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<v Speaker 1>Welcome back everybody.

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<v Speaker 2>Today we're going to be looking at Shadow at Shape,

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<v Speaker 2>the NATO intern spy case, and today we're talking about

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<v Speaker 2>something that doesn't make the using news cycle of that

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<v Speaker 2>well in the way a kinetic strike does, but it should.

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<v Speaker 2>The Canadian national Chinese origin working as an intern at

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<v Speaker 2>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Shape in Belgium was arrested

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<v Speaker 2>on suspicion of spying for a third country and being

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<v Speaker 2>part of a criminal investigation, a criminal organization. Belgian federal

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<v Speaker 2>prosecutors confirmed and NATO's security services tip them off. They

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<v Speaker 2>hit her home and her workplace inside the headquarters. She's

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<v Speaker 2>sitting in pre trial custody right now. Shape is not

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<v Speaker 2>some administrative office with cubicles. That's the military brain of

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<v Speaker 2>the Alliance. That's where the plans get built, the operations

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<v Speaker 2>get synchronized.

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<v Speaker 1>An intern had access, maybe limited, maybe more than limited.

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<v Speaker 2>We don't know, oh, exactly the full scope, because the

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<v Speaker 2>Belgians are playing this close to the chest and NATO

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<v Speaker 2>is saying operational readiness wasn't impacted.

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<v Speaker 1>I've been I've seen a lot of skifts.

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<v Speaker 2>In on my day and enough briefings to know what

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<v Speaker 2>the language usually means folks. The clearance process, polygraphs, background checks,

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<v Speaker 2>that they dig into your even your high school girlfriend's

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<v Speaker 2>cousin continuous evaluation. The whole machine is built on the

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<v Speaker 2>assumption that the people inside the wire are solid. When

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<v Speaker 2>the assumption cracks, even at the intern level, everything downstream

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<v Speaker 2>gets re examined. This woman was a Canadian citizen. That matters.

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<v Speaker 2>Canada has a five eyes partner, is a five eyes partner.

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<v Speaker 2>The trust between those nations is supposed to be ironclad.

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<v Speaker 2>Chinese origin doesn't equal guilt. Let's be clear, but Chinese

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<v Speaker 2>intelligence has a documented aggressive, long game approach to talent spotting,

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<v Speaker 2>co option, and recruitment. They play the diaspora, they play students,

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<v Speaker 2>they play interns. They play the long game better than

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<v Speaker 2>almost anyone. The Chinese have been running inflowid and said

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<v Speaker 2>collection operations against Winstern institutions for decades, academia, tech.

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<v Speaker 1>Government contractors. But I want to know is how far

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<v Speaker 1>did this go?

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<v Speaker 2>Was she tasking? Was she photographing documents? Was she social

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<v Speaker 2>engineering people with clearances? Was she just collecting open source

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<v Speaker 2>stuff that still had operational value?

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<v Speaker 1>We don't have those answers yet.

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<v Speaker 2>The Belgian prosecutor's office is keeping the third country unnamed

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<v Speaker 2>in public statements. Here's the part that should keep everybody up.

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<v Speaker 2>Interns in junior people have more access in the system

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<v Speaker 2>of events. They sit in meetings, they carry documents, they

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<v Speaker 2>hear hallway conversations, they see the calendar of senior officers

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<v Speaker 2>and a headquarters environment. The junior person, who is always helpful,

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<v Speaker 2>always asking questions, can become invisible in the best possible

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<v Speaker 2>way for a collector.

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<v Speaker 1>This arrest also.

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<v Speaker 2>Comes at a time when the Alliance is already under stressed.

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<v Speaker 2>Different threat perceptions across the members. Pressure on defense spending,

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<v Speaker 2>highbred warfare from Russia persist.

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<v Speaker 1>In Chinese collection.

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<v Speaker 2>Belgian authorities move fast once that tip came in, and

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<v Speaker 2>that's good, But the fact that it required a tip

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<v Speaker 2>from inside NATO security services tells you the detection system worked.

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<v Speaker 1>Eventually.

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<v Speaker 2>The question is how long the vulnerability exists before the detection.

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<v Speaker 2>We'll keep an eye on this case and names will

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<v Speaker 2>eventually come out. Details will also The third country will

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<v Speaker 2>be confirmed until the end. The lesson is clear. The

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<v Speaker 2>soft targets inside the hardest targets are still soft.