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<v Speaker 1>Imagine a world where every email you send, every video

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<v Speaker 1>you stream, all the smart devices in your home, even

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<v Speaker 1>your car, they're all speaking this hidden language. It's this

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<v Speaker 1>invisible web of connections making our digital lives work. But

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<v Speaker 1>what if you could actually understand that language, the nuts

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<v Speaker 1>and bolts of it, and crucially see where the weak

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<v Speaker 1>spots are.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a really powerful idea, because in today's world everything's connected.

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<v Speaker 2>Understanding how networks actually function it's not just for the

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<v Speaker 2>tech geeks or the security pros anymore, like a critical

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<v Speaker 2>way to see what's happening in our digital lives, whether

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<v Speaker 2>you're building things, securing them, or just trying to use

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<v Speaker 2>the Internet safely exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's really our mission today on the deep Dive.

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<v Speaker 1>We're going to dig into a foundational guide. It's called

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<v Speaker 1>Network Basics for Hackers, written by Occupy the Web. Their website,

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<v Speaker 1>hackers Arise is described as a white hat hacker training site,

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<v Speaker 1>So the focus is on using these skills for good ethically.

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<v Speaker 1>Our goal here is to pull out the most important bits,

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<v Speaker 1>those nuggets of knowledge, to give you a shortcut to

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<v Speaker 1>really getting how networks operate their flaws and you understand

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<v Speaker 1>not just what's happening. But why it's important.

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<v Speaker 2>And what's interesting about this source is how it defines

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<v Speaker 2>white hat hacker. It's not just about finding flaws for companies.

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<v Speaker 2>It talks about being a beacon and warrior for information

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<v Speaker 2>freedom and human rights on the Internet.

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<v Speaker 1>That's a strong statement.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and it even goes into detail about occupyth Web's

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<v Speaker 2>documented activities in the Ukraine conflict, things like denial of

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<v Speaker 2>service attacks against Russian government sites, finding oligarch yachts, hacking

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<v Speaker 2>cameras for war crime evidence, even cyber attacks on Russian

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<v Speaker 2>industrial systems, the schodaic stuff, and setting up a cybersecurity

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<v Speaker 2>school in Kharkiev. Now, obviously we're just reporting this impartially

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<v Speaker 2>as it's laid out in the source material.

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<v Speaker 1>Right understood, Okay, so let's get into it. We're started

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<v Speaker 1>with the absolute basics, the plumbing, like what is an

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<v Speaker 1>IP address really, and we'll go all the way to

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<v Speaker 1>well networks in cars, factories, even hacking radio signals. It's

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<v Speaker 1>a deep dive into the hidden anatomy of our digital world.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's start right at the beginning. IP addresses.

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<v Speaker 2>Okay, Yeah, IP addresses they are absolutely fundamental. Think of

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<v Speaker 2>it simply as the house address for every single digital device,

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<v Speaker 2>your laptop, your phone, your smart fridge. Without that unique address,

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<v Speaker 2>data just wouldn't know where to go. Communication breaks down.

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<v Speaker 1>So if it's a house number, how's it structured? Most

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<v Speaker 1>of us are still on IPv four, right, that's the

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<v Speaker 1>thirty two bit one.

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<v Speaker 2>That's the one. It's broken into four groups of eight bits.

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<v Speaker 2>We call those octets. So you see things like one,

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<v Speaker 2>ninety two point one, sixty eight point one, one zero

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<v Speaker 2>one each number in there. Each octet can be anything

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<v Speaker 2>from zero up to two fifty five. Okay, Now, historically

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<v Speaker 2>these were grouped into classes ABC based on the first

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<v Speaker 2>few numbers. Helped organize things early on. But the real issue,

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<v Speaker 2>the big problem today is we've basically run out of

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<v Speaker 2>IPv four addresses. Yeah, there are only about four point

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<v Speaker 2>three billion unique addresses possible with that thirty two bit structure,

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<v Speaker 2>and we've got what over seven point five billion people

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<v Speaker 2>plus way more devices than that. The math just doesn't

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<v Speaker 2>work anymore.

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<v Speaker 1>So how do we cope. That's where things like private

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<v Speaker 1>ips come.

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<v Speaker 2>In, exactly. That's one of the clever workarounds. They set

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<v Speaker 2>aside specific ranges of IP addresses just for internal use

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<v Speaker 2>inside your local area network your land. These are the private.

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<v Speaker 1>Ips like one ninety two point one six eight dot

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<v Speaker 1>something or ten dots are the common ones.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, one ninety two point one six eight dot x

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<v Speaker 2>dot x, ten dot x dot is and also the

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<v Speaker 2>one seventy two point one six dot x dot x range.

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<v Speaker 2>Your home router probably signs these to all your devices, which.

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<v Speaker 1>Brings up a good question. Then, if my phone is

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<v Speaker 1>an internal private IP like one ninety two point one

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<v Speaker 1>six eight point one point five, how does it talk

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<v Speaker 1>to a website out on the public internet.

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<v Speaker 2>Ah? Good question. That involves two key pieces of magic

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<v Speaker 2>DHCP and net. First, DCP Dynamic Host Configuration protocol that's

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<v Speaker 2>usually running on your router. It automatically hands out those

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<v Speaker 2>private IP addresses to divice is joining your network. Often

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<v Speaker 2>it's just a temporary lease, so your phone might get

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<v Speaker 2>a slightly different private IP next time it connects.

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<v Speaker 1>Got it and that.

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<v Speaker 2>NAT is network address translation. Think of it as the

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<v Speaker 2>translator or the receptionist for your entire network. It lets

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<v Speaker 2>all those devices on your internal network, each with its

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<v Speaker 2>own private IP. Yeah, share the single public IP address

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<v Speaker 2>that your internet provider gives to your router.

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<v Speaker 1>Ah. Good.

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<v Speaker 2>So When your phone sends a request out, NAT swaps

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<v Speaker 2>the private source IP for the router's public IP, keeps

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<v Speaker 2>a record, and when the reply comes back, NAT knows

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<v Speaker 2>exactly which internal device which private IP to send it

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<v Speaker 2>back to, and.

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<v Speaker 1>It all just happens automatically, feels seamless to.

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<v Speaker 2>Me as the user, completely transparent. That's the beauty of it. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>so we have the house address the IP. What about

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<v Speaker 2>the apartment number.

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<v Speaker 1>That's whereports come in ports. Right, So the IP gets

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<v Speaker 1>dated to the right computer, but the port tells it

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<v Speaker 1>which specific program or service on that computer should receive it, exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Like web traffic usually goes to port eighty for standard

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<v Speaker 2>HTTP or four to forty three for secure HTTPS. Email

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<v Speaker 2>uses different ports, Games use different ports. It directs the

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<v Speaker 2>traffic internally.

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<v Speaker 1>And how many ports are there? I remember reading it's

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<v Speaker 1>a lot.

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<v Speaker 2>It is sixty five thousand, five hundred and thirty six

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<v Speaker 2>possible ports for each IP address zero through six hundred

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<v Speaker 2>and five to five thirty five. The first oneenty twenty

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<v Speaker 2>four are often called the well known or common ports

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<v Speaker 2>reserved for standard services, and from.

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<v Speaker 1>A security angle, knowing which ports are open on a

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<v Speaker 1>device is huge, right, that's what tools like map do

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<v Speaker 1>absolutely critical.

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<v Speaker 2>End MAP scans a target. IP probes these ports and

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<v Speaker 2>tells you which ones are open, meaning a service is

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<v Speaker 2>listening there. It's often the very first step in reconnaissance,

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<v Speaker 2>for a security assessment or for an attacker. It maps

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<v Speaker 2>out the potential entry points.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so IP addresses for location ports for the specific service.

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<v Speaker 1>What's the language they're actually speaking? That's TCPIP primarily.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, TCPIP is the dominant suite of protocols for Internet communication.

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<v Speaker 2>TCP is Transmission Control protocol and IP is Internet protocol.

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<v Speaker 1>And protocols are just agreed upon rules.

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<v Speaker 2>For talking, pretty much like a language has grammar and vocabulary.

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<v Speaker 2>For networks, these rules ensure devices understand each other. They're

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<v Speaker 2>often defined in technical documents called RFC's Requests for Comments.

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<v Speaker 1>So the IP part that handles the addressing and routing,

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<v Speaker 1>making sure packets get from source AID to destination B correct.

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<v Speaker 2>The ipheader within each data packet contains crucial info like

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<v Speaker 2>the version is this IPv four or the newer IPv

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<v Speaker 2>six and the source and destination IP addresses?

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<v Speaker 1>Obviously, what about that TTL field I've heard about? Time

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<v Speaker 1>to live?

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<v Speaker 2>Ah? Yes, TTL. It's basically a counter that prevents packets

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<v Speaker 2>from looping endlessly around the Internet. Each router that handles

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<v Speaker 2>the packet decreases the TTL value. If it hits zero,

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<v Speaker 2>the packet is discarded. Okay, but here's a neat trick.

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<v Speaker 2>Different operating systems often start packets with different default TTL values,

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<v Speaker 2>So just by looking at the TTL of incoming packets,

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<v Speaker 2>you can sometimes make a pretty good I guess about

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<v Speaker 2>the sender's OS, Windows, Linux, Mac OS. It's a passive

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<v Speaker 2>fingerprinting technique.

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<v Speaker 1>That's clever. Okay, So that's IP. What about the TCP

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<v Speaker 1>part you said, Transmission Control Protocol Right.

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<v Speaker 2>TCP sits on top of IP and adds reliability. It's

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<v Speaker 2>header has fields like source port and destination port. Connecting

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<v Speaker 2>back to our port discussion makes sense. But crucially, it

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<v Speaker 2>adds sequence numbers and acknowledgment numbers. These ensure that all

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<v Speaker 2>the packets arrive and that they get reassembled in the

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<v Speaker 2>correct order at the destination. If the center doesn't get

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<v Speaker 2>an acknowledgment ack back for a packet it's sent, it

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<v Speaker 2>knows to resend it.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's why TCP is called connection oriented and reliable

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<v Speaker 1>because of that back and forth checking.

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<v Speaker 2>Precisely, it establishes a formal connection before sending data and

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<v Speaker 2>ensures everything gets there intact.

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<v Speaker 1>And what are those TCP flags? Things like s yn

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<v Speaker 1>ack fim ah.

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<v Speaker 2>The flags. They're like little single bit signals within the

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<v Speaker 2>TCP header that manage the state of the connection. S

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<v Speaker 2>yn synchronized starts a connection, ack acknowledged, confirms seat of data,

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<v Speaker 2>fin finish signals the end of the data transmission.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay.

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<v Speaker 2>There are others to like RST reset to abruptly kill

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<v Speaker 2>a connection, or PSH push and urg urgent. Understanding these

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<v Speaker 2>flags is key for analyzing traffic, and attackers can manipulate

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<v Speaker 2>them for scanning like an s yn scan or even

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<v Speaker 2>trying to bypass firewalls.

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<v Speaker 1>And this all starts with the famous three way handshake.

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<v Speaker 2>Every single TCP connection. Yes, it's fundamental.

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<v Speaker 1>How does that work again?

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<v Speaker 2>Simple client sends a s yn packet I want to connect.

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<v Speaker 2>Server replies with a s y n ack. Okay, acknowledge

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<v Speaker 2>your request, and I also want to sink. Client sends

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<v Speaker 2>a final ack, got it connection established? Only then can

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<v Speaker 2>the actual data start flowing. S yn s yn ack

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<v Speaker 2>three steps, got.

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<v Speaker 1>It s y n s y n ack ack.

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<v Speaker 2>So TCP is reliable, but has that set up overhead?

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<v Speaker 2>What's the alternative?

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<v Speaker 1>UDP? UDP user data GRAM protocols the polar opposite in

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<v Speaker 1>some ways. It's connectionless, meaning meaning it doesn't do the handshake.

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<v Speaker 1>It just sends packets datagrams out toward the destination. No

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<v Speaker 1>sequence numbers, no acknowledgements, no guarantee they'll arrive or in

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<v Speaker 1>what order.

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<v Speaker 2>So why use it?

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<v Speaker 1>Sounds risky Because it's fast and efficient, low overhead. It's

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<v Speaker 1>perfect for things where losing a tiny bit of data

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<v Speaker 1>isn't the end of the world and speed matters more.

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<v Speaker 1>Think streaming video or music ah.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, a droped frame is barely noticeable exactly, or online gaming. Also,

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<v Speaker 2>some really important network services use UDP, like DNS for

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<v Speaker 2>looking up domain names, SNMP for network management, and NTP

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<v Speaker 2>for time synchronization. They handle reliability at the application layer

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<v Speaker 2>if needed.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, that makes sense. Protocols covered. What about the physical

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<v Speaker 1>layout how the devices are actually connected.

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<v Speaker 2>Network topology right toology how the network is physically or

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<v Speaker 2>logically arranged. There are a few classic types. The simplest

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<v Speaker 2>is maybe the bus topology like.

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<v Speaker 1>An old school ethernet cable everyone plugs into.

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<v Speaker 2>Pretty much all devices share a single communication line. It's

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<v Speaker 2>cheap and easy to set up, but prone to collisions

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<v Speaker 2>if multiple devices talk at once, and if the main

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<v Speaker 2>cable breaks, the whole segment goes down.

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<v Speaker 1>Not ideal. What's more common now for.

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<v Speaker 2>Local area networks definitely the start apology. Every device connects

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<v Speaker 2>directly to a central point, usually a switch these days,

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<v Speaker 2>historically a hub.

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<v Speaker 1>That seems way better for resilience.

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<v Speaker 2>It is, if one device is cable fails, it only

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<v Speaker 2>affects that one device. The rest of the network keeps working.

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<v Speaker 2>It's the standard for most office and home networks.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, any other's worth knowing.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, there's the ring topology. Devices are connected in a circle.

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<v Speaker 2>Data packets travel around the ring until they reach their destination. Simple,

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<v Speaker 2>can be efficient, but like the bus, a single break

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<v Speaker 2>in the ring can be catastrophic. Used in some older

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<v Speaker 2>network types like token ring.

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<v Speaker 1>Right.

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<v Speaker 2>And then there's mesh. In a full mesh, every device

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<v Speaker 2>connects directly to every other device.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow, that sounds complicated, but.

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<v Speaker 2>Robust, extremely robust, lots of redundant paths. If one link fails,

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<v Speaker 2>data can easily reroute the Internet itself at a high

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<v Speaker 2>level functions like a massive mesh network, and interestingly, some

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<v Speaker 2>modern peer to peer mobile apps like Brier can create

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<v Speaker 2>ad hoc mesh networks using Bluetooth or Wi Fi by

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<v Speaker 2>passing the need for central servers.

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<v Speaker 1>Fascinating. Okay, so we have protocols topologies. How do we

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<v Speaker 1>conceptibly tie all these layers together? That's the OSI model.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, ah, the o SI model, the Open System's interconnection model. Yes,

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<v Speaker 2>it's a conceptual framework, a way to understand how different

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<v Speaker 2>networking tasks are divided into layers, each performing a specific function.

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<v Speaker 2>Seven layers in total.

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<v Speaker 1>Seven layers. Can you list them? And maybe that mnemonic

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<v Speaker 1>I always forget.

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<v Speaker 2>Sure from top closest to the user to bottom closest

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<v Speaker 2>to the physical wire layer. Seven is applications, six is presentation,

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<v Speaker 2>five a session, four is transport, three is network, two

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<v Speaker 2>is data link, and one is physical. Okay, the mnemonics

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<v Speaker 2>help going down? All people seem to need data processing

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<v Speaker 2>going up? Please do not throw sausage pizza away, chezy,

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<v Speaker 2>but they work.

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<v Speaker 1>Huh. Okay, Please do not throw sausage pizzaway. Physical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation, application.

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<v Speaker 2>Got it?

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<v Speaker 1>But why is This model useful, especially from a.

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<v Speaker 2>Security viewpoint, because different types of attacks target different layers.

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<v Speaker 2>Understanding the model helps you categorize threats and defenses.

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<v Speaker 1>You give examples sure.

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<v Speaker 2>Layer seven application is where you see application specific exploits

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<v Speaker 2>like SQL injection on a web app. Layer six presentation

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<v Speaker 2>deals with data formatting and encryption. Phishing attacks often try

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<v Speaker 2>to trick users at this interface.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay.

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<v Speaker 2>Layer five session manages connection session hijacking attacks happen here.

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<v Speaker 2>Layer four transport, where TCPUDP live is often targeted for

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<v Speaker 2>reconnaissance like port scanning. Layer three network, where IP lives

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<v Speaker 2>is vulnerable to things like men in the middle attacks

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<v Speaker 2>or routing manipulation. Layer two data link MIIC addresses can

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<v Speaker 2>see MP spoofing or ARP poisoning. And Layer one physical

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<v Speaker 2>is where simple wiretapping or signal jamming occurs.

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<v Speaker 1>So the model provides a map for understanding where things

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<v Speaker 1>are can go wrong exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a foundational concept for network engineers and security pros.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, this is great foundational stuff. Let's shift gears a bit.

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<v Speaker 1>We talked about running out of IPv four addresses. How

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<v Speaker 1>do we use the ones we have more efficiently than involve.

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<v Speaker 2>Subnetting, subnetting, yes, and cid R notation. The main reasons

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<v Speaker 2>for subnetting are one to conserve that limited IPv four space,

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<v Speaker 2>two to create network segments with a more realistic number

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<v Speaker 2>of hosts instead of huge flat networks, and three to

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<v Speaker 2>improve performance and security by dividing large networks into smaller,

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<v Speaker 2>manageable broadcast domains.

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<v Speaker 1>So a subnet is like a network within a network.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a perfect way to put it. You take a

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<v Speaker 2>larger block of IP addresses assigned to you and break

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<v Speaker 2>it down into smaller logical networks.

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<v Speaker 1>How does that work technically with the subnet mask?

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<v Speaker 2>Right? The subnet mask is another thirty two BET number

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<v Speaker 2>that looks like an IP address, like two five five

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<v Speaker 2>point two five to five point zero. It's used mathematically,

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<v Speaker 2>usually with a binary A and D operation to separate

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<v Speaker 2>the network portion of an IP address from the host portion.

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<v Speaker 2>Tells devices which part identifies the street network and which

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<v Speaker 2>part identifies the house number host on that street.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, and CIDR, that slash notation like twenty.

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<v Speaker 2>Four CIR class list inter domain roading is basically shorthand

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<v Speaker 2>for the subnet mask. Instead of writing out the full mask,

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<v Speaker 2>you just put a slash followed by the number of

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<v Speaker 2>bits used for the network portion.

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<v Speaker 1>So one nineteen point one six eight point one point

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<v Speaker 1>zero two four means the first twenty four bits are

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<v Speaker 1>the network.

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<v Speaker 2>Part exactly, which corresponds to a subnetmask of two hundred

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<v Speaker 2>five five point two FI five five point two five

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<v Speaker 2>five point zero eight would be two hundred finty five

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<v Speaker 2>point zero point zero and song.

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<v Speaker 1>And you can use this to carve up networks.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely. You could take a standard Class C range like

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<v Speaker 2>that twenty four, giving you about two hundred and fifty

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<v Speaker 2>four usable host addresses, and decide you need, say six

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<v Speaker 2>smaller departments, each needing maybe twenty five hosts. By borrowing

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<v Speaker 2>a few bits from the host portion for the network portion,

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<v Speaker 2>making it say a twenty seven, you can create multiple

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<v Speaker 2>smaller subnets from that original block. It's efficient and helps

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<v Speaker 2>organize and secure the network.

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<v Speaker 1>Makes sense. Okay, Now, how do we actually see what's

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<v Speaker 1>happening on our network? What tools are there besides just theory?

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<v Speaker 2>Good question. There are essential command line tools built into

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<v Speaker 2>most operating systems. If CANFIG or IP addra on modern

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<v Speaker 2>Linux shows your network interface configuration, IP address, MAC address, etc.

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<v Speaker 2>Right Ping two, Ping, is fundamental. Sends a simple ECO

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<v Speaker 2>request to see if a host is online and how

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<v Speaker 2>long it takes to respond. Basic connectivity testing.

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<v Speaker 1>What about seeing active connections for that?

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<v Speaker 2>Netstat is classic? It shows all the network connections to

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<v Speaker 2>and from your machine, TCPUDP, listening, poards, established connections, really

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<v Speaker 2>useful for troubleshooting or even spotting suspicious activity like malware

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<v Speaker 2>calling home.

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<v Speaker 1>Is there a newer version?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah? On Linux, USS socket statistics is generally preferred now,

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<v Speaker 2>often faster and provides more detailed information than netstat.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, those are good for looking at my own machines connections.

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<v Speaker 1>But yeah, what about seeing all the traffic flowing across

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<v Speaker 1>the network segment?

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<v Speaker 2>That's sniffing, right, that's network sniffing or packet analysis using

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<v Speaker 2>tools called sniffers or packet analyzers. These are incredibly powerful.

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<v Speaker 2>Network engineers use them constantly to diagnose problems, forensic investigators

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<v Speaker 2>use them to capture digital evidences, and hackers use them

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<v Speaker 2>for reconnaissance, finding vulnerabilities, capturing sensitive data if it's unencrypted,

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<v Speaker 2>like passwords, session cookies, emails files.

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<v Speaker 1>Is this legal? I remember hearing that FBI tool. Ah.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, the source mentions the FBI's Carnivore system, which was controversial.

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<v Speaker 2>Sniffing traffic on a network you don't own or have

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<v Speaker 2>permission to monitor is generally illegal in most places, but

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<v Speaker 2>for legitimate network administration and security testing on your own networks,

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<v Speaker 2>it's an indispensable tool.

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<v Speaker 1>What do you need to make it work?

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<v Speaker 2>Two main things. First, your computer's network interface card and

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<v Speaker 2>I SEE needs to be put into promiscuous mode. Normally,

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<v Speaker 2>and I SEE ignores packets not addressed to its specific

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<v Speaker 2>and MESSI doaters. Promiscuous mode tells it to grab every

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<v Speaker 2>packet it sees on the wire or Wi Fi channel.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay.

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<v Speaker 2>Second, you need the sniffing software itself, and captured traffic

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<v Speaker 2>is usually saved in a standard file format called dot

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<v Speaker 2>p cap packet capture, which many different tools can read.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's talk tools. The source mentions TCP dump.

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<v Speaker 2>TCP dump the classic. It's a command line sniffer that's

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<v Speaker 2>been around since the late eighties, available on Linux and

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<v Speaker 2>Unix like systems. It's powerful and flexible, though the output

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<v Speaker 2>can be a bit raw.

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<v Speaker 1>How do you use it?

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<v Speaker 2>You can just run TCP dump and it starts showing

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<v Speaker 2>packet summary, scrolling by more usefully you use flags SS

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<v Speaker 2>specifies the interface to listen on like F zero or

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<v Speaker 2>one and zero. AW writs the raw packets to a

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<v Speaker 2>dot pcap file for later analysis.

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<v Speaker 1>What about filtering? Can it narrow down the traffic?

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely? That's its strength. You can filter by source or destination,

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<v Speaker 2>IP address, SRC host or DCS host. You can filter

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<v Speaker 2>by port port eighty for web traffic. You can filter

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<v Speaker 2>by protocol TCP, UDP, ICP. You can even filter based

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<v Speaker 2>on TCP flags, TCPDCP flags and tcps in equals zero

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<v Speaker 2>to C only syn.

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<v Speaker 1>Packets wow specific very You.

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<v Speaker 2>Can combine filters with and or not. The source even

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<v Speaker 2>shows examples of filtering for things like clear text passwords,

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<v Speaker 2>password or specific user agent strings from web browsers or

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<v Speaker 2>session cookies. It requires understanding the protocols, but it lets

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<v Speaker 2>you zero in on exactly what you need.

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<v Speaker 1>Powerful, but maybe not super user friendly for visualizing things.

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<v Speaker 1>What's the go to graphical tool?

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<v Speaker 2>That would be wire shark. The source calls it the

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<v Speaker 2>de facto standard, and that's accurate. It's graphical, runs on Windows, Mac, Os, Linux,

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<v Speaker 2>and it makes analyzing packet captures much easier.

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<v Speaker 1>How does it display the data?

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<v Speaker 2>It has three main pains. The top PAIN is the

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<v Speaker 2>packet list, showing a summary of each captured packet. Click

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<v Speaker 2>one there, and the middle pain packet details shows a

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<v Speaker 2>decoded breakdown of all the protocol layers and fields within

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<v Speaker 2>that packet Ethernet, IP, TCP, application data. The bottom pain

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<v Speaker 2>packet bytes shows the raw hexadecimal and ask data.

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<v Speaker 1>And filtering in wire Shark.

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<v Speaker 2>Also very powerful. You can type display filters directly like

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<v Speaker 2>IP dot adr equals one ninety two point one sixty

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<v Speaker 2>eight point one point one, or TCP dot port equals

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<v Speaker 2>eighty or HTTP contains Facebook. There's also an expression builder

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<v Speaker 2>to help create complex filters.

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<v Speaker 1>What about seeing a whole conversation like a web request

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<v Speaker 1>in its response.

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<v Speaker 2>Wireshark makes that super easy with the follow TCP stream

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<v Speaker 2>or udpr SSLTLS stream feature. Write click a packet in

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<v Speaker 2>a conversation, choose follow, and it opens a new window

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<v Speaker 2>showing just the data exchange between those two end points,

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<v Speaker 2>reassembled in order. Fantastic for reading HTTP requests, emails, chat

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<v Speaker 2>messages if they're unencrypted.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, wire Shark sounds essential for digging into dot pcat files.

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<v Speaker 1>Now we know how to see traffic, how do we

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<v Speaker 1>control it. How do we block unwanted traffic? Firewalls?

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<v Speaker 2>Firewalls, Yeah, your digital gatekeepers absolutely crucial. They can be

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<v Speaker 2>software running on a single computer, a host based firewall

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<v Speaker 2>protecting just that machine, or a dedicated hardware appliance protecting

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<v Speaker 2>an entire network perimeter.

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<v Speaker 1>The source focuses on Linux firewalls, specifically iptables right.

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<v Speaker 2>Tiptables is the classic built in command line firewall utility

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<v Speaker 2>for Linux kernels. Though NF tables is newer, iptables is

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<v Speaker 2>still widely used and understood. It's incredibly flexible, but can

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<v Speaker 2>be complex.

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<v Speaker 1>How does it work conceptually? Tables chains.

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<v Speaker 2>It uses a system of tables, chains, and rules. Tables

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<v Speaker 2>group rules based on their general purpose. The main one

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<v Speaker 2>is the filter table for packet filtering. Others include NAT

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<v Speaker 2>for network address translation, mangle for modifying packets, and raw okay,

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<v Speaker 2>and chains. Chains are lists of rules within a table

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<v Speaker 2>that packets traverse. The key chains in the filter table

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<v Speaker 2>are input for packets destined for the firewall host itself,

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<v Speaker 2>output for packets originating from the firewall host, and forward

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<v Speaker 2>for packets just passing through the firewall like in a router.

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<v Speaker 1>So packets flow through these chains and rules are applied exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Each rule has matches conditions the packet must meet, like source, ipe, destination,

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<v Speaker 2>port protocol, and a target. What to do if the

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<v Speaker 2>packet matches like accept it, drop it silently, reject it

426
00:21:00.559 --> 00:21:02.119
<v Speaker 2>with an error, or log it.

427
00:21:02.440 --> 00:21:04.079
<v Speaker 1>Can you set default actions?

428
00:21:04.359 --> 00:21:07.359
<v Speaker 2>Yes, each chain has a default policy. You could set

429
00:21:07.359 --> 00:21:11.440
<v Speaker 2>the EMPPUT policy to accept allow everything by default, then

430
00:21:11.440 --> 00:21:14.880
<v Speaker 2>add specific drop rules, or more securely, set it to

431
00:21:15.000 --> 00:21:18.640
<v Speaker 2>drop block everything by default, then adds specific accept rules

432
00:21:18.640 --> 00:21:19.480
<v Speaker 2>for needed traffic.

433
00:21:19.559 --> 00:21:21.440
<v Speaker 1>And the order of rules is important.

434
00:21:21.000 --> 00:21:24.759
<v Speaker 2>Critically important. Iptables processes rules in a chain sequentially from

435
00:21:24.839 --> 00:21:27.359
<v Speaker 2>top to bottom. The first rule that matches a packet

436
00:21:27.400 --> 00:21:30.119
<v Speaker 2>determines its fate. So if you want to allow traffic

437
00:21:30.119 --> 00:21:32.920
<v Speaker 2>from a specific IP but block all others, the allow

438
00:21:33.039 --> 00:21:35.039
<v Speaker 2>rule must come before the general block rule.

439
00:21:35.119 --> 00:21:37.039
<v Speaker 1>So you can use it to block specific ips or

440
00:21:37.079 --> 00:21:39.960
<v Speaker 1>whole networks using CIDR, or block access to certain ports.

441
00:21:40.039 --> 00:21:43.319
<v Speaker 2>All of that block incoming SSH from anywhere except your

442
00:21:43.319 --> 00:21:47.720
<v Speaker 2>trusted IP, block outgoing connections to non malicious domains, allow

443
00:21:47.799 --> 00:21:50.680
<v Speaker 2>incoming web traffic only to port eighty and four forty three.

444
00:21:51.079 --> 00:21:52.160
<v Speaker 2>Very granular control.

445
00:21:52.359 --> 00:21:55.680
<v Speaker 1>Okay, that covers wired network defenses. What about the wild

446
00:21:55.680 --> 00:21:57.559
<v Speaker 1>West of wireless Wi Fi.

447
00:21:57.599 --> 00:22:00.599
<v Speaker 2>Ah Wi Fi eight POH two point one one standard.

448
00:22:00.799 --> 00:22:04.759
<v Speaker 2>It's everywhere convenient, but yeah, historically riddled with security issues.

449
00:22:05.279 --> 00:22:08.039
<v Speaker 2>We've come a long way from the original WEP encryption,

450
00:22:08.160 --> 00:22:09.359
<v Speaker 2>which was broken years ago.

451
00:22:09.640 --> 00:22:11.799
<v Speaker 1>WP is basically useless now right completely.

452
00:22:12.039 --> 00:22:15.119
<v Speaker 2>Then came WPA which was better but still flawed. Then

453
00:22:15.359 --> 00:22:18.799
<v Speaker 2>WPA two using AES encryption became the standard for a

454
00:22:18.839 --> 00:22:21.599
<v Speaker 2>long time, pretty strong but not perfect, and now we

455
00:22:21.680 --> 00:22:24.279
<v Speaker 2>have WPA three, which aims to fix some of WP

456
00:22:24.400 --> 00:22:25.200
<v Speaker 2>two's weaknesses.

457
00:22:25.359 --> 00:22:29.119
<v Speaker 1>Let's cover some Wi Fi basics. AP, SSID PSK right.

458
00:22:29.319 --> 00:22:32.759
<v Speaker 2>AP is the access point your wireless router. SSID is

459
00:22:32.799 --> 00:22:35.160
<v Speaker 2>the service set identifier that's the network name you see

460
00:22:35.160 --> 00:22:37.799
<v Speaker 2>and connect to. PSK is the pre shared key, the

461
00:22:37.799 --> 00:22:41.000
<v Speaker 2>password you type in for WPA two WPA.

462
00:22:40.599 --> 00:22:43.200
<v Speaker 1>Three Personal mode BSSID.

463
00:22:42.599 --> 00:22:45.440
<v Speaker 2>BSID is basically the m address of the access points

464
00:22:45.480 --> 00:22:48.319
<v Speaker 2>wireless interface uniquely identifies the AP and.

465
00:22:48.200 --> 00:22:50.279
<v Speaker 1>For hacking Wi Fi, you often need special gear.

466
00:22:50.400 --> 00:22:55.079
<v Speaker 2>Often, yes, specifically a wireless adapter that supports monitor mode

467
00:22:55.119 --> 00:22:58.240
<v Speaker 2>like promiscuous mode, but for Wi Fi letting you see

468
00:22:58.240 --> 00:23:03.039
<v Speaker 2>all nearby traffic. Then crucially, packet injection, the ability to

469
00:23:03.079 --> 00:23:06.440
<v Speaker 2>craft and send your own wireless frames. The source recommends

470
00:23:06.480 --> 00:23:09.039
<v Speaker 2>Alpha brand cards, which are popular for this.

471
00:23:09.240 --> 00:23:11.960
<v Speaker 1>What about common security tips that might not be so secure,

472
00:23:12.640 --> 00:23:14.359
<v Speaker 1>like hiding your SSID.

473
00:23:14.079 --> 00:23:17.079
<v Speaker 2>Hiding the SSAD. Yeah, that provides almost no real security.

474
00:23:17.480 --> 00:23:20.160
<v Speaker 2>Your devices still need to know the SSID to connect,

475
00:23:20.160 --> 00:23:23.119
<v Speaker 2>so they send out probe requests asking for it. A

476
00:23:23.160 --> 00:23:25.680
<v Speaker 2>hacker and monitor mode can just listen for these requests

477
00:23:25.720 --> 00:23:29.079
<v Speaker 2>or the AP's responses and discover the hidden name easily.

478
00:23:29.119 --> 00:23:33.119
<v Speaker 1>And MSc filtering only allowing specific devices.

479
00:23:33.279 --> 00:23:37.079
<v Speaker 2>Same problem security through obscurity, an attacker can just sniff

480
00:23:37.119 --> 00:23:40.000
<v Speaker 2>the traffic, see the MC address of an allowed client,

481
00:23:40.079 --> 00:23:43.319
<v Speaker 2>and then change their own adapter's MC address, spoofing it

482
00:23:43.359 --> 00:23:45.480
<v Speaker 2>with a tool like the changer to match the allowed

483
00:23:45.480 --> 00:23:47.000
<v Speaker 2>one bypass achieved.

484
00:23:47.160 --> 00:23:49.200
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so what are the real attacks against something like

485
00:23:49.319 --> 00:23:49.920
<v Speaker 1>WPA two.

486
00:23:50.119 --> 00:23:54.000
<v Speaker 2>The most common attack against WPA two PSK, the password version,

487
00:23:54.200 --> 00:23:58.720
<v Speaker 2>involves capturing the four way handshake handshake. When a legitimate

488
00:23:58.759 --> 00:24:02.079
<v Speaker 2>client connects to a WA two network, there's a four

489
00:24:02.160 --> 00:24:05.319
<v Speaker 2>step process where the client and AP prove they both

490
00:24:05.359 --> 00:24:08.720
<v Speaker 2>know the password and derive session keys without actually sending

491
00:24:08.759 --> 00:24:09.519
<v Speaker 2>the password in the.

492
00:24:09.440 --> 00:24:11.559
<v Speaker 1>Clear, But you can capture that exchange.

493
00:24:11.640 --> 00:24:15.200
<v Speaker 2>Yes, an attacker puts their card in monitor mode and

494
00:24:15.279 --> 00:24:18.559
<v Speaker 2>uses tools like aero dumping to watch for clients connecting.

495
00:24:19.200 --> 00:24:22.079
<v Speaker 2>Or they can speed things up by sending a de

496
00:24:22.240 --> 00:24:26.200
<v Speaker 2>authentication frame using airplaying to kick a connected client off

497
00:24:26.200 --> 00:24:29.240
<v Speaker 2>the network, forcing them to reconnect and generate a new handshake,

498
00:24:29.519 --> 00:24:30.880
<v Speaker 2>which the attacker captures.

499
00:24:30.880 --> 00:24:32.440
<v Speaker 1>And once you have the handshake, the.

500
00:24:32.400 --> 00:24:35.200
<v Speaker 2>Handshake contains a hash derived from the password. It's not

501
00:24:35.240 --> 00:24:38.039
<v Speaker 2>the password itself, but you can take that captured handshake

502
00:24:38.079 --> 00:24:40.960
<v Speaker 2>and feed it into an offline password cracking tool.

503
00:24:40.920 --> 00:24:43.400
<v Speaker 1>Like hashcat, along with the word list exactly.

504
00:24:43.880 --> 00:24:47.000
<v Speaker 2>Hashcat tries hashing every word in a massive dictionary or

505
00:24:47.039 --> 00:24:50.640
<v Speaker 2>word list, using the network's SSID as part of the process.

506
00:24:50.920 --> 00:24:54.319
<v Speaker 2>Comparing the result to the captured hash, it finds a match. Boom,

507
00:24:54.319 --> 00:24:57.319
<v Speaker 2>You've got the Wi Fi password. Success depends heavily on

508
00:24:57.359 --> 00:24:59.960
<v Speaker 2>the password complexity and the quality of the word list.

509
00:25:00.319 --> 00:25:03.839
<v Speaker 1>Okay, that's the handshake attack. Yeah, what about WPS that buttons.

510
00:25:03.839 --> 00:25:04.559
<v Speaker 1>Some routers have.

511
00:25:04.839 --> 00:25:08.400
<v Speaker 2>WPS Wi Fi protected setup designed for ease of use,

512
00:25:08.559 --> 00:25:12.240
<v Speaker 2>but the initial PI in implementation was a security disaster.

513
00:25:12.359 --> 00:25:15.039
<v Speaker 2>How So, it uses an eight digit PN but it

514
00:25:15.119 --> 00:25:18.160
<v Speaker 2>validates the first four digits separately from the next three.

515
00:25:18.559 --> 00:25:21.240
<v Speaker 2>The last digit is just a check some This means

516
00:25:21.279 --> 00:25:24.039
<v Speaker 2>an attacker only needs to guess a four digit number

517
00:25:24.119 --> 00:25:26.720
<v Speaker 2>ten thousand possibilities, and then a three digit number one

518
00:25:26.720 --> 00:25:30.240
<v Speaker 2>thousand possibilities. That's only eleven thousand total guesses.

519
00:25:29.960 --> 00:25:31.799
<v Speaker 1>Maximum, which is easy to brood force.

520
00:25:32.000 --> 00:25:35.960
<v Speaker 2>Trivial tools like reaver or Bully can try all possible pins,

521
00:25:36.039 --> 00:25:38.440
<v Speaker 2>often in just a few hours, and recover the actual

522
00:25:38.599 --> 00:25:42.759
<v Speaker 2>WPA two password. Many routers still have this vulnerable WPS

523
00:25:42.839 --> 00:25:45.960
<v Speaker 2>enabled by default. Checking the WPS status is often the

524
00:25:46.000 --> 00:25:47.119
<v Speaker 2>first thing an attacker tries.

525
00:25:47.240 --> 00:25:50.160
<v Speaker 1>Thikes, okay, what about the evil twin attack? Sounds nasty?

526
00:25:50.279 --> 00:25:50.519
<v Speaker 1>It is.

527
00:25:50.519 --> 00:25:52.839
<v Speaker 2>It's a man in the middle attack. The attacker sets

528
00:25:52.880 --> 00:25:55.480
<v Speaker 2>up their own fake access point with the exact same

529
00:25:55.680 --> 00:25:58.799
<v Speaker 2>SSID and security settings as the legitimate network you want

530
00:25:58.839 --> 00:26:01.759
<v Speaker 2>to connect to, like a fake cofee shop WiFi exactly.

531
00:26:02.279 --> 00:26:04.839
<v Speaker 2>Then they might use de authentication attacks to kick you

532
00:26:04.880 --> 00:26:08.640
<v Speaker 2>off the real coffee shop WiFi. Your device, seeing the

533
00:26:08.640 --> 00:26:12.279
<v Speaker 2>familiar network name, might automatically reconnect, but this time to

534
00:26:12.319 --> 00:26:15.640
<v Speaker 2>the attacker's fake AP, and then all your Internet traffic

535
00:26:15.759 --> 00:26:20.240
<v Speaker 2>flows through the attacker's machine. If you visit unencrypted websites HGTP.

536
00:26:20.640 --> 00:26:24.640
<v Speaker 2>They can see everything in wireshirk usernames, passwords, anything you type.

537
00:26:24.839 --> 00:26:28.000
<v Speaker 2>Even with HTTPS, they might try SSL stripping or prompt

538
00:26:28.079 --> 00:26:31.519
<v Speaker 2>you with fake login pages. It's very effective in public areas.

539
00:26:31.799 --> 00:26:34.440
<v Speaker 1>You mentioned the authentication attacks. Can they just be used

540
00:26:34.480 --> 00:26:35.480
<v Speaker 1>to knock people offline?

541
00:26:35.519 --> 00:26:35.640
<v Speaker 2>Oh?

542
00:26:35.680 --> 00:26:36.039
<v Speaker 1>Yeah?

543
00:26:36.119 --> 00:26:40.559
<v Speaker 2>Just continuously sending deof frames spoofing the AP's address to

544
00:26:40.599 --> 00:26:43.880
<v Speaker 2>all connected clients basically creates a denial of service attack

545
00:26:43.960 --> 00:26:46.599
<v Speaker 2>for that Wi Fi network. The source even shows a

546
00:26:46.599 --> 00:26:49.759
<v Speaker 2>simple BSA script to automate this, making it persistently annoying.

547
00:26:49.920 --> 00:26:52.240
<v Speaker 1>Is there anything newer attacking WPA two?

548
00:26:52.440 --> 00:26:56.000
<v Speaker 2>Yes. A significant development from twenty eighteen is the PMKID

549
00:26:56.119 --> 00:26:58.400
<v Speaker 2>attack pairwise master key identifier.

550
00:26:58.559 --> 00:27:00.000
<v Speaker 1>How's that different from the handshake cap?

551
00:27:00.440 --> 00:27:02.759
<v Speaker 2>The key difference is you don't need a client to

552
00:27:02.759 --> 00:27:06.839
<v Speaker 2>be connecting or deauthenticate anyone. The attacker can potentially get

553
00:27:06.880 --> 00:27:10.480
<v Speaker 2>the necessary password hash information directly from the access point

554
00:27:10.559 --> 00:27:14.319
<v Speaker 2>itself in the first message, the RSNIE frame it sends

555
00:27:14.319 --> 00:27:15.400
<v Speaker 2>when a client tries.

556
00:27:15.200 --> 00:27:17.359
<v Speaker 1>To associate just one frame needed.

557
00:27:17.200 --> 00:27:20.599
<v Speaker 2>Potentially Yes, Tools like hcx dump tool are used to

558
00:27:20.759 --> 00:27:26.000
<v Speaker 2>request and capture this RSNIE containing the PMKID. Then, just

559
00:27:26.039 --> 00:27:29.519
<v Speaker 2>like the handshake hash. You feed this pmkid data into

560
00:27:29.519 --> 00:27:33.359
<v Speaker 2>hashcat for offline cracking against word lists. It's faster and

561
00:27:33.400 --> 00:27:35.440
<v Speaker 2>stealthier than waiting for a full handshake.

562
00:27:35.599 --> 00:27:38.119
<v Speaker 1>Wi Fi security is a constant cat mask game. What

563
00:27:38.200 --> 00:27:39.839
<v Speaker 1>about Bluetooth? That's everywhere too.

564
00:27:39.920 --> 00:27:43.880
<v Speaker 2>Bluetooth, designed for short range, low power communication, creates small

565
00:27:43.920 --> 00:27:50.160
<v Speaker 2>personal area networks or peconets. Your headphones, speakers, keyboards, fitness trackers, cars.

566
00:27:49.960 --> 00:27:51.880
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, tons of stuff. Are there Linux tools for it?

567
00:27:51.960 --> 00:27:56.039
<v Speaker 2>Basic ones yeah. Hcnfig manages your Bluetooth adapter. H to

568
00:27:56.079 --> 00:27:58.839
<v Speaker 2>tool can scan for nearby devices, and h dump can

569
00:27:58.880 --> 00:28:01.599
<v Speaker 2>sniff Bluetooth traffic similar to TCP dump.

570
00:28:01.799 --> 00:28:03.880
<v Speaker 1>Is Bluetooth secure It seems like it should be, with

571
00:28:03.960 --> 00:28:04.759
<v Speaker 1>pairing and stuff.

572
00:28:05.000 --> 00:28:08.519
<v Speaker 2>It has security features like frequency hopping to avoid interference

573
00:28:08.519 --> 00:28:13.960
<v Speaker 2>and eavesdropping, and pairing involves generating shared keys, but vulnerabilities

574
00:28:14.000 --> 00:28:17.680
<v Speaker 2>have consistently popped up over the years like what Classic

575
00:28:17.680 --> 00:28:21.200
<v Speaker 2>attacks include blue smarfing connecting to a device without permission

576
00:28:21.240 --> 00:28:24.680
<v Speaker 2>to steal data like contacts or calendars. Blue bugging goes

577
00:28:24.720 --> 00:28:28.319
<v Speaker 2>further trying to take full control of the phone. Bluesmac

578
00:28:28.480 --> 00:28:30.160
<v Speaker 2>is a simple denial of service attack.

579
00:28:30.240 --> 00:28:32.000
<v Speaker 1>Anything more recent or severe.

580
00:28:31.680 --> 00:28:35.440
<v Speaker 2>The source highlights the blueborne attack vector, discovered in twenty seventeen.

581
00:28:36.000 --> 00:28:39.240
<v Speaker 2>This was a collection of vulnerabilities affecting billions of unpatched

582
00:28:39.279 --> 00:28:43.359
<v Speaker 2>devices Android, Windows, Linux, older iOS s or did it allow?

583
00:28:43.720 --> 00:28:47.440
<v Speaker 2>It exploited flaws in the Bluetooth implementation, particularly in the

584
00:28:47.519 --> 00:28:52.720
<v Speaker 2>Service Discovery Protocol SDP. Critically, an attacker could trigger these

585
00:28:52.759 --> 00:28:55.680
<v Speaker 2>flaws without needing to pair with the target device, and

586
00:28:55.759 --> 00:28:58.680
<v Speaker 2>often even if the device wasn't set to discoverable mode,

587
00:28:58.799 --> 00:29:01.079
<v Speaker 2>and the impact it could lead to remote code execution,

588
00:29:01.319 --> 00:29:05.000
<v Speaker 2>potentially giving the attacker full control, even kernel level access.

589
00:29:05.039 --> 00:29:07.839
<v Speaker 2>The source demonstrates using a Python script to exploit one

590
00:29:07.880 --> 00:29:10.960
<v Speaker 2>of these volunds and extract memory content from a vulnerable device.

591
00:29:11.119 --> 00:29:12.119
<v Speaker 2>Really serious stuff.

592
00:29:12.160 --> 00:29:15.920
<v Speaker 1>Patching is key, definitely. Okay, let's move into some other crucial,

593
00:29:16.279 --> 00:29:21.599
<v Speaker 1>maybe less obvious, network protocols ARP. Address Resolution Protocol.

594
00:29:21.480 --> 00:29:24.960
<v Speaker 2>ARP essential on local Ethernet networks. Its job is simple

595
00:29:25.000 --> 00:29:28.440
<v Speaker 2>but vital. It translates layer three IP addresses into layer

596
00:29:28.440 --> 00:29:29.799
<v Speaker 2>two MC addresses.

597
00:29:29.920 --> 00:29:32.279
<v Speaker 1>Why is that needed? If my computer knows the IP

598
00:29:32.359 --> 00:29:34.880
<v Speaker 1>address of the printer, why does it need the MC address?

599
00:29:35.039 --> 00:29:38.960
<v Speaker 2>Because on an Ethernet segment, devices ultimately communicate using physical

600
00:29:39.039 --> 00:29:42.039
<v Speaker 2>MC addresses. When your computer wants to send a packet

601
00:29:42.079 --> 00:29:44.519
<v Speaker 2>to the printer's IP, say one ninety two point one

602
00:29:44.559 --> 00:29:46.960
<v Speaker 2>six eight point one point two zero on the same

603
00:29:47.079 --> 00:29:49.880
<v Speaker 2>local network, it first needs to know the printer's hardware

604
00:29:49.880 --> 00:29:52.400
<v Speaker 2>and MAC dress, so it sends out an ARP request

605
00:29:52.440 --> 00:29:54.720
<v Speaker 2>broadcast who has one on two point one sixty eight

606
00:29:54.759 --> 00:29:56.799
<v Speaker 2>point one point one two all, or tell me my

607
00:29:56.880 --> 00:29:59.640
<v Speaker 2>IP in m AC. The printer sees this and replies

608
00:29:59.680 --> 00:30:02.160
<v Speaker 2>with an a RP response one ninety two point one

609
00:30:02.200 --> 00:30:04.200
<v Speaker 2>sixty eight point one point two zero is at MC

610
00:30:04.319 --> 00:30:07.759
<v Speaker 2>address AA BBC d e e ff. Your computer then

611
00:30:07.799 --> 00:30:09.920
<v Speaker 2>stores this mapping and its ARP table or cast.

612
00:30:09.960 --> 00:30:11.599
<v Speaker 1>Oh okay, you can see this table.

613
00:30:11.359 --> 00:30:15.720
<v Speaker 2>YEP the command in Windows or ARPN in Linux will

614
00:30:15.759 --> 00:30:18.839
<v Speaker 2>show you the current IP TOMAC mappings your system knows about.

615
00:30:19.079 --> 00:30:22.000
<v Speaker 1>How do attackers use AARP for reconnaissance?

616
00:30:22.039 --> 00:30:25.960
<v Speaker 2>First off, tools like net Discover send out ARP requests

617
00:30:26.000 --> 00:30:29.759
<v Speaker 2>for every possible IP on the local subnet. Any device

618
00:30:29.799 --> 00:30:33.400
<v Speaker 2>that replies reveals its IP, its MMASS address, and often

619
00:30:33.480 --> 00:30:36.039
<v Speaker 2>the vendor of its network card based on the first

620
00:30:36.039 --> 00:30:38.440
<v Speaker 2>half of the MC address. It's a quick way to

621
00:30:38.480 --> 00:30:40.759
<v Speaker 2>map out all the live hosts on the land, but.

622
00:30:40.839 --> 00:30:44.160
<v Speaker 1>There are attacks too. ARP spoofing big time.

623
00:30:44.559 --> 00:30:48.720
<v Speaker 2>AARP is inherently trusting, it doesn't really authenticate responses. This

624
00:30:48.799 --> 00:30:52.559
<v Speaker 2>makes it vulnerable to ARP spoofing or ARP poisoning, which

625
00:30:52.599 --> 00:30:55.680
<v Speaker 2>is the basis for many Man in the Middle MATM.

626
00:30:55.200 --> 00:30:56.920
<v Speaker 1>Attacks on a land How does that work?

627
00:30:57.119 --> 00:31:00.720
<v Speaker 2>An attacker sends out forged ARP replies. For example, they

628
00:31:00.759 --> 00:31:03.599
<v Speaker 2>tell the victim computer that the router's IP address corresponds

629
00:31:03.640 --> 00:31:05.759
<v Speaker 2>to the attackers MC address, and they tell the router

630
00:31:05.799 --> 00:31:08.079
<v Speaker 2>that the victim's IP address corresponds to the attackers and

631
00:31:08.160 --> 00:31:08.880
<v Speaker 2>mass C address.

632
00:31:08.920 --> 00:31:11.240
<v Speaker 1>So all traffic between the victim and the router now

633
00:31:11.279 --> 00:31:13.000
<v Speaker 1>goes through the attacker precisely.

634
00:31:13.359 --> 00:31:15.559
<v Speaker 2>The attacker sits in the middle relaying the traffic, but

635
00:31:15.640 --> 00:31:19.920
<v Speaker 2>able to read modifier block anything unencrypted. Tools like ettercap

636
00:31:20.079 --> 00:31:23.960
<v Speaker 2>or arpspoof automate this process very effective on switch networks

637
00:31:23.960 --> 00:31:25.759
<v Speaker 2>where simple sniffing doesn't work well.

638
00:31:25.880 --> 00:31:28.480
<v Speaker 1>Scary stuff on the local network. Okay, what about the

639
00:31:28.480 --> 00:31:30.160
<v Speaker 1>global phone book DNS?

640
00:31:30.440 --> 00:31:34.319
<v Speaker 2>Domain Name system DNS absolutely fundamental to how we use

641
00:31:34.319 --> 00:31:38.440
<v Speaker 2>the Internet. It's core job translate human friendly domain names

642
00:31:38.480 --> 00:31:41.440
<v Speaker 2>like www, dot Google dot com into the numerical IP

643
00:31:41.559 --> 00:31:44.279
<v Speaker 2>addresses that computers actually use to connect like one seventy

644
00:31:44.319 --> 00:31:46.319
<v Speaker 2>two point two to one c point one six to

645
00:31:46.400 --> 00:31:47.920
<v Speaker 2>zero point one four to two.

646
00:31:48.119 --> 00:31:49.920
<v Speaker 1>Without it, we b typing numbers all day.

647
00:31:49.799 --> 00:31:52.720
<v Speaker 2>We would And domain names have that hierarchy right at

648
00:31:52.759 --> 00:31:55.319
<v Speaker 2>the top the route, then top level domains dot com,

649
00:31:55.319 --> 00:31:58.319
<v Speaker 2>dot org, dot UK, then second level domains Google, BBC,

650
00:31:58.519 --> 00:32:02.680
<v Speaker 2>and potentially subdomains www, the whole thing together like mail

651
00:32:02.720 --> 00:32:04.960
<v Speaker 2>dot Google dot com is a fully qualified domain name

652
00:32:05.039 --> 00:32:05.880
<v Speaker 2>or FQDN.

653
00:32:06.079 --> 00:32:07.920
<v Speaker 1>Is the old host's file still relevant?

654
00:32:08.039 --> 00:32:11.480
<v Speaker 2>Surprisingly, Yes, that simple text file on your computer echosts

655
00:32:11.480 --> 00:32:14.640
<v Speaker 2>on LinuxMac C Window System thirty two drivers on Windows

656
00:32:14.839 --> 00:32:18.640
<v Speaker 2>contains manual domain to IP mappings, and crucially, your system

657
00:32:18.720 --> 00:32:21.039
<v Speaker 2>checks this file before it makes a DNS query out

658
00:32:21.079 --> 00:32:21.960
<v Speaker 2>to the network.

659
00:32:21.680 --> 00:32:24.839
<v Speaker 1>So you can hijack DNS locally by editing that file.

660
00:32:25.000 --> 00:32:25.480
<v Speaker 1>You could.

661
00:32:26.359 --> 00:32:30.079
<v Speaker 2>Malware sometimes modifies the host's file to redirect users from

662
00:32:30.160 --> 00:32:34.359
<v Speaker 2>legitimate sites like their bank, to malicious fishing sites hosted elsewhere.

663
00:32:34.480 --> 00:32:37.440
<v Speaker 2>It's a simple form of DNS spoofing on a local machine.

664
00:32:37.480 --> 00:32:41.160
<v Speaker 1>But generally DNS is this huge distributed system.

665
00:32:40.680 --> 00:32:43.960
<v Speaker 2>Massively distributed, hierarchical and dynamic. That's why it's so resilient.

666
00:32:44.000 --> 00:32:47.279
<v Speaker 2>It's not just one server, it's a global network of servers.

667
00:32:47.799 --> 00:32:50.960
<v Speaker 2>Key components include the DNS cash on your computer, storing

668
00:32:51.039 --> 00:32:55.000
<v Speaker 2>recent lookups, resolvers, servers often run by your ISP that

669
00:32:55.039 --> 00:32:58.920
<v Speaker 2>handle your queries, Authoritative name servers which hold the actual

670
00:32:58.920 --> 00:33:02.039
<v Speaker 2>records for a domain and the overall name space, and.

671
00:33:01.960 --> 00:33:04.759
<v Speaker 1>The records themselves a cripple amx right.

672
00:33:04.920 --> 00:33:08.680
<v Speaker 2>Domains are organized into zone files, which contain various resource records,

673
00:33:09.160 --> 00:33:13.920
<v Speaker 2>soa startup authority defines administrative info. NS lists the authoritative

674
00:33:14.000 --> 00:33:17.160
<v Speaker 2>name servers. A map's a name to an IPv four address,

675
00:33:17.440 --> 00:33:20.799
<v Speaker 2>quad a maps to an IPv six address. Cname creates

676
00:33:20.839 --> 00:33:23.759
<v Speaker 2>an alias pointing to another name. PTR does the reverse

677
00:33:23.759 --> 00:33:26.920
<v Speaker 2>look up IP to name, and MX mail exchanger tells

678
00:33:26.960 --> 00:33:29.519
<v Speaker 2>email servers where to send mail for that domain. Has

679
00:33:29.640 --> 00:33:33.640
<v Speaker 2>DNS always been secure historically No, It was designed for openness,

680
00:33:33.759 --> 00:33:39.319
<v Speaker 2>not security. Vulnerabilities included fragility. Early versions could be crashed easily,

681
00:33:40.039 --> 00:33:43.960
<v Speaker 2>information leakage attackers could query DNS servers to learn man

682
00:33:44.000 --> 00:33:48.720
<v Speaker 2>internal network structures, DNS recon and denial of service. Taking

683
00:33:48.759 --> 00:33:51.680
<v Speaker 2>down a company's DNS server effectively takes them offline.

684
00:33:51.759 --> 00:33:53.680
<v Speaker 1>What about redirecting traffic.

685
00:33:53.960 --> 00:33:57.000
<v Speaker 2>Malicious zone transfers were a problem, tricking a server into

686
00:33:57.039 --> 00:34:00.000
<v Speaker 2>giving up its entire zone file, and attackers could compromise

687
00:34:00.119 --> 00:34:03.759
<v Speaker 2>DNS servers or registration accounts to change legitimate records, pointing

688
00:34:03.839 --> 00:34:07.480
<v Speaker 2>users to bad sites. The source mentions Iranian state actors

689
00:34:07.519 --> 00:34:10.320
<v Speaker 2>doing this in twenty eighteen twenty nineteen to redirect users

690
00:34:10.320 --> 00:34:11.360
<v Speaker 2>and steal credentials.

691
00:34:11.519 --> 00:34:12.119
<v Speaker 1>Is there a fix?

692
00:34:12.840 --> 00:34:18.119
<v Speaker 2>The main security enhancement is DNSSECNS Security Extensions. It uses

693
00:34:18.159 --> 00:34:22.079
<v Speaker 2>digital signatures to add authentication and integrity to DNS data.

694
00:34:22.199 --> 00:34:25.360
<v Speaker 2>When you get a DNS response, dnssec allows your resolver

695
00:34:25.440 --> 00:34:27.639
<v Speaker 2>to verify that the data came from the legitimate source

696
00:34:27.679 --> 00:34:30.519
<v Speaker 2>and hasn't been tampered with. Adoption is growing, but it's

697
00:34:30.519 --> 00:34:31.519
<v Speaker 2>not universal.

698
00:34:31.199 --> 00:34:33.320
<v Speaker 1>Yet, and you can build your own DNS server. Yeah.

699
00:34:33.320 --> 00:34:36.440
<v Speaker 2>The source gives steps using BND, the most common DNS

700
00:34:36.519 --> 00:34:39.719
<v Speaker 2>server software on Linux. Good way to understand the moving parts.

701
00:34:40.039 --> 00:34:43.840
<v Speaker 1>Okay, moving on SMB server message block. The source seems

702
00:34:43.880 --> 00:34:46.000
<v Speaker 1>to think this one is particularly troublesome.

703
00:34:46.239 --> 00:34:50.440
<v Speaker 2>SMB Yes, it's described as often impenetrable but critical. It's

704
00:34:50.519 --> 00:34:54.199
<v Speaker 2>an application layer protocol, mostly known for file and printer

705
00:34:54.239 --> 00:34:58.159
<v Speaker 2>sharing and Windows networks, but also used for other interprocess communication.

706
00:34:58.440 --> 00:35:02.440
<v Speaker 2>It usually runs over tcpport four five the older dialect

707
00:35:02.519 --> 00:35:07.119
<v Speaker 2>CIFS Common Internet File System is basically SMB version one.

708
00:35:07.280 --> 00:35:08.800
<v Speaker 1>Why is it considered so problematic?

709
00:35:08.960 --> 00:35:12.119
<v Speaker 2>History? It has been a consistent source of major critical

710
00:35:12.199 --> 00:35:16.480
<v Speaker 2>vulnerabilities and Windows for decades. Linux implementations via Samba have

711
00:35:16.519 --> 00:35:19.800
<v Speaker 2>had issues too. These aren't minor bugs. They often lead

712
00:35:19.800 --> 00:35:21.559
<v Speaker 2>to full remote system compromise.

713
00:35:21.639 --> 00:35:23.079
<v Speaker 1>Any famous examples, Oh yeah.

714
00:35:23.280 --> 00:35:26.360
<v Speaker 2>The source specifically calls out MS seventeen zero six seven,

715
00:35:26.400 --> 00:35:29.760
<v Speaker 2>a classic vulnerability exploited by the configure worm, and even

716
00:35:29.760 --> 00:35:33.920
<v Speaker 2>more significantly, MS seventeen zero ten, the vulnerability exploited by

717
00:35:33.960 --> 00:35:35.480
<v Speaker 2>the NSA's eternal Blue tool.

718
00:35:35.599 --> 00:35:37.360
<v Speaker 1>Eternal Blue that was leaked.

719
00:35:37.159 --> 00:35:40.239
<v Speaker 2>Right, leaked by the Shadow Brokers group. Yes, and it

720
00:35:40.280 --> 00:35:44.079
<v Speaker 2>was quickly weaponized in massive ransomware attacks like Wanacry and

721
00:35:44.119 --> 00:35:49.239
<v Speaker 2>Pettianapaedia in twenty seventeen, causing global disruption. Eternal Blue allowed

722
00:35:49.239 --> 00:35:53.199
<v Speaker 2>attackers to gain complete control over unpatched Windows systems simply

723
00:35:53.239 --> 00:35:57.239
<v Speaker 2>by sending malicious SMB packets. It highlights just how dangerous

724
00:35:57.280 --> 00:35:58.280
<v Speaker 2>SMB flaws can be.

725
00:35:58.440 --> 00:36:00.000
<v Speaker 1>Can you practice with SMB? Say?

726
00:36:00.480 --> 00:36:03.079
<v Speaker 2>The source suggests setting up a Samba server on Calley

727
00:36:03.199 --> 00:36:06.800
<v Speaker 2>Linux Samba implements the SMB protocol so you can configure

728
00:36:06.840 --> 00:36:09.199
<v Speaker 2>it to act like a Windows file share, letting you

729
00:36:09.239 --> 00:36:12.239
<v Speaker 2>experiment with tools and techniques in a controlled lab environment.

730
00:36:12.519 --> 00:36:15.960
<v Speaker 1>Good tip, Okay. Another daily protocol SMTP.

731
00:36:15.639 --> 00:36:19.519
<v Speaker 2>For email SMTP simple Mail Transfer Protocol the backbone of

732
00:36:19.559 --> 00:36:23.840
<v Speaker 2>email delivery. It's primarily used for transferring email between mail servers,

733
00:36:24.039 --> 00:36:27.800
<v Speaker 2>mail transfer agents, or MTAs, typically on TCP port twenty five.

734
00:36:27.880 --> 00:36:29.840
<v Speaker 1>How does the whole email process work?

735
00:36:30.239 --> 00:36:34.440
<v Speaker 2>Generally, your email client Mail user agent MUA sends your

736
00:36:34.480 --> 00:36:39.119
<v Speaker 2>outgoing message to your organizations or ISP's mail submission agent MSA.

737
00:36:40.000 --> 00:36:43.119
<v Speaker 2>The MSA then uses SMTP to relay that message to

738
00:36:43.159 --> 00:36:46.719
<v Speaker 2>the recipient's MTA. Finally, the recipient's MTA passes it to

739
00:36:46.760 --> 00:36:49.199
<v Speaker 2>their mail delivery Agent MDA, which puts it in their

740
00:36:49.199 --> 00:36:52.119
<v Speaker 2>inbox for their MUA to retrieve, often using protocols like

741
00:36:52.159 --> 00:36:55.800
<v Speaker 2>POP three or IMAP. SMTP is that server to server

742
00:36:55.880 --> 00:36:56.480
<v Speaker 2>relay part.

743
00:36:56.599 --> 00:36:58.800
<v Speaker 1>Has SMTP had recent security issues too?

744
00:36:59.079 --> 00:37:02.880
<v Speaker 2>Yes? Even major. The source mentions significant vulnerabilities in a

745
00:37:02.920 --> 00:37:06.519
<v Speaker 2>Microsoft Exchange server in twenty twenty one, allegedly exploited by

746
00:37:06.639 --> 00:37:09.840
<v Speaker 2>Chinese state actors, which prompted an unusual response where the

747
00:37:09.920 --> 00:37:13.679
<v Speaker 2>FBI remotely patched vulnerable servers in the US. WOW and XIM,

748
00:37:13.719 --> 00:37:16.880
<v Speaker 2>another very popular mail server software used on Linux Unix,

749
00:37:17.039 --> 00:37:19.880
<v Speaker 2>had critical vulnerabilities in twenty nineteen and twenty twenty that

750
00:37:19.920 --> 00:37:23.920
<v Speaker 2>could allow remote code execution or unauthorized access. Email servers

751
00:37:23.960 --> 00:37:25.079
<v Speaker 2>are high value targets.

752
00:37:25.159 --> 00:37:27.159
<v Speaker 1>How would someone probe? An SMTP server?

753
00:37:27.440 --> 00:37:30.599
<v Speaker 2>Reconnaissance often starts with NMAP. You scan port twenty five

754
00:37:30.639 --> 00:37:34.159
<v Speaker 2>to confirm SMTPS running and identify the server software and

755
00:37:34.280 --> 00:37:39.320
<v Speaker 2>version like Microsoft Exchange EXEM postfix. Then NMAP has specific

756
00:37:39.360 --> 00:37:43.320
<v Speaker 2>scripts NSE scripts that can try to enumerate valid usernames

757
00:37:43.360 --> 00:37:46.960
<v Speaker 2>on the server using VRFY or EXPN commands if enabled,

758
00:37:47.239 --> 00:37:50.519
<v Speaker 2>or even check for known vulnerabilities based on the detected.

759
00:37:50.119 --> 00:37:51.280
<v Speaker 1>Version exploit it.

760
00:37:51.440 --> 00:37:54.360
<v Speaker 2>If a non vulnerability exists like the source describes for

761
00:37:54.400 --> 00:37:58.239
<v Speaker 2>an older EXUM version CVE twenty ten four three fourty four,

762
00:37:58.559 --> 00:38:01.800
<v Speaker 2>you could use a framework like metasp mesaplat has modules

763
00:38:01.800 --> 00:38:05.360
<v Speaker 2>specifically designed to exploit known flaws. In that EXEM example,

764
00:38:05.440 --> 00:38:09.119
<v Speaker 2>successfully exploiting a heat buffer overflow could grant the attacker

765
00:38:09.199 --> 00:38:12.840
<v Speaker 2>a remote shell, potentially with root privileges on the mail server.

766
00:38:13.280 --> 00:38:16.800
<v Speaker 1>Full compromise okay one more standard protocol. The source highlights

767
00:38:16.800 --> 00:38:19.119
<v Speaker 1>has often overlooked SNMP.

768
00:38:18.880 --> 00:38:22.840
<v Speaker 2>SNMP simple network management protocol. The source calls it least

769
00:38:22.880 --> 00:38:26.239
<v Speaker 2>understood yet so vitally important and that's fair. It's used

770
00:38:26.280 --> 00:38:31.039
<v Speaker 2>by network administrators to monitor and manage network devices, routers, switches, servers, printers.

771
00:38:31.159 --> 00:38:33.519
<v Speaker 2>It usually runs on UDP ports one hundred and sixty

772
00:38:33.559 --> 00:38:37.000
<v Speaker 2>one requests and one hundred and sixty two traps notifications.

773
00:38:37.039 --> 00:38:39.280
<v Speaker 1>How does it work? Manage agent exactly?

774
00:38:39.800 --> 00:38:44.519
<v Speaker 2>SNMP managers like a central monitoring station, query SNMP agents

775
00:38:44.639 --> 00:38:48.599
<v Speaker 2>running on the managed devices. The agents gather information requested

776
00:38:48.599 --> 00:38:49.320
<v Speaker 2>by the manager.

777
00:38:49.559 --> 00:38:51.639
<v Speaker 1>Where does the information come from? The MIIB?

778
00:38:52.079 --> 00:38:56.159
<v Speaker 2>The MiB Management information base. It's a hierarchical database structure

779
00:38:56.199 --> 00:38:59.119
<v Speaker 2>defined on each managed device. It contains a ton of

780
00:38:59.119 --> 00:39:03.960
<v Speaker 2>information or orgize using object identifiers ODS, things like device uptime,

781
00:39:04.039 --> 00:39:08.920
<v Speaker 2>network interface statistics, running processes, installed software, user accounts, system

782
00:39:08.960 --> 00:39:11.639
<v Speaker 2>hardware details, potentially very sensitive data.

783
00:39:11.760 --> 00:39:14.840
<v Speaker 1>What's the security issue? Especially with SNMPv one?

784
00:39:15.079 --> 00:39:19.559
<v Speaker 2>SNMP version one had notoriously weak security. Authentication relied solely

785
00:39:19.599 --> 00:39:23.280
<v Speaker 2>on plaintext community strings, which essentially act like passwords. There

786
00:39:23.280 --> 00:39:26.840
<v Speaker 2>are typically two a read only string often default public,

787
00:39:26.960 --> 00:39:29.280
<v Speaker 2>and a read right string often default.

788
00:39:28.880 --> 00:39:30.639
<v Speaker 1>Private public ampress.

789
00:39:30.679 --> 00:39:34.559
<v Speaker 2>Seriously, if devices were left with these defaults, anyone on

790
00:39:34.599 --> 00:39:37.679
<v Speaker 2>the network could potentially query the device using the public

791
00:39:37.719 --> 00:39:40.960
<v Speaker 2>string to extract vast amounts of information from the MIP,

792
00:39:41.800 --> 00:39:44.760
<v Speaker 2>and if the private string was guessable or default, they

793
00:39:44.760 --> 00:39:48.079
<v Speaker 2>could even change configuration settings on the device remotely via

794
00:39:48.239 --> 00:39:49.760
<v Speaker 2>snmps set commands.

795
00:39:50.159 --> 00:39:51.360
<v Speaker 1>How would you find this info?

796
00:39:51.639 --> 00:39:54.480
<v Speaker 2>Tools like splot can dump large sections of the MiB

797
00:39:54.599 --> 00:39:58.039
<v Speaker 2>if you know the community string. Some check is specifically

798
00:39:58.079 --> 00:40:01.719
<v Speaker 2>designed for enumerting. SNMP infoe and tools like one sixty

799
00:40:01.760 --> 00:40:05.360
<v Speaker 2>one are built to rapidly broute force common community strings

800
00:40:05.599 --> 00:40:07.280
<v Speaker 2>against a list of IP addresses.

801
00:40:07.400 --> 00:40:10.039
<v Speaker 1>So SNMP could be a gold mine for attacker doing.

802
00:40:09.840 --> 00:40:13.280
<v Speaker 2>Reconnaissance, absolutely and potentially a way to control devices. The

803
00:40:13.320 --> 00:40:16.519
<v Speaker 2>source even mentions an alleged NSA exploit called extra Bacon,

804
00:40:16.719 --> 00:40:20.639
<v Speaker 2>which targeted a vulnerability in Cisco's SNMP implementation to bypass

805
00:40:20.679 --> 00:40:24.800
<v Speaker 2>firewalls and monitor VPN traffic. It underscores that SNMP, if

806
00:40:24.840 --> 00:40:28.320
<v Speaker 2>not properly secured, using newer versions like SNMPv three with

807
00:40:28.440 --> 00:40:32.079
<v Speaker 2>encryption and strong authentication, can be a major security risk.

808
00:40:32.360 --> 00:40:35.320
<v Speaker 1>Okay, we've covered a lot of the traditional IT network

809
00:40:35.400 --> 00:40:38.639
<v Speaker 1>round Now for the really cutting edge stuff. The source

810
00:40:38.679 --> 00:40:44.119
<v Speaker 1>gets into hacking physical systems, starting with cars automobile networks.

811
00:40:44.199 --> 00:40:46.679
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, this is described as a leading edge area. As

812
00:40:46.719 --> 00:40:50.719
<v Speaker 2>cars get loaded with more electronics, sensors, and connectivity, entertainment,

813
00:40:50.800 --> 00:40:56.599
<v Speaker 2>remote diagnostics, driver assyst their attack surface expands dramatically. Autonomous

814
00:40:56.679 --> 00:40:58.960
<v Speaker 2>vehicles magnify this concern hugely.

815
00:40:59.239 --> 00:41:02.079
<v Speaker 1>What's the main next work inside a car? CANbus?

816
00:41:02.360 --> 00:41:05.840
<v Speaker 2>The CANbus controller area network is the workhorse. It connects

817
00:41:05.840 --> 00:41:10.880
<v Speaker 2>the various electronic control units ECUs and the car engine control, transmission, breaks, airbags,

818
00:41:10.960 --> 00:41:12.559
<v Speaker 2>dashboard entertainment.

819
00:41:12.119 --> 00:41:14.039
<v Speaker 1>And it's vulnerable fundamentally. Yes.

820
00:41:14.760 --> 00:41:18.320
<v Speaker 2>Standard CANbus is a broadcast protocol. Every message sent by

821
00:41:18.360 --> 00:41:21.840
<v Speaker 2>any ECU is seen by all other ECUs. More importantly,

822
00:41:22.000 --> 00:41:25.239
<v Speaker 2>it typically has no built in encryption or authentication at

823
00:41:25.280 --> 00:41:26.159
<v Speaker 2>the protocol level.

824
00:41:26.239 --> 00:41:29.239
<v Speaker 1>No authentication, so you can just inject messages essentially.

825
00:41:29.440 --> 00:41:32.280
<v Speaker 2>Yes, If you gain access to the CANbus you can

826
00:41:32.280 --> 00:41:36.320
<v Speaker 2>potentially send messages pretending to be any ECU. This makes

827
00:41:36.440 --> 00:41:40.000
<v Speaker 2>boofing attacks and man in the middle relatively straightforward compared

828
00:41:40.000 --> 00:41:43.599
<v Speaker 2>to typical IT networks. Access is often gained via the

829
00:41:43.679 --> 00:41:46.679
<v Speaker 2>OBED two port under the dashboard, the same one mechanics

830
00:41:46.760 --> 00:41:47.800
<v Speaker 2>used for diagnostics.

831
00:41:48.199 --> 00:41:50.519
<v Speaker 1>How do people practice this? The source mentions.

832
00:41:50.239 --> 00:41:53.400
<v Speaker 2>Tools for learning. Can U tools is a set of

833
00:41:53.480 --> 00:41:57.239
<v Speaker 2>Linux command line utilities for working with can and ICSM

834
00:41:57.320 --> 00:42:01.039
<v Speaker 2>is an open source instrument cluster simulator, basically a little

835
00:42:01.159 --> 00:42:06.159
<v Speaker 2>video game dashboard that simulates can traffic for things like speed, turn, signals, doors.

836
00:42:06.679 --> 00:42:09.519
<v Speaker 2>You can interact with ICSIM using can utils as if

837
00:42:09.519 --> 00:42:10.440
<v Speaker 2>it were real.

838
00:42:10.199 --> 00:42:12.199
<v Speaker 1>Car networks, so you can try to reverse engineer the

839
00:42:12.239 --> 00:42:13.199
<v Speaker 1>signals exactly.

840
00:42:13.360 --> 00:42:16.280
<v Speaker 2>The source describes the process. Use can sniffer part of

841
00:42:16.320 --> 00:42:19.679
<v Speaker 2>can utils while interacting with the simulator, say pressing the

842
00:42:19.679 --> 00:42:23.360
<v Speaker 2>accelerator pedal, and ICSIM can sniffer highlights which can message

843
00:42:23.400 --> 00:42:24.920
<v Speaker 2>IDs change their data values.

844
00:42:25.000 --> 00:42:26.320
<v Speaker 1>Find the ID for acceleration.

845
00:42:26.679 --> 00:42:30.239
<v Speaker 2>Find the ID in the specific data bytes that control acceleration.

846
00:42:30.920 --> 00:42:33.360
<v Speaker 2>Once you figured that out, you can use cansen to

847
00:42:33.440 --> 00:42:36.639
<v Speaker 2>inject your own message onto the simulated can bus with

848
00:42:36.719 --> 00:42:40.079
<v Speaker 2>that ID in data, telling the car to accelerate. If

849
00:42:40.119 --> 00:42:43.320
<v Speaker 2>you loop the Cansen command, you can effectively take autonomous

850
00:42:43.360 --> 00:42:45.639
<v Speaker 2>control of that function in the simulator.

851
00:42:45.280 --> 00:42:46.920
<v Speaker 1>Like making the simulated car floor.

852
00:42:46.719 --> 00:42:49.039
<v Speaker 2>It exactly, making it go to one hundred milar hour,

853
00:42:49.159 --> 00:42:52.239
<v Speaker 2>turn the wheel, unlocked doors, whatever functions you can reverse

854
00:42:52.239 --> 00:42:56.320
<v Speaker 2>engineer and control via CAN messages. Applying this to real

855
00:42:56.360 --> 00:42:59.440
<v Speaker 2>cars is obviously much more complex and dangerous, but the

856
00:42:59.480 --> 00:43:00.840
<v Speaker 2>principle is the same.

857
00:43:01.119 --> 00:43:03.239
<v Speaker 1>What about key fobs? Can they be hacked?

858
00:43:03.599 --> 00:43:07.880
<v Speaker 2>Keyfobs often use rolling codes now, making simple replay attacks difficult,

859
00:43:08.159 --> 00:43:11.880
<v Speaker 2>But the source details a different technique, Signal amplification relay

860
00:43:11.920 --> 00:43:13.039
<v Speaker 2>attack or SARAH.

861
00:43:13.119 --> 00:43:14.000
<v Speaker 1>How does SARAH work?

862
00:43:14.400 --> 00:43:17.280
<v Speaker 2>It requires two attackers working together, each with a device

863
00:43:17.280 --> 00:43:21.039
<v Speaker 2>that can relay radio signals. Attacker one stands near the car.

864
00:43:21.360 --> 00:43:24.599
<v Speaker 2>Attacker two stands near the owner carrying the keyfob, maybe

865
00:43:24.639 --> 00:43:27.480
<v Speaker 2>outside their house or following them in a store. Attacker

866
00:43:27.480 --> 00:43:30.599
<v Speaker 2>one's device triggers the car to send it's where's the

867
00:43:30.679 --> 00:43:34.840
<v Speaker 2>key signal. This signal is relayed to attacker two's device

868
00:43:34.920 --> 00:43:38.360
<v Speaker 2>near the fob. The fob responds. That response is relayed

869
00:43:38.400 --> 00:43:41.039
<v Speaker 2>back to Attacker one's device near the car. The car

870
00:43:41.079 --> 00:43:43.320
<v Speaker 2>thinks the fob is nearby and unlocks or allows the

871
00:43:43.320 --> 00:43:44.159
<v Speaker 2>ignition to start.

872
00:43:44.440 --> 00:43:46.360
<v Speaker 1>So they just boost the signal range. They don't need

873
00:43:46.440 --> 00:43:47.760
<v Speaker 1>to crack the code exactly.

874
00:43:47.800 --> 00:43:51.159
<v Speaker 2>They don't decrypt anything. They just relay the legitimate encrypted

875
00:43:51.199 --> 00:43:54.920
<v Speaker 2>communication over a much longer distance. The source compares it

876
00:43:54.960 --> 00:43:57.519
<v Speaker 2>to a pass the HASH attack in networking using the

877
00:43:57.559 --> 00:44:01.760
<v Speaker 2>credential without needing to know the under lying secret very

878
00:44:01.800 --> 00:44:05.000
<v Speaker 2>effective against passive keyless entry systems.

879
00:44:05.119 --> 00:44:08.920
<v Speaker 1>Clever and scary. Okay, from cars to even more critical

880
00:44:08.960 --> 00:44:12.840
<v Speaker 1>systems SCATA and ICs industrial control systems.

881
00:44:12.440 --> 00:44:17.000
<v Speaker 2>Satas supervisory control and data acquisition and ICs industrial control systems.

882
00:44:17.280 --> 00:44:21.360
<v Speaker 2>These are the systems running critical infrastructure, power grids, water

883
00:44:21.400 --> 00:44:25.840
<v Speaker 2>treatment plants, oil refineries, manufacturing lines, pipelines. The source rightly

884
00:44:25.880 --> 00:44:29.280
<v Speaker 2>calls securing them the most important and overlooked field. An

885
00:44:29.320 --> 00:44:32.599
<v Speaker 2>attack here can have devastating real world consequences.

886
00:44:32.880 --> 00:44:35.199
<v Speaker 1>How are they different from regular IT networks.

887
00:44:35.480 --> 00:44:39.840
<v Speaker 2>They often use specialized, sometimes proprietary communication protocols designed for

888
00:44:39.880 --> 00:44:44.039
<v Speaker 2>industrial environments, not necessarily with security as the top priority. Initially,

889
00:44:44.639 --> 00:44:47.519
<v Speaker 2>reliability and real time operation were often the main goals.

890
00:44:47.679 --> 00:44:52.079
<v Speaker 2>Protocols like modbus, DNP three, profinet ethernet APE are common.

891
00:44:52.519 --> 00:44:57.960
<v Speaker 2>They also often involve programmable logic controllers PLCs directly interacting

892
00:44:58.000 --> 00:44:59.079
<v Speaker 2>with physical machinery.

893
00:44:59.360 --> 00:45:01.000
<v Speaker 1>The source folk this is on modbus.

894
00:45:01.039 --> 00:45:03.639
<v Speaker 2>Mod Bus is one of the oldest and most widely

895
00:45:03.800 --> 00:45:07.519
<v Speaker 2>used industrial protocols. It's a simple master slave protocol, but

896
00:45:07.599 --> 00:45:09.280
<v Speaker 2>its simplicity is also its weakness.

897
00:45:09.480 --> 00:45:10.519
<v Speaker 1>What are the vulnerabilities?

898
00:45:10.559 --> 00:45:13.840
<v Speaker 2>Big ones standard mod bus has no authentication, any device

899
00:45:13.880 --> 00:45:17.159
<v Speaker 2>can send commands, no encryption, All data is sent in

900
00:45:17.199 --> 00:45:21.360
<v Speaker 2>the clear. The TCPIP version lacks checksums sometimes and no

901
00:45:21.480 --> 00:45:24.960
<v Speaker 2>broadcast suppression. Easy to flood the network with requests, causing

902
00:45:24.960 --> 00:45:26.000
<v Speaker 2>a denial of service.

903
00:45:26.119 --> 00:45:27.639
<v Speaker 1>Can you find these systems online?

904
00:45:27.800 --> 00:45:31.519
<v Speaker 2>Worryingly Yes. Search engines like showdand specialize in finding Internet

905
00:45:31.519 --> 00:45:34.960
<v Speaker 2>connected devices, including industrial controllers. The source shows how to

906
00:45:34.960 --> 00:45:38.920
<v Speaker 2>search showdown for specific Schneider Electric TM two twenty one PLCs,

907
00:45:39.320 --> 00:45:41.920
<v Speaker 2>a common type that are exposed directly to the Internet,

908
00:45:41.960 --> 00:45:42.719
<v Speaker 2>often running.

909
00:45:42.519 --> 00:45:44.760
<v Speaker 1>Mod bus and can you interact with them.

910
00:45:44.920 --> 00:45:45.840
<v Speaker 2>If they're unsecured?

911
00:45:45.960 --> 00:45:46.199
<v Speaker 1>Yes.

912
00:45:46.800 --> 00:45:50.480
<v Speaker 2>The source demonstrates using a command line tool called modbus Clay.

913
00:45:51.159 --> 00:45:53.960
<v Speaker 2>This tool can connect to a mod bus device using

914
00:45:53.960 --> 00:45:57.360
<v Speaker 2>its IP address found DA SHOWDAN and send commands to

915
00:45:57.480 --> 00:46:00.519
<v Speaker 2>read or write values to its internal memory LOOE lotions

916
00:46:00.599 --> 00:46:02.360
<v Speaker 2>called coils and registers.

917
00:46:02.800 --> 00:46:04.519
<v Speaker 1>What does writing to a register do?

918
00:46:05.159 --> 00:46:08.199
<v Speaker 2>It depends on what that register controls in the plc's program.

919
00:46:08.360 --> 00:46:11.079
<v Speaker 2>It could start or stop a motor, open or close

920
00:46:11.119 --> 00:46:14.880
<v Speaker 2>a valve, change a temperature set point, directly manipulating the

921
00:46:14.920 --> 00:46:16.360
<v Speaker 2>physical industrial process.

922
00:46:16.440 --> 00:46:19.239
<v Speaker 1>And the source mentions this was used in the Ukraine conflict.

923
00:46:19.400 --> 00:46:22.400
<v Speaker 2>Yes, it explicitly states that maud Disclin was used often

924
00:46:22.440 --> 00:46:25.760
<v Speaker 2>to disrupt Russian industrial systems during the Ukraine Russia War.

925
00:46:26.239 --> 00:46:28.800
<v Speaker 2>It's presented as a real world example of how knowledge

926
00:46:28.800 --> 00:46:31.599
<v Speaker 2>of these protocols and vulnerabilities can be applied, in this

927
00:46:31.719 --> 00:46:33.760
<v Speaker 2>case for cyber warfare or activism.

928
00:46:33.920 --> 00:46:39.519
<v Speaker 1>Powerful implications. Okay, Last, major area radio frequency hacking with SDR.

929
00:46:39.960 --> 00:46:44.400
<v Speaker 2>SDR software defined radio. This is another fascinating frontier. So

930
00:46:44.559 --> 00:46:50.000
<v Speaker 2>many things communicate wirelessly using radio frequencies RF, Wi Fi, Bluetooth, yes,

931
00:46:50.159 --> 00:46:55.360
<v Speaker 2>but also car keyfobs, garage door openers, drones, baby monitors,

932
00:46:55.400 --> 00:47:00.039
<v Speaker 2>weather stations, aircraft communications, GPS, satellite signals, cellular.

933
00:46:59.639 --> 00:47:02.440
<v Speaker 1>Network Mayer's full of signals completely.

934
00:47:02.199 --> 00:47:05.920
<v Speaker 2>And many of these RF applications, especially older or cheaper ones,

935
00:47:05.960 --> 00:47:09.880
<v Speaker 2>weren't designed with strong security in mind. This opens them

936
00:47:09.960 --> 00:47:14.519
<v Speaker 2>up to sniffing, eavesdropping, replay attacks, recording a signal and

937
00:47:14.519 --> 00:47:17.400
<v Speaker 2>playing it back later like opening a garage door, signal

938
00:47:17.400 --> 00:47:21.199
<v Speaker 2>deception or spoofing, sending fake signals, and jamming or denial

939
00:47:21.199 --> 00:47:21.719
<v Speaker 2>of service.

940
00:47:21.840 --> 00:47:22.920
<v Speaker 1>What does SDR let you do?

941
00:47:23.199 --> 00:47:27.760
<v Speaker 2>Traditionally, working with different radio figurals required different specialized hardware radios.

942
00:47:28.119 --> 00:47:31.480
<v Speaker 2>SDR replaces much of that dedicated hardware with software running

943
00:47:31.519 --> 00:47:34.880
<v Speaker 2>on a computer. You use relatively inexpensive SDR hardware that

944
00:47:35.000 --> 00:47:38.400
<v Speaker 2>just handles the raw radio reception and sometimes transmission, and

945
00:47:38.440 --> 00:47:42.039
<v Speaker 2>the computer software does all the demodulation, filtering, and processing

946
00:47:42.079 --> 00:47:43.400
<v Speaker 2>for different types of signals.

947
00:47:43.519 --> 00:47:46.280
<v Speaker 1>So one piece of hardware can tune into many different.

948
00:47:45.960 --> 00:47:49.639
<v Speaker 2>Things potentially yes, depending on its frequency range and capabilities.

949
00:47:50.159 --> 00:47:54.480
<v Speaker 2>The source mentions popular SDR hardware, the super cheap rtl

950
00:47:54.639 --> 00:47:58.639
<v Speaker 2>SDR dongles receive only great for beginners, the hack RF

951
00:47:58.679 --> 00:48:02.199
<v Speaker 2>one transmit and receive mid range, and higher end options

952
00:48:02.239 --> 00:48:03.800
<v Speaker 2>like blader F or Lime SDR.

953
00:48:03.880 --> 00:48:05.039
<v Speaker 1>Can you give a simple example.

954
00:48:05.199 --> 00:48:07.920
<v Speaker 2>Sure, you can get an RTLSDR for maybe thirty dollars,

955
00:48:08.000 --> 00:48:11.320
<v Speaker 2>plug it into your computer's USB port, install software like

956
00:48:11.440 --> 00:48:15.079
<v Speaker 2>SDR sharp SDR sharp on Windows or g corex on Linux,

957
00:48:15.280 --> 00:48:18.480
<v Speaker 2>attached an antenna, and you can immediately tune into broadcast

958
00:48:18.519 --> 00:48:21.440
<v Speaker 2>FM radio stations just like a regular radio, but seeing

959
00:48:21.480 --> 00:48:23.679
<v Speaker 2>the signal visually on a waterfall display.

960
00:48:23.800 --> 00:48:26.079
<v Speaker 1>Okay, cool, but what about more interesting signals?

961
00:48:26.280 --> 00:48:29.840
<v Speaker 2>The source shows intercepting aircraft communication, air traffic control, and

962
00:48:29.880 --> 00:48:34.000
<v Speaker 2>pilot communications are typically unencrypted AM signals in the VHF airband.

963
00:48:34.280 --> 00:48:36.639
<v Speaker 2>With an SDR and the right software, you can listen

964
00:48:36.679 --> 00:48:41.920
<v Speaker 2>in YEP. Also, aircraft constantly broadcast their position, altitude, speed,

965
00:48:41.960 --> 00:48:46.079
<v Speaker 2>and flight number using a system called ADSB Automatic Dependent

966
00:48:46.159 --> 00:48:50.360
<v Speaker 2>Surveillance Broadcast. This is also unencrypted. Tools like dump ten

967
00:48:50.480 --> 00:48:53.840
<v Speaker 2>ninety used with an SDR can capture these ADSB signals,

968
00:48:53.880 --> 00:48:56.599
<v Speaker 2>decode them, and even plot the planes on a map

969
00:48:56.719 --> 00:48:59.239
<v Speaker 2>like Google Maps in real time. You can build your

970
00:48:59.239 --> 00:49:00.400
<v Speaker 2>own personal flock.

971
00:49:00.760 --> 00:49:04.039
<v Speaker 1>That's amazing. What about the GPS spoofing example.

972
00:49:03.760 --> 00:49:07.320
<v Speaker 2>Ah GPS spoofing. This requires an SDR that can transmit

973
00:49:07.639 --> 00:49:10.440
<v Speaker 2>like the hack or f one. GPS signals from satellites

974
00:49:10.480 --> 00:49:15.119
<v Speaker 2>are actually very weak and unencrypted. Specialized software like GPSSDR

975
00:49:15.239 --> 00:49:18.519
<v Speaker 2>sim can generate a simulated GPS signal data file for

976
00:49:18.599 --> 00:49:19.599
<v Speaker 2>any location on.

977
00:49:19.599 --> 00:49:22.000
<v Speaker 1>Earth, so you can create a fake signal for say

978
00:49:22.119 --> 00:49:23.400
<v Speaker 1>Moscow exactly.

979
00:49:23.519 --> 00:49:26.320
<v Speaker 2>You generate the data file for coordinates in Moscow, then

980
00:49:26.360 --> 00:49:29.280
<v Speaker 2>you use software like hack transfer to transmit that simulated

981
00:49:29.320 --> 00:49:33.360
<v Speaker 2>signal using your hack RF. Any GPS receivers nearby, like smartphones,

982
00:49:33.519 --> 00:49:36.000
<v Speaker 2>might lock onto your stronger fake signal instead of the

983
00:49:36.000 --> 00:49:36.960
<v Speaker 2>real satellite signal.

984
00:49:37.039 --> 00:49:38.400
<v Speaker 1>And think they're in Moscow and.

985
00:49:38.400 --> 00:49:42.039
<v Speaker 2>Think they're physically located in the Kremlin or wherever you chose.

986
00:49:42.719 --> 00:49:46.480
<v Speaker 2>The source smashins potential applications like hiding shroop movements or

987
00:49:46.519 --> 00:49:49.960
<v Speaker 2>spoofing the locations of assets like oligarch yachts during conflicts.

988
00:49:50.360 --> 00:49:54.159
<v Speaker 2>It's a powerful demonstration of manipulating radio frequencies that underpin

989
00:49:54.320 --> 00:49:55.360
<v Speaker 2>critical systems.

990
00:49:55.480 --> 00:49:59.880
<v Speaker 1>Wow, we have really covered an enormous amount of ground today,

991
00:50:00.440 --> 00:50:05.079
<v Speaker 1>from the absolute basics of IPS and TCP, through firewalls,

992
00:50:05.360 --> 00:50:09.159
<v Speaker 1>Wi Fi hacks, all the way to cars, industrial systems,

993
00:50:09.400 --> 00:50:11.840
<v Speaker 1>and now spoofing GPS with radio waves.

994
00:50:12.320 --> 00:50:15.360
<v Speaker 2>It's a huge landscape, isn't it. But understanding these pieces,

995
00:50:15.400 --> 00:50:17.719
<v Speaker 2>even at a high level, gives you such a different

996
00:50:17.719 --> 00:50:20.480
<v Speaker 2>perspective on the technology we use every single day.

997
00:50:20.639 --> 00:50:23.400
<v Speaker 1>Absolutely, and it really drives home that this knowledge isn't

998
00:50:23.440 --> 00:50:26.480
<v Speaker 1>just for hackers in the stereotypical sense. It's for anyone

999
00:50:26.559 --> 00:50:30.079
<v Speaker 1>curious about how this interconnected world actually works for you

1000
00:50:30.239 --> 00:50:33.119
<v Speaker 1>listening now, Understanding this stuff helps you navigate it all

1001
00:50:33.119 --> 00:50:35.840
<v Speaker 1>more effectively, more securely. It sheds light on the how

1002
00:50:35.880 --> 00:50:36.639
<v Speaker 1>and why.

1003
00:50:36.760 --> 00:50:39.800
<v Speaker 2>You become a much more informed user, developer, or defender

1004
00:50:39.840 --> 00:50:43.199
<v Speaker 2>of these systems. You can ask better questions, spot potential issues,

1005
00:50:43.239 --> 00:50:45.039
<v Speaker 2>and appreciate the complexity involved.

1006
00:50:45.239 --> 00:50:47.920
<v Speaker 1>Definitely. So to wrap up, let's leave our listeners with

1007
00:50:47.960 --> 00:50:51.719
<v Speaker 1>a thought to chew on the source network basics for

1008
00:50:51.760 --> 00:50:55.119
<v Speaker 1>hackers offers some cyber warrior wisdom. At the end, it

1009
00:50:55.159 --> 00:50:59.440
<v Speaker 1>says knowledge is most valuable when understood and applied. Every adversary,

1010
00:50:59.480 --> 00:51:02.760
<v Speaker 1>no matter how how strong and powerful, always has a weakness.

1011
00:51:03.119 --> 00:51:04.719
<v Speaker 1>Find the weakness and exploit it.

1012
00:51:04.840 --> 00:51:07.039
<v Speaker 2>That's a powerful quote, it is, and.

1013
00:51:07.039 --> 00:51:09.599
<v Speaker 1>While it's framed in hacking terms, think about how that

1014
00:51:09.639 --> 00:51:12.800
<v Speaker 1>applies more broadly, not just to digital security, but to

1015
00:51:12.880 --> 00:51:16.719
<v Speaker 1>understanding any complex system you encounter, any challenge you face,

1016
00:51:17.320 --> 00:51:19.599
<v Speaker 1>maybe even any opportunity you want to pursue in your

1017
00:51:19.639 --> 00:51:23.320
<v Speaker 1>own life. Where's the underlying structure, Where's the potential leverage point?

1018
00:51:23.519 --> 00:51:24.360
<v Speaker 1>Something to think about.
