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<v Speaker 1>So, mister Vickers really appreciate your patients with us and

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<v Speaker 1>your being gracious with your time. We'll jump right into

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<v Speaker 1>it here. Could you tell us a little bit about

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<v Speaker 1>your origin story, sort of about how you grew up

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<v Speaker 1>and how that took you and led you towards governmental service.

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<v Speaker 2>Sure. So I grew up in southern California and went

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<v Speaker 2>to Hollywood High School and had dreams of being a

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<v Speaker 2>professional baseball player, football player, or quarterback. And my passions

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<v Speaker 2>were much greater than my abilities. So as I completed

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<v Speaker 2>high school, I started thinking about what else I wanted

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<v Speaker 2>to do. And as it turned out, a high school

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<v Speaker 2>teacher gave me a copy of the New York Times

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<v Speaker 2>or put it in front of my desk when I

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<v Speaker 2>was in the school library, and it had an article

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<v Speaker 2>about CIA's big paramilitary operation during the Vietnam War and

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<v Speaker 2>Laos supporting the Homong tribesmen and said, you might be

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<v Speaker 2>interested in this, and you know, it was about secret armies.

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<v Speaker 2>It's the first I had heard of it, and I thought, yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, I think I might want to be a

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<v Speaker 2>CI officer. And so that kind of planted the seed,

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<v Speaker 2>and then I thought the best path for doing that

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<v Speaker 2>was to go into the Special Forces, which I did

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<v Speaker 2>after a couple of years of college and then became

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<v Speaker 2>an officer and then actually then became a CIA operations officer.

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<v Speaker 1>So tell us about landing in tenth Special Forces Group,

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<v Speaker 1>and I mean this is during the Cold War, of course,

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<v Speaker 1>what was tenth Group like at that time? What was

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<v Speaker 1>your initial roles and duty positions?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, So I completed the Special Forces Qualification course as

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<v Speaker 2>a weapons sergeant in May nineteen seventy four and then

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<v Speaker 2>was assigned to the tenth Group, which had two battalions

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<v Speaker 2>at Fort Devons, Massachusetts time. And you know, as you know,

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<v Speaker 2>special Forces groups are oriented toward different regions of the world.

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<v Speaker 2>And after Vietna the number of groups collapsed down to three.

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<v Speaker 2>But the tenth Group had Europe and the Soviet Bloc,

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<v Speaker 2>and basically the operational detachments were divided. Some of them

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<v Speaker 2>would go had their operational areas were Eastern Europe and

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<v Speaker 2>the Soviet Union, and that's the part I was in.

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<v Speaker 2>So I had Russian and Czech and then others had

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<v Speaker 2>the stay behind mission if the Soviets overran Germany or

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<v Speaker 2>Scandinavia or others. And so they learned Norwegian and German

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<v Speaker 2>and French and Danish and that sort of thing. And

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<v Speaker 2>the group was really a fantastic learning experience. You know,

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<v Speaker 2>I was kind of the youngest guy on the team.

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<v Speaker 2>Most of my teammates were Vietnam veterans. Some had participated

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<v Speaker 2>in you know, very sensitive reconnaissance operations in Laos and

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<v Speaker 2>North Vietnam with MACV you know, studies and observation groups

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<v Speaker 2>that were doing these dangerous special reconnaissance missions. And then

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<v Speaker 2>we also had a number of Eastern European emigrats, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>who were born in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere. One of my

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<v Speaker 2>group commanders was born in Georgia and another Battanan commander

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<v Speaker 2>was born in Czechoslovakia, and so they were a great

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<v Speaker 2>source of knowledge about, you know, if we actually had

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<v Speaker 2>to deploy into our unconventional warfare operational areas, what it

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<v Speaker 2>would be like to live there and everything else. So

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<v Speaker 2>it was a tremendous learning experience for me, and you know,

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<v Speaker 2>they sent me to a lot of training then, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>in the post Vietnam era, we didn't have a lot

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<v Speaker 2>of operations, and so it was mostly a great deal

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<v Speaker 2>of training till till the nineteen eighties, we did have one.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, our job was mainly to prepare for World

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<v Speaker 2>War three, and our job was either to do special

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<v Speaker 2>reconnaissance behind enemy lines or direct action and then if

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<v Speaker 2>there was a resistance movement, unconventional warfare. And one special

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<v Speaker 2>mission we had a few of us in the group

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<v Speaker 2>was to train with very small nuclear weapons, man portable

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<v Speaker 2>nuclear weapons to actually try to stop the Soviet advances,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, by interdicting the second Echelon. Forces had one

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<v Speaker 2>potential combat deployment to Angola during that period. Angola had

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<v Speaker 2>gone into a civil war, but it was aborted at

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<v Speaker 2>the last minute, and the president decided to go to

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<v Speaker 2>the covert action route rather than overt military or special operations. Use.

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<v Speaker 1>Would you like to talk a little bit about one

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<v Speaker 1>thing I thought was unique and interesting about your book

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<v Speaker 1>was we talked about getting sent to Berlin to do

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<v Speaker 1>some clandestine tradecraft training.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah. So the tenth Group in those days, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>I mentioned two battalions in the group headquarters at Fort Devons.

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<v Speaker 2>There was a battalion forward at bod Toltzen Bavaria. I

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<v Speaker 2>later served in that unit, and then there was essentially

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<v Speaker 2>a company size force in civilian clothes that was in

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<v Speaker 2>Berlin called Detachment A, changed its name in the nineteen

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<v Speaker 2>eighties to something else, but they had a stay behind mission,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, if the Soviets overran Berlin and then also

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<v Speaker 2>potentially to go out into East Germany, you know, given

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<v Speaker 2>the location of Berlin in the event of war, and

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<v Speaker 2>so one of the training episodes I had was to

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<v Speaker 2>go serve with them and do essentially urban unconventional warfare.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, how we would sabotage facilities and how we

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<v Speaker 2>would clandestinely communicate so we couldn't be found out by

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<v Speaker 2>the secret police, and so a lot of a lot

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<v Speaker 2>of denied area trade crafts.

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<v Speaker 1>And then you touched upon it the training with the

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<v Speaker 1>special atomic demolition munition. Yeah, you tell us a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit more about what that entailed.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, So from the early I guess the late nineteen

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<v Speaker 2>sixties and early nineteen in nineteen seventies up until the

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<v Speaker 2>mid nineteen eighties, special operations forces mainly seals and Green Berets,

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<v Speaker 2>a select portion of them were given this mission to

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<v Speaker 2>train to place, to arm and place this device. And

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<v Speaker 2>you know, so with all nuclear weapons, you have personal

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<v Speaker 2>reliability programs. You know, you have to do extra vetting

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<v Speaker 2>of the people selected for this and pretty intensive training.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, it's really a no fail mission, so you'd

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<v Speaker 2>have these operational readiness evaluations by nuclear inspectors to make

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<v Speaker 2>sure you knew how to do everything, and the command

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<v Speaker 2>and control for those things obviously directed from very on

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<v Speaker 2>high so there's communications procedures you have to learn, and

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<v Speaker 2>so it's pretty intensive training. And as I said, the

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<v Speaker 2>standards were very high for that, and you know, it

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<v Speaker 2>was probably considered one of the most risky missions, and

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<v Speaker 2>I mean they were all risky in those days if

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<v Speaker 2>general war broke out, but this thing in particular to

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<v Speaker 2>have to you know, emplace it and had a timer

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<v Speaker 2>on it that you know, you could arm, and then

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<v Speaker 2>you'd have to get in an overwatch position to maintain

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<v Speaker 2>custody of it. So you know, the kind of the

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<v Speaker 2>gallows humor among those trained in it was as soon

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<v Speaker 2>as you'd you know, touch that dial, the thing would

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<v Speaker 2>enough was in place that would detonate, and but yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>it was it was a very interesting experience. And then

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<v Speaker 2>you know, learning how to parachute with it, either freefall

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<v Speaker 2>or static line, and you could also scuba with it too,

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<v Speaker 2>so that's hence the Seals or Special Forces scuba teams.

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<v Speaker 1>I've actually been doing a lot of research on the

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<v Speaker 1>green Light Teams recently, and I think that it's it's

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<v Speaker 1>easy for us today to look back on it as

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<v Speaker 1>a sort of strange Doctor Strangelove sort of esque mission.

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<v Speaker 3>But what I'm struck by all the people.

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<v Speaker 1>I've talked to is like, how deadly serious all of

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<v Speaker 1>you guys were about this mission and completely ready to

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<v Speaker 1>execute it if they were called upon.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah. Well, I mean, so some context. You know, beginning

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<v Speaker 2>in the nineteen fifties, you know, Soviet has had numerical

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<v Speaker 2>superiority in Europe, and so we kind of went the

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<v Speaker 2>route in the Eisenhower administration and through the sixties and

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<v Speaker 2>seventies to make up for that numerical inferiority by having

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<v Speaker 2>lots of tactical nuclear weapons, so artillery shills, minds, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>things you can drop from air bombs from aircraft. And

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<v Speaker 2>then this was just part of that family. You know

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<v Speaker 2>that this was the Special Forces and seal role, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>to go behind enemy lines with a small nuclear weapon,

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<v Speaker 2>but you know, it's part of a part of a

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<v Speaker 2>larger family, and it was a very very serious mission.

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<v Speaker 1>So as a as you know, the kid, the teenager

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<v Speaker 1>that read the New York Times article about Special Ops

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<v Speaker 1>and LAOS, I mean, was this will all of this

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<v Speaker 1>sounds like a dream come true?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah? I had to pinch myself. I was really you know,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, the path actually worked out in terms of

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<v Speaker 2>you know, I I originally thought I would go into

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<v Speaker 2>Special Forces for maybe you know, five years or something

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<v Speaker 2>and then go to CIA, and I decided to become

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<v Speaker 2>an officer and ended up staying for ten before I

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<v Speaker 2>went to CIA. You know, so I really loved it.

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<v Speaker 2>It was just just a great experience.

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<v Speaker 1>So you went to officer candidate school and then you

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<v Speaker 1>got to do a pretty big venue change from Germany

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<v Speaker 1>and tenth Group to third Battalion, seventh Group that was

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<v Speaker 1>down at Fort Goolik, Panama, Right.

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<v Speaker 2>That's right. Yeah, I was on the Atlantic side of

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<v Speaker 2>the Canal zone rather than the Pacific side, so most

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<v Speaker 2>of the forces in Panama were over on the Pacific side,

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<v Speaker 2>but there was an infantry battalion and a Special Forces

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<v Speaker 2>battalion on the Atlantic. And you know the reason I

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<v Speaker 2>chose that. When I graduated from OCS, we didn't have

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<v Speaker 2>an SF branch in those days. And so I was

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<v Speaker 2>an infantry officer, went to Infantry officer training, and the

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<v Speaker 2>assignments officer came down to our class as we were

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<v Speaker 2>getting our assignments and said, how would you like to

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<v Speaker 2>go right back to special Forces and be a detachment

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<v Speaker 2>commander because you don't need to be a platoon leader

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<v Speaker 2>given your enlisted experience, you could go right into company command.

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<v Speaker 2>And I thought, well, great, so I get a captain's

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<v Speaker 2>job as a lieutenant, and then I have a captain's

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<v Speaker 2>job as a captain. And you know, there were three

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<v Speaker 2>assignments offered, the tenth Group, the fifth Group, and third

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<v Speaker 2>of the seventh and it was very tempted to go

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<v Speaker 2>back to the tenth group. My former battalion commander had

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<v Speaker 2>become the group commander and he just got the Medal

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<v Speaker 2>of Honor award in Paris Davis this year. But you know,

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<v Speaker 2>the insurgencies were really heating up in Central America. That

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<v Speaker 2>was the big focus. You know, had a a communist

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<v Speaker 2>insurgency and I'll solve it or and then the Sandinistas

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<v Speaker 2>had taken over in Nicaragua. And you know, it's always

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<v Speaker 2>good to kind of follow the sound of guns, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>to go where the action is, and so I learned

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<v Speaker 2>Spanish and ended up in third Battalion, seventh Group. And

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<v Speaker 2>as it turned out, I was getting you know, after

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<v Speaker 2>the Iran rescue attempt and the taking of our should

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<v Speaker 2>say it the other way, the taking of our hostages

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<v Speaker 2>in Tehran and then the Iran rescue attempt, we became

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<v Speaker 2>very concerned about other high threat embassies and so I

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<v Speaker 2>was given essentially a troop command of two operational detachments

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<v Speaker 2>that would go around to high threat embassies in Latin America,

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<v Speaker 2>mainly Central America, but Colombia and others too, to make

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<v Speaker 2>sure that if we needed to do a rescue, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>our special mission forces that they had the blueprints and

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<v Speaker 2>you know, knew where the cameras were and you know

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<v Speaker 2>all the things you would need to do to rescue

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<v Speaker 2>like that. So you know, it caused me to interact

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<v Speaker 2>a lot with the State Department and with CIA, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>across the region, and again a great learning experience.

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<v Speaker 1>I thought it was really cool as I was reading

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<v Speaker 1>the book this I think you said it was the

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<v Speaker 1>mission and then became the RST Mission. This this, this

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<v Speaker 1>is that sort of nascent what we would call today,

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<v Speaker 1>we advanced force operations is probably the term that you

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<v Speaker 1>probably use nowadays. As I was reading the book, I

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<v Speaker 1>read about it this operation that you guys got sent

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<v Speaker 1>down to Honduras, and I was like, oh, I remember

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<v Speaker 1>hearing about this years and years ago, but I had

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<v Speaker 1>no idea it was you. Could you explain a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit more about like what the mission entailed and how

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<v Speaker 1>you guys went over to sort of prepare the environment?

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<v Speaker 2>Sure, so you know, the normal mission was, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>intelligence collection, so you know, visiting these embassies and making

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<v Speaker 2>sure we had all the information we would need for

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<v Speaker 2>a rescue beforehand. And then if there was an actual

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<v Speaker 2>terrorist incident, then a small portion of my team would

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<v Speaker 2>deploy to be the first on site where we'd been

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<v Speaker 2>to this country several times, and start preparing the environment

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<v Speaker 2>for the rescue force that would come in, but also

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<v Speaker 2>provide special operations advice to the ambassador and the country team,

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<v Speaker 2>Chief of station, ambassador, etc. And so in late April

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<v Speaker 2>nineteen eighty two, a Honduras Honduran terrorist group supported by

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<v Speaker 2>Cuba hijacked an airline or a Dash seven airliner a

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<v Speaker 2>prop plane in Togusaglfa Airport, the capital of Honduras with

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<v Speaker 2>fifty eight hostages on board, and ten of whom were Americans.

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<v Speaker 2>And so we got deployed right away by Southcomb to

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<v Speaker 2>the embassy to meet with the ambassador, who I served

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<v Speaker 2>with a lot of years and govern he ended up

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<v Speaker 2>becoming ambassador multiple places, John Negroponte, and then Deputy Secretary

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<v Speaker 2>of State, and about military options, including bringing in some

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<v Speaker 2>of our special mission forces to be in a position

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<v Speaker 2>to do a rescue. And so they came in and

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<v Speaker 2>there was a three day standoff with this terrorist group

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<v Speaker 2>with the hostages. I was up for three nights essentially,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, with my little team, my four man team

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<v Speaker 2>doing surveillance around the airfield and with our Army Special

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<v Speaker 2>Operations counterparts, and we had one interesting incident. The terrorists

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<v Speaker 2>had a homemade improvised explosive device with nitro glycerin on

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<v Speaker 2>the plane, and you know, the airplane was getting really

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<v Speaker 2>hot and nitro glycerin can become unstable when it gets

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<v Speaker 2>hot like that. So the terrorists actually asked for assistance

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<v Speaker 2>in that regard and we had to scramble to how

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<v Speaker 2>they would diffuse the bomb. And it turned out, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>Kitty Litter was a pretty good field expedient to do,

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<v Speaker 2>so we raced out to Degusigalpa to procure some and

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<v Speaker 2>that that kind of did the trick, and some of

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<v Speaker 2>the hostages were able to escape from the plane on

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<v Speaker 2>the third day and the gunfire, but fortunately they were

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<v Speaker 2>only injured from the fall, not from the terir of shots.

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<v Speaker 2>And then the terrorists decided to give up the ghost

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<v Speaker 2>after three days for safe passage to Cuba, and so

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<v Speaker 2>that was incident number one. And then four months later,

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<v Speaker 2>a similar terrorist group took one hundred and nine hostages

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<v Speaker 2>in San Pedro Sula town in the north of Hunduras,

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<v Speaker 2>including three government ministers. So we did it all over

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<v Speaker 2>again and went there and did you know, ten day

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<v Speaker 2>siege and it ended the same way with the negotiations.

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<v Speaker 1>And also showed the capabilities of you know that the

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<v Speaker 1>concept worked as far as the reconnaissance.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, yes, So it was considered a model for the

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<v Speaker 2>combat for other combatant commands to then follow south COM's

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<v Speaker 2>lead on having this kind of capability, and that eventually

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<v Speaker 2>led to more special operations, intelligence units and then the rsts.

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<v Speaker 4>As you mentioned when when you guys were developing this capability,

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<v Speaker 4>you know, if you're you're developing capability. There's not necessarily

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<v Speaker 4>groundwork that's been laid before, you know, laid before. How

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<v Speaker 4>how did you guys go about that process?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so it was a you know, kind of a

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<v Speaker 2>one of a kind unit at the time, made out

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<v Speaker 2>of two O das and people were selected for their

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<v Speaker 2>fluency and you know, civilian clothes and long hair, selected

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<v Speaker 2>for their fluency in Spanish and their intelligence tradecraft in

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<v Speaker 2>addition to other special operations skills and uh and then

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<v Speaker 2>you know, we had to have training. We were kind

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<v Speaker 2>of ahead of our time on satellite communications, so we

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<v Speaker 2>had really reliable communications, some technical surveillance devices and stuff

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<v Speaker 2>that weren't organic to the to the Special Forces Battalion

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<v Speaker 2>that we had to procure commercially and learn how to use.

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<v Speaker 2>And so we were really building this from the ground up,

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<v Speaker 2>including you know, learning how to put these target folders together,

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<v Speaker 2>of what exactly was needed and how to present it

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<v Speaker 2>to the operators, you know, who would do the rescue

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<v Speaker 2>and so you needed to know a lot about close

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<v Speaker 2>quarter battle and sniping and lots of other things. So

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<v Speaker 2>right before I had that command, for a few months,

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<v Speaker 2>I had command of a sniper team which also was useful,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, personal preparation before I took this counter terrorism

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<v Speaker 2>intelligence mission.

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<v Speaker 1>And then let's talk a little bit of about how

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<v Speaker 1>you made that transition from Special Forces to the CIA,

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<v Speaker 1>Like how did that take place for you?

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<v Speaker 2>You know? So my original goal was to serve in

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<v Speaker 2>the Special Forces and learn more languages and get competent

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<v Speaker 2>in all these disciplines and then go to CIA. And

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<v Speaker 2>then I thought, well, maybe I'll make the Army a career.

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<v Speaker 2>And you know, I went to OCS and had this command,

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<v Speaker 2>but you know, as I was wrestling with it, I thought, Okay,

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00:19:29.559 --> 00:19:32.960
<v Speaker 2>I've had this great experience as a lieutenant and captain

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<v Speaker 2>commanding this troop and participating in real operations, you know,

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00:19:38.160 --> 00:19:41.519
<v Speaker 2>but my next assignment would be infantry company command and

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00:19:41.599 --> 00:19:45.119
<v Speaker 2>a peacetime army and I thought I wanted to join

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00:19:45.680 --> 00:19:48.000
<v Speaker 2>more of the Cold War fight. You I saw what

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<v Speaker 2>was going on in Central America and what CIA was doing,

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00:19:52.359 --> 00:19:56.440
<v Speaker 2>and I thought, potentially I could contribute more if I

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<v Speaker 2>went to CIA. And so I applied for a career

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<v Speaker 2>training program and you know, got accepted and enjoined the agency.

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<v Speaker 1>And the way I read it in the book, if I,

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<v Speaker 1>if I understood correctly, you had some adventures before you

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<v Speaker 1>even got trained as a CIA officer.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so the in my day, the career training program

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<v Speaker 2>for operations officers, we had a ten week course, you know,

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00:20:28.000 --> 00:20:31.119
<v Speaker 2>kind of introduction to CIA and the intelligence community, all

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00:20:31.160 --> 00:20:34.240
<v Speaker 2>the different directorates and learned how to write reports and

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00:20:34.759 --> 00:20:38.920
<v Speaker 2>do analysis and some basic trade craft, and learned about

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00:20:38.920 --> 00:20:42.160
<v Speaker 2>our satellites and you know, the science and technology side

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00:20:42.240 --> 00:20:45.759
<v Speaker 2>and et cetera. Had senior case officers come in and

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<v Speaker 2>talk to us about agents they recruited and including Russians

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<v Speaker 2>that were handled in Moscow, and you know, so it

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00:20:53.400 --> 00:20:57.720
<v Speaker 2>was pretty good training. And then you typically do two

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<v Speaker 2>three month assignments on operational desk to learn operations more,

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<v Speaker 2>and then you would go to the operations course at

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<v Speaker 2>what we call the farm, a special facility. And then

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<v Speaker 2>in those days we also had a twelve week paramilitary

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<v Speaker 2>operations course called Special Operations Training. And during my first

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<v Speaker 2>assignment in Latin America, Division I was selected for this

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<v Speaker 2>because there was a coup in Suriname and a former

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<v Speaker 2>Dutch colony in northern Tip of South America and we

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<v Speaker 2>had assets in prison and the branch chief wanted to

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<v Speaker 2>do a jail break essentially and thought I had the

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00:21:51.920 --> 00:21:56.039
<v Speaker 2>right skills to help plan that with the assets and stuff,

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00:21:56.079 --> 00:21:58.400
<v Speaker 2>and so that was kind of my introduction to CI

336
00:21:59.119 --> 00:22:03.440
<v Speaker 2>and then LO and will Hold. A crisis occurred in

337
00:22:03.519 --> 00:22:06.880
<v Speaker 2>Grenada as I was some weeks into this assignment working

338
00:22:06.920 --> 00:22:11.599
<v Speaker 2>on this jail break plan, and you know, we had

339
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<v Speaker 2>six hundred medical students attending training in Grenada, American medical students,

340
00:22:18.039 --> 00:22:22.440
<v Speaker 2>and you know, the situation deteriorated. The coup leaders killed,

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<v Speaker 2>the president of the country and some others, and President

342
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<v Speaker 2>Reagan made the decision over a weekend to do the

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<v Speaker 2>invasion of Grenada. It was combination of Special Operations Forces

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<v Speaker 2>and Marines. And I was before I had even completed

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00:22:40.279 --> 00:22:44.400
<v Speaker 2>my CIA operational training. I was called into headquarters and

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<v Speaker 2>said by the who was going to become the chief

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00:22:47.759 --> 00:22:50.839
<v Speaker 2>of station, a man named Bill Rooney, very distinguished career

348
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<v Speaker 2>in CIA, said you're going to Grenada with me and

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<v Speaker 2>a communicator and we were going in with the Special

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<v Speaker 2>Operations Forces in the main effort in the south and uh.

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<v Speaker 2>And I didn't know that at the time. I was

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<v Speaker 2>just told to come into headquarters and pack for two

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<v Speaker 2>weeks on a Sunday, and so I thought I was

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<v Speaker 2>going to be going to one of the bases, uh

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<v Speaker 2>supporting the operations, and so I packed a bunch of suits.

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<v Speaker 2>And as soon as I got in and I was

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<v Speaker 2>told I was going into combat, you know, I was

358
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<v Speaker 2>glad I had a few casual clothes in my luggage.

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<v Speaker 2>You know. So we got weapons, we got a lot

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00:23:27.000 --> 00:23:30.920
<v Speaker 2>of cash so we could uh pay assets and stuff.

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<v Speaker 2>And the Satcom radio got a briefing and had an

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<v Speaker 2>airplane take us to a staging base and then went

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<v Speaker 2>in with the invading forces. And so I went into

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<v Speaker 2>combat with a Ralph Lauren polo shirt, some linen pants

365
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<v Speaker 2>and some loafers and a weapon and h a big

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<v Speaker 2>bag of cash and set coom. Uh. You know you

367
00:23:50.920 --> 00:23:53.359
<v Speaker 2>got a hand to the CIA. They go to Warren style.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, this is not quite how we did it.

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<v Speaker 2>The special courses.

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<v Speaker 4>And the military elements. Lincoln out probably lets you get

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<v Speaker 4>c I A I don't know, right right.

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<v Speaker 2>Right yeah, and uh, and so you know our task

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00:24:08.920 --> 00:24:11.960
<v Speaker 2>was to establish a station and then you know, bring

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<v Speaker 2>in people to interrogate Cuban prisoners and others, and then

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00:24:18.400 --> 00:24:21.519
<v Speaker 2>you know, we had some other things to do. That

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00:24:23.000 --> 00:24:27.920
<v Speaker 2>led to my first combat experience in Grenada. Uh, looking

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00:24:27.960 --> 00:24:31.880
<v Speaker 2>at an arms cash and in the very very forward

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<v Speaker 2>lines where there was still a lot of combat, and

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00:24:36.400 --> 00:24:39.039
<v Speaker 2>it was a company of the eighty second that we

380
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<v Speaker 2>were actually visiting at the time, and uh, you know,

381
00:24:42.119 --> 00:24:45.200
<v Speaker 2>lo and behold. As soon as we got there, uh,

382
00:24:45.759 --> 00:24:50.160
<v Speaker 2>Cubans attacked the position. And you know, all we had

383
00:24:50.200 --> 00:24:52.960
<v Speaker 2>at the time were browning high power pistols. And so

384
00:24:53.119 --> 00:24:54.759
<v Speaker 2>I thought about it for you know, as we're faced

385
00:24:54.759 --> 00:24:56.759
<v Speaker 2>down in the dirt, I thought about it for a

386
00:24:56.799 --> 00:24:59.039
<v Speaker 2>few seconds and I thought, I just saw a bunch

387
00:24:59.039 --> 00:25:01.720
<v Speaker 2>of a k's and am mission in this warehouse. You know,

388
00:25:01.799 --> 00:25:05.519
<v Speaker 2>there were cubans for the Grenadans, and I thought, you know,

389
00:25:05.559 --> 00:25:07.160
<v Speaker 2>we could use some of those that we're going to

390
00:25:07.240 --> 00:25:10.359
<v Speaker 2>get shot at and shoot back. So Low crawled over there,

391
00:25:10.480 --> 00:25:13.119
<v Speaker 2>got some game, gave one to my chief of station

392
00:25:13.359 --> 00:25:15.920
<v Speaker 2>and one for me, and battle was over in ten minutes.

393
00:25:15.960 --> 00:25:18.920
<v Speaker 2>But it was an interesting experience.

394
00:25:19.440 --> 00:25:21.599
<v Speaker 1>And so I think you said you spent like a

395
00:25:21.640 --> 00:25:25.960
<v Speaker 1>week crawling around Grenada and then showed up back home,

396
00:25:26.079 --> 00:25:28.559
<v Speaker 1>you know, covered in dirt in your Ralph Laurent polo

397
00:25:28.640 --> 00:25:30.519
<v Speaker 1>shirt that you've been wearing for a week.

398
00:25:31.480 --> 00:25:35.319
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so it was actually almost two weeks and we

399
00:25:35.400 --> 00:25:39.920
<v Speaker 2>had another mission where we were told to apprehend a

400
00:25:40.039 --> 00:25:44.279
<v Speaker 2>Libyan intelligence officer on the island who had been ordered

401
00:25:44.279 --> 00:25:48.359
<v Speaker 2>by Kadafi to take American hostages. And before we could

402
00:25:48.440 --> 00:25:53.000
<v Speaker 2>capture him, he had fled to the Soviet embassy. But

403
00:25:53.039 --> 00:25:59.079
<v Speaker 2>we had this chase around Saint George's, the capitol. And Yeah,

404
00:25:59.200 --> 00:26:04.799
<v Speaker 2>toward the the end of the operation that when the

405
00:26:04.839 --> 00:26:07.759
<v Speaker 2>training staff learned that I had been in combat for

406
00:26:07.839 --> 00:26:10.920
<v Speaker 2>ten days, they weren't too happy about it. And so

407
00:26:10.960 --> 00:26:14.319
<v Speaker 2>they said, Okay, war's over for you, come home. And

408
00:26:14.359 --> 00:26:19.359
<v Speaker 2>so I hitched a military flight to Barbados, took off,

409
00:26:19.400 --> 00:26:22.039
<v Speaker 2>went into the bathroom, took off all my dirty clothes,

410
00:26:22.079 --> 00:26:24.759
<v Speaker 2>threw them in the trash, can you know, put on

411
00:26:24.839 --> 00:26:28.640
<v Speaker 2>some fresh civilian clothes, took my AMEX card out, bought

412
00:26:28.640 --> 00:26:31.519
<v Speaker 2>a plane ticket, you know, for the States, and came home.

413
00:26:32.680 --> 00:26:35.160
<v Speaker 4>I'm really surprised you didn't get like a deal with

414
00:26:35.240 --> 00:26:37.799
<v Speaker 4>Ralph Florin after that, and like they didn't develop it,

415
00:26:37.960 --> 00:26:41.599
<v Speaker 4>they didn't develop a new combat line of leisure wear.

416
00:26:42.400 --> 00:26:43.279
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, there you go.

417
00:26:46.519 --> 00:26:48.759
<v Speaker 1>So now you finally have the opportunity to go to

418
00:26:48.799 --> 00:26:51.559
<v Speaker 1>the farm and become, you know, a formalized officer.

419
00:26:52.599 --> 00:26:57.039
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so before that, you know. When I came into

420
00:26:57.039 --> 00:27:00.799
<v Speaker 2>the agency, I had check Russian and SPAN and I

421
00:27:00.839 --> 00:27:03.799
<v Speaker 2>was debating whether I would go to Latin America where

422
00:27:03.799 --> 00:27:07.160
<v Speaker 2>the wars were, or you know, to Moscow or somewhere

423
00:27:07.200 --> 00:27:09.319
<v Speaker 2>for a first assignment. And so I thought I would

424
00:27:09.400 --> 00:27:13.720
<v Speaker 2>get assigned to Soviet operations when I came back from Grenada.

425
00:27:14.039 --> 00:27:17.799
<v Speaker 2>That's what I had requested, and they called me in.

426
00:27:18.559 --> 00:27:23.960
<v Speaker 2>As it turned out, we invaded Grenada on a Tuesday,

427
00:27:24.000 --> 00:27:26.759
<v Speaker 2>the Sunday before the marine barracks were blown up in

428
00:27:26.880 --> 00:27:32.039
<v Speaker 2>Leven And and then months before that, our embassy had

429
00:27:32.079 --> 00:27:34.119
<v Speaker 2>been blown up by you know what today we know

430
00:27:34.240 --> 00:27:38.559
<v Speaker 2>is his Balla. And so I was called in and said,

431
00:27:38.720 --> 00:27:42.640
<v Speaker 2>the Near East Division wants you assigned to them for

432
00:27:42.720 --> 00:27:45.400
<v Speaker 2>a special counter terrace and task force to identify the

433
00:27:45.440 --> 00:27:50.039
<v Speaker 2>perpetrators and develop response options, et cetera. And I said,

434
00:27:50.039 --> 00:27:51.720
<v Speaker 2>you know, I don't know anything about the Middle East,

435
00:27:51.759 --> 00:27:55.079
<v Speaker 2>you know, and and well it's a directed assignment and

436
00:27:55.119 --> 00:27:57.440
<v Speaker 2>they want you. And so that was my introduction to

437
00:27:57.519 --> 00:28:00.720
<v Speaker 2>the to the Middle East to work with our station

438
00:28:00.920 --> 00:28:04.599
<v Speaker 2>there on assets who could report on Hezbala and then

439
00:28:04.680 --> 00:28:10.559
<v Speaker 2>develop various strike options. And then after that I went

440
00:28:10.599 --> 00:28:15.680
<v Speaker 2>to the farm.

441
00:28:14.240 --> 00:28:17.039
<v Speaker 1>I mean, just to wrap up of Beirute, I mean,

442
00:28:17.160 --> 00:28:19.079
<v Speaker 1>was there any kind of kind of final thoughts or

443
00:28:19.079 --> 00:28:20.920
<v Speaker 1>did anything come out of that time that you spent

444
00:28:20.960 --> 00:28:25.240
<v Speaker 1>there that you thought was notable or important or even

445
00:28:25.240 --> 00:28:26.359
<v Speaker 1>personal reflections?

446
00:28:27.079 --> 00:28:33.319
<v Speaker 2>Yeah. So, I mean one, you know, Grenada was this great,

447
00:28:33.440 --> 00:28:37.799
<v Speaker 2>exhilarating experience, and it felt like a real extension of

448
00:28:37.839 --> 00:28:41.720
<v Speaker 2>what I'd been doing in Special Forces, particularly the last

449
00:28:41.799 --> 00:28:45.319
<v Speaker 2>years as an officer in Latin America. And you know,

450
00:28:45.519 --> 00:28:48.279
<v Speaker 2>I knew the people we were going in with, and

451
00:28:48.359 --> 00:28:50.240
<v Speaker 2>so it was like old home week for me. In

452
00:28:50.319 --> 00:28:53.319
<v Speaker 2>the operation, there were problems, but the operation was generally

453
00:28:53.400 --> 00:28:59.319
<v Speaker 2>a success. With Lebanon, you know, we had a peacekeeping

454
00:28:59.400 --> 00:29:02.839
<v Speaker 2>force in there with the Marines who did not have

455
00:29:02.960 --> 00:29:06.920
<v Speaker 2>good rules of engagement, very restrictive rules of engagement, and

456
00:29:08.160 --> 00:29:11.079
<v Speaker 2>you know, it was really kind of muddled policy for

457
00:29:11.160 --> 00:29:14.960
<v Speaker 2>a country that was, you know, essentially heading into civil

458
00:29:15.000 --> 00:29:19.599
<v Speaker 2>war and sectarian conflict and the same thing. Our station

459
00:29:21.240 --> 00:29:25.400
<v Speaker 2>had similar challenges, you know, and so Americans started getting kidnapped,

460
00:29:25.400 --> 00:29:28.680
<v Speaker 2>including our chief of station, the late Bill Buckley, and

461
00:29:28.759 --> 00:29:33.920
<v Speaker 2>tortured and killed, and so it really was a searing

462
00:29:34.000 --> 00:29:37.640
<v Speaker 2>experience for me in terms of you know, failed policy

463
00:29:40.000 --> 00:29:41.839
<v Speaker 2>you know, we weren't in it to win it, and

464
00:29:42.279 --> 00:29:45.880
<v Speaker 2>we essentially put ourselves in a position where we were

465
00:29:46.039 --> 00:29:51.599
<v Speaker 2>we were very vulnerable and and you know, and as

466
00:29:51.599 --> 00:29:53.839
<v Speaker 2>I said, it was my introduction into the Middle East.

467
00:29:53.880 --> 00:29:58.160
<v Speaker 2>And then later, you know, decades later, when I was

468
00:29:58.200 --> 00:30:00.160
<v Speaker 2>involved in I Rock and others, you know, seeing that

469
00:30:00.240 --> 00:30:03.359
<v Speaker 2>sectarian conflict again and back all those memories.

470
00:30:03.759 --> 00:30:07.279
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, when you did go to the farm. Now now

471
00:30:07.400 --> 00:30:09.799
<v Speaker 4>you're going to the farm, but you've already had combat

472
00:30:09.839 --> 00:30:14.079
<v Speaker 4>experience as a CIA officer, a CIA employee. Did that

473
00:30:14.200 --> 00:30:16.400
<v Speaker 4>help you or hurt you? Or didn't Nobody there know

474
00:30:16.440 --> 00:30:16.880
<v Speaker 4>about it?

475
00:30:17.519 --> 00:30:19.680
<v Speaker 2>Now they knew about it, and it was both, you know.

476
00:30:19.920 --> 00:30:24.720
<v Speaker 2>They the chief instructor pulled me aside. You know, I

477
00:30:24.720 --> 00:30:29.039
<v Speaker 2>got an award for heroism, and one of the top

478
00:30:29.079 --> 00:30:31.680
<v Speaker 2>agency officials came down and they talked about it, and

479
00:30:32.240 --> 00:30:35.039
<v Speaker 2>you know, some of the instructors were, Okay, let's test

480
00:30:35.039 --> 00:30:37.359
<v Speaker 2>this guy's metal some more, you know, so he doesn't

481
00:30:37.400 --> 00:30:39.480
<v Speaker 2>think he's too big for his breeches and all that.

482
00:30:39.519 --> 00:30:43.200
<v Speaker 2>But others, you know, we were impressed. And one guy

483
00:30:43.279 --> 00:30:46.559
<v Speaker 2>said to me, geez, you really just you know, picked

484
00:30:46.599 --> 00:30:48.480
<v Speaker 2>up the weapons and did this. You know, I don't

485
00:30:48.480 --> 00:30:51.119
<v Speaker 2>know if I could have done that in that situation,

486
00:30:51.240 --> 00:30:54.599
<v Speaker 2>and this guy had served in mostly Europe, and I thought, well,

487
00:30:54.640 --> 00:30:56.599
<v Speaker 2>you know, this is kind of what I've been trained

488
00:30:56.640 --> 00:31:00.240
<v Speaker 2>to do for ten years, so it's kind of but yeah.

489
00:31:00.240 --> 00:31:02.359
<v Speaker 2>So it was a mixture actually of both. You know,

490
00:31:02.480 --> 00:31:06.759
<v Speaker 2>some let's screw with them a little bit, and then others.

491
00:31:06.839 --> 00:31:09.640
<v Speaker 2>You know, I was a little bit of a special class.

492
00:31:09.880 --> 00:31:12.079
<v Speaker 4>But some of them are sort of like, okay, you

493
00:31:12.079 --> 00:31:15.720
<v Speaker 4>can handle grenative, let's see how you handle the seedier

494
00:31:15.880 --> 00:31:18.119
<v Speaker 4>sides of Virginia.

495
00:31:18.480 --> 00:31:24.480
<v Speaker 2>Sure right, can you man up? Yeah? Yeah? Right?

496
00:31:27.319 --> 00:31:30.279
<v Speaker 1>And after the form you got what I as I

497
00:31:30.319 --> 00:31:33.920
<v Speaker 1>recall you describing your book as sort of your dream assignment,

498
00:31:33.960 --> 00:31:35.400
<v Speaker 1>you got assigned to a ground branch.

499
00:31:36.599 --> 00:31:40.319
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so, you know, after the operations course where you're

500
00:31:40.319 --> 00:31:42.759
<v Speaker 2>trained to recruit and handle agents, then we had this

501
00:31:42.839 --> 00:31:47.559
<v Speaker 2>special operations course including another airborne school, you know, five

502
00:31:47.640 --> 00:31:51.759
<v Speaker 2>parachute jobs, which was old hat, but you know, it

503
00:31:51.839 --> 00:31:55.200
<v Speaker 2>was sort of like a Special Forces qualification course again

504
00:31:55.279 --> 00:31:59.160
<v Speaker 2>not as strenuous, but the same basic tactics and techniques.

505
00:31:59.759 --> 00:32:04.640
<v Speaker 2>And then as I came out again and was thinking

506
00:32:04.640 --> 00:32:08.240
<v Speaker 2>about where I would go for an assignment, which the

507
00:32:08.400 --> 00:32:10.599
<v Speaker 2>division or part of the world, you know, Soviet, East

508
00:32:10.599 --> 00:32:16.079
<v Speaker 2>European or Latin America. What today is the Special Activity Center.

509
00:32:16.160 --> 00:32:18.920
<v Speaker 2>Then it was called International Activities because it had counter

510
00:32:19.039 --> 00:32:22.559
<v Speaker 2>terrorism and counter narcotics as well as the paramilitary stuff.

511
00:32:23.519 --> 00:32:27.240
<v Speaker 2>The division chief there said to me, we would like

512
00:32:27.319 --> 00:32:30.599
<v Speaker 2>you to come to this division because we're creating a

513
00:32:30.640 --> 00:32:35.319
<v Speaker 2>program to fast track a few officers for leadership of

514
00:32:35.359 --> 00:32:39.359
<v Speaker 2>our covert action that would combine case officer work with

515
00:32:39.599 --> 00:32:44.319
<v Speaker 2>management of these covert action programs. And said we want

516
00:32:44.359 --> 00:32:47.000
<v Speaker 2>you to be the first case and so how you

517
00:32:47.039 --> 00:32:49.920
<v Speaker 2>can argue with a senior official and on a fast

518
00:32:49.960 --> 00:32:52.400
<v Speaker 2>track to the top. So I did, and then he

519
00:32:52.440 --> 00:32:53.519
<v Speaker 2>said where do you want to go? You want to

520
00:32:53.559 --> 00:32:55.880
<v Speaker 2>go to El Salvador. What would you like for a

521
00:32:55.880 --> 00:32:58.160
<v Speaker 2>first tour. There's a lot of wars going on and

522
00:32:58.200 --> 00:32:59.759
<v Speaker 2>so if you don't mind, I'd like to go to

523
00:33:00.240 --> 00:33:04.119
<v Speaker 2>branch first and then do the case officer stuff next.

524
00:33:04.359 --> 00:33:06.559
<v Speaker 2>And said sure. So I got assigned a ground branch

525
00:33:08.960 --> 00:33:15.000
<v Speaker 2>in Special Operations Group, and then within a couple weeks

526
00:33:15.480 --> 00:33:18.319
<v Speaker 2>I was told that they were creating this new position

527
00:33:19.079 --> 00:33:23.519
<v Speaker 2>for the Afghanistan Covered Action program, combining two jobs into one,

528
00:33:23.680 --> 00:33:33.039
<v Speaker 2>essentially the program officer overall oversight of management of the program,

529
00:33:33.079 --> 00:33:36.640
<v Speaker 2>which had been a senior CIA case officer, and then

530
00:33:36.720 --> 00:33:39.839
<v Speaker 2>the chief Paramilitary Advisor who had been a Marine colonel

531
00:33:40.079 --> 00:33:42.480
<v Speaker 2>on detail, and they were combining them into two and

532
00:33:43.240 --> 00:33:45.519
<v Speaker 2>interviewed a bunch of candidates and thought I was the

533
00:33:45.599 --> 00:33:47.440
<v Speaker 2>right guy for the job. So it was really like

534
00:33:47.480 --> 00:33:49.680
<v Speaker 2>the job of a lifetime for me, you know. And

535
00:33:49.759 --> 00:33:55.279
<v Speaker 2>I thought, you know, instead of just fighting Soviet surrogates

536
00:33:55.319 --> 00:33:58.960
<v Speaker 2>in Central America or elsewhere, now we've got the main

537
00:33:59.119 --> 00:34:02.519
<v Speaker 2>enemy in Afghania. Stand and it, you know, And so

538
00:34:02.680 --> 00:34:04.720
<v Speaker 2>it really seemed like the job of a lifetime.

539
00:34:05.519 --> 00:34:08.480
<v Speaker 4>Prior to that, though, you know, you're going to volunteering

540
00:34:08.519 --> 00:34:12.599
<v Speaker 4>to go to grand branch tracking studies? Was that a

541
00:34:13.199 --> 00:34:15.920
<v Speaker 4>Did some people consider that like a misstep in a

542
00:34:16.000 --> 00:34:20.599
<v Speaker 4>career as it wasn't really attached to a larger division

543
00:34:20.679 --> 00:34:24.519
<v Speaker 4>or whatever, and like did it have legitimacy in the

544
00:34:24.639 --> 00:34:26.360
<v Speaker 4>in the wider agency at the time?

545
00:34:30.880 --> 00:34:32.920
<v Speaker 2>Yes, and no. I mean there were a lot of

546
00:34:33.320 --> 00:34:38.760
<v Speaker 2>paramilitary operations going on that hadn't been before, you know, uh,

547
00:34:38.800 --> 00:34:42.519
<v Speaker 2>Central America and Afghanistan, and so that raised the important

548
00:34:42.519 --> 00:34:44.960
<v Speaker 2>you know, they were the first one since Laos in

549
00:34:45.000 --> 00:34:52.159
<v Speaker 2>a way. But yeah, in those days, ground branch officers

550
00:34:52.199 --> 00:34:56.559
<v Speaker 2>didn't become chiefs of station. Later they would uh integrated

551
00:34:56.639 --> 00:35:01.000
<v Speaker 2>more into the Director of Operations. And so that's why

552
00:35:01.039 --> 00:35:05.159
<v Speaker 2>I kind of chose the general operations track. I knew

553
00:35:05.199 --> 00:35:07.800
<v Speaker 2>I could do the paramilitary stuff, but I didn't want

554
00:35:07.840 --> 00:35:12.480
<v Speaker 2>to just do that, you know, since aspirations to become

555
00:35:12.519 --> 00:35:18.159
<v Speaker 2>a chief of station and other things, and so, you know,

556
00:35:18.199 --> 00:35:20.719
<v Speaker 2>and my reasoning was just this is a unique time.

557
00:35:20.800 --> 00:35:23.119
<v Speaker 2>We're in a lot of wars, and I have skills

558
00:35:23.199 --> 00:35:25.039
<v Speaker 2>that can contribute to this, and so I want to

559
00:35:25.039 --> 00:35:26.880
<v Speaker 2>do this first, but I knew i'd have to do

560
00:35:26.960 --> 00:35:27.639
<v Speaker 2>the other stuff.

561
00:35:27.800 --> 00:35:32.639
<v Speaker 1>Right, So, as you get on the Afghan program, I

562
00:35:32.639 --> 00:35:34.719
<v Speaker 1>would be remiss if I didn't ask you. I mean,

563
00:35:34.719 --> 00:35:39.280
<v Speaker 1>you dedicated your book to gust and Bert Dunn, and

564
00:35:39.440 --> 00:35:41.559
<v Speaker 1>I'd love to ask you about those two gentlemen, and

565
00:35:41.559 --> 00:35:43.519
<v Speaker 1>if you could tell us about coming onto the program

566
00:35:43.519 --> 00:35:44.320
<v Speaker 1>and working with them.

567
00:35:45.639 --> 00:35:52.559
<v Speaker 2>Sure. So, the Near East and South Asia Division was

568
00:35:52.599 --> 00:35:58.280
<v Speaker 2>responsible for agency operations from Morocco to Bangladesh and essentially

569
00:35:58.320 --> 00:36:02.880
<v Speaker 2>divided in half, you know, the Arab Israeli world up

570
00:36:02.920 --> 00:36:07.679
<v Speaker 2>to the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf States in Iraq and

571
00:36:07.719 --> 00:36:14.320
<v Speaker 2>then Iran over to Bangladesh for South Asian Operations, and Gustavraccados,

572
00:36:14.480 --> 00:36:18.960
<v Speaker 2>a veteran case officer in Greek American was the chief

573
00:36:19.000 --> 00:36:23.480
<v Speaker 2>of South Asian Operations, And so he's the guy who

574
00:36:23.719 --> 00:36:29.239
<v Speaker 2>wanted to create this new position as program officer and

575
00:36:29.559 --> 00:36:34.880
<v Speaker 2>chief Paramilitary Advisor into one and brought me in. And

576
00:36:34.960 --> 00:36:37.679
<v Speaker 2>then Bert Dunn was his boss. Burt Dunn had just

577
00:36:37.760 --> 00:36:42.480
<v Speaker 2>come in as the chief of Near East Division, and

578
00:36:42.760 --> 00:36:47.320
<v Speaker 2>Bert was one of the founding members of Special Forces

579
00:36:47.519 --> 00:36:52.679
<v Speaker 2>West Virginia lawyer founding members of Special Forces in nineteen

580
00:36:52.719 --> 00:36:56.639
<v Speaker 2>fifty two. And I had been in the eighty second

581
00:36:56.679 --> 00:37:00.280
<v Speaker 2>before that, you know, and his Army time and then

582
00:37:00.400 --> 00:37:05.320
<v Speaker 2>joined the CIA after law school, and his first assignment

583
00:37:05.599 --> 00:37:10.159
<v Speaker 2>was in Pakistan and learned Pashto. He was the agency's

584
00:37:10.199 --> 00:37:14.880
<v Speaker 2>most fluent Pashto speaker, and set up the Pakistani Special

585
00:37:14.960 --> 00:37:19.039
<v Speaker 2>Forces and went all over, you know, the tribal areas.

586
00:37:19.039 --> 00:37:21.559
<v Speaker 2>In those days. We had the U two flights over

587
00:37:21.599 --> 00:37:25.800
<v Speaker 2>the Soviet Union out of Peshawar, Gary Powers and all that,

588
00:37:26.320 --> 00:37:28.960
<v Speaker 2>and so it was involved in that too. And he'd

589
00:37:29.000 --> 00:37:35.519
<v Speaker 2>served in all these difficult places around the world. He'd

590
00:37:35.519 --> 00:37:42.480
<v Speaker 2>been chief in Afghanistan, he'd served in Pakistan, India supporting

591
00:37:42.559 --> 00:37:46.039
<v Speaker 2>Tibetan insurgents when we were doing that in the sixties

592
00:37:46.639 --> 00:37:53.119
<v Speaker 2>against China, served in Vietnam and then in Africa, and

593
00:37:53.159 --> 00:37:55.639
<v Speaker 2>so he was my kind of Both of them were

594
00:37:55.679 --> 00:37:58.000
<v Speaker 2>really my kind of guys, you know, street smart, but

595
00:37:58.119 --> 00:38:01.639
<v Speaker 2>also you know, a guy who went to the sound

596
00:38:01.719 --> 00:38:04.719
<v Speaker 2>of guns and had, you know, the Special Forces background,

597
00:38:04.760 --> 00:38:08.679
<v Speaker 2>and so we just clicked and they were very good

598
00:38:08.719 --> 00:38:08.920
<v Speaker 2>to me.

599
00:38:10.800 --> 00:38:14.480
<v Speaker 1>And as the program, I mean, I'd love to hear

600
00:38:14.519 --> 00:38:17.239
<v Speaker 1>in your words, how this program evolved as it sort

601
00:38:17.239 --> 00:38:19.760
<v Speaker 1>of got off the ground and there was a presidential

602
00:38:19.800 --> 00:38:24.000
<v Speaker 1>finding for Afghanistan. And the impression I get reading through

603
00:38:24.039 --> 00:38:26.400
<v Speaker 1>your book is that as time went on, the spigot

604
00:38:26.679 --> 00:38:29.840
<v Speaker 1>became fully open, like we were really about.

605
00:38:29.679 --> 00:38:31.679
<v Speaker 3>Sticking it to the Soviets in Afghanistan.

606
00:38:33.000 --> 00:38:40.760
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, So, you know, as background, there was, you know,

607
00:38:40.800 --> 00:38:42.840
<v Speaker 2>there was kind of this great game, you know, first

608
00:38:42.880 --> 00:38:45.599
<v Speaker 2>between the Russians and the British and then the nineteenth

609
00:38:45.639 --> 00:38:49.519
<v Speaker 2>century and then later in the Cold War between the

610
00:38:49.599 --> 00:38:52.920
<v Speaker 2>United States and the Soviet Union for influence in Afghanistan,

611
00:38:53.519 --> 00:38:56.800
<v Speaker 2>you know, and the Soviets generally got the better of

612
00:38:56.840 --> 00:39:00.440
<v Speaker 2>the deal. They built a tunnel, they trained a lot

613
00:39:00.480 --> 00:39:03.800
<v Speaker 2>of Afghan military officers, you know, and then they started

614
00:39:03.920 --> 00:39:08.800
<v Speaker 2>underground communist parties in the sixties and we focused on

615
00:39:09.000 --> 00:39:13.840
<v Speaker 2>agriculture in the South and Helman Province and you know,

616
00:39:14.039 --> 00:39:18.119
<v Speaker 2>up to that period. And then in nineteen seventy three,

617
00:39:19.360 --> 00:39:23.519
<v Speaker 2>the king's cousin overthrew him after you know, several decades

618
00:39:23.559 --> 00:39:29.440
<v Speaker 2>of royal rule, and the prime minister ran the country

619
00:39:29.480 --> 00:39:31.800
<v Speaker 2>for five years, and then he was overthrown in nineteen

620
00:39:31.880 --> 00:39:37.880
<v Speaker 2>seventy eight by the communist parties with Soviet support, launching

621
00:39:37.880 --> 00:39:42.079
<v Speaker 2>a communist revolution in Afghanistan, and immediately it triggered resistance,

622
00:39:43.239 --> 00:39:48.519
<v Speaker 2>you know, trying to impose land reform, which really means

623
00:39:48.599 --> 00:39:52.719
<v Speaker 2>land appropriation, and then you know, atheism, you know, just

624
00:39:52.760 --> 00:39:59.719
<v Speaker 2>not going to fly in Afghanistan. And the communist Afghan

625
00:39:59.760 --> 00:40:05.880
<v Speaker 2>govern asked for Soviet assistance, and Soviets were given a lot,

626
00:40:05.920 --> 00:40:09.559
<v Speaker 2>but didn't want to intervene, you know, until they did finally.

627
00:40:10.199 --> 00:40:19.320
<v Speaker 2>And so before the Soviets intervened in December late December

628
00:40:19.400 --> 00:40:22.400
<v Speaker 2>nineteen seventy nine, that summer, there were a couple of

629
00:40:22.440 --> 00:40:26.440
<v Speaker 2>what we call non lethal findings to provide political and

630
00:40:26.519 --> 00:40:34.079
<v Speaker 2>psychological support to the resistance and money essentially and communications support,

631
00:40:34.960 --> 00:40:39.880
<v Speaker 2>and then when the Soviets invaded in force, then three

632
00:40:39.960 --> 00:40:43.599
<v Speaker 2>days after that, President Jimmy Carter signed a lethal Finding

633
00:40:43.719 --> 00:40:48.159
<v Speaker 2>authorizing CI, the third Finding authorizing CIA to support the resistance,

634
00:40:48.239 --> 00:40:51.960
<v Speaker 2>you know, fully with and so within ten days CI

635
00:40:52.239 --> 00:40:57.119
<v Speaker 2>actually had weapons starting flowing to the resistance. But for

636
00:40:57.199 --> 00:41:01.000
<v Speaker 2>the first five years, President Carter's last year and President

637
00:41:01.039 --> 00:41:08.360
<v Speaker 2>Reagan's first term, the program was reasonably big. It was

638
00:41:10.199 --> 00:41:13.599
<v Speaker 2>we had a lot of foreign partners, and Saudi's being one,

639
00:41:13.719 --> 00:41:17.639
<v Speaker 2>obviously Pakistan. The Saudi's matched this dollar for dollar, and

640
00:41:17.719 --> 00:41:22.039
<v Speaker 2>so the US government budget was sixty million, and the

641
00:41:22.199 --> 00:41:24.320
<v Speaker 2>Saudi's matched that, so it was one hundred and twenty

642
00:41:24.400 --> 00:41:28.920
<v Speaker 2>million dollars a year. But analysts thought there was no

643
00:41:29.079 --> 00:41:32.719
<v Speaker 2>chance that the resistance could defeat the Soviets. The policy

644
00:41:32.840 --> 00:41:36.800
<v Speaker 2>goal in the finding was just to make the occupation

645
00:41:36.920 --> 00:41:40.000
<v Speaker 2>as costly as possible for the Soviets. So the war

646
00:41:40.159 --> 00:41:43.760
<v Speaker 2>kind of settled into this stalemate, and the resistance was

647
00:41:43.840 --> 00:41:47.360
<v Speaker 2>lightly equipped, mostly with small arms, not a lot of

648
00:41:47.440 --> 00:41:51.800
<v Speaker 2>heavy weapons, mortars and anti tank weapons and rocket launchers

649
00:41:51.840 --> 00:41:55.960
<v Speaker 2>and stuff. Very few surfaced air missiles, you know, handful

650
00:41:56.039 --> 00:42:00.400
<v Speaker 2>of them, twenty or so, not a lot of training, munication,

651
00:42:00.559 --> 00:42:03.639
<v Speaker 2>not a lot of intelligence, but they were still holding

652
00:42:03.679 --> 00:42:09.239
<v Speaker 2>their own against the Soviets. And then in the summer

653
00:42:09.280 --> 00:42:14.039
<v Speaker 2>of nineteen eighty four, Congressman Charlie Wilson from Texas, who

654
00:42:14.559 --> 00:42:21.800
<v Speaker 2>was on the House Defense Appropriation Subcommittee, really wanted to

655
00:42:22.760 --> 00:42:25.840
<v Speaker 2>expand the funding for the program. So CIA went in

656
00:42:26.639 --> 00:42:31.320
<v Speaker 2>for a ten percent budget increase, and Wilson quadrupled the budget,

657
00:42:31.320 --> 00:42:33.719
<v Speaker 2>you know, three hundred percent increase, which you don't see

658
00:42:33.760 --> 00:42:37.159
<v Speaker 2>every day, and that's right at the you know, and

659
00:42:37.199 --> 00:42:43.360
<v Speaker 2>so that naturally caused a lot of concern in CIA about,

660
00:42:43.480 --> 00:42:46.000
<v Speaker 2>you know, can we execute this, you know, is it

661
00:42:46.039 --> 00:42:50.320
<v Speaker 2>too much money? Can the resistance absorb it? And that's

662
00:42:50.440 --> 00:42:53.320
<v Speaker 2>exactly the moment that I got the job, and I thought, hell.

663
00:42:53.280 --> 00:42:54.639
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, we can act.

664
00:42:56.440 --> 00:42:57.239
<v Speaker 2>Eighteen. Bravo.

665
00:42:57.320 --> 00:43:00.480
<v Speaker 3>Of course he think, right, exactly.

666
00:43:00.400 --> 00:43:04.440
<v Speaker 2>How to do with this, you know, and so yeah, yeah,

667
00:43:04.480 --> 00:43:09.159
<v Speaker 2>developing plans and everything else, and so a series of

668
00:43:09.199 --> 00:43:12.039
<v Speaker 2>things led to a big change. That was the first

669
00:43:12.079 --> 00:43:15.440
<v Speaker 2>one that you know, the funding just went way up

670
00:43:15.440 --> 00:43:20.960
<v Speaker 2>and the Saudis agreed to match it. And then five

671
00:43:21.039 --> 00:43:25.280
<v Speaker 2>years into the war, we were getting some criticism in Congress,

672
00:43:25.360 --> 00:43:28.840
<v Speaker 2>you know, and Central America was already very controversial you know,

673
00:43:28.920 --> 00:43:31.159
<v Speaker 2>you had a thing called the Bowl and Amendment that

674
00:43:31.239 --> 00:43:34.920
<v Speaker 2>suspended aid to the contrast for a while and other things.

675
00:43:34.960 --> 00:43:40.960
<v Speaker 2>But the controversy on Afghanistan was, you know, some Republicans

676
00:43:41.000 --> 00:43:46.480
<v Speaker 2>felt that the Pakistanis were a corruption problem. The Pakistanis

677
00:43:46.559 --> 00:43:49.800
<v Speaker 2>were keeping all the weapons for themselves and they weren't

678
00:43:49.840 --> 00:43:52.719
<v Speaker 2>getting into the resistance, and so we had to show

679
00:43:52.800 --> 00:43:56.840
<v Speaker 2>that and and that Sea Ice management of the program

680
00:43:56.920 --> 00:44:00.599
<v Speaker 2>wasn't very good because we were letting the power. Kistani's

681
00:44:00.679 --> 00:44:04.599
<v Speaker 2>controlled the the end distribution, and so we had to

682
00:44:04.639 --> 00:44:09.280
<v Speaker 2>address that. And then on the left side of the aisle,

683
00:44:10.440 --> 00:44:12.800
<v Speaker 2>there was concern that this was a hopeless war and

684
00:44:12.840 --> 00:44:15.199
<v Speaker 2>we're just fighting to the last last Afghan and it

685
00:44:15.320 --> 00:44:19.199
<v Speaker 2>was immoral, and so that triggered a National Security Council

686
00:44:19.320 --> 00:44:23.159
<v Speaker 2>review of the program how to deal with these political problems,

687
00:44:23.159 --> 00:44:26.480
<v Speaker 2>you know, from both left and right. But as any

688
00:44:26.519 --> 00:44:29.199
<v Speaker 2>good NSC review, it also said, okay, what are we

689
00:44:29.239 --> 00:44:31.760
<v Speaker 2>trying to do here? We're five years into this thing.

690
00:44:32.039 --> 00:44:39.039
<v Speaker 2>What are should we read? Visit our goals and the

691
00:44:39.079 --> 00:44:45.800
<v Speaker 2>inner what today we would call a paper principles committee meeting.

692
00:44:46.679 --> 00:44:51.519
<v Speaker 2>The NSC staff circulated documents with questions at the State Department,

693
00:44:51.559 --> 00:44:54.719
<v Speaker 2>Defense Department, and CIA were supposed to answer about, you know,

694
00:44:54.840 --> 00:44:57.760
<v Speaker 2>our goals and what we thought we should do, and

695
00:44:58.599 --> 00:45:01.760
<v Speaker 2>one of them was, instead of you know, stay the course,

696
00:45:02.360 --> 00:45:05.360
<v Speaker 2>et cetera, it was to change our goal to defeating

697
00:45:05.400 --> 00:45:08.840
<v Speaker 2>the Soviets and drive them out by all means available.

698
00:45:08.840 --> 00:45:11.679
<v Speaker 2>It was in the working papers, and I'd liked the phrase.

699
00:45:11.760 --> 00:45:14.159
<v Speaker 2>I remembered it thirty years later and you know, made

700
00:45:14.199 --> 00:45:16.440
<v Speaker 2>it the title of my book. But I thought, that's

701
00:45:16.480 --> 00:45:19.239
<v Speaker 2>the one we want to do with all this new money.

702
00:45:19.880 --> 00:45:21.840
<v Speaker 2>And you know, it didn't really have an idea yet

703
00:45:22.079 --> 00:45:26.199
<v Speaker 2>totally how we would do that, but we programmed everything

704
00:45:26.239 --> 00:45:30.039
<v Speaker 2>I could in terms of more heavy weapons, this, more

705
00:45:30.039 --> 00:45:33.199
<v Speaker 2>of that. But I knew it wasn't going to be

706
00:45:33.320 --> 00:45:39.159
<v Speaker 2>enough yet. And lo and behold, George Schultz at the

707
00:45:39.159 --> 00:45:43.920
<v Speaker 2>State Department and his key deputies went along with this.

708
00:45:44.199 --> 00:45:48.360
<v Speaker 2>CIA's leadership did under Bill Casey, Casper Weinberger and Defense

709
00:45:48.400 --> 00:45:51.840
<v Speaker 2>did you know on the policy side, And so our

710
00:45:51.920 --> 00:45:56.239
<v Speaker 2>goal then became to defeat the Soviets and drive them out,

711
00:45:56.719 --> 00:46:01.360
<v Speaker 2>and President Reagan signed a top secret National Security Decision

712
00:46:01.400 --> 00:46:05.239
<v Speaker 2>Directive which has been mostly declassified for the past decade

713
00:46:06.159 --> 00:46:09.360
<v Speaker 2>with that goal in mind. That that was our aim

714
00:46:09.400 --> 00:46:11.320
<v Speaker 2>there and so in a sense now we had a

715
00:46:11.400 --> 00:46:15.800
<v Speaker 2>hunting license to do what was required to do that.

716
00:46:15.920 --> 00:46:20.079
<v Speaker 2>And so then that triggered, okay, do when can we

717
00:46:20.119 --> 00:46:22.960
<v Speaker 2>get all our partners to escalate with us? And so

718
00:46:23.039 --> 00:46:29.440
<v Speaker 2>that meant resting strategic control. So we controlled the strategy

719
00:46:29.480 --> 00:46:31.960
<v Speaker 2>from the pakistanis, you know, and that would help solve

720
00:46:32.000 --> 00:46:35.599
<v Speaker 2>this issue of are they controlling too much or diverting things?

721
00:46:36.559 --> 00:46:39.519
<v Speaker 2>But also for us to put in all these new

722
00:46:39.719 --> 00:46:44.960
<v Speaker 2>weapons and both quantity and quality, and then getting our suppliers.

723
00:46:45.039 --> 00:46:47.480
<v Speaker 2>The Chinese were a big ally of ours and our

724
00:46:47.559 --> 00:46:51.480
<v Speaker 2>largest arms supplier, and Egypt was another. Would they agree

725
00:46:51.519 --> 00:46:55.280
<v Speaker 2>with the escalation and not only escalation and quantity, but

726
00:46:55.440 --> 00:46:59.639
<v Speaker 2>also in more advanced weapons, you know, rocket launchers from

727
00:46:59.679 --> 00:47:04.719
<v Speaker 2>the Chinese surface stair missiles. You know, that would really

728
00:47:06.360 --> 00:47:11.000
<v Speaker 2>make our partners more vulnerable. And you know Pakistan in

729
00:47:11.119 --> 00:47:15.159
<v Speaker 2>terms of subversion and maybe invasion. Uh, you know, the

730
00:47:15.239 --> 00:47:19.199
<v Speaker 2>Chinese with diplomatic repercussions when their weapons are found, you know,

731
00:47:19.280 --> 00:47:22.800
<v Speaker 2>surface stare missiles or shooting down aircraft. And so I

732
00:47:22.840 --> 00:47:26.840
<v Speaker 2>had to go to all these countries with the top

733
00:47:26.920 --> 00:47:31.360
<v Speaker 2>leadership of their intelligence services to try to get them

734
00:47:31.400 --> 00:47:33.880
<v Speaker 2>to go along with the escalation, and they all did

735
00:47:33.920 --> 00:47:38.440
<v Speaker 2>within six months. And then that included trying to get

736
00:47:38.440 --> 00:47:42.320
<v Speaker 2>a more advanced surface stare weapon. You know, in covert

737
00:47:42.360 --> 00:47:47.440
<v Speaker 2>action programs you want a plausible deniability, you know, so

738
00:47:47.960 --> 00:47:51.719
<v Speaker 2>what you know covert means for your listeners is you're

739
00:47:51.760 --> 00:47:55.000
<v Speaker 2>concealing the sponsor of the operation, but not the operation,

740
00:47:55.079 --> 00:47:57.800
<v Speaker 2>because you're influencing events. You know, you're supporting a war,

741
00:47:58.159 --> 00:48:03.679
<v Speaker 2>you're doing political action or whatever it is. But you

742
00:48:04.360 --> 00:48:07.119
<v Speaker 2>don't want the United States role to be a parent.

743
00:48:08.519 --> 00:48:12.159
<v Speaker 2>You know, even if people suspect it, you're not acknowledging it.

744
00:48:13.639 --> 00:48:18.800
<v Speaker 2>And you know, so in paramilitary operations, the ones that

745
00:48:18.880 --> 00:48:22.800
<v Speaker 2>are kind of the most deniable were when you're using

746
00:48:22.880 --> 00:48:25.639
<v Speaker 2>the enemy's weapons, which is what the Afghan program was

747
00:48:26.239 --> 00:48:28.880
<v Speaker 2>for the first five years. And then you know, you

748
00:48:28.920 --> 00:48:31.159
<v Speaker 2>can lift up the skirt a little more by going

749
00:48:31.199 --> 00:48:34.880
<v Speaker 2>to Western weapons and then even more with US weapons,

750
00:48:34.880 --> 00:48:37.719
<v Speaker 2>And within twelve months we kind of went to the

751
00:48:37.719 --> 00:48:40.519
<v Speaker 2>spectrum in certain high areas. You know, we went for

752
00:48:40.840 --> 00:48:44.280
<v Speaker 2>Western surface to air missiles, a British blowpipe, and then

753
00:48:44.320 --> 00:48:49.000
<v Speaker 2>eventually the US Stinger. You know, so further escalations in

754
00:48:49.039 --> 00:48:54.280
<v Speaker 2>that regard and so first the Britz turned us down

755
00:48:54.320 --> 00:48:56.440
<v Speaker 2>on the blowpipe, and then we went back to them

756
00:48:56.480 --> 00:48:59.679
<v Speaker 2>and Prime Minister Thatcher agreed, and so we started that

757
00:49:00.159 --> 00:49:03.960
<v Speaker 2>program up. And then we went back to Congress and said,

758
00:49:06.079 --> 00:49:08.440
<v Speaker 2>you know, we now have a strategy and a real

759
00:49:08.519 --> 00:49:13.039
<v Speaker 2>detailed plan, and we know you just get you quadrupled

760
00:49:13.079 --> 00:49:15.880
<v Speaker 2>our budget, but we actually need double that. You know,

761
00:49:15.920 --> 00:49:18.840
<v Speaker 2>if you'll just double it one more time and take

762
00:49:18.920 --> 00:49:21.679
<v Speaker 2>us up to a billion billion two, we think we

763
00:49:21.719 --> 00:49:24.360
<v Speaker 2>can actually achieve this objective in a couple of years.

764
00:49:24.679 --> 00:49:28.960
<v Speaker 2>And lo and behold, Charlie Wilson came through again that

765
00:49:29.119 --> 00:49:33.559
<v Speaker 2>summer and transferred money from the Department of Defense, and

766
00:49:33.599 --> 00:49:38.119
<v Speaker 2>the Saudi's matched it, and so within less than twelve

767
00:49:38.199 --> 00:49:41.679
<v Speaker 2>months the program had increased by a factor of more

768
00:49:41.719 --> 00:49:44.480
<v Speaker 2>than ten, you know, from like one hundred and twenty

769
00:49:44.480 --> 00:49:48.280
<v Speaker 2>million to almost one point two billion, where it leveled up.

770
00:49:48.559 --> 00:49:51.719
<v Speaker 2>And then lots of you know, we went from twenty

771
00:49:51.760 --> 00:49:55.079
<v Speaker 2>surfaced air missiles some of which didn't work, you know,

772
00:49:55.199 --> 00:49:59.639
<v Speaker 2>damn near two thousand, and increased our training by factor

773
00:49:59.679 --> 00:50:02.280
<v Speaker 2>of and you know, all sorts of other things, and

774
00:50:02.320 --> 00:50:05.079
<v Speaker 2>so the temple of combat went up, the number of

775
00:50:05.079 --> 00:50:08.960
<v Speaker 2>aircraft shot down, the size of ambushes, the attacks on

776
00:50:09.119 --> 00:50:13.440
<v Speaker 2>urban areas and bases, shelling with rockets, shelling in the cobble,

777
00:50:14.239 --> 00:50:18.679
<v Speaker 2>you know, all that just increased dramatically. And at the

778
00:50:18.719 --> 00:50:23.840
<v Speaker 2>same the same time, Mikhyle Gorbachev came to power in

779
00:50:23.880 --> 00:50:26.679
<v Speaker 2>the Soviet Union in March eighty five, just as we

780
00:50:26.679 --> 00:50:30.960
<v Speaker 2>were beginning on this escalation path all of eighty five,

781
00:50:31.519 --> 00:50:35.320
<v Speaker 2>took us top general from Eastern Europe East Germany and

782
00:50:35.440 --> 00:50:37.519
<v Speaker 2>put them in charge. It got two years to win

783
00:50:37.559 --> 00:50:40.559
<v Speaker 2>the war. We'll give you twenty five thousand more troops

784
00:50:40.599 --> 00:50:42.639
<v Speaker 2>to the one hundred and five that the Soviets had

785
00:50:42.679 --> 00:50:45.920
<v Speaker 2>there already. So we had this dual escalation, you know,

786
00:50:46.000 --> 00:50:49.599
<v Speaker 2>ours covert and there's over. And within twelve months we

787
00:50:49.639 --> 00:50:52.960
<v Speaker 2>had won that battle of the surges, and Gorbachev started

788
00:50:52.960 --> 00:50:53.920
<v Speaker 2>looking for the exit.

789
00:50:54.599 --> 00:50:57.840
<v Speaker 4>Mike, I just out of curious when you're going around

790
00:50:57.840 --> 00:51:01.159
<v Speaker 4>and selling, you know, partner nation is on the idea

791
00:51:01.239 --> 00:51:05.599
<v Speaker 4>of increasing their investments, increasing the weaponship to Afghanistan, things

792
00:51:05.599 --> 00:51:09.480
<v Speaker 4>like that. Do you need a different pitch for each country,

793
00:51:09.559 --> 00:51:15.559
<v Speaker 4>Like because Afghanistan isn't like necessarily strategically necessary for anybody.

794
00:51:15.639 --> 00:51:19.000
<v Speaker 4>Is it just the idea of bleeding the Soviet Union.

795
00:51:20.760 --> 00:51:23.880
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so it differed in each case. So, you know,

796
00:51:24.039 --> 00:51:28.960
<v Speaker 2>with China, they had had a border clash in nineteen

797
00:51:29.039 --> 00:51:31.599
<v Speaker 2>sixty nine and we had, you know, the Opening to

798
00:51:31.760 --> 00:51:36.679
<v Speaker 2>China led by Henry Kissinger and Nixon and then consolidated

799
00:51:36.760 --> 00:51:42.760
<v Speaker 2>in the normalization of relations under President Carter and started

800
00:51:42.760 --> 00:51:47.400
<v Speaker 2>an intelligence partnership with the Chinese and then started supporting

801
00:51:47.840 --> 00:51:51.480
<v Speaker 2>the afghan program because they wanted to weaken the Soviets

802
00:51:51.519 --> 00:51:54.360
<v Speaker 2>and have them tied down in a war because you know,

803
00:51:54.400 --> 00:51:58.280
<v Speaker 2>they were worried about a Soviet invasion of China from

804
00:51:58.320 --> 00:52:02.559
<v Speaker 2>the north. You know, Soviet priorities were NATO number one,

805
00:52:02.960 --> 00:52:05.239
<v Speaker 2>you know, that was the Big War, China number two,

806
00:52:05.320 --> 00:52:08.239
<v Speaker 2>and then maybe Iran number three, and Afghanistan was kind

807
00:52:08.280 --> 00:52:11.039
<v Speaker 2>of number four there, which is why we thought there

808
00:52:11.039 --> 00:52:14.320
<v Speaker 2>were limits on their ability to escalate. And so with

809
00:52:14.440 --> 00:52:17.119
<v Speaker 2>the Chinese, it was really more a case of they're

810
00:52:17.159 --> 00:52:19.280
<v Speaker 2>already in it, are they willing to go in it

811
00:52:19.320 --> 00:52:23.400
<v Speaker 2>even more with more sophisticated weapons and numbers of weapons,

812
00:52:23.440 --> 00:52:27.360
<v Speaker 2>And you know, there was a debate about whether they

813
00:52:27.360 --> 00:52:30.519
<v Speaker 2>would The National Intelligence officer for China told me, there's

814
00:52:30.559 --> 00:52:32.880
<v Speaker 2>no way they will give you these surface their missiles,

815
00:52:32.920 --> 00:52:36.599
<v Speaker 2>and they ended up doing it, you know, and where

816
00:52:36.679 --> 00:52:41.159
<v Speaker 2>with Pakistan, you know, it was a function of the

817
00:52:41.239 --> 00:52:46.000
<v Speaker 2>Islamic world not liking these infidels invading a Muslim country

818
00:52:46.320 --> 00:52:49.360
<v Speaker 2>and so that you know, affected Egypt and Pakistan. And

819
00:52:49.400 --> 00:52:52.960
<v Speaker 2>then with Pakistan there was really the risk of you know,

820
00:52:55.480 --> 00:53:01.199
<v Speaker 2>cross border raids with special forces, airstrikes, sabotaged by the

821
00:53:01.320 --> 00:53:05.039
<v Speaker 2>KGB and Afghan Secret Service, and maybe an invasion because

822
00:53:05.079 --> 00:53:08.719
<v Speaker 2>the Soviets would do these big sweeps, you know, searching,

823
00:53:08.800 --> 00:53:12.880
<v Speaker 2>destroy missions right up to the border, and so it

824
00:53:12.920 --> 00:53:14.840
<v Speaker 2>was a little different and they were in it, but

825
00:53:14.880 --> 00:53:19.239
<v Speaker 2>it took some convincing more about the risk of you know,

826
00:53:19.679 --> 00:53:22.800
<v Speaker 2>escalation that would directly affect them as the frontline state.

827
00:53:23.119 --> 00:53:25.639
<v Speaker 2>I meant I should have mentioned Saudi Arabia to another one,

828
00:53:25.800 --> 00:53:29.920
<v Speaker 2>you know, was mostly helping fund the program, but again

829
00:53:29.960 --> 00:53:32.719
<v Speaker 2>it was the invasion of a Muslim country. And then

830
00:53:32.760 --> 00:53:36.599
<v Speaker 2>with the Brits, you know, it was more high technology.

831
00:53:36.679 --> 00:53:39.719
<v Speaker 2>You know, we were partnering on intelligence collection and other

832
00:53:39.800 --> 00:53:44.760
<v Speaker 2>things and support for resistance commanders, but it was it

833
00:53:44.840 --> 00:53:47.480
<v Speaker 2>was really you know, do we want to stick it

834
00:53:47.519 --> 00:53:50.199
<v Speaker 2>to the Soviets with this advanced weapon that they're not

835
00:53:50.280 --> 00:53:52.880
<v Speaker 2>going to you know that shoots down more aircraft, and

836
00:53:53.239 --> 00:53:55.599
<v Speaker 2>same for the US decision. So yeah, you know, the

837
00:53:55.639 --> 00:53:59.079
<v Speaker 2>pitch was tailored to their own interests in Afghanistan in

838
00:53:59.119 --> 00:53:59.719
<v Speaker 2>each case.

839
00:54:00.639 --> 00:54:03.199
<v Speaker 1>I think you answered at least half of my next question,

840
00:54:03.320 --> 00:54:06.440
<v Speaker 1>But because you talked about it in the book at

841
00:54:06.440 --> 00:54:10.000
<v Speaker 1>some length, I wanted to ask you about the covert

842
00:54:10.039 --> 00:54:13.440
<v Speaker 1>operation cooperation that you mentioned with China, which is this

843
00:54:14.039 --> 00:54:17.960
<v Speaker 1>interesting historical interlude, almost impossible to imagine something like that

844
00:54:18.000 --> 00:54:21.840
<v Speaker 1>happening today, But I just wanted to see if I

845
00:54:21.840 --> 00:54:23.840
<v Speaker 1>can tease out of you a little bit any sort

846
00:54:23.880 --> 00:54:29.440
<v Speaker 1>of a cultural observations about their approach to warfare, covert operations,

847
00:54:30.159 --> 00:54:32.239
<v Speaker 1>or anything else that you took away from those numerous

848
00:54:32.280 --> 00:54:36.039
<v Speaker 1>meetings where you interfaced directly with the Chinese intelligence apparatus.

849
00:54:37.119 --> 00:54:45.039
<v Speaker 2>Yeah. So, you know, it was very interesting in a

850
00:54:45.159 --> 00:54:48.920
<v Speaker 2>sense that you know, they had the long Chinese Civil War,

851
00:54:49.400 --> 00:54:57.679
<v Speaker 2>and you know, Mao had been dead for almost a decade,

852
00:54:57.719 --> 00:55:01.920
<v Speaker 2>but and Dung Chaoping actually approved it big escalation. But

853
00:55:03.840 --> 00:55:07.239
<v Speaker 2>you know, so in our initial discussions, we had big

854
00:55:07.280 --> 00:55:12.679
<v Speaker 2>debates about guerrilla warfare strategy, and you know, so try

855
00:55:14.159 --> 00:55:18.039
<v Speaker 2>different visions about how to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan.

856
00:55:18.119 --> 00:55:20.559
<v Speaker 2>You know, is it really lots of people armed with

857
00:55:20.639 --> 00:55:24.440
<v Speaker 2>a KS or is it combined arms and stuff which

858
00:55:24.440 --> 00:55:27.159
<v Speaker 2>I was pushing and more, you know, win shift the

859
00:55:27.199 --> 00:55:30.400
<v Speaker 2>anti air balance more in the insurgents favor and stuff.

860
00:55:30.400 --> 00:55:33.039
<v Speaker 2>And so that took some convincing. You know. We went

861
00:55:33.119 --> 00:55:36.440
<v Speaker 2>back and forth, and you know, you know, they're saying

862
00:55:36.480 --> 00:55:39.599
<v Speaker 2>to me, look, we really know guerrilla warfare, you know,

863
00:55:39.719 --> 00:55:42.480
<v Speaker 2>we we we we over to our own government this way,

864
00:55:42.559 --> 00:55:44.920
<v Speaker 2>and and I'd say, well, yeah, I know something about

865
00:55:44.920 --> 00:55:46.599
<v Speaker 2>it too, and here's why I think we need to

866
00:55:46.639 --> 00:55:52.559
<v Speaker 2>do this, and and they finally, you know, went along.

867
00:55:52.679 --> 00:55:58.280
<v Speaker 2>But it was very interesting. It was very interesting culturally

868
00:55:58.400 --> 00:56:02.639
<v Speaker 2>in a sense that they're negotiating style. You know, you

869
00:56:02.719 --> 00:56:05.880
<v Speaker 2>weren't allowed to when you make presentations. They would just

870
00:56:05.880 --> 00:56:08.960
<v Speaker 2>say continue, continue, with no break, you know. And if

871
00:56:09.000 --> 00:56:13.000
<v Speaker 2>you said you couldn't ask them questions when they were

872
00:56:13.159 --> 00:56:16.119
<v Speaker 2>talking for thirty minutes and they didn't want any interruption,

873
00:56:16.159 --> 00:56:19.239
<v Speaker 2>you know, if I'd say, well, okay, you want me

874
00:56:19.280 --> 00:56:21.960
<v Speaker 2>to elaborate on this or something, they don't just continue,

875
00:56:22.000 --> 00:56:25.079
<v Speaker 2>you know. And so we were really almost like ships

876
00:56:25.119 --> 00:56:27.760
<v Speaker 2>passing in the night. And then you know, as they often,

877
00:56:27.920 --> 00:56:30.559
<v Speaker 2>as I later learned, they do with businesses a lot.

878
00:56:31.000 --> 00:56:33.880
<v Speaker 2>You don't clinch the deal until the very end. And

879
00:56:33.920 --> 00:56:35.960
<v Speaker 2>so it looked like we weren't going to get everything

880
00:56:36.000 --> 00:56:37.800
<v Speaker 2>we want. We were heading to the air we got

881
00:56:37.800 --> 00:56:40.400
<v Speaker 2>some things. We were heading to the airport, and they're

882
00:56:40.440 --> 00:56:43.840
<v Speaker 2>waiting for us at an airport lounge with drinks and stuff.

883
00:56:44.320 --> 00:56:46.920
<v Speaker 2>Was the head of armaments for the play.

884
00:56:47.039 --> 00:56:53.239
<v Speaker 5>Okay, read everything better late than never, But yeah, it was,

885
00:56:53.800 --> 00:56:59.000
<v Speaker 5>you know, and I I imagined myself when I was

886
00:56:59.079 --> 00:57:04.440
<v Speaker 5>in spe Forces, you know, in the tenth Group, where

887
00:57:04.480 --> 00:57:07.519
<v Speaker 5>we had this World War three mission and you know,

888
00:57:08.440 --> 00:57:10.960
<v Speaker 5>to liberate Eastern Europe. You know, I thought this would

889
00:57:11.000 --> 00:57:13.360
<v Speaker 5>be if this ever came to pass, this would be

890
00:57:13.440 --> 00:57:14.000
<v Speaker 5>you know, T. E.

891
00:57:14.119 --> 00:57:17.239
<v Speaker 2>Lawrence and all this great stuff. But I also thought

892
00:57:17.280 --> 00:57:21.159
<v Speaker 2>I'd read, you know, about World War two and Oss

893
00:57:21.159 --> 00:57:25.519
<v Speaker 2>and China and others, and I knew about the the

894
00:57:25.559 --> 00:57:28.679
<v Speaker 2>border conflict that they had had in sixty nine. I'd

895
00:57:28.679 --> 00:57:32.039
<v Speaker 2>study that as I was completing my bachelor's degree, and

896
00:57:32.119 --> 00:57:34.719
<v Speaker 2>I thought, well, maybe I'd find myself on the side

897
00:57:34.719 --> 00:57:37.480
<v Speaker 2>of the Chinese against the Russians. You know, that would

898
00:57:37.519 --> 00:57:40.159
<v Speaker 2>be really exotic, you know, Eastern Europe, I kind of know,

899
00:57:40.360 --> 00:57:43.199
<v Speaker 2>but this one would be exotic and lo and behold,

900
00:57:43.239 --> 00:57:45.599
<v Speaker 2>they became my partner to fight in Afghanistan. You know,

901
00:57:45.639 --> 00:57:48.079
<v Speaker 2>I didn't have the imagination to think about that.

902
00:57:48.199 --> 00:57:55.039
<v Speaker 1>But yeah, as far as the end game in Afghanistan,

903
00:57:55.360 --> 00:57:57.679
<v Speaker 1>I mean, the obvious end of the conflict is the

904
00:57:57.719 --> 00:58:00.760
<v Speaker 1>Soviet withdraw When did you know it was over?

905
00:58:02.840 --> 00:58:10.159
<v Speaker 2>Really in sort of early nineteen eighty six. Gorbachev gave

906
00:58:10.280 --> 00:58:14.320
<v Speaker 2>this open speech in February eighty six about bleeding wound

907
00:58:14.360 --> 00:58:21.079
<v Speaker 2>and we've got to extricate ourselves from this, and our

908
00:58:21.239 --> 00:58:25.400
<v Speaker 2>escalation was just starting. I mean, we had we had

909
00:58:25.559 --> 00:58:29.480
<v Speaker 2>flows of stuff going there through nineteen eighty seven, and

910
00:58:30.320 --> 00:58:33.960
<v Speaker 2>you know, this meant strengthening the logistics system from ships

911
00:58:34.039 --> 00:58:37.119
<v Speaker 2>to what you do at ports, to railroads, to trucks,

912
00:58:37.159 --> 00:58:41.159
<v Speaker 2>to warehouses and then to Toyota land cruisers and even

913
00:58:41.199 --> 00:58:43.519
<v Speaker 2>you know, ten thousand mules. You know, I grew up

914
00:58:43.559 --> 00:58:45.960
<v Speaker 2>in Hollywood. I didn't know a damn thing about mules,

915
00:58:46.000 --> 00:58:49.320
<v Speaker 2>and suddenly I find myself dealing with China about you know,

916
00:58:49.719 --> 00:58:52.599
<v Speaker 2>ten thousand of these things. And it turns out Chinese

917
00:58:52.679 --> 00:58:55.920
<v Speaker 2>mules were better for Afghanistan than Tennessee mules, which you know,

918
00:58:56.440 --> 00:59:06.639
<v Speaker 2>who would think. But there's the mountain, and so, you know,

919
00:59:06.719 --> 00:59:10.639
<v Speaker 2>it really was pretty clear in eighty six, but then

920
00:59:10.679 --> 00:59:15.440
<v Speaker 2>you had this dance of negotiations. The first Soviet six

921
00:59:15.519 --> 00:59:20.400
<v Speaker 2>regiments come out that summer, but the Soviets are hoping

922
00:59:20.480 --> 00:59:23.719
<v Speaker 2>that we'll leave the Afghan government in place, and so

923
00:59:23.760 --> 00:59:28.639
<v Speaker 2>there's negotiations about that, and the US rightly holds firm

924
00:59:29.079 --> 00:59:32.760
<v Speaker 2>and then eventually Gorbachev says, okay, we just want out.

925
00:59:32.760 --> 00:59:36.039
<v Speaker 2>We don't care what kind of government is there, and

926
00:59:36.440 --> 00:59:41.000
<v Speaker 2>that sense the deal. And then from the time the

927
00:59:41.079 --> 00:59:45.360
<v Speaker 2>agreement was signed, they withdrew in two big phases, and

928
00:59:45.400 --> 00:59:49.079
<v Speaker 2>so that was not quite a year, like nine months,

929
00:59:49.119 --> 00:59:52.039
<v Speaker 2>but you know, so it just played out in slow motion,

930
00:59:52.159 --> 00:59:55.679
<v Speaker 2>but the writing was on the wall. Their tactic shifted

931
00:59:55.760 --> 00:59:59.760
<v Speaker 2>there once we started shooting down so many aircraft, they

932
00:59:59.760 --> 01:00:03.320
<v Speaker 2>start and flying above surface the era Michial range, which meant

933
01:00:03.360 --> 01:00:07.239
<v Speaker 2>they couldn't do close order support very well. They didn't

934
01:00:07.239 --> 01:00:10.159
<v Speaker 2>do offensive operations as much anymore. You know, they just

935
01:00:10.239 --> 01:00:13.239
<v Speaker 2>kind of hunkered down to their bases, and uh, you know,

936
01:00:13.360 --> 01:00:17.039
<v Speaker 2>so it was pretty clear. And also they announced this

937
01:00:17.199 --> 01:00:21.199
<v Speaker 2>policy like we did in Vietnam, the Afghanization, you know,

938
01:00:21.360 --> 01:00:25.599
<v Speaker 2>to basically shift to an indirect role where the afghan

939
01:00:25.719 --> 01:00:28.199
<v Speaker 2>the communist Afghans are going to do the fighting and

940
01:00:28.239 --> 01:00:30.920
<v Speaker 2>the Soviets are going to support them but not do

941
01:00:31.039 --> 01:00:33.719
<v Speaker 2>the combat. And and you know, so we saw all

942
01:00:33.800 --> 01:00:36.639
<v Speaker 2>that and that that kind of you know, led to

943
01:00:36.679 --> 01:00:39.800
<v Speaker 2>the led to the end game. What was important was

944
01:00:41.719 --> 01:00:44.639
<v Speaker 2>holding their feet to the fire, you know, really sustaining

945
01:00:44.679 --> 01:00:46.679
<v Speaker 2>this through this period. And this is where I really

946
01:00:46.760 --> 01:00:50.039
<v Speaker 2>give I think there's important lessons from President Reagan in

947
01:00:50.119 --> 01:00:54.119
<v Speaker 2>this is that, you know, as relations were really warming

948
01:00:54.320 --> 01:00:59.039
<v Speaker 2>between Reagan and Gorbachev and uh, you know, bring breakthroughs

949
01:00:59.079 --> 01:01:03.039
<v Speaker 2>in diplomacy, we kept the heat on in Afghanistan, pressure

950
01:01:03.480 --> 01:01:05.519
<v Speaker 2>and still said, look, we want to do business with you.

951
01:01:06.320 --> 01:01:09.079
<v Speaker 2>This can be great, but you know, we disagree on

952
01:01:09.079 --> 01:01:11.360
<v Speaker 2>this one thing, and you know, he ended up getting

953
01:01:11.360 --> 01:01:11.719
<v Speaker 2>his way.

954
01:01:12.119 --> 01:01:16.480
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, the as we kind of get towards the end

955
01:01:16.519 --> 01:01:20.079
<v Speaker 1>of part one of our interview with you, I wanted

956
01:01:20.079 --> 01:01:21.599
<v Speaker 1>to ask a couple of questions that are sort of

957
01:01:21.639 --> 01:01:25.079
<v Speaker 1>like big picture things that I think maybe you're uniquely

958
01:01:25.159 --> 01:01:28.440
<v Speaker 1>qualified to answer. At the time, we've talked at length

959
01:01:28.440 --> 01:01:31.679
<v Speaker 1>about supporting the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan. At the same time,

960
01:01:31.679 --> 01:01:36.039
<v Speaker 1>there were paramilitary programs supporting Yunida in Angola and the

961
01:01:36.159 --> 01:01:38.960
<v Speaker 1>FDN or the Contras in Nicaragua. I wonder if you

962
01:01:39.000 --> 01:01:42.559
<v Speaker 1>could talk a little bit about these three anti essentially

963
01:01:42.639 --> 01:01:46.920
<v Speaker 1>anti Soviet covert operations around the world and what was

964
01:01:46.960 --> 01:01:50.239
<v Speaker 1>the global strategy behind them.

965
01:01:50.639 --> 01:01:56.480
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and there was also a brief period of supporting

966
01:01:59.360 --> 01:02:04.119
<v Speaker 2>Cambodia against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, although it was

967
01:02:04.239 --> 01:02:13.880
<v Speaker 2>very very small, so you know it really we started

968
01:02:13.920 --> 01:02:18.400
<v Speaker 2>this period on defense in Central America. You know, Nicaragua

969
01:02:18.440 --> 01:02:22.079
<v Speaker 2>had fallen to the Sandinistas, you know, and there was

970
01:02:22.119 --> 01:02:25.199
<v Speaker 2>a sense that the Soviets and their Cuban allies and

971
01:02:25.280 --> 01:02:30.320
<v Speaker 2>others were really on the march, and insurgency really exploded

972
01:02:30.360 --> 01:02:34.480
<v Speaker 2>inn l Salvador, and you know, so we were counterinsurgency

973
01:02:34.519 --> 01:02:39.559
<v Speaker 2>and essentially dealing there. And then the country program is

974
01:02:39.639 --> 01:02:43.360
<v Speaker 2>kind of the first big one in a sense because

975
01:02:43.840 --> 01:02:48.159
<v Speaker 2>Afghanistan is this. We're doing what we can there, but

976
01:02:48.199 --> 01:02:50.440
<v Speaker 2>there's no thought you're going to win. Where we really

977
01:02:50.480 --> 01:02:52.639
<v Speaker 2>didn't want to lose in We certainly didn't want to

978
01:02:53.000 --> 01:02:56.400
<v Speaker 2>have more countries fall to communism in Central America, but

979
01:02:56.719 --> 01:02:58.599
<v Speaker 2>there was even a hope, well, maybe we could defeat

980
01:02:58.639 --> 01:03:01.239
<v Speaker 2>them in Nicaragua and at least in our backyard, you know.

981
01:03:01.320 --> 01:03:05.039
<v Speaker 2>So it starts off fairly modest, and then as you

982
01:03:05.119 --> 01:03:09.159
<v Speaker 2>move to nineteen eighty four when the country program becomes

983
01:03:09.159 --> 01:03:13.960
<v Speaker 2>politically controversial and has this hiatus and it's you know,

984
01:03:14.000 --> 01:03:16.599
<v Speaker 2>it's doing so. So we had a lot of success

985
01:03:16.679 --> 01:03:20.280
<v Speaker 2>and counterinsurgency in Al Salvador, but not as much, you know,

986
01:03:20.320 --> 01:03:26.400
<v Speaker 2>on the offensive side in Nicaragua. And then as Afghanistan escalates,

987
01:03:26.559 --> 01:03:30.079
<v Speaker 2>that then becomes the real main effort, and so people's

988
01:03:30.119 --> 01:03:34.440
<v Speaker 2>minds changed between this is hopeless too, maybe we can

989
01:03:34.480 --> 01:03:37.519
<v Speaker 2>win there, and if we win here it really matters.

990
01:03:37.599 --> 01:03:41.239
<v Speaker 2>You know, this is the main enemy in the in

991
01:03:41.280 --> 01:03:44.280
<v Speaker 2>the big Enchilada, where if you win in Nicaragua, you know,

992
01:03:44.320 --> 01:03:47.280
<v Speaker 2>you move upon on the chessboard rather than a queen.

993
01:03:48.039 --> 01:03:52.280
<v Speaker 2>And then Angola picks up, I think in eighty six

994
01:03:52.440 --> 01:03:56.800
<v Speaker 2>or so, and you know, the Cubans had sent a

995
01:03:56.880 --> 01:04:02.360
<v Speaker 2>big proxy army into a goal of twenty some thousand troops,

996
01:04:03.000 --> 01:04:08.760
<v Speaker 2>and that kicks in as well, and then President Reagan

997
01:04:08.880 --> 01:04:12.760
<v Speaker 2>gives the Reagan Doctrine speech, which is will support anti

998
01:04:12.800 --> 01:04:19.119
<v Speaker 2>communist insurgencies. And I want to say that's early eighty

999
01:04:19.239 --> 01:04:23.159
<v Speaker 2>five if I remember, right, and it provides kind of

1000
01:04:23.159 --> 01:04:27.880
<v Speaker 2>the strategic framework for this global irregular war that kind

1001
01:04:27.880 --> 01:04:31.760
<v Speaker 2>of came in parts, essentially, in at different times and

1002
01:04:32.159 --> 01:04:36.519
<v Speaker 2>different emphasis, and it's tied to a broader strategy of

1003
01:04:38.360 --> 01:04:45.480
<v Speaker 2>restricting technology transfer, hurting the Soviets with low oil prices,

1004
01:04:46.639 --> 01:04:50.800
<v Speaker 2>you know, other things to kind of weaken the system.

1005
01:04:51.079 --> 01:04:53.039
<v Speaker 2>And then of course the Reagan built up you know

1006
01:04:53.079 --> 01:04:58.119
<v Speaker 2>that they really can't match this defense, yeah, and that

1007
01:04:58.320 --> 01:05:04.519
<v Speaker 2>you know, missile defense. And then since the late seventies,

1008
01:05:05.719 --> 01:05:11.159
<v Speaker 2>we started shifting our strategy or conventional strategy in Europe

1009
01:05:11.199 --> 01:05:14.159
<v Speaker 2>to deep attack. You know, we knew we really couldn't,

1010
01:05:14.320 --> 01:05:17.559
<v Speaker 2>you know, Up until say nineteen seventy six, our strategy

1011
01:05:17.760 --> 01:05:21.360
<v Speaker 2>was to trade space for time, essentially to withdraw under

1012
01:05:21.400 --> 01:05:27.119
<v Speaker 2>pressure of a Soviet advance. And every war game showed

1013
01:05:27.119 --> 01:05:29.920
<v Speaker 2>that they could break through on multiple fronts, and it

1014
01:05:30.079 --> 01:05:33.760
<v Speaker 2>just didn't work. Once we developed the precision weapons and

1015
01:05:33.800 --> 01:05:38.360
<v Speaker 2>the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and other things, the first

1016
01:05:38.400 --> 01:05:43.440
<v Speaker 2>stealth aircraft, the F one seventeen, the Army tactical missile system,

1017
01:05:43.559 --> 01:05:48.760
<v Speaker 2>you know that's finally getting to Ukraine today, the Joint

1018
01:05:49.920 --> 01:05:55.320
<v Speaker 2>Surveillance and Market Acquisition JSTARS that really worried the Soviets

1019
01:05:55.320 --> 01:05:58.320
<v Speaker 2>about their strategy that you know, all the second echelon

1020
01:05:58.440 --> 01:06:00.920
<v Speaker 2>forces would be vulnerable, you know, rather than having a

1021
01:06:00.960 --> 01:06:05.119
<v Speaker 2>tank battle right up in front, those reinforcing forces could

1022
01:06:05.159 --> 01:06:08.559
<v Speaker 2>get hit. And that's what the Soviet general staff back

1023
01:06:08.639 --> 01:06:12.280
<v Speaker 2>garbage off because as they looked out, you know, ten

1024
01:06:12.360 --> 01:06:14.719
<v Speaker 2>twenty years, they thought, we're just going to fall further

1025
01:06:14.840 --> 01:06:17.400
<v Speaker 2>behind the United States and technology, and we got to

1026
01:06:17.440 --> 01:06:20.960
<v Speaker 2>do something to revitalize our system to catch up. And

1027
01:06:21.000 --> 01:06:23.239
<v Speaker 2>so all that weighed them down.

1028
01:06:24.159 --> 01:06:27.039
<v Speaker 4>Do you think that all of the and I would add.

1029
01:06:26.840 --> 01:06:31.360
<v Speaker 2>Two support for Solidarity Poland you know, that was keeping

1030
01:06:31.360 --> 01:06:31.880
<v Speaker 2>them alive?

1031
01:06:32.079 --> 01:06:32.440
<v Speaker 3>You know.

1032
01:06:33.280 --> 01:06:36.480
<v Speaker 4>Do you think that all these these these counter sort

1033
01:06:36.519 --> 01:06:39.639
<v Speaker 4>of Soviet wars that we fought, that you know, are

1034
01:06:39.800 --> 01:06:43.400
<v Speaker 4>challenging because you can't you can't always mold the the

1035
01:06:43.519 --> 01:06:47.920
<v Speaker 4>indigenous peoples that that you are your proxy soldiers, right,

1036
01:06:47.960 --> 01:06:50.679
<v Speaker 4>they're doing their thing. But do you think that all

1037
01:06:50.719 --> 01:06:55.079
<v Speaker 4>those led up to Gorbachev to the you know, because

1038
01:06:55.079 --> 01:06:57.360
<v Speaker 4>in eighty nine we saw the fall of the Berlin

1039
01:06:57.440 --> 01:07:01.039
<v Speaker 4>Wall like that. Do you think that we basely defeated

1040
01:07:01.079 --> 01:07:03.920
<v Speaker 4>the Soviets through these even if we didn't win in

1041
01:07:03.960 --> 01:07:05.599
<v Speaker 4>the specific places, all the time.

1042
01:07:06.639 --> 01:07:11.840
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so I think. You know, in Nicaragua the result

1043
01:07:12.000 --> 01:07:15.000
<v Speaker 2>was a little more ambiguous because the sandin East has

1044
01:07:15.000 --> 01:07:19.000
<v Speaker 2>got defeated an election in nineteen ninety, but you know,

1045
01:07:19.119 --> 01:07:24.440
<v Speaker 2>pressure from the insurgents in Angola, we really defeated the Cubans,

1046
01:07:24.639 --> 01:07:27.760
<v Speaker 2>and in Afghanistan defeated the Soviets, and it was the

1047
01:07:27.800 --> 01:07:30.360
<v Speaker 2>only defeat the Red Army had suffered in its history,

1048
01:07:30.400 --> 01:07:34.039
<v Speaker 2>so real blow to its credibility and claim on resources.

1049
01:07:34.079 --> 01:07:37.480
<v Speaker 2>And same with the KGB, and you know, and I

1050
01:07:38.199 --> 01:07:41.400
<v Speaker 2>do think that had a big effect on the Soviets.

1051
01:07:41.400 --> 01:07:44.599
<v Speaker 2>You know, it's not the only thing that led to

1052
01:07:44.719 --> 01:07:48.440
<v Speaker 2>the disillusion of the Soviet Empire. Gorbachev's critical in that

1053
01:07:48.559 --> 01:07:51.480
<v Speaker 2>in a sense not using force in Eastern Europe when

1054
01:07:52.079 --> 01:07:55.519
<v Speaker 2>you know, the wall starts cumbling down and Solidarity gets

1055
01:07:55.519 --> 01:07:59.239
<v Speaker 2>elected and you know all that. But the defeat of

1056
01:07:59.280 --> 01:08:01.639
<v Speaker 2>the Red Army was a big deal.

1057
01:08:01.480 --> 01:08:05.039
<v Speaker 3>You know, another sort of like big picture.

1058
01:08:05.079 --> 01:08:08.400
<v Speaker 1>And this is more of an institutional question, and I

1059
01:08:08.440 --> 01:08:10.360
<v Speaker 1>hope I won't start a food fight with this one.

1060
01:08:10.400 --> 01:08:15.280
<v Speaker 1>But the differences between the Special Activities Division and special Forces,

1061
01:08:15.400 --> 01:08:18.760
<v Speaker 1>or between ground branch and special forces, what are the

1062
01:08:18.760 --> 01:08:20.880
<v Speaker 1>pros and cons of each why do we maintain these

1063
01:08:20.920 --> 01:08:23.439
<v Speaker 1>two in some ways parallel capabilities.

1064
01:08:25.199 --> 01:08:28.079
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so that's a question that's been debated over the decades.

1065
01:08:28.159 --> 01:08:31.119
<v Speaker 2>You know, should see, I just focus on intelligence and

1066
01:08:31.199 --> 01:08:35.640
<v Speaker 2>not covert action, and particularly paramilitary covert action, where you know,

1067
01:08:35.720 --> 01:08:40.199
<v Speaker 2>the military has very strong capabilities, and so you know,

1068
01:08:40.319 --> 01:08:45.079
<v Speaker 2>part of the reason for that is the political benefits

1069
01:08:45.119 --> 01:08:48.000
<v Speaker 2>of covert action to begin with. You know, so the

1070
01:08:48.039 --> 01:08:50.880
<v Speaker 2>way I like to describe it, if we're going to

1071
01:08:50.960 --> 01:08:57.279
<v Speaker 2>support an insurgency against the hostile power, and peace time

1072
01:08:57.920 --> 01:09:02.000
<v Speaker 2>presidents overwhelmingly for the CIA there. So it's not a

1073
01:09:02.079 --> 01:09:06.800
<v Speaker 2>question of capabilities, it's a question of plausible deniability and

1074
01:09:06.920 --> 01:09:11.000
<v Speaker 2>escalation control. And you know, if we had special forces

1075
01:09:11.079 --> 01:09:14.119
<v Speaker 2>doing Afghanistan, it's not that they couldn't do it technically,

1076
01:09:14.720 --> 01:09:16.960
<v Speaker 2>it's that you run a higher risk that you're going

1077
01:09:17.000 --> 01:09:19.920
<v Speaker 2>to trigger a direct war than if CI is doing it.

1078
01:09:20.079 --> 01:09:22.399
<v Speaker 2>You're still killing Soviets, you know, I mean, it's still

1079
01:09:22.439 --> 01:09:26.039
<v Speaker 2>a war. It's just that it provides this level of

1080
01:09:26.439 --> 01:09:31.279
<v Speaker 2>control that president seems to go to. And then when

1081
01:09:31.319 --> 01:09:37.920
<v Speaker 2>you go to war, you know, particularly a big war,

1082
01:09:38.600 --> 01:09:41.399
<v Speaker 2>you don't have enough CI for that, and then there's

1083
01:09:41.439 --> 01:09:44.560
<v Speaker 2>no reason not to use your military, you know, for that,

1084
01:09:44.920 --> 01:09:48.000
<v Speaker 2>and then all these other missions counter terrorism and you

1085
01:09:48.000 --> 01:09:53.359
<v Speaker 2>know that require real surgical skill and everything that's properly

1086
01:09:53.399 --> 01:09:56.800
<v Speaker 2>the military, you know, and those things occur in peace time.

1087
01:09:56.880 --> 01:09:59.119
<v Speaker 2>But you know, so there's this kind of division of

1088
01:09:59.239 --> 01:10:03.279
<v Speaker 2>labor based on you know, the politics of it and

1089
01:10:03.319 --> 01:10:08.279
<v Speaker 2>whether covert or over makes sense or whether you know,

1090
01:10:08.439 --> 01:10:16.239
<v Speaker 2>and then CIA essentially working through partners with a smaller

1091
01:10:16.279 --> 01:10:21.600
<v Speaker 2>footprint rather than you know, something more muscular. You know,

1092
01:10:22.039 --> 01:10:24.039
<v Speaker 2>as you get to the more muscular side, you get

1093
01:10:24.039 --> 01:10:27.720
<v Speaker 2>to do od And you know that's true in a

1094
01:10:27.840 --> 01:10:32.199
<v Speaker 2>number of areas, whether it's drones or whether it's cyber

1095
01:10:32.680 --> 01:10:36.079
<v Speaker 2>you know, you have these equal you have capabilities in

1096
01:10:36.119 --> 01:10:39.760
<v Speaker 2>both areas, but for different purposes there So I think

1097
01:10:39.800 --> 01:10:43.159
<v Speaker 2>it serves the country. It gives the president more options,

1098
01:10:43.640 --> 01:10:46.640
<v Speaker 2>and it serves the country well to have both, but

1099
01:10:46.680 --> 01:10:48.279
<v Speaker 2>you got to know the limitations of both.

1100
01:10:49.079 --> 01:10:52.640
<v Speaker 4>There's sort of this idea or rumor, I guess that

1101
01:10:53.239 --> 01:10:56.600
<v Speaker 4>Republican presidents will lean more heavily on the military and

1102
01:10:56.640 --> 01:11:00.239
<v Speaker 4>Democratic presidents will lean more heavily on the CIA. Do

1103
01:11:00.279 --> 01:11:04.199
<v Speaker 4>you think that's an actual thing or is it just

1104
01:11:04.279 --> 01:11:05.920
<v Speaker 4>sort of whomever?

1105
01:11:08.560 --> 01:11:14.199
<v Speaker 2>I don't think that bears out necessarily in history. I mean,

1106
01:11:14.760 --> 01:11:20.479
<v Speaker 2>the you know, from the last two decades of the

1107
01:11:20.479 --> 01:11:24.359
<v Speaker 2>Cold War and maybe parts of the last twenty years.

1108
01:11:25.479 --> 01:11:29.800
<v Speaker 2>You know, the differences in general about aggressive foreign policy

1109
01:11:30.000 --> 01:11:34.079
<v Speaker 2>have differentiated the parties until recently, you know, when you

1110
01:11:34.479 --> 01:11:37.760
<v Speaker 2>know you've got all this isolationism strain creeping in. But

1111
01:11:38.520 --> 01:11:42.880
<v Speaker 2>you know, part of the reason I think analysts explain

1112
01:11:43.079 --> 01:11:47.079
<v Speaker 2>that Republicans won five out of six presidential elections in

1113
01:11:47.119 --> 01:11:49.880
<v Speaker 2>the late Cold War is because they were trusted more

1114
01:11:49.920 --> 01:11:53.359
<v Speaker 2>on national security. So I think it rather than military

1115
01:11:53.640 --> 01:11:57.039
<v Speaker 2>or CIA, I think it's more how aggressively you use

1116
01:11:57.079 --> 01:12:01.520
<v Speaker 2>either one. There's still nuances, And like I said, you

1117
01:12:01.560 --> 01:12:06.439
<v Speaker 2>know what Carter started, Reagan continued, and then Reagan escalated,

1118
01:12:06.479 --> 01:12:12.399
<v Speaker 2>but it took a while, right and and then you know,

1119
01:12:12.800 --> 01:12:19.479
<v Speaker 2>after nine to eleven, President Bush, for the invasion of Afghanistan,

1120
01:12:19.560 --> 01:12:22.760
<v Speaker 2>went with essentially a CI led plan because it was

1121
01:12:22.920 --> 01:12:26.039
<v Speaker 2>very rapid, and you know, of course the military was

1122
01:12:26.079 --> 01:12:27.840
<v Speaker 2>going to fold in on that. You know, see, I

1123
01:12:27.960 --> 01:12:30.239
<v Speaker 2>wasn't going to fight the Afghan War by themselves, but

1124
01:12:30.479 --> 01:12:33.439
<v Speaker 2>you needed airpower and you needed special forces and all that.

1125
01:12:34.000 --> 01:12:38.319
<v Speaker 2>But you know, the initial options that the military came

1126
01:12:38.399 --> 01:12:43.079
<v Speaker 2>up with weren't unconventional. They were airstrikes or massive invasion,

1127
01:12:43.199 --> 01:12:45.720
<v Speaker 2>and President Bush didn't want to you know, air strikes

1128
01:12:45.720 --> 01:12:49.039
<v Speaker 2>were too little and massive invasion too late, you know.

1129
01:12:49.159 --> 01:12:52.800
<v Speaker 2>So you know, so that's what kind of drove it.

1130
01:12:53.159 --> 01:12:54.359
<v Speaker 3>Do we have any questions?

1131
01:12:54.760 --> 01:12:57.399
<v Speaker 2>And then the other thing that drives it is our

1132
01:12:57.439 --> 01:13:00.239
<v Speaker 2>foreign partners. You know a lot of times for their

1133
01:13:00.279 --> 01:13:03.359
<v Speaker 2>own risk, they'll want to deal with CI or and

1134
01:13:03.399 --> 01:13:08.720
<v Speaker 2>intelligence channels because they think it provides them more more protection,

1135
01:13:10.520 --> 01:13:13.359
<v Speaker 2>and you know, and then it's it's also flexible, like

1136
01:13:13.479 --> 01:13:17.880
<v Speaker 2>we can, uh, you know, if CI needs certain capabilities

1137
01:13:17.920 --> 01:13:20.800
<v Speaker 2>that the Department of Defense has, we can loan them

1138
01:13:20.840 --> 01:13:23.319
<v Speaker 2>to them, you know, so you know, and so then

1139
01:13:23.319 --> 01:13:25.479
<v Speaker 2>it's just a question of what authority do you want?

1140
01:13:25.960 --> 01:13:28.359
<v Speaker 3>Right I think we have a few of youwer questions.

1141
01:13:28.439 --> 01:13:33.239
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, we have some great questions. First off, Rory, thank

1142
01:13:33.279 --> 01:13:35.039
<v Speaker 4>you very much for the donation. I didn't see a question.

1143
01:13:35.079 --> 01:13:36.960
<v Speaker 4>If there is one, police art and chat and we'll

1144
01:13:37.039 --> 01:13:39.760
<v Speaker 4>keep an eye out for it. Andrew Dunbar, thanks buddy.

1145
01:13:41.239 --> 01:13:44.720
<v Speaker 4>Do you have any funny anecdotes about dealing with the

1146
01:13:44.760 --> 01:13:48.119
<v Speaker 4>State Department. It seems like s after the Diplomatic Service

1147
01:13:48.239 --> 01:13:54.000
<v Speaker 4>would be a bit of a culture clash.

1148
01:13:54.600 --> 01:14:00.079
<v Speaker 2>Well, yeah, I don't know how funny they are. But

1149
01:14:00.159 --> 01:14:04.560
<v Speaker 2>you know, when I was dealing on the counter terrorism

1150
01:14:04.640 --> 01:14:09.720
<v Speaker 2>intelligence collection, you know, in case our embassies were seized

1151
01:14:09.720 --> 01:14:15.199
<v Speaker 2>by terrorists, you know, the diplomat the ambassadors, and the

1152
01:14:15.279 --> 01:14:17.880
<v Speaker 2>diplomats thought, okay, this is a good thing to have.

1153
01:14:17.960 --> 01:14:20.199
<v Speaker 2>I want someone to come and rescue me if things

1154
01:14:20.520 --> 01:14:23.439
<v Speaker 2>go bad. And so you know I dealt with the

1155
01:14:23.479 --> 01:14:27.319
<v Speaker 2>security people and the ambassador and the chiefest station and

1156
01:14:27.359 --> 01:14:29.680
<v Speaker 2>they were all they were in high thread areas, so

1157
01:14:29.720 --> 01:14:33.800
<v Speaker 2>they were supportive of having the military and you know,

1158
01:14:33.920 --> 01:14:39.000
<v Speaker 2>prepare for this. And you know more, I think what

1159
01:14:39.680 --> 01:14:44.960
<v Speaker 2>your listener is referring to is approaches to foreign policy

1160
01:14:45.039 --> 01:14:47.920
<v Speaker 2>decisions and use of force the inner agency where we

1161
01:14:48.000 --> 01:14:51.479
<v Speaker 2>do have differences of opinion, you know. Sometimes that's where

1162
01:14:51.680 --> 01:14:56.760
<v Speaker 2>the different departments, you know, can diverge sometimes. But on

1163
01:14:57.279 --> 01:14:59.920
<v Speaker 2>what I did there, I don't think. And then also

1164
01:15:00.000 --> 01:15:03.960
<v Speaker 2>so generally I wouldn't say all ambassadors, but lots of

1165
01:15:04.000 --> 01:15:06.880
<v Speaker 2>ambassadors welcome all the help they can get, you know,

1166
01:15:07.000 --> 01:15:10.960
<v Speaker 2>so they've got us, you know, whatever size country team,

1167
01:15:11.039 --> 01:15:13.039
<v Speaker 2>but you know, if you can send them a few

1168
01:15:13.079 --> 01:15:16.159
<v Speaker 2>people that will really augment them and do something for

1169
01:15:16.279 --> 01:15:19.640
<v Speaker 2>them useful. They generally welcome it. You know, it's it's

1170
01:15:19.680 --> 01:15:23.000
<v Speaker 2>more for their empire and more more ability to do

1171
01:15:23.039 --> 01:15:27.199
<v Speaker 2>good things, you know, in in their particular country. So yeah,

1172
01:15:27.239 --> 01:15:29.119
<v Speaker 2>I didn't I didn't really have that experience.

1173
01:15:29.399 --> 01:15:32.319
<v Speaker 4>They didn't look at you as outavis knuckle driggers who

1174
01:15:32.319 --> 01:15:35.359
<v Speaker 4>should like sit in a corner and only come out

1175
01:15:35.399 --> 01:15:36.399
<v Speaker 4>when you know, breaking.

1176
01:15:37.119 --> 01:15:41.800
<v Speaker 2>They'd laugh like, you know, like the one ambassador. You know,

1177
01:15:42.079 --> 01:15:45.439
<v Speaker 2>I mentioned John Negroponte earlier that I served with over

1178
01:15:45.520 --> 01:15:48.920
<v Speaker 2>several decades, you know, when we were both in the

1179
01:15:49.199 --> 01:15:52.920
<v Speaker 2>Bush to administration. He said, I remember you as a

1180
01:15:52.960 --> 01:15:55.359
<v Speaker 2>Special Forces captain, and you know you wanted to take

1181
01:15:55.399 --> 01:15:59.159
<v Speaker 2>pictures of my bathroom and all this other stuff you

1182
01:15:59.199 --> 01:16:01.119
<v Speaker 2>were being held in your bathroom. We're going to want

1183
01:16:01.119 --> 01:16:04.359
<v Speaker 2>to know how to get in there.

1184
01:16:06.640 --> 01:16:10.560
<v Speaker 4>Spencer Devns, thank you very much. From your perspective, What

1185
01:16:10.640 --> 01:16:14.359
<v Speaker 4>does the United States need to address the PRC going

1186
01:16:14.600 --> 01:16:18.720
<v Speaker 4>into the rest of this century? When does your recommendation

1187
01:16:19.119 --> 01:16:20.159
<v Speaker 4>need to be done by.

1188
01:16:21.479 --> 01:16:24.640
<v Speaker 2>Ah So, I have a chapter in the book called

1189
01:16:24.680 --> 01:16:29.079
<v Speaker 2>Winning the New Cold War that deals with how to compete,

1190
01:16:29.199 --> 01:16:33.640
<v Speaker 2>how to prevail over China over several decades, and Russia

1191
01:16:33.760 --> 01:16:38.720
<v Speaker 2>is an ally of China as well. And you know,

1192
01:16:40.520 --> 01:16:44.000
<v Speaker 2>probably the biggest factor, since they're a global power and

1193
01:16:44.039 --> 01:16:50.600
<v Speaker 2>an integrated world, is really the economic and technological competition.

1194
01:16:50.760 --> 01:16:54.399
<v Speaker 2>We've been the dominant economic power in the world for

1195
01:16:54.439 --> 01:16:56.960
<v Speaker 2>a century and we never had a rival in the

1196
01:16:57.000 --> 01:16:59.920
<v Speaker 2>twentieth century that had more than fifty percent of our

1197
01:17:00.680 --> 01:17:04.560
<v Speaker 2>so we had this economic escalation dominance. You know. World

1198
01:17:04.640 --> 01:17:06.600
<v Speaker 2>War two is the best example of that. You know,

1199
01:17:06.680 --> 01:17:10.079
<v Speaker 2>we get surprised at the beginning, but then we mobilize

1200
01:17:10.079 --> 01:17:13.000
<v Speaker 2>American industry and you know, we flood the Pacific with

1201
01:17:13.119 --> 01:17:16.039
<v Speaker 2>ships and you know, other things and landing craft to

1202
01:17:16.079 --> 01:17:19.720
<v Speaker 2>go to D Day and all that. And you know

1203
01:17:19.760 --> 01:17:21.920
<v Speaker 2>that may not be as true in the twenty first

1204
01:17:21.920 --> 01:17:24.960
<v Speaker 2>century if China continues to grow now they've been stumbling.

1205
01:17:25.000 --> 01:17:27.439
<v Speaker 2>And then you also have this revolution and technology with

1206
01:17:27.560 --> 01:17:30.279
<v Speaker 2>AI and quantum and that can remake the world, and

1207
01:17:30.560 --> 01:17:32.279
<v Speaker 2>we don't want to be on the losing end of that.

1208
01:17:33.680 --> 01:17:37.359
<v Speaker 2>And then those things translate into like the original Cold War,

1209
01:17:37.439 --> 01:17:41.880
<v Speaker 2>into competitions for global influence, you know, all around Africa,

1210
01:17:42.039 --> 01:17:50.840
<v Speaker 2>Latin America and elsewhere. And as warfare has evolved, you know,

1211
01:17:50.920 --> 01:17:54.520
<v Speaker 2>our position has been eroded in the Western Pacific so

1212
01:17:55.039 --> 01:17:57.760
<v Speaker 2>China kind of went to school on the US military

1213
01:17:58.279 --> 01:18:01.680
<v Speaker 2>more than any other country in Desert Storm. In the

1214
01:18:01.680 --> 01:18:04.760
<v Speaker 2>aftermath of Desert Storm and the big conclusion the Chinese

1215
01:18:04.880 --> 01:18:07.880
<v Speaker 2>drew out of this was terrible idea to give the

1216
01:18:07.960 --> 01:18:12.640
<v Speaker 2>United States six months to build up massive combat power

1217
01:18:12.760 --> 01:18:15.119
<v Speaker 2>right on your border and then beat your brains in,

1218
01:18:15.199 --> 01:18:19.000
<v Speaker 2>you know. And so they developed this anti access strategy

1219
01:18:19.039 --> 01:18:21.920
<v Speaker 2>to try to prevent US force, hurt the ones that

1220
01:18:21.960 --> 01:18:25.640
<v Speaker 2>are in the region by attacking air bases and surface ships,

1221
01:18:25.720 --> 01:18:28.479
<v Speaker 2>and then prevent the reinforcements or make it very costly

1222
01:18:28.560 --> 01:18:31.439
<v Speaker 2>for them to come in. And they've pursued that strategy

1223
01:18:31.520 --> 01:18:34.880
<v Speaker 2>for several decades. And now you have these new warfare domains,

1224
01:18:34.960 --> 01:18:39.840
<v Speaker 2>space and cyber that are inherently global. And while the

1225
01:18:40.000 --> 01:18:44.159
<v Speaker 2>Chinese are pretty powerful opposite Taiwan, you know, once you

1226
01:18:44.279 --> 01:18:47.319
<v Speaker 2>get out of missile range, you know, if we were

1227
01:18:47.359 --> 01:18:50.600
<v Speaker 2>both projecting power stay to Africa or somewhere, you know,

1228
01:18:50.640 --> 01:18:53.119
<v Speaker 2>the US would dominate, and we'd like to keep it

1229
01:18:53.159 --> 01:18:56.239
<v Speaker 2>that way. So we have undersea dominance, you know, we

1230
01:18:56.319 --> 01:19:01.520
<v Speaker 2>have really more and longer and strike we have better

1231
01:19:01.600 --> 01:19:05.119
<v Speaker 2>space systems. I'd like to keep it that way because

1232
01:19:05.119 --> 01:19:07.840
<v Speaker 2>the way for China. To become a global military power

1233
01:19:07.880 --> 01:19:12.039
<v Speaker 2>is to gain advantages in those areas. And you know,

1234
01:19:12.079 --> 01:19:13.640
<v Speaker 2>so there's a number of things you have to do

1235
01:19:13.720 --> 01:19:17.319
<v Speaker 2>to strengthen regional and global deterrence. But then you got

1236
01:19:17.359 --> 01:19:20.560
<v Speaker 2>to win this Cold War, which might be from proxies

1237
01:19:20.600 --> 01:19:23.000
<v Speaker 2>and influence and a lot of the covered action and

1238
01:19:23.039 --> 01:19:27.680
<v Speaker 2>the special ops stuff that you know below direct conflict.

1239
01:19:27.680 --> 01:19:30.520
<v Speaker 2>Because you know, another characteristic of the old Cold War

1240
01:19:30.560 --> 01:19:34.079
<v Speaker 2>in this one is nuclear weapons tends to put a

1241
01:19:34.159 --> 01:19:37.439
<v Speaker 2>little bit of a break on conventional war. You can't

1242
01:19:37.439 --> 01:19:40.399
<v Speaker 2>do world too the way you know you otherwise would,

1243
01:19:40.479 --> 01:19:42.199
<v Speaker 2>and so that means you got to get at your

1244
01:19:42.239 --> 01:19:46.920
<v Speaker 2>adversary through more devious ways. And you know, we've got

1245
01:19:46.920 --> 01:19:50.279
<v Speaker 2>our work work cut out for us for there.

1246
01:19:53.760 --> 01:19:56.840
<v Speaker 4>And Cormoran, thank you very much, if possible, any commentary

1247
01:19:56.960 --> 01:20:02.720
<v Speaker 4>on the lasting impact of the ISI. Director General ahamdul.

1248
01:20:04.000 --> 01:20:11.840
<v Speaker 2>Ah So uh, he's funny question. So he he came

1249
01:20:11.920 --> 01:20:19.039
<v Speaker 2>in late in the Soviet Afghan War and was a

1250
01:20:19.079 --> 01:20:26.199
<v Speaker 2>conventional armor officer and wanted to shift uh the insurgency

1251
01:20:26.319 --> 01:20:32.119
<v Speaker 2>into conventional battle essentially, and ordered assaults on cities which

1252
01:20:32.159 --> 01:20:38.760
<v Speaker 2>played right into Soviet and common Afghan government hands. You know,

1253
01:20:38.920 --> 01:20:41.840
<v Speaker 2>like you make yourself a big target and stay there

1254
01:20:41.880 --> 01:20:44.159
<v Speaker 2>long enough, we'll pound you. You know, you don't want

1255
01:20:44.159 --> 01:20:48.159
<v Speaker 2>to do daylight assaults on cities generally, but particularly when

1256
01:20:48.560 --> 01:20:53.159
<v Speaker 2>your enemy has artillery superiority and air superiority and you know,

1257
01:20:53.199 --> 01:20:57.000
<v Speaker 2>everything else. So he was a pretty disruptive force in

1258
01:20:57.039 --> 01:21:05.880
<v Speaker 2>the endgame of Afghanistan and then became very anti US

1259
01:21:05.920 --> 01:21:10.439
<v Speaker 2>and so over time, you know, supported the Taliban and others.

1260
01:21:10.840 --> 01:21:20.199
<v Speaker 2>Over time, really became an agitator for uh, you know,

1261
01:21:20.399 --> 01:21:24.239
<v Speaker 2>essentially not partnering with the US and everything else. So

1262
01:21:24.319 --> 01:21:27.760
<v Speaker 2>he's he's not my favorite Pakistani.

1263
01:21:32.319 --> 01:21:35.039
<v Speaker 4>Spencer day devins, thank you very much. He has a

1264
01:21:35.039 --> 01:21:37.159
<v Speaker 4>couple of questions coming up. He's in a meeting, so

1265
01:21:37.279 --> 01:21:39.359
<v Speaker 4>he's going to get to these later. H Do you

1266
01:21:39.479 --> 01:21:43.439
<v Speaker 4>see any sort of scenario where we risk becoming Eisenhower's

1267
01:21:43.680 --> 01:21:47.960
<v Speaker 4>feared garrison state while we try to maintain escalation dominance

1268
01:21:48.159 --> 01:21:50.520
<v Speaker 4>with an adversary that could have a larger DDP than

1269
01:21:50.520 --> 01:21:50.760
<v Speaker 4>we do.

1270
01:21:51.960 --> 01:21:54.439
<v Speaker 2>Yeah. So that's the challenge of the economics is that,

1271
01:21:54.560 --> 01:21:57.920
<v Speaker 2>I say, now, China may have peaked, and they're you know,

1272
01:21:57.960 --> 01:22:01.800
<v Speaker 2>they're emphasizing political control over economic growth, and so they're

1273
01:22:01.880 --> 01:22:05.000
<v Speaker 2>kind of killing their golden goose right now. So it

1274
01:22:05.039 --> 01:22:07.520
<v Speaker 2>may not be as dire as as we think, but

1275
01:22:07.600 --> 01:22:13.239
<v Speaker 2>you know, they could, they could recover. And you know,

1276
01:22:13.359 --> 01:22:22.039
<v Speaker 2>the genius of Eisenhower was to recognize that the Cold

1277
01:22:22.079 --> 01:22:28.079
<v Speaker 2>War would be fought hopefully short of conventional war because

1278
01:22:28.119 --> 01:22:30.680
<v Speaker 2>of nuclear weapons. And in fact, you know, he emphasized

1279
01:22:30.760 --> 01:22:35.199
<v Speaker 2>nuclear weapons very dramatically in his strategy, the National Security Strategy,

1280
01:22:35.520 --> 01:22:38.359
<v Speaker 2>the New the New Look. But he also thought it

1281
01:22:38.399 --> 01:22:40.840
<v Speaker 2>was very important to put the United States in a

1282
01:22:40.840 --> 01:22:45.159
<v Speaker 2>long term competition on a sustainable fiscal path. You know,

1283
01:22:45.199 --> 01:22:47.800
<v Speaker 2>we had spent a lot of money mobilizing for Korea,

1284
01:22:47.840 --> 01:22:51.439
<v Speaker 2>you know, demobilized after World War Two and then ramped

1285
01:22:51.520 --> 01:22:53.880
<v Speaker 2>up for Korea, and it really created a lot of

1286
01:22:53.880 --> 01:22:56.960
<v Speaker 2>budget problems and everything. And so Eisenhower kind of put

1287
01:22:57.039 --> 01:23:02.680
<v Speaker 2>us on a steady state where innovation was emphasized. Nuclear

1288
01:23:02.720 --> 01:23:07.319
<v Speaker 2>weapons would be used to deter war and hopefully bring

1289
01:23:07.359 --> 01:23:12.439
<v Speaker 2>an end if you if you had one. But also

1290
01:23:12.560 --> 01:23:15.920
<v Speaker 2>all these innovations in you know, after Sputnik, in the

1291
01:23:16.119 --> 01:23:19.560
<v Speaker 2>space race, NASA and DARPA was created, and then the

1292
01:23:19.680 --> 01:23:23.840
<v Speaker 2>NRO and and so you know, it was a and

1293
01:23:23.840 --> 01:23:26.640
<v Speaker 2>then used COVID action, you know, to compete in the

1294
01:23:26.640 --> 01:23:30.760
<v Speaker 2>Third World, and so it was a pretty effective grand strategy,

1295
01:23:30.920 --> 01:23:33.039
<v Speaker 2>you know. And then even on the economic side, you know,

1296
01:23:33.079 --> 01:23:38.079
<v Speaker 2>the interstate highway system, you know, and so it's a

1297
01:23:38.119 --> 01:23:41.920
<v Speaker 2>good model for you know. You know, at the end

1298
01:23:41.960 --> 01:23:45.439
<v Speaker 2>of the day, I think who wins this new Cold

1299
01:23:45.479 --> 01:23:48.199
<v Speaker 2>War between US and China and its allies will be

1300
01:23:48.279 --> 01:23:51.840
<v Speaker 2>who has the strongest overall system, which means our domestic

1301
01:23:51.920 --> 01:23:54.800
<v Speaker 2>power base, you know, which it's got resilient. You can't

1302
01:23:54.840 --> 01:23:57.960
<v Speaker 2>spend yourself into oblivion, and you know, and one of

1303
01:23:58.279 --> 01:24:00.880
<v Speaker 2>you know, one of the dangers of great powers is

1304
01:24:00.920 --> 01:24:03.640
<v Speaker 2>they you know, both we and the Soviets made these

1305
01:24:03.680 --> 01:24:09.079
<v Speaker 2>mistakes in the Cold War is you know, strategies and

1306
01:24:09.199 --> 01:24:11.960
<v Speaker 2>art not a science. So you can overreach and make

1307
01:24:12.000 --> 01:24:16.079
<v Speaker 2>yourself vulnerable on peripheral things, or you can underreach and

1308
01:24:16.239 --> 01:24:18.520
<v Speaker 2>not do anything, and then the world really gets bad

1309
01:24:18.600 --> 01:24:21.800
<v Speaker 2>for you. And you know we've done over various periods

1310
01:24:21.840 --> 01:24:25.119
<v Speaker 2>of time, and you know, and you want to find

1311
01:24:25.119 --> 01:24:29.000
<v Speaker 2>that realm where you're adding to your power, not depleting it,

1312
01:24:29.600 --> 01:24:33.319
<v Speaker 2>and then taking advantage of your adversary when they make

1313
01:24:33.359 --> 01:24:35.520
<v Speaker 2>a mistake, you know, and that's what we eventually did

1314
01:24:35.520 --> 01:24:38.279
<v Speaker 2>in the late Cold War. You know, you know, I

1315
01:24:38.439 --> 01:24:41.319
<v Speaker 2>like to describe the Cold War. We started off pretty strong,

1316
01:24:41.479 --> 01:24:43.880
<v Speaker 2>you know, the first decade and a half. We kind

1317
01:24:43.880 --> 01:24:46.199
<v Speaker 2>of had trouble in the middle couple decades, and then

1318
01:24:46.279 --> 01:24:48.520
<v Speaker 2>we finished strong and that was enough to win it.

1319
01:24:50.600 --> 01:24:56.560
<v Speaker 4>Great answer also from Censor. If it's possible, how would

1320
01:24:56.560 --> 01:25:00.039
<v Speaker 4>you seek to make COVID action programs immune to the

1321
01:25:00.079 --> 01:25:03.520
<v Speaker 4>holes of the US domestic domestic political theater.

1322
01:25:03.600 --> 01:25:05.079
<v Speaker 3>I'm not sure it works like that.

1323
01:25:06.920 --> 01:25:13.920
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, So you know, Intelligence emphasizes our republican form of government,

1324
01:25:13.960 --> 01:25:17.560
<v Speaker 2>where a couple committees in Congress do the oversight for

1325
01:25:17.600 --> 01:25:21.640
<v Speaker 2>the American people to keep things secret. But you know,

1326
01:25:21.680 --> 01:25:24.439
<v Speaker 2>one of the tests of a COVID action program is,

1327
01:25:25.359 --> 01:25:29.000
<v Speaker 2>you know, it ought to be consistent with broader US

1328
01:25:29.039 --> 01:25:34.880
<v Speaker 2>foreign policy interests and goals. And when it's too disjointed

1329
01:25:34.920 --> 01:25:38.079
<v Speaker 2>from that, you know, and then the likelihood that it's

1330
01:25:38.119 --> 01:25:41.199
<v Speaker 2>going to get leaked by opponents goes up as well,

1331
01:25:41.399 --> 01:25:42.880
<v Speaker 2>you're going to have trouble. You know, you're going to

1332
01:25:42.920 --> 01:25:47.000
<v Speaker 2>have controversy, and so you know, you'd like the test

1333
01:25:47.039 --> 01:25:50.039
<v Speaker 2>of it is you'd like the American people to say, Okay, yeah,

1334
01:25:50.079 --> 01:25:52.399
<v Speaker 2>I see, I see why my government's doing that. It's

1335
01:25:52.439 --> 01:25:55.199
<v Speaker 2>in our interest and I see why it was secret,

1336
01:25:55.279 --> 01:25:58.239
<v Speaker 2>you know, rather than what the hell are you doing? Right?

1337
01:25:58.439 --> 01:25:59.920
<v Speaker 1>Right? Uh?

1338
01:26:00.079 --> 01:26:02.199
<v Speaker 2>Uh, you know, and so and so we've had both

1339
01:26:02.319 --> 01:26:07.159
<v Speaker 2>over decades, and uh, you know, hopefully we've learned how

1340
01:26:07.159 --> 01:26:09.960
<v Speaker 2>to do that. You know, the answer is not to

1341
01:26:09.960 --> 01:26:14.279
<v Speaker 2>do COVID action. I mean, presidents will differ on you know,

1342
01:26:14.359 --> 01:26:17.039
<v Speaker 2>how aggressive they want to be. But you know, when

1343
01:26:17.039 --> 01:26:20.479
<v Speaker 2>it succeeds, it really succeeds very well. And it's generally

1344
01:26:20.560 --> 01:26:25.840
<v Speaker 2>our biggest programs that are the most successful. But then

1345
01:26:25.880 --> 01:26:30.079
<v Speaker 2>we've also had spectacular failures like Bay of Pigs and others.

1346
01:26:30.319 --> 01:26:32.680
<v Speaker 2>You just got, you know, got to avoid the dumb

1347
01:26:32.720 --> 01:26:34.680
<v Speaker 2>ship and do the smart ship.

1348
01:26:34.680 --> 01:26:37.760
<v Speaker 4>Right and unfortunately, sometimes you don't know if it's dumb

1349
01:26:37.800 --> 01:26:41.439
<v Speaker 4>shit or smart shit until it's already yeah, right, I

1350
01:26:41.439 --> 01:26:48.920
<v Speaker 4>mean sometimes that's right. How involved or aware should the

1351
01:26:48.960 --> 01:26:52.760
<v Speaker 4>average American be about national security topics? And how would

1352
01:26:52.800 --> 01:26:54.560
<v Speaker 4>you amend current engagement?

1353
01:26:58.760 --> 01:27:02.039
<v Speaker 2>Well, I think we're very affected by what goes on

1354
01:27:02.239 --> 01:27:05.079
<v Speaker 2>in the rest of the world, and you know, it's

1355
01:27:05.119 --> 01:27:08.760
<v Speaker 2>incumbent about our political leaders, you know, to make that case,

1356
01:27:11.119 --> 01:27:14.840
<v Speaker 2>and then you know, and I think engagement is important,

1357
01:27:14.840 --> 01:27:17.000
<v Speaker 2>and you know, and one of the reasons we're connected

1358
01:27:17.119 --> 01:27:20.359
<v Speaker 2>is not just trade and and and others, all of

1359
01:27:20.359 --> 01:27:25.560
<v Speaker 2>that that matters. It's also the reach of weapons, you know,

1360
01:27:25.640 --> 01:27:31.079
<v Speaker 2>and the destructiveness of weapons, so beginning with nuclear weapons,

1361
01:27:31.079 --> 01:27:35.439
<v Speaker 2>but also now there's more ways to reach intercontinental distances,

1362
01:27:35.520 --> 01:27:39.119
<v Speaker 2>cyber being one example. You know, so the two oceans

1363
01:27:39.199 --> 01:27:41.880
<v Speaker 2>don't protect us in the way they have in the past,

1364
01:27:42.039 --> 01:27:47.359
<v Speaker 2>and you know, what happens overseas matters to us. And

1365
01:27:47.399 --> 01:27:51.119
<v Speaker 2>it's the same thing, you know, as terrorists go from

1366
01:27:51.159 --> 01:27:55.000
<v Speaker 2>a local regional problem to ones with global ambitions or

1367
01:27:55.119 --> 01:27:58.479
<v Speaker 2>extra regional you know, it affects our interests more. And

1368
01:28:00.800 --> 01:28:08.239
<v Speaker 2>so you know, generally, when we've disengaged, we've paid a

1369
01:28:08.279 --> 01:28:10.479
<v Speaker 2>price for it down the road. Now that doesn't mean

1370
01:28:10.560 --> 01:28:14.680
<v Speaker 2>over engagement. It just means you can't completely disengage. You know.

1371
01:28:14.760 --> 01:28:17.640
<v Speaker 2>You get you use economy of force in a lot

1372
01:28:17.640 --> 01:28:20.520
<v Speaker 2>of places and that's enough. But you can't just up

1373
01:28:20.520 --> 01:28:23.199
<v Speaker 2>and leave and say I don't care about the place. Mike.

1374
01:28:23.680 --> 01:28:26.760
<v Speaker 4>You know, you mentioned cyber a couple times, and I'm

1375
01:28:26.800 --> 01:28:29.760
<v Speaker 4>curious about your position on this. And obviously sometimes the

1376
01:28:29.840 --> 01:28:33.479
<v Speaker 4>cyber gangs are in China or in Russia, they're in

1377
01:28:33.479 --> 01:28:36.960
<v Speaker 4>a non permissive environment. But you know, we do see

1378
01:28:36.960 --> 01:28:39.880
<v Speaker 4>like ransomware attacks on hospitals where a hospital will get

1379
01:28:39.880 --> 01:28:43.720
<v Speaker 4>locked down. If if a group of armed people were

1380
01:28:43.720 --> 01:28:47.920
<v Speaker 4>to go into that hospital and lock it down, we

1381
01:28:48.439 --> 01:28:51.960
<v Speaker 4>have specific reactions to it. Do you feel as though

1382
01:28:52.000 --> 01:28:55.199
<v Speaker 4>the US government should start viewing certain types of cyber

1383
01:28:55.239 --> 01:29:00.159
<v Speaker 4>attacks as actually offensive military or acts of war or

1384
01:29:00.760 --> 01:29:02.920
<v Speaker 4>acts of terrorism and treat them as such.

1385
01:29:03.560 --> 01:29:06.600
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's a great question. So so one, you know,

1386
01:29:06.720 --> 01:29:11.039
<v Speaker 2>cyber is this unique weapon that it uh, you know,

1387
01:29:12.560 --> 01:29:15.119
<v Speaker 2>it can be used by states. It can be used,

1388
01:29:15.159 --> 01:29:19.439
<v Speaker 2>you know to harass and destroy, you know, distributed denial

1389
01:29:19.439 --> 01:29:26.039
<v Speaker 2>of service attacks and then really destructive attacks. It can

1390
01:29:26.079 --> 01:29:29.880
<v Speaker 2>be used for intelligence collection as well as force, et cetera.

1391
01:29:29.960 --> 01:29:32.680
<v Speaker 2>So it has a lot of a lot of different attributes.

1392
01:29:32.720 --> 01:29:42.000
<v Speaker 2>And so where a lot of supposedly non governmental cyber

1393
01:29:42.079 --> 01:29:46.960
<v Speaker 2>actors or operate hostile territory and hurting you, you have

1394
01:29:47.039 --> 01:29:52.399
<v Speaker 2>to have some kind of diplomatic or some response because

1395
01:29:53.000 --> 01:30:00.159
<v Speaker 2>they're operating on this guy's territory, probably with his and

1396
01:30:00.199 --> 01:30:03.119
<v Speaker 2>they're hurting you. You know. So mainly a problem right

1397
01:30:03.159 --> 01:30:07.279
<v Speaker 2>now in Russia, but it's also China, China as well.

1398
01:30:07.760 --> 01:30:14.520
<v Speaker 2>And then you know, as you mentioned, we had this experience,

1399
01:30:14.760 --> 01:30:17.640
<v Speaker 2>you know, when I was Under Secretary of Defense for intelligence.

1400
01:30:17.720 --> 01:30:22.680
<v Speaker 2>North Korea whacked Sony Pictures and the Iranians whacked Saudi

1401
01:30:22.720 --> 01:30:27.479
<v Speaker 2>Arabian oil, you know, ab Cake and others, big destructive attacks.

1402
01:30:27.479 --> 01:30:31.279
<v Speaker 2>And as you said, had North Koreans walked into Sony

1403
01:30:31.439 --> 01:30:34.479
<v Speaker 2>and blew up those computers, there'd be no doubt about

1404
01:30:34.520 --> 01:30:37.159
<v Speaker 2>a response. But you know, if you do it with cyber,

1405
01:30:37.239 --> 01:30:40.399
<v Speaker 2>it's this, well what is it? And you know, it's

1406
01:30:40.479 --> 01:30:44.079
<v Speaker 2>just a computer and or thirty thirty thousand computers or

1407
01:30:44.119 --> 01:30:47.680
<v Speaker 2>whatever the case is. But so we have a ways

1408
01:30:47.760 --> 01:30:53.800
<v Speaker 2>to go in this nascent field to develop you know,

1409
01:30:54.640 --> 01:30:57.840
<v Speaker 2>in a way it was easier to develop strategy in

1410
01:30:57.880 --> 01:31:01.840
<v Speaker 2>the nuclear world after the advent of nuclear weapons, and

1411
01:31:01.880 --> 01:31:03.880
<v Speaker 2>it has been you know, cyber has been around now

1412
01:31:03.960 --> 01:31:07.359
<v Speaker 2>for a couple of decades and we're still struggling with

1413
01:31:07.600 --> 01:31:09.520
<v Speaker 2>what does it mean and how is it fit in

1414
01:31:09.560 --> 01:31:14.680
<v Speaker 2>the world of force, and what's acceptable intelligence collection and

1415
01:31:14.720 --> 01:31:17.800
<v Speaker 2>what's not. You know, so like this intellectual mass on

1416
01:31:17.840 --> 01:31:20.800
<v Speaker 2>a massive scale, this intellectual property theft, you know, like

1417
01:31:21.960 --> 01:31:25.239
<v Speaker 2>one of the things I thought in the Cold War

1418
01:31:25.279 --> 01:31:27.720
<v Speaker 2>against the Soviet Union, you know, where we really didn't

1419
01:31:27.760 --> 01:31:32.960
<v Speaker 2>interact economically and we restricted technologies. They got some of them,

1420
01:31:32.960 --> 01:31:36.439
<v Speaker 2>but I thought, you know, you really can't steal your

1421
01:31:36.479 --> 01:31:39.920
<v Speaker 2>way to economic competitiveness, you know, so they're trying to

1422
01:31:39.960 --> 01:31:43.600
<v Speaker 2>get our computers through you know, clandestine means and stuff

1423
01:31:43.640 --> 01:31:46.520
<v Speaker 2>like that, and it seemed like we had enormous advantage

1424
01:31:46.920 --> 01:31:49.560
<v Speaker 2>cyber and the Chinese have changed my views about that, right,

1425
01:31:49.640 --> 01:31:55.840
<v Speaker 2>given massive gains they've made economically from taking intellectual property,

1426
01:31:56.159 --> 01:31:57.319
<v Speaker 2>it looks like crime.

1427
01:31:57.079 --> 01:32:00.960
<v Speaker 4>Pays right, so right, And it's also tough because we've

1428
01:32:01.000 --> 01:32:03.399
<v Speaker 4>had people on the show when the counter intelligence industry

1429
01:32:03.560 --> 01:32:06.760
<v Speaker 4>or from you know, the FBI, the CIA, who are

1430
01:32:06.840 --> 01:32:12.640
<v Speaker 4>like when every you know, Chinese national or Chinese descendant

1431
01:32:12.640 --> 01:32:16.039
<v Speaker 4>who has relatives in mainland are a potential spy for

1432
01:32:16.079 --> 01:32:19.159
<v Speaker 4>the United States, Like, how do you stop how do

1433
01:32:19.159 --> 01:32:22.159
<v Speaker 4>you stop your technology from walking out the doors when

1434
01:32:22.199 --> 01:32:24.560
<v Speaker 4>the Chinese government can walk up and go, hey, I

1435
01:32:24.600 --> 01:32:27.279
<v Speaker 4>saw your grandmother last week, right.

1436
01:32:27.640 --> 01:32:31.199
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, yeah, So, I mean, you know, the FBI's job

1437
01:32:31.279 --> 01:32:36.159
<v Speaker 2>jar has grown dramatically with this ology problem and the proliferation,

1438
01:32:36.399 --> 01:32:39.760
<v Speaker 2>you know, the traditional counter intelligence problem of I've got

1439
01:32:39.760 --> 01:32:44.279
<v Speaker 2>you know, one hundred intelligence of hostile intelligence officers working

1440
01:32:44.319 --> 01:32:47.840
<v Speaker 2>in this country has changed pretty dramatically, and then you've

1441
01:32:47.840 --> 01:32:52.520
<v Speaker 2>got you know, still international terrorist extremists and domestics. So

1442
01:32:52.920 --> 01:32:53.359
<v Speaker 2>they got that.

1443
01:32:54.399 --> 01:32:57.119
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, maybe we'll do well one more before we let Mike,

1444
01:32:57.680 --> 01:32:58.199
<v Speaker 1>we have we.

1445
01:32:58.199 --> 01:33:01.079
<v Speaker 4>Have like three more, if that's okay, because one of them,

1446
01:33:01.199 --> 01:33:03.000
<v Speaker 4>like is a very generous donation. I want to make

1447
01:33:03.039 --> 01:33:04.840
<v Speaker 4>sure we get to it. I read in your bio

1448
01:33:04.880 --> 01:33:07.840
<v Speaker 4>that in nineteen seventy eight you went to over to

1449
01:33:07.880 --> 01:33:12.199
<v Speaker 4>Harefair in UK and completed a British SASUQB course. How

1450
01:33:12.239 --> 01:33:14.840
<v Speaker 4>did you get that opportunity and how was that experience

1451
01:33:14.880 --> 01:33:15.119
<v Speaker 4>for you?

1452
01:33:15.199 --> 01:33:18.439
<v Speaker 1>It's also in the book By All Means Available, which

1453
01:33:18.479 --> 01:33:20.039
<v Speaker 1>I hope you guys would go and take a look at.

1454
01:33:20.800 --> 01:33:24.840
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so, you know, we were just starting to develop

1455
01:33:27.199 --> 01:33:31.199
<v Speaker 2>precision counter terrorism capabilities in the late nineteen seventies, you know,

1456
01:33:31.279 --> 01:33:35.720
<v Speaker 2>after the Munich massacre in seventy two and some airline

1457
01:33:36.199 --> 01:33:40.840
<v Speaker 2>hijackers or hijackings, and you know, so the Israelis were

1458
01:33:40.880 --> 01:33:42.800
<v Speaker 2>ahead of us, and the Brits were ahead of us

1459
01:33:42.840 --> 01:33:46.800
<v Speaker 2>in certain ways, and then we started building this capability

1460
01:33:46.800 --> 01:33:49.000
<v Speaker 2>and I was fortunate enough I was in a special

1461
01:33:49.039 --> 01:33:52.680
<v Speaker 2>Forces unit in Germany at the time, and Bob Tolt's

1462
01:33:52.720 --> 01:33:55.319
<v Speaker 2>part of the tenth Group, and I got selected to

1463
01:33:55.399 --> 01:34:00.960
<v Speaker 2>go to this training early on, and you know, and

1464
01:34:01.119 --> 01:34:04.279
<v Speaker 2>not only gave me some new tactical skills this close

1465
01:34:04.359 --> 01:34:06.760
<v Speaker 2>quarter battle and they had a lot to teach us.

1466
01:34:06.760 --> 01:34:09.680
<v Speaker 2>Then you know today, you know, we're we're the best

1467
01:34:09.680 --> 01:34:12.680
<v Speaker 2>force in the world in those areas, but and have

1468
01:34:12.800 --> 01:34:17.439
<v Speaker 2>been for the past couple of decades. But you know it,

1469
01:34:17.159 --> 01:34:21.319
<v Speaker 2>it started me really on this counter terrorism track that

1470
01:34:21.680 --> 01:34:24.000
<v Speaker 2>became a pretty big part of my career, along with

1471
01:34:24.079 --> 01:34:28.039
<v Speaker 2>unconventional warfare and you know other parts that you know,

1472
01:34:28.079 --> 01:34:30.439
<v Speaker 2>so it was more than just tactical training in a

1473
01:34:30.520 --> 01:34:35.560
<v Speaker 2>sense that you know, got me thinking about precision counter

1474
01:34:35.640 --> 01:34:39.159
<v Speaker 2>terrorisms and operations and all that goes into it and stuff.

1475
01:34:39.199 --> 01:34:40.840
<v Speaker 2>So it's a great experience.

1476
01:34:41.560 --> 01:34:43.760
<v Speaker 4>So we have four questions. Off, I'm only going to

1477
01:34:43.800 --> 01:34:45.239
<v Speaker 4>ask one of them and then we'll to get the

1478
01:34:45.279 --> 01:34:47.399
<v Speaker 4>other three next shows. We don't want to keep it

1479
01:34:47.439 --> 01:34:51.880
<v Speaker 4>too late. We know you're on a timeline. Mohammed Sabani,

1480
01:34:52.039 --> 01:34:54.760
<v Speaker 4>thank you very much for the very genest nation love

1481
01:34:54.800 --> 01:34:57.880
<v Speaker 4>the show is always y'all. What actions, if any, can

1482
01:34:57.920 --> 01:35:01.199
<v Speaker 4>be taken for America to compete and hardware chip production

1483
01:35:01.840 --> 01:35:04.319
<v Speaker 4>with the entire rare Earth process and the supply chain

1484
01:35:04.359 --> 01:35:07.439
<v Speaker 4>being owned by Chinese. Also, how can America protect its

1485
01:35:07.560 --> 01:35:09.239
<v Speaker 4>infrastructure from cyber attacks?

1486
01:35:10.359 --> 01:35:13.800
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, two great questions really at the heart of this

1487
01:35:13.920 --> 01:35:17.279
<v Speaker 2>new competition. So one, you know, we've got this chip

1488
01:35:17.640 --> 01:35:21.800
<v Speaker 2>acts to try to repatriate production that had gone overseas

1489
01:35:21.880 --> 01:35:25.800
<v Speaker 2>the past couple of decades. In advanced chips, you know,

1490
01:35:25.840 --> 01:35:28.039
<v Speaker 2>we really are still ahead. But then you want to

1491
01:35:28.039 --> 01:35:30.039
<v Speaker 2>restrict some of that. So I think, you know, and

1492
01:35:30.079 --> 01:35:35.439
<v Speaker 2>that's companies like Nvidia, you know, the GPUs and stuff

1493
01:35:36.319 --> 01:35:41.199
<v Speaker 2>that's been subject of some administration restrictions and things. I

1494
01:35:41.239 --> 01:35:44.840
<v Speaker 2>want to maintain that lead. There are certain areas where

1495
01:35:45.079 --> 01:35:50.960
<v Speaker 2>behind in you know, precision, you know how many things

1496
01:35:51.000 --> 01:35:53.039
<v Speaker 2>you can fit on a chip and stuff the scale,

1497
01:35:54.520 --> 01:35:59.640
<v Speaker 2>nanometers and things that Taiwan Semiconductor, you know, is more

1498
01:35:59.680 --> 01:36:02.880
<v Speaker 2>advanced than us, but it's it's it's just a critical area.

1499
01:36:02.880 --> 01:36:06.039
<v Speaker 2>It's an area that you know, we invented, we dominated.

1500
01:36:07.479 --> 01:36:13.399
<v Speaker 2>It had military implications as well as commercial economic and

1501
01:36:13.479 --> 01:36:16.359
<v Speaker 2>you know it's going to be just as important in

1502
01:36:16.399 --> 01:36:21.720
<v Speaker 2>this century. And then the caller. Two other parts to that. One,

1503
01:36:23.720 --> 01:36:26.800
<v Speaker 2>you know, the the de risking of supply chains. Now

1504
01:36:26.840 --> 01:36:30.720
<v Speaker 2>that I think there's more we're discovering more rare earth's everywhere.

1505
01:36:30.760 --> 01:36:36.239
<v Speaker 2>You know, China has pretty big dominance now, but you

1506
01:36:36.239 --> 01:36:38.439
<v Speaker 2>know they're all over the world and including in the

1507
01:36:38.520 --> 01:36:42.119
<v Speaker 2>United States, you know, Wyoming and elsewhere, and so we

1508
01:36:42.279 --> 01:36:44.720
<v Speaker 2>just got to have the right policies to go after them,

1509
01:36:44.760 --> 01:36:49.039
<v Speaker 2>and then the relationships with with with some foreign governments

1510
01:36:49.079 --> 01:36:53.319
<v Speaker 2>to compete in that area. And then you know where

1511
01:36:53.319 --> 01:36:57.920
<v Speaker 2>we're dependent in pharmaceuticals as we saw and many you know,

1512
01:36:58.359 --> 01:37:01.119
<v Speaker 2>in COVID and medical supplies. You know, you got to

1513
01:37:01.159 --> 01:37:04.239
<v Speaker 2>de risk. That doesn't mean decouple completely, but you have

1514
01:37:04.319 --> 01:37:08.000
<v Speaker 2>to have alternative sources to supply and assured sources to supply.

1515
01:37:08.239 --> 01:37:10.199
<v Speaker 2>Doesn't mean everything has to be in the United States.

1516
01:37:10.239 --> 01:37:15.039
<v Speaker 2>Just can't all be in China, right. And then on

1517
01:37:15.159 --> 01:37:24.079
<v Speaker 2>cyber security, you know, that's a tough one because the

1518
01:37:24.159 --> 01:37:27.680
<v Speaker 2>public private partnership only goes so far because you know,

1519
01:37:27.720 --> 01:37:30.199
<v Speaker 2>we've got a free market system and it's sense that

1520
01:37:30.439 --> 01:37:33.039
<v Speaker 2>you know, companies don't want to tell you all their

1521
01:37:33.119 --> 01:37:36.920
<v Speaker 2>vulnerabilities or you know, for lots of reasons. And so

1522
01:37:38.199 --> 01:37:42.800
<v Speaker 2>you know, our Cyber Command commander has three missions essentially

1523
01:37:42.880 --> 01:37:47.239
<v Speaker 2>to support combatant commanders to defend all of DoD's networks.

1524
01:37:47.239 --> 01:37:51.039
<v Speaker 2>But then to defend the United States against the massive attack,

1525
01:37:51.119 --> 01:37:54.399
<v Speaker 2>you know, something that's beyond crime and everything else. But

1526
01:37:54.439 --> 01:37:57.800
<v Speaker 2>he's the only commander who really can't see the battlefield.

1527
01:37:57.920 --> 01:38:00.119
<v Speaker 2>You know, he sees partner that field or if if

1528
01:38:00.119 --> 01:38:02.840
<v Speaker 2>he can if he can target the attack or you know,

1529
01:38:03.880 --> 01:38:06.960
<v Speaker 2>where it's coming from, he can see that. But you know,

1530
01:38:07.159 --> 01:38:09.439
<v Speaker 2>if the attacks, if he doesn't see the point of

1531
01:38:09.479 --> 01:38:13.439
<v Speaker 2>origin and it's hitting all these other places that he

1532
01:38:13.479 --> 01:38:17.239
<v Speaker 2>doesn't have visibility on. He got a challenge with that.

1533
01:38:17.439 --> 01:38:22.560
<v Speaker 2>And so you know, and I you know, there's a

1534
01:38:22.560 --> 01:38:26.439
<v Speaker 2>big debate about cyber offense and cyber defense. You know,

1535
01:38:26.520 --> 01:38:28.960
<v Speaker 2>I think some of the advances in AI are going

1536
01:38:29.039 --> 01:38:32.880
<v Speaker 2>to really enable the offense going forward. We need a

1537
01:38:32.880 --> 01:38:36.039
<v Speaker 2>lot of you know, attention to this and and and

1538
01:38:36.119 --> 01:38:38.880
<v Speaker 2>you know, if quantum computing comes around in the next

1539
01:38:38.920 --> 01:38:43.479
<v Speaker 2>decade or so. So yeah, I mean it's great. Those

1540
01:38:43.479 --> 01:38:48.840
<v Speaker 2>are both really strategic questions and it's not something national

1541
01:38:48.880 --> 01:38:54.600
<v Speaker 2>security councils typically are trained or you know, kind of problem.

1542
01:38:54.760 --> 01:38:57.800
<v Speaker 1>Well, Mike, I really appreciate you, you know, being willing

1543
01:38:57.800 --> 01:39:00.479
<v Speaker 1>to tackle so many of these difficult subjects. And this

1544
01:39:00.640 --> 01:39:03.159
<v Speaker 1>turned out to be a pretty wide ranging interview. Actually,

1545
01:39:03.920 --> 01:39:05.520
<v Speaker 1>I hope that all of you out there will go

1546
01:39:05.560 --> 01:39:08.079
<v Speaker 1>and check out his memoir by all means available.

1547
01:39:08.279 --> 01:39:09.720
<v Speaker 3>I read it. It was terrific.

1548
01:39:09.920 --> 01:39:13.720
<v Speaker 1>And we will have Mike back next Friday for part two,

1549
01:39:13.760 --> 01:39:16.399
<v Speaker 1>where I'm sure we'll have more of these policy discussions

1550
01:39:16.920 --> 01:39:19.840
<v Speaker 1>and we'll also be talking about the latter part of

1551
01:39:19.880 --> 01:39:22.159
<v Speaker 1>his career where he served as the Assistant Secretary of

1552
01:39:22.199 --> 01:39:25.479
<v Speaker 1>Defense for Special Ops and Low Intensity Conflict asd Solick

1553
01:39:25.760 --> 01:39:29.520
<v Speaker 1>and also headed up USDI. So again, Mike, you thank

1554
01:39:29.560 --> 01:39:32.920
<v Speaker 1>you very much for taking the time for this interview.

1555
01:39:33.600 --> 01:39:36.760
<v Speaker 1>Thank you both, and we will see all of you

1556
01:39:36.760 --> 01:39:37.359
<v Speaker 1>next Friday.

1557
01:39:37.399 --> 01:39:40.199
<v Speaker 4>Also, real quick, make sure you check out Jack and

1558
01:39:40.239 --> 01:39:42.920
<v Speaker 4>I being interviewed on the Cleared Hot podcast for Andy Stump.

1559
01:39:42.960 --> 01:39:45.279
<v Speaker 4>He was generous enough to invite us out to Montana

1560
01:39:45.319 --> 01:39:47.520
<v Speaker 4>and it's out there now, sat around and shot the

1561
01:39:47.520 --> 01:39:50.319
<v Speaker 4>shit for a while. So and Mike, thanks so much.

1562
01:39:50.399 --> 01:39:51.399
<v Speaker 4>We will see you on Friday.

1563
01:39:52.000 --> 01:39:55.279
<v Speaker 2>Okay, take care. Thanks
