Speaker 1: Get ready for September eleventh, twenty twenty four, allegedly according
Speaker 1: to that thing we call a calendar. And you know what, Larry, Okay,
Speaker 1: I heard a bit of a sound there, just disrupt
Speaker 1: my own intro. You all right now?
Speaker 2: Not on my end, I'm fine.
Speaker 1: Oh I heard a weird noise. I don't know what
Speaker 1: you guys heard, but I'll leave it in the recording.
Speaker 1: Whatever it is. Anyway, weird noise is aside and the
Speaker 1: fact that this is an anniversary of a tragic event.
Speaker 1: I'm not doing a nine to eleven show, not at all.
Speaker 1: But you never know how this could in some way
Speaker 1: relate to those events, or the study of them, or
Speaker 1: something else. Anyway, not the true path of this show today. Nope,
Speaker 1: it's a Wednesday. I've got the great author Larry Hancock
Speaker 1: with me, who again takes up a lot of space
Speaker 1: on my bookshelf, but not because he's taken up space.
Speaker 1: Everything Larry writes is wonderfully informative, gives you an idea
Speaker 1: of exactly the type of topic we're going to cover tonight,
Speaker 1: which is all about a follow up to the last
Speaker 1: time we spoke with Larry and David boy Lean, who both,
Speaker 1: by the way, will be in one way or another
Speaker 1: participating in the Lancer conference coming up this November twenty
Speaker 1: second through the twenty fourth in Dallas, Texas, where I
Speaker 1: will be the MC Larry, as far as I know,
Speaker 1: will be remotely involved from parts another location, let's say
Speaker 1: an undisclosed location. About that, an undisclosed location his house anyway,
Speaker 1: there he will be, but he will be participating as well.
Speaker 1: David will be there a slew of individuals bringing you
Speaker 1: unique and in some cases very new information on the
Speaker 1: now sixty one year old case. And this will be
Speaker 1: in the crosshairs part in the I don't know, that's
Speaker 1: not a pun expression. How about that? You know? In
Speaker 1: the crosshairs, so to speak. Of tonight's topic, the CIA,
Speaker 1: how it works, and we went over documentation last time.
Speaker 1: We went over, you know, how things might be shared,
Speaker 1: kept where they need to go. Why a file is
Speaker 1: created just a bit though, really an introductory course, not
Speaker 1: even a course, maybe the introductory chapter to the introductory course.
Speaker 1: Not because that's all David knows or that's all Larry knows,
Speaker 1: but because it is rather difficult to explain, rather laborious,
Speaker 1: if you will, voluminous processes and files that are kept
Speaker 1: by guess who, your government and for what operations that
Speaker 1: you don't really need to know about. The public has
Speaker 1: no need to get all involved in stuff, and by
Speaker 1: the way, it would cease to serve its purpose if
Speaker 1: everything was known to the public, because the public would
Speaker 1: also include our adversaries. Anyway, forget about the benign explanations.
Speaker 1: Let's get into the nuts and bolts. And that's something
Speaker 1: that Larry greatly does, you know, through things like Surprise Attack.
Speaker 1: By the way, these are names of his books. Surprise Attack, Okay,
Speaker 1: the Nexus Nexus excuse me, not the Nexus, It's not
Speaker 1: the matrix Nexus. Also, someone would have talked tipping point.
Speaker 1: I could keep going unidentified. All of these books, at
Speaker 1: one time or another have been discussed at length and
Speaker 1: focused on on this show. And you could find that
Speaker 1: stuff in my archives past and all that. But tonight
Speaker 1: we're going to talk about something that, in one way
Speaker 1: or another is probably in nearly all of Larry's books,
Speaker 1: except I don't know. Maybe it's not in the Doctor
Speaker 1: King books. Maybe it's not it's not Nope, maybe not there,
Speaker 1: but nearly every other I.
Speaker 2: Mean, out of twelve or fifteen books, you've got to
Speaker 2: pass on a couple.
Speaker 1: You got to give it a break somewhere. I mean.
Speaker 1: But the thing is this type of topic fit. It's
Speaker 1: with everything, and you would have to consider it as
Speaker 1: well for the King books, but doesn't end up in there.
Speaker 1: Uh the King Books of course, the Awful Grace of God.
Speaker 1: And what is the title of the of the other
Speaker 1: the other title of the King work.
Speaker 2: Killing King, Killing King?
Speaker 1: See you know I should know that, but I'm kind
Speaker 1: of pushing away from that title, not because of you,
Speaker 1: not because of stew but you know it's that Bill
Speaker 1: O'Reilly character, and he was, you know, all about killing everybody.
Speaker 1: Uh you know what was it? Patent Jesus JFK. Who
Speaker 1: didn't he kill in his books?
Speaker 2: Everybody in World War Two? Killing Japan. But but I
Speaker 2: will say in the in the King books, we do
Speaker 2: talk a lot about documentation and practices. But in that regard,
Speaker 2: it's it has to do with the Federal Bureau of
Speaker 2: Investigation because the FBI was the primary agency involved in
Speaker 2: investigating the crime. So we do go into practices there
Speaker 2: and spend a lot of time with FBI agents and
Speaker 2: documentar what how it did things. It's just that that
Speaker 2: did not involve CIA, so it was FBI and that
Speaker 2: and that particular focus.
Speaker 1: Decidedly different bureaucracy, even though it is part of the
Speaker 1: same government, and it's certainly a similar agency to some degree.
Speaker 1: But the FBI is not the CIA, although occasionally we
Speaker 1: have seen instances where it's gotten confused. And you can
Speaker 1: go to Larry dash Handcock or Larryhypenhancock dot com. I
Speaker 1: always recommend you go over that check out his books.
Speaker 1: If you don't know about them and own them all yet,
Speaker 1: what are you doing? Go get them? Uh. And also
Speaker 1: you could check out his blog, which runs many interesting
Speaker 1: things in real time, including his research into what is
Speaker 1: it UAPs? I always got to stop myself because I'm
Speaker 1: so used to saying UFOs, but even including some academic
Speaker 1: work on guess what the intelligence agencies reactions to these
Speaker 1: things called UFOs UAPs unidentified phenomen I'm going to etc.
Speaker 1: The most fascinating story in that book, though, to me,
Speaker 1: is about the instance on the military base. But let's
Speaker 1: just leave it alone for now, because that's not tonight's topic.
Speaker 1: As we said, it's going to be about the bureaucratic
Speaker 1: workings and the inner workings of what ends up being
Speaker 1: a lot of paperwork for sure. Oh wait, we're not
Speaker 1: going to do that. We're going to discuss something else.
Speaker 1: But either way, it's connected to all this, how this
Speaker 1: stuff is codified, how it ends up existing in the
Speaker 1: official record, whether it is secret or not. We're going
Speaker 1: to talk about a bunch of things and the way
Speaker 1: it works out. So where are we going, Larry, how
Speaker 1: would we title this discussion?
Speaker 2: Well, this would be a focus Again. We're talking about
Speaker 2: an agency. It's a government agency. It does have official reporting.
Speaker 2: People do expense reports, people have budgets. There's an Office
Speaker 2: of Security, there's an office in accounting. It is a
Speaker 2: government agency, so at its core it has to operate
Speaker 2: like any other agency, even though it has to shield
Speaker 2: itself from the public. But as you said, primarily the adversaries,
Speaker 2: because the CIA, as we talked before, has as many aspects.
Speaker 2: It collects intelligence, it does intelligence analysis, it does political action,
Speaker 2: which is an entirely different thing. But what we're focused
Speaker 2: on here is how does it actually carry out the
Speaker 2: practice is involved with operations, which means plandestine operations. So
Speaker 2: how do you do something that is supposedly deniable but
Speaker 2: still keep it under some level of control, because yeah,
Speaker 2: you've got to do expense reports and budgets.
Speaker 1: Too, right. And the interesting part about this to me is,
Speaker 1: of course, this is often the almost banal or benign
Speaker 1: aspects of things that end up being most revelatory. For instance,
Speaker 1: and I love to bring this up, Larry, and I'm
Speaker 1: sorry heard it one hundred times already. But the fact
Speaker 1: is that, you know, even the revelation, if you will,
Speaker 1: regarding the you know, things like mk ultra, how did
Speaker 1: we really get hold of that long, long story short?
Speaker 1: How did the public get informed about it? Wasn't you know,
Speaker 1: a parade of whistleblowers know, it was an investigation into
Speaker 1: something else that wound up turning up documentation, and it
Speaker 1: wasn't even documentation, Like, here's the evil thing we did.
Speaker 1: Here's where we drugged people. I'm being facetious obviously, you know,
Speaker 1: here's where we had people killed, et cetera at this
Speaker 1: time and date. And oh, by the way, I hope
Speaker 1: I'm going to get my lunch reimbursement here, you know,
Speaker 1: because I had to eat while I was out there
Speaker 1: killing someone.
Speaker 2: No.
Speaker 1: The thing is though, that there are rather sort of
Speaker 1: you know, run of the mill expense reports. That's literally
Speaker 1: what ended up creating the record because the forensic individual,
Speaker 1: a forensic accountant type person comes in and reconstruct That's
Speaker 1: what happened based on basically the receipts. So you know,
Speaker 1: you never know which part of this which again seemingly
Speaker 1: and obviously people forgot about that part of it, although
Speaker 1: they did destroy other documents and that's another thing. But anyway,
Speaker 1: before we get too complicated about all this, what is
Speaker 1: always said to be the thing that must be protected
Speaker 1: to keep files safe from public view, to keep people
Speaker 1: away from the deeper, darker secrets, the ugly stuff that
Speaker 1: you know, just like as a child, you don't need
Speaker 1: to know what it is that somebody had to go
Speaker 1: through to maybe earn the money to buy you the
Speaker 1: brand new jacket, but you know a jacket was provided
Speaker 1: for you, and that's good enough for you if you're
Speaker 1: seven years old. But as a primarily adult nation, right,
Speaker 1: we feel entitled to know these things and don't always
Speaker 1: get to know them. And why because they even protect
Speaker 1: their practices, they protect their what they're you know, their
Speaker 1: means there. Jeez, what would we call that? Larry Well,
Speaker 1: I've got an idea. How about this? The operative. Let's
Speaker 1: say the individuals, oh, the resources Wait a minute, even better,
Speaker 1: sources and methodology or sources and methods common phrase a
Speaker 1: lot more complex than it sounds, Larry. So that's where
Speaker 1: we're going tonight.
Speaker 2: Yes, yeah, And I think the key thing to remember
Speaker 2: about that is, again, it sounds mysterious, but in one
Speaker 2: aspect it's not. Somebody has to assign a task. I mean,
Speaker 2: there's nobody in an organization. You know people, People get
Speaker 2: personnel reports done on them anually. People get reviewed, case
Speaker 2: officers get reviewed, managers get reviewed, stations get reviewed. If
Speaker 2: I'm Mexico City station, I have to review my personnel,
Speaker 2: I have to provide spending reports and finances looking over
Speaker 2: my shoulder, and there's a caution there. It's it's yeah,
Speaker 2: the work itself is mysterious, and I it's it pays
Speaker 2: me to use surrogates and volunteers and to offload as
Speaker 2: much of it as possible so my people aren't visible.
Speaker 2: But at the core of it, you have to have practices,
Speaker 2: even for clandestine operations. I think an example of that
Speaker 2: that we often cite is one of the most sensational
Speaker 2: things related to clandestine operations, as assassinations. Okay, and we
Speaker 2: all talk and about the Castro assassination attempts. But it's
Speaker 2: kind of interesting that when when the CIA was tasked
Speaker 2: and specifically someone was given a task, like you said
Speaker 2: with mk Ultra, someone had to be assigned a task
Speaker 2: of going after Castro. Okay, they recruited Johnny Roselli to
Speaker 2: do that. Johnny Roselli brought in some people that required money. Okay,
Speaker 2: where's the money coming from? Whose budget is it coming from?
Speaker 2: So the interesting thing is General Cabell, who was in
Speaker 2: charge of the Geographic Directorate where Cubilize, had to know
Speaker 2: about this and had to know the money was being spent.
Speaker 2: And so when when push comes to shove and somebody
Speaker 2: really needs cash, somebody really needs to build a cash
Speaker 2: the person who's going to do this requires signatures like
Speaker 2: I am not going to pay one hundred thousand dollars
Speaker 2: out of my budget unless you sign off on it.
Speaker 2: And thence a record had to be created of one
Speaker 2: of the most clandestine and explodes as things that was
Speaker 2: being done. And that applies to almost any clandestine action.
Speaker 2: People have to get approvals for spending money. And again
Speaker 2: the common and that's why so much of it digging
Speaker 2: into it is you don't look, you know, you don't
Speaker 2: look for it to be talked about. You have, as
Speaker 2: you were kind of saying, you have to reverse engineer
Speaker 2: it from the records trail.
Speaker 1: Well, right, because there's a process by which this all occurs.
Speaker 1: And here's the thing. It's not like you have a
Speaker 1: standard set of let's call them, you know, chores or
Speaker 1: goals for the day. You know, if you work in
Speaker 1: a retail establishment, you know that during the course of
Speaker 1: the day, this or this or this has to be done.
Speaker 1: But in truth, when you have operations like this, investigations
Speaker 1: or things that are meant to create desired effects, whatever,
Speaker 1: you have to assign a job. But you got to
Speaker 1: create that job. So you create the job, you create
Speaker 1: a pool of resources, you know, not just human resources,
Speaker 1: but you also need to have oh, I don't know, guns,
Speaker 1: you know, places for people to be, storage areas, vehicles,
Speaker 1: let's say. So you have to pull together great men
Speaker 1: the assets. Then you have to you know, map out
Speaker 1: where do they go, what are they going to do?
Speaker 1: What are their objectives as they move forward? So you
Speaker 1: have to create all that. Somebody commits that to papers,
Speaker 1: so that I mean, I hate to oversimplify it, but
Speaker 1: you have to create a checklist. Okay, we have all
Speaker 1: the guns we need. Okay, we have all the people
Speaker 1: we need, we have the backup individuals. We have an
Speaker 1: alternative mode of transportation. If we can't get out of
Speaker 1: the country because of a plane, well, is there a
Speaker 1: harbor nearby, et cetera. All these things laid out one
Speaker 1: way or another. And I know it sounds very mundane,
Speaker 1: and it's like you're being silly. You're telling me that
Speaker 1: they got to create a budget within a budget and
Speaker 1: also keep most of its secret because very few people
Speaker 1: are allowed to know about this. But still money and
Speaker 1: assets and people need to be appropriated and assigned. I mean,
Speaker 1: I don't know how much more simple you make. Yeah.
Speaker 2: Again, as you said, he has projects that are sanctioned. Okay, Okay,
Speaker 2: this project is sanctioned, This project is funded. Everybody within
Speaker 2: that project it's tasked with doing certain things. Let's say
Speaker 2: I'm running this covert war against castro. Okay, create a
Speaker 2: project to do it, put it under a project AD.
Speaker 2: He assigned staff to it, recruits them, they get paid,
Speaker 2: they get performance reports, and then he parcels out his
Speaker 2: budget and as an example for that, they decide that
Speaker 2: to do this deniably they have to use surrogates. So
Speaker 2: they're going to use certain Cuban anti Castro groups to
Speaker 2: do certain activities, propaganda, maritime missions, whatever. Got to be
Speaker 2: a budget for that, got to have somebody handing over
Speaker 2: that money, and you have to there's a paper trail
Speaker 2: that goes with it. So even for a clandestine operation
Speaker 2: like that, you've got you know, case off that are
Speaker 2: making reports. And when we go to the files, we
Speaker 2: find files on these various groups that are summary files.
Speaker 2: In other words, how are things going with the DRE,
Speaker 2: How are they, what are the various people that work
Speaker 2: with them have to say about them? What missions do
Speaker 2: they do?
Speaker 1: Well?
Speaker 2: Are they problems for us? And that's why so much
Speaker 2: of what we dig out is from these operational reports.
Speaker 2: You know. It's if you've got an actual station report
Speaker 2: from Mexico City or from Berlin or from JM. Way,
Speaker 2: you can really find out what's going on, even though
Speaker 2: it's all shielded from the outside and cripts are used
Speaker 2: and code names are used for projects inside, You've got
Speaker 2: to have a trail. You've got to have just like
Speaker 2: any other management system. So I think one of the
Speaker 2: things that I would like to draw a difference between
Speaker 2: is what the what the CIA did with its own
Speaker 2: at sets and covert operations, where you've got CIA people
Speaker 2: actually recruiting people, paying people, setting up supplies to support
Speaker 2: the operations, whether it's guns, money, boats, whatever, or where
Speaker 2: they actually are able to call in support from outside
Speaker 2: the CIA. That is more deniable in a way. And
Speaker 2: that's where we run into the things that are called
Speaker 2: cover companies. I kind of actually the term CIA cover
Speaker 2: is again used much too broadly. But for example, you
Speaker 2: may recruit. You'll go out to a major corporation, let's
Speaker 2: say it's a shipping corporation. You'll contact the people on
Speaker 2: its board, you contact its president, senior officers, and ask
Speaker 2: them to volunteer to provide covers for you. Whether it's
Speaker 2: simply travel documents for your people. You know you're going
Speaker 2: to accept that their crew on your boat, okay, or
Speaker 2: whether it's you're gonna we're going to use your ships
Speaker 2: and you'll agree to transfer our cargo for no cost
Speaker 2: and with no accounting. By the way, thank you very much.
Speaker 1: And we'll also ask you to the company right, and
Speaker 1: we'll also ask you to create documentation for people that
Speaker 1: are going to travel with you under the guys that
Speaker 1: they are your employees. So these guys are now your employees.
Speaker 1: Don't ask them to do any work, but they have
Speaker 1: a job title and they get to travel with your
Speaker 1: other employees when we say they do so. This way,
Speaker 1: you have a sort of benign group of businessmen going
Speaker 1: to establish something that is completely normal, run of the
Speaker 1: mill whatever. And meantime, they don't actually do any of
Speaker 1: that work. What they really do is whatever the CIA
Speaker 1: is test them with. Excuse me, but that's the reality
Speaker 1: of it. And a lot of people will use the
Speaker 1: term shell corporation as well or shell company. And why
Speaker 1: is that? Because they create something whole cloth, let's say,
Speaker 1: or partially. Like say there is a shipping company that
Speaker 1: has all the licenses and everything, but is a failing business. Well,
Speaker 1: here's the trade off. We'll pump enough money into your
Speaker 1: business so that you can run things for a little while,
Speaker 1: maybe you can figure out how to sort this out.
Speaker 1: While you're doing that, we'll actually keep your business afloat.
Speaker 1: But here's the trade off. You have six employees, sixty employees,
Speaker 1: doesn't matter the number, but you have a handful of
Speaker 1: employees or people that are working with your company one
Speaker 1: way or another that you're just taking along for the ride.
Speaker 1: Then to do so.
Speaker 2: Much better name for that rather than shell company is
Speaker 2: proprietary because you actually acquire business control. You put money
Speaker 2: into the firm, right, you have somebody on the board
Speaker 2: of directors, you have a couple of people in management.
Speaker 2: It's not a company volunteering to work for you. It's
Speaker 2: a company that literally is working for you. And as
Speaker 2: you say, probably without your money might be failing. With
Speaker 2: your money, they're succeeding. You know, you make up the difference.
Speaker 2: You schedule the cargoes, you do deals, and so proprietaries
Speaker 2: are quite different from these these cover companies that I'm
Speaker 2: talking about, where there's a quid pro quo when you're
Speaker 2: working with them, you actually to show you your good faith.
Speaker 2: You'll get together with the senior managers and share certain
Speaker 2: information that the CIA is collecting about the areas where
Speaker 2: their business is working, who's doing you know, you're collecting
Speaker 2: a lot of open source intelligence, financial intelligence. Obviously it's
Speaker 2: great if I'm running a corporation working in South America
Speaker 2: that I get briefed on that kind of stuff.
Speaker 3: Works.
Speaker 2: It's it's great. So I can be patriotic and at
Speaker 2: the same time benefit from being patriotic, or you can
Speaker 2: have a very different instant situation than with the proprietaries
Speaker 2: that I'm talking.
Speaker 1: About, right. So, and another added benefit here is that
Speaker 1: you may indeed have ways to be paid for things
Speaker 1: even though you don't have to do them necessarily. You
Speaker 1: tell them because of the amount of weight that is
Speaker 1: in a particular you know, cargo container that Look, what
Speaker 1: you're going to do is say you're a furniture company
Speaker 1: as benign as that. Well, really, what we're going to
Speaker 1: do is we're going to stick a bunch of guns
Speaker 1: in with the metal bed frames that you're shipping in
Speaker 1: a cargo container. I know it sounds ludicrous but and
Speaker 1: quite oversimplified, but in effect, this is the kind of
Speaker 1: thing that happens. You know, Look, these are metal bed frames.
Speaker 1: Pay no attention to the fact that you know, it's
Speaker 1: actually a bunch of small arms and medium you know,
Speaker 1: arms for troops that have been clandestinely maneuvered into the
Speaker 1: same place that you are going to do business. We're
Speaker 1: going to deliver some guns while you're delivering some bedframes
Speaker 1: and we'll make up for that difference. So you get
Speaker 1: paid for those You don't even have to sell them
Speaker 1: because they didn't exist in the first place.
Speaker 2: And as it turns out, there's actually an alternative to
Speaker 2: doing that, because as you chuck you that can get
Speaker 2: pretty complex. It can get pretty complex. People are smart,
Speaker 2: they realize something else is going on. Wait a minute,
Speaker 2: this is not right. The shipment didn't go where I
Speaker 2: thought it would, and we somehow failed to recognize that.
Speaker 2: Over the decades, in the col War, especially the first
Speaker 2: couple of decades, the CIA relied quite heavily on the
Speaker 2: US military. Right, they relied on the military for people.
Speaker 2: These people were actually vetted and assigned to the CIA.
Speaker 2: They generally went out of uniform, although not necessarily, and
Speaker 2: they became detailed and that was the term detailed to
Speaker 2: the CIA for various activities, generally training activities, you know,
Speaker 2: not actual special operations, that sort of thing. If the
Speaker 2: CIA wanted an military person for actual covert action, they
Speaker 2: hired them, the person would resign their position, They would
Speaker 2: be hired as a contract employee. But the reason I'm
Speaker 2: bringing this up is actually the CIA operations that were
Speaker 2: most covert during those years were where they actually had
Speaker 2: the military, either the military or proprietary working, not where
Speaker 2: the CIA managed it itself. For example, in Guatemala, one
Speaker 2: of the reasons they were very successful in that overthrow
Speaker 2: regime was they actually went to Air America, which was
Speaker 2: a prietary, and literally hired pilots and aircraft. These guys
Speaker 2: are experienced, they know what they're doing. They come in,
Speaker 2: they're on the spot, and the air operation of Guatemala
Speaker 2: was excellent and actually probably made the whole thing work. Okay,
Speaker 2: in Indonesia they used the US Navy. In the end
Speaker 2: it didn't work as well, but the actual shipments and
Speaker 2: delivery of weapons to the groups worked exceedingly well. One
Speaker 2: of the examples of how not to do it is when,
Speaker 2: and we've talked about this before, when we got to
Speaker 2: the Cuban operation in the Bay of Pigs. The CI
Speaker 2: officers that were doing that were of the fact that
Speaker 2: the CIO ought to do everything for itself, and so
Speaker 2: over a period of time, the CIA had built its
Speaker 2: own air force. Okay, as we saw on Gulf you
Speaker 2: can have a priory terry Air America. Not a problem
Speaker 2: you're gonna have. You're gonna have people that really know
Speaker 2: how to do this stuff in a relationship with you.
Speaker 2: But these officers that were running the Cuba projects decided
Speaker 2: they did not want to use the method that had
Speaker 2: worked for them several times before because that wouldn't for
Speaker 2: some reason, be deniable. They decided that they were going
Speaker 2: to have to create their own air operation, recruit their
Speaker 2: own pilots from the Cuban exile community, train their own pilots,
Speaker 2: and not use uh trained pilots that were detailed. Yeah,
Speaker 2: they brought in some people from the Alabama Air National Guard,
Speaker 2: but for training purposes, not to fly missions. As it
Speaker 2: ended up ended up, they as a last resort JFK
Speaker 2: let them fly some missions over the over the beachhead
Speaker 2: which were fatal to the pilots. But it's I guess
Speaker 2: the reason I'm bringing this up is almost like every
Speaker 2: operation became a different mix of these different alternatives. It's
Speaker 2: kind of like we have a we've got a playbook,
Speaker 2: which ones are we going to pick to throw into
Speaker 2: this operation. And as you can understand, if you keep
Speaker 2: doing that, and if you keep changing the playbook over time,
Speaker 2: guess what, things get worse and worse. Because nobody really
Speaker 2: knows how it's going to work this time, and it's
Speaker 2: like you're starting from fresh every time, and that's where
Speaker 2: things ended up in Vietnam and laws. But so I
Speaker 2: just clearly wanted to separate things like cover companies, proprietaries,
Speaker 2: military detailes, and internal groups like the cis on Air
Speaker 2: Force that it created to replace what the Air Force
Speaker 2: had been doing for it very successfully before wars, like
Speaker 2: we don't we don't want the military in this, Okay,
Speaker 2: we'll do it ourselves. We don't want the Navy involved
Speaker 2: in this amphibious operation. We'll do it for ourselves. And
Speaker 2: as you as you're talking, you're going and how is
Speaker 2: that going to work for you? The answer is not well?
Speaker 1: Right, And this is uh covered in in detail in
Speaker 1: in Denial right.
Speaker 2: And shadow warfare, and in Denial Share shadow warfare really
Speaker 2: goes into the history of the practices and you know,
Speaker 2: how how you do some of the things that we've
Speaker 2: been talking about with examples, how did you do it
Speaker 2: you know in Guatemala, how did you do it in Loos,
Speaker 2: how did you do it in Burma? You know what?
Speaker 2: What were the actual cover companies? You know, who did
Speaker 2: you do partnerships with it? It actually got to the
Speaker 2: point under the ICE and our administration where for a
Speaker 2: lot of these cover companies, we're major corporations doing business
Speaker 2: in say South America or the pre and they would
Speaker 2: the CIA would call in the presidents for these these companies.
Speaker 2: General Cabell would meet with them and fill them in
Speaker 2: about the plans to overthrow this regime and kind of
Speaker 2: help them plan how to take advantage of what was
Speaker 2: going to happen.
Speaker 1: Right, Yeah, that.
Speaker 2: Sounds amazing, But we actually have the records of those meetings.
Speaker 1: Right. This is the thing is that it sounds like
Speaker 1: the plot of a movie. I hate to keep repeating that,
Speaker 1: but it really does. And it's truly based on true stories.
Speaker 1: You have literal situations. Now this whole you know kettle
Speaker 1: that's boiling here. You know, people argue all the time
Speaker 1: as to whether it still exists in one way or another,
Speaker 1: or if it's just you know, now a footnote, a
Speaker 1: practice that got out of control, as most creatures of
Speaker 1: the Central Intelligence Agency apparently do. Because and but it's
Speaker 1: difficult to say, because the truth is, if they have
Speaker 1: great control over it. The first thing is you generally
Speaker 1: don't know much about it because it's just they are
Speaker 1: hiding in plain sight, and these become, I said, creatures.
Speaker 1: I'm quoting something or some things from the past that
Speaker 1: I've seen and heard. But the reality is, yes, if
Speaker 1: you pulled off a covert operation, oh so well, people
Speaker 1: should not know about it within a couple of years,
Speaker 1: a couple of months, a couple of days that this
Speaker 1: kind of thing happened.
Speaker 2: But when that was the whole thrust of my book
Speaker 2: in Denial, Right, does anybody really think that you can
Speaker 2: do deniable operations? The Russians were so much smarter about that.
Speaker 2: The Russians did deniability in a very classic fashion. Right, Okay,
Speaker 2: so did they send Russian fighter pilots to Korea? You
Speaker 2: bet they did. In fact, for the first year or so,
Speaker 2: all the air combat was actually between the US and Russia.
Speaker 2: That Rusians just didn't talk about it. They didn't worry
Speaker 2: about covering it up. There was no there were no
Speaker 2: special you know, we could intercept their radio communications and
Speaker 2: you see it's a Russian pilot. We absolutely knew that.
Speaker 2: They didn't worry about it. Don't worry about deniability.
Speaker 1: Well, and here's the other problem, because now here's where
Speaker 1: it gets overly complex. If you're writing a movie script.
Speaker 1: Somebody's gonna drop something on the table and say to you, look, stop,
Speaker 1: you're going too far, because now it's a big mix up.
Speaker 1: And the deal is that these things happened this way.
Speaker 1: But the Russians could get away with, say, just openly
Speaker 1: having the Russian pilots there because the people that witnessed
Speaker 1: the Russian pilots they weren't supposed to be there. So
Speaker 1: you had games like that going on where.
Speaker 2: Well, and they're military, so you don't you don't have
Speaker 2: our military reporting. The decision was made to classify that
Speaker 2: right the same way as in Vietnam. We now know
Speaker 2: there's an ex extensive research that's been done that the
Speaker 2: Russian and Chinese participation in the VS. Vietnam War was immense.
Speaker 2: I mean we're talking about whole battalions of troops, whole
Speaker 2: formations of Chinese troops in North Vietnam. Yes, we're talking
Speaker 2: about immense Russian participation. At the time, we knew that
Speaker 2: because we're pretty good at signals, intelligence and collections. But
Speaker 2: the decision is always made, well, they're just not talking
Speaker 2: about it if we accuse them of even if when
Speaker 2: we capture their equipment, we're in laws, we capture their
Speaker 2: tanks whatever, they just deny it. So their version of
Speaker 2: deniability is just to deny it, where our version of
Speaker 2: deniability is, well, we'll do it in such a fashion
Speaker 2: that you can't trace it to us even if you
Speaker 2: find it. So that adds like several layers of complexity.
Speaker 2: We can't use our own weapons. Russians don't care. They
Speaker 2: use their own weapons. We got a biome O receives
Speaker 2: and ship them in so they can't be traced us.
Speaker 1: Now, and there's the thing. You have to do something
Speaker 1: that makes sense so that if it is revealed. Okay,
Speaker 1: for instance, you know you need to use US military
Speaker 1: troops to accomplish something a larger operation it requires or
Speaker 1: not a larger operation, but let's just create it theoretically
Speaker 1: here quickly, you need thirty guys to capture a base. Why. Logistically,
Speaker 1: you need a certain amount of guys to be able
Speaker 1: to run roadblocks. You need guys to be able to control, say,
Speaker 1: the contingent that is manning the base. Right, you need
Speaker 1: another group of guys to handle the vehicles, make sure
Speaker 1: none of them are moving. Somebody captures the centralized motor
Speaker 1: pool area whatever. By the time you get all that done,
Speaker 1: somebody says, well, here's the thing. If somebody gets killed
Speaker 1: during this operation or drops a gun, I'd rather that
Speaker 1: if we're in Vietnam, it looks like something that was
Speaker 1: manufactured in China, right, or it is manufactured and generally
Speaker 1: used by name a troop from somewhere else, the French. Okay,
Speaker 1: say they want older guns from the French, because it
Speaker 1: would make sense that there are French weapons laying around
Speaker 1: because of the incursion just previous. Right, So you have
Speaker 1: to account for all of this. You don't want to
Speaker 1: leave American you know, M sixteen's laying around, because somebody's
Speaker 1: gonna go, wait a minute, why is it that, you know,
Speaker 1: people from Laos have these brand new American weapons. Why
Speaker 1: is it that they have German weapons that were manufactured
Speaker 1: two months ago? You can't leave that kind of stuff
Speaker 1: laying around, right, or you know, the idea of don't
Speaker 1: let them get captured in a particular uniform whatever.
Speaker 2: Except the problem is the world being not naive and
Speaker 2: pre charp That never works.
Speaker 1: Right.
Speaker 2: In the book, I describe a walk through it page,
Speaker 2: and there has never been a deniable operation that stayed
Speaker 2: deniable because everybody can see what's going on. It's no
Speaker 2: matter how many layers you go through, people are going
Speaker 2: to like, like we do follow the money, Like who
Speaker 2: would have done that all? Who would be screwing around
Speaker 2: with us? Then that kind of a mission in North Vietnam,
Speaker 2: Let's say, do I think it would be the Chinese
Speaker 2: rating in North Vietnamese? No? Do I think it's the
Speaker 2: friend is obviously that it's the Americans.
Speaker 1: Right.
Speaker 2: So the whole concept of deniability from the way that
Speaker 2: we traditionally pursued it just didn't work and it never
Speaker 2: does work. And it's even back in nineteen sixty one
Speaker 2: after the Bay of Pigs when they had the follow
Speaker 2: up meetings and inquiries that got to the point where
Speaker 2: even the Director of the CIA at that time, Alan Dulles, acknowledged,
Speaker 2: is on record the CIA cannot do covert military action.
Speaker 2: You just need to take that stuff and hand it
Speaker 2: over to the military, which actually JFK was the problem
Speaker 2: in the process of doing.
Speaker 1: But it discussed.
Speaker 2: It never does work. It just sounds like it. It's tempting.
Speaker 2: It makes it makes sense. We'll do this, we'll do it,
Speaker 2: and we'll make it deniable so nobody will know that
Speaker 2: we did it right.
Speaker 1: And this is why we've had the extended conversation regarding
Speaker 1: how many responsibilities that had previously been in the hands
Speaker 1: of the CIA were being transferred to the d IA. Uh,
Speaker 1: you know, and what is that? The Defense Intelligence Agency?
Speaker 1: What does it sound like, boys and girls? It sounds
Speaker 1: like it's got something to do with the military, doesn't it?
Speaker 1: Because it does? It is okay. But see, now we've
Speaker 1: spun all into another area, haven't we. But that's the thing.
Speaker 2: Yeah, and we didn't even Will me comment a little
Speaker 2: on the question that you just asked, sure that we
Speaker 2: didn't talk about, and and that is is this the
Speaker 2: same way to day? And I will say that in
Speaker 2: the book Surprise Attack, I dealt with that question quite
Speaker 2: a bit like our CI operations covert operations today like
Speaker 2: they were then. And the answer is no, they're not.
Speaker 2: And one of the reasons. One of the reasons is
Speaker 2: the decision after nine nine to eleven, quite frankly, decision
Speaker 2: was made to start authorizing military action under the CIA
Speaker 2: under the federal laws that you know, Title fifty in
Speaker 2: Title ten are the keys there. The President will authorize
Speaker 2: it under covert actions and national security. But it's assigned
Speaker 2: to the military, and the CIA will always be put
Speaker 2: in a support role. So when we started creating the
Speaker 2: special task Forces and operations after nine nine to eleven,
Speaker 2: those were military operations that would have CIA people assigned
Speaker 2: to them. You might find a team where there's a
Speaker 2: CIA drone operator, you might find this or that. But
Speaker 2: the CAA moved into much more of a support role
Speaker 2: than beforehand because the decision was, if if you're going
Speaker 2: to do military you might as well do it. We're
Speaker 2: going to let them report to Sentcom like when Ben
Speaker 2: Lauden was when they went after Ben Lauden, it was
Speaker 2: authorized under National security the sort of thing that the
Speaker 2: CIA operates under, but it was tasked to the military,
Speaker 2: not the CIA, because the military isn't supposed to do
Speaker 2: certain things under its federal guidelines, which are okay under
Speaker 2: the National Security Act of nineteen forty seven. So I
Speaker 2: just want to get into the fact, since you'd ask
Speaker 2: the question, has changed, things changed over time, and they
Speaker 2: did quite dramatically starting in the last decade after following
Speaker 2: the nine.
Speaker 1: To eleven attacks. Less two decades really, right, because yeah,
Speaker 1: isn't that amazing that Yeah, and you have the whole reorganization.
Speaker 1: I use that term loosely because of a lot of
Speaker 1: things we've seen, but well, you definitely had is the
Speaker 1: outgrowth or the growth from a very pardon the pun,
Speaker 1: centralized you know, singular place to the now what is
Speaker 1: it seventeen agencies now that are involved in these Okay,
Speaker 1: so one agency, which was supposed to be the clearing
Speaker 1: house the centralized I keep using that word location for
Speaker 1: all of this ends up becoming the octopus with sixteen tentacles.
Speaker 2: All right, Clearly that has to make things better, right, Yeah.
Speaker 1: I mean that should make things a lot better and
Speaker 1: less confusing, I think, again facetious comments. But so where
Speaker 1: do we go with this from here?
Speaker 4: Larry?
Speaker 1: I mean we talked about now you know, the way
Speaker 1: it was evolving in a way, and where it stands today.
Speaker 2: Well, I think it's it is much differently today. But
Speaker 2: I think one of the things I wanted to bring
Speaker 2: up in regard to the era that we normally talk
Speaker 2: about in regard to the JFK ASSASS nations, there's there's
Speaker 2: one there's one other area of deniability. We don't know
Speaker 2: how many times it happened. We know for sure one
Speaker 2: time that it happened because it's well documented. But all
Speaker 2: of these things projects tasking, could be tied to performance
Speaker 2: reports and expense reports and budgets and that sort of thing.
Speaker 2: But they always the one thing was that the CIA
Speaker 2: was in control. The CIA was control of the money. Ostensibly,
Speaker 2: the CIA was in control of the people. You know,
Speaker 2: So if you had if you had surrogates that were
Speaker 2: working for you, you stayed in touch with them, you knew
Speaker 2: what they were doing, you paid them a regular fee,
Speaker 2: you had some control. And there is an instance in
Speaker 2: which I write about in Denial, where the decision was
Speaker 2: made that that wasn't deniable enough. It can't really be
Speaker 2: deniable if you've got that paper you know, that kind
Speaker 2: of paperwork trail. If you want to be totally deniable,
Speaker 2: these people have to look like and play like they're
Speaker 2: totally on their own. They've got to have the money, right.
Speaker 2: This happened with something we have talked about many times,
Speaker 2: which was the Amoral Project, which was supposed to represent
Speaker 2: the epitome of deniability. A military force totally on its own,
Speaker 2: buying its own weapons, buying its own boats, conducting its
Speaker 2: own missions, totally no connection to the United States, right,
Speaker 2: and to do that. One of the big dangers was
Speaker 2: they were given the money.
Speaker 1: So what overall, outside of the fact that we have
Speaker 1: a situation where it's like we're going to hand over
Speaker 1: complete control, you're not coming in to check in with
Speaker 1: your with everybody who's over your head. When you have
Speaker 1: to do stuff, you have to operate sort of independently.
Speaker 1: What is the big deal about am world or am
Speaker 1: World when you speak to people that say, have no
Speaker 1: clue about what the significance of that operation is. What's
Speaker 1: the Larry Handcock cliff Notes version of how to put
Speaker 1: Amworld in context?
Speaker 2: Please, The point is you lost control or you exposed
Speaker 2: yourself to being a situation. For example, with am World,
Speaker 2: there were some CI officers assigned to it that we're
Speaker 2: there to support logistics, you know, if travel needed to
Speaker 2: be arranged. Okay, well but we're like a logistics support team.
Speaker 2: Well we'll, yeah, we'll and and actually to try to
Speaker 2: gain control, they tried to infiltrate some people into the
Speaker 2: group to report on them because they were so concerned
Speaker 2: that they could possibly go rope because in that period
Speaker 2: of time, the CIA was always using surrogates. I'm sorry,
Speaker 2: I couldn't help gru people who had, you know, an
Speaker 2: agenda of their own, and you're just helping them accomplish it.
Speaker 1: Right. I'm sorry I had to chuckle there, because it's
Speaker 1: it's an interesting thing to just consider this. Okay, guys,
Speaker 1: not you Larry, you know this, but I mean, consider
Speaker 1: this for a moment. You have a circumstance in which
Speaker 1: you have a very sensitive operation in the hands of
Speaker 1: people that are not usually in charge of the operation.
Speaker 1: According to what i'll call the chain of command, right,
Speaker 1: they're making decisions that might have been made a different
Speaker 1: way and by different people in the food chain. The
Speaker 1: chain of command again, I'll just use that, and am
Speaker 1: world is interesting in that and I'm not saying this
Speaker 1: is the only time it happened, But when you've got
Speaker 1: to literally send people to go infiltrate your infiltration group,
Speaker 1: it becomes again one of those added layers of complexity
Speaker 1: that I got to be frank with you, I'm not
Speaker 1: sure if they imagine that to begin with, or if
Speaker 1: the concept here was to eliminate the problems that would
Speaker 1: cause you to have to investigate your own investigators.
Speaker 2: Because the CI officers themselves anticipated it.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I'm getting at though.
Speaker 2: You how difficult. It was to control surrogates, because when
Speaker 2: I say surrogates, I mean I'm talking about a group
Speaker 2: of people who are combat ready. They've declared themselves to
Speaker 2: be revolutionaries. They're armed, they're committed, they're somewhat fanatical, they're
Speaker 2: somewhat obsessive. You know, they've adopted, they they've engaged. They're
Speaker 2: engaging in a crusade, and you are supporting their crusade.
Speaker 2: But clearly their goal in line is their top priority,
Speaker 2: not your international interest or your geopolitics, or if you
Speaker 2: want to finest something at a particular time. That's not
Speaker 2: their problem. Their problem is their focus is their focus,
Speaker 2: not yours. The CIA knew that because all the groups
Speaker 2: that they worked with ever had the same problems, not
Speaker 2: just the Cuban ones, Eastern Europe same thing. But the
Speaker 2: problem was, and frankly, we have to be honest about this,
Speaker 2: AM World was not the CIA's idea. AM World and
Speaker 2: its leader our teammate. And while our teammate was Robert
Speaker 2: Kennedy's idea, because Robert Kennedy had gotten to the point
Speaker 2: where he didn't he thought the CIA was being too bureaucratic,
Speaker 2: He thought they were being too controlling. The Cubans kept
Speaker 2: telling him, if you just let us go, give us
Speaker 2: the money, give us some exploit, we'll do it. You've
Speaker 2: been holding us back for years. We could have had
Speaker 2: Castro overthrown by now. It's all these controls that they
Speaker 2: keep imposing on us.
Speaker 1: Right now, our teammate for the listener, just to just
Speaker 1: to be clear, here is literally a very key figure
Speaker 1: because he's actually, according to some supposed to be the
Speaker 1: guy who is going to take over even right, I mean,
Speaker 1: am I missing something here?
Speaker 2: He is supposed to replace Castro.
Speaker 1: He's supposed to replace Castro. And here's the again fascinating,
Speaker 1: a little bit frightening though, because here's the thing. The
Speaker 1: agency is doing this and the very the very characteristics
Speaker 1: that make our teammate and anybody who is you know,
Speaker 1: use the word fanatic before, and it could be fanatical,
Speaker 1: or you could just describe it as really deeply held
Speaker 1: dedication to your work. Yeah, the very thing that makes
Speaker 1: them useful and effective and qualifies them to do the
Speaker 1: job is simultaneously I mean talking about the proverbial double
Speaker 1: edged sword is literally the problem that can now create
Speaker 1: problems for the project that they're on your team you're
Speaker 1: with them, but your agendas might not line up exactly.
Speaker 1: And yet that's still the most useful part of them
Speaker 1: that they're willing to go. They're willing to put the
Speaker 1: sacrifice in, they're willing to do the dangerous work because
Speaker 1: this is something they are attached to. This is their life,
Speaker 1: this is their country, this is their I know I'm
Speaker 1: sounding preachy, right.
Speaker 2: But now they're patriot they consider themselves patriots, right, but
Speaker 2: they're ejectorily dedicated. But the other factor is they're always
Speaker 2: political because you've got to remember, these are the guys
Speaker 2: who got thrown out of somebody someplace.
Speaker 1: Kay.
Speaker 2: They're all expatriots, they're all exiles or whatever. So there's
Speaker 2: all kinds of politics going on, right, which the CI
Speaker 2: knows it has to cope with. It's all as difficult.
Speaker 2: It even gets to the point where with Amworld, where
Speaker 2: the CIA guy in charge of am World, our teammate
Speaker 2: comes in and says, you know, these other guys are
Speaker 2: like giving us a real problem and Nolah Ray and Jura,
Speaker 2: and he says, well, that's okay if you run across
Speaker 2: them when you're doing missions against Cuba, sink them. But
Speaker 2: wait a minute, they're also a anichest I don't care
Speaker 2: they're getting in our way sync. So all of these
Speaker 2: patriots I have their own politics too.
Speaker 1: Well, and just like our guys are willing to accept
Speaker 1: their extremist ideas. And okay, that's a little outside the law,
Speaker 1: but you're not really our guy. So you could do
Speaker 1: this right like, you know you are our guy, but
Speaker 1: you're not so and when you do that, you're not
Speaker 1: our guy. When you come back and do this, you're
Speaker 1: our representative again, you know, in our But that's a
Speaker 1: balance where you've got to balance between what their agenda is,
Speaker 1: how you can make that work for you. And it's
Speaker 1: at the same time the other edge of the sword.
Speaker 1: You got to make sure that it doesn't come back
Speaker 1: and cut off or cut into one of the things
Speaker 1: that you have on your agenda as something that should
Speaker 1: be protected or vice versa. You want to protect something
Speaker 1: and they don't, or they want to protect it and
Speaker 1: you don't care what happens to it. It can cut
Speaker 1: both ways, and you know, at the drop of a
Speaker 1: dime or a hat, right, So.
Speaker 2: The CI officers know this, and they've been facing these
Speaker 2: problems their career professionals. They know that they're always going
Speaker 2: to face those problems with surrogates. So you know, how
Speaker 2: as a manager, how can I keep them on target,
Speaker 2: on control? It's going to be tough. So when RFK
Speaker 2: is told by them that it's the CIA itself that's
Speaker 2: the problem. If you just get them out of our hair,
Speaker 2: will be good, and essentially accepted that because the CI
Speaker 2: had been failing on one end, you've got yes to
Speaker 2: say I had failed. They haven't assassinated Castro, they haven't
Speaker 2: caused a coup, they haven't done anything effectively, and so
Speaker 2: there's a good proposition to be made that, well, we've
Speaker 2: got to do something radically different. The CIA, on the
Speaker 2: other hand, would come back and say, well, you know,
Speaker 2: we're trying to do it deniably and in a control fashion,
Speaker 2: and you know, so there's a fundamental argument there. But
Speaker 2: the reason we come back to this is that the
Speaker 2: CIA very much opposed this level of deniability because of
Speaker 2: the risk involved, especially the risk involved with the fact
Speaker 2: that these people had their own not just proprietaries or
Speaker 2: cover companies. These people set up their own companies to
Speaker 2: buy stuff. They had their own money and tens of
Speaker 2: millions of dollars to buy boats, ships to buy weapons
Speaker 2: in Europe, deniable weapons. And they had their own operating
Speaker 2: accounts that they're like open checking accounts. The CIA just
Speaker 2: dumps money into them, whatever happens with it. Why do
Speaker 2: they have those Because we're going to be moving out
Speaker 2: of the US, we're new identities, We're going to go
Speaker 2: into the Caribbean where we can operate deniability, new names,
Speaker 2: and we need to be able to have money that
Speaker 2: we can just have on demand. Okay, buy what you need,
Speaker 2: go where you need whatever. That's at the point where
Speaker 2: it gets to be a really high risk operation.
Speaker 1: And just like with many many businesses that are not
Speaker 1: connected to you know, black or gray operations one way
Speaker 1: or another, guess what. Nobody knows what happens to the
Speaker 1: extra money. The accountant might have something representing where that
Speaker 1: money went, but in reality, it could have went toward
Speaker 1: guess what one of these guys' personal agendas. Yeah, you know,
Speaker 1: so here we go.
Speaker 2: Well, we saw the worst example of that years later
Speaker 2: when a certain military person was assigned by a certain
Speaker 2: president to do a completely deniable, off the books operation
Speaker 2: against the contras in Nicaragua. And what did that turn
Speaker 2: into the biggest drug smuggling operation in history, did anybody
Speaker 2: monitor the money that was given? Oh? Yeah, we actually
Speaker 2: now we can monitor it, and we saw how much
Speaker 2: of it was used for boats and planes for smuggling drugs.
Speaker 2: You know when the pursuit of deniability and I'll make
Speaker 2: the argument here never leads to good things.
Speaker 1: Yeah, so herein is the problem. So again back to
Speaker 1: am world though or am World, and I don't know
Speaker 1: why I keep bouncing back and forth between those. I
Speaker 1: think people used to say it the other way is
Speaker 1: what what happened? Right? At some point I think I'll
Speaker 1: announce her.
Speaker 2: I'm not even sure at this point which was first?
Speaker 1: That's the thing. I'm confused now too, because it's just
Speaker 1: been around and people have kicked this around. Why is
Speaker 1: the am World operation? Key one and two, Just to
Speaker 1: inform the listener, there's a purpose to the cryptonem here
Speaker 1: that is easily discernible and you can trace it through
Speaker 1: other operations. Right regarding am World.
Speaker 2: First off, it is not supposed to relate the cube
Speaker 2: at all. I mean, but it's not. It's not going
Speaker 2: to fall under the directorate that handles America. It's not
Speaker 2: going to fall fall under Cabell it's it's supposed to be.
Speaker 2: It's it's kind of like the crypts that are used
Speaker 2: over and over again because they don't relate to anything else,
Speaker 2: you know, it's it's a standalone thing.
Speaker 5: Uh.
Speaker 2: But for your first question, the reason we the reason
Speaker 2: I write and spent so much time about it is
Speaker 2: it's the best documented example of a totally deniable operation
Speaker 2: that we have. Why is that because it was was
Speaker 2: investigated as far as of the JFK assassination inquiries. Otherwise
Speaker 2: there certainly can be other operations, although, let's face it,
Speaker 2: unless something it's called on the carpet, like a run contra,
Speaker 2: you know, you just don't have that level of detail.
Speaker 2: But we have an immense amount of detail on how
Speaker 2: much money was paid, what was shipped where, But that
Speaker 2: only came out because that some of the individuals involved,
Speaker 2: like our teammate. Quite frankly, we're considered at one time
Speaker 2: as possibly being involved in the assassination. The HSCA was
Speaker 2: actually given our teammates name as someone that might know
Speaker 2: I might have heard, might have Okay, this is the
Speaker 2: guy you want to look at, and of course in
Speaker 2: looking at him, they determine what was he doing in
Speaker 2: nineteen sixty three am World. So two reasons why it
Speaker 2: really stands out. One because we have so much information
Speaker 2: on it, and two because there are suspicions that it
Speaker 2: in some circles that it might have been associated with
Speaker 2: the assassination because it was so essentially untouchable it was
Speaker 2: we can't We don't know where the people that were
Speaker 2: involved when it were in November. All we know is
Speaker 2: that they essentially went off the books, and they go
Speaker 2: off the record for four or five months until they
Speaker 2: show up again outside the United States, which too many
Speaker 2: people as suspicious. But there are a couple of reasons.
Speaker 2: I write about it in my books and in Denial
Speaker 2: and in Shadow Warfare as an example of deniable autonomous operation,
Speaker 2: because they have a lot of data on it. But
Speaker 2: in the other in other books it comes up because
Speaker 2: it's it's has some connections to the assassination.
Speaker 1: No, it's just important to bring up because I've seen
Speaker 1: other mentions of this where you know, and this was
Speaker 1: a big feature a few years back when the discussion
Speaker 1: I hate to, I don't want to. I'm not going
Speaker 1: to bring up somebody else's work here on you, Okay,
Speaker 1: but you probably know what I'm thinking because it was
Speaker 1: a big source, yes, you know, and and the concept
Speaker 1: of C Day right instead of D Day comes out again.
Speaker 1: I'm not trying to pick on anybody in particular, because
Speaker 1: a lot of people thought that this might be the
Speaker 1: key to the why of the assassination, the actual here's
Speaker 1: the thing that needed to be covered up so badly
Speaker 1: that they were willing to let Kennedy die and not
Speaker 1: have the truth revealed in order to protect at this operation, right.
Speaker 2: And absolutely right, there there was a time and I
Speaker 2: think I think it's safe to say one of the
Speaker 2: that reveals one of the things that we're all subject to.
Speaker 2: There are things that look mysterious way mysterious way suspicion
Speaker 2: suspicions at one point in time, and when you learn
Speaker 2: more about it, they're not nearly so mysterious. But there's
Speaker 2: also a real trap of kind of like I just
Speaker 2: learned about this and I want to make the world
Speaker 2: aware of it. There may this may answer the whole thing,
Speaker 2: and then you get caught by what follows kind of like,
Speaker 2: oh geez, now we have more documents, me of more records,
Speaker 2: we know more about all of this, and I just
Speaker 2: I leapt too quickly.
Speaker 1: And sometimes, look, it's rather forgivable because you know, you
Speaker 1: spend twenty years, thirty years, you know, on something, and
Speaker 1: suddenly something that appears to answer a whole lot of
Speaker 1: questions that are legitimate questions, is sort of dropped in
Speaker 1: front of you. And excuse me. We've seen this happen
Speaker 1: a few times with things that are have a lot
Speaker 1: less meat on the bone, let's say, than this by
Speaker 1: a long shot, you know, Like I've even talked about
Speaker 1: very early on, again, I was still a teenager, the
Speaker 1: French gunman, you know, the French gunman theory, the Marseille gangsters, right,
Speaker 1: that to me looked plausible. I wasn't well read into
Speaker 1: anything at that point, but to me, it just appeared
Speaker 1: plausible because of the way that it was presented, and
Speaker 1: it seemed to be rather and I don't even think
Speaker 1: the first time I heard about it wasn't on the
Speaker 1: Men who killed Kennedy. But a whole lot of people
Speaker 1: point to that and say, I remember that show. You know,
Speaker 1: that's the thing that got me going or whatever back then,
Speaker 1: and other people have said, oh, look, there's this confession
Speaker 1: from a mobster, and you know what, I'm referring to there. Yeah,
Speaker 1: you know the camtext whatever they refer to it documents
Speaker 1: right where you have a gangster in prison confessing to
Speaker 1: his sell me. I did this right, supposedly. I mean,
Speaker 1: I'm shortening all these stories, but.
Speaker 2: I can't tell you how many years I just lost
Speaker 2: out of my life following Fred Chrisman and Thomas Beckham
Speaker 2: because that sounded so intriguing at the time, So it
Speaker 2: can happen to anybody. The danger is, you know, the
Speaker 2: temptation is always there to be the first to tell
Speaker 2: that story, right. And in regard to am World, it's
Speaker 2: kind of funny because I was reaching it researching Amworld
Speaker 2: and had come across the crypt and had documents on
Speaker 2: it as the same type as C Day was being investigated,
Speaker 2: and I was actually talking to the other person. It's like, well,
Speaker 2: I'm about to I'm about to publish this, so you know,
Speaker 2: if you could hold off talking about it, okay, yeah,
Speaker 2: that'll you know, I don't know enough about it yet
Speaker 2: to do anything, so it so as a temptation as
Speaker 2: to how sensational it looks. And you know, if you
Speaker 2: want to claim a territory or be the first to
Speaker 2: reveal the information.
Speaker 1: Well, there is that aspect, right, but there's also just
Speaker 1: the you know what, finally I have something that has
Speaker 1: fallen into place and and didn't have to be you know,
Speaker 1: forced or coaxed real hard to make sense of a
Speaker 1: whole lot of things that appeared to have no solution.
Speaker 1: I mean that that. I mean, I know I'm kind
Speaker 1: of repeating myself here and just you know, rewording it,
Speaker 1: but it's true. And again, after a lot of frustration
Speaker 1: and a bunch of dead ends and so on and
Speaker 1: so forth, and maybe you lucked out and you've got
Speaker 1: an interview with somebody who's still alive, but other people
Speaker 1: don't necessarily know where he is or what he's doing.
Speaker 1: You know, these kinds of things all come together and
Speaker 1: it creates an effect. So I don't want to linger
Speaker 1: on this too long, but I'm just pointing out that
Speaker 1: with am World, this is definitely one of those things
Speaker 1: that had a lot to it. You know, you started
Speaker 1: to line up the evidence. Okay, if this is happening,
Speaker 1: this should exist. Some of those things started to come up, right,
Speaker 1: I mean, it.
Speaker 2: Was, And that doesn't mean that one scenario, one particular
Speaker 2: scenario related to it might turn out to be false,
Speaker 2: maybe another scenarios. You know, it doesn't. It relates to
Speaker 2: your interpretation, not to data. I mean, the data that
Speaker 2: we have on it now is there. You go, it's solid.
Speaker 2: You know, it's just a matter of interpretation. So but
Speaker 2: you're right, I kind of it's been discussed for so
Speaker 2: long now it's kind of like I can understand and
Speaker 2: you list would be, well, why are you making so
Speaker 2: much out of that? That's just one crypt that's just
Speaker 2: one thing. But it's it's been in play for much
Speaker 2: longer than I even like to think about, right.
Speaker 1: Right, So anyway, all of these things aside, and we've
Speaker 1: talked about, you know, how some of this works and
Speaker 1: how some of this doesn't work, which is always the
Speaker 1: most fascinating part about the things you write. I love
Speaker 1: that you know it's not all about the success of
Speaker 1: the operation and literally building on the legend of the
Speaker 1: boogeyman CIA. Okay, that's not what Larry Hancock does in
Speaker 1: his writing. It's not let me create the monster, let
Speaker 1: me make it more nefarious, let me make it more imposing,
Speaker 1: let it cast a larger shadow. You don't do that,
Speaker 1: you you know, the way you do this. This is
Speaker 1: why I love your writing actually, because it's always sober,
Speaker 1: and I don't mean sober to the point of holy crap,
Speaker 1: these people are boring as hell because there's so I mean,
Speaker 1: it's sober in the way it needs to be. This
Speaker 1: is the way that these things need to be examined.
Speaker 1: So I know I took us off track a little bit,
Speaker 1: and I apologize, but I think it was worth it
Speaker 1: to go through and kind of let people examine this
Speaker 1: along with us and consider what it is we're dealing
Speaker 1: with here. Okay, so let's bring it all the way
Speaker 1: back around. Let's try and wrap a bow on it. Larry,
Speaker 1: what do you think?
Speaker 2: Yeah, I think what I'd like to get out of
Speaker 2: these two sessions the one we did last week in
Speaker 2: this is that the good news for us anybody that's
Speaker 2: looking into this, is this is history, and good or bad,
Speaker 2: we have learned so much about the history of the
Speaker 2: last several decades that a lot of things that were
Speaker 2: totally mysterious, that were totally classified at the time, we've
Speaker 2: the efforts of the research community in Toto, regardless of
Speaker 2: how many directions we've stumbled off in, have documented a
Speaker 2: huge amount of American history, and we should be able
Speaker 2: to take credit for that, how the CIA operates, how
Speaker 2: the FBI operated. They don't write books and publish them all.
Speaker 2: A couple of their former employees have done that. But
Speaker 2: we now understand a lot of things that were totally
Speaker 2: mysterious to us when they were happening and decades afterwards,
Speaker 2: and we ought to be able to take credit for that.
Speaker 2: But we also need to get past the point that
Speaker 2: it's all mysterious, because it isn't anymore. We really do
Speaker 2: understand their practices, and we have a great knowledge for
Speaker 2: how they operated then versus how they operated now. We
Speaker 2: ought to be able to profit from that and not
Speaker 2: leave it as all mysterious, right.
Speaker 1: And I mean along the way again, I think it's
Speaker 1: relative relatively necessary excuse me for that, uh, to recognize that,
Speaker 1: you know, there is a time when we're going to
Speaker 1: have to wrap up and clear away a lot of
Speaker 1: the clutter that mystery the legend, like I'm saying that
Speaker 1: it's built around these things. Oh, you are right, and
Speaker 1: that was me.
Speaker 2: I dropped a bottle, Oh my goodness, by it soda.
Speaker 1: But we won't go there, no problem, that's your business.
Speaker 1: But anyway, is Larry completely sober. He's dropping his bottle
Speaker 1: over there.
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, we were just talking about being sober, weren't
Speaker 2: we were. Maybe that's too much, too dull, but anyway,
Speaker 2: but anyhow so, but the other thing I'd like to
Speaker 2: wrap it up is that, And one of the reasons
Speaker 2: I wrote in Denial is I don't know that we
Speaker 2: have even to this day, gotten over the lessons that
Speaker 2: we should be learning in terms that actually telling the
Speaker 2: truth is more efficacious. We're just doing it is more
Speaker 2: ficacious doing things that where you fool yourself, that you
Speaker 2: can finess things or do things deniably, that always takes
Speaker 2: so much energy in so many levels, the complexity that
Speaker 2: just doing it to saying what you're doing and doing
Speaker 2: it is always more effective. And that's why in recent
Speaker 2: decades of history we've been outflanked so many times because
Speaker 2: we really just wrapped ourselves up in our own narrative
Speaker 2: and nobody ever believed it. It's just so much more straight.
Speaker 2: It's not like we could ever did deniable action deniably
Speaker 2: never ever. Everybody everybody knew, but we haven't learned that
Speaker 2: lesson yet. In in current politics whatever, we just can't
Speaker 2: seem to get past that where a lot of our
Speaker 2: adversary nations just do it, and so so from that perspective,
Speaker 2: there are still lessons to be learned that are relevant today.
Speaker 1: No, absolutely, And look even with the changing technologies and
Speaker 1: everything else, and the fact that the surveillance grid that
Speaker 1: can be created, manufactured, or intensified around any circumstance is
Speaker 1: literally super accessible. You don't need a guy to build
Speaker 1: gadgets anymore. To tap telephone lines or to discover the
Speaker 1: locations of individuals. You can literally track them, you know,
Speaker 1: from a satellite if you like. There's a lot of
Speaker 1: different things that are so much more evolved now. But again,
Speaker 1: In Denials is a great book for this reason. In
Speaker 1: my mind, it's not the only reason. Larry's written a
Speaker 1: lot of great stuff and I'm looking extremely forward to
Speaker 1: and we're going to have to make a mention about
Speaker 1: Lancer before we're done. I've kept Larry a little longer
Speaker 1: than I wanted to, and I'm sorry about that, Larry.
Speaker 1: But we're going to finish here, you know, in just
Speaker 1: a few moments. The thing is this, after all this
Speaker 1: stuff that's gone on, in some ways, it becomes better
Speaker 1: to work with an open source approach as opposed to
Speaker 1: creating these massive webs that you end up having to
Speaker 1: unravel to even get at the initial objective any longer.
Speaker 1: Over Complexity and oversimplification are two grand enemies of people
Speaker 1: that wish to accomplish larger goals. That's the way I
Speaker 1: see it, That's what's laid out, and that's the lesson
Speaker 1: that our agencies, one way or another, are still having
Speaker 1: a very hard time learning, absorbing, submitting to and ultimately
Speaker 1: that's the biggest problem. So in my mind, you're going
Speaker 1: to have to touch on some of this though at
Speaker 1: Lancer this year, even though you're gonna present through a
Speaker 1: video and I think there's gonna be a video of
Speaker 1: you and then David Boylan right along with you, and
Speaker 1: you're gonna kind of work together at Lancer, right.
Speaker 2: Yeah, we're I've made myself available for one on ones
Speaker 2: remotely if necessary or if possible, But David and I
Speaker 2: will be presenting to doing a presentation and I'm just
Speaker 2: didn't disclose what we'll be talking about. We will be
Speaker 2: talking about Lee, Harvey Oswell and the FBI and New Orleans.
Speaker 1: I'm totally picturing Larry being passed around on an iPad
Speaker 1: or something at a bar while we're having discussions after
Speaker 1: hours at the conference. Hey, somebody bring Larry over to
Speaker 1: my table.
Speaker 2: Sounds good to me. I better stop up before we
Speaker 2: start that, though, I don't want to be left out entirely.
Speaker 2: Let's see a shiner bock. Okay, I'll get.
Speaker 1: Some sounds good. Make sure, though, that you keep the
Speaker 1: camera up nice and high in case you have to
Speaker 1: take a you know, bathroom room break. Nobody needs to
Speaker 1: see that, so you know, because you're you're definitely not
Speaker 1: Jeffrey whatever his name was from CNN. Anyway, I'm making
Speaker 1: ridiculous jokes. I'm trying to have a little fun with it.
Speaker 1: Hopefully you guys have learned a bit of something out
Speaker 1: of this and learn to consider things. See people wave
Speaker 1: around documentation, and people wave around terminologies that they picked
Speaker 1: up by examining documation. Documation. That's a good one documentation.
Speaker 1: They'll tell you, Look, we learned this because this agency
Speaker 1: was doing that, et cetera, et cetera. Here's the key, right,
Speaker 1: the olds shaking around the piece of paper, and probably
Speaker 1: there's nothing written on a trick in a lot of
Speaker 1: cases right when people make presentations. But the truth is
Speaker 1: that you need to be very considerate about how these
Speaker 1: operations ran, what was memorialized, and what is the truth
Speaker 1: about What you'll be able to glean from what remains
Speaker 1: long after the operation is complete, whether it was successful
Speaker 1: or not, or whether it was a complete failure. Well
Speaker 1: that is for history to judge, if history is ever informed.
Speaker 1: So there you go, Larry, anything you want to, you know,
Speaker 1: hit people two about this. I mean, well, we'll try
Speaker 1: and have another talk or to excuse me before Dallas.
Speaker 2: But I think I think this, well, this pretty much
Speaker 2: covers the practices, so I'm pretty comfortable with that. Now
Speaker 2: we can move on to other areas. But now I
Speaker 2: think I think we told the story pretty well, and
Speaker 2: these two together. If people thought the CIA was mysterious,
Speaker 2: hopefully we resolve some of that covert yeah, clandestine, Yeah okay,
Speaker 2: but no longer that mysterious.
Speaker 1: And I think people need to adjust their interpretations. You know,
Speaker 1: the big spooky CIA is not responsible for everything. You know,
Speaker 1: It's almost like everybody thinks or I get into little
Speaker 1: groups of people on occasion where everything from the fact
Speaker 1: that their cell phone call dropped to you know, to
Speaker 1: their neighbor got into a car accident might have something
Speaker 1: to do with the CIA, you know, because they're researching something.
Speaker 1: I mean, I've heard people said, do you.
Speaker 2: Give me a thought for wrapping it up? Though that
Speaker 2: might be interesting, it's not like the CIA wasn't interested
Speaker 2: in promoting that view anyway. And one of the books
Speaker 2: I write about the fact that their very first overseas
Speaker 2: operation that was hugely successful was a coup in ron, Okay.
Speaker 2: We now know all about that coup and why it succeeded,
Speaker 2: and the fact that the CIA had nothing to do
Speaker 2: with it, and actually their planned coup totally failed. But
Speaker 2: after what happened, more or less by coincidence that they
Speaker 2: had nothing to do with, the CIA managed to generate
Speaker 2: its own story that got and released it to the
Speaker 2: press talking about how they had done such a wonderful job,
Speaker 2: and Alan Dalles that had secret meetings with Shaw's representatives
Speaker 2: in Switzerland, and so the stories from the very beginning,
Speaker 2: THEA is determined it would create this impression of its
Speaker 2: own infallibility, make itself mysterious and always successful. So one
Speaker 2: thing that we could attribute to them is what a
Speaker 2: lot of this infallibility and mystery didn't come from their
Speaker 2: actual actions that came from their pr.
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's the legend. It's the legend, you know. And
Speaker 1: that's the thing about it, just like ch That's why
Speaker 1: I didn't object to that book title for the Oswald
Speaker 1: thing at one time, where somebody called it legend. But
Speaker 1: we now know about the motivations. Let's say that author
Speaker 1: a little more than we used to. But the thing is,
Speaker 1: that's what made sense, is that it was the legend
Speaker 1: that was being generated. And today, you know, like I
Speaker 1: make the joke all the time, Lee rby Oswald, who
Speaker 1: will cover next time? Maybe you know, he goes everywhere
Speaker 1: across the spectrum from a full, a complete foal who's
Speaker 1: out playing games that he has no idea about. He's
Speaker 1: like the seven year old playing pretend fireman, okay to
Speaker 1: some people. To others, he's James Bond, you know. And
Speaker 1: you know what I'm saying. And it's based on the legends,
Speaker 1: positive or negative one way or another. It swings both ways,
Speaker 1: and it ends up out there both ways without people
Speaker 1: ever really giving context and real world connection to a
Speaker 1: human being that lived to be twenty four years old,
Speaker 1: that had an interesting life. But then again, you know
Speaker 1: what did I say before we started the show. You know,
Speaker 1: sometimes you have plans and other times plans have you Anyway,
Speaker 1: that's my food for thought.
Speaker 2: Larry's sitting there down that earlier check. We might have
Speaker 2: used the quote in the book. I'm sorry, the manuscript
Speaker 2: is are already at the publishers. What can I say?
Speaker 1: Well, if you need a blurb, I'll work on one
Speaker 1: for you.
Speaker 2: About that, Okay, we'll work on.
Speaker 1: That anyway, Larry Hancock, everybody go over to Larry dash
Speaker 1: Handcock dot com. I kept him way longer than I
Speaker 1: wanted to. My apologies, Larry. It's been a weird week
Speaker 1: for me, recovering from an injury and such. But but hey,
Speaker 1: it is what it is, and again life goes on.
Speaker 1: But go to Larry dash Handcock dot com, and once
Speaker 1: again I want to remind you that we're both involved.
Speaker 1: I'll be there in person, Larry'll be there remotely at
Speaker 1: the Lancer Conference twenty second to the twenty fourth of
Speaker 1: November in Dallas, Texas at the at the Marriott there. Anyway,
Speaker 1: All that information will be in with the show notes,
Speaker 1: including links to Larry's blog, Larry's website, you know a
Speaker 1: couple of his books. All that plus all the lanswer
Speaker 1: information and you can get a ten percent discount I
Speaker 1: think on all your tickets one way or another ten
Speaker 1: percent off if you use the code o'celly ten at
Speaker 1: Assassinationconference dot com. But again it's all linked in the
Speaker 1: show notes, and Larry, anything you want to throw at
Speaker 1: us before I check us off for the day.
Speaker 2: Now, I think I'm good. It was fun as usual.
Speaker 1: Excellent well, always happy to talk to Larry Hancock, and
Speaker 1: always happy to talk to all of you, because after all,
Speaker 1: I am merely o'celly. All of you are the effect.
Speaker 1: Good night.
Speaker 6: In Denial Secret Wars with air strikes and tanks by
Speaker 6: Larry Hancock. Secret wars became a staple of US covert
Speaker 6: operations and are still happening today. Larry Hancock's book In
Speaker 6: Denial rips the cover off many of them, using new files.
Speaker 6: It exposes things about the Bay and Pigs that no
Speaker 6: one has ever written about before. It shows why it
Speaker 6: really failed and why the United States did not.
Speaker 1: Learn from it.
Speaker 6: It also shows why other countries today are doing secret
Speaker 6: operations with more success. This is the book that puts
Speaker 6: what some want to deny into the light.
Speaker 1: In Denial, secret wars with air strikes and tanks Larryhancock.
Speaker 1: For more information, go to Larry hyphen Handcock dot com.
Speaker 1: Pick up your copy of In Denial at Amazon dot com.
Speaker 6: In digital or physical.
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Speaker 1: Assassination Right, Well, what do you want to know?
Speaker 5: Baker's wild claim Oswell, girlfriends he knew Ruby and Barry
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Speaker 1: Really, I imagine I could claim I have four wheels. It
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Speaker 1: Go to Amazon dot com enter Judith Baker in her
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Speaker 5: Thank you for all the great information.
Speaker 1: Well so you've expressed, like caller Schools or anyone else
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Speaker 1: If you not necessarily reflect the views little Jelly dot
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Speaker 9: Uncle, do you remember that time when Benjamin Fulford said
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Speaker 1: Yeah?
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Speaker 2: No?
Speaker 9: At didn't did it? But here on o'chelly dot com
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Speaker 11: Call yo, yo, This Doug Campbell, host of the Dallas
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Speaker 5: Calling the truth about the JAFA assassination.
Speaker 1: Right, Well, what do you want to know?
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Speaker 1: Really? I imagine I could claim I have four wheels. It
Speaker 1: doesn't make me a wagon.
Speaker 5: But okaywal was on the building and trying to event
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Speaker 1: Go to Amazon dot com enter Judith Baker in her
Speaker 1: own words. You'll get the results for a digital copy
Speaker 1: of a book where Walt Brown utilizes her own words
Speaker 1: and the known evidence in the case to get at
Speaker 1: well a different perspective. Let's say you can get judith
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Speaker 5: Thank you for all the great information.