WEBVTT 1 00:00:02.439 --> 00:00:05.839 Welcome to scot Discast, a project of the Federalist Society 2 00:00:05.960 --> 00:00:09.519 for Law and Public Policy Studies. Our contributors joined us 3 00:00:09.560 --> 00:00:12.759 from around the country to bring you expert commentary on 4 00:00:12.960 --> 00:00:15.599 US Supreme Court cases as they are argued and the 5 00:00:15.679 --> 00:00:19.120 decisions are issued. The Federalist Society takes no position on 6 00:00:19.160 --> 00:00:22.960 particular legal or public policy issues. All expressions are those 7 00:00:23.000 --> 00:00:29.399 of the speaker. Hello, and welcome to scot Discast. I'm 8 00:00:29.440 --> 00:00:32.640 your host, Kyle hammernis On, behalf of the Faculty division 9 00:00:32.679 --> 00:00:36.000 of the Federalist Society. We are here today to discuss 10 00:00:36.039 --> 00:00:39.159 Williams versus Reed, which was decided by the Supreme Court 11 00:00:39.240 --> 00:00:41.960 in a five to four decision on February twenty first, 12 00:00:42.159 --> 00:00:45.560 twenty twenty five. Is my honor to introduce our guest today, 13 00:00:45.759 --> 00:00:49.359 Professor Tyler Linley. Professor Linley is an Associate professor of 14 00:00:49.479 --> 00:00:52.399 law at the J. Rubin Clark Law School at Brigham 15 00:00:52.439 --> 00:00:55.679 Young University. His research centers on the judicial, rural, and 16 00:00:55.799 --> 00:00:59.479 historical evolution of the judiciary in America. He has extensively 17 00:00:59.479 --> 00:01:03.840 examined published on judicial remedies, federal courts, constitutional law, and 18 00:01:03.880 --> 00:01:06.599 administrative law. And with that, I'd like to hand things, 19 00:01:06.760 --> 00:01:09.200 or to President Lee to get us started by talking 20 00:01:09.239 --> 00:01:10.879 about how the case got to the Supreme Court. 21 00:01:12.480 --> 00:01:16.480 Thank you. So this case comes out of Alabama and 22 00:01:16.680 --> 00:01:23.159 the plaintiffs are several more than twenty individuals in Alabama 23 00:01:23.200 --> 00:01:26.359 who applied for unemployment benefits in the wake of the 24 00:01:26.400 --> 00:01:30.840 COVID pandemic. As you might imagine, the Alabama Department of 25 00:01:30.920 --> 00:01:36.560 Labor now the Department of Workforce, was overwhelmed by a 26 00:01:36.599 --> 00:01:39.959 lot of the applications that came in in the years 27 00:01:40.000 --> 00:01:45.159 following COVID. The plaintiffs had a mix of complaints about 28 00:01:45.159 --> 00:01:49.760 the process for claiming Social Security or not Social Security sorry, 29 00:01:49.799 --> 00:01:56.359 unemployment benefits. One was in the primary one was that 30 00:01:57.400 --> 00:02:00.840 the Department of Labor, the Alabama departm of Labor, was 31 00:02:00.879 --> 00:02:05.079 not even processing their claims, that many of these sat 32 00:02:05.359 --> 00:02:10.280 for more than a year. Others argued that the notice 33 00:02:10.400 --> 00:02:14.439 that the Department of Labor provided them about the ear 34 00:02:14.439 --> 00:02:17.039 preliminary decisions that could be appealed within the Department of 35 00:02:17.120 --> 00:02:22.800 Labor or insufficient. The Alabama Department of Labor has a 36 00:02:22.840 --> 00:02:26.000 process that claimants need to go through. They submit an 37 00:02:26.039 --> 00:02:31.120 initial claim that has an initial determination and the statute 38 00:02:31.120 --> 00:02:33.759 requires that determination to be made promptly but doesn't provide 39 00:02:33.800 --> 00:02:37.280 a deadline. Then once that determination is made, then the 40 00:02:37.319 --> 00:02:42.080 claimant can appeal an adverse determination within the Department and 41 00:02:42.120 --> 00:02:46.080 then eventually up to the Board of Appeals, which is 42 00:02:46.120 --> 00:02:49.800 composed of members appointed by the governor. So this is 43 00:02:49.840 --> 00:02:56.120 an intricate process. Now, Alabama also allows for eventual appeals 44 00:02:56.120 --> 00:02:59.800 into courts of these determinations or challenges to the process, 45 00:03:00.319 --> 00:03:06.479 but an Alabama statute limits the judicial jurisdiction of those 46 00:03:06.520 --> 00:03:11.000 types of appeals. The statute essentially says that no circuit court, 47 00:03:11.400 --> 00:03:14.840 the state Circuit Court, shall permit an appeal unless that 48 00:03:14.919 --> 00:03:18.120 appeal has been exhausted through all of the administrative remedies, 49 00:03:18.120 --> 00:03:19.840 so has to go through all of the appeal process 50 00:03:19.840 --> 00:03:22.800 within the Department of Labor and then can come before 51 00:03:22.879 --> 00:03:30.759 state court. So these plaintiffs are stuck in the administrative 52 00:03:30.800 --> 00:03:35.199 process and they sue the Secretary of Labor, the Alabama 53 00:03:35.240 --> 00:03:39.280 Secretary of Labor in state court under section nineteen eighty three, 54 00:03:39.360 --> 00:03:42.560 which is a federal law. So this federal law, Section 55 00:03:42.599 --> 00:03:46.599 nineteen eighty three is generally understood to provide a federal 56 00:03:46.599 --> 00:03:51.199 cause of action for any violation by state officials of 57 00:03:51.319 --> 00:03:56.759 an individual's constitutional or federal statutory rights. So these plaintiffs 58 00:03:56.800 --> 00:04:00.479 say that the delays in the process or the sufficient 59 00:04:00.560 --> 00:04:03.840 notice violate both the due process clause of the Constitution 60 00:04:04.680 --> 00:04:09.240 and the Social Security Act, which kind of sets forth 61 00:04:09.240 --> 00:04:12.439 the procedures that states have to follow in administering these benefits. 62 00:04:12.919 --> 00:04:17.879 And so they go to state court saying, we want 63 00:04:18.199 --> 00:04:23.360 the state court to issue an injunction against the Secretary 64 00:04:23.360 --> 00:04:25.720 of Labor and the employees of the Secretary of Labor 65 00:04:26.040 --> 00:04:29.399 ordering them to process these applications or, in the event 66 00:04:29.560 --> 00:04:34.519 of the improper notice at the insufficient notice, to fix 67 00:04:34.560 --> 00:04:37.920 the notice and allow an appeal. And so they want 68 00:04:37.959 --> 00:04:41.279 an injunctive remedy, and the Alabama courts say, well, we 69 00:04:41.319 --> 00:04:44.839 have an Alabama law that says all claims that come 70 00:04:44.879 --> 00:04:48.240 out of this out of the Secretary of Labor at 71 00:04:48.319 --> 00:04:52.279 kind of any benefits claims need to be exhausted before 72 00:04:52.319 --> 00:04:55.120 we have jurisdiction. So we don't have jurisdiction. That goes 73 00:04:55.160 --> 00:04:58.360 to the Alabama Supreme Court. The Supreme Court says we 74 00:04:58.399 --> 00:05:02.879 don't have jurisdiction, and the petitioner's appeal saying no, No, No. 75 00:05:03.120 --> 00:05:05.920 Section nineteen eighty three. This federal law that we're suing 76 00:05:06.000 --> 00:05:11.519 under requires the states to hear this case preempts the 77 00:05:11.600 --> 00:05:14.720 exhaustion jurisdiction rule. And we'll get into exactly whether it's 78 00:05:14.759 --> 00:05:17.720 an exhaustion rule or whether it's a jurisdictional rule, but 79 00:05:17.800 --> 00:05:22.000 preempts that and doesn't allow its application when it comes 80 00:05:22.040 --> 00:05:24.040 to Section nineteen eighty three claims specifically. 81 00:05:25.600 --> 00:05:29.480 Great, so the case gets to the Supreme Court, can 82 00:05:29.519 --> 00:05:33.199 you talk a little bit about how each side argued 83 00:05:33.199 --> 00:05:36.279 the case before we jump into the decision. 84 00:05:36.920 --> 00:05:41.480 Yeah, so the petitioners hear, the plaintiffs, those who are 85 00:05:41.600 --> 00:05:47.720 claiming unemployment benefits, had a broader and then a narrower argument, 86 00:05:48.040 --> 00:05:52.920 And the broadest argument is that although this exhaustion requirement, 87 00:05:53.040 --> 00:05:56.680 this requirement that the plaintiffs before going to state court 88 00:05:56.759 --> 00:05:59.959 have to exhaust their administrative remedies before the secretary of labor, 89 00:06:00.399 --> 00:06:06.240 that this exhaustion requirement is just categorically not allowed, even 90 00:06:06.279 --> 00:06:08.839 if it's framed in jurisdictional terms. And so you have 91 00:06:08.959 --> 00:06:11.480 a couple of cases that come beforehand that maybe kind 92 00:06:11.519 --> 00:06:14.279 of give a little bit of color to this. One 93 00:06:14.399 --> 00:06:19.560 is a case called Patsy that in which a federal 94 00:06:19.600 --> 00:06:25.759 court had imposed an exhaustion requirement. Often exhaustion requirements are 95 00:06:25.879 --> 00:06:30.399 kind of unlogged common law, may you know, judge made 96 00:06:30.759 --> 00:06:35.279 And the Supreme Court says in Patsy, No. Section nineteen 97 00:06:35.279 --> 00:06:38.160 eighty three does not have an exhaustion requirement, and an 98 00:06:38.160 --> 00:06:42.839 exhaustion requirement is inconsistent with this scheme where plaintiffs get 99 00:06:42.839 --> 00:06:46.639 to go directly to federal court and get damages or 100 00:06:46.720 --> 00:06:49.839 equitable relief for violations of their federal rights, whether it 101 00:06:49.920 --> 00:06:52.959 be constitutional or statutory. So we have that case, and 102 00:06:53.000 --> 00:06:55.800 then we have a case called Felder that comes out 103 00:06:55.800 --> 00:06:59.560 of Wisconsin. This is out of a state court and 104 00:07:00.519 --> 00:07:02.920 the or at least out of a state law. And 105 00:07:02.959 --> 00:07:07.160 in Felder, what happened was there's a state law requiring 106 00:07:07.240 --> 00:07:09.480 a notice of the claim. Plaint just had to give 107 00:07:09.480 --> 00:07:11.720 a notice of the claim to the defendants and then 108 00:07:11.800 --> 00:07:14.439 let it sit for a certain amount of time before 109 00:07:14.480 --> 00:07:17.040 they could bring a suit. And the question was, cant 110 00:07:17.120 --> 00:07:19.720 does this law apply to a Section nineteen eighty three claim. 111 00:07:20.560 --> 00:07:23.000 And there was some dispute about whether that's truly an 112 00:07:23.000 --> 00:07:25.920 exhaustion requirement or kind of or what it might be. 113 00:07:26.000 --> 00:07:29.480 But the Court characterizes it as an exhaustion requirement. Saying 114 00:07:29.519 --> 00:07:33.360 you have to kind of try an attempt to make 115 00:07:33.399 --> 00:07:35.680 peace with the defendant by giving a notice of claim 116 00:07:35.680 --> 00:07:38.199 and giving them an opportunity to settle and have discussions, 117 00:07:39.560 --> 00:07:46.600 and said, no, that exhaustion requirement doesn't work. It's again 118 00:07:46.759 --> 00:07:50.800 inconsistent with Section nineteen eighty three, therefore preempted, the state 119 00:07:50.879 --> 00:07:53.959 laws preempted, and courts can't apply that state law in 120 00:07:54.000 --> 00:07:58.560 section nineteen eighty three cases. And the petitioners here say 121 00:07:58.600 --> 00:08:02.040 this is even though it's up in jurisdictional garb, this 122 00:08:02.399 --> 00:08:05.240 is an exhaustion requirement. So it just falls within this 123 00:08:05.319 --> 00:08:08.680 Patsy Felder line of cases that just say Section nineteen 124 00:08:08.680 --> 00:08:14.000 eighty three can't have an exhaustion requirement. Their narrower argument is, well, 125 00:08:14.319 --> 00:08:20.879 this particular exhaustion requirement, even if maybe it can apply 126 00:08:20.959 --> 00:08:23.399 in some instances, maybe we can at least force them 127 00:08:23.399 --> 00:08:27.279 to go to the administrative body, the state administrative body, 128 00:08:27.319 --> 00:08:30.000 in some cases, it can't apply to these types of 129 00:08:30.040 --> 00:08:34.440 claims because these claims are challenging the process that they 130 00:08:34.480 --> 00:08:40.080 have to exhaust, and so it doesn't really work, and 131 00:08:40.159 --> 00:08:43.120 so we should just carve out these types of claims 132 00:08:43.120 --> 00:08:45.480 if we were actually claiming that they had made a 133 00:08:45.559 --> 00:08:47.960 wrong decision. We got all the way through the appeals 134 00:08:48.080 --> 00:08:49.919 and they'd made a wrong decision that violates the Social 135 00:08:49.919 --> 00:08:54.120 Security as Act or some other federal provision, then maybe 136 00:08:54.159 --> 00:08:56.879 we have to exhaust right, Maybe we can't just say 137 00:08:57.039 --> 00:08:59.679 that in the initial determination before we appeal violates my 138 00:08:59.720 --> 00:09:03.039 federal rights. But here we're just challenging the process. We 139 00:09:03.200 --> 00:09:07.039 just want an order telling them to process our applications 140 00:09:07.120 --> 00:09:09.679 or give up me sufficient notice. We're not actually challenging 141 00:09:09.679 --> 00:09:15.159 the ultimate determinations. And so in that instance, this exhaustion 142 00:09:15.240 --> 00:09:19.399 requirement has to be preempted. Now, the state is arguing 143 00:09:20.600 --> 00:09:24.039 argues kind of against both of those arguments on a 144 00:09:24.720 --> 00:09:28.559 somewhat broad broad argument, but it kind of defeats both 145 00:09:28.559 --> 00:09:33.360 of those arguments, which they say, hey, this is different 146 00:09:33.399 --> 00:09:36.000 than an exhaustion than a typical exhaustion requirement. Although it 147 00:09:36.399 --> 00:09:40.960 hinges on whether you've exhausted, it deprives the court of jurisdiction, 148 00:09:41.480 --> 00:09:44.759 it doesn't mean that you lose. So the state says, 149 00:09:44.799 --> 00:09:48.639 in a normal exhaustion case, a plaintiff sues hasn't exhausted 150 00:09:49.279 --> 00:09:52.399 and if the time has run by which they can't 151 00:09:52.440 --> 00:09:56.360 exhaust or or depending on the exact exhaustion rule. Then 152 00:09:56.360 --> 00:10:00.000 they lose on the merits, they get a dismissal with prejudice. 153 00:10:00.080 --> 00:10:04.919 They can't come back. It's over that they're done. Sometimes, 154 00:10:05.000 --> 00:10:07.480 you know, courts will stay the case so that they 155 00:10:07.519 --> 00:10:10.320 can go back and exhaust But that's but the point 156 00:10:10.399 --> 00:10:12.480 is is that it operates on the merits. The court 157 00:10:12.519 --> 00:10:15.200 has chosen to hear the case and decides the case 158 00:10:15.720 --> 00:10:18.720 on exhaustion grounds. They say, here this is different the 159 00:10:18.759 --> 00:10:22.320 Alabama Supreme Court. The Alabama courts just rejected this at 160 00:10:22.320 --> 00:10:25.759 the jurisdictional stage, and the plaintiffs can still go to 161 00:10:25.840 --> 00:10:28.759 federal court or at least arguably can maybe with some 162 00:10:28.799 --> 00:10:32.639 statute of limitations complications. But they're saying that this is 163 00:10:32.679 --> 00:10:35.720 not us adjudicating the claim and imposing an exhaustion requirement. 164 00:10:35.759 --> 00:10:39.480 This is just the state deciding what's the scope of 165 00:10:39.519 --> 00:10:44.840 state court jurisdiction. And state courts always have jurisdictional rules, right, 166 00:10:44.919 --> 00:10:47.600 they say, small claims court can only handle these types 167 00:10:47.600 --> 00:10:49.879 of quick cases, you know, maybe circuit court or trial 168 00:10:49.919 --> 00:10:53.519 court or whatever it might be. We can always define 169 00:10:53.519 --> 00:10:56.240 our jurisdiction. And so that defeats both the petitioners broad 170 00:10:56.320 --> 00:10:59.720 argument that this is an exhaustion requirement and therefore falls 171 00:10:59.720 --> 00:11:03.519 with an Patsy and Felder and also the narrow argument, 172 00:11:03.759 --> 00:11:06.600 which says, maybe this is a bad idea, but it 173 00:11:06.720 --> 00:11:08.240 just leaves you to go to the federal court and 174 00:11:08.279 --> 00:11:12.919 that's just fine. We're just defining our jurisdiction. And so 175 00:11:12.960 --> 00:11:14.960 these are the types of arguments that are going on, 176 00:11:15.039 --> 00:11:17.080 which is do we properly view this as kind of 177 00:11:17.120 --> 00:11:19.399 an exhaustion requirement or is this just a run of 178 00:11:19.440 --> 00:11:22.720 the mill jurisdictional requirement that we generally think state courts 179 00:11:22.720 --> 00:11:28.360 can define their jurisdiction And it's it's not. It's it's 180 00:11:28.360 --> 00:11:31.600 not a matter of federal concern. If a state court 181 00:11:31.759 --> 00:11:35.440 just doesn't have as much jurisdiction as they might otherwise. 182 00:11:35.039 --> 00:11:40.279 Have, great, And I guess that since you went into 183 00:11:40.440 --> 00:11:42.639 into that distinction a little bit more on the arguments 184 00:11:43.120 --> 00:11:44.600 would now be a good time to go into the 185 00:11:44.639 --> 00:11:48.919 decisions and see how how it all all came out. 186 00:11:49.639 --> 00:11:52.840 It was a five to four decision, Uh, and uh, 187 00:11:53.639 --> 00:11:56.960 it wasn't on ideological lines at all. It seemed like, 188 00:11:58.399 --> 00:12:02.799 so can you go over the majority opinion the reasoning 189 00:12:02.879 --> 00:12:03.519 behind it, and. 190 00:12:05.039 --> 00:12:09.320 Then we'll go to the descent Yeah, So the decision 191 00:12:09.399 --> 00:12:11.799 is five to four, as you mentioned, and Justice Kavanaugh 192 00:12:11.840 --> 00:12:17.320 writes he's joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice sodamor, Justice Kagan, 193 00:12:17.360 --> 00:12:20.840 and Justice Jackson. And so we'll talk about the descent 194 00:12:21.039 --> 00:12:24.919 in a minute, which is somewhat divided. But does Kevanaugh 195 00:12:25.080 --> 00:12:28.159 does not reach the broader argument. I think he says 196 00:12:28.200 --> 00:12:31.600 a couple of times that it's the ground that they 197 00:12:31.639 --> 00:12:34.519 reach is narrow, tries to emphasize the narrowness of the decision, 198 00:12:34.919 --> 00:12:38.679 drops a footnote saying we're not addressing the Patsy Felder argument. 199 00:12:39.639 --> 00:12:42.840 So this is really it's really narrow. And so there's 200 00:12:42.879 --> 00:12:44.679 a line, you know, in the opening paragraph that kind 201 00:12:44.720 --> 00:12:49.080 of summarizes exactly where Justice Kavanaugh gets, which says, because 202 00:12:49.159 --> 00:12:52.440 the claimants cannot sue until they complete the administrative process, 203 00:12:52.840 --> 00:12:55.399 they can never sue under section nineteen eighty three to 204 00:12:55.440 --> 00:12:59.679 obtain an order expediting the administrative process. Okay, so the 205 00:12:59.720 --> 00:13:03.279 major opinions somewhat sets aside the insufficient notice question. I 206 00:13:03.279 --> 00:13:07.240 didn't see the majority of picion separating that out, but 207 00:13:07.399 --> 00:13:10.039 at the very least it's enough to reverse the Supreme 208 00:13:10.080 --> 00:13:14.879 Court of Alabama saying when when a plaintiff in this 209 00:13:14.960 --> 00:13:18.519 type of instance is trying to challenge the delays in 210 00:13:18.559 --> 00:13:22.080 the process. It's kind of a never ending loop that 211 00:13:22.120 --> 00:13:24.559 they can never actually come to state court because they 212 00:13:24.600 --> 00:13:27.159 aren't getting a decision, so they cannot exhaust and the 213 00:13:27.200 --> 00:13:30.000 whole and what their claim is is not this decision 214 00:13:30.120 --> 00:13:33.720 was wrong, but we were in permissively being denied a decision. 215 00:13:34.720 --> 00:13:39.120 And so that is kind of where the court where 216 00:13:39.159 --> 00:13:43.519 the court falls and addresses this what it claims to 217 00:13:43.519 --> 00:13:46.600 be a narrow a narrow holding. And yet but yet 218 00:13:46.639 --> 00:13:50.679 some of the reasoning might might extend a little bit 219 00:13:50.720 --> 00:13:53.279 further than the majority might imagine. And that's something that 220 00:13:53.360 --> 00:13:55.480 the scent says. Great. 221 00:13:55.639 --> 00:13:58.120 And then I guess, as you said that the scent 222 00:13:58.320 --> 00:14:01.799 was split just as Tom wrote, wrote the dissenting opinion, 223 00:14:03.120 --> 00:14:08.440 but Justice Alito, a Justice Coursic, and Justice Parrott only 224 00:14:08.519 --> 00:14:12.600 joined in Part two. And then you you were cited 225 00:14:12.679 --> 00:14:15.519 in the dissenting opinion. So if you can just touch 226 00:14:15.559 --> 00:14:17.799 on the dissenting opinion as a whole, and then also 227 00:14:18.120 --> 00:14:21.039 your your citation that was in there. 228 00:14:21.679 --> 00:14:24.879 Yeah, so thinks and I think so Part one, Justice 229 00:14:24.879 --> 00:14:30.480 Thomas reiterates his view about how he views kind of 230 00:14:30.960 --> 00:14:35.159 the role of state jurisdictional limitations. And this comes back 231 00:14:35.200 --> 00:14:37.799 to a decision Heywood be Drowned from two thousand and 232 00:14:37.919 --> 00:14:41.000 nine that involved a state law, also involving Section nineteen 233 00:14:41.039 --> 00:14:44.080 eighty three, and so in order to kind of understand 234 00:14:44.080 --> 00:14:45.919 where he's coming from and where the argument with the 235 00:14:45.919 --> 00:14:48.120 majority is, we need to understand Heywood just a little bit. 236 00:14:48.480 --> 00:14:52.159 So before Heywood, we had a had a rule, or 237 00:14:52.200 --> 00:14:54.519 at least people understood there to be a rule that 238 00:14:54.639 --> 00:14:59.559 as long as the state law that prohibited state courts 239 00:14:59.559 --> 00:15:02.039 from a duiccating a federal claim, as long as it 240 00:15:02.120 --> 00:15:06.559 was a neutral rule of judicial administration, then it was okay. 241 00:15:06.799 --> 00:15:09.639 And we understood judicial administration to be mean. It needs 242 00:15:09.639 --> 00:15:12.519 to be jurisdictional, meaning we're not actually reaching the merits, 243 00:15:12.519 --> 00:15:14.559 we're not hearing the claim, and then saying no federal 244 00:15:14.639 --> 00:15:19.080 law applies to this claim. It's it's it's jurisdictional is 245 00:15:19.080 --> 00:15:25.080 about administration and neutral means it needs to divide. It 246 00:15:25.159 --> 00:15:28.480 needs to kind of coverable state and federal claims. Not 247 00:15:28.919 --> 00:15:31.000 it can't target the federal claim. It can't say our 248 00:15:31.080 --> 00:15:35.720 jurisdiction just doesn't extend any federal claims. Justice Thomas in 249 00:15:36.159 --> 00:15:42.279 Heywood and argues that actually, this discrimination rule, the idea 250 00:15:42.320 --> 00:15:47.000 of neutral doesn't isn't rooted in the Constitution, right, So 251 00:15:47.080 --> 00:15:51.200 he makes the argument that Article three, by allowing Congress 252 00:15:51.200 --> 00:15:54.720 to create lower federal courts, was recognizing that state courts 253 00:15:54.759 --> 00:15:56.960 might not hear all federal claims and that we might 254 00:15:57.000 --> 00:16:00.600 need lower federal courts. Also says that the supremacy clause 255 00:16:00.960 --> 00:16:03.559 just talks about laws that conflict, but a law that 256 00:16:03.639 --> 00:16:07.039 just restricts jurisdiction doesn't actually conflict with a substantive law 257 00:16:07.600 --> 00:16:12.159 that governs kind of what the rights and obligations of 258 00:16:12.200 --> 00:16:15.960 the parties are. So he also was alone and a 259 00:16:15.960 --> 00:16:17.879 sole dissenter. Heywood v. Drown was also a five to 260 00:16:17.879 --> 00:16:21.480 four decision at the time. It was Justice Galia, Chief 261 00:16:21.519 --> 00:16:24.480 Justice Roberts, and Justice Alito who joined Justice Thomas on 262 00:16:24.519 --> 00:16:26.320 the other part. But he was alone there, and he 263 00:16:26.399 --> 00:16:33.120 reiterates his argument in part one that actually there's no 264 00:16:33.720 --> 00:16:37.879 discrimination nondiscrimination requirement at all when it comes to state 265 00:16:37.879 --> 00:16:42.399 courts hearing federal claims. And then so then I'll get 266 00:16:42.399 --> 00:16:44.440 back to kind of what Haywood did. And this is 267 00:16:44.480 --> 00:16:49.519 where the dissenters in williams Our case today come back 268 00:16:49.519 --> 00:16:52.279 into the play. But Justice Thomas reiterates this and says, 269 00:16:52.679 --> 00:16:55.279 as long as it's jurisdictional, and he defines jurisdictional by 270 00:16:55.320 --> 00:16:59.120 meaning it's dismissed without prejudice, meaning the state courts just 271 00:16:59.159 --> 00:17:00.799 won't hear the claim. You can always go to federal 272 00:17:00.840 --> 00:17:03.240 court later, but just you can't hear it. He says, 273 00:17:03.279 --> 00:17:06.240 as long as it's it's actually jurisdictional. And I agree, 274 00:17:06.279 --> 00:17:08.440 He says, I agree that you know it can't just 275 00:17:08.519 --> 00:17:13.599 be nominally jurisdictional, it actually has to be jurisdictional. Then 276 00:17:14.680 --> 00:17:18.359 we shouldn't care about this. And because the Alabama law 277 00:17:18.400 --> 00:17:22.799 here about exhaustion is jurisdictional, we shouldn't care. Then, as 278 00:17:22.839 --> 00:17:25.440 you mentioned, he drops a footnote because that goes even 279 00:17:25.480 --> 00:17:28.519 further and says, well, we should actually reconsider two of 280 00:17:28.519 --> 00:17:30.519 our additional line of cases, at least might need to 281 00:17:30.559 --> 00:17:35.039 reconsider them. One is that there's even a due process 282 00:17:35.559 --> 00:17:38.240 problem here. So the reason why there's a due process 283 00:17:38.279 --> 00:17:41.920 problem is that we have a case named Gold v. Kelly, 284 00:17:41.960 --> 00:17:44.519 and then a line of cases including Matthews v. Eldridge 285 00:17:44.519 --> 00:17:51.039 and others, that say, sometimes government benefits or entitlements are 286 00:17:51.279 --> 00:17:54.000 property within the meaning of the due process clause. It 287 00:17:54.039 --> 00:17:57.599 says no state shell or in the or in the 288 00:17:57.599 --> 00:18:01.440 Fifth Amendment, that you know, the government shall not deprive 289 00:18:02.279 --> 00:18:04.480 any person of life, liberty, and property withou due process 290 00:18:04.480 --> 00:18:08.359 of law. And just as Thomas says, I think historically 291 00:18:09.200 --> 00:18:12.000 kind of government that ifits in entitlements were probably not property, 292 00:18:12.759 --> 00:18:14.440 you didn't have a right to them until you actually 293 00:18:14.519 --> 00:18:16.400 kind of received them and took a property interest in 294 00:18:16.440 --> 00:18:20.319 the money. And so in this case that would obviously 295 00:18:20.319 --> 00:18:23.559 defeat kind of the Section nineteen eighty three claim. And 296 00:18:23.599 --> 00:18:27.319 then he says, we also might need to reconsider whether 297 00:18:27.359 --> 00:18:29.480 Section nineteen eighty three is kind of a standalone cause 298 00:18:29.519 --> 00:18:33.400 of action or whether it gives federal courts jurisdiction over 299 00:18:33.480 --> 00:18:36.160 certain state law causes of action that implicate federal rights. 300 00:18:36.799 --> 00:18:39.880 And this is where he cites one of my papers. 301 00:18:40.640 --> 00:18:44.720 I argue that, as originally understood, section nineteen eighty three 302 00:18:44.920 --> 00:18:48.119 was not a standalone federal cause of action that gave 303 00:18:48.480 --> 00:18:53.160 kind of a new and unique individual right to come 304 00:18:53.160 --> 00:18:57.000 to federal court. What it did was it codified these 305 00:18:57.240 --> 00:19:00.200 the federal rights, which was needed to establish out a 306 00:19:00.279 --> 00:19:04.039 question jurisdiction. But then it allowed plaintiffs to bring whatever 307 00:19:04.079 --> 00:19:08.599 their state law claims were into federal court if those 308 00:19:08.640 --> 00:19:11.279 state law claims were seeking to vindicate a federal right. 309 00:19:12.000 --> 00:19:15.920 And that's mostly you know, most of that understanding is 310 00:19:15.920 --> 00:19:20.039 done by the backdrop, where before nineteen thirty eight, the 311 00:19:20.880 --> 00:19:24.759 causes of action and actions at law were derived from 312 00:19:24.839 --> 00:19:27.559 from state law. As a matter of statute, Congress required 313 00:19:27.559 --> 00:19:30.920 federal courts to look to state law to know which 314 00:19:30.960 --> 00:19:32.799 causes of action or in that case the forms of 315 00:19:32.839 --> 00:19:38.559 action historically would be used. But also kind of the 316 00:19:38.640 --> 00:19:42.240 fact that this section is very simple just says you 317 00:19:42.279 --> 00:19:45.799 can sue the defendants shall be liable in an action 318 00:19:45.839 --> 00:19:47.680 at law, and what action of law we don't know, 319 00:19:49.000 --> 00:19:52.440 but Justice Thomas says we should reconsider that, in which case, 320 00:19:52.480 --> 00:19:55.400 again section nineteen eighty three, there is no kind of 321 00:19:55.440 --> 00:19:57.119 standalone claim. You'd have to go to state law. And 322 00:19:57.119 --> 00:19:59.000 if state lawer card is exhaustion, then state law RECRD 323 00:19:59.079 --> 00:20:01.839 is exhaustion a state law cause of action. So you 324 00:20:01.880 --> 00:20:03.920 can't bring it in federal court or in state court 325 00:20:03.920 --> 00:20:06.079 because Section nine ten ey three doesn't provide that independent 326 00:20:06.079 --> 00:20:09.440 cause of action. So now we get back to part two, 327 00:20:09.480 --> 00:20:11.839 where the dissenters join right, And now we have Haywood. 328 00:20:11.960 --> 00:20:17.119 So what does Haywood say. Haywood is is not it is, 329 00:20:17.400 --> 00:20:20.079 it's a it's a clear opinion, but it's unclear kind 330 00:20:20.119 --> 00:20:22.559 of which line of reasoning is doing the work. So 331 00:20:22.680 --> 00:20:25.000 Haywood is a case from New York where New York 332 00:20:25.079 --> 00:20:29.359 says state courts no longer have jurisdiction over any claim 333 00:20:29.400 --> 00:20:34.480 for damages again by prisoners against prison officials. That includes 334 00:20:34.480 --> 00:20:37.680 state law claims, that includes federal law claims. So the 335 00:20:37.880 --> 00:20:44.119 four justice descent in in Haywood says, now, again, this 336 00:20:44.200 --> 00:20:46.279 is a narrower view than just Thomas's broader view that 337 00:20:46.319 --> 00:20:50.640 this is as long as it's purely jurisdictional. But they say, well, 338 00:20:50.640 --> 00:20:52.759 this is neutral in that sense. Then it covers state 339 00:20:52.839 --> 00:20:55.880 law claims, and it covers federal law claims. And New 340 00:20:55.960 --> 00:20:58.279 York is New York. State courts are not obligated to 341 00:20:58.640 --> 00:21:01.440 hear a certain type of claim just because Congress wants, 342 00:21:02.319 --> 00:21:06.960 just because Congress has enacted a lot that effects rights 343 00:21:06.960 --> 00:21:12.200 and obligations. And the majority says, no, that's not enough, 344 00:21:12.279 --> 00:21:16.400 it's not enough just to be non discriminatory. And yet 345 00:21:16.480 --> 00:21:19.559 it kind of has three lines of argument at least 346 00:21:19.559 --> 00:21:22.160 how I read it that it's unclear which one's doing 347 00:21:22.200 --> 00:21:24.559 the work. Do you need all three? Which are they 348 00:21:24.599 --> 00:21:28.799 all three independent? So the first one, although it says 349 00:21:29.440 --> 00:21:32.920 non discrimination is not enough to be neutral, it then 350 00:21:33.039 --> 00:21:36.559 kind of says, well, maybe this isn't really neutral because 351 00:21:37.119 --> 00:21:40.720 it's not about all Section nineteen eighty three claims. It's 352 00:21:40.759 --> 00:21:45.960 not about all defendants because it's only prison officials. And 353 00:21:46.000 --> 00:21:48.599 it's really not even about all types of claims against 354 00:21:48.599 --> 00:21:52.559 prison officials because you could bring equitable claims for injunctions 355 00:21:52.680 --> 00:21:55.960 or another or other type of equitable relief. So really 356 00:21:56.039 --> 00:22:00.799 it's kind of jerrymandering that certain type type of claim. 357 00:22:01.160 --> 00:22:03.759 And yes, it includes any state law claims that happened 358 00:22:03.799 --> 00:22:08.319 to come within that jerrymander, but really, kind of we 359 00:22:08.720 --> 00:22:10.440 know what they're doing, right, The state law claims aren't 360 00:22:10.440 --> 00:22:12.160 doing a lot of work there. It's really Section nineteen 361 00:22:12.160 --> 00:22:17.559 eighty three that allows kind of this claim to proceed 362 00:22:17.640 --> 00:22:22.400 and then requires state courts to apply federal law authorizes attorneys, fees, 363 00:22:22.440 --> 00:22:24.400 all types of benefits to bring in Section nineteen eighty 364 00:22:24.440 --> 00:22:28.200 three claim and the court seems to say, well, this 365 00:22:28.440 --> 00:22:34.640 is two gerrymanders. But then in another analysis, the court says, well, really, 366 00:22:34.720 --> 00:22:40.519 this kind of just works as an immunity statute clothed 367 00:22:40.559 --> 00:22:44.640 in jurisdictional garb, which is kind of saying, if there's 368 00:22:44.680 --> 00:22:46.759 a certain type of claim that just can't be brought, 369 00:22:47.799 --> 00:22:51.519 then then we're we're going to be really hesitant. 370 00:22:51.599 --> 00:22:51.720 Right. 371 00:22:51.759 --> 00:22:55.839 That just seems like the court the state is undermining 372 00:22:56.519 --> 00:22:58.880 federal law as a matter of effects. Right, It's just 373 00:22:59.160 --> 00:23:01.000 it's saying that this type of claim can't be brought. 374 00:23:01.039 --> 00:23:03.880 A Section nineteen eighty three allows this type of claim, 375 00:23:04.279 --> 00:23:07.000 and so therefore it can't be brought. And then the 376 00:23:07.039 --> 00:23:12.200 court also says, well, this is a unique case because 377 00:23:12.240 --> 00:23:15.720 New York, both in the litigation and the legislature, had 378 00:23:15.799 --> 00:23:18.920 said pretty explicitly, the reason why we have this rule 379 00:23:19.119 --> 00:23:22.720 is because we think most claims by prisoners for damages 380 00:23:22.759 --> 00:23:25.799 are frivolous and they waste the prison officials times and 381 00:23:25.839 --> 00:23:29.119 they waste the court's times. And so the court in 382 00:23:29.160 --> 00:23:33.279 Heywood says, well, we don't like when this is a 383 00:23:33.359 --> 00:23:39.279 jurisdictional rule that is based on policy disagreement with Congress, 384 00:23:40.039 --> 00:23:44.920 and in that sense, it's preempted. And so we had 385 00:23:45.000 --> 00:23:48.079 kind of multiple lines of reasoning, and it's unclear. So 386 00:23:48.160 --> 00:23:50.480 let's go through those and see how the Alabama law fairs. Right, 387 00:23:50.519 --> 00:23:53.400 that's kind of how the dissent kind of goes about it. 388 00:23:53.920 --> 00:23:58.880 So on the first which says, this isn't really that neutral. 389 00:24:00.920 --> 00:24:04.160 You know, maybe it's less gerrymandered than the New York law. Right, 390 00:24:04.160 --> 00:24:07.799 it just applies to all, you know, claims that have 391 00:24:07.839 --> 00:24:11.440 to do with benefits, and so it's maybe a little 392 00:24:11.480 --> 00:24:14.519 less jerrymandered. But the petitioners didn't make the argument that 393 00:24:14.559 --> 00:24:17.559 it was that it only really applied to government officials 394 00:24:17.759 --> 00:24:19.839 and only applied to a small subset of Section nineteen 395 00:24:19.880 --> 00:24:22.599 eighty three claims, so maybe it's not as neutral, right. 396 00:24:22.759 --> 00:24:26.440 Heywood also said, when we're thinking about what's the purpose 397 00:24:26.480 --> 00:24:30.119 of jurisdictional rules that we think aren't kind of trying 398 00:24:30.160 --> 00:24:32.720 to be jerrymandered, we think about it as competence over 399 00:24:32.759 --> 00:24:37.960 the subject matter and power over the person. So, you know, 400 00:24:38.000 --> 00:24:40.319 the petitioners here argue, well, it's really not about either 401 00:24:40.359 --> 00:24:42.359