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<v Speaker 1>Get ready for September eleventh, twenty twenty four, allegedly according

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<v Speaker 1>to that thing we call a calendar. And you know what, Larry, Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>I heard a bit of a sound there, just disrupt

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<v Speaker 1>my own intro. You all right now?

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<v Speaker 2>Not on my end, I'm fine.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh I heard a weird noise. I don't know what

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<v Speaker 1>you guys heard, but I'll leave it in the recording.

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<v Speaker 1>Whatever it is. Anyway, weird noise is aside and the

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<v Speaker 1>fact that this is an anniversary of a tragic event.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm not doing a nine to eleven show, not at all.

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<v Speaker 1>But you never know how this could in some way

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<v Speaker 1>relate to those events, or the study of them, or

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<v Speaker 1>something else. Anyway, not the true path of this show today. Nope,

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<v Speaker 1>it's a Wednesday. I've got the great author Larry Hancock

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<v Speaker 1>with me, who again takes up a lot of space

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<v Speaker 1>on my bookshelf, but not because he's taken up space.

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<v Speaker 1>Everything Larry writes is wonderfully informative, gives you an idea

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<v Speaker 1>of exactly the type of topic we're going to cover tonight,

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<v Speaker 1>which is all about a follow up to the last

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<v Speaker 1>time we spoke with Larry and David boy Lean, who both,

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<v Speaker 1>by the way, will be in one way or another

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<v Speaker 1>participating in the Lancer conference coming up this November twenty

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<v Speaker 1>second through the twenty fourth in Dallas, Texas, where I

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<v Speaker 1>will be the MC Larry, as far as I know,

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<v Speaker 1>will be remotely involved from parts another location, let's say

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<v Speaker 1>an undisclosed location. About that, an undisclosed location his house anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>there he will be, but he will be participating as well.

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<v Speaker 1>David will be there a slew of individuals bringing you

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<v Speaker 1>unique and in some cases very new information on the

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<v Speaker 1>now sixty one year old case. And this will be

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<v Speaker 1>in the crosshairs part in the I don't know, that's

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<v Speaker 1>not a pun expression. How about that? You know? In

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<v Speaker 1>the crosshairs, so to speak. Of tonight's topic, the CIA,

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<v Speaker 1>how it works, and we went over documentation last time.

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<v Speaker 1>We went over, you know, how things might be shared,

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<v Speaker 1>kept where they need to go. Why a file is

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<v Speaker 1>created just a bit though, really an introductory course, not

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<v Speaker 1>even a course, maybe the introductory chapter to the introductory course.

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<v Speaker 1>Not because that's all David knows or that's all Larry knows,

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<v Speaker 1>but because it is rather difficult to explain, rather laborious,

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<v Speaker 1>if you will, voluminous processes and files that are kept

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<v Speaker 1>by guess who, your government and for what operations that

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<v Speaker 1>you don't really need to know about. The public has

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<v Speaker 1>no need to get all involved in stuff, and by

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<v Speaker 1>the way, it would cease to serve its purpose if

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<v Speaker 1>everything was known to the public, because the public would

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<v Speaker 1>also include our adversaries. Anyway, forget about the benign explanations.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's get into the nuts and bolts. And that's something

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<v Speaker 1>that Larry greatly does, you know, through things like Surprise Attack.

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<v Speaker 1>By the way, these are names of his books. Surprise Attack, Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>the Nexus Nexus excuse me, not the Nexus, It's not

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<v Speaker 1>the matrix Nexus. Also, someone would have talked tipping point.

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<v Speaker 1>I could keep going unidentified. All of these books, at

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<v Speaker 1>one time or another have been discussed at length and

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<v Speaker 1>focused on on this show. And you could find that

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<v Speaker 1>stuff in my archives past and all that. But tonight

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<v Speaker 1>we're going to talk about something that, in one way

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<v Speaker 1>or another is probably in nearly all of Larry's books,

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<v Speaker 1>except I don't know. Maybe it's not in the Doctor

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<v Speaker 1>King books. Maybe it's not it's not Nope, maybe not there,

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<v Speaker 1>but nearly every other I.

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<v Speaker 2>Mean, out of twelve or fifteen books, you've got to

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<v Speaker 2>pass on a couple.

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<v Speaker 1>You got to give it a break somewhere. I mean.

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<v Speaker 1>But the thing is this type of topic fit. It's

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<v Speaker 1>with everything, and you would have to consider it as

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<v Speaker 1>well for the King books, but doesn't end up in there.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh the King Books of course, the Awful Grace of God.

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<v Speaker 1>And what is the title of the of the other

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<v Speaker 1>the other title of the King work.

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<v Speaker 2>Killing King, Killing King?

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<v Speaker 1>See you know I should know that, but I'm kind

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<v Speaker 1>of pushing away from that title, not because of you,

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<v Speaker 1>not because of stew but you know it's that Bill

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<v Speaker 1>O'Reilly character, and he was, you know, all about killing everybody.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh you know what was it? Patent Jesus JFK. Who

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<v Speaker 1>didn't he kill in his books?

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<v Speaker 2>Everybody in World War Two? Killing Japan. But but I

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<v Speaker 2>will say in the in the King books, we do

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<v Speaker 2>talk a lot about documentation and practices. But in that regard,

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<v Speaker 2>it's it has to do with the Federal Bureau of

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<v Speaker 2>Investigation because the FBI was the primary agency involved in

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<v Speaker 2>investigating the crime. So we do go into practices there

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<v Speaker 2>and spend a lot of time with FBI agents and

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<v Speaker 2>documentar what how it did things. It's just that that

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<v Speaker 2>did not involve CIA, so it was FBI and that

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<v Speaker 2>and that particular focus.

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<v Speaker 1>Decidedly different bureaucracy, even though it is part of the

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<v Speaker 1>same government, and it's certainly a similar agency to some degree.

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<v Speaker 1>But the FBI is not the CIA, although occasionally we

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<v Speaker 1>have seen instances where it's gotten confused. And you can

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<v Speaker 1>go to Larry dash Handcock or Larryhypenhancock dot com. I

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<v Speaker 1>always recommend you go over that check out his books.

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<v Speaker 1>If you don't know about them and own them all yet,

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<v Speaker 1>what are you doing? Go get them? Uh. And also

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<v Speaker 1>you could check out his blog, which runs many interesting

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<v Speaker 1>things in real time, including his research into what is

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<v Speaker 1>it UAPs? I always got to stop myself because I'm

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<v Speaker 1>so used to saying UFOs, but even including some academic

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<v Speaker 1>work on guess what the intelligence agencies reactions to these

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<v Speaker 1>things called UFOs UAPs unidentified phenomen I'm going to etc.

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<v Speaker 1>The most fascinating story in that book, though, to me,

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<v Speaker 1>is about the instance on the military base. But let's

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<v Speaker 1>just leave it alone for now, because that's not tonight's topic.

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<v Speaker 1>As we said, it's going to be about the bureaucratic

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<v Speaker 1>workings and the inner workings of what ends up being

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of paperwork for sure. Oh wait, we're not

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<v Speaker 1>going to do that. We're going to discuss something else.

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<v Speaker 1>But either way, it's connected to all this, how this

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<v Speaker 1>stuff is codified, how it ends up existing in the

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<v Speaker 1>official record, whether it is secret or not. We're going

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<v Speaker 1>to talk about a bunch of things and the way

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<v Speaker 1>it works out. So where are we going, Larry, how

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<v Speaker 1>would we title this discussion?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, this would be a focus Again. We're talking about

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<v Speaker 2>an agency. It's a government agency. It does have official reporting.

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<v Speaker 2>People do expense reports, people have budgets. There's an Office

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<v Speaker 2>of Security, there's an office in accounting. It is a

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<v Speaker 2>government agency, so at its core it has to operate

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<v Speaker 2>like any other agency, even though it has to shield

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<v Speaker 2>itself from the public. But as you said, primarily the adversaries,

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<v Speaker 2>because the CIA, as we talked before, has as many aspects.

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<v Speaker 2>It collects intelligence, it does intelligence analysis, it does political action,

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<v Speaker 2>which is an entirely different thing. But what we're focused

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<v Speaker 2>on here is how does it actually carry out the

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<v Speaker 2>practice is involved with operations, which means plandestine operations. So

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<v Speaker 2>how do you do something that is supposedly deniable but

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<v Speaker 2>still keep it under some level of control, because yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>you've got to do expense reports and budgets.

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<v Speaker 1>Too, right. And the interesting part about this to me is,

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<v Speaker 1>of course, this is often the almost banal or benign

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<v Speaker 1>aspects of things that end up being most revelatory. For instance,

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<v Speaker 1>and I love to bring this up, Larry, and I'm

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<v Speaker 1>sorry heard it one hundred times already. But the fact

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<v Speaker 1>is that, you know, even the revelation, if you will,

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<v Speaker 1>regarding the you know, things like mk ultra, how did

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<v Speaker 1>we really get hold of that long, long story short?

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<v Speaker 1>How did the public get informed about it? Wasn't you know,

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<v Speaker 1>a parade of whistleblowers know, it was an investigation into

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<v Speaker 1>something else that wound up turning up documentation, and it

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<v Speaker 1>wasn't even documentation, Like, here's the evil thing we did.

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<v Speaker 1>Here's where we drugged people. I'm being facetious obviously, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>here's where we had people killed, et cetera at this

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<v Speaker 1>time and date. And oh, by the way, I hope

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<v Speaker 1>I'm going to get my lunch reimbursement here, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>because I had to eat while I was out there

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<v Speaker 1>killing someone.

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<v Speaker 2>No.

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<v Speaker 1>The thing is though, that there are rather sort of

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<v Speaker 1>you know, run of the mill expense reports. That's literally

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<v Speaker 1>what ended up creating the record because the forensic individual,

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<v Speaker 1>a forensic accountant type person comes in and reconstruct That's

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<v Speaker 1>what happened based on basically the receipts. So you know,

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<v Speaker 1>you never know which part of this which again seemingly

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<v Speaker 1>and obviously people forgot about that part of it, although

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<v Speaker 1>they did destroy other documents and that's another thing. But anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>before we get too complicated about all this, what is

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<v Speaker 1>always said to be the thing that must be protected

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<v Speaker 1>to keep files safe from public view, to keep people

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<v Speaker 1>away from the deeper, darker secrets, the ugly stuff that

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<v Speaker 1>you know, just like as a child, you don't need

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<v Speaker 1>to know what it is that somebody had to go

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<v Speaker 1>through to maybe earn the money to buy you the

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<v Speaker 1>brand new jacket, but you know a jacket was provided

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<v Speaker 1>for you, and that's good enough for you if you're

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<v Speaker 1>seven years old. But as a primarily adult nation, right,

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<v Speaker 1>we feel entitled to know these things and don't always

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<v Speaker 1>get to know them. And why because they even protect

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<v Speaker 1>their practices, they protect their what they're you know, their

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<v Speaker 1>means there. Jeez, what would we call that? Larry Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I've got an idea. How about this? The operative. Let's

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<v Speaker 1>say the individuals, oh, the resources Wait a minute, even better,

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<v Speaker 1>sources and methodology or sources and methods common phrase a

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<v Speaker 1>lot more complex than it sounds, Larry. So that's where

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<v Speaker 1>we're going tonight.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, yeah, And I think the key thing to remember

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<v Speaker 2>about that is, again, it sounds mysterious, but in one

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<v Speaker 2>aspect it's not. Somebody has to assign a task. I mean,

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<v Speaker 2>there's nobody in an organization. You know people, People get

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<v Speaker 2>personnel reports done on them anually. People get reviewed, case

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<v Speaker 2>officers get reviewed, managers get reviewed, stations get reviewed. If

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<v Speaker 2>I'm Mexico City station, I have to review my personnel,

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<v Speaker 2>I have to provide spending reports and finances looking over

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<v Speaker 2>my shoulder, and there's a caution there. It's it's yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>the work itself is mysterious, and I it's it pays

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<v Speaker 2>me to use surrogates and volunteers and to offload as

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<v Speaker 2>much of it as possible so my people aren't visible.

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<v Speaker 2>But at the core of it, you have to have practices,

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<v Speaker 2>even for clandestine operations. I think an example of that

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<v Speaker 2>that we often cite is one of the most sensational

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<v Speaker 2>things related to clandestine operations, as assassinations. Okay, and we

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<v Speaker 2>all talk and about the Castro assassination attempts. But it's

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<v Speaker 2>kind of interesting that when when the CIA was tasked

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<v Speaker 2>and specifically someone was given a task, like you said

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<v Speaker 2>with mk Ultra, someone had to be assigned a task

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<v Speaker 2>of going after Castro. Okay, they recruited Johnny Roselli to

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<v Speaker 2>do that. Johnny Roselli brought in some people that required money. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>where's the money coming from? Whose budget is it coming from?

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<v Speaker 2>So the interesting thing is General Cabell, who was in

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<v Speaker 2>charge of the Geographic Directorate where Cubilize, had to know

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<v Speaker 2>about this and had to know the money was being spent.

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<v Speaker 2>And so when when push comes to shove and somebody

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<v Speaker 2>really needs cash, somebody really needs to build a cash

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<v Speaker 2>the person who's going to do this requires signatures like

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<v Speaker 2>I am not going to pay one hundred thousand dollars

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<v Speaker 2>out of my budget unless you sign off on it.

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<v Speaker 2>And thence a record had to be created of one

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<v Speaker 2>of the most clandestine and explodes as things that was

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<v Speaker 2>being done. And that applies to almost any clandestine action.

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<v Speaker 2>People have to get approvals for spending money. And again

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<v Speaker 2>the common and that's why so much of it digging

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<v Speaker 2>into it is you don't look, you know, you don't

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<v Speaker 2>look for it to be talked about. You have, as

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<v Speaker 2>you were kind of saying, you have to reverse engineer

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<v Speaker 2>it from the records trail.

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<v Speaker 1>Well, right, because there's a process by which this all occurs.

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<v Speaker 1>And here's the thing. It's not like you have a

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<v Speaker 1>standard set of let's call them, you know, chores or

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<v Speaker 1>goals for the day. You know, if you work in

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<v Speaker 1>a retail establishment, you know that during the course of

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<v Speaker 1>the day, this or this or this has to be done.

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<v Speaker 1>But in truth, when you have operations like this, investigations

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<v Speaker 1>or things that are meant to create desired effects, whatever,

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<v Speaker 1>you have to assign a job. But you got to

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<v Speaker 1>create that job. So you create the job, you create

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<v Speaker 1>a pool of resources, you know, not just human resources,

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<v Speaker 1>but you also need to have oh, I don't know, guns,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, places for people to be, storage areas, vehicles,

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<v Speaker 1>let's say. So you have to pull together great men

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<v Speaker 1>the assets. Then you have to you know, map out

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<v Speaker 1>where do they go, what are they going to do?

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<v Speaker 1>What are their objectives as they move forward? So you

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<v Speaker 1>have to create all that. Somebody commits that to papers,

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<v Speaker 1>so that I mean, I hate to oversimplify it, but

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<v Speaker 1>you have to create a checklist. Okay, we have all

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<v Speaker 1>the guns we need. Okay, we have all the people

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<v Speaker 1>we need, we have the backup individuals. We have an

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<v Speaker 1>alternative mode of transportation. If we can't get out of

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<v Speaker 1>the country because of a plane, well, is there a

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<v Speaker 1>harbor nearby, et cetera. All these things laid out one

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<v Speaker 1>way or another. And I know it sounds very mundane,

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<v Speaker 1>and it's like you're being silly. You're telling me that

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<v Speaker 1>they got to create a budget within a budget and

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<v Speaker 1>also keep most of its secret because very few people

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<v Speaker 1>are allowed to know about this. But still money and

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<v Speaker 1>assets and people need to be appropriated and assigned. I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know how much more simple you make. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>Again, as you said, he has projects that are sanctioned. Okay, Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>this project is sanctioned, This project is funded. Everybody within

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<v Speaker 2>that project it's tasked with doing certain things. Let's say

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<v Speaker 2>I'm running this covert war against castro. Okay, create a

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<v Speaker 2>project to do it, put it under a project AD.

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<v Speaker 2>He assigned staff to it, recruits them, they get paid,

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<v Speaker 2>they get performance reports, and then he parcels out his

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<v Speaker 2>budget and as an example for that, they decide that

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<v Speaker 2>to do this deniably they have to use surrogates. So

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<v Speaker 2>they're going to use certain Cuban anti Castro groups to

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<v Speaker 2>do certain activities, propaganda, maritime missions, whatever. Got to be

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<v Speaker 2>a budget for that, got to have somebody handing over

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<v Speaker 2>that money, and you have to there's a paper trail

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<v Speaker 2>that goes with it. So even for a clandestine operation

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<v Speaker 2>like that, you've got you know, case off that are

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<v Speaker 2>making reports. And when we go to the files, we

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<v Speaker 2>find files on these various groups that are summary files.

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<v Speaker 2>In other words, how are things going with the DRE,

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<v Speaker 2>How are they, what are the various people that work

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<v Speaker 2>with them have to say about them? What missions do

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<v Speaker 2>they do?

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<v Speaker 1>Well?

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<v Speaker 2>Are they problems for us? And that's why so much

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<v Speaker 2>of what we dig out is from these operational reports.

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<v Speaker 2>You know. It's if you've got an actual station report

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<v Speaker 2>from Mexico City or from Berlin or from JM. Way,

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<v Speaker 2>you can really find out what's going on, even though

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<v Speaker 2>it's all shielded from the outside and cripts are used

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<v Speaker 2>and code names are used for projects inside, You've got

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<v Speaker 2>to have a trail. You've got to have just like

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<v Speaker 2>any other management system. So I think one of the

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<v Speaker 2>things that I would like to draw a difference between

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<v Speaker 2>is what the what the CIA did with its own

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<v Speaker 2>at sets and covert operations, where you've got CIA people

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<v Speaker 2>actually recruiting people, paying people, setting up supplies to support

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<v Speaker 2>the operations, whether it's guns, money, boats, whatever, or where

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<v Speaker 2>they actually are able to call in support from outside

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<v Speaker 2>the CIA. That is more deniable in a way. And

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<v Speaker 2>that's where we run into the things that are called

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<v Speaker 2>cover companies. I kind of actually the term CIA cover

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<v Speaker 2>is again used much too broadly. But for example, you

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<v Speaker 2>may recruit. You'll go out to a major corporation, let's

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<v Speaker 2>say it's a shipping corporation. You'll contact the people on

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<v Speaker 2>its board, you contact its president, senior officers, and ask

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<v Speaker 2>them to volunteer to provide covers for you. Whether it's

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<v Speaker 2>simply travel documents for your people. You know you're going

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<v Speaker 2>to accept that their crew on your boat, okay, or

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<v Speaker 2>whether it's you're gonna we're going to use your ships

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<v Speaker 2>and you'll agree to transfer our cargo for no cost

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<v Speaker 2>and with no accounting. By the way, thank you very much.

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<v Speaker 1>And we'll also ask you to the company right, and

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<v Speaker 1>we'll also ask you to create documentation for people that

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<v Speaker 1>are going to travel with you under the guys that

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<v Speaker 1>they are your employees. So these guys are now your employees.

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<v Speaker 1>Don't ask them to do any work, but they have

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<v Speaker 1>a job title and they get to travel with your

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00:18:30.759 --> 00:18:34.799
<v Speaker 1>other employees when we say they do so. This way,

305
00:18:34.839 --> 00:18:37.839
<v Speaker 1>you have a sort of benign group of businessmen going

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<v Speaker 1>to establish something that is completely normal, run of the

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<v Speaker 1>mill whatever. And meantime, they don't actually do any of

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00:18:45.559 --> 00:18:48.759
<v Speaker 1>that work. What they really do is whatever the CIA

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00:18:48.880 --> 00:18:53.119
<v Speaker 1>is test them with. Excuse me, but that's the reality

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<v Speaker 1>of it. And a lot of people will use the

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<v Speaker 1>term shell corporation as well or shell company. And why

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<v Speaker 1>is that? Because they create something whole cloth, let's say,

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<v Speaker 1>or partially. Like say there is a shipping company that

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<v Speaker 1>has all the licenses and everything, but is a failing business. Well,

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00:19:12.920 --> 00:19:15.240
<v Speaker 1>here's the trade off. We'll pump enough money into your

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00:19:15.240 --> 00:19:18.519
<v Speaker 1>business so that you can run things for a little while,

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00:19:18.559 --> 00:19:20.519
<v Speaker 1>maybe you can figure out how to sort this out.

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<v Speaker 1>While you're doing that, we'll actually keep your business afloat.

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<v Speaker 1>But here's the trade off. You have six employees, sixty employees,

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't matter the number, but you have a handful of

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00:19:32.440 --> 00:19:35.559
<v Speaker 1>employees or people that are working with your company one

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00:19:35.559 --> 00:19:38.480
<v Speaker 1>way or another that you're just taking along for the ride.

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<v Speaker 1>Then to do so.

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<v Speaker 2>Much better name for that rather than shell company is

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<v Speaker 2>proprietary because you actually acquire business control. You put money

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<v Speaker 2>into the firm, right, you have somebody on the board

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<v Speaker 2>of directors, you have a couple of people in management.

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<v Speaker 2>It's not a company volunteering to work for you. It's

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00:20:00.160 --> 00:20:04.079
<v Speaker 2>a company that literally is working for you. And as

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<v Speaker 2>you say, probably without your money might be failing. With

331
00:20:08.400 --> 00:20:13.359
<v Speaker 2>your money, they're succeeding. You know, you make up the difference.

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<v Speaker 2>You schedule the cargoes, you do deals, and so proprietaries

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00:20:22.519 --> 00:20:27.319
<v Speaker 2>are quite different from these these cover companies that I'm

334
00:20:27.359 --> 00:20:30.519
<v Speaker 2>talking about, where there's a quid pro quo when you're

335
00:20:30.559 --> 00:20:35.640
<v Speaker 2>working with them, you actually to show you your good faith.

336
00:20:36.200 --> 00:20:39.960
<v Speaker 2>You'll get together with the senior managers and share certain

337
00:20:40.000 --> 00:20:43.480
<v Speaker 2>information that the CIA is collecting about the areas where

338
00:20:43.480 --> 00:20:47.240
<v Speaker 2>their business is working, who's doing you know, you're collecting

339
00:20:47.279 --> 00:20:52.880
<v Speaker 2>a lot of open source intelligence, financial intelligence. Obviously it's

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<v Speaker 2>great if I'm running a corporation working in South America

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<v Speaker 2>that I get briefed on that kind of stuff.

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<v Speaker 3>Works.

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<v Speaker 2>It's it's great. So I can be patriotic and at

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<v Speaker 2>the same time benefit from being patriotic, or you can

345
00:21:06.720 --> 00:21:10.400
<v Speaker 2>have a very different instant situation than with the proprietaries

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<v Speaker 2>that I'm talking.

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<v Speaker 1>About, right. So, and another added benefit here is that

348
00:21:14.880 --> 00:21:18.680
<v Speaker 1>you may indeed have ways to be paid for things

349
00:21:19.039 --> 00:21:22.240
<v Speaker 1>even though you don't have to do them necessarily. You

350
00:21:22.640 --> 00:21:25.319
<v Speaker 1>tell them because of the amount of weight that is

351
00:21:25.359 --> 00:21:29.480
<v Speaker 1>in a particular you know, cargo container that Look, what

352
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<v Speaker 1>you're going to do is say you're a furniture company

353
00:21:32.039 --> 00:21:34.799
<v Speaker 1>as benign as that. Well, really, what we're going to

354
00:21:34.880 --> 00:21:36.680
<v Speaker 1>do is we're going to stick a bunch of guns

355
00:21:37.279 --> 00:21:40.799
<v Speaker 1>in with the metal bed frames that you're shipping in

356
00:21:40.880 --> 00:21:44.279
<v Speaker 1>a cargo container. I know it sounds ludicrous but and

357
00:21:45.400 --> 00:21:48.720
<v Speaker 1>quite oversimplified, but in effect, this is the kind of

358
00:21:48.720 --> 00:21:52.599
<v Speaker 1>thing that happens. You know, Look, these are metal bed frames.

359
00:21:53.119 --> 00:21:54.960
<v Speaker 1>Pay no attention to the fact that you know, it's

360
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<v Speaker 1>actually a bunch of small arms and medium you know,

361
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<v Speaker 1>arms for troops that have been clandestinely maneuvered into the

362
00:22:03.240 --> 00:22:06.440
<v Speaker 1>same place that you are going to do business. We're

363
00:22:06.599 --> 00:22:09.720
<v Speaker 1>going to deliver some guns while you're delivering some bedframes

364
00:22:10.359 --> 00:22:13.000
<v Speaker 1>and we'll make up for that difference. So you get

365
00:22:13.039 --> 00:22:14.960
<v Speaker 1>paid for those You don't even have to sell them

366
00:22:15.039 --> 00:22:16.799
<v Speaker 1>because they didn't exist in the first place.

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<v Speaker 2>And as it turns out, there's actually an alternative to

368
00:22:22.359 --> 00:22:26.440
<v Speaker 2>doing that, because as you chuck you that can get

369
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<v Speaker 2>pretty complex. It can get pretty complex. People are smart,

370
00:22:31.559 --> 00:22:34.839
<v Speaker 2>they realize something else is going on. Wait a minute,

371
00:22:35.079 --> 00:22:37.359
<v Speaker 2>this is not right. The shipment didn't go where I

372
00:22:37.359 --> 00:22:42.640
<v Speaker 2>thought it would, and we somehow failed to recognize that.

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<v Speaker 2>Over the decades, in the col War, especially the first

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<v Speaker 2>couple of decades, the CIA relied quite heavily on the

375
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<v Speaker 2>US military. Right, they relied on the military for people.

376
00:22:55.119 --> 00:22:59.160
<v Speaker 2>These people were actually vetted and assigned to the CIA.

377
00:22:59.240 --> 00:23:03.839
<v Speaker 2>They generally went out of uniform, although not necessarily, and

378
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<v Speaker 2>they became detailed and that was the term detailed to

379
00:23:07.519 --> 00:23:13.319
<v Speaker 2>the CIA for various activities, generally training activities, you know,

380
00:23:13.400 --> 00:23:17.160
<v Speaker 2>not actual special operations, that sort of thing. If the

381
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<v Speaker 2>CIA wanted an military person for actual covert action, they

382
00:23:23.680 --> 00:23:27.200
<v Speaker 2>hired them, the person would resign their position, They would

383
00:23:27.240 --> 00:23:30.519
<v Speaker 2>be hired as a contract employee. But the reason I'm

384
00:23:30.559 --> 00:23:34.480
<v Speaker 2>bringing this up is actually the CIA operations that were

385
00:23:34.599 --> 00:23:39.039
<v Speaker 2>most covert during those years were where they actually had

386
00:23:39.519 --> 00:23:45.119
<v Speaker 2>the military, either the military or proprietary working, not where

387
00:23:45.279 --> 00:23:51.799
<v Speaker 2>the CIA managed it itself. For example, in Guatemala, one

388
00:23:51.839 --> 00:23:55.640
<v Speaker 2>of the reasons they were very successful in that overthrow

389
00:23:55.880 --> 00:23:59.680
<v Speaker 2>regime was they actually went to Air America, which was

390
00:23:59.680 --> 00:24:05.880
<v Speaker 2>a prietary, and literally hired pilots and aircraft. These guys

391
00:24:05.880 --> 00:24:08.880
<v Speaker 2>are experienced, they know what they're doing. They come in,

392
00:24:08.920 --> 00:24:12.599
<v Speaker 2>they're on the spot, and the air operation of Guatemala

393
00:24:12.880 --> 00:24:17.680
<v Speaker 2>was excellent and actually probably made the whole thing work. Okay,

394
00:24:18.799 --> 00:24:22.839
<v Speaker 2>in Indonesia they used the US Navy. In the end

395
00:24:22.880 --> 00:24:25.519
<v Speaker 2>it didn't work as well, but the actual shipments and

396
00:24:25.599 --> 00:24:31.880
<v Speaker 2>delivery of weapons to the groups worked exceedingly well. One

397
00:24:31.920 --> 00:24:35.599
<v Speaker 2>of the examples of how not to do it is when,

398
00:24:36.000 --> 00:24:38.920
<v Speaker 2>and we've talked about this before, when we got to

399
00:24:39.160 --> 00:24:42.319
<v Speaker 2>the Cuban operation in the Bay of Pigs. The CI

400
00:24:42.440 --> 00:24:47.200
<v Speaker 2>officers that were doing that were of the fact that

401
00:24:47.359 --> 00:24:50.720
<v Speaker 2>the CIO ought to do everything for itself, and so

402
00:24:50.799 --> 00:24:54.160
<v Speaker 2>over a period of time, the CIA had built its

403
00:24:54.160 --> 00:24:58.440
<v Speaker 2>own air force. Okay, as we saw on Gulf you

404
00:24:58.440 --> 00:25:02.000
<v Speaker 2>can have a priory terry Air America. Not a problem

405
00:25:02.039 --> 00:25:04.400
<v Speaker 2>you're gonna have. You're gonna have people that really know

406
00:25:04.440 --> 00:25:07.400
<v Speaker 2>how to do this stuff in a relationship with you.

407
00:25:08.119 --> 00:25:11.519
<v Speaker 2>But these officers that were running the Cuba projects decided

408
00:25:12.039 --> 00:25:14.680
<v Speaker 2>they did not want to use the method that had

409
00:25:14.720 --> 00:25:18.880
<v Speaker 2>worked for them several times before because that wouldn't for

410
00:25:18.920 --> 00:25:22.160
<v Speaker 2>some reason, be deniable. They decided that they were going

411
00:25:22.240 --> 00:25:26.559
<v Speaker 2>to have to create their own air operation, recruit their

412
00:25:26.599 --> 00:25:32.279
<v Speaker 2>own pilots from the Cuban exile community, train their own pilots,

413
00:25:32.880 --> 00:25:41.599
<v Speaker 2>and not use uh trained pilots that were detailed. Yeah,

414
00:25:41.640 --> 00:25:44.559
<v Speaker 2>they brought in some people from the Alabama Air National Guard,

415
00:25:45.119 --> 00:25:49.000
<v Speaker 2>but for training purposes, not to fly missions. As it

416
00:25:49.119 --> 00:25:52.279
<v Speaker 2>ended up ended up, they as a last resort JFK

417
00:25:52.599 --> 00:25:56.400
<v Speaker 2>let them fly some missions over the over the beachhead

418
00:25:56.640 --> 00:26:01.920
<v Speaker 2>which were fatal to the pilots. But it's I guess

419
00:26:01.960 --> 00:26:04.680
<v Speaker 2>the reason I'm bringing this up is almost like every

420
00:26:04.759 --> 00:26:09.240
<v Speaker 2>operation became a different mix of these different alternatives. It's

421
00:26:09.319 --> 00:26:11.559
<v Speaker 2>kind of like we have a we've got a playbook,

422
00:26:12.359 --> 00:26:14.839
<v Speaker 2>which ones are we going to pick to throw into

423
00:26:14.880 --> 00:26:20.359
<v Speaker 2>this operation. And as you can understand, if you keep

424
00:26:20.400 --> 00:26:24.160
<v Speaker 2>doing that, and if you keep changing the playbook over time,

425
00:26:24.559 --> 00:26:28.759
<v Speaker 2>guess what, things get worse and worse. Because nobody really

426
00:26:28.799 --> 00:26:31.440
<v Speaker 2>knows how it's going to work this time, and it's

427
00:26:31.480 --> 00:26:36.000
<v Speaker 2>like you're starting from fresh every time, and that's where

428
00:26:36.039 --> 00:26:39.519
<v Speaker 2>things ended up in Vietnam and laws. But so I

429
00:26:39.599 --> 00:26:45.279
<v Speaker 2>just clearly wanted to separate things like cover companies, proprietaries,

430
00:26:46.039 --> 00:26:53.039
<v Speaker 2>military detailes, and internal groups like the cis on Air

431
00:26:53.079 --> 00:26:57.640
<v Speaker 2>Force that it created to replace what the Air Force

432
00:26:57.680 --> 00:27:00.480
<v Speaker 2>had been doing for it very successfully before wars, like

433
00:27:00.480 --> 00:27:03.759
<v Speaker 2>we don't we don't want the military in this, Okay,

434
00:27:03.799 --> 00:27:06.839
<v Speaker 2>we'll do it ourselves. We don't want the Navy involved

435
00:27:07.039 --> 00:27:10.720
<v Speaker 2>in this amphibious operation. We'll do it for ourselves. And

436
00:27:11.440 --> 00:27:13.839
<v Speaker 2>as you as you're talking, you're going and how is

437
00:27:13.880 --> 00:27:18.240
<v Speaker 2>that going to work for you? The answer is not well?

438
00:27:18.319 --> 00:27:22.759
<v Speaker 1>Right, And this is uh covered in in detail in

439
00:27:22.759 --> 00:27:23.920
<v Speaker 1>in Denial right.

440
00:27:24.839 --> 00:27:28.559
<v Speaker 2>And shadow warfare, and in Denial Share shadow warfare really

441
00:27:28.599 --> 00:27:32.279
<v Speaker 2>goes into the history of the practices and you know,

442
00:27:32.319 --> 00:27:34.640
<v Speaker 2>how how you do some of the things that we've

443
00:27:34.640 --> 00:27:37.319
<v Speaker 2>been talking about with examples, how did you do it

444
00:27:38.559 --> 00:27:41.559
<v Speaker 2>you know in Guatemala, how did you do it in Loos,

445
00:27:41.640 --> 00:27:44.680
<v Speaker 2>how did you do it in Burma? You know what?

446
00:27:44.680 --> 00:27:47.440
<v Speaker 2>What were the actual cover companies? You know, who did

447
00:27:47.440 --> 00:27:50.079
<v Speaker 2>you do partnerships with it? It actually got to the

448
00:27:50.480 --> 00:27:53.480
<v Speaker 2>point under the ICE and our administration where for a

449
00:27:53.480 --> 00:27:57.039
<v Speaker 2>lot of these cover companies, we're major corporations doing business

450
00:27:57.119 --> 00:28:01.240
<v Speaker 2>in say South America or the pre and they would

451
00:28:01.559 --> 00:28:06.440
<v Speaker 2>the CIA would call in the presidents for these these companies.

452
00:28:06.799 --> 00:28:10.160
<v Speaker 2>General Cabell would meet with them and fill them in

453
00:28:10.400 --> 00:28:14.000
<v Speaker 2>about the plans to overthrow this regime and kind of

454
00:28:14.039 --> 00:28:16.480
<v Speaker 2>help them plan how to take advantage of what was

455
00:28:16.519 --> 00:28:17.119
<v Speaker 2>going to happen.

456
00:28:18.000 --> 00:28:19.400
<v Speaker 1>Right, Yeah, that.

457
00:28:19.519 --> 00:28:22.799
<v Speaker 2>Sounds amazing, But we actually have the records of those meetings.

458
00:28:22.920 --> 00:28:25.640
<v Speaker 1>Right. This is the thing is that it sounds like

459
00:28:25.720 --> 00:28:28.039
<v Speaker 1>the plot of a movie. I hate to keep repeating that,

460
00:28:28.200 --> 00:28:33.079
<v Speaker 1>but it really does. And it's truly based on true stories.

461
00:28:33.519 --> 00:28:38.039
<v Speaker 1>You have literal situations. Now this whole you know kettle

462
00:28:38.240 --> 00:28:41.759
<v Speaker 1>that's boiling here. You know, people argue all the time

463
00:28:41.839 --> 00:28:45.440
<v Speaker 1>as to whether it still exists in one way or another,

464
00:28:46.119 --> 00:28:49.000
<v Speaker 1>or if it's just you know, now a footnote, a

465
00:28:49.160 --> 00:28:52.519
<v Speaker 1>practice that got out of control, as most creatures of

466
00:28:52.559 --> 00:28:56.960
<v Speaker 1>the Central Intelligence Agency apparently do. Because and but it's

467
00:28:57.000 --> 00:28:59.759
<v Speaker 1>difficult to say, because the truth is, if they have

468
00:28:59.799 --> 00:29:03.759
<v Speaker 1>great control over it. The first thing is you generally

469
00:29:03.759 --> 00:29:06.839
<v Speaker 1>don't know much about it because it's just they are

470
00:29:06.920 --> 00:29:10.720
<v Speaker 1>hiding in plain sight, and these become, I said, creatures.

471
00:29:10.720 --> 00:29:14.039
<v Speaker 1>I'm quoting something or some things from the past that

472
00:29:14.079 --> 00:29:17.279
<v Speaker 1>I've seen and heard. But the reality is, yes, if

473
00:29:17.319 --> 00:29:20.960
<v Speaker 1>you pulled off a covert operation, oh so well, people

474
00:29:21.000 --> 00:29:24.000
<v Speaker 1>should not know about it within a couple of years,

475
00:29:24.119 --> 00:29:26.559
<v Speaker 1>a couple of months, a couple of days that this

476
00:29:26.640 --> 00:29:27.720
<v Speaker 1>kind of thing happened.

477
00:29:28.640 --> 00:29:31.240
<v Speaker 2>But when that was the whole thrust of my book

478
00:29:31.279 --> 00:29:35.000
<v Speaker 2>in Denial, Right, does anybody really think that you can

479
00:29:35.039 --> 00:29:40.599
<v Speaker 2>do deniable operations? The Russians were so much smarter about that.

480
00:29:41.240 --> 00:29:45.319
<v Speaker 2>The Russians did deniability in a very classic fashion. Right, Okay,

481
00:29:45.400 --> 00:29:49.720
<v Speaker 2>so did they send Russian fighter pilots to Korea? You

482
00:29:49.759 --> 00:29:52.039
<v Speaker 2>bet they did. In fact, for the first year or so,

483
00:29:52.640 --> 00:29:56.400
<v Speaker 2>all the air combat was actually between the US and Russia.

484
00:29:57.599 --> 00:30:03.279
<v Speaker 2>That Rusians just didn't talk about it. They didn't worry

485
00:30:03.279 --> 00:30:06.319
<v Speaker 2>about covering it up. There was no there were no

486
00:30:06.480 --> 00:30:11.759
<v Speaker 2>special you know, we could intercept their radio communications and

487
00:30:11.799 --> 00:30:14.160
<v Speaker 2>you see it's a Russian pilot. We absolutely knew that.

488
00:30:14.200 --> 00:30:16.880
<v Speaker 2>They didn't worry about it. Don't worry about deniability.

489
00:30:16.960 --> 00:30:19.480
<v Speaker 1>Well, and here's the other problem, because now here's where

490
00:30:19.480 --> 00:30:22.440
<v Speaker 1>it gets overly complex. If you're writing a movie script.

491
00:30:22.480 --> 00:30:26.240
<v Speaker 1>Somebody's gonna drop something on the table and say to you, look, stop,

492
00:30:26.359 --> 00:30:29.720
<v Speaker 1>you're going too far, because now it's a big mix up.

493
00:30:30.599 --> 00:30:34.039
<v Speaker 1>And the deal is that these things happened this way.

494
00:30:34.759 --> 00:30:38.279
<v Speaker 1>But the Russians could get away with, say, just openly

495
00:30:38.319 --> 00:30:41.720
<v Speaker 1>having the Russian pilots there because the people that witnessed

496
00:30:41.759 --> 00:30:45.440
<v Speaker 1>the Russian pilots they weren't supposed to be there. So

497
00:30:45.559 --> 00:30:47.880
<v Speaker 1>you had games like that going on where.

498
00:30:47.960 --> 00:30:51.720
<v Speaker 2>Well, and they're military, so you don't you don't have

499
00:30:51.880 --> 00:30:56.119
<v Speaker 2>our military reporting. The decision was made to classify that

500
00:30:56.440 --> 00:30:59.279
<v Speaker 2>right the same way as in Vietnam. We now know

501
00:30:59.400 --> 00:31:03.759
<v Speaker 2>there's an ex extensive research that's been done that the

502
00:31:04.079 --> 00:31:08.640
<v Speaker 2>Russian and Chinese participation in the VS. Vietnam War was immense.

503
00:31:09.000 --> 00:31:13.079
<v Speaker 2>I mean we're talking about whole battalions of troops, whole

504
00:31:13.440 --> 00:31:17.480
<v Speaker 2>formations of Chinese troops in North Vietnam. Yes, we're talking

505
00:31:17.480 --> 00:31:22.000
<v Speaker 2>about immense Russian participation. At the time, we knew that

506
00:31:22.480 --> 00:31:26.599
<v Speaker 2>because we're pretty good at signals, intelligence and collections. But

507
00:31:27.039 --> 00:31:30.200
<v Speaker 2>the decision is always made, well, they're just not talking

508
00:31:30.240 --> 00:31:32.720
<v Speaker 2>about it if we accuse them of even if when

509
00:31:32.720 --> 00:31:36.920
<v Speaker 2>we capture their equipment, we're in laws, we capture their

510
00:31:37.039 --> 00:31:41.079
<v Speaker 2>tanks whatever, they just deny it. So their version of

511
00:31:41.119 --> 00:31:44.440
<v Speaker 2>deniability is just to deny it, where our version of

512
00:31:44.480 --> 00:31:48.000
<v Speaker 2>deniability is, well, we'll do it in such a fashion

513
00:31:48.079 --> 00:31:50.799
<v Speaker 2>that you can't trace it to us even if you

514
00:31:50.880 --> 00:31:54.640
<v Speaker 2>find it. So that adds like several layers of complexity.

515
00:31:55.039 --> 00:31:57.799
<v Speaker 2>We can't use our own weapons. Russians don't care. They

516
00:31:57.839 --> 00:32:00.680
<v Speaker 2>use their own weapons. We got a biome O receives

517
00:32:01.200 --> 00:32:03.400
<v Speaker 2>and ship them in so they can't be traced us.

518
00:32:03.480 --> 00:32:05.680
<v Speaker 1>Now, and there's the thing. You have to do something

519
00:32:05.720 --> 00:32:08.680
<v Speaker 1>that makes sense so that if it is revealed. Okay,

520
00:32:08.720 --> 00:32:12.559
<v Speaker 1>for instance, you know you need to use US military

521
00:32:12.559 --> 00:32:17.079
<v Speaker 1>troops to accomplish something a larger operation it requires or

522
00:32:17.160 --> 00:32:19.720
<v Speaker 1>not a larger operation, but let's just create it theoretically

523
00:32:19.720 --> 00:32:24.960
<v Speaker 1>here quickly, you need thirty guys to capture a base. Why. Logistically,

524
00:32:25.000 --> 00:32:26.400
<v Speaker 1>you need a certain amount of guys to be able

525
00:32:26.440 --> 00:32:30.160
<v Speaker 1>to run roadblocks. You need guys to be able to control, say,

526
00:32:30.680 --> 00:32:34.920
<v Speaker 1>the contingent that is manning the base. Right, you need

527
00:32:35.119 --> 00:32:37.559
<v Speaker 1>another group of guys to handle the vehicles, make sure

528
00:32:37.599 --> 00:32:42.079
<v Speaker 1>none of them are moving. Somebody captures the centralized motor

529
00:32:42.119 --> 00:32:45.519
<v Speaker 1>pool area whatever. By the time you get all that done,

530
00:32:45.640 --> 00:32:48.400
<v Speaker 1>somebody says, well, here's the thing. If somebody gets killed

531
00:32:48.480 --> 00:32:52.720
<v Speaker 1>during this operation or drops a gun, I'd rather that

532
00:32:52.960 --> 00:32:55.960
<v Speaker 1>if we're in Vietnam, it looks like something that was

533
00:32:56.039 --> 00:33:00.839
<v Speaker 1>manufactured in China, right, or it is manufactured and generally

534
00:33:00.960 --> 00:33:05.319
<v Speaker 1>used by name a troop from somewhere else, the French. Okay,

535
00:33:05.400 --> 00:33:08.119
<v Speaker 1>say they want older guns from the French, because it

536
00:33:08.160 --> 00:33:11.119
<v Speaker 1>would make sense that there are French weapons laying around

537
00:33:11.440 --> 00:33:16.079
<v Speaker 1>because of the incursion just previous. Right, So you have

538
00:33:16.160 --> 00:33:19.440
<v Speaker 1>to account for all of this. You don't want to

539
00:33:19.519 --> 00:33:25.079
<v Speaker 1>leave American you know, M sixteen's laying around, because somebody's

540
00:33:25.079 --> 00:33:28.559
<v Speaker 1>gonna go, wait a minute, why is it that, you know,

541
00:33:29.480 --> 00:33:34.799
<v Speaker 1>people from Laos have these brand new American weapons. Why

542
00:33:34.920 --> 00:33:38.400
<v Speaker 1>is it that they have German weapons that were manufactured

543
00:33:38.640 --> 00:33:42.400
<v Speaker 1>two months ago? You can't leave that kind of stuff

544
00:33:42.480 --> 00:33:45.359
<v Speaker 1>laying around, right, or you know, the idea of don't

545
00:33:45.400 --> 00:33:48.319
<v Speaker 1>let them get captured in a particular uniform whatever.

546
00:33:49.559 --> 00:33:53.079
<v Speaker 2>Except the problem is the world being not naive and

547
00:33:53.240 --> 00:33:55.559
<v Speaker 2>pre charp That never works.

548
00:33:55.960 --> 00:33:56.119
<v Speaker 1>Right.

549
00:33:56.200 --> 00:33:59.400
<v Speaker 2>In the book, I describe a walk through it page,

550
00:34:00.000 --> 00:34:04.720
<v Speaker 2>and there has never been a deniable operation that stayed

551
00:34:04.720 --> 00:34:09.679
<v Speaker 2>deniable because everybody can see what's going on. It's no

552
00:34:09.719 --> 00:34:13.199
<v Speaker 2>matter how many layers you go through, people are going

553
00:34:13.239 --> 00:34:16.480
<v Speaker 2>to like, like we do follow the money, Like who

554
00:34:16.480 --> 00:34:19.840
<v Speaker 2>would have done that all? Who would be screwing around

555
00:34:19.840 --> 00:34:23.800
<v Speaker 2>with us? Then that kind of a mission in North Vietnam,

556
00:34:23.920 --> 00:34:27.039
<v Speaker 2>Let's say, do I think it would be the Chinese

557
00:34:27.239 --> 00:34:30.119
<v Speaker 2>rating in North Vietnamese? No? Do I think it's the

558
00:34:30.119 --> 00:34:32.599
<v Speaker 2>friend is obviously that it's the Americans.

559
00:34:32.960 --> 00:34:33.119
<v Speaker 1>Right.

560
00:34:33.599 --> 00:34:37.559
<v Speaker 2>So the whole concept of deniability from the way that

561
00:34:37.599 --> 00:34:42.119
<v Speaker 2>we traditionally pursued it just didn't work and it never

562
00:34:42.199 --> 00:34:47.960
<v Speaker 2>does work. And it's even back in nineteen sixty one

563
00:34:48.159 --> 00:34:51.239
<v Speaker 2>after the Bay of Pigs when they had the follow

564
00:34:51.320 --> 00:34:53.719
<v Speaker 2>up meetings and inquiries that got to the point where

565
00:34:54.400 --> 00:34:58.960
<v Speaker 2>even the Director of the CIA at that time, Alan Dulles, acknowledged,

566
00:34:59.079 --> 00:35:04.719
<v Speaker 2>is on record the CIA cannot do covert military action.

567
00:35:04.880 --> 00:35:07.480
<v Speaker 2>You just need to take that stuff and hand it

568
00:35:07.519 --> 00:35:10.519
<v Speaker 2>over to the military, which actually JFK was the problem

569
00:35:10.760 --> 00:35:12.159
<v Speaker 2>in the process of doing.

570
00:35:12.360 --> 00:35:13.079
<v Speaker 1>But it discussed.

571
00:35:13.199 --> 00:35:16.760
<v Speaker 2>It never does work. It just sounds like it. It's tempting.

572
00:35:17.079 --> 00:35:19.920
<v Speaker 2>It makes it makes sense. We'll do this, we'll do it,

573
00:35:20.159 --> 00:35:23.119
<v Speaker 2>and we'll make it deniable so nobody will know that

574
00:35:23.199 --> 00:35:24.039
<v Speaker 2>we did it right.

575
00:35:24.119 --> 00:35:27.000
<v Speaker 1>And this is why we've had the extended conversation regarding

576
00:35:27.039 --> 00:35:29.920
<v Speaker 1>how many responsibilities that had previously been in the hands

577
00:35:29.920 --> 00:35:34.280
<v Speaker 1>of the CIA were being transferred to the d IA. Uh,

578
00:35:34.320 --> 00:35:37.559
<v Speaker 1>you know, and what is that? The Defense Intelligence Agency?

579
00:35:37.599 --> 00:35:40.280
<v Speaker 1>What does it sound like, boys and girls? It sounds

580
00:35:40.320 --> 00:35:42.599
<v Speaker 1>like it's got something to do with the military, doesn't it?

581
00:35:42.719 --> 00:35:47.760
<v Speaker 1>Because it does? It is okay. But see, now we've

582
00:35:47.840 --> 00:35:51.679
<v Speaker 1>spun all into another area, haven't we. But that's the thing.

583
00:35:51.880 --> 00:35:54.400
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and we didn't even Will me comment a little

584
00:35:54.480 --> 00:35:56.800
<v Speaker 2>on the question that you just asked, sure that we

585
00:35:56.880 --> 00:35:59.480
<v Speaker 2>didn't talk about, and and that is is this the

586
00:35:59.519 --> 00:36:02.400
<v Speaker 2>same way to day? And I will say that in

587
00:36:03.000 --> 00:36:07.480
<v Speaker 2>the book Surprise Attack, I dealt with that question quite

588
00:36:07.519 --> 00:36:13.079
<v Speaker 2>a bit like our CI operations covert operations today like

589
00:36:13.159 --> 00:36:15.280
<v Speaker 2>they were then. And the answer is no, they're not.

590
00:36:15.719 --> 00:36:19.000
<v Speaker 2>And one of the reasons. One of the reasons is

591
00:36:19.079 --> 00:36:23.679
<v Speaker 2>the decision after nine nine to eleven, quite frankly, decision

592
00:36:23.880 --> 00:36:29.360
<v Speaker 2>was made to start authorizing military action under the CIA

593
00:36:30.599 --> 00:36:33.360
<v Speaker 2>under the federal laws that you know, Title fifty in

594
00:36:33.519 --> 00:36:37.239
<v Speaker 2>Title ten are the keys there. The President will authorize

595
00:36:37.280 --> 00:36:41.840
<v Speaker 2>it under covert actions and national security. But it's assigned

596
00:36:41.880 --> 00:36:45.360
<v Speaker 2>to the military, and the CIA will always be put

597
00:36:45.400 --> 00:36:48.960
<v Speaker 2>in a support role. So when we started creating the

598
00:36:48.960 --> 00:36:53.639
<v Speaker 2>special task Forces and operations after nine nine to eleven,

599
00:36:54.880 --> 00:36:59.800
<v Speaker 2>those were military operations that would have CIA people assigned

600
00:36:59.840 --> 00:37:02.760
<v Speaker 2>to them. You might find a team where there's a

601
00:37:02.800 --> 00:37:06.480
<v Speaker 2>CIA drone operator, you might find this or that. But

602
00:37:06.840 --> 00:37:09.719
<v Speaker 2>the CAA moved into much more of a support role

603
00:37:11.159 --> 00:37:14.159
<v Speaker 2>than beforehand because the decision was, if if you're going

604
00:37:14.239 --> 00:37:16.679
<v Speaker 2>to do military you might as well do it. We're

605
00:37:16.679 --> 00:37:20.519
<v Speaker 2>going to let them report to Sentcom like when Ben

606
00:37:20.599 --> 00:37:24.639
<v Speaker 2>Lauden was when they went after Ben Lauden, it was

607
00:37:25.000 --> 00:37:28.679
<v Speaker 2>authorized under National security the sort of thing that the

608
00:37:28.760 --> 00:37:32.480
<v Speaker 2>CIA operates under, but it was tasked to the military,

609
00:37:33.280 --> 00:37:37.079
<v Speaker 2>not the CIA, because the military isn't supposed to do

610
00:37:37.199 --> 00:37:42.800
<v Speaker 2>certain things under its federal guidelines, which are okay under

611
00:37:43.199 --> 00:37:46.440
<v Speaker 2>the National Security Act of nineteen forty seven. So I

612
00:37:46.519 --> 00:37:48.280
<v Speaker 2>just want to get into the fact, since you'd ask

613
00:37:48.360 --> 00:37:52.599
<v Speaker 2>the question, has changed, things changed over time, and they

614
00:37:52.760 --> 00:37:58.360
<v Speaker 2>did quite dramatically starting in the last decade after following

615
00:37:58.360 --> 00:37:58.800
<v Speaker 2>the nine.

616
00:37:58.639 --> 00:38:04.039
<v Speaker 1>To eleven attacks. Less two decades really, right, because yeah,

617
00:38:04.440 --> 00:38:07.760
<v Speaker 1>isn't that amazing that Yeah, and you have the whole reorganization.

618
00:38:08.760 --> 00:38:12.280
<v Speaker 1>I use that term loosely because of a lot of

619
00:38:12.320 --> 00:38:15.719
<v Speaker 1>things we've seen, but well, you definitely had is the

620
00:38:15.800 --> 00:38:20.239
<v Speaker 1>outgrowth or the growth from a very pardon the pun,

621
00:38:20.760 --> 00:38:26.159
<v Speaker 1>centralized you know, singular place to the now what is

622
00:38:26.199 --> 00:38:29.920
<v Speaker 1>it seventeen agencies now that are involved in these Okay,

623
00:38:30.079 --> 00:38:33.920
<v Speaker 1>so one agency, which was supposed to be the clearing

624
00:38:33.960 --> 00:38:38.719
<v Speaker 1>house the centralized I keep using that word location for

625
00:38:38.880 --> 00:38:43.559
<v Speaker 1>all of this ends up becoming the octopus with sixteen tentacles.

626
00:38:43.920 --> 00:38:47.920
<v Speaker 2>All right, Clearly that has to make things better, right, Yeah.

627
00:38:47.679 --> 00:38:49.559
<v Speaker 1>I mean that should make things a lot better and

628
00:38:49.639 --> 00:38:55.239
<v Speaker 1>less confusing, I think, again facetious comments. But so where

629
00:38:55.239 --> 00:38:56.440
<v Speaker 1>do we go with this from here?

630
00:38:56.559 --> 00:38:56.800
<v Speaker 4>Larry?

631
00:38:56.840 --> 00:38:59.159
<v Speaker 1>I mean we talked about now you know, the way

632
00:38:59.199 --> 00:39:03.320
<v Speaker 1>it was evolving in a way, and where it stands today.

633
00:39:04.119 --> 00:39:08.280
<v Speaker 2>Well, I think it's it is much differently today. But

634
00:39:08.320 --> 00:39:10.239
<v Speaker 2>I think one of the things I wanted to bring

635
00:39:10.360 --> 00:39:13.079
<v Speaker 2>up in regard to the era that we normally talk

636
00:39:13.119 --> 00:39:16.960
<v Speaker 2>about in regard to the JFK ASSASS nations, there's there's

637
00:39:17.039 --> 00:39:20.960
<v Speaker 2>one there's one other area of deniability. We don't know

638
00:39:21.000 --> 00:39:23.559
<v Speaker 2>how many times it happened. We know for sure one

639
00:39:23.599 --> 00:39:28.960
<v Speaker 2>time that it happened because it's well documented. But all

640
00:39:29.000 --> 00:39:35.320
<v Speaker 2>of these things projects tasking, could be tied to performance

641
00:39:35.400 --> 00:39:39.000
<v Speaker 2>reports and expense reports and budgets and that sort of thing.

642
00:39:39.400 --> 00:39:42.199
<v Speaker 2>But they always the one thing was that the CIA

643
00:39:42.320 --> 00:39:46.599
<v Speaker 2>was in control. The CIA was control of the money. Ostensibly,

644
00:39:46.639 --> 00:39:49.559
<v Speaker 2>the CIA was in control of the people. You know,

645
00:39:49.679 --> 00:39:52.800
<v Speaker 2>So if you had if you had surrogates that were

646
00:39:52.840 --> 00:39:55.800
<v Speaker 2>working for you, you stayed in touch with them, you knew

647
00:39:55.840 --> 00:40:00.880
<v Speaker 2>what they were doing, you paid them a regular fee,

648
00:40:01.519 --> 00:40:05.000
<v Speaker 2>you had some control. And there is an instance in

649
00:40:05.280 --> 00:40:08.239
<v Speaker 2>which I write about in Denial, where the decision was

650
00:40:08.280 --> 00:40:14.239
<v Speaker 2>made that that wasn't deniable enough. It can't really be

651
00:40:14.400 --> 00:40:17.039
<v Speaker 2>deniable if you've got that paper you know, that kind

652
00:40:17.079 --> 00:40:20.880
<v Speaker 2>of paperwork trail. If you want to be totally deniable,

653
00:40:21.280 --> 00:40:24.559
<v Speaker 2>these people have to look like and play like they're

654
00:40:24.599 --> 00:40:29.000
<v Speaker 2>totally on their own. They've got to have the money, right.

655
00:40:29.159 --> 00:40:32.199
<v Speaker 2>This happened with something we have talked about many times,

656
00:40:32.239 --> 00:40:36.400
<v Speaker 2>which was the Amoral Project, which was supposed to represent

657
00:40:36.519 --> 00:40:43.079
<v Speaker 2>the epitome of deniability. A military force totally on its own,

658
00:40:44.000 --> 00:40:47.320
<v Speaker 2>buying its own weapons, buying its own boats, conducting its

659
00:40:47.360 --> 00:40:52.239
<v Speaker 2>own missions, totally no connection to the United States, right,

660
00:40:52.320 --> 00:40:54.960
<v Speaker 2>and to do that. One of the big dangers was

661
00:40:55.440 --> 00:40:56.480
<v Speaker 2>they were given the money.

662
00:40:57.880 --> 00:41:00.679
<v Speaker 1>So what overall, outside of the fact that we have

663
00:41:00.679 --> 00:41:02.719
<v Speaker 1>a situation where it's like we're going to hand over

664
00:41:02.840 --> 00:41:06.079
<v Speaker 1>complete control, you're not coming in to check in with

665
00:41:06.360 --> 00:41:09.199
<v Speaker 1>your with everybody who's over your head. When you have

666
00:41:09.239 --> 00:41:12.000
<v Speaker 1>to do stuff, you have to operate sort of independently.

667
00:41:12.559 --> 00:41:16.119
<v Speaker 1>What is the big deal about am world or am

668
00:41:16.159 --> 00:41:20.199
<v Speaker 1>World when you speak to people that say, have no

669
00:41:20.320 --> 00:41:23.639
<v Speaker 1>clue about what the significance of that operation is. What's

670
00:41:23.679 --> 00:41:28.599
<v Speaker 1>the Larry Handcock cliff Notes version of how to put

671
00:41:28.800 --> 00:41:30.199
<v Speaker 1>Amworld in context?

672
00:41:30.239 --> 00:41:34.800
<v Speaker 2>Please, The point is you lost control or you exposed

673
00:41:34.800 --> 00:41:37.519
<v Speaker 2>yourself to being a situation. For example, with am World,

674
00:41:38.000 --> 00:41:41.719
<v Speaker 2>there were some CI officers assigned to it that we're

675
00:41:41.760 --> 00:41:46.000
<v Speaker 2>there to support logistics, you know, if travel needed to

676
00:41:46.039 --> 00:41:50.679
<v Speaker 2>be arranged. Okay, well but we're like a logistics support team.

677
00:41:50.840 --> 00:41:55.679
<v Speaker 2>Well we'll, yeah, we'll and and actually to try to

678
00:41:55.719 --> 00:41:58.920
<v Speaker 2>gain control, they tried to infiltrate some people into the

679
00:41:58.920 --> 00:42:01.599
<v Speaker 2>group to report on them because they were so concerned

680
00:42:02.199 --> 00:42:05.599
<v Speaker 2>that they could possibly go rope because in that period

681
00:42:05.599 --> 00:42:10.639
<v Speaker 2>of time, the CIA was always using surrogates. I'm sorry,

682
00:42:10.639 --> 00:42:13.519
<v Speaker 2>I couldn't help gru people who had, you know, an

683
00:42:13.559 --> 00:42:17.360
<v Speaker 2>agenda of their own, and you're just helping them accomplish it.

684
00:42:17.519 --> 00:42:20.559
<v Speaker 1>Right. I'm sorry I had to chuckle there, because it's

685
00:42:22.320 --> 00:42:25.559
<v Speaker 1>it's an interesting thing to just consider this. Okay, guys,

686
00:42:25.880 --> 00:42:28.880
<v Speaker 1>not you Larry, you know this, but I mean, consider

687
00:42:28.920 --> 00:42:32.519
<v Speaker 1>this for a moment. You have a circumstance in which

688
00:42:32.559 --> 00:42:35.639
<v Speaker 1>you have a very sensitive operation in the hands of

689
00:42:35.719 --> 00:42:39.559
<v Speaker 1>people that are not usually in charge of the operation.

690
00:42:39.719 --> 00:42:42.480
<v Speaker 1>According to what i'll call the chain of command, right,

691
00:42:43.000 --> 00:42:45.719
<v Speaker 1>they're making decisions that might have been made a different

692
00:42:45.719 --> 00:42:49.360
<v Speaker 1>way and by different people in the food chain. The

693
00:42:49.440 --> 00:42:53.800
<v Speaker 1>chain of command again, I'll just use that, and am

694
00:42:53.880 --> 00:42:58.280
<v Speaker 1>world is interesting in that and I'm not saying this

695
00:42:58.360 --> 00:43:00.880
<v Speaker 1>is the only time it happened, But when you've got

696
00:43:00.880 --> 00:43:05.000
<v Speaker 1>to literally send people to go infiltrate your infiltration group,

697
00:43:06.440 --> 00:43:09.960
<v Speaker 1>it becomes again one of those added layers of complexity

698
00:43:11.079 --> 00:43:13.239
<v Speaker 1>that I got to be frank with you, I'm not

699
00:43:13.280 --> 00:43:16.599
<v Speaker 1>sure if they imagine that to begin with, or if

700
00:43:16.679 --> 00:43:20.960
<v Speaker 1>the concept here was to eliminate the problems that would

701
00:43:20.960 --> 00:43:24.599
<v Speaker 1>cause you to have to investigate your own investigators.

702
00:43:25.440 --> 00:43:28.760
<v Speaker 2>Because the CI officers themselves anticipated it.

703
00:43:29.559 --> 00:43:30.599
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I'm getting at though.

704
00:43:30.840 --> 00:43:35.559
<v Speaker 2>You how difficult. It was to control surrogates, because when

705
00:43:35.599 --> 00:43:38.480
<v Speaker 2>I say surrogates, I mean I'm talking about a group

706
00:43:38.519 --> 00:43:42.079
<v Speaker 2>of people who are combat ready. They've declared themselves to

707
00:43:42.119 --> 00:43:47.679
<v Speaker 2>be revolutionaries. They're armed, they're committed, they're somewhat fanatical, they're

708
00:43:47.719 --> 00:43:52.280
<v Speaker 2>somewhat obsessive. You know, they've adopted, they they've engaged. They're

709
00:43:52.280 --> 00:43:56.559
<v Speaker 2>engaging in a crusade, and you are supporting their crusade.

710
00:43:56.599 --> 00:44:02.000
<v Speaker 2>But clearly their goal in line is their top priority,

711
00:44:02.280 --> 00:44:06.920
<v Speaker 2>not your international interest or your geopolitics, or if you

712
00:44:07.000 --> 00:44:10.400
<v Speaker 2>want to finest something at a particular time. That's not

713
00:44:10.519 --> 00:44:15.199
<v Speaker 2>their problem. Their problem is their focus is their focus,

714
00:44:15.239 --> 00:44:18.639
<v Speaker 2>not yours. The CIA knew that because all the groups

715
00:44:18.639 --> 00:44:21.679
<v Speaker 2>that they worked with ever had the same problems, not

716
00:44:21.719 --> 00:44:26.079
<v Speaker 2>just the Cuban ones, Eastern Europe same thing. But the

717
00:44:26.159 --> 00:44:29.760
<v Speaker 2>problem was, and frankly, we have to be honest about this,

718
00:44:30.320 --> 00:44:34.599
<v Speaker 2>AM World was not the CIA's idea. AM World and

719
00:44:34.639 --> 00:44:38.079
<v Speaker 2>its leader our teammate. And while our teammate was Robert

720
00:44:38.199 --> 00:44:42.199
<v Speaker 2>Kennedy's idea, because Robert Kennedy had gotten to the point

721
00:44:42.199 --> 00:44:46.119
<v Speaker 2>where he didn't he thought the CIA was being too bureaucratic,

722
00:44:46.559 --> 00:44:50.119
<v Speaker 2>He thought they were being too controlling. The Cubans kept

723
00:44:50.320 --> 00:44:53.599
<v Speaker 2>telling him, if you just let us go, give us

724
00:44:53.639 --> 00:44:58.239
<v Speaker 2>the money, give us some exploit, we'll do it. You've

725
00:44:58.280 --> 00:45:00.920
<v Speaker 2>been holding us back for years. We could have had

726
00:45:00.960 --> 00:45:05.519
<v Speaker 2>Castro overthrown by now. It's all these controls that they

727
00:45:05.599 --> 00:45:06.760
<v Speaker 2>keep imposing on us.

728
00:45:06.960 --> 00:45:09.559
<v Speaker 1>Right now, our teammate for the listener, just to just

729
00:45:09.599 --> 00:45:13.800
<v Speaker 1>to be clear, here is literally a very key figure

730
00:45:13.920 --> 00:45:19.239
<v Speaker 1>because he's actually, according to some supposed to be the

731
00:45:19.360 --> 00:45:23.280
<v Speaker 1>guy who is going to take over even right, I mean,

732
00:45:23.559 --> 00:45:24.800
<v Speaker 1>am I missing something here?

733
00:45:24.960 --> 00:45:26.480
<v Speaker 2>He is supposed to replace Castro.

734
00:45:26.599 --> 00:45:30.719
<v Speaker 1>He's supposed to replace Castro. And here's the again fascinating,

735
00:45:30.800 --> 00:45:34.440
<v Speaker 1>a little bit frightening though, because here's the thing. The

736
00:45:34.480 --> 00:45:41.000
<v Speaker 1>agency is doing this and the very the very characteristics

737
00:45:41.679 --> 00:45:45.159
<v Speaker 1>that make our teammate and anybody who is you know,

738
00:45:45.280 --> 00:45:48.039
<v Speaker 1>use the word fanatic before, and it could be fanatical,

739
00:45:48.159 --> 00:45:51.320
<v Speaker 1>or you could just describe it as really deeply held

740
00:45:51.320 --> 00:45:56.480
<v Speaker 1>dedication to your work. Yeah, the very thing that makes

741
00:45:56.519 --> 00:46:01.920
<v Speaker 1>them useful and effective and qualifies them to do the

742
00:46:02.079 --> 00:46:06.599
<v Speaker 1>job is simultaneously I mean talking about the proverbial double

743
00:46:06.719 --> 00:46:12.400
<v Speaker 1>edged sword is literally the problem that can now create

744
00:46:12.519 --> 00:46:17.119
<v Speaker 1>problems for the project that they're on your team you're

745
00:46:17.119 --> 00:46:21.239
<v Speaker 1>with them, but your agendas might not line up exactly.

746
00:46:21.840 --> 00:46:24.519
<v Speaker 1>And yet that's still the most useful part of them

747
00:46:24.960 --> 00:46:27.440
<v Speaker 1>that they're willing to go. They're willing to put the

748
00:46:27.480 --> 00:46:31.880
<v Speaker 1>sacrifice in, they're willing to do the dangerous work because

749
00:46:32.239 --> 00:46:36.480
<v Speaker 1>this is something they are attached to. This is their life,

750
00:46:36.719 --> 00:46:39.159
<v Speaker 1>this is their country, this is their I know I'm

751
00:46:39.199 --> 00:46:40.320
<v Speaker 1>sounding preachy, right.

752
00:46:40.239 --> 00:46:45.280
<v Speaker 2>But now they're patriot they consider themselves patriots, right, but

753
00:46:45.320 --> 00:46:49.800
<v Speaker 2>they're ejectorily dedicated. But the other factor is they're always

754
00:46:49.840 --> 00:46:52.880
<v Speaker 2>political because you've got to remember, these are the guys

755
00:46:52.880 --> 00:46:55.360
<v Speaker 2>who got thrown out of somebody someplace.

756
00:46:55.719 --> 00:46:55.880
<v Speaker 1>Kay.

757
00:46:56.519 --> 00:47:00.519
<v Speaker 2>They're all expatriots, they're all exiles or whatever. So there's

758
00:47:00.519 --> 00:47:04.039
<v Speaker 2>all kinds of politics going on, right, which the CI

759
00:47:04.239 --> 00:47:06.360
<v Speaker 2>knows it has to cope with. It's all as difficult.

760
00:47:06.719 --> 00:47:09.199
<v Speaker 2>It even gets to the point where with Amworld, where

761
00:47:09.199 --> 00:47:12.599
<v Speaker 2>the CIA guy in charge of am World, our teammate

762
00:47:12.639 --> 00:47:15.400
<v Speaker 2>comes in and says, you know, these other guys are

763
00:47:15.559 --> 00:47:18.400
<v Speaker 2>like giving us a real problem and Nolah Ray and Jura,

764
00:47:20.079 --> 00:47:22.519
<v Speaker 2>and he says, well, that's okay if you run across

765
00:47:22.599 --> 00:47:26.079
<v Speaker 2>them when you're doing missions against Cuba, sink them. But

766
00:47:26.199 --> 00:47:28.519
<v Speaker 2>wait a minute, they're also a anichest I don't care

767
00:47:28.559 --> 00:47:31.119
<v Speaker 2>they're getting in our way sync. So all of these

768
00:47:31.159 --> 00:47:34.639
<v Speaker 2>patriots I have their own politics too.

769
00:47:34.679 --> 00:47:37.960
<v Speaker 1>Well, and just like our guys are willing to accept

770
00:47:38.239 --> 00:47:43.039
<v Speaker 1>their extremist ideas. And okay, that's a little outside the law,

771
00:47:43.079 --> 00:47:45.599
<v Speaker 1>but you're not really our guy. So you could do

772
00:47:45.679 --> 00:47:48.599
<v Speaker 1>this right like, you know you are our guy, but

773
00:47:48.679 --> 00:47:51.800
<v Speaker 1>you're not so and when you do that, you're not

774
00:47:51.880 --> 00:47:53.800
<v Speaker 1>our guy. When you come back and do this, you're

775
00:47:53.840 --> 00:47:57.719
<v Speaker 1>our representative again, you know, in our But that's a

776
00:47:57.800 --> 00:48:01.920
<v Speaker 1>balance where you've got to balance between what their agenda is,

777
00:48:02.360 --> 00:48:05.159
<v Speaker 1>how you can make that work for you. And it's

778
00:48:05.360 --> 00:48:07.519
<v Speaker 1>at the same time the other edge of the sword.

779
00:48:07.920 --> 00:48:09.840
<v Speaker 1>You got to make sure that it doesn't come back

780
00:48:09.880 --> 00:48:13.280
<v Speaker 1>and cut off or cut into one of the things

781
00:48:13.320 --> 00:48:16.960
<v Speaker 1>that you have on your agenda as something that should

782
00:48:16.960 --> 00:48:20.559
<v Speaker 1>be protected or vice versa. You want to protect something

783
00:48:21.480 --> 00:48:25.119
<v Speaker 1>and they don't, or they want to protect it and

784
00:48:25.159 --> 00:48:27.599
<v Speaker 1>you don't care what happens to it. It can cut

785
00:48:27.679 --> 00:48:30.440
<v Speaker 1>both ways, and you know, at the drop of a

786
00:48:30.519 --> 00:48:32.800
<v Speaker 1>dime or a hat, right, So.

787
00:48:32.599 --> 00:48:35.800
<v Speaker 2>The CI officers know this, and they've been facing these

788
00:48:35.840 --> 00:48:39.519
<v Speaker 2>problems their career professionals. They know that they're always going

789
00:48:39.559 --> 00:48:43.000
<v Speaker 2>to face those problems with surrogates. So you know, how

790
00:48:43.960 --> 00:48:46.559
<v Speaker 2>as a manager, how can I keep them on target,

791
00:48:46.679 --> 00:48:51.000
<v Speaker 2>on control? It's going to be tough. So when RFK

792
00:48:51.280 --> 00:48:55.320
<v Speaker 2>is told by them that it's the CIA itself that's

793
00:48:55.360 --> 00:48:57.639
<v Speaker 2>the problem. If you just get them out of our hair,

794
00:48:58.360 --> 00:49:04.000
<v Speaker 2>will be good, and essentially accepted that because the CI

795
00:49:04.119 --> 00:49:07.199
<v Speaker 2>had been failing on one end, you've got yes to

796
00:49:07.239 --> 00:49:11.079
<v Speaker 2>say I had failed. They haven't assassinated Castro, they haven't

797
00:49:11.159 --> 00:49:15.480
<v Speaker 2>caused a coup, they haven't done anything effectively, and so

798
00:49:15.679 --> 00:49:18.639
<v Speaker 2>there's a good proposition to be made that, well, we've

799
00:49:18.639 --> 00:49:21.800
<v Speaker 2>got to do something radically different. The CIA, on the

800
00:49:21.840 --> 00:49:24.960
<v Speaker 2>other hand, would come back and say, well, you know,

801
00:49:26.960 --> 00:49:31.519
<v Speaker 2>we're trying to do it deniably and in a control fashion,

802
00:49:31.760 --> 00:49:35.679
<v Speaker 2>and you know, so there's a fundamental argument there. But

803
00:49:36.559 --> 00:49:39.400
<v Speaker 2>the reason we come back to this is that the

804
00:49:39.400 --> 00:49:44.079
<v Speaker 2>CIA very much opposed this level of deniability because of

805
00:49:44.119 --> 00:49:48.119
<v Speaker 2>the risk involved, especially the risk involved with the fact

806
00:49:48.159 --> 00:49:52.760
<v Speaker 2>that these people had their own not just proprietaries or

807
00:49:52.800 --> 00:49:56.599
<v Speaker 2>cover companies. These people set up their own companies to

808
00:49:56.679 --> 00:50:00.559
<v Speaker 2>buy stuff. They had their own money and tens of

809
00:50:00.559 --> 00:50:04.960
<v Speaker 2>millions of dollars to buy boats, ships to buy weapons

810
00:50:04.960 --> 00:50:09.239
<v Speaker 2>in Europe, deniable weapons. And they had their own operating

811
00:50:09.280 --> 00:50:13.119
<v Speaker 2>accounts that they're like open checking accounts. The CIA just

812
00:50:13.239 --> 00:50:17.519
<v Speaker 2>dumps money into them, whatever happens with it. Why do

813
00:50:17.599 --> 00:50:20.440
<v Speaker 2>they have those Because we're going to be moving out

814
00:50:20.519 --> 00:50:24.320
<v Speaker 2>of the US, we're new identities, We're going to go

815
00:50:24.360 --> 00:50:28.079
<v Speaker 2>into the Caribbean where we can operate deniability, new names,

816
00:50:29.000 --> 00:50:31.000
<v Speaker 2>and we need to be able to have money that

817
00:50:31.039 --> 00:50:34.519
<v Speaker 2>we can just have on demand. Okay, buy what you need,

818
00:50:34.880 --> 00:50:39.320
<v Speaker 2>go where you need whatever. That's at the point where

819
00:50:39.360 --> 00:50:41.960
<v Speaker 2>it gets to be a really high risk operation.

820
00:50:42.440 --> 00:50:46.119
<v Speaker 1>And just like with many many businesses that are not

821
00:50:46.159 --> 00:50:51.679
<v Speaker 1>connected to you know, black or gray operations one way

822
00:50:51.760 --> 00:50:55.559
<v Speaker 1>or another, guess what. Nobody knows what happens to the

823
00:50:55.599 --> 00:50:59.000
<v Speaker 1>extra money. The accountant might have something representing where that

824
00:50:59.079 --> 00:51:02.559
<v Speaker 1>money went, but in reality, it could have went toward

825
00:51:02.599 --> 00:51:06.800
<v Speaker 1>guess what one of these guys' personal agendas. Yeah, you know,

826
00:51:07.079 --> 00:51:08.039
<v Speaker 1>so here we go.

827
00:51:08.840 --> 00:51:11.440
<v Speaker 2>Well, we saw the worst example of that years later

828
00:51:12.480 --> 00:51:17.440
<v Speaker 2>when a certain military person was assigned by a certain

829
00:51:17.719 --> 00:51:22.559
<v Speaker 2>president to do a completely deniable, off the books operation

830
00:51:22.719 --> 00:51:26.480
<v Speaker 2>against the contras in Nicaragua. And what did that turn

831
00:51:26.519 --> 00:51:30.760
<v Speaker 2>into the biggest drug smuggling operation in history, did anybody

832
00:51:30.880 --> 00:51:33.360
<v Speaker 2>monitor the money that was given? Oh? Yeah, we actually

833
00:51:33.440 --> 00:51:35.320
<v Speaker 2>now we can monitor it, and we saw how much

834
00:51:35.360 --> 00:51:39.320
<v Speaker 2>of it was used for boats and planes for smuggling drugs.

835
00:51:39.559 --> 00:51:45.000
<v Speaker 2>You know when the pursuit of deniability and I'll make

836
00:51:45.039 --> 00:51:48.159
<v Speaker 2>the argument here never leads to good things.

837
00:51:49.880 --> 00:51:53.880
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, so herein is the problem. So again back to

838
00:51:53.920 --> 00:51:56.559
<v Speaker 1>am world though or am World, and I don't know

839
00:51:56.559 --> 00:51:58.719
<v Speaker 1>why I keep bouncing back and forth between those. I

840
00:51:58.719 --> 00:52:01.559
<v Speaker 1>think people used to say it the other way is

841
00:52:01.599 --> 00:52:04.719
<v Speaker 1>what what happened? Right? At some point I think I'll

842
00:52:04.960 --> 00:52:05.599
<v Speaker 1>announce her.

843
00:52:05.639 --> 00:52:07.559
<v Speaker 2>I'm not even sure at this point which was first?

844
00:52:07.800 --> 00:52:10.400
<v Speaker 1>That's the thing. I'm confused now too, because it's just

845
00:52:10.440 --> 00:52:13.159
<v Speaker 1>been around and people have kicked this around. Why is

846
00:52:13.679 --> 00:52:17.199
<v Speaker 1>the am World operation? Key one and two, Just to

847
00:52:17.239 --> 00:52:21.679
<v Speaker 1>inform the listener, there's a purpose to the cryptonem here

848
00:52:22.159 --> 00:52:25.199
<v Speaker 1>that is easily discernible and you can trace it through

849
00:52:25.239 --> 00:52:29.559
<v Speaker 1>other operations. Right regarding am World.

850
00:52:31.960 --> 00:52:34.599
<v Speaker 2>First off, it is not supposed to relate the cube

851
00:52:34.639 --> 00:52:37.519
<v Speaker 2>at all. I mean, but it's not. It's not going

852
00:52:37.599 --> 00:52:42.039
<v Speaker 2>to fall under the directorate that handles America. It's not

853
00:52:42.079 --> 00:52:45.360
<v Speaker 2>going to fall fall under Cabell it's it's supposed to be.

854
00:52:45.440 --> 00:52:48.559
<v Speaker 2>It's it's kind of like the crypts that are used

855
00:52:48.599 --> 00:52:52.320
<v Speaker 2>over and over again because they don't relate to anything else,

856
00:52:52.840 --> 00:52:55.239
<v Speaker 2>you know, it's it's a standalone thing.

857
00:52:55.719 --> 00:52:55.840
<v Speaker 5>Uh.

858
00:52:56.400 --> 00:52:59.880
<v Speaker 2>But for your first question, the reason we the reason

859
00:53:00.119 --> 00:53:02.360
<v Speaker 2>I write and spent so much time about it is

860
00:53:02.440 --> 00:53:08.559
<v Speaker 2>it's the best documented example of a totally deniable operation

861
00:53:08.679 --> 00:53:13.079
<v Speaker 2>that we have. Why is that because it was was

862
00:53:13.760 --> 00:53:21.800
<v Speaker 2>investigated as far as of the JFK assassination inquiries. Otherwise

863
00:53:22.360 --> 00:53:26.480
<v Speaker 2>there certainly can be other operations, although, let's face it,

864
00:53:26.559 --> 00:53:30.760
<v Speaker 2>unless something it's called on the carpet, like a run contra,

865
00:53:31.039 --> 00:53:33.760
<v Speaker 2>you know, you just don't have that level of detail.

866
00:53:33.760 --> 00:53:36.599
<v Speaker 2>But we have an immense amount of detail on how

867
00:53:36.679 --> 00:53:40.400
<v Speaker 2>much money was paid, what was shipped where, But that

868
00:53:40.519 --> 00:53:45.000
<v Speaker 2>only came out because that some of the individuals involved,

869
00:53:45.039 --> 00:53:48.920
<v Speaker 2>like our teammate. Quite frankly, we're considered at one time

870
00:53:49.559 --> 00:53:54.159
<v Speaker 2>as possibly being involved in the assassination. The HSCA was

871
00:53:54.199 --> 00:53:58.480
<v Speaker 2>actually given our teammates name as someone that might know

872
00:54:00.000 --> 00:54:02.480
<v Speaker 2>I might have heard, might have Okay, this is the

873
00:54:02.480 --> 00:54:04.840
<v Speaker 2>guy you want to look at, and of course in

874
00:54:04.920 --> 00:54:07.599
<v Speaker 2>looking at him, they determine what was he doing in

875
00:54:07.679 --> 00:54:11.440
<v Speaker 2>nineteen sixty three am World. So two reasons why it

876
00:54:11.519 --> 00:54:14.360
<v Speaker 2>really stands out. One because we have so much information

877
00:54:14.519 --> 00:54:18.199
<v Speaker 2>on it, and two because there are suspicions that it

878
00:54:18.639 --> 00:54:22.239
<v Speaker 2>in some circles that it might have been associated with

879
00:54:22.360 --> 00:54:27.199
<v Speaker 2>the assassination because it was so essentially untouchable it was

880
00:54:28.159 --> 00:54:30.639
<v Speaker 2>we can't We don't know where the people that were

881
00:54:30.679 --> 00:54:33.519
<v Speaker 2>involved when it were in November. All we know is

882
00:54:33.559 --> 00:54:36.840
<v Speaker 2>that they essentially went off the books, and they go

883
00:54:36.920 --> 00:54:39.559
<v Speaker 2>off the record for four or five months until they

884
00:54:39.599 --> 00:54:44.400
<v Speaker 2>show up again outside the United States, which too many

885
00:54:44.440 --> 00:54:47.280
<v Speaker 2>people as suspicious. But there are a couple of reasons.

886
00:54:47.960 --> 00:54:52.079
<v Speaker 2>I write about it in my books and in Denial

887
00:54:53.519 --> 00:54:59.920
<v Speaker 2>and in Shadow Warfare as an example of deniable autonomous operation,

888
00:55:01.039 --> 00:55:02.880
<v Speaker 2>because they have a lot of data on it. But

889
00:55:03.440 --> 00:55:05.920
<v Speaker 2>in the other in other books it comes up because

890
00:55:05.960 --> 00:55:09.559
<v Speaker 2>it's it's has some connections to the assassination.

891
00:55:11.400 --> 00:55:14.079
<v Speaker 1>No, it's just important to bring up because I've seen

892
00:55:14.159 --> 00:55:18.000
<v Speaker 1>other mentions of this where you know, and this was

893
00:55:18.039 --> 00:55:23.440
<v Speaker 1>a big feature a few years back when the discussion

894
00:55:23.719 --> 00:55:25.480
<v Speaker 1>I hate to, I don't want to. I'm not going

895
00:55:25.480 --> 00:55:27.840
<v Speaker 1>to bring up somebody else's work here on you, Okay,

896
00:55:27.840 --> 00:55:30.599
<v Speaker 1>but you probably know what I'm thinking because it was

897
00:55:30.639 --> 00:55:34.840
<v Speaker 1>a big source, yes, you know, and and the concept

898
00:55:34.960 --> 00:55:39.159
<v Speaker 1>of C Day right instead of D Day comes out again.

899
00:55:39.199 --> 00:55:41.400
<v Speaker 1>I'm not trying to pick on anybody in particular, because

900
00:55:41.440 --> 00:55:44.719
<v Speaker 1>a lot of people thought that this might be the

901
00:55:44.800 --> 00:55:50.440
<v Speaker 1>key to the why of the assassination, the actual here's

902
00:55:50.480 --> 00:55:52.920
<v Speaker 1>the thing that needed to be covered up so badly

903
00:55:53.920 --> 00:55:57.519
<v Speaker 1>that they were willing to let Kennedy die and not

904
00:55:57.719 --> 00:56:03.719
<v Speaker 1>have the truth revealed in order to protect at this operation, right.

905
00:56:04.400 --> 00:56:07.719
<v Speaker 2>And absolutely right, there there was a time and I

906
00:56:07.760 --> 00:56:10.119
<v Speaker 2>think I think it's safe to say one of the

907
00:56:11.280 --> 00:56:14.039
<v Speaker 2>that reveals one of the things that we're all subject to.

908
00:56:14.760 --> 00:56:19.159
<v Speaker 2>There are things that look mysterious way mysterious way suspicion

909
00:56:19.679 --> 00:56:23.639
<v Speaker 2>suspicions at one point in time, and when you learn

910
00:56:23.719 --> 00:56:28.199
<v Speaker 2>more about it, they're not nearly so mysterious. But there's

911
00:56:28.239 --> 00:56:30.440
<v Speaker 2>also a real trap of kind of like I just

912
00:56:30.519 --> 00:56:32.440
<v Speaker 2>learned about this and I want to make the world

913
00:56:32.480 --> 00:56:35.519
<v Speaker 2>aware of it. There may this may answer the whole thing,

914
00:56:36.079 --> 00:56:40.360
<v Speaker 2>and then you get caught by what follows kind of like,

915
00:56:40.440 --> 00:56:43.800
<v Speaker 2>oh geez, now we have more documents, me of more records,

916
00:56:44.199 --> 00:56:47.440
<v Speaker 2>we know more about all of this, and I just

917
00:56:48.400 --> 00:56:49.840
<v Speaker 2>I leapt too quickly.

918
00:56:49.800 --> 00:56:54.440
<v Speaker 1>And sometimes, look, it's rather forgivable because you know, you

919
00:56:54.559 --> 00:56:58.599
<v Speaker 1>spend twenty years, thirty years, you know, on something, and

920
00:56:58.920 --> 00:57:03.480
<v Speaker 1>suddenly something that appears to answer a whole lot of

921
00:57:03.559 --> 00:57:08.800
<v Speaker 1>questions that are legitimate questions, is sort of dropped in

922
00:57:08.800 --> 00:57:12.039
<v Speaker 1>front of you. And excuse me. We've seen this happen

923
00:57:12.079 --> 00:57:17.000
<v Speaker 1>a few times with things that are have a lot

924
00:57:17.079 --> 00:57:20.119
<v Speaker 1>less meat on the bone, let's say, than this by

925
00:57:20.159 --> 00:57:23.239
<v Speaker 1>a long shot, you know, Like I've even talked about

926
00:57:23.360 --> 00:57:26.119
<v Speaker 1>very early on, again, I was still a teenager, the

927
00:57:26.119 --> 00:57:31.079
<v Speaker 1>French gunman, you know, the French gunman theory, the Marseille gangsters, right,

928
00:57:31.880 --> 00:57:35.880
<v Speaker 1>that to me looked plausible. I wasn't well read into

929
00:57:35.920 --> 00:57:38.559
<v Speaker 1>anything at that point, but to me, it just appeared

930
00:57:38.599 --> 00:57:43.480
<v Speaker 1>plausible because of the way that it was presented, and

931
00:57:43.519 --> 00:57:45.840
<v Speaker 1>it seemed to be rather and I don't even think

932
00:57:46.159 --> 00:57:48.360
<v Speaker 1>the first time I heard about it wasn't on the

933
00:57:48.360 --> 00:57:50.840
<v Speaker 1>Men who killed Kennedy. But a whole lot of people

934
00:57:50.920 --> 00:57:54.199
<v Speaker 1>point to that and say, I remember that show. You know,

935
00:57:54.360 --> 00:57:57.840
<v Speaker 1>that's the thing that got me going or whatever back then,

936
00:57:59.320 --> 00:58:02.360
<v Speaker 1>and other people have said, oh, look, there's this confession

937
00:58:03.000 --> 00:58:06.320
<v Speaker 1>from a mobster, and you know what, I'm referring to there. Yeah,

938
00:58:06.360 --> 00:58:10.119
<v Speaker 1>you know the camtext whatever they refer to it documents

939
00:58:10.199 --> 00:58:15.639
<v Speaker 1>right where you have a gangster in prison confessing to

940
00:58:15.719 --> 00:58:21.280
<v Speaker 1>his sell me. I did this right, supposedly. I mean,

941
00:58:21.320 --> 00:58:23.679
<v Speaker 1>I'm shortening all these stories, but.

942
00:58:23.920 --> 00:58:28.119
<v Speaker 2>I can't tell you how many years I just lost

943
00:58:28.119 --> 00:58:31.639
<v Speaker 2>out of my life following Fred Chrisman and Thomas Beckham

944
00:58:32.199 --> 00:58:34.679
<v Speaker 2>because that sounded so intriguing at the time, So it

945
00:58:34.719 --> 00:58:39.280
<v Speaker 2>can happen to anybody. The danger is, you know, the

946
00:58:39.320 --> 00:58:42.159
<v Speaker 2>temptation is always there to be the first to tell

947
00:58:42.199 --> 00:58:46.360
<v Speaker 2>that story, right. And in regard to am World, it's

948
00:58:46.440 --> 00:58:50.559
<v Speaker 2>kind of funny because I was reaching it researching Amworld

949
00:58:50.559 --> 00:58:53.000
<v Speaker 2>and had come across the crypt and had documents on

950
00:58:53.079 --> 00:58:57.480
<v Speaker 2>it as the same type as C Day was being investigated,

951
00:58:57.480 --> 00:59:00.679
<v Speaker 2>and I was actually talking to the other person. It's like, well,

952
00:59:00.719 --> 00:59:04.039
<v Speaker 2>I'm about to I'm about to publish this, so you know,

953
00:59:04.039 --> 00:59:07.039
<v Speaker 2>if you could hold off talking about it, okay, yeah,

954
00:59:07.119 --> 00:59:09.559
<v Speaker 2>that'll you know, I don't know enough about it yet

955
00:59:09.719 --> 00:59:13.559
<v Speaker 2>to do anything, so it so as a temptation as

956
00:59:13.599 --> 00:59:17.840
<v Speaker 2>to how sensational it looks. And you know, if you

957
00:59:17.840 --> 00:59:20.320
<v Speaker 2>want to claim a territory or be the first to

958
00:59:20.360 --> 00:59:21.519
<v Speaker 2>reveal the information.

959
00:59:24.519 --> 00:59:27.800
<v Speaker 1>Well, there is that aspect, right, but there's also just

960
00:59:27.920 --> 00:59:31.519
<v Speaker 1>the you know what, finally I have something that has

961
00:59:31.599 --> 00:59:34.599
<v Speaker 1>fallen into place and and didn't have to be you know,

962
00:59:35.000 --> 00:59:38.239
<v Speaker 1>forced or coaxed real hard to make sense of a

963
00:59:38.239 --> 00:59:41.159
<v Speaker 1>whole lot of things that appeared to have no solution.

964
00:59:41.800 --> 00:59:43.679
<v Speaker 1>I mean that that. I mean, I know I'm kind

965
00:59:43.679 --> 00:59:46.239
<v Speaker 1>of repeating myself here and just you know, rewording it,

966
00:59:46.679 --> 00:59:50.559
<v Speaker 1>but it's true. And again, after a lot of frustration

967
00:59:50.800 --> 00:59:53.719
<v Speaker 1>and a bunch of dead ends and so on and

968
00:59:53.760 --> 00:59:55.840
<v Speaker 1>so forth, and maybe you lucked out and you've got

969
00:59:55.880 --> 00:59:58.840
<v Speaker 1>an interview with somebody who's still alive, but other people

970
00:59:58.920 --> 01:00:01.199
<v Speaker 1>don't necessarily know where he is or what he's doing.

971
01:00:02.039 --> 01:00:05.400
<v Speaker 1>You know, these kinds of things all come together and

972
01:00:05.960 --> 01:00:10.119
<v Speaker 1>it creates an effect. So I don't want to linger

973
01:00:10.159 --> 01:00:12.960
<v Speaker 1>on this too long, but I'm just pointing out that

974
01:00:14.039 --> 01:00:17.800
<v Speaker 1>with am World, this is definitely one of those things

975
01:00:18.159 --> 01:00:22.320
<v Speaker 1>that had a lot to it. You know, you started

976
01:00:22.320 --> 01:00:25.000
<v Speaker 1>to line up the evidence. Okay, if this is happening,

977
01:00:25.400 --> 01:00:29.960
<v Speaker 1>this should exist. Some of those things started to come up, right,

978
01:00:30.280 --> 01:00:30.880
<v Speaker 1>I mean, it.

979
01:00:30.840 --> 01:00:35.480
<v Speaker 2>Was, And that doesn't mean that one scenario, one particular

980
01:00:35.559 --> 01:00:38.719
<v Speaker 2>scenario related to it might turn out to be false,

981
01:00:38.840 --> 01:00:43.320
<v Speaker 2>maybe another scenarios. You know, it doesn't. It relates to

982
01:00:43.400 --> 01:00:46.360
<v Speaker 2>your interpretation, not to data. I mean, the data that

983
01:00:46.440 --> 01:00:49.360
<v Speaker 2>we have on it now is there. You go, it's solid.

984
01:00:49.559 --> 01:00:52.559
<v Speaker 2>You know, it's just a matter of interpretation. So but

985
01:00:52.840 --> 01:00:56.159
<v Speaker 2>you're right, I kind of it's been discussed for so

986
01:00:56.360 --> 01:00:59.519
<v Speaker 2>long now it's kind of like I can understand and

987
01:00:59.599 --> 01:01:01.960
<v Speaker 2>you list would be, well, why are you making so

988
01:01:02.079 --> 01:01:04.880
<v Speaker 2>much out of that? That's just one crypt that's just

989
01:01:04.960 --> 01:01:09.639
<v Speaker 2>one thing. But it's it's been in play for much

990
01:01:09.679 --> 01:01:12.159
<v Speaker 2>longer than I even like to think about, right.

991
01:01:12.079 --> 01:01:15.719
<v Speaker 1>Right, So anyway, all of these things aside, and we've

992
01:01:15.760 --> 01:01:18.559
<v Speaker 1>talked about, you know, how some of this works and

993
01:01:18.599 --> 01:01:21.320
<v Speaker 1>how some of this doesn't work, which is always the

994
01:01:21.320 --> 01:01:25.519
<v Speaker 1>most fascinating part about the things you write. I love

995
01:01:25.559 --> 01:01:28.119
<v Speaker 1>that you know it's not all about the success of

996
01:01:28.159 --> 01:01:32.440
<v Speaker 1>the operation and literally building on the legend of the

997
01:01:32.480 --> 01:01:36.039
<v Speaker 1>boogeyman CIA. Okay, that's not what Larry Hancock does in

998
01:01:36.119 --> 01:01:39.480
<v Speaker 1>his writing. It's not let me create the monster, let

999
01:01:39.480 --> 01:01:43.920
<v Speaker 1>me make it more nefarious, let me make it more imposing,

1000
01:01:44.079 --> 01:01:47.360
<v Speaker 1>let it cast a larger shadow. You don't do that,

1001
01:01:48.280 --> 01:01:50.920
<v Speaker 1>you you know, the way you do this. This is

1002
01:01:50.920 --> 01:01:55.039
<v Speaker 1>why I love your writing actually, because it's always sober,

1003
01:01:55.079 --> 01:01:58.159
<v Speaker 1>and I don't mean sober to the point of holy crap,

1004
01:01:58.239 --> 01:02:01.199
<v Speaker 1>these people are boring as hell because there's so I mean,

1005
01:02:01.840 --> 01:02:05.000
<v Speaker 1>it's sober in the way it needs to be. This

1006
01:02:05.159 --> 01:02:07.360
<v Speaker 1>is the way that these things need to be examined.

1007
01:02:07.400 --> 01:02:10.800
<v Speaker 1>So I know I took us off track a little bit,

1008
01:02:10.920 --> 01:02:13.719
<v Speaker 1>and I apologize, but I think it was worth it

1009
01:02:13.800 --> 01:02:17.880
<v Speaker 1>to go through and kind of let people examine this

1010
01:02:17.960 --> 01:02:21.320
<v Speaker 1>along with us and consider what it is we're dealing

1011
01:02:21.360 --> 01:02:25.280
<v Speaker 1>with here. Okay, so let's bring it all the way

1012
01:02:25.320 --> 01:02:27.719
<v Speaker 1>back around. Let's try and wrap a bow on it. Larry,

1013
01:02:27.760 --> 01:02:28.320
<v Speaker 1>what do you think?

1014
01:02:29.320 --> 01:02:31.280
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I think what I'd like to get out of

1015
01:02:31.400 --> 01:02:33.800
<v Speaker 2>these two sessions the one we did last week in

1016
01:02:33.880 --> 01:02:39.119
<v Speaker 2>this is that the good news for us anybody that's

1017
01:02:39.159 --> 01:02:44.239
<v Speaker 2>looking into this, is this is history, and good or bad,

1018
01:02:44.360 --> 01:02:47.000
<v Speaker 2>we have learned so much about the history of the

1019
01:02:47.039 --> 01:02:50.239
<v Speaker 2>last several decades that a lot of things that were

1020
01:02:50.239 --> 01:02:56.199
<v Speaker 2>totally mysterious, that were totally classified at the time, we've

1021
01:02:57.239 --> 01:03:00.559
<v Speaker 2>the efforts of the research community in Toto, regardless of

1022
01:03:00.599 --> 01:03:04.039
<v Speaker 2>how many directions we've stumbled off in, have documented a

1023
01:03:04.159 --> 01:03:08.320
<v Speaker 2>huge amount of American history, and we should be able

1024
01:03:08.320 --> 01:03:11.559
<v Speaker 2>to take credit for that, how the CIA operates, how

1025
01:03:11.599 --> 01:03:16.360
<v Speaker 2>the FBI operated. They don't write books and publish them all.

1026
01:03:16.800 --> 01:03:19.320
<v Speaker 2>A couple of their former employees have done that. But

1027
01:03:20.000 --> 01:03:22.840
<v Speaker 2>we now understand a lot of things that were totally

1028
01:03:22.880 --> 01:03:27.840
<v Speaker 2>mysterious to us when they were happening and decades afterwards,

1029
01:03:28.039 --> 01:03:29.920
<v Speaker 2>and we ought to be able to take credit for that.

1030
01:03:29.960 --> 01:03:33.280
<v Speaker 2>But we also need to get past the point that

1031
01:03:33.360 --> 01:03:36.880
<v Speaker 2>it's all mysterious, because it isn't anymore. We really do

1032
01:03:37.079 --> 01:03:42.960
<v Speaker 2>understand their practices, and we have a great knowledge for

1033
01:03:43.039 --> 01:03:46.239
<v Speaker 2>how they operated then versus how they operated now. We

1034
01:03:46.840 --> 01:03:49.800
<v Speaker 2>ought to be able to profit from that and not

1035
01:03:50.039 --> 01:03:53.159
<v Speaker 2>leave it as all mysterious, right.

1036
01:03:53.000 --> 01:03:55.639
<v Speaker 1>And I mean along the way again, I think it's

1037
01:03:56.840 --> 01:04:04.920
<v Speaker 1>relative relatively necessary excuse me for that, uh, to recognize that,

1038
01:04:06.000 --> 01:04:10.360
<v Speaker 1>you know, there is a time when we're going to

1039
01:04:10.519 --> 01:04:13.519
<v Speaker 1>have to wrap up and clear away a lot of

1040
01:04:13.519 --> 01:04:17.360
<v Speaker 1>the clutter that mystery the legend, like I'm saying that

1041
01:04:17.559 --> 01:04:21.079
<v Speaker 1>it's built around these things. Oh, you are right, and

1042
01:04:21.119 --> 01:04:21.559
<v Speaker 1>that was me.

1043
01:04:21.679 --> 01:04:25.079
<v Speaker 2>I dropped a bottle, Oh my goodness, by it soda.

1044
01:04:25.119 --> 01:04:28.480
<v Speaker 1>But we won't go there, no problem, that's your business.

1045
01:04:29.119 --> 01:04:33.719
<v Speaker 1>But anyway, is Larry completely sober. He's dropping his bottle

1046
01:04:33.719 --> 01:04:34.079
<v Speaker 1>over there.

1047
01:04:34.079 --> 01:04:36.199
<v Speaker 2>Oh yeah, we were just talking about being sober, weren't

1048
01:04:36.239 --> 01:04:39.760
<v Speaker 2>we were. Maybe that's too much, too dull, but anyway,

1049
01:04:39.840 --> 01:04:42.880
<v Speaker 2>but anyhow so, but the other thing I'd like to

1050
01:04:42.920 --> 01:04:45.719
<v Speaker 2>wrap it up is that, And one of the reasons

1051
01:04:45.760 --> 01:04:48.679
<v Speaker 2>I wrote in Denial is I don't know that we

1052
01:04:48.800 --> 01:04:51.960
<v Speaker 2>have even to this day, gotten over the lessons that

1053
01:04:52.039 --> 01:04:56.239
<v Speaker 2>we should be learning in terms that actually telling the

1054
01:04:56.280 --> 01:04:59.800
<v Speaker 2>truth is more efficacious. We're just doing it is more

1055
01:05:00.079 --> 01:05:05.320
<v Speaker 2>ficacious doing things that where you fool yourself, that you

1056
01:05:05.400 --> 01:05:11.960
<v Speaker 2>can finess things or do things deniably, that always takes

1057
01:05:11.960 --> 01:05:15.480
<v Speaker 2>so much energy in so many levels, the complexity that

1058
01:05:16.519 --> 01:05:19.880
<v Speaker 2>just doing it to saying what you're doing and doing

1059
01:05:19.920 --> 01:05:24.079
<v Speaker 2>it is always more effective. And that's why in recent

1060
01:05:24.360 --> 01:05:28.800
<v Speaker 2>decades of history we've been outflanked so many times because

1061
01:05:28.840 --> 01:05:33.079
<v Speaker 2>we really just wrapped ourselves up in our own narrative

1062
01:05:33.440 --> 01:05:37.840
<v Speaker 2>and nobody ever believed it. It's just so much more straight.

1063
01:05:38.079 --> 01:05:42.320
<v Speaker 2>It's not like we could ever did deniable action deniably

1064
01:05:42.880 --> 01:05:47.960
<v Speaker 2>never ever. Everybody everybody knew, but we haven't learned that

1065
01:05:48.039 --> 01:05:53.000
<v Speaker 2>lesson yet. In in current politics whatever, we just can't

1066
01:05:53.039 --> 01:05:55.800
<v Speaker 2>seem to get past that where a lot of our

1067
01:05:56.159 --> 01:06:01.360
<v Speaker 2>adversary nations just do it, and so so from that perspective,

1068
01:06:01.480 --> 01:06:04.480
<v Speaker 2>there are still lessons to be learned that are relevant today.

1069
01:06:05.920 --> 01:06:09.320
<v Speaker 1>No, absolutely, And look even with the changing technologies and

1070
01:06:09.360 --> 01:06:12.400
<v Speaker 1>everything else, and the fact that the surveillance grid that

1071
01:06:12.480 --> 01:06:18.559
<v Speaker 1>can be created, manufactured, or intensified around any circumstance is

1072
01:06:19.000 --> 01:06:23.079
<v Speaker 1>literally super accessible. You don't need a guy to build

1073
01:06:23.119 --> 01:06:27.559
<v Speaker 1>gadgets anymore. To tap telephone lines or to discover the

1074
01:06:27.639 --> 01:06:31.840
<v Speaker 1>locations of individuals. You can literally track them, you know,

1075
01:06:32.000 --> 01:06:35.440
<v Speaker 1>from a satellite if you like. There's a lot of

1076
01:06:35.480 --> 01:06:41.639
<v Speaker 1>different things that are so much more evolved now. But again,

1077
01:06:41.840 --> 01:06:44.679
<v Speaker 1>In Denials is a great book for this reason. In

1078
01:06:44.760 --> 01:06:47.320
<v Speaker 1>my mind, it's not the only reason. Larry's written a

1079
01:06:47.360 --> 01:06:49.960
<v Speaker 1>lot of great stuff and I'm looking extremely forward to

1080
01:06:50.000 --> 01:06:52.000
<v Speaker 1>and we're going to have to make a mention about

1081
01:06:52.039 --> 01:06:54.480
<v Speaker 1>Lancer before we're done. I've kept Larry a little longer

1082
01:06:54.519 --> 01:06:57.400
<v Speaker 1>than I wanted to, and I'm sorry about that, Larry.

1083
01:06:57.440 --> 01:07:00.480
<v Speaker 1>But we're going to finish here, you know, in just

1084
01:07:00.480 --> 01:07:04.119
<v Speaker 1>a few moments. The thing is this, after all this

1085
01:07:04.199 --> 01:07:08.519
<v Speaker 1>stuff that's gone on, in some ways, it becomes better

1086
01:07:08.559 --> 01:07:12.679
<v Speaker 1>to work with an open source approach as opposed to

1087
01:07:12.760 --> 01:07:16.599
<v Speaker 1>creating these massive webs that you end up having to

1088
01:07:16.639 --> 01:07:20.760
<v Speaker 1>unravel to even get at the initial objective any longer.

1089
01:07:21.760 --> 01:07:29.119
<v Speaker 1>Over Complexity and oversimplification are two grand enemies of people

1090
01:07:29.199 --> 01:07:34.599
<v Speaker 1>that wish to accomplish larger goals. That's the way I

1091
01:07:34.639 --> 01:07:37.840
<v Speaker 1>see it, That's what's laid out, and that's the lesson

1092
01:07:38.519 --> 01:07:43.719
<v Speaker 1>that our agencies, one way or another, are still having

1093
01:07:43.840 --> 01:07:52.400
<v Speaker 1>a very hard time learning, absorbing, submitting to and ultimately

1094
01:07:52.440 --> 01:07:56.480
<v Speaker 1>that's the biggest problem. So in my mind, you're going

1095
01:07:56.559 --> 01:07:58.679
<v Speaker 1>to have to touch on some of this though at

1096
01:07:58.760 --> 01:08:03.000
<v Speaker 1>Lancer this year, even though you're gonna present through a

1097
01:08:03.079 --> 01:08:05.400
<v Speaker 1>video and I think there's gonna be a video of

1098
01:08:05.480 --> 01:08:11.440
<v Speaker 1>you and then David Boylan right along with you, and

1099
01:08:11.480 --> 01:08:13.639
<v Speaker 1>you're gonna kind of work together at Lancer, right.

1100
01:08:14.239 --> 01:08:19.159
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, we're I've made myself available for one on ones

1101
01:08:19.199 --> 01:08:22.600
<v Speaker 2>remotely if necessary or if possible, But David and I

1102
01:08:22.680 --> 01:08:25.880
<v Speaker 2>will be presenting to doing a presentation and I'm just

1103
01:08:26.119 --> 01:08:29.159
<v Speaker 2>didn't disclose what we'll be talking about. We will be

1104
01:08:29.239 --> 01:08:32.640
<v Speaker 2>talking about Lee, Harvey Oswell and the FBI and New Orleans.

1105
01:08:33.319 --> 01:08:38.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm totally picturing Larry being passed around on an iPad

1106
01:08:38.680 --> 01:08:42.119
<v Speaker 1>or something at a bar while we're having discussions after

1107
01:08:42.239 --> 01:08:44.880
<v Speaker 1>hours at the conference. Hey, somebody bring Larry over to

1108
01:08:44.920 --> 01:08:45.479
<v Speaker 1>my table.

1109
01:08:46.199 --> 01:08:48.479
<v Speaker 2>Sounds good to me. I better stop up before we

1110
01:08:48.520 --> 01:08:51.319
<v Speaker 2>start that, though, I don't want to be left out entirely.

1111
01:08:51.479 --> 01:08:53.920
<v Speaker 2>Let's see a shiner bock. Okay, I'll get.

1112
01:08:53.800 --> 01:08:56.560
<v Speaker 1>Some sounds good. Make sure, though, that you keep the

1113
01:08:56.600 --> 01:08:58.600
<v Speaker 1>camera up nice and high in case you have to

1114
01:08:58.640 --> 01:09:01.760
<v Speaker 1>take a you know, bathroom room break. Nobody needs to

1115
01:09:01.800 --> 01:09:05.079
<v Speaker 1>see that, so you know, because you're you're definitely not

1116
01:09:05.560 --> 01:09:09.439
<v Speaker 1>Jeffrey whatever his name was from CNN. Anyway, I'm making

1117
01:09:09.520 --> 01:09:12.000
<v Speaker 1>ridiculous jokes. I'm trying to have a little fun with it.

1118
01:09:12.560 --> 01:09:14.680
<v Speaker 1>Hopefully you guys have learned a bit of something out

1119
01:09:14.680 --> 01:09:18.279
<v Speaker 1>of this and learn to consider things. See people wave

1120
01:09:18.319 --> 01:09:22.800
<v Speaker 1>around documentation, and people wave around terminologies that they picked

1121
01:09:22.880 --> 01:09:28.359
<v Speaker 1>up by examining documation. Documation. That's a good one documentation.

1122
01:09:29.680 --> 01:09:32.840
<v Speaker 1>They'll tell you, Look, we learned this because this agency

1123
01:09:32.920 --> 01:09:36.359
<v Speaker 1>was doing that, et cetera, et cetera. Here's the key, right,

1124
01:09:36.840 --> 01:09:39.920
<v Speaker 1>the olds shaking around the piece of paper, and probably

1125
01:09:39.960 --> 01:09:42.319
<v Speaker 1>there's nothing written on a trick in a lot of

1126
01:09:42.359 --> 01:09:46.319
<v Speaker 1>cases right when people make presentations. But the truth is

1127
01:09:46.359 --> 01:09:49.640
<v Speaker 1>that you need to be very considerate about how these

1128
01:09:49.640 --> 01:09:54.079
<v Speaker 1>operations ran, what was memorialized, and what is the truth

1129
01:09:54.119 --> 01:09:57.399
<v Speaker 1>about What you'll be able to glean from what remains

1130
01:09:57.800 --> 01:10:02.520
<v Speaker 1>long after the operation is complete, whether it was successful

1131
01:10:02.600 --> 01:10:06.800
<v Speaker 1>or not, or whether it was a complete failure. Well

1132
01:10:06.840 --> 01:10:10.520
<v Speaker 1>that is for history to judge, if history is ever informed.

1133
01:10:11.479 --> 01:10:14.960
<v Speaker 1>So there you go, Larry, anything you want to, you know,

1134
01:10:15.479 --> 01:10:18.199
<v Speaker 1>hit people two about this. I mean, well, we'll try

1135
01:10:18.199 --> 01:10:22.319
<v Speaker 1>and have another talk or to excuse me before Dallas.

1136
01:10:22.880 --> 01:10:26.560
<v Speaker 2>But I think I think this, well, this pretty much

1137
01:10:26.600 --> 01:10:32.399
<v Speaker 2>covers the practices, so I'm pretty comfortable with that. Now

1138
01:10:32.439 --> 01:10:34.560
<v Speaker 2>we can move on to other areas. But now I

1139
01:10:34.840 --> 01:10:37.560
<v Speaker 2>think I think we told the story pretty well, and

1140
01:10:37.640 --> 01:10:42.960
<v Speaker 2>these two together. If people thought the CIA was mysterious,

1141
01:10:44.479 --> 01:10:49.319
<v Speaker 2>hopefully we resolve some of that covert yeah, clandestine, Yeah okay,

1142
01:10:49.720 --> 01:10:51.359
<v Speaker 2>but no longer that mysterious.

1143
01:10:52.319 --> 01:10:56.239
<v Speaker 1>And I think people need to adjust their interpretations. You know,

1144
01:10:56.399 --> 01:11:01.680
<v Speaker 1>the big spooky CIA is not responsible for everything. You know,

1145
01:11:02.079 --> 01:11:05.800
<v Speaker 1>It's almost like everybody thinks or I get into little

1146
01:11:05.840 --> 01:11:09.520
<v Speaker 1>groups of people on occasion where everything from the fact

1147
01:11:09.600 --> 01:11:13.159
<v Speaker 1>that their cell phone call dropped to you know, to

1148
01:11:14.119 --> 01:11:17.079
<v Speaker 1>their neighbor got into a car accident might have something

1149
01:11:17.119 --> 01:11:21.800
<v Speaker 1>to do with the CIA, you know, because they're researching something.

1150
01:11:22.880 --> 01:11:25.560
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I've heard people said, do you.

1151
01:11:26.159 --> 01:11:28.039
<v Speaker 2>Give me a thought for wrapping it up? Though that

1152
01:11:28.199 --> 01:11:32.319
<v Speaker 2>might be interesting, it's not like the CIA wasn't interested

1153
01:11:32.359 --> 01:11:36.600
<v Speaker 2>in promoting that view anyway. And one of the books

1154
01:11:36.600 --> 01:11:39.319
<v Speaker 2>I write about the fact that their very first overseas

1155
01:11:39.359 --> 01:11:44.600
<v Speaker 2>operation that was hugely successful was a coup in ron, Okay.

1156
01:11:45.039 --> 01:11:48.079
<v Speaker 2>We now know all about that coup and why it succeeded,

1157
01:11:48.119 --> 01:11:50.319
<v Speaker 2>and the fact that the CIA had nothing to do

1158
01:11:50.439 --> 01:11:54.640
<v Speaker 2>with it, and actually their planned coup totally failed. But

1159
01:11:54.840 --> 01:11:58.560
<v Speaker 2>after what happened, more or less by coincidence that they

1160
01:11:58.600 --> 01:12:01.840
<v Speaker 2>had nothing to do with, the CIA managed to generate

1161
01:12:01.880 --> 01:12:05.520
<v Speaker 2>its own story that got and released it to the

1162
01:12:05.600 --> 01:12:09.479
<v Speaker 2>press talking about how they had done such a wonderful job,

1163
01:12:09.960 --> 01:12:14.000
<v Speaker 2>and Alan Dalles that had secret meetings with Shaw's representatives

1164
01:12:14.039 --> 01:12:17.680
<v Speaker 2>in Switzerland, and so the stories from the very beginning,

1165
01:12:18.159 --> 01:12:21.520
<v Speaker 2>THEA is determined it would create this impression of its

1166
01:12:21.560 --> 01:12:27.760
<v Speaker 2>own infallibility, make itself mysterious and always successful. So one

1167
01:12:27.800 --> 01:12:30.800
<v Speaker 2>thing that we could attribute to them is what a

1168
01:12:30.840 --> 01:12:35.119
<v Speaker 2>lot of this infallibility and mystery didn't come from their

1169
01:12:35.159 --> 01:12:37.560
<v Speaker 2>actual actions that came from their pr.

1170
01:12:37.800 --> 01:12:40.640
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, it's the legend. It's the legend, you know. And

1171
01:12:40.680 --> 01:12:42.880
<v Speaker 1>that's the thing about it, just like ch That's why

1172
01:12:42.880 --> 01:12:45.439
<v Speaker 1>I didn't object to that book title for the Oswald

1173
01:12:45.520 --> 01:12:48.159
<v Speaker 1>thing at one time, where somebody called it legend. But

1174
01:12:48.279 --> 01:12:51.640
<v Speaker 1>we now know about the motivations. Let's say that author

1175
01:12:51.680 --> 01:12:54.039
<v Speaker 1>a little more than we used to. But the thing is,

1176
01:12:54.560 --> 01:12:57.079
<v Speaker 1>that's what made sense, is that it was the legend

1177
01:12:57.680 --> 01:13:00.880
<v Speaker 1>that was being generated. And today, you know, like I

1178
01:13:01.039 --> 01:13:03.600
<v Speaker 1>make the joke all the time, Lee rby Oswald, who

1179
01:13:03.600 --> 01:13:08.319
<v Speaker 1>will cover next time? Maybe you know, he goes everywhere

1180
01:13:08.319 --> 01:13:14.199
<v Speaker 1>across the spectrum from a full, a complete foal who's

1181
01:13:14.199 --> 01:13:16.920
<v Speaker 1>out playing games that he has no idea about. He's

1182
01:13:17.000 --> 01:13:20.359
<v Speaker 1>like the seven year old playing pretend fireman, okay to

1183
01:13:20.439 --> 01:13:26.119
<v Speaker 1>some people. To others, he's James Bond, you know. And

1184
01:13:26.720 --> 01:13:30.079
<v Speaker 1>you know what I'm saying. And it's based on the legends,

1185
01:13:30.199 --> 01:13:34.239
<v Speaker 1>positive or negative one way or another. It swings both ways,

1186
01:13:34.520 --> 01:13:37.520
<v Speaker 1>and it ends up out there both ways without people

1187
01:13:37.560 --> 01:13:42.359
<v Speaker 1>ever really giving context and real world connection to a

1188
01:13:42.439 --> 01:13:45.319
<v Speaker 1>human being that lived to be twenty four years old,

1189
01:13:45.920 --> 01:13:49.840
<v Speaker 1>that had an interesting life. But then again, you know

1190
01:13:50.760 --> 01:13:53.359
<v Speaker 1>what did I say before we started the show. You know,

1191
01:13:53.800 --> 01:14:00.199
<v Speaker 1>sometimes you have plans and other times plans have you Anyway,

1192
01:14:00.319 --> 01:14:01.479
<v Speaker 1>that's my food for thought.

1193
01:14:01.560 --> 01:14:04.039
<v Speaker 2>Larry's sitting there down that earlier check. We might have

1194
01:14:04.119 --> 01:14:06.560
<v Speaker 2>used the quote in the book. I'm sorry, the manuscript

1195
01:14:06.640 --> 01:14:09.640
<v Speaker 2>is are already at the publishers. What can I say?

1196
01:14:09.760 --> 01:14:12.119
<v Speaker 1>Well, if you need a blurb, I'll work on one

1197
01:14:12.159 --> 01:14:12.439
<v Speaker 1>for you.

1198
01:14:12.560 --> 01:14:14.600
<v Speaker 2>About that, Okay, we'll work on.

1199
01:14:14.520 --> 01:14:18.760
<v Speaker 1>That anyway, Larry Hancock, everybody go over to Larry dash

1200
01:14:18.840 --> 01:14:21.439
<v Speaker 1>Handcock dot com. I kept him way longer than I

1201
01:14:21.439 --> 01:14:25.000
<v Speaker 1>wanted to. My apologies, Larry. It's been a weird week

1202
01:14:25.039 --> 01:14:28.960
<v Speaker 1>for me, recovering from an injury and such. But but hey,

1203
01:14:29.079 --> 01:14:31.279
<v Speaker 1>it is what it is, and again life goes on.

1204
01:14:31.760 --> 01:14:34.279
<v Speaker 1>But go to Larry dash Handcock dot com, and once

1205
01:14:34.319 --> 01:14:36.880
<v Speaker 1>again I want to remind you that we're both involved.

1206
01:14:37.239 --> 01:14:40.359
<v Speaker 1>I'll be there in person, Larry'll be there remotely at

1207
01:14:40.359 --> 01:14:44.000
<v Speaker 1>the Lancer Conference twenty second to the twenty fourth of

1208
01:14:44.119 --> 01:14:50.479
<v Speaker 1>November in Dallas, Texas at the at the Marriott there. Anyway,

1209
01:14:51.000 --> 01:14:53.560
<v Speaker 1>All that information will be in with the show notes,

1210
01:14:53.920 --> 01:14:58.720
<v Speaker 1>including links to Larry's blog, Larry's website, you know a

1211
01:14:58.760 --> 01:15:02.399
<v Speaker 1>couple of his books. All that plus all the lanswer

1212
01:15:02.439 --> 01:15:06.039
<v Speaker 1>information and you can get a ten percent discount I

1213
01:15:06.119 --> 01:15:09.000
<v Speaker 1>think on all your tickets one way or another ten

1214
01:15:09.039 --> 01:15:12.319
<v Speaker 1>percent off if you use the code o'celly ten at

1215
01:15:12.479 --> 01:15:16.760
<v Speaker 1>Assassinationconference dot com. But again it's all linked in the

1216
01:15:16.760 --> 01:15:20.199
<v Speaker 1>show notes, and Larry, anything you want to throw at

1217
01:15:20.279 --> 01:15:22.800
<v Speaker 1>us before I check us off for the day.

1218
01:15:23.439 --> 01:15:26.159
<v Speaker 2>Now, I think I'm good. It was fun as usual.

1219
01:15:26.119 --> 01:15:29.039
<v Speaker 1>Excellent well, always happy to talk to Larry Hancock, and

1220
01:15:29.119 --> 01:15:32.039
<v Speaker 1>always happy to talk to all of you, because after all,

1221
01:15:32.439 --> 01:15:35.560
<v Speaker 1>I am merely o'celly. All of you are the effect.

1222
01:15:36.000 --> 01:15:36.399
<v Speaker 1>Good night.

1223
01:16:25.560 --> 01:16:30.279
<v Speaker 6>In Denial Secret Wars with air strikes and tanks by

1224
01:16:30.399 --> 01:16:34.840
<v Speaker 6>Larry Hancock. Secret wars became a staple of US covert

1225
01:16:34.920 --> 01:16:38.760
<v Speaker 6>operations and are still happening today. Larry Hancock's book In

1226
01:16:38.880 --> 01:16:42.720
<v Speaker 6>Denial rips the cover off many of them, using new files.

1227
01:16:42.720 --> 01:16:45.119
<v Speaker 6>It exposes things about the Bay and Pigs that no

1228
01:16:45.159 --> 01:16:48.199
<v Speaker 6>one has ever written about before. It shows why it

1229
01:16:48.239 --> 01:16:50.760
<v Speaker 6>really failed and why the United States did not.

1230
01:16:50.880 --> 01:16:51.920
<v Speaker 1>Learn from it.

1231
01:16:51.920 --> 01:16:55.079
<v Speaker 6>It also shows why other countries today are doing secret

1232
01:16:55.119 --> 01:16:58.359
<v Speaker 6>operations with more success. This is the book that puts

1233
01:16:58.399 --> 01:17:01.319
<v Speaker 6>what some want to deny into the light.

1234
01:17:01.760 --> 01:17:06.880
<v Speaker 1>In Denial, secret wars with air strikes and tanks Larryhancock.

1235
01:17:08.039 --> 01:17:11.720
<v Speaker 1>For more information, go to Larry hyphen Handcock dot com.

1236
01:17:11.760 --> 01:17:15.319
<v Speaker 1>Pick up your copy of In Denial at Amazon dot com.

1237
01:17:15.359 --> 01:17:17.159
<v Speaker 6>In digital or physical.

1238
01:17:17.000 --> 01:17:21.560
<v Speaker 3>Revelation through conversation? Do you like history? Real history that

1239
01:17:21.680 --> 01:17:25.439
<v Speaker 3>you were never taught in schools? Why the Vietnam War

1240
01:17:25.720 --> 01:17:29.439
<v Speaker 3>Nuclear Bombs in nation Building in Southeast.

1241
01:17:28.840 --> 01:17:33.359
<v Speaker 7>Asia by author Mike Swanson, with new documentation never seen

1242
01:17:33.439 --> 01:17:36.720
<v Speaker 7>before that'll open your eyes to events that led up

1243
01:17:36.720 --> 01:17:37.000
<v Speaker 7>to this.

1244
01:17:37.479 --> 01:17:41.720
<v Speaker 3>Why the Vietnam War Nuclear Bombs in nation Building in

1245
01:17:41.800 --> 01:17:46.439
<v Speaker 3>Southeast Asia nineteen forty five through nineteen sixty one.

1246
01:17:46.720 --> 01:17:50.079
<v Speaker 7>Get your copy today at Amazon dot com.

1247
01:17:50.279 --> 01:17:53.479
<v Speaker 3>Why the Vietnam War by author Mike Swanson.

1248
01:18:08.399 --> 01:18:46.600
<v Speaker 8>Like like, like pernet like.

1249
01:19:25.319 --> 01:19:26.920
<v Speaker 3>Oh Chilli dot com?

1250
01:19:27.000 --> 01:19:27.359
<v Speaker 1>Go ahead?

1251
01:19:28.560 --> 01:19:30.000
<v Speaker 5>The truth about the JAFA.

1252
01:19:29.760 --> 01:19:31.600
<v Speaker 1>Assassination Right, Well, what do you want to know?

1253
01:19:32.000 --> 01:19:35.560
<v Speaker 5>Baker's wild claim Oswell, girlfriends he knew Ruby and Barry

1254
01:19:35.720 --> 01:19:36.640
<v Speaker 5>cancer weapons.

1255
01:19:36.680 --> 01:19:39.079
<v Speaker 1>Really, I imagine I could claim I have four wheels. It

1256
01:19:39.119 --> 01:19:40.159
<v Speaker 1>doesn't make me a wagon.

1257
01:19:40.239 --> 01:19:43.079
<v Speaker 5>But okay, Oswald was on the JILD and trying to

1258
01:19:43.079 --> 01:19:45.439
<v Speaker 5>prevent the murder of John Kennedy. Come on now, has

1259
01:19:45.439 --> 01:19:48.560
<v Speaker 5>a real effort on the day of hay Assassinationlaim.

1260
01:19:48.720 --> 01:19:52.760
<v Speaker 1>Go to Amazon dot com enter Judith Baker in her

1261
01:19:52.800 --> 01:19:55.680
<v Speaker 1>own words. You'll get the results for a digital copy

1262
01:19:55.720 --> 01:19:59.119
<v Speaker 1>of a book where Walt Brown utilizes her own words

1263
01:19:59.239 --> 01:20:02.119
<v Speaker 1>and the known evidence in the case to get at

1264
01:20:02.199 --> 01:20:05.680
<v Speaker 1>well a different perspective. Let's say you can get Judith

1265
01:20:05.800 --> 01:20:09.000
<v Speaker 1>Ary Baker in her own words from the author himself

1266
01:20:09.119 --> 01:20:12.199
<v Speaker 1>signed if you request it by contracting doctor Brown at

1267
01:20:12.279 --> 01:20:16.479
<v Speaker 1>k I as jfk at aol dot com. It's a

1268
01:20:16.479 --> 01:20:21.159
<v Speaker 1>fun book and it actually dissects the many, many fantastic claims.

1269
01:20:21.399 --> 01:20:24.039
<v Speaker 1>Judith very Baker in her own words.

1270
01:20:23.760 --> 01:20:25.319
<v Speaker 5>Thank you for all the great information.

1271
01:20:25.479 --> 01:20:27.800
<v Speaker 1>Well so you've expressed, like caller Schools or anyone else

1272
01:20:27.800 --> 01:20:29.359
<v Speaker 1>allowed us to get on the air of jelly dot com.

1273
01:20:29.359 --> 01:20:31.560
<v Speaker 1>If you not necessarily reflect the views little Jelly dot

1274
01:20:31.600 --> 01:20:33.880
<v Speaker 1>com or Jocko Chilly and we are not responsible. We're

1275
01:20:33.880 --> 01:20:35.680
<v Speaker 1>getting stupidity which might have student Thank you.

1276
01:20:35.760 --> 01:20:38.720
<v Speaker 4>This world get you down? Are you living you bliss

1277
01:20:39.199 --> 01:20:41.600
<v Speaker 4>diet of therapies that don't offer you any real direction

1278
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<v Speaker 4>or answers? Did you know that Maria does personal life

1279
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<v Speaker 4>coaching sessions? Save thousands of therapy dollars and get the

1280
01:20:48.199 --> 01:20:51.119
<v Speaker 4>direction and answers. You need to live an authentic life

1281
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<v Speaker 4>based on your own personal blueprint for this life. All

1282
01:20:54.239 --> 01:20:57.399
<v Speaker 4>this typically in just one private session with Maria. I'm

1283
01:20:57.439 --> 01:21:00.359
<v Speaker 4>countless hours on a couch. Maria, come on, minds her

1284
01:21:00.399 --> 01:21:04.279
<v Speaker 4>professional experience, life experience, and her heredity into what it

1285
01:21:04.319 --> 01:21:07.720
<v Speaker 4>gives to get you back on track. Email Maria today

1286
01:21:07.760 --> 01:21:11.279
<v Speaker 4>for an appointment at Maria at Maria dot net. That's

1287
01:21:11.439 --> 01:21:13.359
<v Speaker 4>m E r i A at m E r i

1288
01:21:13.439 --> 01:21:15.840
<v Speaker 4>a dot net. Get on with the best life you

1289
01:21:15.840 --> 01:21:19.359
<v Speaker 4>can possibly have. Check out the other side of this happy, loving,

1290
01:21:19.439 --> 01:21:23.279
<v Speaker 4>passionate woman at www dot Maria Heller dot com and

1291
01:21:23.399 --> 01:21:27.079
<v Speaker 4>amvail yourself the best coaching around, all in the privacy

1292
01:21:27.119 --> 01:21:28.680
<v Speaker 4>of your home via the telephone.

1293
01:21:29.079 --> 01:21:30.880
<v Speaker 3>Gift yourself with yourself.

1294
01:21:31.239 --> 01:21:34.800
<v Speaker 4>Make an appointment today, right Maria at Maria dot net.

1295
01:21:36.640 --> 01:21:39.680
<v Speaker 9>Uncle, do you remember that time when Benjamin Fulford said

1296
01:21:39.840 --> 01:21:43.479
<v Speaker 9>that an Asian secret society was going to dispatch ninja's

1297
01:21:43.479 --> 01:21:44.960
<v Speaker 9>to take down the Illuminati?

1298
01:21:45.159 --> 01:21:48.039
<v Speaker 3>Ooh, that's interesting, Yeah and the Claton?

1299
01:21:48.640 --> 01:21:48.880
<v Speaker 1>Yeah?

1300
01:21:48.960 --> 01:21:50.439
<v Speaker 9>Did that ever work out too good?

1301
01:21:50.760 --> 01:21:50.800
<v Speaker 2>No?

1302
01:21:51.640 --> 01:21:55.479
<v Speaker 9>At didn't did it? But here on o'chelly dot com

1303
01:21:55.560 --> 01:21:57.880
<v Speaker 9>Radio network, things work out a bit better, don't they

1304
01:21:58.079 --> 01:21:58.640
<v Speaker 9>much better?

1305
01:21:59.079 --> 01:22:05.680
<v Speaker 10>Much and understanding about the programs, the programs, how much

1306
01:22:05.760 --> 01:22:10.439
<v Speaker 10>clear getting live people into it. They really have a

1307
01:22:10.479 --> 01:22:14.239
<v Speaker 10>good conversation going much better, so much better scene.

1308
01:22:14.319 --> 01:22:17.560
<v Speaker 9>I say, forget Benjamin Fulford and his ninches and listen

1309
01:22:17.600 --> 01:22:19.880
<v Speaker 9>to the o'chelly dot com radio network.

1310
01:22:20.119 --> 01:22:23.479
<v Speaker 10>I agree, it's straight to the point, straight talk and

1311
01:22:23.640 --> 01:22:24.800
<v Speaker 10>I like that idea.

1312
01:22:25.840 --> 01:22:28.439
<v Speaker 11>Call yo, yo, This Doug Campbell, host of the Dallas

1313
01:22:28.479 --> 01:22:32.039
<v Speaker 11>Action podcast presented by Wall Street Window, and you are

1314
01:22:32.079 --> 01:22:37.840
<v Speaker 11>listening to the o'chill effect revelation through conversation, go ahead.

1315
01:22:37.520 --> 01:22:40.479
<v Speaker 5>Calling the truth about the JAFA assassination.

1316
01:22:40.760 --> 01:22:41.720
<v Speaker 1>Right, Well, what do you want to know?

1317
01:22:41.800 --> 01:22:45.279
<v Speaker 5>Judy Baker's wild claim Oswald girlfriends he knew Ruby and

1318
01:22:45.359 --> 01:22:46.760
<v Speaker 5>Barry hanswer weapons?

1319
01:22:46.800 --> 01:22:49.199
<v Speaker 1>Really? I imagine I could claim I have four wheels. It

1320
01:22:49.239 --> 01:22:50.239
<v Speaker 1>doesn't make me a wagon.

1321
01:22:50.359 --> 01:22:53.439
<v Speaker 5>But okaywal was on the building and trying to event

1322
01:22:53.560 --> 01:22:55.640
<v Speaker 5>the leader of John Kennedy Come on now has a

1323
01:22:55.680 --> 01:22:58.640
<v Speaker 5>real effort on the daya assassination ream.

1324
01:22:58.800 --> 01:23:02.880
<v Speaker 1>Go to Amazon dot com enter Judith Baker in her

1325
01:23:02.920 --> 01:23:05.800
<v Speaker 1>own words. You'll get the results for a digital copy

1326
01:23:05.840 --> 01:23:09.319
<v Speaker 1>of a book where Walt Brown utilizes her own words

1327
01:23:09.359 --> 01:23:12.199
<v Speaker 1>and the known evidence in the case to get at

1328
01:23:12.319 --> 01:23:15.760
<v Speaker 1>well a different perspective. Let's say you can get judith

1329
01:23:15.920 --> 01:23:19.119
<v Speaker 1>Ary Baker in her own words from the author himself,

1330
01:23:19.239 --> 01:23:22.319
<v Speaker 1>signed if you request it by contacting doctor Brown at

1331
01:23:22.399 --> 01:23:26.479
<v Speaker 1>k I A s JFK at aol dot com. It's

1332
01:23:26.520 --> 01:23:29.920
<v Speaker 1>a fun book and it actually dissects the many, many

1333
01:23:30.000 --> 01:23:33.760
<v Speaker 1>fantastic claims Judith Ary Baker in her own words.

1334
01:23:33.880 --> 01:23:35.399
<v Speaker 5>Thank you for all the great information.
