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<v Speaker 1>What's up everyone, and welcome back to the program. In

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<v Speaker 1>this episode, we're going to spin back up to Moscow

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<v Speaker 1>and we're going to start taking a look at the

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<v Speaker 1>order on defendant's motion to suppress the genetic information. And

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<v Speaker 1>this is all part of the court document dump that

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<v Speaker 1>recently occurred up in Judge Hipler's courtroom, case number c

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<v Speaker 1>R zero one twenty four three one sixty sixty five

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<v Speaker 1>State of Idaho Plaintiff versus Brian C. Coberger, the defendant

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<v Speaker 1>the order of Defendant's motion to suppress genetic information introduction.

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<v Speaker 1>Defendant is charged with one count of burglary and four

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<v Speaker 1>council murder in the first degree. It's alleged that defendant

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<v Speaker 1>entered a residence at eleven twenty two King Road in Moscow, Idaho,

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<v Speaker 1>in the early morning hours of November thirteenth, twenty twenty two,

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<v Speaker 1>and stab Madison Mogan, Kaylee Gunsalvis, Ethan Chapin, and Xana

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<v Speaker 1>Kernodle with a knife. Left at the crime scene was

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<v Speaker 1>a knife sheath from which single source mail DNA was extracted.

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<v Speaker 1>Using forensic investigative genetic genealogy, law enforcement was able to

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<v Speaker 1>identify defendant as a possible suspect weeks after the crime occurred. Subsequently,

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<v Speaker 1>law enforcement conducted a trash poll from defendant's family residence

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<v Speaker 1>and obtained DNA tying defendant to the DNA found on

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<v Speaker 1>the knife sheath. Defendant was subsequently arrested, pursued into a warrant,

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<v Speaker 1>and charged. In this matter, defendant asserts that law enforcement

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<v Speaker 1>violated his constitutional rights by failing to secure a warrant

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<v Speaker 1>before conducting the IgG and trash pool. He seeks to

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<v Speaker 1>suppress all evidence obtained through these searches, as well as

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<v Speaker 1>evidence obtained through subsequent warrants as fruit of the poisonous tree.

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<v Speaker 1>The state disputes that Defendant's constitutional rights were violated. A

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<v Speaker 1>suppression hearing was held on January twenty third, twenty twenty five,

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<v Speaker 1>during which the Court received testimony from members of law

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<v Speaker 1>enforcement and experts in IgG, each of whom the Court

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<v Speaker 1>found to be credible and reliable. Following argument, the Court

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<v Speaker 1>took the matter under advisement. The Court finds defendant has

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<v Speaker 1>failed to demonstrate his constitutional rights were contravened by the

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<v Speaker 1>IgG and trash pull, and therefore suppression is not warranted.

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<v Speaker 1>Two Standard the standard of review of emotions to suppress

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<v Speaker 1>is bifurcated. The power to assess the credibility of witnesses,

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<v Speaker 1>resolve factual conflicts way evidence, and draw factual inferences is

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<v Speaker 1>vested in the trial court. State vers. Valdez Molina, one

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<v Speaker 1>twenty seven, Idaho one O two one oh six, eight

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<v Speaker 1>ninety seven, p Dot two, d nine ninety three, nine

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<v Speaker 1>ninety seven, nineteen ninety five. A trial court's ruling on

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<v Speaker 1>a motion to suppress evidence combines the issue of law

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<v Speaker 1>in fact and the trial court's factual findings will not

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<v Speaker 1>be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. State Verse. Connate,

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<v Speaker 1>one forty three, Idaho. Seven ninety seven, seven ninety nine,

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<v Speaker 1>one fifty three, p Dot three d. Four seventy seven,

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<v Speaker 1>four seventy nine, two thousand. When a decision on a

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<v Speaker 1>motion to suppress is challenged, the application of constitutional principles

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<v Speaker 1>to the facts found will be freely reviewed. State vers. Venterosa,

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand and three, finding a fact. On November thirteenth,

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<v Speaker 1>twenty twenty two, law enforcement found the bodies of Madison Mogan,

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<v Speaker 1>Kaylee Gonsalves, Xana Kernodle, and Ethan Chapin inside a residence

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<v Speaker 1>located at eleven, twenty two King Road in Moscow, Idaho.

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<v Speaker 1>All four victims died from apparent knife wounds. A k

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<v Speaker 1>bar knife sheath was found on a bed next to

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<v Speaker 1>the bodies of Miss Mogan and Miss Gonsalves. Law enforcement

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<v Speaker 1>sees the knife sheath and swabbed around the button of

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<v Speaker 1>the sheath for DNA. A sample of DNA identified as

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<v Speaker 1>Q one DOT one was extracted from the swab by

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<v Speaker 1>the Idaho State Police Forensics Lab and subsequently tested using

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<v Speaker 1>standard DNA STR short tandem repeat methods. The STR profile

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<v Speaker 1>developed revealed that the DNA came from a single source

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<v Speaker 1>mail profile. Law enforcement uploaded the DNA profile to the

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<v Speaker 1>code's database, but it resulted in no hits to non offenders. Subsequently,

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<v Speaker 1>law enforcement made the decision to pursue forensic investigative genetic

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<v Speaker 1>genealogy testing on Q one one. Such testing begins with

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<v Speaker 1>the generation of a large amount of raw sequencing data

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<v Speaker 1>from the DNA sample, which is then organized into SNPs,

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<v Speaker 1>or single nucleotide polymorphisms using bioinformatic software. The SNPs associated

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<v Speaker 1>with ancestry and genealogy can then be pulled out of

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<v Speaker 1>the raw data and organized into an SNP profile that

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<v Speaker 1>can in turn be uploaded to commercial genetic genealogy databases

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<v Speaker 1>to search for a genetic match. Depending on the strength

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<v Speaker 1>of the match, law enforcement can start building a family

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<v Speaker 1>tree to identify potential genetic relatives of the uploaded SNP profile.

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<v Speaker 1>These genetic genealogy databases are hosted by private companies and

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<v Speaker 1>populated by hundreds of thousands of members of the public

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<v Speaker 1>who voluntarily submit their own DNA and publicly share personal

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<v Speaker 1>information to allow the database to better match them with

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<v Speaker 1>potential genetic relatives. Notably, at all relevant times, only two

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<v Speaker 1>commercial genetic genealogy databases permitted searches by law enforcement, family

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<v Speaker 1>Tree DNA and ged match pro. The databases my Heritage

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<v Speaker 1>and ged match purported to disallow such searches. The IgG

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<v Speaker 1>process essentially attempts to ascertain identity through genetic associations. Unlike

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<v Speaker 1>str profiles, which can only reveal whether a person is

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<v Speaker 1>genetically male or genetically female, the SNPs in their raw

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<v Speaker 1>form have the ability to reveal a trove of personal information,

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<v Speaker 1>including sensitive health information such as whether the person has

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<v Speaker 1>traits indicating and increase risk of cancer or Alzheimer's. However,

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<v Speaker 1>IgG does not target these particular SNA because, according to

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<v Speaker 1>defense expert Daniel Hellwig, they are neither relevant, nor probative,

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<v Speaker 1>nor appropriate to the identification process. In fact, gleaning medical

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<v Speaker 1>information from SNPs is not possible for a layperson to

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<v Speaker 1>do and would take a forensic scientist like mister Hellwig

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of research. The IgG was first performed by

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<v Speaker 1>authrom Labs, a company with which the Idaho Department of

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<v Speaker 1>Purchasing had an existing contract for such work. Authrum was

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<v Speaker 1>asked to develop an SNP profile from Q one dot one,

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<v Speaker 1>uploaded to those public genealogy databases permitting law enforcement entry,

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<v Speaker 1>and submit a preliminary report of its findings. Authroom was

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<v Speaker 1>not asked to ascertain medical information associated with Q one

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<v Speaker 1>dot one, nor is there any evidence it tested for such.

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<v Speaker 1>Law enforcement did not obtain a warrant for Authrum's work.

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<v Speaker 1>The Idaho State Police delivered Q one dot one to

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<v Speaker 1>Authorm on November twenty two, twenty twenty two. Authorum developed

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<v Speaker 1>an SNA MP profile for Q one dot one and

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<v Speaker 1>search family Tree, DNA and ged match pro. This work

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<v Speaker 1>revealed for brothers of interest, all of whom were low

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<v Speaker 1>matches to Q one dot one to further its family

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<v Speaker 1>tree building. AUTHORM as the Idaho State Police to contact

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<v Speaker 1>one of the identified brothers to provide a DNA sample

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<v Speaker 1>to upload it into either of the two databases. Despite

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<v Speaker 1>Idaho State Police request, the contacted brother declined to provide

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<v Speaker 1>a sample. On December tenth, twenty twenty two, members of

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<v Speaker 1>law enforcement and including the FBI, had a meeting to

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<v Speaker 1>discuss Authoram's work. As a result of decision was made

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<v Speaker 1>to turn over the IgG work to the FBI. That

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<v Speaker 1>same day, AUTHORM was instructed to stop work and turn

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<v Speaker 1>over its SNP profile and search results to the Idaho

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<v Speaker 1>State Police. AUTHRM did so along with a preliminary report

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<v Speaker 1>of its findings. The preliminary report did not contain any

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<v Speaker 1>medical information associated with the SNP profile. Daho State Police

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<v Speaker 1>then turned the information over to the FBI, which was

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<v Speaker 1>able to use Authoram's profile to develop a significantly larger

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<v Speaker 1>SNP profile. The FBI uploaded the larger SNP profile to

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<v Speaker 1>multiple genetic genealogy databases, including ged match and my Heritage,

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<v Speaker 1>which purport to disallow law enforcement searches. At the time,

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<v Speaker 1>the FBI had an interim policy issued by the United

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<v Speaker 1>States Department of Justice related to IgG analysis and searches

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<v Speaker 1>by its agencies. On the one hand, the interim policy

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<v Speaker 1>required that investigative agencies conduct IgG searches in genetic genealogy databases,

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<v Speaker 1>permitting law enforcement use. However, on the other hand, the

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<v Speaker 1>interim policy also stated it was intended only as an

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<v Speaker 1>internal guidance and did not impose any legal restrictions on

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<v Speaker 1>investigative agencies, noting the interim policy is not intended to

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<v Speaker 1>does not and may not be relied upon to create

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<v Speaker 1>any substantative or procedural rights or benefits enforceable at law

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<v Speaker 1>or in equity by any party against the United States

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<v Speaker 1>or its departments, agencies, entities, officers, employees, or agents, or

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<v Speaker 1>any other person in any matter civil or criminal. This

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<v Speaker 1>interim policy does not impose any legal limitations on otherwise

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<v Speaker 1>lawful investigative or prosecutorial activities or techniques utilized by the

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<v Speaker 1>Department of Justice, or limit the prerogatives, choices, or decisions

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<v Speaker 1>available to or made by the Department in its discretion

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<v Speaker 1>from the information it acquired through the databases search, the

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<v Speaker 1>FBI was able to build a family tree and arrive

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<v Speaker 1>at a potential match. On December nineteenth, twenty twenty two,

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<v Speaker 1>the FBI provided defendant's name to Idaho law enforcement as

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<v Speaker 1>a possible source of the DNA. The FBI instructed that

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<v Speaker 1>the identification of defendant as a person of interest was

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<v Speaker 1>to be considered solely as a tip. Warrant was obtained

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<v Speaker 1>for the FBI's work, and subsequent warrant applications did not

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<v Speaker 1>include the IgG results to inform probable cause. As the

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<v Speaker 1>investigation ensued, law enforcement discovered that defendant had driven from Pullman,

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<v Speaker 1>Washington to his parents' home in a gated community in

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<v Speaker 1>Monroe County, Pennsylvania. At the time, Monroe County's municipal Waste

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<v Speaker 1>Ordnance required homeowners to dispose of their garbage by placing

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<v Speaker 1>it out for collection or delivering it directly to a

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<v Speaker 1>licensed watehauler. Only an authorized trash collector could collect garbage

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<v Speaker 1>left out for collection. Law enforcement decided to conduct a

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<v Speaker 1>warrantless trash pull from the Coburger residence. Arrangements were made

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<v Speaker 1>with the local trash collector to isolate and turn over

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<v Speaker 1>the Coburger's garbage to law enforcement for testing. Articles of

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<v Speaker 1>trash were retrieved and sent to the Idaho State Police

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<v Speaker 1>Forensic Lab to conduct standard DNA testing. A DNA profile

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<v Speaker 1>developed from one article of trash was determined to be

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<v Speaker 1>from the biological father of the source of Q one one.

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<v Speaker 1>Another article of trash revealed a mixture of male and

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<v Speaker 1>female DNA. According to defendant expert Gary Schulter, PhD. The

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<v Speaker 1>mal DNA from a mixture was consistent with Q one

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<v Speaker 1>dot one profile. Importantly, defendant is not claimed ownership or

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<v Speaker 1>knowledge of the knife sheath from which Q one one

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<v Speaker 1>was taken. After obtaining a search warrant, law enforcement collected

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<v Speaker 1>DNA from a buckle swab obtained from defendant. A traditional

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<v Speaker 1>str DNA comparison was done between the Q one one

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<v Speaker 1>profile and defendant's DNA. The comparison showed a statistical match. Specifically,

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<v Speaker 1>defendant was five zero point three seven octillion times more

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<v Speaker 1>likely to be the source of the Q one one

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<v Speaker 1>profile than an unrelated individual randomly selected from the general population.

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<v Speaker 1>Defendant was subsequently charged in this case. All right, we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to wrap up right here, and in the next

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<v Speaker 1>episode we're going to pick up with conclusions of law.

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<v Speaker 1>If you'd like to contact me, you can do that

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<v Speaker 1>at Bobby Kapuci at ProtonMail dot com. That's Bobby cap

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<v Speaker 1>u Cci at ProtonMail dot com, or if you prefer,

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<v Speaker 1>you can find me on x at Bobby Underscore capu Cci.

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<v Speaker 1>All of the links that go with this episode can

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<v Speaker 1>be found in the description box. What's up everyone, and

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<v Speaker 1>welcome back to the program. In this episode, we're going

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<v Speaker 1>to pick up where he left off with Judge Hibler's

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<v Speaker 1>order on the IgG information Conclusions of law. The Fourth

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<v Speaker 1>Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the right of

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<v Speaker 1>the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

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<v Speaker 1>and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. US Constitution Amendment

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<v Speaker 1>number four. In seeking suppression of evidence based on a

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<v Speaker 1>warrantless search, a defendant bears the evidentiary burden to show

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<v Speaker 1>that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the

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<v Speaker 1>item or play searched. Did the defendant have a subjective

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<v Speaker 1>expectation of privacy in the object of the challenge search,

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<v Speaker 1>and is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.

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<v Speaker 1>The former is a question of fact, the latter a

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<v Speaker 1>question of law. When a defendant makes such a showing,

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<v Speaker 1>the burden will shift to the state to show an

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<v Speaker 1>exception to the warrant requirement exists, or that the search

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<v Speaker 1>was reasonable under the circumstances. Here, defendant challenges three allegedly

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<v Speaker 1>unlawful DNA related searches. One the development of an SNP

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<v Speaker 1>profile from q dot one to one to the trash

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<v Speaker 1>pull from the Coburger residence and subsequent DNA testing thereon,

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<v Speaker 1>and three the search of the commercial genetic databases using

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<v Speaker 1>the SNP profile. He seeks to suppress not only the

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<v Speaker 1>genetic information obtained by law enforcement, but all other evidence

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<v Speaker 1>obtained as a result of the alleged legal behavior. In response,

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<v Speaker 1>the State argues defendant has not met his threshold burden

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<v Speaker 1>of demonstrating that a constitutional violation occurred with regard to

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<v Speaker 1>any of the three searches. The State is correct, a

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<v Speaker 1>defendant is not established the fourth Amendment violation with regard

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<v Speaker 1>to the development of the SNP profile. Defendant first asserts

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<v Speaker 1>that the extraction and testing of DNA from the sheath

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<v Speaker 1>to develop the SNP profile constituted an unreasonable search mandating suppression,

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<v Speaker 1>noting recent advances that have made DNA capable of revealing

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<v Speaker 1>prolific and sensitive information, as well as the fact that

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<v Speaker 1>humans continually shed DNA into the environment. Defendant asked this

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<v Speaker 1>court to find that a reasonable expectation of privacy in

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<v Speaker 1>his DNA, the testing of which through SNP methods required

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<v Speaker 1>a warrant, despite the fact that law enforcement was lawfully

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<v Speaker 1>in possession of the object containing the DNA i e.

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<v Speaker 1>The sheath. He further posits that his privacy interest is

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<v Speaker 1>not subject to the doctrine of abandonment because the sh

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<v Speaker 1>setting of DNA into an environment is not a voluntary

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<v Speaker 1>or knowing act. The state denies that the testing of

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<v Speaker 1>the DNA from the sheath was a search, pointing out

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<v Speaker 1>the DNA was lawfully seized evidence from the scene of

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<v Speaker 1>a crime. The state further contends defendant has not demonstrated

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<v Speaker 1>he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this DNA

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<v Speaker 1>because he abandoned it, or because he has not shown

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<v Speaker 1>the existence of a reasonable privacy interest, society is willing

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00:15:27.720 --> 00:15:32.279
<v Speaker 1>to recognize. This is a matter of first impression in Idaho. However,

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<v Speaker 1>applying a well settled principle of Fourth Amendment law, the

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<v Speaker 1>Corps finds no constitutional violation. First, defendant abandoned any privacy

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<v Speaker 1>interest in his DNA by disclaiming knowledge or ownership of

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00:15:44.159 --> 00:15:48.159
<v Speaker 1>the sheath from which the DNA was extracted. Second, even

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<v Speaker 1>if no such abandonment occurred, there is no reasonable expectation

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<v Speaker 1>of privacy in DNA found at a crime scene which

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<v Speaker 1>is subsequently analyzed to identify an unknown suspect. Defendant cannot

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<v Speaker 1>establish a subjection expectation of privacy in the DNA found

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00:16:05.279 --> 00:16:08.720
<v Speaker 1>on the sheath due to abandonment. It's well settled that

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<v Speaker 1>a person who voluntarily abandons property prior to a search

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<v Speaker 1>cannot be said to possess the requisite privacy interest under

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<v Speaker 1>the Fourth Amendment. When one abandons property, there can be

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<v Speaker 1>nothing unlawful in the government's appropriation of such abandoned property

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<v Speaker 1>Able versus. United States nineteen sixty. In the Fourth Amendment context,

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<v Speaker 1>abandonment occurs through words, acts, and other objective facts indicating

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<v Speaker 1>that the defendant voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquish

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<v Speaker 1>his or her interest in his or her property Stark

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<v Speaker 1>supra citation omitted. Disclaiming ownership or knowledge of an item

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00:16:46.960 --> 00:16:53.200
<v Speaker 1>constitutes abandonment state versu. Melling, Idaho, twenty sixteen. In Melling,

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<v Speaker 1>for example, officers reported to the defendant's house after reports

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<v Speaker 1>of a fight. While officers were speaking to the defendant,

259
00:17:00.600 --> 00:17:03.559
<v Speaker 1>his girlfriend gave officers a lock box that she said

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<v Speaker 1>belonged to the defendant. The defendant old officers he had

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<v Speaker 1>never seen the box before and had no idea who

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<v Speaker 1>it belonged to, that nothing in the box was his,

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<v Speaker 1>and he did not know what was inside of it.

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<v Speaker 1>The court held that by disclaiming ownership of the lock

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<v Speaker 1>box and its contents, the defendant abandoned any privacy interests therein. Moreover,

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<v Speaker 1>a person need not specifically disclaim knowledge or ownership of

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00:17:27.119 --> 00:17:30.279
<v Speaker 1>the contents of a container to result in abandonment thereof,

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00:17:30.720 --> 00:17:34.119
<v Speaker 1>it's sufficient to disclaim knowledge or ownership of the container

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00:17:34.119 --> 00:17:41.559
<v Speaker 1>itself see State versus Ayatseva two thousand and By denying

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00:17:41.559 --> 00:17:44.359
<v Speaker 1>ownership of the bag in response to the officer's inquiry

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<v Speaker 1>prior to the search, the defendant essentially relinquished or abandoned

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<v Speaker 1>any privacy interests in the contents of the bag. There's

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<v Speaker 1>no dispute here that the defendant has not claimed any

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<v Speaker 1>knowledge or ownership of the sheath, thus resulting in its abandonment.

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<v Speaker 1>Defendant concedes as much, but argues that abandonment of any

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00:18:03.359 --> 00:18:05.920
<v Speaker 1>privacy interest in the sheath did not result in the

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00:18:05.960 --> 00:18:10.720
<v Speaker 1>abandonment of the DNA found on the sheath. He contends that,

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00:18:10.839 --> 00:18:14.240
<v Speaker 1>unlike the voluntary act leaving the sheath, leaving DNA on

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00:18:14.319 --> 00:18:17.440
<v Speaker 1>the sheath is not voluntary because a person has no

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<v Speaker 1>way to know that their DNA has been left behind. DNA,

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00:18:21.640 --> 00:18:24.599
<v Speaker 1>points out, is shed everywhere humans have no ability to

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<v Speaker 1>keep their biological material from the environment. Consequently, he reasons

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00:18:29.599 --> 00:18:32.200
<v Speaker 1>of finding that the DNA on the sheath was abandoned

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00:18:32.359 --> 00:18:35.720
<v Speaker 1>would mean that the person voluntarily gives up privacy in

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00:18:35.799 --> 00:18:39.640
<v Speaker 1>their entire genetic makeup every time they interact with the public.

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00:18:40.519 --> 00:18:43.640
<v Speaker 1>In support of his argument, defendant relies exclusively on a

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00:18:43.680 --> 00:18:47.400
<v Speaker 1>concurring opinion in State versus Carbo, which is factually similar

288
00:18:47.440 --> 00:18:50.559
<v Speaker 1>to this case. In Carbo, the evidence that issue was

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00:18:50.599 --> 00:18:55.079
<v Speaker 1>seemen deposited inside the deceased crime victim and skin scrapings

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00:18:55.119 --> 00:18:59.480
<v Speaker 1>from underneath hearth fingernails. In an attempt to identify a suspect,

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00:18:59.559 --> 00:19:03.079
<v Speaker 1>law Enforce contracted with a lab to conduct a genetic

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00:19:03.119 --> 00:19:06.799
<v Speaker 1>analysis of the DNA extracted from this evidence. Like here,

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00:19:06.880 --> 00:19:10.559
<v Speaker 1>the lab created an SNP profile from the DNA and

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00:19:10.680 --> 00:19:15.960
<v Speaker 1>utilized commercial genealogical databases to determine a potential source. It

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00:19:16.000 --> 00:19:19.720
<v Speaker 1>also generated a report that provided information about the suspects

296
00:19:19.759 --> 00:19:25.079
<v Speaker 1>physical traits and ancestral origin. This information ultimately led law

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00:19:25.160 --> 00:19:29.039
<v Speaker 1>enforcement to the defendant. Law enforcement then created a DNA

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00:19:29.119 --> 00:19:32.640
<v Speaker 1>profile from trash discarded by the defendant which matched the

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00:19:32.759 --> 00:19:37.000
<v Speaker 1>DNA profile from the crime scene. Subsequently, the defendant provided

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00:19:37.039 --> 00:19:40.680
<v Speaker 1>a voluntary DNA sample which matched the profile from the

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00:19:40.720 --> 00:19:44.400
<v Speaker 1>crime scene and the garbage. The defendant moved to suppress

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00:19:44.440 --> 00:19:47.519
<v Speaker 1>the evidence of his genetic information left behind at the

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00:19:47.519 --> 00:19:51.400
<v Speaker 1>crime scene. He argued, as defendant does here, that although

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00:19:51.440 --> 00:19:54.039
<v Speaker 1>he may have abandoned his privacy interest in his seamen

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00:19:54.240 --> 00:19:57.279
<v Speaker 1>and skin cells, it did not equate to abandonment of

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00:19:57.359 --> 00:20:01.960
<v Speaker 1>the vast troves of genetic information that biological material contained.

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00:20:03.440 --> 00:20:06.599
<v Speaker 1>Making short work of this argument, the Minnesota Supreme Court

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00:20:06.839 --> 00:20:09.640
<v Speaker 1>found that by voluntarily leaving his semen in skin at

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00:20:09.680 --> 00:20:13.319
<v Speaker 1>the crime scene, he abandoned any subjective privacy interest and

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00:20:13.359 --> 00:20:18.039
<v Speaker 1>his genetic information contained therein. In the concurring opinion relied

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00:20:18.119 --> 00:20:21.519
<v Speaker 1>upon by defendant, one justice disagreed with the majority on

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00:20:21.559 --> 00:20:26.160
<v Speaker 1>this issue. Because the sensitive genetic information revealed BIASNP testing,

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00:20:26.680 --> 00:20:29.559
<v Speaker 1>he would have required a warrant before allowing such testing.

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<v Speaker 1>He further opined that the concept of abandonment, which requires voluntariness,

315
00:20:35.640 --> 00:20:38.960
<v Speaker 1>is an ill fit for genetic information because it's virtually

316
00:20:39.000 --> 00:20:43.519
<v Speaker 1>impossible for humans to prevent leaving personal genetic information everywhere

317
00:20:43.559 --> 00:20:47.160
<v Speaker 1>they go. To this end, he analogized DNA to the

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00:20:47.200 --> 00:20:51.000
<v Speaker 1>cell phone site location information at issue in Carpenter versus

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00:20:51.079 --> 00:20:54.680
<v Speaker 1>United States, five eighty five US two ninety six, three ten,

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<v Speaker 1>and eleven twenty eighteen, where the United States Supreme Court

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00:20:58.920 --> 00:21:03.160
<v Speaker 1>reasoned that E SLI is not voluntarily exposed, given that

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<v Speaker 1>virtually any activity on a phone, which is essential to

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<v Speaker 1>participation in modern life, will leave a trail of location data.

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<v Speaker 1>While there are safeguards to prevent the dissemination of CSLI

325
00:21:16.200 --> 00:21:18.799
<v Speaker 1>ie turning off a phone, he observed, there are no

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00:21:18.880 --> 00:21:22.880
<v Speaker 1>similar safeguards for DNA, thus rendering the case against abandonment

327
00:21:23.160 --> 00:21:26.720
<v Speaker 1>all the more clear. When we venture into public spaces,

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00:21:26.759 --> 00:21:30.880
<v Speaker 1>we simply cannot help but shed our DNA. The majority, however,

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00:21:30.960 --> 00:21:33.880
<v Speaker 1>pointed out that the inquiry as to whether the defendant

330
00:21:33.920 --> 00:21:38.079
<v Speaker 1>abandoned his subjective privacy interests looks to his specific actions.

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<v Speaker 1>When viewed in this way, the majority found just as

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<v Speaker 1>pro Chawne's logic inapt given that the defendant's DNA was

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<v Speaker 1>collected not from a shed skin cell, or flake or dandriff,

334
00:21:48.680 --> 00:21:51.599
<v Speaker 1>nor was it a mere consequence of the defendant venturing

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00:21:51.640 --> 00:21:54.920
<v Speaker 1>into the public sphere. It was collected from semen he

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00:21:55.079 --> 00:21:58.480
<v Speaker 1>voluntarily left inside the victim and dead skin cells he

337
00:21:58.559 --> 00:22:03.519
<v Speaker 1>voluntarily left on under her fingernails. Defendant argues that the

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00:22:03.640 --> 00:22:08.839
<v Speaker 1>justice case against abandonment is particularly appropriate here. Defendant argues

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00:22:08.880 --> 00:22:11.880
<v Speaker 1>the biological material left on the sheath was not blood

340
00:22:12.200 --> 00:22:15.160
<v Speaker 1>or semen or some bodily fluid that the Carbo court

341
00:22:15.440 --> 00:22:18.880
<v Speaker 1>found could be voluntarily left behind instead of argues it

342
00:22:19.039 --> 00:22:24.039
<v Speaker 1>was more likely shed cells, which humans cannot help but discard. However,

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<v Speaker 1>as the state points out, there is nothing that distinguishes

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<v Speaker 1>semen voluntarily left at a crime scene from the sheath.

345
00:22:31.119 --> 00:22:34.880
<v Speaker 1>Both were abandoned vehicles carrying DNA. Stated another way, the

346
00:22:34.920 --> 00:22:38.359
<v Speaker 1>semen in Carbo and the sheath were both containers of DNA.

347
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<v Speaker 1>As discussed, disclaiming ownership or knowledge of a container results

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00:22:42.680 --> 00:22:46.599
<v Speaker 1>in abandonment of privacy interest in its contents. Thus, by

349
00:22:46.640 --> 00:22:51.960
<v Speaker 1>effectively disclaiming knowledge or ownership of the sheath, defendant necessarily

350
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<v Speaker 1>abandons any privacy interest in the DNA it contains. Indeed,

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<v Speaker 1>Carbo is not an anomaly in finding abandoned. Courts uniformly

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<v Speaker 1>hold that a person abandons any privacy interests in their

353
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<v Speaker 1>DNA for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when they abandoned

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<v Speaker 1>property that contains their DNA. In State Verse Burns, for example,

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<v Speaker 1>law enforcement extracted DNA from a bloodstain dress of the

356
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<v Speaker 1>victim and created a genetic profile, which was run through

357
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<v Speaker 1>genetic genealogy. The defendant was identified as a suspect through

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00:23:23.920 --> 00:23:27.000
<v Speaker 1>this process. Officers then followed him to a restaurant and

359
00:23:27.039 --> 00:23:31.440
<v Speaker 1>collected a straw the suspect deposited in the trash. Testing

360
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<v Speaker 1>of the DNA on the straw indicated that the DNA

361
00:23:34.440 --> 00:23:38.160
<v Speaker 1>extracted from the dress could be the defendants. A subsequent

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00:23:38.200 --> 00:23:42.720
<v Speaker 1>test confirmed it. The defendant did not move to suppress

363
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<v Speaker 1>the extraction and analysis of his DNA from the bloodstained dress,

364
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<v Speaker 1>but he did unsuccessfully seek suppression of the DNA extracted

365
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<v Speaker 1>from the straw. On appeal to court had little difficulty

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<v Speaker 1>finding that any privacy interest he had in his DNA

367
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<v Speaker 1>profile developed from the straw was abandoned first by failing

368
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<v Speaker 1>to make any effort to preserve the straw as private,

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<v Speaker 1>he relinquished any subjective privacy interests therein. Secondly, if he

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<v Speaker 1>retained a subjective privacy interest, it was not one society

371
00:24:12.680 --> 00:24:17.000
<v Speaker 1>would recognize as reasonable, considering he voluntarily left the straw

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00:24:17.079 --> 00:24:21.519
<v Speaker 1>behind in the restaurant. Further, the court rejected the defendant's

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<v Speaker 1>attempt to distinguish the DNA on the straw from the

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<v Speaker 1>straw itself, finding no practical differences between the two. By

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<v Speaker 1>abandoning the straw, he also abandoned the DNA on the straw.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, we're going to wrap up right here, and

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<v Speaker 1>in the next episode we're going to pick up with

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<v Speaker 1>the Burns. Court additionally rejected. If you'd like to contact me,

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00:24:41.839 --> 00:24:44.839
<v Speaker 1>you can do that at Bobby Kopuchi at Protonmeil dot com.

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<v Speaker 1>That's Bobby capu Cci at Protonmeil dot com, or if

381
00:24:50.839 --> 00:24:54.000
<v Speaker 1>you prefer, you can find me on x at Bobby

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<v Speaker 1>Underscore cap use Cci. All of the links that go

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<v Speaker 1>with this episode can be found in the description box.

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<v Speaker 1>What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the program. In

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<v Speaker 1>this episode, we're heading back up to Moscow and we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to pick up where we left off with Judge

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<v Speaker 1>Hipler's order on genetic information. The Court finds the analysis

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<v Speaker 1>and Burns compelling and consistent with the Fourth Amendment law.

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<v Speaker 1>The Court recognizes that a distinction can be drawn given

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<v Speaker 1>the fact that in Burns, there was no question that

391
00:25:24.359 --> 00:25:27.799
<v Speaker 1>the defendant abandoned the straw, and here defendant argues it

392
00:25:27.839 --> 00:25:31.960
<v Speaker 1>cannot be conclusively stated that he abandoned the sheath. However,

393
00:25:32.000 --> 00:25:34.839
<v Speaker 1>as the State notes, this distinction does not preclude a

394
00:25:34.880 --> 00:25:39.039
<v Speaker 1>finding of abandonment for two reasons. First, is discussed abandonment

395
00:25:39.319 --> 00:25:42.319
<v Speaker 1>does not occur slowly by discarding an item. It also

396
00:25:42.359 --> 00:25:46.799
<v Speaker 1>occurs by disclaiming ownership or knowledge or otherwise relinquishing an

397
00:25:46.880 --> 00:25:51.480
<v Speaker 1>interest in property Zitsiva Supra. By not claiming ownership of

398
00:25:51.519 --> 00:25:54.200
<v Speaker 1>the sheath or any knowledge as to how this DNA

399
00:25:54.359 --> 00:25:57.720
<v Speaker 1>arrived on the sheath, defend and abandon any privacy interest

400
00:25:57.799 --> 00:26:00.759
<v Speaker 1>in the DNA. Second, the fact fact that a person

401
00:26:00.799 --> 00:26:03.720
<v Speaker 1>does not knowingly expose his DNA to the public does

402
00:26:03.759 --> 00:26:08.000
<v Speaker 1>not contravene a finding of abandonment. Like DNA fingerprints and

403
00:26:08.039 --> 00:26:11.680
<v Speaker 1>bodily fluids are left unknowingly on surfaces of public places

404
00:26:12.000 --> 00:26:15.319
<v Speaker 1>merely as a consequence of venturing into the public sphere. Yet,

405
00:26:15.559 --> 00:26:20.960
<v Speaker 1>as noted in Burns, this does not raise constitutional concerns Burns,

406
00:26:21.039 --> 00:26:23.960
<v Speaker 1>nine eighty eight NW two d At three sixty three.

407
00:26:24.240 --> 00:26:28.119
<v Speaker 1>See also Holland side tech at three thirty one. The

408
00:26:28.160 --> 00:26:31.640
<v Speaker 1>manner in which humans shed cellular material is not fundamentally

409
00:26:31.680 --> 00:26:34.400
<v Speaker 1>different from the manner in which the oil is comprising

410
00:26:34.440 --> 00:26:38.880
<v Speaker 1>fingerprints are shed. What matters is that the material was

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00:26:38.960 --> 00:26:42.559
<v Speaker 1>left in the public domain. Applying this rationale, the Maryland

412
00:26:42.559 --> 00:26:46.599
<v Speaker 1>Supreme Court concluded that the defendant abandoned any privacy interest

413
00:26:46.680 --> 00:26:49.400
<v Speaker 1>he had in his shed DNA collected from a chair

414
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<v Speaker 1>in which he had been sitting Reynard versus State Maryland,

415
00:26:53.160 --> 00:26:56.839
<v Speaker 1>twenty fourteen. In doing so, the Court rejected that notion

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00:26:57.119 --> 00:27:01.359
<v Speaker 1>that abandonment required and explicitly volunteer very knowing act. Noting

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00:27:02.279 --> 00:27:04.559
<v Speaker 1>the fact that one has not knowingly exposed to the

418
00:27:04.559 --> 00:27:08.200
<v Speaker 1>public certain evidence does not by itself demonstrate a reasonable

419
00:27:08.200 --> 00:27:12.640
<v Speaker 1>expectation of privacy in that evidence. While Katz says it

420
00:27:12.799 --> 00:27:16.440
<v Speaker 1>is no search to discover what one knowingly exposes, it

421
00:27:16.480 --> 00:27:20.680
<v Speaker 1>does not declare the exact reverse of this proposition. That is,

422
00:27:20.720 --> 00:27:23.680
<v Speaker 1>the Supreme Court did not say that discovery of what

423
00:27:23.880 --> 00:27:28.000
<v Speaker 1>was knowingly exposed is inevitably a search. Wayne R. Lefay

424
00:27:28.319 --> 00:27:30.759
<v Speaker 1>Search and Seizure Section two dot two d At six

425
00:27:30.920 --> 00:27:35.680
<v Speaker 1>forty nine, Fifth edition, twenty twelve. Likewise, here, at some point,

426
00:27:35.720 --> 00:27:39.000
<v Speaker 1>defendant apparently interacted with the sheath to a sufficient enough

427
00:27:39.000 --> 00:27:42.279
<v Speaker 1>degree that he left his DNA thereon whether he knew

428
00:27:42.319 --> 00:27:45.559
<v Speaker 1>he left his DNA behind is of no consequence. It

429
00:27:45.599 --> 00:27:47.960
<v Speaker 1>is only relevant that he exposed his DNA to the

430
00:27:48.000 --> 00:27:51.519
<v Speaker 1>public by leaving it on the sheath, thus forfeiting any

431
00:27:51.599 --> 00:27:56.640
<v Speaker 1>reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA left behind. Even

432
00:27:56.640 --> 00:28:01.319
<v Speaker 1>if not abandoned, defendant has not established wi subjective privacy

433
00:28:01.359 --> 00:28:05.799
<v Speaker 1>interests in his DNA is objectively reasonable. A Fourth Amendment

434
00:28:05.839 --> 00:28:09.160
<v Speaker 1>search occurs when the government seeks to gain information by

435
00:28:09.359 --> 00:28:13.599
<v Speaker 1>infringing upon a person's reasonable expectation of privacy Cats versus

436
00:28:13.680 --> 00:28:18.200
<v Speaker 1>United States, nineteen sixty seven. An expectation of privacy is

437
00:28:18.200 --> 00:28:22.920
<v Speaker 1>objectively reasonable when it's legitimate, justifiable, and one society should

438
00:28:22.920 --> 00:28:26.880
<v Speaker 1>both recognize and protect state versus Fontor Appeals Court, two

439
00:28:26.880 --> 00:28:31.359
<v Speaker 1>thousand and eight. It's true that DNA testing, particularly SNP testing,

440
00:28:31.599 --> 00:28:35.319
<v Speaker 1>can unlock a wealth of intensely private information about an individual,

441
00:28:35.680 --> 00:28:40.640
<v Speaker 1>including family relationships, ancestry, genetic disorders, and the propensity for

442
00:28:40.720 --> 00:28:45.839
<v Speaker 1>health related risks victoria, romine crime, DNA and family protecting

443
00:28:45.880 --> 00:28:48.039
<v Speaker 1>genetic privacy in the world of twenty three in me

444
00:28:48.480 --> 00:28:52.279
<v Speaker 1>Spring of twenty twenty one. Such highly private information is

445
00:28:52.319 --> 00:28:56.079
<v Speaker 1>already protected under the law in other contexts, including in

446
00:28:56.119 --> 00:28:59.759
<v Speaker 1>Idaho through the Genetic Testing Privacy Act I see section

447
00:28:59.839 --> 00:29:03.119
<v Speaker 1>three thirty nine Dash eight three zero one, which prohibits

448
00:29:03.119 --> 00:29:07.680
<v Speaker 1>genetic discrimination in employment. Given the privacy interest implicated by

449
00:29:07.759 --> 00:29:11.920
<v Speaker 1>DNA testing, defendant argues that DNA, even lawfully in possession

450
00:29:11.920 --> 00:29:15.519
<v Speaker 1>of law enforcement, cannot be tested absent probable cause and

451
00:29:15.599 --> 00:29:19.240
<v Speaker 1>a warrant. In Defendant's view, the breadth of information SNP

452
00:29:19.359 --> 00:29:24.119
<v Speaker 1>testing can reveal is analogous to the CSLI at issue

453
00:29:24.200 --> 00:29:27.359
<v Speaker 1>in Carpenter, where the United States Supreme Court held that

454
00:29:27.440 --> 00:29:30.920
<v Speaker 1>a person maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the

455
00:29:30.960 --> 00:29:35.640
<v Speaker 1>record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI data

456
00:29:35.920 --> 00:29:40.119
<v Speaker 1>maintained by the person's wireless carrier. The Carpenter Court reasoned

457
00:29:40.119 --> 00:29:44.359
<v Speaker 1>that those detailed encyclopedic records, which provided an all encompassing

458
00:29:44.400 --> 00:29:47.359
<v Speaker 1>record of the defendant's location over a course of one

459
00:29:47.400 --> 00:29:50.759
<v Speaker 1>hundred and twenty seven consecutive days, can give law enforcement

460
00:29:51.039 --> 00:29:54.440
<v Speaker 1>an intimate window into a person's life, revealing not only

461
00:29:54.480 --> 00:29:59.440
<v Speaker 1>his particular movements, but through them, his familial, political, professional, religious,

462
00:29:59.720 --> 00:30:05.240
<v Speaker 1>and sexual associations Idea three ten and eleven. These location

463
00:30:05.359 --> 00:30:08.960
<v Speaker 1>records hold for many Americans the privacies of life. Quoting

464
00:30:09.079 --> 00:30:14.079
<v Speaker 1>Riley versus California, twenty fourteen, Defendant also relies on Riley,

465
00:30:14.160 --> 00:30:17.079
<v Speaker 1>where the United States Supreme Court held that police may

466
00:30:17.119 --> 00:30:20.640
<v Speaker 1>not search digital information from a cell phone seize pursuant

467
00:30:20.799 --> 00:30:24.359
<v Speaker 1>to the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.

468
00:30:25.400 --> 00:30:29.039
<v Speaker 1>The Court observed that unlike physical objects, digital data on

469
00:30:29.079 --> 00:30:32.400
<v Speaker 1>a cell phone does not implicate the same government interests

470
00:30:32.559 --> 00:30:36.880
<v Speaker 1>justifying searches incident to arrest, ie preventing loss of evidence,

471
00:30:37.160 --> 00:30:40.960
<v Speaker 1>and threats to officer safety Idea four oh one. Further,

472
00:30:41.039 --> 00:30:43.960
<v Speaker 1>the Court found that the extent of personal information digital

473
00:30:44.039 --> 00:30:49.079
<v Speaker 1>data would reveal about a person implicated significant privacy issues,

474
00:30:49.279 --> 00:30:53.240
<v Speaker 1>noting that while an arrestee has diminished privacy interests, it

475
00:30:53.279 --> 00:30:56.119
<v Speaker 1>does not mean the arreste has no Fourth Amendment protections

476
00:30:56.440 --> 00:31:00.599
<v Speaker 1>Idea three ninety two. By analogy to Riley, defending contends

477
00:31:00.759 --> 00:31:03.680
<v Speaker 1>that law enforcement should be required to obtain a search

478
00:31:03.720 --> 00:31:07.000
<v Speaker 1>warrant to analyze the DNA from the sheath despite being

479
00:31:07.039 --> 00:31:10.960
<v Speaker 1>in lawful possession thereof. With regard to the SNP testing

480
00:31:11.079 --> 00:31:15.160
<v Speaker 1>of DNA in particular, Defendant relies on Skinner versus Railway

481
00:31:15.240 --> 00:31:18.759
<v Speaker 1>Labor Executives, where the United States Supreme Court held that

482
00:31:19.160 --> 00:31:23.279
<v Speaker 1>collection and subsequent testing of an employees legally obtained urine

483
00:31:23.319 --> 00:31:27.720
<v Speaker 1>constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. The Court observed that while

484
00:31:27.759 --> 00:31:31.119
<v Speaker 1>physical intrusion into an employee's body to collect the urine

485
00:31:31.400 --> 00:31:35.240
<v Speaker 1>is an obvious infringement of the employee's reasonable expectational privacy,

486
00:31:35.680 --> 00:31:39.279
<v Speaker 1>the subsequent chemical analysis of the urine sample to obtain

487
00:31:39.559 --> 00:31:43.279
<v Speaker 1>physiological data about the employee is a further invasion of

488
00:31:43.319 --> 00:31:47.079
<v Speaker 1>the employee's privacy interest, given that such testing can reveal

489
00:31:47.119 --> 00:31:50.480
<v Speaker 1>a host of private medical facts about an employee, including

490
00:31:50.519 --> 00:31:54.920
<v Speaker 1>whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Based

491
00:31:54.960 --> 00:31:58.599
<v Speaker 1>on Carpenter, Riley, and Skinner, defendant contends that because SNP

492
00:31:58.720 --> 00:32:02.839
<v Speaker 1>testing of DNA is even more revealing than CLSI data

493
00:32:03.160 --> 00:32:06.440
<v Speaker 1>or urine testing, it should be allowed only upon a warrant,

494
00:32:06.519 --> 00:32:11.480
<v Speaker 1>regardless whether the DNA was lawfully obtained. Defendant argues that

495
00:32:11.519 --> 00:32:13.720
<v Speaker 1>this is precisely what the Fourth Circuit did in the

496
00:32:13.799 --> 00:32:16.680
<v Speaker 1>United States first Davis, when it held that the extraction

497
00:32:16.759 --> 00:32:20.160
<v Speaker 1>of DNA and the creation of DNA profiles result in

498
00:32:20.200 --> 00:32:24.160
<v Speaker 1>a sufficiently separate invasion of privacy that such acts must

499
00:32:24.200 --> 00:32:27.640
<v Speaker 1>be considered a separate search under the Fourth Amendment, even

500
00:32:27.680 --> 00:32:30.359
<v Speaker 1>when there is no issue concerning the collection of the

501
00:32:30.440 --> 00:32:35.640
<v Speaker 1>DNA sample. At issue in Davis was DNA extracted from

502
00:32:35.640 --> 00:32:39.039
<v Speaker 1>the defendant's clothing, which had been lawfully seized four years

503
00:32:39.039 --> 00:32:41.839
<v Speaker 1>earlier when the defendant was a crime victim in an

504
00:32:41.920 --> 00:32:45.640
<v Speaker 1>unrelated case. Relying on Skinner, the court reasoned that the

505
00:32:45.680 --> 00:32:49.119
<v Speaker 1>extraction and analysis was a search because the analysis of

506
00:32:49.160 --> 00:32:53.039
<v Speaker 1>biological samples, such as those derived from blood, urine, or

507
00:32:53.079 --> 00:32:56.799
<v Speaker 1>other bodily fluids, can reveal the physiological data and a

508
00:32:56.839 --> 00:33:00.079
<v Speaker 1>host of private medical facts. Such analysis may intrude u

509
00:33:00.279 --> 00:33:05.119
<v Speaker 1>upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable,

510
00:33:05.799 --> 00:33:10.680
<v Speaker 1>quoting Skinner for eighty nine US at six, sixteen, and seventeen. However,

511
00:33:10.720 --> 00:33:13.519
<v Speaker 1>these cases lend no support to defendant when applied to

512
00:33:13.559 --> 00:33:17.519
<v Speaker 1>the specific circumstances presented here, for three reasons. One, there

513
00:33:17.559 --> 00:33:21.759
<v Speaker 1>is no reasonable expectation of privacy and identity. Two, defendant

514
00:33:21.839 --> 00:33:24.480
<v Speaker 1>is not shown as DNA was tested for anything other

515
00:33:24.519 --> 00:33:28.440
<v Speaker 1>than identifying purposes. And three, even if the DNA analysis

516
00:33:28.480 --> 00:33:32.319
<v Speaker 1>revealed sensitive personal details, there is no reasonable expectation of

517
00:33:32.319 --> 00:33:36.839
<v Speaker 1>privacy in crime scene DNA. First, there is no reasonable

518
00:33:36.880 --> 00:33:40.920
<v Speaker 1>expectation of privacy, and are identifying characteristics such as fingerprints

519
00:33:41.240 --> 00:33:46.119
<v Speaker 1>US FIRS DNACO four ten, nineteen seventy three. This is

520
00:33:46.160 --> 00:33:49.799
<v Speaker 1>because analysis of such physical characteristics involves none of the

521
00:33:49.839 --> 00:33:53.960
<v Speaker 1>probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks

522
00:33:53.960 --> 00:33:57.759
<v Speaker 1>a Fourth Amendment search. On this basis, courts have held

523
00:33:57.799 --> 00:34:01.000
<v Speaker 1>that testing of DNA for identification per purposes does not

524
00:34:01.079 --> 00:34:03.440
<v Speaker 1>run a foul of the Fourth Amendment because it's no

525
00:34:03.559 --> 00:34:07.720
<v Speaker 1>more revealing than fingerprints. Where DNA testing is not obtained

526
00:34:07.720 --> 00:34:10.679
<v Speaker 1>by means of a physical intrusion into the person's body,

527
00:34:10.920 --> 00:34:13.320
<v Speaker 1>there is more of a search for purpose of the

528
00:34:13.360 --> 00:34:16.320
<v Speaker 1>Fourth Amendment than is the testing of fingerprints or the

529
00:34:16.360 --> 00:34:20.039
<v Speaker 1>observation of any other identifying feature revealed to the public

530
00:34:20.519 --> 00:34:25.000
<v Speaker 1>visage apparent, age, body type, skin color, Burns nine eighty eight,

531
00:34:25.119 --> 00:34:28.519
<v Speaker 1>n W two d AT three sixty four, and sixty five.

532
00:34:29.480 --> 00:34:34.800
<v Speaker 1>Likening DNA analysis used for identification purposes to analyzing latent fingerprints.

533
00:34:35.840 --> 00:34:38.559
<v Speaker 1>The Idaho Court of Appeals has all but followed suit

534
00:34:38.920 --> 00:34:41.679
<v Speaker 1>in pure overse state a post conviction action. The Court

535
00:34:41.719 --> 00:34:45.679
<v Speaker 1>of Appeals addressed whether the petitioner's council was deficient by

536
00:34:45.719 --> 00:34:48.760
<v Speaker 1>failing to argue as client had a reasonable expectation of

537
00:34:48.800 --> 00:34:52.199
<v Speaker 1>privacy in his genetic material left behind on a water bottle.

538
00:34:52.880 --> 00:34:55.679
<v Speaker 1>In rejecting the claim, the court first noted that since

539
00:34:55.719 --> 00:34:58.559
<v Speaker 1>the issue of genetic privacy in DNA was a novel

540
00:34:58.599 --> 00:35:02.000
<v Speaker 1>theory in an undeveloped area of law, council was not

541
00:35:02.039 --> 00:35:05.559
<v Speaker 1>ineffective by failing to raise it. Moreover, the court cast

542
00:35:05.639 --> 00:35:09.480
<v Speaker 1>doubt of the substandative value of the argument, noting that

543
00:35:09.519 --> 00:35:12.400
<v Speaker 1>in other jurisdictions, courts have held that the use of

544
00:35:12.480 --> 00:35:17.679
<v Speaker 1>DNA for identification purposes only does not infringe on a

545
00:35:17.719 --> 00:35:21.480
<v Speaker 1>privacy interest in one's genetic identity because the DNA is

546
00:35:21.519 --> 00:35:24.760
<v Speaker 1>not being used to reveal personal information. All Right, we're

547
00:35:24.760 --> 00:35:27.039
<v Speaker 1>gonna wrap up right here, and in the next episode

548
00:35:27.039 --> 00:35:30.000
<v Speaker 1>we're going to pick up with second in Marilyn Verus King.

549
00:35:31.440 --> 00:35:33.079
<v Speaker 1>If you'd like to contact me, you can do that

550
00:35:33.159 --> 00:35:37.400
<v Speaker 1>at Bobby Kapuci at ProtonMail dot com. That's Bobby cap

551
00:35:37.760 --> 00:35:41.360
<v Speaker 1>U Cci at Protonmeil dot com, or if you prefer,

552
00:35:41.440 --> 00:35:46.639
<v Speaker 1>you can find me on x at Bobby Underscore cap Ucci.

553
00:35:47.440 --> 00:35:49.360
<v Speaker 1>All of the links that go with this episode can

554
00:35:49.360 --> 00:35:51.360
<v Speaker 1>be found in the description box.
