Speaker 1: Chapter fourteen C of Considerations on Representative Government. This LibriVox
Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain. Considerations on Representative Government
Speaker 1: by John Stuart Mill, Chapter fourteen A of the executive
Speaker 1: in a representative government. It would be out of place
Speaker 1: in this treatise to discuss the question into what departments
Speaker 1: or branches the executive business of government may most conveniently
Speaker 1: be divided. In this respect, the exigencies of different governments
Speaker 1: are different, and there is little probability that any great
Speaker 1: mistake will be made in the classification of duties. When
Speaker 1: men are willing to begin at the beginning, and do
Speaker 1: not hold themselves bound by the series of accidents which,
Speaker 1: in an old government like ours, has produced the existing
Speaker 1: division of the public business. It may be sufficient to
Speaker 1: say that the classification of functionaries should correspond to that
Speaker 1: of subjects, and that there should not be several departments
Speaker 1: into pendent of one another, to superintend different parts of
Speaker 1: the same natural whole, as in our own military administration
Speaker 1: down to a recent period, and in a less degree
Speaker 1: even at present. Where the object to be attained is single,
Speaker 1: such as that of having an efficient army, the authority
Speaker 1: commissioned to attend to it should be single. Likewise, the
Speaker 1: entire aggregate of means provided for one end should be
Speaker 1: under one and the same control and responsibility. If they
Speaker 1: are divided among independent authorities, the means with each of
Speaker 1: those authorities become ends, and it is the business of
Speaker 1: nobody except the head of the government, who is probably
Speaker 1: no departmental experience to take care of the real end.
Speaker 1: The different classes of means are not combined and adapted
Speaker 1: to one another under the guidance of any leading idea,
Speaker 1: And while every department pushes forward its own requirements regardless
Speaker 1: of those of the rest, the purpose of the work
Speaker 1: is perpetually sacrificed to the work itself. As a general rule,
Speaker 1: every executive function, whether superior or subordinate, should be at
Speaker 1: the appointed duty of some given individual. It should be
Speaker 1: apparent to all the world who did everything and through
Speaker 1: whose default anything was left undone. Responsibility is null when
Speaker 1: nobody knows who is responsible, nor even when real can
Speaker 1: it be divided without being weakened. To maintain it at
Speaker 1: its highest, there must be one person who receives the
Speaker 1: whole praise of what is well done the whole blame
Speaker 1: of what is ill. There are, however, two modes of
Speaker 1: sharing responsibility by one, it is only enfeebled by the
Speaker 1: other absolutely destroyed. It is enfeebled when the concurrence of
Speaker 1: more than one functionary is required to the same act.
Speaker 1: Each one among them has still a real responsibility. If
Speaker 1: a wrong has been done, none of them can say
Speaker 1: he did not do it. He is as much a
Speaker 1: participant as an accomplice is in an offense. If there
Speaker 1: has been legal criminality, they may all be punished legally,
Speaker 1: and their punishment needs not be less severe than if
Speaker 1: there had been only one person concerned. But it is
Speaker 1: not so with the penalties any more than with the
Speaker 1: rewards of opinion. These are always diminished by being shared.
Speaker 1: Where there has been no definite legal offense, no corruption
Speaker 1: or malversation, only an error or an imprudence, or what
Speaker 1: may pass for such, every participator has an excuse to
Speaker 1: himself into the world in the fact that other persons
Speaker 1: are jointly involved with him. There is hardly anything, even
Speaker 1: to pecuniary dishonesty for which men will not feel themselves
Speaker 1: almost absolved if those whose duty it was to resist
Speaker 1: and remonstrate have failed to do it. Still more, if
Speaker 1: they have given a formal assent. In this case, however,
Speaker 1: though responsibility is weakened, there still is responsibility. Every one
Speaker 1: of those implicated has, in his individual capacity, assented to
Speaker 1: and joined in the act. Things are much worse when
Speaker 1: the act itself is only that of a majority a
Speaker 1: board deliberating with closed doors, nobody knowing or except in
Speaker 1: some extreme case, being ever likely to know, whether an
Speaker 1: individual member voted for the act or against it. Responsibility
Speaker 1: in this case is a mere name. Boards, it is
Speaker 1: happily said by Bentham, are screens. What the board does
Speaker 1: is the act of nobody, and nobody can be made
Speaker 1: to answer for it. The board suffers, even in reputation,
Speaker 1: only in its collective character, and no individual member feels
Speaker 1: this further than his disposition leads him to identify his
Speaker 1: own estimation with that of the body, a feeling often
Speaker 1: very strong when the body is a permanent one and
Speaker 1: he is wedded to it for better for worse. But
Speaker 1: the fluctuations of a modern official career give no time
Speaker 1: for the formation of such an esprit decorps, which, if
Speaker 1: it exists at all, exists only in obscure ranks of
Speaker 1: the permanent subordinates. Boards therefore are not a fit instrument
Speaker 1: for executive business, and are only admissible in it when
Speaker 1: for other reasons to give full discretionary power to a
Speaker 1: single minister would be worse. On the other hand, it
Speaker 1: is also a maximum of experience that in the multitude
Speaker 1: of counselors there is wisdom, and that a man seldom
Speaker 1: judges right even in his own concerns still lessen those
Speaker 1: of the public when he makes habitual use of no
Speaker 1: knowledge but his own or that of some single adviser.
Speaker 1: There is no necessary incompatibility between this principle and the other.
Speaker 1: It is easy to give the effective power in the
Speaker 1: full responsibility to one, providing him when necessary with advisers,
Speaker 1: each of whom is responsible only for the opinion he gives.
Speaker 1: In general, the head of a department of the executive
Speaker 1: government is a mere politician. He may be a good
Speaker 1: politician and a man of merit, and unless this is
Speaker 1: usually the case, the government is bad. But his general
Speaker 1: capacity and the knowledge he ought to possess of the
Speaker 1: general interests of the country will not, unless by occasional accident,
Speaker 1: be accompanied by adequate and what may be called professional
Speaker 1: knowledge of the department over which he is called to preside.
Speaker 1: Professional advisers must therefore be provided for him wherever mere
Speaker 1: experience and attainments are sufficient. Wherever the qualities required in
Speaker 1: a professional adviser may possibly be united in a single
Speaker 1: well selected individual, as in the case, for example, of
Speaker 1: a law officer. One such person for general purposes, and
Speaker 1: a staff of clerks to supply knowledge of details meet
Speaker 1: the demands of the case. But more frequently it is
Speaker 1: not sufficient that the minister should consult some one competent person, and,
Speaker 1: when himself not conversant with the subject, act implicitly on
Speaker 1: that person's advice. It is often necessary that he should
Speaker 1: not only a casecasionally, but habitually listen to a variety
Speaker 1: of opinions, and inform his judgment by the discussions among
Speaker 1: a body of advisers. This, for example, is emphatically necessary
Speaker 1: in military and naval affairs. The military and naval ministers, therefore,
Speaker 1: and probably several others, should be provided with a council
Speaker 1: composed at least in those two departments, of able and
Speaker 1: experienced professional men, as a means of obtaining the best
Speaker 1: men for the purpose under every change of administration. They
Speaker 1: ought to be permanent, by which I mean that they
Speaker 1: ought not like the lords of the Admiralty, to be
Speaker 1: expected to resign with the ministry by whom they were appointed.
Speaker 1: But it is a good rule that all who hold
Speaker 1: high appointments to which they have risen by selection and
Speaker 1: not by the ordinary course of promotion, should retain their
Speaker 1: office only for a fixed term, unless reappointed, as is
Speaker 1: now the rule with staff appointments in the British Army.
Speaker 1: This rule renders appointments somewhat less likely to be jobbed,
Speaker 1: not being a provision for life, and the same time
Speaker 1: affords a means, without affront to anyone, of getting rid
Speaker 1: of those who are least worth keeping, and bringing in
Speaker 1: highly qualified persons of younger standing, for whom there might
Speaker 1: never be room if death, vacancies or voluntary resignations were
Speaker 1: waited for. The councils should be consultative merely in this
Speaker 1: sense that the ultimate decision should rest undividedly with the
Speaker 1: Minister himself. But neither ought they to be looked upon,
Speaker 1: or to look upon themselves as cipher's, or as capable
Speaker 1: of being reduced to such at his pleasure. The advisers
Speaker 1: attached to a powerful and perhaps self willed man ought
Speaker 1: to be placed under conditions which make it impossible for
Speaker 1: them without discredit, not to express an opinion, and impossible
Speaker 1: for him not to listen to and consider their recommendations,
Speaker 1: whether he adopts them or not. The relation which ought
Speaker 1: to exist between a chief and this description of advisers
Speaker 1: is very accurately hit by the constitution of the Council
Speaker 1: of the Governor General and those of the different presidencies
Speaker 1: in India. These councils are composed of persons who have
Speaker 1: professional knowledge of Indian affairs, which the Governor General and
Speaker 1: governors usually lack, and which it would not be desirable
Speaker 1: to require of them. As a rule, every member of
Speaker 1: council is expected to give an opinion, which is of
Speaker 1: course very often a simple acquiescence. But if there is
Speaker 1: a difference of sentiment, it is at the option of
Speaker 1: every member, and is the invariable practice to record the
Speaker 1: reasons of his opinion, the Governor General or governor doing
Speaker 1: the same. In ordinary cases, the decision is according to
Speaker 1: the sense of the majority. The council therefore has a
Speaker 1: substantial part in the government. But if the Governor General
Speaker 1: or governor thinks fit, he may set aside even their
Speaker 1: unanimous opinion recording his reasons. The result is that the
Speaker 1: Chief is individually and effectively responsible for every act of government.
Speaker 1: The members of council have only the responsibility of advisers.
Speaker 1: But it is always known from documents capable of being produced,
Speaker 1: and which if called for by Parliament or public opinion,
Speaker 1: always are produced, what each has advised and what reasons
Speaker 1: he gave for his advice. While from their dignified position
Speaker 1: and ostensible participation in all acts of government, they have
Speaker 1: nearly as strong motives to apply themselves to the public
Speaker 1: business and to form and express a well considered opinion
Speaker 1: on every part of it, as that the whole responsibility
Speaker 1: rested with themselves. This mode of conducting the highest class
Speaker 1: of administrative business is one of the most successful instances
Speaker 1: of the adaptation of means to ends, which political history,
Speaker 1: not hitherto very prolific in works of skill and contrivance,
Speaker 1: has yet to show. It is one of the acquisitions
Speaker 1: with which the art of politics has been enriched by
Speaker 1: the experience of the East Indian Company's rule, and, like
Speaker 1: most of the otherwise contrivances by which India has been
Speaker 1: preserved to this country, and an amount of good government
Speaker 1: produced which is truly wonderful. Considering the circumstances and the materials,
Speaker 1: it is probably destined to perish in the general holocaust
Speaker 1: which the traditions of Indian government seem fated to undergo,
Speaker 1: since they have been placed at the mercy of public
Speaker 1: ignorance and the presumptuous vanity of political men. Already, an
Speaker 1: outcry is raised for abolishing the councils as a superfluous
Speaker 1: and expensive clog on the wheels of government, while the
Speaker 1: clamor has long been urgent and is daily obtaining more
Speaker 1: countenance in the highest quarters, for the abrogation of the
Speaker 1: professional civil service, which breeds the men that compose the councils,
Speaker 1: and the existence of which is the sole guarantee for
Speaker 1: their being of any value. A most important principle of
Speaker 1: good government in a popular constitution is that no executive
Speaker 1: functionaries should be appointed by popular election, neither by the
Speaker 1: votes of the people themselves, nor by those of their representatives.
Speaker 1: The entire business of government is skilled employment. The qualifications
Speaker 1: for the discharge of it are of that special and
Speaker 1: professional kind which cannot be properly judged of except by
Speaker 1: persons who have themselves some share of those qualifications or
Speaker 1: some practical experience of them. The business of finding the
Speaker 1: fittest persons to fill public employments, not merely selecting the
Speaker 1: best to offer, but looking out for the absolutely best,
Speaker 1: and taking note of all fit persons who are met
Speaker 1: with that they may be found when wanted, is very
Speaker 1: laborious and requires a delicate as well as highly conscientious discernment.
Speaker 1: And as there is no public duty which is in
Speaker 1: general so badly performed, so there is none for which
Speaker 1: it is of greater importance to enforce the utmost practicable
Speaker 1: amount of personal responsibility by imposing it as a special
Speaker 1: obligation on high functionaries in the several departments. All subordinate
Speaker 1: public officers who are not appointed by some mode of
Speaker 1: public competition should be selected on the direct responsibility of
Speaker 1: the minister under whom they serve. The ministers all but
Speaker 1: the chief, will naturally be selected by the Chief, and
Speaker 1: the Chief himself, though really designated by Parliament, should be
Speaker 1: in a regal government, officially appointed by the Crown. The
Speaker 1: functionary who appoints should be the sole person empowered to
Speaker 1: remove any subordinate officer who is liable to removal, which
Speaker 1: the far greater number ought not to be except for
Speaker 1: personal misconduct, since it would be vain to expect that
Speaker 1: the body of persons by whom the whole detail of
Speaker 1: the public business is transacted, and whose qualifications are generally
Speaker 1: of much more importance to the public than those of
Speaker 1: the minister himself, will devote themselves to their profession and
Speaker 1: acquire the knowledge and skill on which the minister must
Speaker 1: often place entire dependents, if they are liable at any
Speaker 1: moment to be turned adrift for no fault, that the
Speaker 1: minister may gratify himself or promote his political interest by
Speaker 1: appointing somebody else. To the principle which condemns the appointment
Speaker 1: of executive officers by popular suffrage, ought the chief of
Speaker 1: the executive in a republican government to be an exception.
Speaker 1: Is it a good rule which in the American Constitution
Speaker 1: provides for the election of the president once every four
Speaker 1: years by the entire people. The question is not free
Speaker 1: from difficulty. There is unquestionably some advantage in a country
Speaker 1: like America, where no apprehension needs to be entertained of
Speaker 1: a coup de etat, in making the chief minister constitutionally
Speaker 1: independent of the legislative body and rendering the two great
Speaker 1: branches of the government, while equally popular both in their
Speaker 1: origin and in their responsibility, an effective check on one another.
Speaker 1: The plan is in accordance with that sedular avoidance of
Speaker 1: the concentration of great masses of power in the same hands,
Speaker 1: which is a marked characteristic of the American Federal Constitution.
Speaker 1: But the advantage in this instance is purchased at a
Speaker 1: price above all reasonable estimates of its value. It seems
Speaker 1: far better that the chief magistrate in a republic should
Speaker 1: be appointed avowedly, as the chief minister in a constitutional
Speaker 1: monarchy is virtually by the representative body in the first place,
Speaker 1: he is certain when thus appointed to be a more
Speaker 1: eminent man. The party which has the majority in Parliament
Speaker 1: would then, as a rule, appoint its own leader, who
Speaker 1: is always one of the foremost and often the very
Speaker 1: foremost person in political life. While the President of the
Speaker 1: United States, since the last survivor of the founders of
Speaker 1: the Republic disappeared from the scene, is almost always either
Speaker 1: an obscure man or one who has gained any reputation
Speaker 1: he may possess in some other field than politics. This,
Speaker 1: as I have before observed, is no accident, but the
Speaker 1: natural effect of the situation. The eminent men of a
Speaker 1: party in an election extending to the whole country are
Speaker 1: never its most available candidates. All eminent men have made
Speaker 1: personal enemies, or have done something, or at the lost
Speaker 1: professed some opinion obnoxious to some local or other considerable
Speaker 1: division of the community, and likely to tell with fatal
Speaker 1: effect upon the number of votes. Whereas a man without antecedents,
Speaker 1: of whom nothing is known but that he professes the
Speaker 1: creed of the party is readily voted for by its
Speaker 1: entire strength. Another important consideration is the great mischief of
Speaker 1: unintermitted electioneering. When the highest dignity in the state is
Speaker 1: to be conferred by popular election once in every few years,
Speaker 1: the whole intervening time is spent in what is virtually
Speaker 1: a canvass. President ministers, chiefs of parties, and their followers
Speaker 1: are all electioneerers. The whole community is kept intent on
Speaker 1: the mere personalities of politics, and every public question is
Speaker 1: discussed and decided with less reference to its merits than
Speaker 1: to its expected bearing on the presidential election. If a
Speaker 1: system had been devised to make party spirit the ruling
Speaker 1: principle of action in all public affairs, and create an
Speaker 1: inducement not only to make every question a party question,
Speaker 1: but to raise questions for the purpose of founding parties
Speaker 1: upon them. It would have been difficult to contrive any
Speaker 1: means better adapted to the purpose. I will not affirm
Speaker 1: that it would, at all times and places be desirable
Speaker 1: that the head of the executive should be so completely
Speaker 1: dependent upon the votes of a representative Assembly, as the
Speaker 1: Prime Minister is in England and is without inconvenience. If
Speaker 1: it were thought best to avoid this, he might, though
Speaker 1: appointed by Parliament, hold his office for a fixed period
Speaker 1: independent of a parliamentary vote, which would be the American
Speaker 1: system minus the popular election and its evils. There is
Speaker 1: another mode of giving the head of the administration as
Speaker 1: much independence of the legislature as is at all compatible
Speaker 1: with the essentials of free government. He never could be
Speaker 1: unduly dependent on a vote of Parliament if he had,
Speaker 1: As the British Prime Minister practically has the power to
Speaker 1: dissolve the House and appeal to the people if instead
Speaker 1: of being turned out of office by a hostile vote,
Speaker 1: he could only be reduced by it to the alternative
Speaker 1: of resignation or dissolution. The power of dissolving parliament is
Speaker 1: one which I think it desirable he should possess. Even
Speaker 1: under the system by which his own tenure of offices
Speaker 1: secured to him for a fixed period. There ought not
Speaker 1: to be any possibility of that deadlock in politics which
Speaker 1: would ensue on a quarrel breaking out between a president
Speaker 1: and an Assembly, neither of whom, during an interval which
Speaker 1: might amount to years, would have any legal means of
Speaker 1: ridding itself of the other. To get through such a
Speaker 1: period without a coup de'eta being attempted either side or
Speaker 1: on both requires such a combination of the love of
Speaker 1: liberty and the habit of self restraint, as very few
Speaker 1: nations have yet shown themselves capable of, and though this
Speaker 1: extremity were avoided. To expect that the two authorities would
Speaker 1: not paralyze each other's operations is to suppose that the
Speaker 1: political life of the country will always be pervaded by
Speaker 1: a spirit of mutual forbearance and compromise, imperturbable by the
Speaker 1: passions and excitements of the keenest party struggles. Such a
Speaker 1: spirit may exist, but even where it does, there is
Speaker 1: imprudence in trying it too far. End of Chapter fourteen,
Speaker 1: a recording by Bill Burst