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do it there. Thank you. I want to welcome everyone
back to part six of my reading of Riizard Lgut
goes the Demon in Democracy. We are smack dab in
the middle of chapter three, and we are going to
keep going. This is part five of chapter three. There
is yet another engine of politicization in liberal democracy. As
I pointed out previously, this system has an inbuilt tendency
to extend its rural rule to all areas of life,
no matter how small or one would think non political.
While it is true that the liberal and democratic traditions
did include a vague promise to accept free, non political
self organization of communities and disturb flourish and undisturbed flourishing
of social life, this acceptance never really went beyond verbal declarations.
What invalidated it was a much stronger tendency, both in
liberalism and in democracy, to perform a deep political restructuring
of society. What actually happened was the opposite of what
the doctrine professed, an atrophy of social spontaneity and a
hyper hypert this's word should be hypertrophy, hypertrophy of politics.
I'm assuming that would be like entrophy or I'm gonna
look it up real quick. Hold on, I rarely do this,
but I don't remember what this word means. Process of
no increasing the sized, density and shape of an organ
or tissue hyper yes, usually through cell enlargement cool. In
the liberal tradition, communities such as family and nation were
not believed to have independent existence and therefore have always
been looked upon with suspens Liberals never parted with individualistic
assumptions according to which collective entities had a secondary role,
being contractual and provisional constructions. Doctrinally or doctrinally, nothing stood
in the way of rebuilding the communities according to liberal rules,
which meant free exit and equal rights to everybody, and
the empowering of the state with the tools to eliminate discrimination.
Such strong pressure to restructure communities and ultimately to weaken
their roles does not exist in the democratic tradition as
long as the democratic mechanisms were limited to the emergence,
maintenance and transfer of power in the government. But after
the liberal democracy gained strength and matured, all of that changed.
One of the main objectives that the elected authority set
before itself was liberalization of society, that is, harmonizing the
whole of society with the political system. Homogeneity well, I
mean homogeneity, but not homogeneity of your culture, or your
religion or your family. But according to the system liberal
democrats were guided by a similar assumption as the communists
before them. Both disliked communities for their alleged anachronism, and
for that reason thought them because deep rooted. Because deep
rooted to be the major obstacles to progress when you're moving,
when you have progress, when you're moving towards a goal,
anything that's deep rooted isn't moving with you, and I
that's an impediment. If enough of the population becomes deep rooted,
they're going to resist that progress. Both believe that one
cannot modernize society without modernizing communities, including rural areas, families, churches,
and schools. Just as communism was not possible with families
adhering to the feudal patriarchal patriarchal society system, so liberal
democracy is believed to be incomplete and unsuccessful with schools
respecting traditional moral and cultural authoritarianism. The arguments are analogous.
Just as a person coming from a non communist community
could not become a full fledged, dedicated, and efficient citizen
of the communist state, so a graduate of a traditional
school will never be a faithful and reliable citizen of
the liberal democratic state. I was talking with our friend
dark enlightenment about this. Yesterday we were talking about Catholic
School and the Catholic Church, and now, the Catholic Church
was a rock that was unmovable for so long despite
every system, every organization is going to have corruption, but
it was unmovable. It didn't change as far as its
doctrine went and as far as its worship went, as
far as its form went, and then it underwent its
own Nuremberg Trials in nineteen sixty five, and ever since
then it is not it's become so no, it's become
so a historical to its own self that now you
see a mass movement among Catholics to move back to
the Latin mass and traditionally, so just an example, it
was a rock, and because progress was being made, they
had to move that rock and make it roll. And
when that rock rolls, it's going to pick up if
it's rolling with progressivism, it's going to pick up hints
of progressivism. And you've seen that in every basically every
religious organization. Socialists and communists, let it be noted, have
always embraced the notion of community, at least theoretically, to
a lot larger extent than liberals, whom they accused of
individualism that falsified human nature. However, while emphasizing the role
of the community, they sternly and ruthlessly criticized, just as
liberals did, existing communities with long traditions, and after seizing power,
brutally destroyed them. Villages were treated with particular aversion because
they were seen as the main stay of tradition. Marx
and Engels contemptuously wrote about the idiocy of rural life,
and their successors did everything to destroy rural communities, which
they regarded as strongholds of conservatism and bigotry. The communist
regimes systematically did their best to wipe out rural culture,
while at the same time seemingly defended the peasants as
victims of exploitation. This inconsistency was not an isolated case.
The Communists also effectively destroyed working class communities, even though
in its official program the party proclaimed itself to be
the strongest ever champion of the world working class, which
it honored by calling on it to become a history
making liberator of humanity. The brutal crusade against existing rural
and urban communities against farmers and workers did not prevent
the Communists from praising the working people of town and
country and the proletariat terms denoting social entities whose existence
was rather doubtful. The communists also exhorted the proletarians of
all countries to unite in the mission of carrying out
a worldwide communist revolution. The proletariat was an abstract term
to which no real community corresponded. It was nothing but
a requirement of political strategy. The Marxist proletariat existed only
so far as it fulfilled the political criteria of the
revolutionary program, and the only identifying feature of this construct
was its political role by itself. The status of being
a factory worker or being unemployed did not automatically make
one beloe belong to the working people of town and
country or the proletariat. We see this today the same
thing in liberalism, and a lot of people who quote
unquote called themselves right wingers still to cry liberalism. Oh,
all the political powers in the cities, We can go
to the cities. Huh, how's that working out. The politicization
of society by liberal democracy developed somewhat differently, but had
similar effects when it became largely acknowledged that this system
was destined not only to secure a smooth transfer of
political power from one government to another, but to organize
the entire fabric of society. Communities became a natural object
of first critique and then open attack. Because they were
seen as power structures of an alien, nonliberal and non
democratic nature, stripped of all content and all value, and
reduced to the political form, they were forced to accept
liberal democratic rules as the only acceptable standards. Whenever they
have managed to resist such standards or have been defended
on non political grounds, they provoked even louder protests. The
pure liberal democrats could not but see in them morally
out could not but see in them morally outrageous and
politically dangerous anachronisms that were to open the door for dictatorship.
The old communal bonds, incomprehensible to and feared by the
liberal democratic mind, were to be replaced with new, modern ones.
Libertarianism just replaces this with, you know, with not a
liberal democratic mind. But they are seeking to replace the old.
They will tell you, oh, you can do what you
want over there, will do what we want over here.
But then everlasts ever now. The feminist ideology, for example,
proclaimed that women are united by a special feeling of
togetherness and solidarity, which they unsurprisingly called a bond of sisterhood.
It does not require much perspectiveness to see that the
women thus defined were a close equivalent of Marxist proletariat.
Like the proletariat, the women's sisters were believed to form
an international, or rather transnational, political group whose primary reason
of being is empowerment of their entire sex and liberation
of all possible chains imposed on them by history and
by men. By default. Anything that has liber in it
starts with liber or is promoting libre. Is not promoting libre,
they will tell you. I mean who promoting liber is
telling you that? Who is talking about men's roles and
women's roles? That's anathematic them. Just as a proletariat woman,
women is an abstract concept that does not denote any
actual existing community, but only an imagined collective, made an
object of political worship among feminist organizations and their allies.
But the paradox is that the feminist woman, being a
figment of political imagination, is considered by the feminists to
be a proper woman, a woman in a strict sense,
the truest woman. Just as for communists, the Marxist proletariat
was the truest representative of the working class. By the
same token, a real woman living in a real society,
like a real worker living in a real society, is
politically not to be trusted because she deviates too much
from the political model. In fact, a non feminist woman
is not a woman at all, just as a non
communist worker was not really a proletarian. No, she can
do anything a man can do. Yep. There are other
cases of bringing into alleged exists in certain groups by
giving them for above from above, as it were, a
political identity. Probably the most striking examples are homosexuals, who,
by a political fiat gained a status of a transnational
movement fighting for power and political influence. Even some ethnic
groups today only insofar as they are seen by their
assigned political role as fighters for group entitlements. Multiculturalism, and
idea that has become extremely popular in recent decades, is
nothing more than a program to build a society in
which there exists not many cultures, but many political identities
attached to many real or more often imagined collectives. Multiculturalism
encourages what is today called identity politics. This term may
be misleading. It has little to do with the defense
of the rich fab of societies and their historically constituted communities,
but should be rather seen as a program of politicization
of certain groups that could radically change the fabric of society.
One would think that such a program is congruent with
the logic of democracy, which, after all, is based on
the competition among groups struggling for power. This argument is
partly correct and partly fallacious. It is correct so far
as it actually points to today's persistent tendency to turn
social groups into something like political parties, which, once they
become parties, lose their communal character. Women, homosexuals, Muslims, ethnic
groups are being perceived as and transformed into quasi parties
organized from above by the political or ideological leadership, and
not possessing any characteristics, any possessing other characteristics than resulting
from the struggle of power against other groups, and no
other identity than that provided by this leadership, allowing no
ideological dissent. What's he saying? All of these special interest
groups are puppeted from above? Who started the NAACP? Do
I need to say it? Go look it up? Whoever?
Is not a member of this quasi party, even though
for some reason, be it sex, birth, or color, he
should be included, but stays outside its boundaries or sometimes
even opposes it. Is the enemy, a sellout, and a trader.
A Black American who condemns the absurdity of African Americanism,
regardless of his virtues and achievements, is considered as much
a trader, as much a trader to his own race.
A woman who rejects feminism for its crude and destructive
ideological content is a trader to the sisterhood. This argument
is also wrong in another respect. Obviously, communities are not parties,
and a society cannot be divided, like a democratically elected parliament,
into parties playing a political game and vying for power.
The word multiculturalism, still used today despite numerous criticisms and ridicule,
represents yet another hoax that liberal democracy created and that
turned out to be super surprisingly effective. Both parts of
the word misrepresent reality. Multiculturalism is not about culture but
about politics. In fact, they should. They should be polyt
as in polit bureau rather than culture, and mono rather
than multi. Many ingredients of the multicultural cake are not
ingredients anymore. But have become the cake itself. Feminism is
not the culture of feminists, or feminist parties or women,
but the political platform expoused by governments, the European Union
and many international institutions. The ideology of homosexuality is no
longer in the hands of homosexual activists in their organization,
but is a major item in national and global agendas.
A nation that would dare to entertain any misgivings in
this regard, or, for example, include wording in its constitution,
as was recently done by the Hungarians, that marriage as
a union between a man and a woman, would be
subjected to almost worldwide condemnation expressed in the rhetoric of
rage and hatred. The acquisition of all these catchphrases by
the mainstream resulted in paradoxically further homogenization of the modern world,
the most effectively executed because concealed behind the shamelessly fraudulent
rhetoric of cultural diversity. Hence, multiculturalism does not avert the
progressive politicization of liberal democracies nor stop the herd like
proclivity of a liberal democratic demos. In fact, multiculturalism pushes
them to a new level never before in human history.
Do we see a similar phenomenon when millions of people
indistinguishable from each other, using the same patterns of thinking,
politically homogeneous, and oblivious to any other way of viewing
the political world except according to the orthodox liberal democratic version,
are not only convinced of their own individual and group
differences and proclaim the unchallenged superiority of pluralism, but also
wants to enforce the same simplistic and tediously predictable orthodoxy
on the entire world as the ultimate embodiment of the
idea of multiplicity. All this undermines and weakens communities their
role in their cohesion, and it is the communities that
are the major carriers and strongholds of diversity. They're not
the only victims. Politicization, which took over culture, has also
considerable havoc in the law, making it a particularly effective
tool of political or in fact partisan power. Again, an
analogy with communism is inescapable. Naturally. Under communism, the degree
of arbitrariness and control of the courts by the ruling
party were much stronger, but the approach to the law
in liberal democracy and the use of law by the
liberal democratic mainstream place closer to rather than farther from communism,
today's mainstream, like the erstwhile communist ruling class, takes over
the mechanisms for creating laws and regards it as its
exclusive property to be used for its own goals. The
modern state openly, even proudly, carries out the policy of
social engineering, intervening deeply in the lives of communities, while
enjoying total impunity, which is guaranteed by its control of
lawmaking and law enforcement procedures. There was Monica Perez shared
with me a video. This must have been back in
twenty nineteen or and it was at the Chatham House,
and it was the head of the CFR. I can't
remember what the hell his name is, Richard Bass I
think it was at the time. Maybe he still is.
I haven't looked at on that in a long time.
And they were talking about how they didn't even worry
about the churches in the United States anymore, that they
basically owned them all, they had quote unquote partnerships with them.
A markedly important function of the law to act as
a barrier to political hubris, was lost or significantly weakened. Instead,
the law has become a sword against the unresponsiveness and
sometimes resistance of society to the policy of aggressive social
restructuring that is euphemistically called modernization. The law in liberal
democracy as under communism is no longer blind. No longer
can one envision it as blindfolded got us holding the
scales to determine guilt and punishment. It is now as
it were as it was under communism. One of the
engines it transforms to present into the future and the
backwards backward into the progressive. The law is expected to
be endowed with an accurate picture of what is going
to happen in the future, so that it can adjudicate
today what will certainly happen tomorrow. Naturally, politics and law
and liberal democracies are fickle, just as the reaction of
demos had always been unpredictable. But there are exceptions to this.
Politics in law are not blind, for instance, to the
fact that not all groups deserve support and not all
should enjoy the approval of the mainstream, its laws and
its courts. In liberal democracy, as under communism, there are
those who deserve special protection and are therefore honored with
special privileges. To this selected circle belong groups. A groups
official officially anoints it as oppressed. The status of being
oppressed results from the ideological orthodoxy. Bestowing it on this
or that group is a purely political decision with no
regard to reality. Today, for example, homosexual groups have gained
enormous privileges precisely because they have been identified as an
oppressed group, the status granted to them for as long
as liberal democracy reigns. The somewhat bizarre warmth towards homosexuals
is probably fueled by a persistent attempt to deconstruct the family,
the institution to which the left has from the very
beginning felt a singular hostility. Remember the book The Authoritarian
Personality identifies strong central families as a precursor to fascism.
Muslims are also privileged to some extent, but for a
different reason, partly because of the real fear they arouse
in liberal democrats, partly for doctrinal reasons because granting them
privileged status is believed to be the living proof of
the viability of multiculturalist ideology, and partly as an exercise
in moral massacre. As the attitude towards Muslims is sometimes
regarded as a test, undoubtedly not an easy one, of
liberal tolerance and open mindedness. But there are also less
fortunate groups, not privileged and often treated harshly, such as Christians,
whom the liberal democratic legislatures and courts clearly dislike. Chapter three,
Part six. Democratic politicization, being similar to communist politicization, differs
from it in one important aspect. In democracy, the focus
is primarily on the cooperation among groups, a problem virtually
nonexistent under communism, in which, as it was claimed, conflicts
ceased to exist and therefore a political system of cooperation
was no longer necessary. Liberal democracy, on the other hand,
makes cooperation a paramount category and considers itself unquestionably superior
in that respect to any other system on the argument
irrefutable in its abstract formulation that cooperation is superior to
aggression and war. We do not have unceasing wars, to
be sure, But this does not automatically make liberal democratic
politics a model of cooperation. Nor is it true that
the so called politics of emancipation, recognition, and empowerment of
groups is permeated by the spirit of dialogue, debate, and
mutual respect. These expressions are of course well rooted in
today's discourse, nearly as deeply as the building of socialism,
or a moral political unity of the nation, or integral
parts of the language of communism. But it does not
require much effort to see that the dialogue in liberal
democracy is of a peculiar kind because its aim is
to maintain the domination of the mainstream and not to
undermine it. A deliberation is believed to make sense only
if the mainstream orthodoxy is sure to win politically. Yeah,
what's that, I guess Chomsky said, you limit debate to
you limit debate to a box, but you encourage vigorous
debate inside that box. Anything outside that box's off limits.
Today's dialogue politics are a pure form of the right
right is might politics, cleverly concealed by the ostentatiously vacuous
rhetoric of all inclusiveness. The belief that the liberal democratic
system has this wonderful cooperation, cooperative nature, No matter that
that practice often frustrates, it is not without consequence. Once
this belief is taken to heart, it imposes a particular
way of thinking. If politics means a mutually respective cooperation
of parties, and the opposite is a conflict that leads
a discrimination, unjust domination and in the last instance war.
Then the establishment of cooperation becomes a political imperative. It
is certainly not enough to collaborate at the parliamentary and
government levels. Cooperative politics should cover virtually all areas of
public life, because everywhere the alternative to cooperation is discrimination,
unjust domination, and war. Everywhere there are groups being denied
their rights and therefore struggling for empowerment. And more importantly,
everywhere there are women, homosexuals, Muslims, Gypsies, blacks, and representatives
of other groups whom liberal democracy give the status of
political quasi parties, and upon whom it is thrust the
duty of settling scores with the alleged oppressors. Thus, everywhere
we encounter circumstances that make us aware for the need
for cooperation and of the securing the conditions that make
it possible. The success in establishing these conditions at the legislative, governmental,
and international levels depends. In no small measure has been
emphatically pointed out on success in creating such conditions at
lower levels. No dialogue, no tolerance, or no respect for
equal rights exists in everything that constitutes a society, even
its small and seemingly non political elements, then all agreements
to cooperate politically at upper levels lose their effectiveness. If
there is no acceptance of the rights of women and
homosexuals in everyday life and small neighborhoods, then general rules
in the constitution that equate men and women, homosexuals and
heterosexuals are empty. That equate men and women, homosexuals and
heterosexuals are empty declarations. Effective politics becomes thus a comprehensive
task because the preconditions on which cooperation is dependent are
not only numerous, but constantly growing in number. Literature, art, education,
family liturgy, the Bible, traditions, idea, entertainment, children's toys all
can be deemed conducive to cooperation or strengthening intolerance, discrimination,
and domination. All contain sentences, ideas, topics, and images that
are difficult to accept by some groups, and that may
be interpreted as reflecting negative perception of these groups. Such
negative perceptions, called prejudices, undermine these group status, the group's status,
and consequently their political position in a democratic society. If
in families it is the father who makes the major decisions,
and such a power structure and a small social unit
generates negative stereotypes that undermine the position of women in
the family, which, multiplied by the appropriate number of cases,
undermines the position of women in society at large and
prevents them from cooperating on an equal footing with men.
If a book, for example, Ladislav Ray mons The Promised
Land presents a picture of capitalists in which their ways
of doing business are correlated with cultural ethnic characteristics Polish,
Jewish or German. Some may consider this portrayal to promote
anti Polish, anti Jewish, and anti German stereotypes, which, in turn,
multiplied by the appropriate number of readers and lessons of school,
contributes to serious distortions of cooperation among Polish, Jewish and
German communities in the real world. If people tell faggot jokes,
then the result, when multiplied by the appropriate number of situations,
is a discrimination that intentionally marginalizes the cooper cooperation process
for homosexuals as a group. So all of this has
to be eliminated, even at the smallest That's why a
woman in the home, even a woman who's working in
the home, has to have equal standing with her husband,
because all of this can multiply. Another woman can see
that faggot jokes can start. All of these things have
to be stopped dead in their tracks. This explains the
rise and the infamous phenomenon of political correctness. There's nothing
mysterious about it. It is simply a practical consequence of
the view that the duty of citizens of the liberal
democratic society is to participate in the great collective enterprise
where everyone cooperates with everyone else at all levels and
under all circumstances. If we look at three above examples family,
life of books, content, and popular jokes, we can see
that from politically correct perspective, they are no longer irrelevant trivialities.
They illustrate what is absolutely crucial for the entire logic
of liberal democracy. Because the logic of this system turns
on dialogue, respect, equal rights, openness, and tolerance, everything is
by definition political, and nothing that relates, however remotely to
these notions is trivial, minor, or irrelevant. A slight offensive
remark must always be must always be regarded as a
manifestation of mortal sin. What seems a barely visible mark
on the surface conceals underneath swirling currents of hatred, intolerance, racism,
and hedgemony. The body responsible for the ensuring that these
terrible things do not surface is the state, with all
the instruments at its disposal. It is the state that
should incessantly work to impose and improve cooperation policies by
removing all real and potential barriers, creating a favorable legal environment,
and reshaping public space and education in such a way
that the people's minds internalize the rule of politically correct thinking.
If you haven't seen that or noticed that in the
last four years, you're not paying attention. This also raises
the question as to whether calling what liberal democracy he's
proving liberal democracy is here communism remarks, whether that's legitimate.
It's obviously closed. But it's not the same thing. So
if you insist on using this boomer retard term of
calling everything you don't like Marxism or communism, well you're wrong.
Communism and Marxism are something historic, They mean something. And
if you are not, if you don't understand what dialectical
materialism is, to stop using words. So I'm using terms
you don't understand. It's liberal democracy, that's all it is.
Now you can stop listening to James Lindsay and burn
his books. I do whatever you want with them, I
don't care. Such undertaking carries a high price. When the
state takes over responsibility for the roles of cooperation and
their enforcement on all layers of society, there will be
no limits to its interference in people's lives. The laws
that enacts must of necessity be increasingly more detailed than intrusive,
because what threatens those rules and has to be curtailed
is believed to be hidden deeply in social practices and
human consciousness. You will actually hear this when I did
the reading of Israel The Psychopathic Nation, which is just
basically a paper that quotes Jewish philosophers over and over again.
They will say that antisemitism has basically taken over human consciousness,
that it's a disease that's been passed down for two
thousand years. Do you believe that or is it just jealousy?
The slippery slope argument, so often used by liberals, is
particularly pertinent here. The logic of liberalism is that whatever
seems to be the most obviously non political sooner or
later will become political. Logic of democracy, with its notions
of participation, inclusion, and representation, only strengthened this tendency. Language
was first was the first to go down this road.
Initially thought of as potentially descriptive and neutral, it soon
came to be seen as the major political weapon used
by oppressors against the oppressed. Thus, the fagot jokes are
not harmless anecdotes, sometimes funny and sometimes not. The mere
fact of using the word faggot and speech public or
private is an act of participation in the exclusion of
homosexuals from the Democrats, from the democratic cooperation. But because
speech is just an expression of thoughts, emotions, and deeply
hidden aversions, it must soon become obvious that the actual
sources of evil, intolerance, discrimination, domination lie dormant in people's minds,
often deposited in their semi conscious layers, uncontrolled and unnoticed.
These shape our language and consequently are bad habits and
negative predilections. These habits and predilections leads to discriminatory laws
and authoritarian politics, and extreme cases, at the very bottom
of the slippery slope, to prosecution, the stocks, torture, and genocide.
But at the beginning, at the very top, it's thought
with which it all began, a thought crime, a mental
sin that constitutes the first act of disobedience to holy
political principles. Whoever seeks the remedy must start with the
political therapy of people's minds. I was talking about the
slippery slope yesterday, and I said that I thought a
better like thinking about a rolling rock. A rock, a stone,
a gigantic stone should be in place. It should be
something that's foundational, grounded. But once you start moving it,
it starts picking up. And usually the only way you
can move it is to roll it. Well, now it's
starting to pick things up. Now it's starting to wear away,
become different. That's how it happens. When you have something
that's a bedrock and you abandon it, Well, what's going
to happen. That's how you get the slippery slope, because
now you've something that was not meant to be moved,
was not meant to be changed, is being changed, and
once something has changed, or what's the big deal? It's
changes some more. Communism had a comparably strong sense of
political evil, originating, as in liberal democracy, from an internal
act of treason and a profound inability to accept the
communist message. But the evil could be disarmed or even
turn to good once he's maternal active treason was disowned
and the mind reborn and reformed, accepted without reservations the
communist message. The communist state was not oblivious to this possibility,
and its functionaries offered various therapeutic programs to help the
sinners to abandon bad habits and cleanse themselves of bad thoughts.
Once their consciousness was raised, as it was then called,
they could join good comrades in the march toward the
happy future of communism. This incredible as it may seem,
found that its continuation in liberal democracy, even the expression
raising consciousness was retained despite its sinister undertone, denoting essentially
comparable practices of cleansing people's minds of politically subversive mental predilections.
Having gone through consciousness raising therapy, people could, for instance,
rid their minds of sexist thoughts and developed disgust for
faggot jokes. America, to my knowledge, was the first liberal
democratic country to create and in some cases impose such
therapies on people with unruly minds, but the method found
zealous imitators elsewhere, including in Eastern Europe. We have already
had several enthusiastic reports of some Polish professors who during
their stay at American universities were shipped after having sinned
to such a training to have their awareness of a
feminist perspective raised. Former patients equip with new minds now
politically correct because because free from thought crimes, will probably
be the first to be asked to pilot similar programs
in their native country, in which, as we are constantly
reminded by our intellectual pundits, raising the awareness of feminism, homosexuality,
and race is of critical importance. The government is not
the only agent that is supposed to oversee the rules
of cooperation and fight against all the non collaborative groups. Actually,
this responsibility rests on everyone's shoulders and everyone responsible for
tracking what is wrong and implementing what is right. In
this respect, liberal democracy has achieved at least as much
as communism, and perhaps even more real socialism used coercion
in the most palatable sense of the word. The authorities
treated acts of disobedience with brutality, and the bloody birth
of the system was not without effect on the behavior
of the next generation. In a liberal democracy, of asked.
Part of this process oc correspontaneously, and the legal and
political coersion is to some extent a response to public
demand and not an arbitrary act of violence against society.
Hence the large hence the large crowds of individuals who
are willing, like some contemporary Povka Mosarovs, to track down
dissonant words, actions, and intentions in their immediate vicinity, their
tartsif like minds poisoned the society and other minds. In
liberal democracy as an communism, a significant role in the
task of tracking is assigned to intellectuals, who, as the
most knowledgeable and enlightened, are best suited for such a task,
which is first to identify a criminal thought and then
to warn against a slippery slope that leads from this
thought to political domination. Sometimes this path is not perceptible
to a simple mind. It may start, for example, with
a non inclusive use of a personal pronoun he instead
of he or she or better she or he or
still better she all the time. This use may be
indeed a result of simple educational negligence in kindergarten, but
may sometimes end with the rape of a woman. An
intellectual sharp eye and perceptiveness will always recognize what is
politically dangerous a sentence, a metaphor of proverb, an incorrect
text on the bulletin board, work of fiction, a seemingly
little thing, and yet shamelessly undermining the liberal democratic rules.
And because liberal democracy, like communism, produces large numbers of
lumpen intellectuals, there is no shortage of people who ecstatically
become involved in tracking disloyalty and fostering a new orthodoxy.
It happens that both systems never suffer from a shortage
of people willing, often without being asked, to survey the
political purity in communities, institutions, groups, and all types of
social behavior. Lumpen intellectuals will be added to my vocabulary.
The atmosphere of the system. The atmosphere of the systems
produce is particularly conducive to endangering, engendering a certain type
of mentality that of a moralist, a commissar, and an
informer roled into one. In one sense, this person may
think that he performs something particularly valuable to humanity. In another,
the situation helps him to develop a sense of power
otherwise unavailable to him. And in a third, he often
cannot resist the temptation to indulge in a low desire
to harm others. With impunity for this reason, tracking opposition
and defending orthodox he turned out to be so attractive
that more and more people failed to resist. In both
communism and liberal democracy we encounter the same peculiarity. What
is incidental is treated by as a systematic problem as
a systemic problem, which really means that whatever happens is
systemic and nothing is incidental to the system. It thus
becomes natural for true liberal democrats, as it was for
true communists, to harass their colleagues because of a casual remark,
or of a lack of vigilance or an improper joke,
making the lives of unruly individuals difficult by constantly admonishing
and creating further regulations and stricter laws. By doing so,
the self proclaimed guardians of purity see themselves as carrying
on their shoulders the responsibility for the fear future of
liberal democracy worldwide. If not for their effort and dedication,
this great political enterprise, they think, would become fouled and
then perish. The thought, as in any system built on
violence and laws, In communism, this somewhat paradoxical belief in
both invincibility and vulnerability could be easily explained. It was
felt that a few true thoughts and ideas, once they
became public publicly acknowledged is true, would lay bare the
false set of the entire system and eventually tear it down.
Even the most self mystified builders of this structure knew
that the truth was their most powerful enemy, and to
speak not entirely metaphorically, it was the truth that tore
it down. In a liberal democracy, such a view seems
absurd because the system is stable and the principle of
freedom of speech is included in the constitution. But those
who hunt for political incorrectness political incorrectness and foster political correctness.
Leaver perhaps subconsciously assumed that the stability is not as
great as naively thought, nor the freedom of speech is
unproblematic as people of ill will consider it to be.
Give me a second, I need to clear my nose. Sorry,
something is uh causing allergies under communism. The fact that
somebody published a poem, a story, a book, and an
uncensored illegal circulation or a politically dubious cartoon in a
local newspaper put the entire pullet bureau on the alert,
which sometimes made the heads make the heads roll. Such
seemingly small incidents were considered a major problem that would
require massive counter actions, such as carefully organized demonstrations of
workers denouncing the perpetrators, or official condemnations by the Association
of Writers, Artists, actors, and teachers. Just one incorrect word
or one word too many was enough to make the
creator lose his job or be blacklisted. In a liberal democracy,
seemingly everything is permissible, but politically incorrect events immediately trigger
an avalanche reaction of resistance, intellectualist protests. Journalists on TV
twist their faces in moral indignation. Comedians used the whip
of satire, and the lump and intelligentsia, delighted with all
their indignation, whistle heckel, stamp their feet and demand exemplary
punishment of the perpetrators. A delusion to which the trackers
of traders to liberal democracy readily succumb is that is
their belief that they are a brave, small group struggling
dauntlessly against an overwhelmingly overwhelming enemy. And again, an analogy
to communism seems irresistible. On your communism, people were made
to believe that they were involved in a never ending
fight against the enemy. This enemy had various faces, and identities,
all frighteningly powerful international imperialism, the CIA allied reactionary domestic
and foreign forces supported by millions of dollars from Washington,
London and Paris. In a liberal democracy, the fight also
goes on, and the enemy two represents the dark forces,
always reviving despite a series of victories by the forces
of light. Patriarchy, white supremacy, racism, nationalism and other terrible
things said to have millions of supporters and a network
of speech and cultural habits established over the centuries. The
warriors of political correctness think of themselves in the category
of the struggle between David and Goliath. Nothing can be
further from the truth. They belong to the mainstream, having
all instruments of power at their disposal on their side
of the courts, both national and international, the UN and
its agencies, to European Union with all its institutions, countless
media universities and public opinion. I'll add social media corporations.
All that. The illusion they cherish of being a brave
minority heroically facing the whole world, false as it is,
gives them, nevertheless, a strange sense of comfort. They feel
absolutely safe, being equipped with the most powerful political sools
in today's world, but at the same time priding themselves
on their courage and decency, which are more formidable, which
are more formidable, the more awesome the image of the
enemy becomes Chapter three, Part seven. The stifling intrusiveness of
liberal democracy should not come to us as a surprise
once we remember its inner dialectic. Liberalism, as we recall,
created a private man and wanted to deliver the vast
majority of human race from the burden unnatural and unnecessary
as the liberals thought of politics. It succeeded in the
first and failed in the second. Liberalism indeed made people
private on an unprecedented scale. Yet these people, having discovered
the importance of their privacy, did not renounce politics. Hence,
when a liberal democratic man becomes involved in political activities,
it was natural that he imbued them with what he
regarded to be closest to him, what he lived for
and breathed, and what provided him with the reason for being.
But these were matters so far regarded as private. The
liberal democratic man politicized his privacy, perhaps his main contributions
to the change in thinking about politics. He politicized marriage,
family relations, communal life. Language in this, he resembled his
communist comrade. But his greatest success in this regard, unmatched
so far by any competitor, was to politicize that area
that seemed to be the most private of all private,
the most intimate of all things intimate, and thus the
least appropriate to political meddling, the realm of sex. Obviously,
the intentions to politicize sex had appeared before in radical
programs aimed at fundamental transformation of society, including the destruction
of his traditional institutions. Those radicals and revolutionaries who were
looking for a better foundation for a better society knew
very well that their program must fail unless they managed
to do something with the family. This institution was always considered,
quite understandably to be the most serious obstacle to the
task of building a new society. When Plato and the
Republic raised the question of a perfect political power elite,
he naturally related it to the problem of family. He
argued that a member of such a true elite should
be free from any family bonds, because these would weaken
his dedication to work for the state, and it was
this state that he should regard his sole object of
quasi familial devotion to this, Plato added a singular politics
of sex, whose distribution was, on the one hand, give
the members of the elite an opportunity to satisfy their
sexual needs, and on the other side, strengthen the state.
In modern times, the family, while not particularly respected by
philosophers of liberal and democratic persuasions, was not an object
of systematic attack. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau certainly did not
fight against it with the use of arguments referring to
sex and sexual instinct. The Communists were far more outspoken
in this regard. They willingly raised sex arguments to attack
the monogamous marriage as an institution. Friedrich Engels and his
work on the family, spoke sharply about the existing institution
of marriage, which he compared to prostitution, the wife selling
herself upon entering the marriage, and the husband buying extramarital pleasures.
In his scattered comments, Engles drew a picture of what
he considered a good family. The marriage would last only
as long as the spouses loved and were physically attracted
to each other. It all sounded disarmingly naive, even sentimental,
with no special insight into human nature or the sense
of the institution itself. The idea of free love between
adults completely unrelated to marriage, gained some notoriety in the
late eighteenth century and was practiced with little success by
some liberally minded eccentrics. It played a more prominent role
in the writings of certain communists, who assumed that the
Communist revolution would inevitably entail a dramatic change in sexual mores. Indeed,
after the October Revolution in nineteen seventeen, sexual life was
set free, with sadly predictable results. Later this policy was abandoned,
mainly because the communist leaders started to perceive it as
a whim of the intelligentsia, and militant communism found other
fields for action much more important from the point of
view of the revolution. Despite the occasional tide changes, divorce
and abortion ultimately became the leading achievements of the new
political system, and in this regard, Communism was far ahead
of the liberal West gee all the levers just following
ride along for the Great sexual revolution the West had
to win until the sixties of the twentieth century. What
happened then was in terms of scope and content, far
more radical than anything in the past. Its consequences unpredicted
during the revolution itself continue to unfold themselves before our
eyes even today, and will most likely continue in the
years to come. The Revolution of mind two things. First,
it repeated the old communist plan to overthrow the repressive
power structures, including marriage and family. This time, however, and
that was what made it different from previous revolutions. Its
slogans of sexual liberation mobilized millions of people, and it
had at its disposal previously unheard of instruments of ideological warfare,
notably mass culture and mass media. The novelty was the
clarity of the message. Sex was said to be the
most powerful element of human nature, and yet still enslaved
by oppressive structures from within and from without. This emphasis
on sex came probably from Freudianism, which had a particularly
strong impact on America but also a considerable sway in Europe.
The New Crusaders' sexual liberation simplified Freud's views and widely
distributed them as politically palatable, a politically palatable, rather carefree vision.
The message that reached a million's was a human sexual
impulses had been so far suppressed that the suppression had
been deletarious, and that once sex was liberated, life would
become immeasurably nicer. The concept received its revolutionary form from
Herbert Marcuse, who back in the nineteen fifties came up
with a theory a mixture of Freudianism and Marxism, explaining
how to combine sexual liberation with a political struggle to
overthrow the system. His argument was roughly composed of two elements.
The first or rather diabolical image of the modern capitalist world,
able to repel and neutralize all the revolutionary movements of change.
The second and interpretation of sexis the only power in
man and society, inherently subversive and yet uncontrolled by the
powers that be. Hence, the proclamation of sexual liberation was
a call to political collective action, and sex itself became
the paramount political weapon. For some time, this diagnosis remained
unnoticed and was considered by many to be quite silly.
Why would sexual promiscuity be a tool of political struggle.
The very idea seemed unworthy of intellectual attention. However, after
several years this theory gained great popularity, especially as it
is fairly easy to understand among young people, including the
rebellious students on college on university campuses. But there was
another side to the sexual revolution alongside the Marxian freudianism
that was rarely indicated. The sexual Revolution was a culmination
of growing consumerism in Western societies, which in turn stemmed
from the unprecedented prosperity and security that these societies had
managed to achieve until the nineteen sixties. The growing number
of easily available goods did not include. This was regulated
by existing social practices as well as by old moral
precepts going back to classical ethics. This growing consumerism tended
to weaken both social practices and moral precepts and replace
them with far less demanding and seemingly more natural criteria
of a utilitarian kind, pleasure being the principal yardstick to
measure the value of human goals. The impressive efficiency of
modern civilization accustomed people to expect that their actions would
be instantly gratified. Whatever delayed or hindered this gratification was
considered unnatural, repressive, incomprehensible, and in the long run, unacceptable.
When we look at this mental change from the perspective
of the history of philosophy, we can see it in
the final though, thank god, not yet closed phase of
a long process. From the beginning, pleasure was considered by
philosophers to be an important part of the human experience,
also having a complicated but power powerful relation to morality.
For twenty five centuries, the nature of this relationship had
been the subject of an engaging and often illuminating debate.
The debate unavoidably occasioned the use of other concepts not
identical to that of pleasure but somehow related to it, happiness, fulfillment, flourishing,
and a few others. At the end of the day,
pleasure finally outclassed its rivals. Perhaps the most momentous aspect
of this victory was that the concept of happiness in
classical ethics, considered one of the central categories, fell out
of use and was eventually equated quite erroneously with pleasure. Originally,
happiness was a quantity that one could attribute to an
entire life, not to its episodes or moments. Under no
circumstances could one reduce it to pleasure, a short and
transient experience. Pursuing happiness meant planning one's entire life so
that it had its own moral consistency and internal harmony.
Both achieved through the inculcation of virtues. Bringing pleasures to
the center of life engendered a different image of human nature.
Human beings, in this view no longer think of themselves
in terms of the whole of their existence, but in
terms of moments and episodes. It could not be otherwise,
because there is no such thing as the pleasure of life.
One can talk about pleasures and pleasant moments that happen
in life, and one can even encourage people to collect
their pleasures and pleasant moments, the more the better, But
the latter strategy, even if successful, does not predetermine whether
this or that particular life and its entirety is or
is not happy. It may have many pleasant moments, but
these do not automatically translate themselves into a unifying moral scenario,
nor make a life fulfilled. To have a fulfilling life
is it is necessary to give it a durable, inherent
meaning that may very well exists with having many pleasant moments,
but is in no way a result of these moments,
no matter how many. One can, of course construe one's
life as a series of episodes, but this must, to
a greater or lesser degree, undermine the sense of continuity
of existence. In more extreme cases, leading to different identifications,
each associated with a different episode. But even if our
lives are episodic, ourselves are not. Hence, the life dedicated
to the accumulation of pleasures, but lacking an internal unity
will most likely not be a happy life, because a
human being cannot renounce his unity without negative consequences. The
sexual revolution is arguably the most extreme manifestation of the
episodic nature of man. To surrender one's life to sexual
pleasure meant once and for all, abandoning any attempt. It
gives one existence a unifying meaning. This pleasure is like
no other related to what is short lived and ephemeral.
Many wise men in the history of European and thought
consistently warned against the effects of the uncontrolled rain of
pleasures over human life. In classical ethics, pleasures were feared
because they not only do not have a self mitigating mechanism,
but are likely, when unchecked, to do away with external
to do away with external mitigating measures, these warnings were
not treated with the seriousness they deserved by modern utilitarians.
With the growth of consumerism, this fur evaporated as a
new rhetoric of sexual liberation declared the existing limitations on
sex consumption unacceptable. The time finally came to push the
cull to pleasure to a new low. Free sex was
not only pleasure, It also stood for spontaneity against soulis,
technology and productivity. It stood for peace and universal harmony,
with no constraints, no domination, no discrimination. These musings illustrated
as it is easy to see an old dream somewhat
modified to new realities of the advent of the era
free of politics, where individual people would enjoy individual pleasures
unmolested by the state and its institutions. The difference was
that instead of trading, gardening, fishing, reading books, and leaving
family life, these old dreams lost their charms. Being a
private man met now primarily indulging in sexual pleasures occasionally
enhanced with narcotic trips. But as before, what was intended
as a plan to cleanse the world, the politics ushered
in politicization on a scale unprecedented in liberal democratic societies.
Millions of people were mobilized to act for the better world,
and one wave of sexual liberation followed another. Women, homosexuals, lesbians, polygamists,
advocates of sexual communes all wanted to have their claims
recognized and to contribute to the making of a new society.
Sex became the new weapons to destroy the old order
and the instruments to forge a new one. Having been
elevated to such a high position, it began to penetrate
all spheres of public life, and upon intended education, art, culture, commerce, language.
The sexual utopia did not come about, but sex was
politicized and became a part of the official agenda of
the state and its institutions. The rebels, without a moment's hesitation,
joined the ranks to the political structures and became their functionaries.
The consequences of all this, however, were not necessarily quite
those that were planned. Once institutionalized from ass orb by
the system, sexual freedom permeated law, customs, social practices, schools,
educational programs, and public discourse. Since then, the issue of
human sexuality, abortion, homosexuality, and so called reproductive rights have
been expoused by the mainstream and begun to be the
basic identification marks in liberal democratic politics. Today. They are
supported by the United Nations, the WHO, international tribunals, governments,
the political majority, European institutions, universities, and innumerable think tanks.
And NGOs, long haired hippies chanting make love not War
have been replaced by today's politicians, teachers, bureaucrats, and lawyers.
The cultal pleasure that once ignited the revolutionary flame does
not cause great excitement. Today people have more fun, and
fun is still what people are said to be after.
But these pursuits did not bring about happiness to human life.
Contemporary literature describing the condition of sexual liberated man depicts
a rather gloomy picture of despair and senselessness. Yet the
existential vacuum in which the modern man found himself after
the revolution did not diminish. The continued onslaught of sexual
politics on society. The institutionalization of sex the road that
was once open to man by hedonism and made avoid
all the promises of what can be found on this road.
New promises would sound hollow, as one cannot go further
than sex. One cannot indicate other human experience, which would
be more basic and more democratic, luring people with more
attempting illusions of liberation, giving more intense pleasure, and being
more correlated with episodic existence. The only thing that could
happen to people in societies going along this road is
a continuation of the same sexual policy, which perpetuated by
a bureaucratic routine, will become even more ruthless. And how
so well transgenderism? Have you heard of maps minor attracted persons?
You think it was going to stop at just sexual
liberation and homosexuality And did you think that was it
or that they were going to go even further? Yep,
that's chapter three. Chapter four is titled ideology. But yeah,
that's it. I hope you enjoyed it, and I'll see
you for part seven. I believe it's going to be yep,
Part seven. Thank you. Take care of everyone.