission fell

409
00:25:11.720 --> 00:25:16.799
<v Speaker 1>apart once they made it to land. So it was

410
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<v Speaker 1>you know, in one sense, I mean, obviously it's incredibly dramatic,

411
00:25:21.240 --> 00:25:25.079
<v Speaker 1>but in another way it was it was over almost

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<v Speaker 1>as soon as it began.

413
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<v Speaker 2>Clean drinking water is one of the best investments you

414
00:25:30.519 --> 00:25:33.279
<v Speaker 2>can make for your family's health. That's exactly why I

415
00:25:33.319 --> 00:25:37.400
<v Speaker 2>started using cove Pure, a countertop water purifier that filters

416
00:25:37.400 --> 00:25:39.240
<v Speaker 2>out all the things you don't want in your water,

417
00:25:39.480 --> 00:25:41.720
<v Speaker 2>so you can feel good about what your family's drinking.

418
00:25:42.359 --> 00:25:45.400
<v Speaker 2>Here's something you might not realize. When people take meds,

419
00:25:45.440 --> 00:25:47.960
<v Speaker 2>their bodies don't absorb all of them. Much of that

420
00:25:48.000 --> 00:25:50.920
<v Speaker 2>stuff gets flushed down the toilet. The water treatment plants

421
00:25:50.960 --> 00:25:57.079
<v Speaker 2>are horrible at filtering out those leftover pharmaceuticals, things like antibiotics, antidepressants,

422
00:25:57.079 --> 00:26:00.160
<v Speaker 2>and even hormone disruptors from birth control pills. It is

423
00:26:00.200 --> 00:26:03.640
<v Speaker 2>no wonder our society is so messed up. Luckily, cove

424
00:26:03.680 --> 00:26:06.279
<v Speaker 2>Pure is lab certified to remove up to ninety nine

425
00:26:06.319 --> 00:26:12.119
<v Speaker 2>point nine percent of impurities. That includes fluoride, pfas, agricultural runoff,

426
00:26:12.160 --> 00:26:15.960
<v Speaker 2>and of course pharmaceutical drugs. The first thing I noticed

427
00:26:15.960 --> 00:26:18.759
<v Speaker 2>with Cove Pure is the taste. Guys, this is what

428
00:26:18.839 --> 00:26:23.160
<v Speaker 2>water is supposed to taste like, pure clean, no aftertaste.

429
00:26:23.440 --> 00:26:27.000
<v Speaker 2>You'll actually want to drink more. And Cove Pure makes

430
00:26:27.000 --> 00:26:30.079
<v Speaker 2>it so easy. It sits on top of your countertop.

431
00:26:30.240 --> 00:26:32.680
<v Speaker 2>No plumber, is no drilling. You just fill it up

432
00:26:32.680 --> 00:26:35.240
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433
00:26:35.279 --> 00:26:37.799
<v Speaker 2>you want, hot, cold, or warm with the tap of

434
00:26:37.839 --> 00:26:41.200
<v Speaker 2>a button. You wouldn't take a stranger's drug prescription, so

435
00:26:41.440 --> 00:26:44.799
<v Speaker 2>why accept their leftovers in your water? Protect yourself with

436
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437
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438
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439
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<v Speaker 2>That's Coovepu. You are e dot com slash t e

440
00:27:04.640 --> 00:27:10.279
<v Speaker 2>A M. A couple other interesting details from the article

441
00:27:10.319 --> 00:27:12.240
<v Speaker 2>that I'd just like to tease out a little bit.

442
00:27:13.039 --> 00:27:16.640
<v Speaker 2>You mentioned how they were using deniable weapons, So these

443
00:27:16.680 --> 00:27:20.279
<v Speaker 2>weren't like American M fours or for sixteens, It wasn't

444
00:27:20.319 --> 00:27:22.799
<v Speaker 2>American ammunition that would have a head stamp on it

445
00:27:22.920 --> 00:27:25.359
<v Speaker 2>that you know, the brass would be an indicator of

446
00:27:25.359 --> 00:27:29.160
<v Speaker 2>where it came from. So the weapon systems were deniable.

447
00:27:29.200 --> 00:27:31.640
<v Speaker 2>And then you also mentioned the quick reaction force that

448
00:27:31.799 --> 00:27:32.640
<v Speaker 2>was off the coast.

449
00:27:33.519 --> 00:27:37.759
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, it's interesting the weapons were deniable, but it's it'd

450
00:27:37.799 --> 00:27:42.000
<v Speaker 3>be hard to keep this vision deniable if anything went wrong, right,

451
00:27:42.039 --> 00:27:46.519
<v Speaker 3>because you have a team of about eight Navy seals

452
00:27:46.559 --> 00:27:51.160
<v Speaker 3>at the shore and presumably none of them are Korean

453
00:27:51.359 --> 00:27:56.640
<v Speaker 3>or or seam Korean, and so uh and you and you,

454
00:27:56.839 --> 00:27:59.359
<v Speaker 3>as you mentioned, you have a quick reaction force off

455
00:27:59.480 --> 00:28:04.119
<v Speaker 3>of the shore. So in a nutshell, what happened is

456
00:28:04.119 --> 00:28:07.039
<v Speaker 3>these guys went to the shore, they thought they'd been spotted,

457
00:28:07.079 --> 00:28:10.279
<v Speaker 3>They killed some people that they thought might be security forces.

458
00:28:10.319 --> 00:28:12.839
<v Speaker 3>It turned out they were fisherman, and they left. Everyone

459
00:28:12.880 --> 00:28:17.440
<v Speaker 3>got off outsafe. Few But when I was reporting this,

460
00:28:17.799 --> 00:28:20.599
<v Speaker 3>we had a lot of conversations about how bad this

461
00:28:20.640 --> 00:28:24.920
<v Speaker 3>could have gotten because it wasn't just eight seals. There

462
00:28:25.000 --> 00:28:29.200
<v Speaker 3>was another quick reaction force of seals based on the

463
00:28:30.559 --> 00:28:33.359
<v Speaker 3>at the nuclear powered stuff that were ready to inflate

464
00:28:33.519 --> 00:28:38.160
<v Speaker 3>speedboats and come to shore in case someone was wounded captured.

465
00:28:38.559 --> 00:28:40.839
<v Speaker 3>You know, you can imagine that that quite easily could

466
00:28:40.839 --> 00:28:44.720
<v Speaker 3>have happened. That a small firefight on the beach where

467
00:28:44.759 --> 00:28:48.279
<v Speaker 3>a seal was wounded or captured grows as quick reaction

468
00:28:48.400 --> 00:28:52.200
<v Speaker 3>forces come in and maybe more seals are wounded and captured.

469
00:28:52.240 --> 00:28:55.359
<v Speaker 3>But there was another part of the of the response

470
00:28:55.400 --> 00:28:58.759
<v Speaker 3>plan was there was stealth rotary aircraft that may be

471
00:28:59.599 --> 00:29:02.400
<v Speaker 3>some blocks was that are the stealth version or maybe

472
00:29:02.400 --> 00:29:05.559
<v Speaker 3>some Ospreys that were ready to bring in even more

473
00:29:05.599 --> 00:29:08.640
<v Speaker 3>special operators in case that was needed. So one could

474
00:29:08.640 --> 00:29:11.000
<v Speaker 3>imagine that if that happened, you could have a black

475
00:29:11.039 --> 00:29:14.279
<v Speaker 3>Hawk down situation where one of those aircraft went down.

476
00:29:14.440 --> 00:29:19.200
<v Speaker 3>That has happened in a number of recent Special Operations missions.

477
00:29:19.519 --> 00:29:23.359
<v Speaker 3>So just imagine if that happened on that night in

478
00:29:24.200 --> 00:29:30.440
<v Speaker 3>North Korea. There would be probably some dead service members there.

479
00:29:30.519 --> 00:29:34.960
<v Speaker 3>There would probably be some captives. Best case scenario, shooting

480
00:29:34.960 --> 00:29:39.160
<v Speaker 3>stops within a few hours and North Korea then has

481
00:29:39.200 --> 00:29:42.519
<v Speaker 3>a bunch of American captives. Worst case scenario is that

482
00:29:42.599 --> 00:29:47.039
<v Speaker 3>the shooting continues and spreads across the border as North

483
00:29:47.079 --> 00:29:49.799
<v Speaker 3>Korea thinks it's being attacked in response to South Korea,

484
00:29:50.920 --> 00:29:53.559
<v Speaker 3>and that could have gotten really bad. Now, Fortunately, all

485
00:29:53.599 --> 00:29:56.480
<v Speaker 3>we're talking about is a mission where two or maybe

486
00:29:56.640 --> 00:29:59.039
<v Speaker 3>three civilians who are out trying to catch something to

487
00:29:59.039 --> 00:30:02.519
<v Speaker 3>eat got killed. But it could have been much much worse,

488
00:30:02.599 --> 00:30:03.960
<v Speaker 3>like strategically worse.

489
00:30:05.960 --> 00:30:08.160
<v Speaker 2>And I mean that's kind of my next question is

490
00:30:08.160 --> 00:30:11.599
<v Speaker 2>the North Korean response, which is interesting because apparently it

491
00:30:11.680 --> 00:30:13.000
<v Speaker 2>was just silence.

492
00:30:13.240 --> 00:30:20.599
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so silence from them, also basically silenced from the Americans.

493
00:30:20.680 --> 00:30:24.200
<v Speaker 3>President Trump said in when it was questioned about it

494
00:30:24.200 --> 00:30:27.119
<v Speaker 3>in the Oval Office during a press conference that he

495
00:30:27.200 --> 00:30:28.880
<v Speaker 3>didn't know anything about it. This is the first he's

496
00:30:28.920 --> 00:30:31.880
<v Speaker 3>hearing about it, which, by the way, our reporting does

497
00:30:31.920 --> 00:30:37.000
<v Speaker 3>not support. You know, I've been sort of scratching my

498
00:30:37.039 --> 00:30:40.519
<v Speaker 3>head about this because we believed, through the course of

499
00:30:41.039 --> 00:30:43.720
<v Speaker 3>reporting it, it was relatively clear to us that the

500
00:30:43.759 --> 00:30:47.240
<v Speaker 3>North Koreans did learn about this, and so we wouldn't

501
00:30:47.279 --> 00:30:51.000
<v Speaker 3>be breaking the news to them, But it wasn't clear

502
00:30:51.039 --> 00:30:53.359
<v Speaker 3>to us how the North Koreans were going to respond,

503
00:30:53.400 --> 00:30:55.799
<v Speaker 3>and so as far as we can tell, they haven't

504
00:30:55.839 --> 00:30:59.039
<v Speaker 3>responded at all. But I was speaking to someone yesterday

505
00:30:59.319 --> 00:31:03.559
<v Speaker 3>who's sort of a specialist in this, someone who was

506
00:31:04.240 --> 00:31:08.119
<v Speaker 3>a Green Beret and worked for special Operations come in

507
00:31:08.720 --> 00:31:11.359
<v Speaker 3>Korea for a long time, and he said, you know

508
00:31:11.400 --> 00:31:16.720
<v Speaker 3>what these types of missions by South Korea and North

509
00:31:16.759 --> 00:31:21.279
<v Speaker 3>Korea have been going on forever, and neither side ever

510
00:31:21.440 --> 00:31:26.119
<v Speaker 3>acknowledges either unless civilians figure it out. And he pointed

511
00:31:26.119 --> 00:31:32.000
<v Speaker 3>me towards two missions in the nineteen nineties where North

512
00:31:32.079 --> 00:31:37.559
<v Speaker 3>Korean mini subs essentially went aground in South Korea and

513
00:31:37.599 --> 00:31:39.960
<v Speaker 3>it was and it was chaos and people got killed.

514
00:31:39.960 --> 00:31:44.319
<v Speaker 3>It was very serious, more serious than this one. And

515
00:31:45.839 --> 00:31:49.039
<v Speaker 3>you know, in those cases, these they were the missions

516
00:31:49.079 --> 00:31:52.240
<v Speaker 3>got too big to deny. But he said, you know,

517
00:31:52.279 --> 00:31:54.400
<v Speaker 3>as far as we could tell, missions like that had

518
00:31:54.440 --> 00:31:58.799
<v Speaker 3>been happening somewhat regularly, and the South kind of new

519
00:31:59.279 --> 00:32:02.000
<v Speaker 3>and the North kind of new, but they would never

520
00:32:02.400 --> 00:32:06.440
<v Speaker 3>there was no upside for either by calling them out

521
00:32:06.440 --> 00:32:08.920
<v Speaker 3>when they happened. And he gave me an example. He

522
00:32:08.960 --> 00:32:11.000
<v Speaker 3>had actually, early in his army career, had been in

523
00:32:11.119 --> 00:32:14.720
<v Speaker 3>charge of a watchtower on the DMZ and they would

524
00:32:14.759 --> 00:32:17.880
<v Speaker 3>actually do little ambushes and patrols within the DMZ. And

525
00:32:17.920 --> 00:32:22.000
<v Speaker 3>he's like, look, we were told, even if we saw

526
00:32:22.319 --> 00:32:26.279
<v Speaker 3>a North Korean like infiltrating, like unless he's actively like

527
00:32:26.359 --> 00:32:30.279
<v Speaker 3>aiming at you don't shoot him because like the risk

528
00:32:30.519 --> 00:32:34.000
<v Speaker 3>of like an escalation is probably worse than the risk

529
00:32:34.119 --> 00:32:37.319
<v Speaker 3>of an infiltration and maybe that at like a very

530
00:32:37.319 --> 00:32:40.759
<v Speaker 3>sort of small unit level, is what's going on at

531
00:32:40.759 --> 00:32:44.400
<v Speaker 3>a strategic level with both nations is like we know,

532
00:32:45.119 --> 00:32:47.359
<v Speaker 3>we know, they know. We know that they know that

533
00:32:47.440 --> 00:32:51.200
<v Speaker 3>we know. So what is the upside of us actually

534
00:32:51.240 --> 00:32:55.880
<v Speaker 3>discussing something that you know is inherently supposed to be secret.

535
00:32:55.279 --> 00:32:58.759
<v Speaker 2>In the nineteen sixties and seventies and North Koreans would

536
00:32:58.799 --> 00:33:02.920
<v Speaker 2>even send death squads into South Korea. I mean, you know,

537
00:33:03.039 --> 00:33:05.559
<v Speaker 2>wild stuff happened, happened in the past. That kind of

538
00:33:05.559 --> 00:33:08.160
<v Speaker 2>gets memory hold. Yeah, Matthew, we know.

539
00:33:08.519 --> 00:33:10.079
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you know, one of the things we do know,

540
00:33:10.119 --> 00:33:12.519
<v Speaker 1>and I think we reported in the story is is

541
00:33:12.559 --> 00:33:16.880
<v Speaker 1>that the Trump White House was working after the mission

542
00:33:16.880 --> 00:33:20.960
<v Speaker 1>failed under the assumption that the North Koreans knew. Part

543
00:33:20.960 --> 00:33:25.279
<v Speaker 1>of it was that there was an unexplained, an unusual

544
00:33:25.359 --> 00:33:30.079
<v Speaker 1>military build up in the location where the operation had occurred.

545
00:33:30.559 --> 00:33:33.039
<v Speaker 1>And just on the sort of basics, right, you're talking

546
00:33:33.119 --> 00:33:36.240
<v Speaker 1>about North Korea is not a country outside of you know,

547
00:33:36.480 --> 00:33:40.079
<v Speaker 1>the security forces, where people have weapons, and so in

548
00:33:40.200 --> 00:33:45.039
<v Speaker 1>a in a shallow, relatively shallow bay that was well trafficked.

549
00:33:45.079 --> 00:33:46.720
<v Speaker 1>I mean, we're not going to get into the specific

550
00:33:46.759 --> 00:33:51.039
<v Speaker 1>location but it wasn't you know, some random, totally remote place.

551
00:33:51.359 --> 00:33:54.160
<v Speaker 1>You had three bodies that were ultimately going to be found,

552
00:33:54.160 --> 00:33:56.240
<v Speaker 1>and we're going to be found with bullet holes. So

553
00:33:56.720 --> 00:34:00.000
<v Speaker 1>even if you can't you know, trace back the ammunition

554
00:34:00.240 --> 00:34:03.759
<v Speaker 1>specifically to the US, the North Koreans were going to

555
00:34:03.799 --> 00:34:06.240
<v Speaker 1>be able to figure out that someone had come in

556
00:34:06.279 --> 00:34:10.760
<v Speaker 1>by water and killed three of their citizens with a gun.

557
00:34:11.360 --> 00:34:13.599
<v Speaker 1>And so there's really only a few options. You know,

558
00:34:14.159 --> 00:34:16.440
<v Speaker 1>quite likely, of course, that they made the assumption that

559
00:34:16.480 --> 00:34:19.760
<v Speaker 1>it was the South Koreans. That's certainly a possibility, or they,

560
00:34:20.239 --> 00:34:23.039
<v Speaker 1>you know, guessed that it was an American provocation. We

561
00:34:23.400 --> 00:34:25.960
<v Speaker 1>don't know that, but we do know that they that

562
00:34:26.239 --> 00:34:29.360
<v Speaker 1>the White House assumed that the North Koreans knew, and

563
00:34:30.239 --> 00:34:32.199
<v Speaker 1>at least in one case, one of our sources told

564
00:34:32.280 --> 00:34:36.559
<v Speaker 1>us that leading up to the Hanoi summit, the concern

565
00:34:36.679 --> 00:34:40.039
<v Speaker 1>or the question inside the White House was are the

566
00:34:40.079 --> 00:34:43.639
<v Speaker 1>North Koreans going to cancel the summit because of this mission?

567
00:34:44.559 --> 00:34:47.320
<v Speaker 1>With no one of course saying or signaling either way.

568
00:34:47.760 --> 00:34:50.559
<v Speaker 1>But the American side, you know, let's call it the

569
00:34:51.000 --> 00:34:53.199
<v Speaker 1>guilty party, if you will, with the knowledge of what

570
00:34:53.239 --> 00:34:55.880
<v Speaker 1>they had done and that had gone it had gone wrong,

571
00:34:57.039 --> 00:35:02.079
<v Speaker 1>concerned that it was going to end the upcoming summit

572
00:35:02.119 --> 00:35:07.400
<v Speaker 1>between Kim Johan and President Trump. So there certainly was

573
00:35:07.639 --> 00:35:11.519
<v Speaker 1>the assumption on the American side that the North Koreans

574
00:35:11.559 --> 00:35:15.880
<v Speaker 1>knew some evidence that they may have known. I think

575
00:35:15.960 --> 00:35:18.840
<v Speaker 1>the you know, it still is interesting to me.

576
00:35:19.519 --> 00:35:19.679
<v Speaker 3>One.

577
00:35:20.039 --> 00:35:22.280
<v Speaker 1>You know, you can't know, of course, what's going to

578
00:35:22.320 --> 00:35:25.000
<v Speaker 1>happen until the story publishes. But my thought had been

579
00:35:26.159 --> 00:35:28.840
<v Speaker 1>that it, you know, our story would lead to the

580
00:35:28.880 --> 00:35:32.000
<v Speaker 1>North Koreans going to the UN, for instance, to make

581
00:35:32.039 --> 00:35:35.400
<v Speaker 1>some kind of formal complaint about you know, the US

582
00:35:35.559 --> 00:35:40.280
<v Speaker 1>violating North Korean sovereignty. That was sort of what I

583
00:35:40.320 --> 00:35:43.000
<v Speaker 1>thought we might be in line with how they react,

584
00:35:43.320 --> 00:35:46.119
<v Speaker 1>And it's been interesting to see that there's been total

585
00:35:46.159 --> 00:35:50.159
<v Speaker 1>silence on their part. But of course, you know, we're

586
00:35:50.199 --> 00:35:52.880
<v Speaker 1>talking still about a hermit kingdom.

587
00:35:54.000 --> 00:35:55.840
<v Speaker 2>It's I mean, this gets a little bit into like

588
00:35:55.880 --> 00:35:59.800
<v Speaker 2>sort of the international relations theory. But you'll hear some people,

589
00:36:00.199 --> 00:36:02.840
<v Speaker 2>I believe Michael Kaufman was one of them, talking about

590
00:36:02.880 --> 00:36:07.119
<v Speaker 2>how nations will choose to acknowledge or not acknowledge covert

591
00:36:07.159 --> 00:36:11.760
<v Speaker 2>operations or intelligence operations directed against them. That there's this

592
00:36:11.840 --> 00:36:14.519
<v Speaker 2>fear that you know, a war will accidentally break out

593
00:36:14.559 --> 00:36:17.440
<v Speaker 2>between America and China because we make one false move.

594
00:36:17.760 --> 00:36:21.000
<v Speaker 2>But he was pointing out that actually states look at

595
00:36:21.000 --> 00:36:23.480
<v Speaker 2>these things a little bit more objectively and will decide

596
00:36:23.519 --> 00:36:26.039
<v Speaker 2>whether or not to acknowledge it based on their overall

597
00:36:26.320 --> 00:36:29.039
<v Speaker 2>strategic picture. And I think you probably saw that here,

598
00:36:29.039 --> 00:36:31.800
<v Speaker 2>like the North Koreans must see something bigger, like we

599
00:36:31.880 --> 00:36:34.239
<v Speaker 2>still want to get rice and beans from the Western world.

600
00:36:34.239 --> 00:36:37.880
<v Speaker 2>We're not interested in I don't think Kim Jong unreally

601
00:36:37.920 --> 00:36:39.760
<v Speaker 2>cares about three dead fishermen, to tell you the.

602
00:36:39.719 --> 00:36:44.119
<v Speaker 3>Truth, well, and like, what's the upside, right, you know,

603
00:36:44.320 --> 00:36:47.679
<v Speaker 3>if he acknowledges this happened, and you know, it looks

604
00:36:47.719 --> 00:36:51.039
<v Speaker 3>bad on him, the authoritarian leader who's saying to your people,

605
00:36:51.400 --> 00:36:53.840
<v Speaker 3>only I can protect you from the West, who's out

606
00:36:53.840 --> 00:36:56.719
<v Speaker 3>to get you, and put your faith in me. I'm

607
00:36:56.719 --> 00:36:58.599
<v Speaker 3>going to need you to sacrifice quite a bit, but

608
00:36:58.639 --> 00:37:01.119
<v Speaker 3>don't worry. I've got your bath. And something like this

609
00:37:01.280 --> 00:37:05.039
<v Speaker 3>shows that his nation isn't as secure as he's been

610
00:37:05.079 --> 00:37:09.559
<v Speaker 3>telling people. That's not good, right, and making a big

611
00:37:09.639 --> 00:37:12.800
<v Speaker 3>stink about it to the UN probably isn't going to

612
00:37:12.920 --> 00:37:18.079
<v Speaker 3>lead to any like real material gains. So maybe, you know,

613
00:37:19.199 --> 00:37:21.760
<v Speaker 3>maybe he is just thinking like yo, you know, like

614
00:37:23.199 --> 00:37:25.760
<v Speaker 3>why should I bother? What what's in it for me?

615
00:37:26.639 --> 00:37:29.159
<v Speaker 2>That's one of I think, like the most one of

616
00:37:29.199 --> 00:37:32.679
<v Speaker 2>the most interesting things about the aftermath of this story

617
00:37:32.679 --> 00:37:34.920
<v Speaker 2>that you guys wrote is that And I don't mean

618
00:37:34.960 --> 00:37:38.800
<v Speaker 2>to make light of the seriousness of this operation or

619
00:37:38.800 --> 00:37:42.039
<v Speaker 2>the consequences that you discussed that many ways this could

620
00:37:42.039 --> 00:37:45.679
<v Speaker 2>have ended in an absolute disaster, But I think it's

621
00:37:45.760 --> 00:37:48.760
<v Speaker 2>kind of shocking how low the stakes turned out to

622
00:37:48.840 --> 00:37:51.639
<v Speaker 2>be in the end, that there's like no fall out

623
00:37:51.639 --> 00:37:53.800
<v Speaker 2>whatsoever on our side or their side.

624
00:37:55.920 --> 00:37:59.599
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, you know, I was again talking to someone who

625
00:37:59.679 --> 00:38:04.239
<v Speaker 3>spent long time and Special Operations Command Korea yesterday and

626
00:38:04.320 --> 00:38:06.840
<v Speaker 3>he said, you know, I feel like that's one of

627
00:38:06.840 --> 00:38:10.039
<v Speaker 3>the benefits that comes out of this failed mission is

628
00:38:10.920 --> 00:38:15.199
<v Speaker 3>we've spent so much time, like generations in this conflict,

629
00:38:15.840 --> 00:38:22.159
<v Speaker 3>uh worried about North Korea's response, and this thing happened

630
00:38:22.400 --> 00:38:25.719
<v Speaker 3>and there was no response, and so maybe that tells

631
00:38:25.800 --> 00:38:30.920
<v Speaker 3>us something helpful about what North Korea actually is. Maybe

632
00:38:30.960 --> 00:38:32.840
<v Speaker 3>we built it up too much in our minds. Now.

633
00:38:33.079 --> 00:38:36.400
<v Speaker 3>To me, I felt like that was a very dangerous

634
00:38:36.400 --> 00:38:38.559
<v Speaker 3>sense of confidence, like great, so you feel like you

635
00:38:38.599 --> 00:38:41.360
<v Speaker 3>can do this again like I'm sleeping so much better now.

636
00:38:41.800 --> 00:38:45.000
<v Speaker 3>So I think that that bit of knowledge is both

637
00:38:45.159 --> 00:38:49.679
<v Speaker 3>potentially helpful and potentially harmful. Like if somethingow this emboldens,

638
00:38:49.719 --> 00:38:51.440
<v Speaker 3>the United States would be like, hey, check it out,

639
00:38:51.440 --> 00:38:53.039
<v Speaker 3>we can mess with North Korea. They're not going to

640
00:38:53.119 --> 00:38:57.320
<v Speaker 3>nucas Like, uh, that's not necessarily a great.

641
00:38:57.199 --> 00:39:02.119
<v Speaker 1>Thing, right, Well, that's it's and it's because the fallout

642
00:39:02.280 --> 00:39:06.000
<v Speaker 1>and the failure was contained, right. I mean, there are

643
00:39:06.039 --> 00:39:10.239
<v Speaker 1>scenarios here that we haven't even discussed. But you know,

644
00:39:10.320 --> 00:39:14.440
<v Speaker 1>at the end of the day, besides the Tier one

645
00:39:14.519 --> 00:39:19.440
<v Speaker 1>operators who they inserted, you know, there's a nuclear submarine

646
00:39:19.679 --> 00:39:23.800
<v Speaker 1>that's sitting in North Korean waters, and god forbid, there

647
00:39:23.840 --> 00:39:25.920
<v Speaker 1>had been some kind of incident or some kind of

648
00:39:25.960 --> 00:39:29.760
<v Speaker 1>misapp with the submarine itself where you have a you know,

649
00:39:29.800 --> 00:39:33.159
<v Speaker 1>I think what they call it is a national capital asset.

650
00:39:34.159 --> 00:39:37.000
<v Speaker 1>Where there had been a problem with the sub we'd

651
00:39:37.000 --> 00:39:40.239
<v Speaker 1>be talking about this in a completely different way. And

652
00:39:40.239 --> 00:39:44.400
<v Speaker 1>and it's it's those potential risks and the fallout that

653
00:39:44.480 --> 00:39:48.079
<v Speaker 1>are supposed to be you know what is and I

654
00:39:48.079 --> 00:39:50.519
<v Speaker 1>don't mean to say that they weren't, they're they're considered,

655
00:39:50.559 --> 00:39:54.960
<v Speaker 1>but have to be weighed against the potential reward of

656
00:39:55.199 --> 00:39:58.159
<v Speaker 1>a you know, uh, you know, and again I think

657
00:39:58.199 --> 00:40:00.760
<v Speaker 1>even with the with the tap and what we do

658
00:40:00.880 --> 00:40:04.800
<v Speaker 1>know about it was it was all potential in the

659
00:40:04.840 --> 00:40:07.039
<v Speaker 1>sense of this was a black hole. It was an

660
00:40:07.039 --> 00:40:10.880
<v Speaker 1>opportunity that could have that might have been able to

661
00:40:11.119 --> 00:40:14.280
<v Speaker 1>give them some kind of strategic advantage or insight into

662
00:40:14.320 --> 00:40:16.840
<v Speaker 1>what was going on both in Kim Jungun's mind and

663
00:40:17.480 --> 00:40:21.199
<v Speaker 1>thought process, but also just communications in the country altogether.

664
00:40:21.440 --> 00:40:24.119
<v Speaker 1>But they don't know that because the truth is is

665
00:40:24.159 --> 00:40:26.320
<v Speaker 1>that there's no sure thing in any of this, and

666
00:40:26.360 --> 00:40:30.840
<v Speaker 1>so the question is is risk versus reward with an

667
00:40:30.920 --> 00:40:34.960
<v Speaker 1>adversary where you don't even have diplomatic relations with I mean,

668
00:40:35.000 --> 00:40:36.920
<v Speaker 1>you know, the thing that I sort of thought through was,

669
00:40:37.320 --> 00:40:40.159
<v Speaker 1>you know, if shit had gone had hit the fan

670
00:40:40.280 --> 00:40:42.880
<v Speaker 1>during the mission, how are they picking up the phone

671
00:40:42.920 --> 00:40:46.760
<v Speaker 1>to communicate with the North Koreans that, hey, it's us

672
00:40:46.800 --> 00:40:50.679
<v Speaker 1>and we're not invading your country. It's a small you know,

673
00:40:50.920 --> 00:40:54.199
<v Speaker 1>we're just planting a listening device let them go. As

674
00:40:54.199 --> 00:40:58.719
<v Speaker 1>opposed to they believe that the South Koreans have decided

675
00:40:58.760 --> 00:41:01.000
<v Speaker 1>to invade or there's some kind of you know, the

676
00:41:01.280 --> 00:41:05.280
<v Speaker 1>miscalculations that go into this and so it turned out

677
00:41:05.320 --> 00:41:09.159
<v Speaker 1>to be low stakes. But you know that's circumstantial and

678
00:41:09.800 --> 00:41:10.599
<v Speaker 1>just the way it broke.

679
00:41:10.719 --> 00:41:13.519
<v Speaker 3>So let me just there's what Matthew said to Like,

680
00:41:14.159 --> 00:41:18.840
<v Speaker 3>this Ohio class nuclear power sub that went in there.

681
00:41:19.719 --> 00:41:23.599
<v Speaker 3>We don't know exactly how close it got to shore,

682
00:41:24.519 --> 00:41:27.960
<v Speaker 3>but we were told that it took, you know, significant

683
00:41:28.079 --> 00:41:31.800
<v Speaker 3>risks to come and retrieve this seal team once the

684
00:41:31.840 --> 00:41:36.039
<v Speaker 3>mission was compromised and came closer than maybe was considered

685
00:41:36.800 --> 00:41:42.760
<v Speaker 3>risk free. Now, imagine if that sub had been grounded.

686
00:41:43.840 --> 00:41:46.199
<v Speaker 3>There's more than one hundred people on that sub. That

687
00:41:46.360 --> 00:41:50.679
<v Speaker 3>sub costs more than a billion dollars. Imagine if that

688
00:41:50.920 --> 00:41:54.760
<v Speaker 3>sub had been detected and had been attacked by their

689
00:41:54.800 --> 00:42:00.000
<v Speaker 3>defensive forces because they have submarine hunting ships, and potentially

690
00:42:00.119 --> 00:42:04.400
<v Speaker 3>that whole crew had been killed. There's just so many

691
00:42:04.440 --> 00:42:08.480
<v Speaker 3>scenarios here that turn out badly. And so what I

692
00:42:08.519 --> 00:42:12.199
<v Speaker 3>think what motivated both Matthew and I in telling this

693
00:42:12.280 --> 00:42:18.320
<v Speaker 3>story is I don't have faith that that is that

694
00:42:18.360 --> 00:42:21.079
<v Speaker 3>process is fully understood, not just by the general public

695
00:42:21.119 --> 00:42:28.039
<v Speaker 3>but even by special operations, that there is a good

696
00:42:28.159 --> 00:42:32.119
<v Speaker 3>understanding of the risk reward of these types of operations

697
00:42:32.159 --> 00:42:35.559
<v Speaker 3>and the sort of the track record of these operations,

698
00:42:35.559 --> 00:42:39.159
<v Speaker 3>because very few people, even in the Seals, probably even

699
00:42:39.280 --> 00:42:43.440
<v Speaker 3>in Joint Special Operations, knew about this operation, and it's

700
00:42:43.559 --> 00:42:47.159
<v Speaker 3>unclear to us what they were ever told afterwards. You know,

701
00:42:47.320 --> 00:42:51.679
<v Speaker 3>maybe this thing is painted as a win, right, and

702
00:42:51.719 --> 00:42:54.719
<v Speaker 3>that lessons learned from it are not being learned. And

703
00:42:54.840 --> 00:42:58.280
<v Speaker 3>so I think it's so important when the risks are

704
00:42:58.360 --> 00:43:02.440
<v Speaker 3>so severe. So I have a really clear eyed understanding

705
00:43:02.480 --> 00:43:04.960
<v Speaker 3>of what happened and what could have happened.

706
00:43:06.079 --> 00:43:08.719
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I mean, you think when a helicopter gets shot

707
00:43:08.760 --> 00:43:11.079
<v Speaker 2>down on an operation like, Okay, this turned into a

708
00:43:11.119 --> 00:43:14.199
<v Speaker 2>real shit show. I can't even imagine what a grounded

709
00:43:14.320 --> 00:43:17.000
<v Speaker 2>submarine off the coast of North Korea, like, what that

710
00:43:17.000 --> 00:43:22.599
<v Speaker 2>would entail. That's beyond what I can imagine right now.

711
00:43:23.639 --> 00:43:28.239
<v Speaker 2>When did the administration inform Congress that this operation took place?

712
00:43:29.519 --> 00:43:33.920
<v Speaker 1>Oh, the administration didn't inform Congress that it took place.

713
00:43:33.960 --> 00:43:39.480
<v Speaker 1>It didn't happen until Biden became president and he informed

714
00:43:39.480 --> 00:43:43.559
<v Speaker 1>the Gang of Eight that it had occurred. And that's

715
00:43:43.639 --> 00:43:46.000
<v Speaker 1>one of the things one of in the ENDU and

716
00:43:46.119 --> 00:43:49.599
<v Speaker 1>we walked into this. As Dave said, I think trying

717
00:43:49.639 --> 00:43:56.960
<v Speaker 1>to make public something that requires civilians in particular, but

718
00:43:57.039 --> 00:44:01.480
<v Speaker 1>also senior military fish is to understand the full scope

719
00:44:01.519 --> 00:44:07.039
<v Speaker 1>and consequence, potential consequences. We had no idea until sort

720
00:44:07.079 --> 00:44:10.199
<v Speaker 1>of the end of the reporting that Congress had never

721
00:44:10.280 --> 00:44:13.800
<v Speaker 1>been notified, which, as far as we understand, is a

722
00:44:13.880 --> 00:44:17.480
<v Speaker 1>violation of the law. And it's a it's a you know,

723
00:44:18.280 --> 00:44:20.519
<v Speaker 1>I mean, the truth is is that prior to Trump,

724
00:44:20.880 --> 00:44:27.280
<v Speaker 1>that that issue alone is a massive scandal. Now, unfortunately

725
00:44:27.719 --> 00:44:29.599
<v Speaker 1>the world we live in, it's really like a Friday

726
00:44:29.599 --> 00:44:34.079
<v Speaker 1>in September and and has has gone sort of you know,

727
00:44:34.119 --> 00:44:38.280
<v Speaker 1>overlooked the idea that the president could authorize a mission

728
00:44:38.360 --> 00:44:42.880
<v Speaker 1>like this and and then can have it fail under

729
00:44:42.920 --> 00:44:46.199
<v Speaker 1>these circumstances and then never disclose it to Congress. To me,

730
00:44:46.320 --> 00:44:50.639
<v Speaker 1>is I mean that alone is reason to publish it,

731
00:44:51.480 --> 00:44:55.840
<v Speaker 1>but is also reason to to for Congress in particular

732
00:44:56.079 --> 00:44:58.960
<v Speaker 1>to be up in arms about what the president is

733
00:44:59.079 --> 00:45:00.440
<v Speaker 1>or is not holding.

734
00:45:01.199 --> 00:45:03.679
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, you can imagine that, like if Obama had done

735
00:45:03.719 --> 00:45:07.320
<v Speaker 3>the exact same thing or George W. Bush, Congress would

736
00:45:07.320 --> 00:45:12.880
<v Speaker 3>be going nuts right now. Yeah, But like there it's

737
00:45:12.880 --> 00:45:16.079
<v Speaker 3>such a different Congress, it's such a different Washington that

738
00:45:16.440 --> 00:45:18.519
<v Speaker 3>this idea that like, oh, you didn't follow the rules.

739
00:45:19.239 --> 00:45:21.440
<v Speaker 3>I don't even know if that registers with these books.

740
00:45:22.039 --> 00:45:25.719
<v Speaker 2>Did you guys get any inkling during your research for

741
00:45:25.760 --> 00:45:28.840
<v Speaker 2>this about kind of the US Title code stuff and

742
00:45:28.880 --> 00:45:32.199
<v Speaker 2>like the legal authorities under which this operation was conducted.

743
00:45:32.320 --> 00:45:35.480
<v Speaker 2>Was it considered a military operational preparation of the environment

744
00:45:35.679 --> 00:45:36.719
<v Speaker 2>or something else.

745
00:45:39.079 --> 00:45:42.480
<v Speaker 1>I'm not sure if we know to answer this specifically,

746
00:45:42.480 --> 00:45:45.800
<v Speaker 1>whether there was ope. We know it was Title ten

747
00:45:46.239 --> 00:45:51.400
<v Speaker 1>and not Title fifty, and so that governed a little bit,

748
00:45:51.760 --> 00:45:54.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, and that protected them from, for instance, not

749
00:45:55.199 --> 00:45:58.679
<v Speaker 1>disclosing to Congress before the mission happened that it was

750
00:45:58.719 --> 00:46:02.639
<v Speaker 1>going to happen. So technically it's a clandestine not a

751
00:46:02.679 --> 00:46:07.639
<v Speaker 1>covert operation, but it was still you know, as I

752
00:46:07.719 --> 00:46:10.440
<v Speaker 1>was saying to Dave throughout our reporting, I thought of

753
00:46:10.480 --> 00:46:13.039
<v Speaker 1>myself as being somewhat of an expert in Title ten

754
00:46:13.119 --> 00:46:15.639
<v Speaker 1>versus Title fifty, for all the reporting that I've done

755
00:46:15.760 --> 00:46:17.880
<v Speaker 1>over the years. But the truth is this Title ten

756
00:46:17.960 --> 00:46:24.159
<v Speaker 1>versus Title fifty is so complicated and fuzzy that I

757
00:46:24.320 --> 00:46:28.960
<v Speaker 1>still am not quite clear if it's an intelligence operation

758
00:46:29.159 --> 00:46:33.079
<v Speaker 1>conducted by the military under the authorities of the Secretary

759
00:46:33.079 --> 00:46:38.760
<v Speaker 1>of Defense, but with the presidents say so, I mean,

760
00:46:39.000 --> 00:46:41.639
<v Speaker 1>the president had to authorize it, but it didn't require

761
00:46:41.880 --> 00:46:46.559
<v Speaker 1>a memo a finding from the president. But it was

762
00:46:46.760 --> 00:46:51.239
<v Speaker 1>for the intelligence community and not you know, a military

763
00:46:51.280 --> 00:46:55.679
<v Speaker 1>operation as such. It was confusing.

764
00:46:56.159 --> 00:46:58.840
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I'm not totally clear on all of this stuff either,

765
00:46:58.920 --> 00:47:02.320
<v Speaker 2>but I mean, I as I understand that the combatant commands,

766
00:47:02.320 --> 00:47:07.239
<v Speaker 2>the COCOMs have a lot more authority than we commonly think.

767
00:47:08.159 --> 00:47:11.079
<v Speaker 2>There's something called like the Human Intelligence Executor. I mean,

768
00:47:11.119 --> 00:47:12.920
<v Speaker 2>there's all kinds of different things that they can do

769
00:47:12.960 --> 00:47:15.840
<v Speaker 2>that they just choose not to because, as I was told,

770
00:47:16.199 --> 00:47:18.000
<v Speaker 2>none of these generals want to get dragon in front

771
00:47:18.039 --> 00:47:20.480
<v Speaker 2>of Congress, you know, telling the congressman like, oh, this

772
00:47:20.559 --> 00:47:22.800
<v Speaker 2>is the twenty two suppressed pistol we use for close

773
00:47:22.840 --> 00:47:24.440
<v Speaker 2>in work. Like they don't want to be that guy.

774
00:47:25.960 --> 00:47:31.679
<v Speaker 2>So there's some interesting legal lease involved. And I know

775
00:47:31.760 --> 00:47:34.079
<v Speaker 2>you guys don't want to and I won't ask you

776
00:47:34.119 --> 00:47:37.519
<v Speaker 2>about sourcing for this article, but is there anything you

777
00:47:37.679 --> 00:47:39.679
<v Speaker 2>want to tell us about kind of how you wrote

778
00:47:39.679 --> 00:47:42.320
<v Speaker 2>this article and how it came about and you will

779
00:47:42.400 --> 00:47:43.039
<v Speaker 2>put it together.

780
00:47:45.079 --> 00:47:46.719
<v Speaker 3>There's nothing I want to tell you about that.

781
00:47:50.719 --> 00:47:54.719
<v Speaker 1>Uh yeah, I mean the less said is always the

782
00:47:54.760 --> 00:47:55.280
<v Speaker 1>better here.

783
00:47:56.599 --> 00:47:59.960
<v Speaker 3>The only thing, so no one who's listening things for

784
00:48:00.079 --> 00:48:05.400
<v Speaker 3>being coy, Like potentially people speaking to us broke the law,

785
00:48:05.960 --> 00:48:10.960
<v Speaker 3>and potentially there's going to be an investigation, and anything

786
00:48:11.000 --> 00:48:14.360
<v Speaker 3>that we can do to protect anyone who spoke to

787
00:48:14.440 --> 00:48:19.159
<v Speaker 3>us is helpful, helpful to all of us as a society.

788
00:48:20.039 --> 00:48:24.280
<v Speaker 1>The only thing I'll say, just very generically, is that

789
00:48:24.360 --> 00:48:28.400
<v Speaker 1>we really tried hard, and I think we were pretty

790
00:48:28.400 --> 00:48:33.599
<v Speaker 1>successful at getting a wide variety of sources so that

791
00:48:33.639 --> 00:48:36.239
<v Speaker 1>we were not stuck in some kind of you know,

792
00:48:36.280 --> 00:48:41.360
<v Speaker 1>looking through a straw in understanding what was happening, and

793
00:48:41.679 --> 00:48:44.840
<v Speaker 1>some of that, you know, is dun luck, some of

794
00:48:44.880 --> 00:48:47.480
<v Speaker 1>it is just circumstance, but we sort of made our

795
00:48:47.519 --> 00:48:56.639
<v Speaker 1>way together with a pretty broad assessment and understanding of

796
00:48:57.519 --> 00:49:02.719
<v Speaker 1>what happened. You know, it was well sourced. I'll just

797
00:49:02.719 --> 00:49:05.599
<v Speaker 1>say that we were very comfortable and feel very confident

798
00:49:05.800 --> 00:49:10.079
<v Speaker 1>about our sourcing, and you know, from that side of it,

799
00:49:10.119 --> 00:49:11.639
<v Speaker 1>I would just say I'm quite proud of it.

800
00:49:11.679 --> 00:49:13.800
<v Speaker 3>Well, you want to know what the White House's complaint

801
00:49:13.840 --> 00:49:16.960
<v Speaker 3>was after we published? Yeah, I mean, first of like

802
00:49:17.039 --> 00:49:19.760
<v Speaker 3>for for weeks leaving up to it, they said, don't publish,

803
00:49:19.800 --> 00:49:22.679
<v Speaker 3>you know you're gonna x y Z. They had very

804
00:49:22.679 --> 00:49:26.320
<v Speaker 3>big hands up in the air of reasons, strategic reasons.

805
00:49:26.320 --> 00:49:29.239
<v Speaker 3>But once it published, they're like, I thought you weren't

806
00:49:29.239 --> 00:49:31.679
<v Speaker 3>going to name the unit and I was like, what

807
00:49:32.199 --> 00:49:36.760
<v Speaker 3>they said, Seal Team six, Red Squadron. That's very specific classified.

808
00:49:36.960 --> 00:49:38.440
<v Speaker 3>I was like, come on, you can look that up

809
00:49:38.440 --> 00:49:40.760
<v Speaker 3>on Wikipedia. And they're like, you said you weren't going

810
00:49:40.760 --> 00:49:42.719
<v Speaker 3>to name the unit. I was like, no, I didn't.

811
00:49:43.000 --> 00:49:45.119
<v Speaker 3>We did make an agreement that we would not name

812
00:49:45.199 --> 00:49:49.440
<v Speaker 3>any individuals who were involved in this mission because saw

813
00:49:49.480 --> 00:49:51.679
<v Speaker 3>it as, look, these are people who are doing their job.

814
00:49:52.440 --> 00:49:55.239
<v Speaker 3>Their privacy is very important to their ability to do

815
00:49:55.280 --> 00:49:59.239
<v Speaker 3>their job. We weren't didn't see any misconduct, so we

816
00:49:59.239 --> 00:50:01.679
<v Speaker 3>weren't going to call it. Went out from being uh,

817
00:50:01.760 --> 00:50:04.840
<v Speaker 3>you know, a lawbreaker, but yeah, we were going to

818
00:50:04.880 --> 00:50:07.239
<v Speaker 3>say the unit because it's important. But that was the

819
00:50:07.239 --> 00:50:10.159
<v Speaker 3>thing that the White House wanted to know that they

820
00:50:10.239 --> 00:50:10.920
<v Speaker 3>disapproved of.

821
00:50:12.079 --> 00:50:14.599
<v Speaker 2>I remember when when Zach and I wrote about the

822
00:50:14.639 --> 00:50:19.159
<v Speaker 2>Solomani assassination. There's this pushback initially to it, but then

823
00:50:19.199 --> 00:50:21.840
<v Speaker 2>once Pompeo realized he could use this to make himself

824
00:50:21.840 --> 00:50:24.079
<v Speaker 2>look tough, it was all like, yeah, I killed Solimani.

825
00:50:24.159 --> 00:50:24.559
<v Speaker 2>I did that.

826
00:50:26.480 --> 00:50:29.440
<v Speaker 1>The pushback on what they what their reasoning was a

827
00:50:30.039 --> 00:50:30.960
<v Speaker 1>moving goalpost.

828
00:50:31.320 --> 00:50:35.000
<v Speaker 3>Uh it. We didn't know if Trump was just going

829
00:50:35.039 --> 00:50:36.559
<v Speaker 3>to get on the phone with us and be like, yeah,

830
00:50:36.559 --> 00:50:39.039
<v Speaker 3>I did it, that would have been a possibility.

831
00:50:39.719 --> 00:50:42.400
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you know, I think that the most interesting,

832
00:50:42.960 --> 00:50:46.920
<v Speaker 1>you know, I said, from someone like like both of you.

833
00:50:46.960 --> 00:50:50.480
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I'm not a Washington person, and so it's

834
00:50:50.599 --> 00:50:53.400
<v Speaker 1>somewhat fascinating to me to see, you know, Trump has

835
00:50:53.400 --> 00:50:57.239
<v Speaker 1>become his own Washington creature. And the response afterwards that

836
00:50:57.280 --> 00:51:01.639
<v Speaker 1>he knew nothing about it, which we know to be inaccurate, untrue,

837
00:51:02.760 --> 00:51:05.679
<v Speaker 1>was really I thought reflective of someone who just refuses

838
00:51:05.719 --> 00:51:09.079
<v Speaker 1>to be associated with anything that gets labeled as a failure, right,

839
00:51:09.119 --> 00:51:12.760
<v Speaker 1>And so you know, his his he ran from this

840
00:51:13.199 --> 00:51:17.440
<v Speaker 1>because he can't own anything that isn't a massive success,

841
00:51:17.519 --> 00:51:19.760
<v Speaker 1>right whereas it had been a success and we've written

842
00:51:19.760 --> 00:51:22.760
<v Speaker 1>about it, he would be boasting, I imagine, And certainly

843
00:51:22.760 --> 00:51:25.840
<v Speaker 1>we've seen him do things like you know, even he

844
00:51:26.199 --> 00:51:28.159
<v Speaker 1>also has taken a lot of credit for the solomony

845
00:51:28.519 --> 00:51:33.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, decision or striking you know, the the remember

846
00:51:33.440 --> 00:51:38.360
<v Speaker 1>when he weaked out or tweeted the picture of the

847
00:51:38.400 --> 00:51:43.519
<v Speaker 1>Iranian ballistic missile tests that had gone wrong and sort

848
00:51:43.519 --> 00:51:49.880
<v Speaker 1>of revealing how good American intelligence satellites were, but to boast.

849
00:51:50.159 --> 00:51:52.719
<v Speaker 1>You know, if he wants to take credit for something,

850
00:51:52.719 --> 00:51:56.280
<v Speaker 1>he has no problem declassifying things or talking about it.

851
00:51:56.360 --> 00:51:58.079
<v Speaker 1>In this case, it was I don't know what you're

852
00:51:58.119 --> 00:52:00.480
<v Speaker 1>talking about, right, Yeah.

853
00:52:02.119 --> 00:52:04.760
<v Speaker 2>So, you know, on the tail end of this interview here,

854
00:52:04.840 --> 00:52:06.960
<v Speaker 2>I wanted to kind of like return to some of

855
00:52:06.960 --> 00:52:09.360
<v Speaker 2>the topics that we spoke to you guys about the

856
00:52:09.400 --> 00:52:12.800
<v Speaker 2>last time we had you on the podcast. Matthew you

857
00:52:12.840 --> 00:52:16.559
<v Speaker 2>wrote Code Over Country about some of the war crimes

858
00:52:16.559 --> 00:52:19.559
<v Speaker 2>and Sealed Team six, and Dave you wrote Alpha about

859
00:52:19.599 --> 00:52:22.920
<v Speaker 2>the Eddie Gallagher trial and all the controversies surrounding that,

860
00:52:23.239 --> 00:52:26.079
<v Speaker 2>And both of those books were, at least within NSW,

861
00:52:26.199 --> 00:52:29.360
<v Speaker 2>very controversial, And I just want to sort of return

862
00:52:29.400 --> 00:52:31.639
<v Speaker 2>to this subject with each of you to ask about

863
00:52:31.679 --> 00:52:34.280
<v Speaker 2>what has been the response to these books over the

864
00:52:34.360 --> 00:52:36.760
<v Speaker 2>subsequent you know, say, three three and a half years

865
00:52:36.800 --> 00:52:38.320
<v Speaker 2>since the last time we spoke.

866
00:52:40.119 --> 00:52:41.639
<v Speaker 1>Who will you who should go first?

867
00:52:41.639 --> 00:52:45.920
<v Speaker 3>And we go first? Dad? Sure, that's a great question.

868
00:52:46.760 --> 00:52:51.960
<v Speaker 3>So I wrote a book about the seal named Eddie Gallagher,

869
00:52:51.960 --> 00:52:56.079
<v Speaker 3>who was charged with murdering an ISIS captive and turned

870
00:52:56.079 --> 00:52:59.239
<v Speaker 3>in by his own platoon, and the platoon had other

871
00:52:59.239 --> 00:53:01.559
<v Speaker 3>complaints about it. It was just like essentially a bad

872
00:53:01.639 --> 00:53:05.760
<v Speaker 3>dude and wanted to kill people illegally. It was also

873
00:53:05.800 --> 00:53:10.880
<v Speaker 3>a story about how they had a lot of problems

874
00:53:11.000 --> 00:53:14.280
<v Speaker 3>getting the Navy Seals as a culture and as an

875
00:53:14.320 --> 00:53:20.840
<v Speaker 3>organization to hold Eddie Gallagher to account. What was the

876
00:53:20.960 --> 00:53:24.880
<v Speaker 3>response to that. There are a lot of people who

877
00:53:24.920 --> 00:53:29.599
<v Speaker 3>were either Eddie's friends or at least believed in Eddie's

878
00:53:29.639 --> 00:53:33.000
<v Speaker 3>versions of things that just sort of dismissed me as

879
00:53:33.719 --> 00:53:36.239
<v Speaker 3>a liar. And there were other people who spent years

880
00:53:36.239 --> 00:53:38.880
<v Speaker 3>in the Seals and it had seen other Eddies who

881
00:53:38.960 --> 00:53:42.599
<v Speaker 3>really felt like, you know, thankfully, something's coming out. I

882
00:53:43.280 --> 00:53:48.719
<v Speaker 3>hope that it helped the Seals as an organization because

883
00:53:48.760 --> 00:53:51.159
<v Speaker 3>again and again, what I have seen, and this is

884
00:53:51.239 --> 00:53:56.679
<v Speaker 3>not unique to the Seals at all, but any organization

885
00:53:56.760 --> 00:53:59.840
<v Speaker 3>that has a high level of self reverence and a

886
00:54:00.159 --> 00:54:03.199
<v Speaker 3>low level of transparency is headed for Turmo. And that

887
00:54:03.239 --> 00:54:06.559
<v Speaker 3>doesn't it doesn't matter if you're a prestigious university, or

888
00:54:06.599 --> 00:54:11.119
<v Speaker 3>you're a religious sect, or you're an elite military unit.

889
00:54:11.320 --> 00:54:15.719
<v Speaker 3>Like if you can't really understand what's actually going on

890
00:54:15.760 --> 00:54:20.239
<v Speaker 3>in your community and look at it, critically, that's harmful

891
00:54:20.360 --> 00:54:22.960
<v Speaker 3>over the long term, and so I think that there

892
00:54:22.960 --> 00:54:24.920
<v Speaker 3>are a lot of people who saw it as as

893
00:54:24.960 --> 00:54:29.920
<v Speaker 3>like a useful guardrail, and certainly not everybody, and I'm

894
00:54:29.920 --> 00:54:30.920
<v Speaker 3>not surprised about that.

895
00:54:30.840 --> 00:54:30.920
<v Speaker 4>But.

896
00:54:32.639 --> 00:54:34.880
<v Speaker 3>Personally, I'm happy that it's still there for anyone who

897
00:54:34.880 --> 00:54:36.320
<v Speaker 3>wants to pick it up and learn something.

898
00:54:37.159 --> 00:54:39.679
<v Speaker 2>What about like John Q Public, how how have they

899
00:54:39.719 --> 00:54:41.280
<v Speaker 2>responded to the book over time?

900
00:54:44.000 --> 00:54:47.800
<v Speaker 3>Generally really really well, because it's I mean, honestly, the

901
00:54:47.880 --> 00:54:50.559
<v Speaker 3>easiest thing for the reader John KU Public to do,

902
00:54:51.079 --> 00:54:53.719
<v Speaker 3>The easiest thing that they can do is not read right.

903
00:54:54.599 --> 00:54:59.320
<v Speaker 3>So we're where you've got to make something accessible, and

904
00:54:59.559 --> 00:55:03.360
<v Speaker 3>a murder mystery about Navy seals is a good way

905
00:55:03.519 --> 00:55:06.960
<v Speaker 3>in to learning about this elite unit that you know,

906
00:55:07.199 --> 00:55:13.079
<v Speaker 3>is very important in our national national security policy and

907
00:55:13.199 --> 00:55:16.960
<v Speaker 3>learning about both its strength and its weaknesses. So a

908
00:55:17.000 --> 00:55:19.960
<v Speaker 3>lot of people connected with it. I think people who

909
00:55:20.000 --> 00:55:22.559
<v Speaker 3>maybe were surprised they were reading a book about seals

910
00:55:22.559 --> 00:55:24.840
<v Speaker 3>but learned a lot because it's a story about one

911
00:55:25.000 --> 00:55:27.519
<v Speaker 3>seal who was charged with murder. But it's also a

912
00:55:27.559 --> 00:55:32.320
<v Speaker 3>story about how their culture has grown since Vietnam, and

913
00:55:32.400 --> 00:55:35.440
<v Speaker 3>so there's something there for someone who wants to understand

914
00:55:35.480 --> 00:55:36.159
<v Speaker 3>the wide world.

915
00:55:38.079 --> 00:55:45.039
<v Speaker 1>How about you, Matthew, Well, you know my book was

916
00:55:45.079 --> 00:55:49.000
<v Speaker 1>a little different. It was about the culture, yes, but

917
00:55:49.119 --> 00:55:54.760
<v Speaker 1>it was really focused on the sort of corrupted culture

918
00:55:55.159 --> 00:55:59.000
<v Speaker 1>at Seal Team six the Seals at large, yes, but

919
00:55:59.000 --> 00:56:02.760
<v Speaker 1>but focus mostly on Seale Team six, and there's some

920
00:56:02.800 --> 00:56:08.039
<v Speaker 1>crossover and some causal relationship between the two. They're not

921
00:56:08.559 --> 00:56:14.760
<v Speaker 1>mutually exclusive. The response was quite good. I mean, I

922
00:56:14.840 --> 00:56:17.639
<v Speaker 1>have to be honest. I get people who reach out

923
00:56:17.880 --> 00:56:21.400
<v Speaker 1>from Seal Team six, from the Seals who will quietly

924
00:56:21.480 --> 00:56:25.039
<v Speaker 1>say thank you. I've had other Seals who've reached out

925
00:56:25.320 --> 00:56:27.239
<v Speaker 1>to tell me about some of the things that were

926
00:56:27.239 --> 00:56:29.679
<v Speaker 1>in the book and say I was there. I had

927
00:56:29.679 --> 00:56:32.280
<v Speaker 1>someone not so long ago do that exact thing and

928
00:56:32.639 --> 00:56:34.679
<v Speaker 1>described a scene that I have in my book and

929
00:56:34.800 --> 00:56:37.679
<v Speaker 1>told me it was worse than I reported, and gave

930
00:56:37.760 --> 00:56:40.000
<v Speaker 1>me details that I knew to be true but didn't

931
00:56:40.000 --> 00:56:42.840
<v Speaker 1>have enough to support putting in the book at the time.

932
00:56:44.320 --> 00:56:48.159
<v Speaker 1>And I have had people complain and tell me, you

933
00:56:48.199 --> 00:56:51.719
<v Speaker 1>know you're missing you're missing this, or you're missing that.

934
00:56:52.800 --> 00:56:56.639
<v Speaker 1>Not errors as much as omissions of things that I

935
00:56:56.719 --> 00:57:01.280
<v Speaker 1>didn't know. Although nothing that would have changed how I

936
00:57:01.280 --> 00:57:04.639
<v Speaker 1>would have reported it or published to be honest. You know,

937
00:57:04.800 --> 00:57:08.360
<v Speaker 1>I knew going in that my book was probably never

938
00:57:08.400 --> 00:57:13.320
<v Speaker 1>going to may be for the general audience. What I

939
00:57:13.559 --> 00:57:16.039
<v Speaker 1>set out with the book was, look, this is a

940
00:57:16.079 --> 00:57:18.559
<v Speaker 1>group and a community that's been holding on to some

941
00:57:18.599 --> 00:57:25.000
<v Speaker 1>really bad secrets, some pernicious secrets that frankly have do

942
00:57:25.199 --> 00:57:30.000
<v Speaker 1>affect like a cloud, psychological cloud over everyone who's in

943
00:57:30.079 --> 00:57:32.360
<v Speaker 1>on the secret as they go forward in life and

944
00:57:32.400 --> 00:57:37.119
<v Speaker 1>their families too. And shining light on that has both

945
00:57:37.239 --> 00:57:40.960
<v Speaker 1>from an accountability standpoint and transparency, but it also has

946
00:57:41.000 --> 00:57:44.599
<v Speaker 1>the ability for people to you know, just talking about things.

947
00:57:44.639 --> 00:57:46.239
<v Speaker 1>I mean it sound like a social worker now or

948
00:57:46.239 --> 00:57:48.280
<v Speaker 1>a therapist, but you know sometimes when you just talk

949
00:57:48.280 --> 00:57:53.719
<v Speaker 1>about things, they get easier. And my notion was this

950
00:57:53.760 --> 00:57:56.519
<v Speaker 1>book should be public as these stories need to be

951
00:57:56.599 --> 00:58:00.119
<v Speaker 1>public because in the future, when there's another war, or

952
00:58:00.679 --> 00:58:03.239
<v Speaker 1>or in the future when there is a problem that

953
00:58:03.280 --> 00:58:06.599
<v Speaker 1>occurs with the Seals or Seal Team six, the public

954
00:58:06.639 --> 00:58:09.079
<v Speaker 1>has to be able to go somewhere to read about

955
00:58:09.079 --> 00:58:12.239
<v Speaker 1>where it came from, how it started, how we got

956
00:58:12.280 --> 00:58:13.360
<v Speaker 1>to where we are today.

957
00:58:13.519 --> 00:58:18.159
<v Speaker 5>And and you know what's interesting, both Matthew and my books,

958
00:58:18.599 --> 00:58:21.920
<v Speaker 5>there's a ton of sealed history books out there and

959
00:58:21.960 --> 00:58:25.000
<v Speaker 5>there's zero overlap between those books and what we've written.

960
00:58:25.119 --> 00:58:29.440
<v Speaker 3>And so it's very easy if like, if you wanted

961
00:58:29.480 --> 00:58:33.719
<v Speaker 3>to learn about the Seals, to learn a completely sanitized,

962
00:58:34.280 --> 00:58:37.079
<v Speaker 3>like boy scout version of it. And and you know,

963
00:58:37.199 --> 00:58:40.320
<v Speaker 3>to your point, Matthew going into another conflict that might

964
00:58:40.360 --> 00:58:43.519
<v Speaker 3>not like equip you with everything that you need.

965
00:58:45.039 --> 00:58:48.199
<v Speaker 1>No, totally, and it's exactly it. And I think that

966
00:58:48.480 --> 00:58:51.199
<v Speaker 1>the you know again, I mean I thought of it

967
00:58:51.199 --> 00:58:53.079
<v Speaker 1>as like, this book is probably going to be like

968
00:58:53.119 --> 00:58:57.280
<v Speaker 1>a cult if I could, you know, humor myself, it

969
00:58:57.320 --> 00:58:59.840
<v Speaker 1>would be a cult classic. But the reality is is

970
00:58:59.880 --> 00:59:03.760
<v Speaker 1>that it on bookshelves. There's just nothing else. And so

971
00:59:04.199 --> 00:59:06.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, the fact that it exists means people will

972
00:59:06.440 --> 00:59:08.800
<v Speaker 1>find it, and they do and I hear from them,

973
00:59:08.880 --> 00:59:12.719
<v Speaker 1>and you know, I'm grateful. It's it has sold modestly. Well,

974
00:59:13.679 --> 00:59:18.480
<v Speaker 1>I'm quite happy. And you know, again, it's it's it's

975
00:59:18.519 --> 00:59:20.719
<v Speaker 1>probably I know it's not for the general reader. My

976
00:59:20.760 --> 00:59:25.800
<v Speaker 1>wife still struggles to to get through it, but you know,

977
00:59:26.079 --> 00:59:27.679
<v Speaker 1>it's a it's an important story.

978
00:59:27.920 --> 00:59:28.119
<v Speaker 2>You know.

979
00:59:28.159 --> 00:59:30.400
<v Speaker 1>I'll tell you one thing. There's someone that I know

980
00:59:30.840 --> 00:59:36.000
<v Speaker 1>very well who every year speaks to a group of

981
00:59:36.119 --> 00:59:41.159
<v Speaker 1>I'm not sure if they're graduating from BUDS, the BUDS process.

982
00:59:41.239 --> 00:59:43.280
<v Speaker 1>But there is something that some kind of event that

983
00:59:43.320 --> 00:59:49.519
<v Speaker 1>happens annually at Coronado and they speak before Seal officers,

984
00:59:50.000 --> 00:59:53.519
<v Speaker 1>And for the past three years that person has gone

985
00:59:53.599 --> 00:59:57.920
<v Speaker 1>to the bookstore in Coronado bought copies of my book

986
00:59:57.960 --> 01:00:02.199
<v Speaker 1>and handed them out to the young seal officers to

987
01:00:02.239 --> 01:00:06.559
<v Speaker 1>go and go. It is cool, and frankly, that makes me.

988
01:00:07.639 --> 01:00:11.480
<v Speaker 1>I couldn't be more proud of that, because that's really

989
01:00:11.480 --> 01:00:15.079
<v Speaker 1>what it's about. That's what that transparency, and it's what

990
01:00:15.119 --> 01:00:18.440
<v Speaker 1>the journalism is for, which is trying to figure out

991
01:00:18.440 --> 01:00:22.440
<v Speaker 1>how to fix things that went wrong. And you know,

992
01:00:22.519 --> 01:00:26.760
<v Speaker 1>I don't overestimate that it had any it had much effect,

993
01:00:27.840 --> 01:00:30.480
<v Speaker 1>but if it can have any, I'm thrilled for it.

994
01:00:31.039 --> 01:00:33.400
<v Speaker 2>I'm really glad you brought that up, actually, Matthew, because

995
01:00:33.400 --> 01:00:35.159
<v Speaker 2>that's what I was going to say next, was that

996
01:00:35.199 --> 01:00:37.800
<v Speaker 2>I think these books serve as like a cautionary tale

997
01:00:38.360 --> 01:00:41.960
<v Speaker 2>for young men and now women who are considering a

998
01:00:42.000 --> 01:00:47.159
<v Speaker 2>career in special operations, that these other histories, the unpublished

999
01:00:47.199 --> 01:00:51.559
<v Speaker 2>history until now, tells them what to avoid, warns them

1000
01:00:51.679 --> 01:00:53.599
<v Speaker 2>of what to avoid what you don't want to, you know,

1001
01:00:53.639 --> 01:00:57.280
<v Speaker 2>you don't want to end up here, right, Yeah.

1002
01:00:57.320 --> 01:00:59.719
<v Speaker 1>You know, I ended up in a conversation with a

1003
01:01:01.199 --> 01:01:06.280
<v Speaker 1>someone who teaches ethics at the Naval Academy and who

1004
01:01:07.239 --> 01:01:09.360
<v Speaker 1>read my book. In fact, they said, normally I wouldn't

1005
01:01:09.360 --> 01:01:11.079
<v Speaker 1>speak to anyone in the press, but I read your

1006
01:01:11.079 --> 01:01:14.920
<v Speaker 1>book and I took it to heart, and I use

1007
01:01:15.960 --> 01:01:18.719
<v Speaker 1>they weren't using anything specific from the book, but the

1008
01:01:18.760 --> 01:01:22.440
<v Speaker 1>general lessons that they thought were portrayed in the book

1009
01:01:22.480 --> 01:01:26.159
<v Speaker 1>as something that they teached the midshipmen that they have

1010
01:01:26.760 --> 01:01:31.559
<v Speaker 1>And again, you know, that to me is like, you know, ideal.

1011
01:01:32.920 --> 01:01:35.119
<v Speaker 1>You know, I think that the seals are you know,

1012
01:01:35.159 --> 01:01:37.039
<v Speaker 1>one of the things I'll tell you over the years,

1013
01:01:37.079 --> 01:01:40.239
<v Speaker 1>the criticism is, you're a seal hater. You hate seals.

1014
01:01:40.639 --> 01:01:42.840
<v Speaker 1>You were you know, you must have been a nerd

1015
01:01:42.920 --> 01:01:45.960
<v Speaker 1>in high school and you know you must have been

1016
01:01:45.960 --> 01:01:48.719
<v Speaker 1>bullied by the jocks and the tough guys who became seals,

1017
01:01:48.760 --> 01:01:51.000
<v Speaker 1>and that's why you're doing this. And I, you know,

1018
01:01:51.639 --> 01:01:55.920
<v Speaker 1>mostly it's so immature that I mostly laugh, and I

1019
01:01:55.920 --> 01:01:58.760
<v Speaker 1>don't mean to be glib, but it really almost like,

1020
01:01:58.800 --> 01:02:01.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, my sources for that book and for all

1021
01:02:01.840 --> 01:02:06.639
<v Speaker 1>their reporting were seals. They were really impressive seals. They

1022
01:02:06.639 --> 01:02:10.280
<v Speaker 1>were impressive seals who did you know, multiple decades at

1023
01:02:10.320 --> 01:02:14.400
<v Speaker 1>Seal Team six, these were not you know, in a

1024
01:02:14.440 --> 01:02:17.639
<v Speaker 1>word that I learned from from Dave's reporting on Gallagher,

1025
01:02:17.760 --> 01:02:20.840
<v Speaker 1>they were not turns. You know, these were the best

1026
01:02:20.840 --> 01:02:23.559
<v Speaker 1>of the best who had been on the inside and

1027
01:02:23.639 --> 01:02:27.519
<v Speaker 1>had tried to fix things and were repeatedly shut down.

1028
01:02:28.119 --> 01:02:32.039
<v Speaker 1>And so you know, in that sense, you know, I

1029
01:02:32.159 --> 01:02:35.280
<v Speaker 1>tell you that I admire the seals. I admired many

1030
01:02:35.280 --> 01:02:37.280
<v Speaker 1>of the seals that I've met, and I, you know,

1031
01:02:37.880 --> 01:02:42.159
<v Speaker 1>surely admire what they do professionally, but that doesn't make

1032
01:02:42.199 --> 01:02:46.719
<v Speaker 1>them or give them some position that's above criticism or

1033
01:02:47.599 --> 01:02:50.119
<v Speaker 1>above accountability or transparency.

1034
01:02:51.159 --> 01:02:52.920
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I think that's true. Like, you can't do this

1035
01:02:53.000 --> 01:02:56.039
<v Speaker 3>work without interacting with a ton of people from SEFF,

1036
01:02:56.320 --> 01:02:58.119
<v Speaker 3>and like, you know, you get to know people who

1037
01:02:58.119 --> 01:03:02.119
<v Speaker 3>are just awesome people, and maybe that motivates you all,

1038
01:03:02.400 --> 01:03:04.599
<v Speaker 3>or at least if you have a journalist like frame

1039
01:03:04.639 --> 01:03:07.320
<v Speaker 3>of mind, like motivates you that much more to be like.

1040
01:03:07.440 --> 01:03:09.519
<v Speaker 3>But there are problems here, and maybe I can help

1041
01:03:10.239 --> 01:03:12.679
<v Speaker 3>out because I like a lot of these guys, and

1042
01:03:13.199 --> 01:03:14.639
<v Speaker 3>sometimes they're getting a raw deal.

1043
01:03:16.920 --> 01:03:19.719
<v Speaker 2>So you guys can find Dave Phillips at The New

1044
01:03:19.800 --> 01:03:24.000
<v Speaker 2>York Times. Matthew Cole has a website, the Cole Report,

1045
01:03:24.079 --> 01:03:27.639
<v Speaker 2>right Matthew yep on sub stack and there's you know,

1046
01:03:27.679 --> 01:03:30.519
<v Speaker 2>he publishes NSW stories on there as well. You guys

1047
01:03:30.519 --> 01:03:33.400
<v Speaker 2>can go and check that out. Is there anything else

1048
01:03:33.559 --> 01:03:35.639
<v Speaker 2>you guys want to talk about? Anything you're working on

1049
01:03:35.800 --> 01:03:38.400
<v Speaker 2>now or you know where you want to direct people to.

1050
01:03:38.679 --> 01:03:40.679
<v Speaker 1>Dude, I'll tell you to read The New York Times.

1051
01:03:40.880 --> 01:03:43.800
<v Speaker 3>I always have an existential like crisis after a big

1052
01:03:43.800 --> 01:03:45.559
<v Speaker 3>story comes out, and I'm like, oh my god, what

1053
01:03:45.599 --> 01:03:47.679
<v Speaker 3>have I got. I've got nothing. I'm washed up, like

1054
01:03:48.000 --> 01:03:51.000
<v Speaker 3>you got no ideas. So that's that's where you can

1055
01:03:51.039 --> 01:03:53.039
<v Speaker 3>find me now, in my closet crying.

1056
01:03:54.440 --> 01:03:57.400
<v Speaker 1>I'm you know, it's funny to answer your question, I'll

1057
01:03:57.400 --> 01:03:59.599
<v Speaker 1>just tell you I had to source an old source

1058
01:04:00.280 --> 01:04:03.079
<v Speaker 1>who texted me after this the North Korea story came out.

1059
01:04:03.119 --> 01:04:04.880
<v Speaker 1>He was a member of Seal Team six and he

1060
01:04:05.000 --> 01:04:07.199
<v Speaker 1>was sort of I had heard from him in a

1061
01:04:07.239 --> 01:04:10.880
<v Speaker 1>couple of years, and he was complaining that he had

1062
01:04:10.920 --> 01:04:15.440
<v Speaker 1>gotten text messages or emails from He said, roughly one

1063
01:04:15.480 --> 01:04:19.000
<v Speaker 1>hundred people with my story, and I said, you know,

1064
01:04:19.159 --> 01:04:21.199
<v Speaker 1>I apologize. I genuinely.

1065
01:04:22.360 --> 01:04:22.599
<v Speaker 2>Didn't.

1066
01:04:22.679 --> 01:04:25.360
<v Speaker 1>He said, Oh, you're just kidding, you don't You're not

1067
01:04:25.400 --> 01:04:27.719
<v Speaker 1>sorry about it. I said, no, I am. I you

1068
01:04:27.760 --> 01:04:29.599
<v Speaker 1>know I'm not trying. I didn't write this story to

1069
01:04:29.960 --> 01:04:32.960
<v Speaker 1>have people bother you about your your former life. And

1070
01:04:32.960 --> 01:04:35.519
<v Speaker 1>I said to him, and I said, you know, as

1071
01:04:35.559 --> 01:04:40.400
<v Speaker 1>it happens, I am mostly tried to disengage from covering

1072
01:04:41.199 --> 01:04:43.639
<v Speaker 1>sealed stuff and working on another book for an imprint

1073
01:04:43.639 --> 01:04:45.519
<v Speaker 1>as Simon and Schuster that has nothing to do with

1074
01:04:45.559 --> 01:04:49.679
<v Speaker 1>the Navy seals, has to do with the foreign policy

1075
01:04:49.719 --> 01:04:53.440
<v Speaker 1>and Jared Kushner under the first Trump administration. So at

1076
01:04:53.480 --> 01:04:55.880
<v Speaker 1>some point that book will be out, and I hope,

1077
01:04:55.920 --> 01:05:00.159
<v Speaker 1>even though it's not a special operations related subject, you

1078
01:05:00.239 --> 01:05:01.480
<v Speaker 1>might have me on again.

1079
01:05:01.960 --> 01:05:06.599
<v Speaker 2>Yeah. Absolutely, send me in another advanced reader's copy and

1080
01:05:06.679 --> 01:05:09.559
<v Speaker 2>I will go through it and make my underlines and

1081
01:05:09.840 --> 01:05:12.280
<v Speaker 2>vigorous notes in the margins. We'll do.

1082
01:05:14.519 --> 01:05:14.639
<v Speaker 6>So.

1083
01:05:14.719 --> 01:05:16.960
<v Speaker 2>Thank you guys for joining us. Appreciate both of you

1084
01:05:17.000 --> 01:05:19.880
<v Speaker 2>coming on the show today, joining us on the brocast here,

1085
01:05:21.119 --> 01:05:24.000
<v Speaker 2>and for everyone else, We'll see you guys next time.

1086
01:05:24.880 --> 01:05:30.320
<v Speaker 3>Thanks Jack a pleasure. Thanks Hey, guys, it's Jack.

1087
01:05:30.360 --> 01:05:31.760
<v Speaker 2>I just want to talk to you for a moment

1088
01:05:31.800 --> 01:05:33.960
<v Speaker 2>about how you can support the show. If you've been

1089
01:05:34.000 --> 01:05:36.519
<v Speaker 2>watching it enjoying it, but you'd like to get a

1090
01:05:36.519 --> 01:05:38.880
<v Speaker 2>little bit more involved and help us continue to do this,

1091
01:05:39.400 --> 01:05:42.519
<v Speaker 2>you can check out our Patreon. It is patreon dot

1092
01:05:42.519 --> 01:05:46.639
<v Speaker 2>com slash the Teamhouse, and for five dollars a month

1093
01:05:46.760 --> 01:05:49.320
<v Speaker 2>you can get access to all of these episodes of

1094
01:05:49.360 --> 01:05:53.519
<v Speaker 2>The Teamhouse ad free. The same goes with our affiliated

1095
01:05:53.519 --> 01:05:58.079
<v Speaker 2>podcast eyes On with Andy Milburn, Jason Lyons mcmulroy that

1096
01:05:58.199 --> 01:06:00.119
<v Speaker 2>one you will also get all of those episod so

1097
01:06:00.159 --> 01:06:04.559
<v Speaker 2>it's ad free and you support the channel and the show,

1098
01:06:04.599 --> 01:06:08.079
<v Speaker 2>and we really appreciate it. The Patreon members are literally

1099
01:06:08.480 --> 01:06:11.719
<v Speaker 2>what has helped this company and this small business survive,

1100
01:06:12.679 --> 01:06:16.400
<v Speaker 2>especially during our early years, and you are what continues

1101
01:06:16.440 --> 01:06:19.559
<v Speaker 2>to help this thing going even as we navigate the

1102
01:06:20.039 --> 01:06:23.639
<v Speaker 2>turbulent world of YouTube advertising. So we really appreciate all

1103
01:06:23.679 --> 01:06:24.239
<v Speaker 2>of you guys.

1104
01:06:25.119 --> 01:06:26.760
<v Speaker 6>There's going to be a link down in the description

1105
01:06:26.880 --> 01:06:30.360
<v Speaker 6>to that Patreon page, and there is also going to

1106
01:06:30.400 --> 01:06:33.199
<v Speaker 6>be a link to our new merch shop, so if

1107
01:06:33.239 --> 01:06:35.599
<v Speaker 6>you guys want to go and get some Team House merchandise,

1108
01:06:35.639 --> 01:06:39.199
<v Speaker 6>we got stickers and we also have patches, and I

1109
01:06:39.239 --> 01:06:42.159
<v Speaker 6>should mention if you sign up for Patreon at ten

1110
01:06:42.239 --> 01:06:44.760
<v Speaker 6>dollars a month, we will mail you this patch as well.

1111
01:06:45.960 --> 01:06:49.360
<v Speaker 2>So we really appreciate that. But they're also for sale

1112
01:06:49.400 --> 01:06:53.000
<v Speaker 2>on the merch Shop and additionally, they got t shirts

1113
01:06:53.079 --> 01:06:57.800
<v Speaker 2>up there, water bottles, a tote bag, coffee mugs, all

1114
01:06:57.840 --> 01:07:00.599
<v Speaker 2>that good stuff. So please go in check them out

1115
01:07:00.599 --> 01:07:03.760
<v Speaker 2>and support the show. We really appreciate it, guys. Thank you,