1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:01,919 Speaker 1: I want you to just for a second look around 2 00:00:01,919 --> 00:00:04,200 the room. You're in your living room. Maybe do you 3 00:00:04,200 --> 00:00:05,240 have a smart TV on. 4 00:00:05,200 --> 00:00:07,480 Speaker 2: The wall, or maybe one of those digital assistants on 5 00:00:07,519 --> 00:00:07,879 the counter. 6 00:00:08,000 --> 00:00:10,839 Speaker 1: Okay, good, Now, I want you to really consider this fact, 7 00:00:10,919 --> 00:00:14,519 which has been confirmed by a CIA insider, that tele 8 00:00:14,519 --> 00:00:16,719 division even when the little red light is off and 9 00:00:16,760 --> 00:00:20,280 you think it's sleeping, it can be taken over. 10 00:00:20,239 --> 00:00:23,079 Speaker 2: Remotely by an intelligence agency. 11 00:00:22,719 --> 00:00:25,600 Speaker 1: And they can flip the speaker the thing that's designed 12 00:00:25,600 --> 00:00:29,199 to push sound out, and turn it into a microphone. 13 00:00:28,640 --> 00:00:31,359 Speaker 2: A very sensitive microphone listening to everything you're saying. 14 00:00:31,600 --> 00:00:34,200 Speaker 1: This isn't some movie plot. This is the reality of 15 00:00:34,280 --> 00:00:37,719 modern espionage. The surveillance device is the one you bought, 16 00:00:37,880 --> 00:00:40,439 you installed, and you plugged into the wall yourself. 17 00:00:40,640 --> 00:00:44,560 Speaker 2: It's a whole new world, far beyond invisible ink or 18 00:00:44,600 --> 00:00:45,520 exploding pins. 19 00:00:45,840 --> 00:00:48,880 Speaker 1: Welcome to Thrilling Threads, where we unpack the world's most 20 00:00:48,880 --> 00:00:53,320 complex and consequential stories. Today we are pulling back the 21 00:00:53,399 --> 00:00:58,039 curtain on the Central Intelligence Agency, the ultimate black box 22 00:00:58,200 --> 00:01:00,079 of US intelligence. 23 00:01:00,079 --> 00:01:03,039 Speaker 2: And we're doing it through the eyes of a true insider. 24 00:01:03,600 --> 00:01:07,719 We've been completely immersed in this incredibly candid discussion with 25 00:01:07,840 --> 00:01:12,239 a former CIA counter terrorism officer named John Kyriaku. 26 00:01:11,879 --> 00:01:13,680 Speaker 1: Right, and this all comes from a video shared by 27 00:01:13,719 --> 00:01:17,200 the led Bible Stories channel on YouTube. Kiriaku was not 28 00:01:17,319 --> 00:01:19,920 just any officer. He was also a senior investigator for 29 00:01:19,959 --> 00:01:22,000 the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 30 00:01:22,439 --> 00:01:26,599 Speaker 2: He gives this just unprecedented look into what the agency 31 00:01:26,680 --> 00:01:29,680 is really for, how they recruit, the tech they use, 32 00:01:30,239 --> 00:01:32,799 and the ethical lines they just completely obliterate. 33 00:01:33,040 --> 00:01:35,920 Speaker 1: So our mission today is to really unpack this testimony. 34 00:01:36,040 --> 00:01:39,599 We're going to pull out the operational truths and maybe 35 00:01:39,640 --> 00:01:43,079 more importantly, the ethical tightropes from a man who didn't. 36 00:01:42,799 --> 00:01:44,640 Speaker 2: Just work there, No, not at all. He paid a 37 00:01:44,719 --> 00:01:46,519 huge personal price for his principles. 38 00:01:46,599 --> 00:01:49,239 Speaker 1: And that's maybe the most important part of this. Kiriaku 39 00:01:49,319 --> 00:01:53,239 isn't just a former officer telling stories. He's a convicted whistleblower. 40 00:01:53,400 --> 00:01:56,000 Speaker 2: He served twenty three months in federal prison for what. 41 00:01:56,480 --> 00:01:59,000 Speaker 1: For exposing the CIA's torture program. 42 00:01:59,239 --> 00:02:02,959 Speaker 2: Yeah, so his testimony, you know, carries this incredible weight. 43 00:02:03,439 --> 00:02:07,239 It's from someone who chose his conscience over loyalty to 44 00:02:07,280 --> 00:02:11,520 the agency, which makes his perspective incredibly sharp and frankly 45 00:02:11,719 --> 00:02:12,360 very credible. 46 00:02:12,400 --> 00:02:14,800 Speaker 1: Okay, so let's get into it. Let's unpack this reality, 47 00:02:15,000 --> 00:02:17,520 starting with the very reason the CIA exists in the 48 00:02:17,520 --> 00:02:21,680 first place, it's legal mission, and how that mission just 49 00:02:21,840 --> 00:02:23,759 collides with what the president wants. 50 00:02:23,879 --> 00:02:28,360 Speaker 2: Officially, you know, on paper, the CIA's role sounds almost 51 00:02:28,919 --> 00:02:30,439 well bureaucratic. 52 00:02:29,919 --> 00:02:32,319 Speaker 1: Like a government research agency or something exactly. 53 00:02:32,680 --> 00:02:37,520 Speaker 2: Their legal tasking is basically three things. Recruit spies that's 54 00:02:37,560 --> 00:02:40,280 what they call human intelligence or human anti steel secrets, 55 00:02:40,680 --> 00:02:43,360 and then analyze those secrets. The whole point is to 56 00:02:43,360 --> 00:02:45,840 give the president and other policy makers the absolute best 57 00:02:45,879 --> 00:02:48,479 information so they can make smart, informed decisions. 58 00:02:48,800 --> 00:02:52,479 Speaker 1: So an information broker, a very very high level research 59 00:02:52,520 --> 00:02:54,840 firm for the White House. But Kyriaku says right away, 60 00:02:54,879 --> 00:02:56,199 that's just the textbook definition. 61 00:02:56,319 --> 00:02:59,240 Speaker 2: That's the paper mission, right, and then there's the real world, 62 00:02:59,360 --> 00:03:00,319 the operation. 63 00:03:00,199 --> 00:03:02,879 Speaker 1: Warw So what does the job actually become. 64 00:03:03,240 --> 00:03:06,439 Speaker 2: The defining reality, he says, is that the CIA is 65 00:03:06,479 --> 00:03:10,159 a direct tool of the president. So it's mission in 66 00:03:10,240 --> 00:03:14,280 practice becomes, and I'm quoting him here, whatever the President 67 00:03:14,319 --> 00:03:14,960 tells it to do. 68 00:03:15,199 --> 00:03:16,719 Speaker 1: Whatever the President tells it to do. 69 00:03:16,919 --> 00:03:19,800 Speaker 2: Yeah, and that is the exact point where the agency 70 00:03:19,919 --> 00:03:23,479 stops being just an intelligence analyst and becomes, you know, 71 00:03:23,560 --> 00:03:25,840 an instrument for covert action all over the world. 72 00:03:26,280 --> 00:03:29,479 Speaker 1: So you go from being an analyst to an operative. 73 00:03:29,680 --> 00:03:33,199 The people gathering the facts are suddenly the ones executing 74 00:03:33,240 --> 00:03:36,159 these these massive global acts of interference. 75 00:03:36,280 --> 00:03:39,479 Speaker 2: That's it. It goes way beyond just gathering facts. The 76 00:03:39,520 --> 00:03:43,719 scope of what a presidential directive can authorize. 77 00:03:42,919 --> 00:03:45,680 Speaker 1: It's staggering, like what specifically. 78 00:03:45,280 --> 00:03:48,120 Speaker 2: Well, once the president signs what's called a covert action finding, 79 00:03:48,439 --> 00:03:50,719 the CIA can be told to do anything from overthrowing 80 00:03:50,759 --> 00:03:51,919 foreign governments. 81 00:03:51,479 --> 00:03:54,919 Speaker 1: Which we know has happened. History is full of examples. 82 00:03:54,360 --> 00:03:57,120 Speaker 2: Countless times, yeah, Latin America, in the Middle East, or 83 00:03:57,240 --> 00:04:00,439 they can be told to implement these huge, systemic covert 84 00:04:00,439 --> 00:04:04,680 programs designed to destabilize a country or install a friendlier government. 85 00:04:04,960 --> 00:04:08,159 Speaker 1: And it's not always the big dramatic stuff, right, The 86 00:04:08,199 --> 00:04:12,719 subtle interference can be just as powerful, influencing public opinion 87 00:04:12,840 --> 00:04:14,639 without leaving any fingerprints. 88 00:04:14,639 --> 00:04:18,240 Speaker 2: Absolutely, they can influence foreign media, they can plant stories 89 00:04:18,360 --> 00:04:21,560 or disinformation to shape a political conversation in a way 90 00:04:21,560 --> 00:04:23,879 that helps us interests. And then, of course there's the. 91 00:04:23,800 --> 00:04:25,879 Speaker 1: Most controversial part, the lethal component. 92 00:04:26,079 --> 00:04:32,120 Speaker 2: Lethal component state sanctioned assassinations, targeted killings. The agency completely 93 00:04:32,160 --> 00:04:35,480 shifts from being a collector of information to being a 94 00:04:35,600 --> 00:04:38,439 direct implementer of deadly force. 95 00:04:38,680 --> 00:04:41,600 Speaker 1: The gap between those two things is just mind blowing. 96 00:04:41,879 --> 00:04:43,959 It's the difference between being the smartest person in the 97 00:04:44,040 --> 00:04:46,240 room and being the person in the room who's allowed 98 00:04:46,279 --> 00:04:47,319 to kill someone. 99 00:04:47,199 --> 00:04:49,120 Speaker 2: Or over three a government, it all depends on the 100 00:04:49,120 --> 00:04:51,759 policy goals of whoever's in the White House at that moment. 101 00:04:52,040 --> 00:04:57,560 The CIA becomes this incredibly adaptable shadow extension of American power, and. 102 00:04:57,519 --> 00:05:00,480 Speaker 1: That flexibility, I guess, is where all the ethical problems start. 103 00:05:00,720 --> 00:05:03,000 Speaker 2: That's the core of it. I mean, the US military 104 00:05:03,040 --> 00:05:07,240 operates under much clearer rules of engagement, there's public accountability. 105 00:05:07,600 --> 00:05:11,959 The CIA operates in that gray, shadowy space of presidential. 106 00:05:11,399 --> 00:05:15,040 Speaker 1: Findings, and that kind of space requires a very specific 107 00:05:15,240 --> 00:05:16,319 kind of person. 108 00:05:16,160 --> 00:05:19,600 Speaker 2: A very specific and often morally compromised person. 109 00:05:19,519 --> 00:05:23,160 Speaker 1: Which brings us to the next logical question, who on 110 00:05:23,279 --> 00:05:26,480 earth are they recruiting for this job? If the mission 111 00:05:26,639 --> 00:05:29,639 is to break international law, maybe even take a life, 112 00:05:30,240 --> 00:05:31,480 you're not looking for a boy. 113 00:05:31,279 --> 00:05:34,680 Speaker 2: Scout, definitely not. The agency is looking for a very 114 00:05:34,680 --> 00:05:39,000 distinct psychological profile, and Kiryaku makes us really clear they're 115 00:05:39,120 --> 00:05:43,279 explicitly not looking for that. You know, stereotype from the movies, 116 00:05:43,319 --> 00:05:46,079 the square jawed, big buff guy who's at the gym 117 00:05:46,120 --> 00:05:46,560 every day. 118 00:05:46,600 --> 00:05:47,560 Speaker 1: So what are they looking for? 119 00:05:47,720 --> 00:05:49,519 Speaker 2: He says, they look for people with and this is 120 00:05:49,560 --> 00:05:51,920 his term, sociopathic. 121 00:05:51,240 --> 00:05:56,000 Speaker 1: Tendencies, tendencies, not full blown sociopaths. That distinction seems really important. 122 00:05:56,079 --> 00:05:58,639 It's critical because you'd think, if the job requires you 123 00:05:58,680 --> 00:06:01,879 to be ruthless, don't hire someone with no conscience at all. 124 00:06:01,920 --> 00:06:03,959 Wouldn't that be the most efficient spy? 125 00:06:04,000 --> 00:06:08,120 Speaker 2: It seems logical, But the reason is control. A full 126 00:06:08,199 --> 00:06:12,720 sociopath has no conscience, which means they are fundamentally uncontrollable. 127 00:06:13,079 --> 00:06:17,160 They operate completely outside of any moral framework and more importantly, 128 00:06:17,399 --> 00:06:18,720 outside of a chain of command. 129 00:06:18,759 --> 00:06:20,120 Speaker 1: They won't take orders, they. 130 00:06:20,040 --> 00:06:24,399 Speaker 2: Won't take orders reliably. And Kyriaku also pointed out something fascinating. 131 00:06:24,560 --> 00:06:27,399 A full sopiopath can, as he says, blow right through 132 00:06:27,399 --> 00:06:28,519 a polygraph because. 133 00:06:28,279 --> 00:06:30,240 Speaker 1: They don't feel any stress when they lie. 134 00:06:30,160 --> 00:06:35,079 Speaker 2: Exactly, there's no remorse, no physiological response, So they're useless 135 00:06:35,079 --> 00:06:40,160 from a security standpoint. But someone with sociopathic tendencies, they 136 00:06:40,199 --> 00:06:43,720 still have a conscience. It might be faint or bury deep, 137 00:06:44,040 --> 00:06:45,000 but it's there. 138 00:06:44,800 --> 00:06:46,839 Speaker 1: So they still react to a polygraph test. 139 00:06:46,920 --> 00:06:50,079 Speaker 2: Precisely, they still feel regret or remorse or at least 140 00:06:50,079 --> 00:06:53,079 that little spike of stress when they're being deceptive, and 141 00:06:53,120 --> 00:06:55,920 that tiny flicker of a conscience means they can be managed, 142 00:06:56,000 --> 00:06:59,959 they could be disciplined, and most importantly, they will follow order. 143 00:07:00,240 --> 00:07:02,959 Speaker 1: So they're looking for someone who is ruthless enough to 144 00:07:02,959 --> 00:07:05,560 do the job, but just human enough to be controlled. 145 00:07:05,759 --> 00:07:09,199 Speaker 2: Calculated ruthlessness paired with compliance. That's the magic formula. 146 00:07:09,519 --> 00:07:12,120 Speaker 1: Wow, Okay, So how do they even test for something 147 00:07:12,199 --> 00:07:13,279 like that? During recruitment? 148 00:07:13,480 --> 00:07:16,800 Speaker 2: They use these very specific scenarios. Yeah, they're designed to 149 00:07:17,000 --> 00:07:21,439 force a recruit to just prioritize the mission outcome over 150 00:07:21,519 --> 00:07:25,319 everything else. Legality, diplomacy, you name it. The classic example 151 00:07:25,360 --> 00:07:27,399 he gives is the Indonesian economy scenario. 152 00:07:27,560 --> 00:07:28,959 Speaker 1: Right, set this up for us. 153 00:07:29,000 --> 00:07:32,480 Speaker 2: Okay, so you're a new recruit. You're giving a hypothetical task. 154 00:07:33,680 --> 00:07:36,959 You need to get specific intelligence on the Indonesian economy. 155 00:07:37,279 --> 00:07:41,639 You've spent months targeting the Indonesian Economic Secretary. You've done 156 00:07:41,680 --> 00:07:44,720 the whole cycle, spot assess, develop. 157 00:07:44,560 --> 00:07:45,600 Speaker 1: Use the unlimited budget. 158 00:07:45,680 --> 00:07:48,639 Speaker 2: The unlimited budget. You've gone on vacations together your wives 159 00:07:48,680 --> 00:07:51,360 or friends. You've been to a thousand expensive dinners. But 160 00:07:51,680 --> 00:07:55,040 after all that time and money and this deep personal relationship, 161 00:07:56,120 --> 00:07:59,759 the target is still not repruitable. He just won't give 162 00:07:59,839 --> 00:08:00,600 up secrets. 163 00:08:00,680 --> 00:08:03,759 Speaker 1: So the instructor turns to the recruit and asks, what 164 00:08:03,800 --> 00:08:05,199 do you do now exactly? 165 00:08:05,240 --> 00:08:08,040 Speaker 2: And the answers tell you everything. The traditional buy the 166 00:08:08,040 --> 00:08:11,000 book intelligence answer was you double down, you work the 167 00:08:11,040 --> 00:08:13,120 case for another six months. You played a long game. 168 00:08:13,199 --> 00:08:14,120 Speaker 1: Okay, that makes sense. 169 00:08:14,160 --> 00:08:17,360 Speaker 2: Another answer, a bit more creative, but still within the lines, 170 00:08:17,519 --> 00:08:20,839 was you work it through the wives, use that friendship 171 00:08:20,879 --> 00:08:24,839 to get the information. Both of those answers respect the rules. 172 00:08:25,199 --> 00:08:28,240 Speaker 1: But Kuriaka's answer was different. 173 00:08:28,399 --> 00:08:31,519 Speaker 2: His answer just threw the whole diplomatic playbook out the window. 174 00:08:31,560 --> 00:08:35,159 His immediate, unfiltered response was you break into the Indonesian 175 00:08:35,159 --> 00:08:36,440 embassy and you steal it. 176 00:08:36,720 --> 00:08:39,000 Speaker 1: Wow, just straight to the felony. 177 00:08:39,120 --> 00:08:42,480 Speaker 2: A direct, illegal, non diplomatic solution that gets the mission 178 00:08:42,519 --> 00:08:46,480 done instantly, and the instructor's reaction he confirmed that this 179 00:08:46,600 --> 00:08:50,080 was the desired sociopathic tendency. It showed that Kuriaku would 180 00:08:50,080 --> 00:08:54,559 put the mission's success above everything else, international law, personal risk, 181 00:08:54,759 --> 00:08:55,200 all of it. 182 00:08:55,320 --> 00:08:58,519 Speaker 1: The mindset is crystal clear. If the normal path is blocked. 183 00:08:58,639 --> 00:09:01,399 You don't find a detour, just crash right through the wall. 184 00:09:01,639 --> 00:09:04,000 Speaker 2: That says so much about who they need to execute 185 00:09:04,000 --> 00:09:05,919 those presidential directives we were talking about. 186 00:09:06,039 --> 00:09:08,120 Speaker 1: So once they find someone with that mindset, they have 187 00:09:08,200 --> 00:09:11,960 to teach them the process, the trade craft of actually 188 00:09:12,000 --> 00:09:13,399 acquiring human assets. 189 00:09:13,480 --> 00:09:16,840 Speaker 2: I'll say, yeah, Kiriaku lays out this really rigorous four 190 00:09:16,840 --> 00:09:23,519 step cycle. It's the absolute foundation of UMANT. It's spot, assess, develop, 191 00:09:23,600 --> 00:09:24,159 and recruit. 192 00:09:24,639 --> 00:09:27,399 Speaker 1: Okay, let's start with spotting. This sounds like, I don't know, 193 00:09:27,480 --> 00:09:29,960 professional networking, but for spying, that's. 194 00:09:29,799 --> 00:09:31,360 Speaker 2: A great way to put it. It starts with the 195 00:09:31,360 --> 00:09:34,799 CIA officer just circulating in places where you'd find high 196 00:09:34,879 --> 00:09:40,200 value targets, so diplomatic cocktail parties, embassy events, certain conferences. 197 00:09:40,600 --> 00:09:43,200 The goal is just to identify someone whose job gives 198 00:09:43,200 --> 00:09:44,840 them access to valuable secrets. 199 00:09:44,919 --> 00:09:46,200 Speaker 1: So you just walk up and say hi. 200 00:09:46,559 --> 00:09:50,159 Speaker 2: Pretty much. The officer introduces themselves as you know, the 201 00:09:50,200 --> 00:09:52,519 new guy at the American embassy, maybe covering political or 202 00:09:52,600 --> 00:09:56,480 economic issues. You've changed business cards. It's that simple first handshake. 203 00:09:56,799 --> 00:09:59,759 Speaker 1: Step two is assess. This is the filtering process. 204 00:10:00,200 --> 00:10:01,919 Speaker 2: This is where you figure out if the person you 205 00:10:02,000 --> 00:10:05,279 just met is actually useful. If headquarters needs intel on 206 00:10:05,360 --> 00:10:09,159 say Uran's nuclear program, and this person is an engineer 207 00:10:09,200 --> 00:10:12,240 working at a sensitive site, well that's a high value target. 208 00:10:12,360 --> 00:10:14,600 Speaker 1: But if there are a landscape architects. 209 00:10:14,039 --> 00:10:16,720 Speaker 2: Probably not so useful. So the assessment phase is quick, 210 00:10:16,759 --> 00:10:19,559 it's critical, and it saves a ton of time and resources. 211 00:10:19,759 --> 00:10:22,639 Speaker 1: And then comes the developed stage. Kyriaku called this the 212 00:10:22,679 --> 00:10:25,440 fun part, but honestly, it sounds like the most psychologically 213 00:10:25,480 --> 00:10:27,000 manipulative part of the whole thing. 214 00:10:27,159 --> 00:10:31,320 Speaker 2: It absolutely is. This is where the CIA officer systematically 215 00:10:31,360 --> 00:10:37,200 builds an entirely false, but deeply emotional personal relationship, and 216 00:10:37,240 --> 00:10:41,559 it's all funded by what he called a literally unlimited budget. 217 00:10:41,639 --> 00:10:44,759 Speaker 1: Okay, we have to unpack that. How is an unlimited 218 00:10:44,759 --> 00:10:47,200 budget weaponized? In this context? 219 00:10:47,240 --> 00:10:50,720 Speaker 2: It's used to eliminate every single inconvenience or desire the 220 00:10:50,759 --> 00:10:53,879 target might have. For example, if the target mentions they 221 00:10:53,919 --> 00:10:57,240 love fishing but could never afford a real deep sea trip. 222 00:10:57,360 --> 00:10:59,639 Speaker 1: The officer doesn't just offer to go fishing. 223 00:10:59,440 --> 00:11:02,279 Speaker 2: No, the officer charters a four thousand dollars vote for 224 00:11:02,320 --> 00:11:05,320 the weekend. They'll cover luxury vacations, They'll help the target 225 00:11:05,360 --> 00:11:07,639 out if they have financial problems, and they make sure 226 00:11:07,679 --> 00:11:10,799 the officers' wives become best friends with the target's wife. 227 00:11:11,440 --> 00:11:13,440 It creates this multi layered dependency. 228 00:11:13,840 --> 00:11:17,600 Speaker 1: It's transactional friendship on a massive scale. The target gets 229 00:11:17,639 --> 00:11:20,559 this amazing lifestyle they could never afford on their own, 230 00:11:20,879 --> 00:11:23,440 all thanks to their new best friend who just happens 231 00:11:23,440 --> 00:11:25,440 to be a CIA officer exactly. 232 00:11:25,720 --> 00:11:29,000 Speaker 2: The officer is creating a relationship that is so strong, 233 00:11:29,360 --> 00:11:33,000 so reinforcing, that when the time comes to actually ask 234 00:11:33,080 --> 00:11:37,399 for something, the target is already heavily compromised. They've accepted 235 00:11:37,519 --> 00:11:42,240 huge favors, they shared personal secrets. They have this seemingly 236 00:11:42,360 --> 00:11:43,840 unbreakable bond. 237 00:11:43,559 --> 00:11:45,679 Speaker 1: Which dramatically lowers the chance they'll say no. 238 00:11:46,159 --> 00:11:49,840 Speaker 2: It makes saying no almost impossible, which leads directly to 239 00:11:49,879 --> 00:11:51,759 the final stage recruit. 240 00:11:52,120 --> 00:11:54,159 Speaker 1: So how do you make that transition from best friend 241 00:11:54,200 --> 00:11:56,399 to asset handler? 242 00:11:56,480 --> 00:11:59,600 Speaker 2: It starts small, with a little, non threatening request. The 243 00:11:59,600 --> 00:12:02,039 officer I say something like, hey, the Russians just rolled 244 00:12:02,039 --> 00:12:04,039 out this new tank. I know you have the blueprints 245 00:12:04,080 --> 00:12:06,159 at work. Could you could you just make me a 246 00:12:06,200 --> 00:12:07,120 copy of those plans? 247 00:12:07,159 --> 00:12:09,399 Speaker 1: Downplaying it, making it seem like no big deal. 248 00:12:09,360 --> 00:12:11,720 Speaker 2: Right, Maybe offer a little cash for the trouble. The 249 00:12:11,759 --> 00:12:13,600 goal is just to get the target to cross that 250 00:12:13,679 --> 00:12:15,200 ethical line one time. 251 00:12:15,200 --> 00:12:19,639 Speaker 1: And once they've copied those plans, they're hooked, they're compromised. 252 00:12:20,000 --> 00:12:21,440 That's when the big reveal happens. 253 00:12:21,480 --> 00:12:24,679 Speaker 2: That's when the officer comes clean. Listen, I haven't been 254 00:12:24,679 --> 00:12:27,679 totally honest with you. I'm actually a CIA officer working 255 00:12:27,759 --> 00:12:32,200 under cover. Are you okay with that? But at this point, 256 00:12:32,279 --> 00:12:34,720 what can the target say? They've already committed a crime 257 00:12:34,759 --> 00:12:38,799 for their friend, they're emotionally invested, and now they're legally trapped. 258 00:12:38,840 --> 00:12:40,399 Speaker 1: And then comes the formal offer. 259 00:12:40,519 --> 00:12:44,519 Speaker 2: Then the officer formalizes it offers a big continuous salary 260 00:12:44,960 --> 00:12:49,320 kiriaku throughout a number like five thousand dollars a month. Yeah, 261 00:12:49,399 --> 00:12:52,600 just for continued access to information. It's a masterful and 262 00:12:52,639 --> 00:12:56,639 frankly a deeply cynical execution of psychological warfare. 263 00:12:56,759 --> 00:12:59,519 Speaker 1: Okay, so let's move from manipulating people to the technology 264 00:12:59,519 --> 00:13:03,600 they use spy tech, and the reality here is way 265 00:13:03,679 --> 00:13:05,399 less glamorous than what you see in the movies. 266 00:13:05,559 --> 00:13:08,360 Speaker 2: Yeah, Curiak who drops what he calls the dirty little 267 00:13:08,360 --> 00:13:10,759 secret of spy tech, which is at ninety five percent 268 00:13:10,759 --> 00:13:12,639 of the technology they use in the field is bought 269 00:13:12,639 --> 00:13:15,000 off the shelf, mostly from Amazon dot Com. 270 00:13:15,000 --> 00:13:17,159 Speaker 1: From Amazon, seriously. 271 00:13:16,960 --> 00:13:21,519 Speaker 2: Seriously, it just completely dismantles that whole image of a 272 00:13:21,639 --> 00:13:25,279 government funded Q branch lab inventing everything from scratch. 273 00:13:25,480 --> 00:13:28,159 Speaker 1: But why, I mean, why not custom build everything for 274 00:13:28,320 --> 00:13:30,080 maximum secrecy and capability. 275 00:13:30,200 --> 00:13:33,039 Speaker 2: It's all about speed and cost. It is so much 276 00:13:33,120 --> 00:13:37,559 cheaper and faster to buy existing highly advanced consumer tech 277 00:13:37,759 --> 00:13:41,360 which already has computers, GPS and tiny cameras built in, 278 00:13:41,840 --> 00:13:43,639 and then just adapt it for their own purposes. 279 00:13:43,720 --> 00:13:45,960 Speaker 1: Right, Developing new tech from the ground up would take 280 00:13:46,200 --> 00:13:48,279 years and billions of dollars exactly. 281 00:13:48,320 --> 00:13:51,360 Speaker 2: The real genius isn't in the invention. It's in the 282 00:13:51,480 --> 00:13:54,519 clever modification and deployment of what they call cootess or 283 00:13:54,559 --> 00:13:56,840 commercial off the shelf equipment. 284 00:13:56,480 --> 00:13:59,000 Speaker 1: And that adaptation is where the real trade craft comes in. 285 00:13:59,519 --> 00:14:02,559 History about the listening briefcase in Pakistan is a perfect 286 00:14:02,639 --> 00:14:03,320 example of this. 287 00:14:03,399 --> 00:14:05,399 Speaker 2: Oh, it's one of the best stories he told. The 288 00:14:05,440 --> 00:14:08,879 starting point was just a cheap leather briefcase. They bought 289 00:14:08,879 --> 00:14:11,279 it in a local market in Pakistan for the equivalent 290 00:14:11,279 --> 00:14:12,679 of about ten US. 291 00:14:12,440 --> 00:14:17,480 Speaker 1: Dollars, so it looks completely unremarkable. Local something you'd see anywhere. 292 00:14:17,159 --> 00:14:21,159 Speaker 2: Exactly something nobody would look at. Twice. Then a technical officer, 293 00:14:21,440 --> 00:14:25,600 one of these highly skilled gadget guys, meticulously unstitched the 294 00:14:25,639 --> 00:14:26,720 seams of the briefcase. 295 00:14:26,759 --> 00:14:28,039 Speaker 1: And what did they put inside. 296 00:14:28,320 --> 00:14:31,399 Speaker 2: They installed a very fine wire all the way around 297 00:14:31,440 --> 00:14:34,559 the perimeter of the briefcase. That wire, hooked up to 298 00:14:34,600 --> 00:14:37,279 some specialized electronics in what he called little teeny tiny 299 00:14:37,279 --> 00:14:41,200 batteries packed into the lining, turned the whole bag into 300 00:14:41,240 --> 00:14:42,840 a giant listening device. 301 00:14:43,120 --> 00:14:45,600 Speaker 1: And then he sewed it all back up perfectly. 302 00:14:45,240 --> 00:14:48,279 Speaker 2: Perfectly, so it just looked like an empty, cheap briefcase again. 303 00:14:48,480 --> 00:14:50,320 Speaker 1: And in the field, how did it work. 304 00:14:50,480 --> 00:14:53,039 Speaker 2: The agent just hands the briefcase to the target. The 305 00:14:53,080 --> 00:14:55,200 target opens it up, sees that it's empty, and puts 306 00:14:55,240 --> 00:14:57,559 it on the table between them, and the whole time, 307 00:14:57,799 --> 00:15:01,960 that ten dollars bag is broadcast their entire conversation to 308 00:15:02,279 --> 00:15:04,919 a CIA team sitting in a car half a mile away. 309 00:15:05,120 --> 00:15:08,039 Speaker 1: It just proves that success depends on cleverness and deception, 310 00:15:08,240 --> 00:15:09,559 not just raw power and money. 311 00:15:09,679 --> 00:15:12,360 Speaker 2: Right, But then the conversation pivots and it moves into 312 00:15:12,399 --> 00:15:17,200 the really frightening stuff, the realm of digital surveillance. Specifically 313 00:15:17,320 --> 00:15:18,919 the Vault seven disclosures. 314 00:15:19,039 --> 00:15:21,600 Speaker 1: This was that massive leak back in twenty seventeen. 315 00:15:21,759 --> 00:15:24,879 Speaker 2: Right, Yeah, gigabytes of top secret documents were leaked by 316 00:15:24,960 --> 00:15:29,679 a CIA technology engineer and they revealed capabilities that before 317 00:15:29,759 --> 00:15:33,960 then were just paranoid speculation. Yeah, Kyriaku confirmed. Yeah, they're 318 00:15:34,000 --> 00:15:36,639 real and they are terrifying. 319 00:15:36,879 --> 00:15:39,519 Speaker 1: So what were the key capabilities from Balt seven that 320 00:15:39,720 --> 00:15:42,480 just changed everything we thought we knew about privacy? 321 00:15:42,679 --> 00:15:46,039 Speaker 2: Okay, First, just the sheer scale of it. The CIA 322 00:15:46,159 --> 00:15:50,879 can intercept and I quote anything from anyone, so global 323 00:15:51,080 --> 00:15:54,519 widespread digital surveillance is a fact. Second, and this is 324 00:15:54,600 --> 00:15:57,799 maybe the most chilling part, is the ability to remotely 325 00:15:57,799 --> 00:16:00,480 take control of a modern car through it's built in 326 00:16:00,519 --> 00:16:01,440 computer systems. 327 00:16:01,679 --> 00:16:04,480 Speaker 1: You mean they can cause a fatal accident whenever they want. 328 00:16:04,559 --> 00:16:06,559 Speaker 2: That's exactly what it means. They can steer the car 329 00:16:06,600 --> 00:16:09,240 remotely off a bridge into a tree and make the 330 00:16:09,240 --> 00:16:12,279 assassination look like a tragic accident or even a suicide. 331 00:16:12,360 --> 00:16:15,200 It turns your car into a potential weapon under state control. 332 00:16:15,440 --> 00:16:18,039 Speaker 1: And third, the one we started with the smart. 333 00:16:17,720 --> 00:16:20,639 Speaker 2: TV hack, curning a consumer product that's in millions of 334 00:16:20,639 --> 00:16:23,559 homes into a persistent high quality listening post. 335 00:16:23,720 --> 00:16:26,360 Speaker 1: And the really scary part, as Kiryaku pointed out, is 336 00:16:26,399 --> 00:16:28,240 that this is just what we know about, right. 337 00:16:28,320 --> 00:16:30,320 Speaker 2: He says, God knows what else that they can do 338 00:16:30,399 --> 00:16:33,879 that hasn't been leaked. The rule is if it has 339 00:16:33,919 --> 00:16:37,039 a computer in it, your car, your phone, your TV, 340 00:16:37,519 --> 00:16:42,240 maybe even your pacemaker, it is potentially hackable and weaponizable. 341 00:16:42,480 --> 00:16:45,600 Speaker 1: So how do they use all this to actually track threats? 342 00:16:45,759 --> 00:16:49,000 Speaker 2: They use what's called the terrorist matrix, which just means 343 00:16:49,320 --> 00:16:53,559 using all source intelligence, integrating every single form of intelligence 344 00:16:53,600 --> 00:16:54,240 gathering they have. 345 00:16:54,440 --> 00:16:58,360 Speaker 1: So that's the traditional human human spies on the ground, right. 346 00:16:58,559 --> 00:17:02,120 Speaker 2: But that's now heavily supported by vast electronic surveillance. But 347 00:17:02,159 --> 00:17:06,359 they call sigant or signals intelligence that cell phones emails 348 00:17:06,720 --> 00:17:08,119 any kind of electronic message. 349 00:17:08,160 --> 00:17:10,559 Speaker 1: But he mentioned two surprising sources that people might not 350 00:17:10,599 --> 00:17:10,960 think about. 351 00:17:11,039 --> 00:17:14,160 Speaker 2: Yeah, this was fascinating. First, terrorist groups literally giving press 352 00:17:14,160 --> 00:17:18,279 interviews basically announcing or telegraphing their next attacks. The CIA 353 00:17:18,400 --> 00:17:22,000 just monitors the open media. That's osen open source intelligence. 354 00:17:22,119 --> 00:17:24,519 Speaker 1: And the second one, which really highlights how young and 355 00:17:24,559 --> 00:17:26,039 tech savvy some of these guys. 356 00:17:25,799 --> 00:17:28,680 Speaker 2: Are intercepting messages from game platforms. 357 00:17:28,240 --> 00:17:30,039 Speaker 1: Like Xbox Live exactly. 358 00:17:30,519 --> 00:17:33,880 Speaker 2: They discovered that operatives were using encrypted channels or coded 359 00:17:33,960 --> 00:17:38,039 language within these global gaming networks, probably thinking nobody would 360 00:17:38,079 --> 00:17:38,359 ever look. 361 00:17:38,400 --> 00:17:39,240 Speaker 1: Thet night were wrong. 362 00:17:39,480 --> 00:17:43,039 Speaker 2: They were very wrong. Those channels are fully monitored. But 363 00:17:43,119 --> 00:17:45,480 you know what the ultimate act of self sabotage is 364 00:17:45,480 --> 00:17:48,079 for these targets, social media, right. 365 00:17:48,440 --> 00:17:49,920 Speaker 1: He was just amazed by this. 366 00:17:50,279 --> 00:17:53,640 Speaker 2: He said, they'll put their entire lives on LinkedIn and Facebook, 367 00:17:53,720 --> 00:17:57,519 their jobs, their travel schedules, their family photos, their political views. 368 00:17:57,960 --> 00:18:01,839 They're basically doing the CIA's research for them. His advice 369 00:18:01,920 --> 00:18:04,720 was blunt. If you value your privacy and you want 370 00:18:04,759 --> 00:18:07,240 to stay off the radar of a global intelligence service, 371 00:18:07,640 --> 00:18:08,880 stay off social media. 372 00:18:08,920 --> 00:18:11,559 Speaker 1: We have to turn now to what is probably the 373 00:18:11,680 --> 00:18:16,279 darkest reality that Kiriaku discussed, one that really shows the immense, 374 00:18:16,359 --> 00:18:21,200 unchecked power of that presidential mandate, the formalized business of killing. 375 00:18:21,279 --> 00:18:23,359 Speaker 2: Yeah, and the most shocking part of it is how 376 00:18:23,920 --> 00:18:26,599 bureaucratic it is, how mundane it sounds. This isn't some 377 00:18:26,720 --> 00:18:31,039 rogue agent. This is a state sanctioned, highly structured, weekly 378 00:18:31,200 --> 00:18:32,400 administrative procedure. 379 00:18:32,519 --> 00:18:35,680 Speaker 1: So describe this weekly killing agenda. Where does this process 380 00:18:35,720 --> 00:18:36,200 even begin? 381 00:18:36,640 --> 00:18:40,200 Speaker 2: Kiriaku confirms that every single Tuesday morning at nine o'clock, 382 00:18:40,680 --> 00:18:44,279 a committee meets at the National Security Council the NSC, 383 00:18:44,759 --> 00:18:48,839 and at that meeting, At that meeting, they finalize and 384 00:18:49,200 --> 00:18:53,119 in his words, drop, the kill list. They literally list 385 00:18:53,240 --> 00:18:56,759 the people identified as the world's most dangerous terrorists, or 386 00:18:56,799 --> 00:19:00,079 at least deemed so by the CIA, who they want killed. 387 00:19:00,599 --> 00:19:02,480 Speaker 1: Like a standing weekly meeting. 388 00:19:02,559 --> 00:19:05,839 Speaker 2: Just like any other business meeting, but the agenda is well, 389 00:19:05,920 --> 00:19:08,160 it's a kill list, and as soon as that list 390 00:19:08,200 --> 00:19:11,039 is finalized, it's immediately send over to a dedicated unit 391 00:19:11,079 --> 00:19:11,359 at the. 392 00:19:11,279 --> 00:19:14,160 Speaker 1: CIA, and that unit just works its way down the 393 00:19:14,160 --> 00:19:15,720 list sequentially. 394 00:19:15,200 --> 00:19:17,319 Speaker 2: Like checking off items on a to do list. The 395 00:19:17,319 --> 00:19:21,000 process he described is chillingly simple. Number one, drive to 396 00:19:21,039 --> 00:19:23,720 the airport, get on the plane, go out to that country, 397 00:19:23,799 --> 00:19:26,160 kill the person, come back. They go to number two 398 00:19:26,200 --> 00:19:26,599 on the list. 399 00:19:26,680 --> 00:19:28,680 Speaker 1: And this happens every single week. 400 00:19:28,519 --> 00:19:30,839 Speaker 2: Every single week. It removes all the drama and just 401 00:19:30,920 --> 00:19:34,119 replaces it with logistics. It's treated like a production line. 402 00:19:33,839 --> 00:19:37,039 Speaker 1: Which raises this huge ethical question, how does the agency 403 00:19:37,200 --> 00:19:40,920 justify this internally and action that just completely bypasses due 404 00:19:40,920 --> 00:19:42,559 process and international law. 405 00:19:42,839 --> 00:19:46,319 Speaker 2: The justification is always the same, It's pragmatic. It's a 406 00:19:46,400 --> 00:19:51,279 fear based utilitarian argument. They tell themselves, they tell policy makers, 407 00:19:51,720 --> 00:19:54,160 there hasn't been another nine to eleven? Has there? Maybe 408 00:19:54,200 --> 00:19:55,799 it's because we're out there killing people. 409 00:19:56,000 --> 00:19:57,559 Speaker 1: The ends justify the means. 410 00:19:58,119 --> 00:20:01,079 Speaker 2: The argument is that the means, even if they are 411 00:20:01,160 --> 00:20:04,799 illegal and immoral, are justified by the goal of preventing 412 00:20:04,839 --> 00:20:10,240 another catastrophic attack on US soil. But Kuriaku himself refuses 413 00:20:10,279 --> 00:20:13,319 to let that stand. He acknowledges that while it's ordered 414 00:20:13,319 --> 00:20:17,240 by the President, the process is quote certainly immoral and illegal. 415 00:20:17,480 --> 00:20:20,559 Speaker 1: So there's this internal friction, the knowledge that they're committing 416 00:20:20,559 --> 00:20:21,960 crimes in the name of security. 417 00:20:22,039 --> 00:20:24,680 Speaker 2: That's the heart of the agency's moral crisis. And beyond 418 00:20:24,720 --> 00:20:26,960 the kill lists, they also have other ways of literally 419 00:20:27,160 --> 00:20:28,799 making people disappear. 420 00:20:28,519 --> 00:20:30,920 Speaker 1: Right which can be either lethal or protective. 421 00:20:31,160 --> 00:20:33,240 Speaker 2: In the wake of nine to eleven, the most infamous 422 00:20:33,279 --> 00:20:36,039 method was the creation of what he called an archipelago 423 00:20:36,079 --> 00:20:37,960 of secret prisons, the black. 424 00:20:37,680 --> 00:20:40,640 Speaker 1: Sites, undisclosed locations all over the world where they would 425 00:20:40,640 --> 00:20:41,519 take detainees. 426 00:20:41,880 --> 00:20:44,400 Speaker 2: They would just disappear people, snatch them from a safe 427 00:20:44,440 --> 00:20:48,319 house in Pakistan or Afghanistan, and remove them entirely from 428 00:20:48,480 --> 00:20:53,079 any legal system, any human rights oversight any public knowledge. 429 00:20:52,680 --> 00:20:56,000 Speaker 1: And the secrecy around these places was insane. He said 430 00:20:56,000 --> 00:20:58,720 that in many cases, the presidents or prime ministers of 431 00:20:58,759 --> 00:21:01,440 the countries where these prisons were located didn't even know 432 00:21:01,480 --> 00:21:02,960 they existed on their own soil. 433 00:21:03,079 --> 00:21:06,559 Speaker 2: It's an incredible level of operational security. The second method, 434 00:21:06,599 --> 00:21:10,279 of course, is just lethal disappearance assassination, where they just 435 00:21:10,440 --> 00:21:13,640 bury them in some crazy foreign land and nobody would 436 00:21:13,640 --> 00:21:13,960 ever know. 437 00:21:14,119 --> 00:21:16,680 Speaker 1: But then there's the other side of the coin, disappearance 438 00:21:16,720 --> 00:21:17,960 as a form of protection. 439 00:21:18,240 --> 00:21:21,519 Speaker 2: Yeah, this is basically the witness protection program on steroids 440 00:21:21,640 --> 00:21:26,279 for high value defectors. If say a KGB officer decides 441 00:21:26,319 --> 00:21:28,920 to come over to the West, the CIA will give 442 00:21:28,960 --> 00:21:30,400 them a completely new life, a. 443 00:21:30,400 --> 00:21:32,960 Speaker 1: New identity, a new backstory. 444 00:21:32,519 --> 00:21:35,759 Speaker 2: A new name like John Smith, and a huge financial package, 445 00:21:36,200 --> 00:21:38,200 more money than you could ever count. He says. The 446 00:21:38,279 --> 00:21:41,240 goal is just to make them and their family completely untraceable, 447 00:21:41,359 --> 00:21:43,759 so they can live happily ever after vanished from their 448 00:21:43,759 --> 00:21:44,440 old life. 449 00:21:44,599 --> 00:21:48,000 Speaker 1: Executing these missions, whether it's recruiting an asset or carrying 450 00:21:48,039 --> 00:21:52,400 out something from the kill list, obviously involves intense, constant 451 00:21:52,480 --> 00:21:56,240 personal danger. Kurioku's career was filled with close calls. 452 00:21:56,519 --> 00:21:59,519 Speaker 2: Yeah, he talks about two active assassination attempts against him. 453 00:22:00,039 --> 00:22:04,000 Really underscores that constant threat from hostile intelligence services or 454 00:22:04,119 --> 00:22:05,240 terrorist groups, and. 455 00:22:05,200 --> 00:22:09,559 Speaker 1: The attempt in Athens is just it's so tragic because 456 00:22:09,559 --> 00:22:11,519 it shows how random the threat can be. 457 00:22:11,759 --> 00:22:15,119 Speaker 2: It really is the ultimate nightmare for an operative. Kiriaku 458 00:22:15,279 --> 00:22:18,079 was the intended target, but because of some small change 459 00:22:18,079 --> 00:22:20,839 in his routine or just blind luck, they killed his 460 00:22:20,920 --> 00:22:25,319 next door neighbor instead. The British Defense Attache Brigadier General 461 00:22:25,319 --> 00:22:29,559 Stephen Saunders wow and Kyriaku says that this tragedy haunts 462 00:22:29,559 --> 00:22:32,720 the agent every single day. That's the psychological toll of 463 00:22:32,759 --> 00:22:34,759 this work, knowing that what you do for a living 464 00:22:35,000 --> 00:22:37,839 can get an innocent person, a friend, a neighbor killed. 465 00:22:38,079 --> 00:22:40,240 Speaker 1: And the second attempt was only stopped because they had 466 00:22:40,240 --> 00:22:41,960 a HEAs up from an asset. 467 00:22:41,839 --> 00:22:45,480 Speaker 2: Right they got advanced warning so they can neutralize the threat, 468 00:22:45,720 --> 00:22:48,240 as they say in the movies. But that level of 469 00:22:48,319 --> 00:22:52,039 constant threat management must be absolutely exhausting. 470 00:22:52,160 --> 00:22:56,319 Speaker 1: It creates the state of permanent hypervigilance. 471 00:22:55,680 --> 00:22:58,440 Speaker 2: Which she illustrates perfectly with this story about being under 472 00:22:58,480 --> 00:23:02,640 surveillance in Pakistan. He was staying in this small secure guesthouse, 473 00:23:03,160 --> 00:23:05,799 which was a good call because the big fancy hotel 474 00:23:05,839 --> 00:23:08,880 down the street was later blown up, killing forty five people. 475 00:23:08,960 --> 00:23:11,240 Speaker 1: And he was a pro right. He changed his route 476 00:23:11,240 --> 00:23:13,880 to work every day, left at different times to make 477 00:23:13,920 --> 00:23:14,880 it hard to tail. 478 00:23:14,680 --> 00:23:17,519 Speaker 2: Him, but he still noticed something. He kept seeing the 479 00:23:17,559 --> 00:23:21,640 same guy on a motorcycle wearing a red helmet, always 480 00:23:21,640 --> 00:23:22,839 trying to stay in his blind spot. 481 00:23:22,960 --> 00:23:26,759 Speaker 1: And as an operative, you have to recognize that pattern immediately, you. 482 00:23:26,720 --> 00:23:30,480 Speaker 2: Do, and he identified it based on the classic intelligence 483 00:23:30,480 --> 00:23:34,000 definition multiple sightings at time and distance. He was seeing 484 00:23:34,039 --> 00:23:37,359 the same person multiple times at different places over several days. 485 00:23:37,640 --> 00:23:39,359 He knew he was being followed. 486 00:23:39,000 --> 00:23:41,440 Speaker 1: So he reports it to his chief and the chief 487 00:23:41,440 --> 00:23:43,839 gives him the brutal expected. 488 00:23:43,480 --> 00:23:46,039 Speaker 2: Order, Well, you know what you have to do, neutralize 489 00:23:46,079 --> 00:23:47,400 the threat, kill him. 490 00:23:47,720 --> 00:23:50,000 Speaker 1: And this is where the human element really comes through. 491 00:23:50,039 --> 00:23:50,880 He was scared. 492 00:23:51,039 --> 00:23:54,000 Speaker 2: He was terrified not just as being caught, but of 493 00:23:54,079 --> 00:23:56,839 the actual act of having to kill someone. He was 494 00:23:56,880 --> 00:23:59,519 preparing himself for a gunfight on the street because that's 495 00:23:59,519 --> 00:24:02,079 what the missie and required eliminate the threat. 496 00:24:02,240 --> 00:24:05,160 Speaker 1: But the story has this incredible twist. He doesn't go 497 00:24:05,319 --> 00:24:05,960 through with it. 498 00:24:06,119 --> 00:24:09,960 Speaker 2: No, instead of ambushing the guy. He took a huge risk. 499 00:24:10,720 --> 00:24:13,039 He drove to a safe house and he confronted a 500 00:24:13,079 --> 00:24:16,880 general from the local intelligence service directly. He just asked him, general, 501 00:24:16,920 --> 00:24:19,599 are you following me? The general denied it, and then 502 00:24:20,079 --> 00:24:22,079 the man in the red helmet disappeared. 503 00:24:21,599 --> 00:24:23,519 Speaker 1: And he found out the real story later, and. 504 00:24:23,480 --> 00:24:27,920 Speaker 2: It's an amazing story. The local service had decided to 505 00:24:27,960 --> 00:24:31,519 test the new American guy because Kiriaku had a reputation 506 00:24:31,599 --> 00:24:32,880 for being too nice. 507 00:24:32,640 --> 00:24:34,480 Speaker 1: So they put their worst guy on him. 508 00:24:34,359 --> 00:24:37,440 Speaker 2: Their absolute worst surveillance office, with the red helmet staying 509 00:24:37,440 --> 00:24:40,759 in the blind spot. It was all amateur hour. Kiriaku's 510 00:24:40,759 --> 00:24:44,000 direct confrontation saved that man's life. He says, if he 511 00:24:44,039 --> 00:24:47,279 hadn't spoken up, that incompetent officer would be dead today. 512 00:24:47,680 --> 00:24:49,680 This is a credible moment. We're just talking to somewhat 513 00:24:49,680 --> 00:24:51,960 overrode protocol and prevented a killing. 514 00:24:52,160 --> 00:24:55,119 Speaker 1: And that story really brings us to the ultimate ethical 515 00:24:55,160 --> 00:24:58,039 conflict of his career, the thing that defined his life. 516 00:24:58,799 --> 00:25:02,039 Kiriaku says the the CIA trains its officers to see the 517 00:25:02,039 --> 00:25:07,000 world in shades of gray, to believe there are no absolutes. 518 00:25:06,759 --> 00:25:09,359 Speaker 2: But he argues that some things are just definitively black 519 00:25:09,400 --> 00:25:10,960 and white, right or wrong. 520 00:25:10,960 --> 00:25:13,039 Speaker 1: Period, And he doesn't base that on philosophy. 521 00:25:13,240 --> 00:25:17,119 Speaker 2: He bases it on the law, on clear established US law. 522 00:25:17,279 --> 00:25:20,079 He points out that the legal framework banning torture has 523 00:25:20,119 --> 00:25:23,000 been in place for decades. It starts the Federal Torture 524 00:25:23,000 --> 00:25:24,599 Act of nineteen forty. 525 00:25:24,319 --> 00:25:27,640 Speaker 1: Six, and internationally, the US isn't just a signatory to 526 00:25:28,000 --> 00:25:30,039 the UN Convention against Torture. 527 00:25:29,839 --> 00:25:32,559 Speaker 2: It wrote the convention, the US has historically been the 528 00:25:32,599 --> 00:25:34,519 standard bearer against these practices. 529 00:25:34,640 --> 00:25:37,400 Speaker 1: That historical consistency is key to his argument. 530 00:25:37,519 --> 00:25:40,440 Speaker 2: It is he brings up these powerful historical examples. In 531 00:25:40,519 --> 00:25:43,559 nineteen forty six, the US executed Japanese soldiers who had 532 00:25:43,559 --> 00:25:46,799 waterboarded American prisoners of war. In nineteen sixty eight, an 533 00:25:46,799 --> 00:25:50,160 American soldier who waterboarded a North Vietnamese prisoner was convicted 534 00:25:50,200 --> 00:25:52,960 of torture and got twenty years at hard labor. The 535 00:25:53,039 --> 00:25:54,880 legal line has always been absolute. 536 00:25:55,039 --> 00:25:58,279 Speaker 1: So if the law never changed, how did torture become, 537 00:25:58,400 --> 00:26:01,519 as he puts it, magically legal from two thousand and 538 00:26:01,519 --> 00:26:02,519 two to two thousand and five. 539 00:26:02,759 --> 00:26:05,599 Speaker 2: His conclusion is that it wasn't the US was committing 540 00:26:05,640 --> 00:26:09,480 crimes against humanity. The law didn't change the executive policy, 541 00:26:09,519 --> 00:26:13,000 and the little arguments they used, the infamous torture memos, 542 00:26:13,319 --> 00:26:17,119 were just designed to redefine the word torture so that 543 00:26:17,160 --> 00:26:19,079 what they were doing didn't technically count. 544 00:26:19,240 --> 00:26:23,200 Speaker 1: It was a massive institutional failure, built on a semantic loophole. 545 00:26:22,960 --> 00:26:25,720 Speaker 2: Exactly, and feeling that the American people had a right 546 00:26:25,759 --> 00:26:27,640 to know what their government was doing in their name, 547 00:26:28,200 --> 00:26:30,920 he made a choice that would completely destroy his life. 548 00:26:31,000 --> 00:26:33,319 Speaker 1: In December two thousand and seven, he went on ABC 549 00:26:33,440 --> 00:26:34,079 News and. 550 00:26:34,039 --> 00:26:37,599 Speaker 2: He stated three simple facts. The CIA was torturing prisoners. 551 00:26:37,599 --> 00:26:40,839 Torture was official US policy, and that policy was personally 552 00:26:40,839 --> 00:26:43,480 approved by the President. It was a direct moral challenge to. 553 00:26:43,440 --> 00:26:47,200 Speaker 1: The entire system, and the system's reaction was predictable retaliation. 554 00:26:47,400 --> 00:26:50,519 Speaker 2: The FBI investigated him, and initially they concluded he hadn't 555 00:26:50,519 --> 00:26:53,559 committed a crime, but after the administration changed, the case 556 00:26:53,599 --> 00:26:57,480 was secretly reopened. It became this obsessive prosecution. He was 557 00:26:57,519 --> 00:27:01,680 indicted on five felonies, including three ounce of espionage. 558 00:27:01,119 --> 00:27:02,519 Speaker 1: Which can carry the death penalty. 559 00:27:02,559 --> 00:27:05,480 Speaker 2: A death penalty charge, he was facing forty five years 560 00:27:05,480 --> 00:27:07,920 in prison. He was going bankrupt from legal fees. He 561 00:27:07,960 --> 00:27:12,640 had five kids. He was forced into this horrifying choice. 562 00:27:12,680 --> 00:27:13,519 Speaker 1: He took a plea deal. 563 00:27:13,599 --> 00:27:16,359 Speaker 2: He took a plea deal. He agreed to serve twenty 564 00:27:16,359 --> 00:27:20,119 three months in prison on a lesser charge, just to 565 00:27:20,279 --> 00:27:23,319 end the nightmare that was destroying his family. A staggering 566 00:27:23,359 --> 00:27:25,119 price to pay for telling the truth. 567 00:27:24,839 --> 00:27:27,200 Speaker 1: And yet he says I would do it again today. 568 00:27:28,079 --> 00:27:31,839 That level of conviction is just It's incredible, and his 569 00:27:31,880 --> 00:27:33,000 sacrifice wasn't. 570 00:27:32,799 --> 00:27:36,079 Speaker 2: For nothing at all. His revelations created a political and 571 00:27:36,119 --> 00:27:40,440 ethical firestorm. It forced Congress to act because he spoke out. 572 00:27:40,519 --> 00:27:44,000 The McCain Feinstein Amendment was passed into law, which formally 573 00:27:44,039 --> 00:27:47,359 and permanently banned torture. He literally traded his freedom to 574 00:27:47,400 --> 00:27:49,839 force the government to codify what the law should have 575 00:27:49,839 --> 00:27:50,720 protected all along. 576 00:27:50,880 --> 00:27:53,480 Speaker 1: And finally, he makes this powerful argument that beyond being 577 00:27:53,559 --> 00:27:57,079 illegal and immoral, torture is also just ineffective. 578 00:27:57,200 --> 00:27:59,359 Speaker 2: It is the evidence shows that people will say anything 579 00:27:59,359 --> 00:28:02,440 to make the pains, So the intelligence you get is unreliable, 580 00:28:02,799 --> 00:28:05,920 but even more critically, it's the single most powerful recruiting 581 00:28:05,960 --> 00:28:07,200 tool you can hand to your enemy. 582 00:28:07,440 --> 00:28:10,559 Speaker 1: And the example he gives is the photos from Abu 583 00:28:10,599 --> 00:28:13,640 Grebe prison, the prisoners in the orange jumpsuits. 584 00:28:13,799 --> 00:28:16,519 Speaker 2: The whole world saw those photos, and when ices started 585 00:28:16,559 --> 00:28:19,039 kidnapping journalists and aid workers. 586 00:28:18,680 --> 00:28:21,319 Speaker 1: They bought the exact same orange jympsuits. 587 00:28:21,359 --> 00:28:24,319 Speaker 2: They did it deliberately to mimic what the US had done. 588 00:28:24,359 --> 00:28:27,680 They broadcast the beheadings as a direct act of retaliation 589 00:28:28,039 --> 00:28:32,200 and a recruitment video torture Kuriak, who argues doesn't work. 590 00:28:32,480 --> 00:28:35,319 It just pours gasoline on the fire of global conflict 591 00:28:35,559 --> 00:28:37,759 and strips the US of any moral high ground. 592 00:28:38,039 --> 00:28:41,160 Speaker 1: Let's zoom out a bit now to Kyriako's broader views 593 00:28:41,200 --> 00:28:44,960 on geopolitics, starting with his critique of US foreign policy, 594 00:28:45,240 --> 00:28:47,680 this idea of a permanent wartime economy. 595 00:28:47,839 --> 00:28:50,839 Speaker 2: When he's asked for his frank opinion on US global activism, 596 00:28:50,960 --> 00:28:53,680 he just goes straight to the numbers. He points out 597 00:28:53,680 --> 00:28:56,000 that the US defense budget is bigger than the next 598 00:28:56,039 --> 00:28:58,079 eight largest countries combined, and that. 599 00:28:58,039 --> 00:28:59,960 Speaker 1: Kind of spending creates its own momentum. 600 00:29:00,200 --> 00:29:02,559 Speaker 2: It does. He argues that since nine to eleven, the 601 00:29:02,640 --> 00:29:04,880 US has basically entered a state where the defense and 602 00:29:04,920 --> 00:29:08,440 intelligence industries need a conflict to fight and to finance. 603 00:29:08,960 --> 00:29:11,440 If they don't have one, the economy or at least 604 00:29:11,480 --> 00:29:14,000 that massive sector of it would go into a recession. 605 00:29:14,160 --> 00:29:17,920 Speaker 1: So that economic need drives an activist foreign policy. It 606 00:29:17,960 --> 00:29:21,519 pushes the US into places where it's not wanted or welcome, 607 00:29:21,839 --> 00:29:24,400 and then, as he says, it forgets to leave. 608 00:29:24,799 --> 00:29:27,440 Speaker 2: That whole sentiment is just perfectly captured in this little 609 00:29:27,480 --> 00:29:29,640 internal CIA joke he shared about Iran. 610 00:29:29,920 --> 00:29:30,480 Speaker 1: What was it? 611 00:29:30,559 --> 00:29:33,000 Speaker 2: Why would Iran put its country right in the middle 612 00:29:33,039 --> 00:29:34,440 of all of our military basis? 613 00:29:34,680 --> 00:29:38,559 Speaker 1: Wow? Yeah, that cuts deep. It just completely reverses the 614 00:29:38,680 --> 00:29:41,920 narrative and highlights the massive US military footprint. 615 00:29:42,160 --> 00:29:44,359 Speaker 2: And he also had a pretty sharp critique of a 616 00:29:44,400 --> 00:29:49,160 recent administration's foreign policy, calling it a complete and utter disaster. 617 00:29:49,400 --> 00:29:52,640 Why because of how hard it worked to offend and 618 00:29:52,759 --> 00:29:56,480 alienate traditional allies. He gives these examples like threatening to 619 00:29:56,519 --> 00:29:59,240 invade Canada, a member of the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance, 620 00:29:59,279 --> 00:30:02,720 threatening Panama, or proposing to annex Greenland. He just calls 621 00:30:02,720 --> 00:30:05,960 it craziness. You can't undermine your closest partners and expect 622 00:30:06,000 --> 00:30:07,680 to be effected globally. 623 00:30:07,440 --> 00:30:10,559 Speaker 1: And in terms of pure operational danger. He visited seventy 624 00:30:10,599 --> 00:30:13,359 two countries. He said most of them are awful. Which 625 00:30:13,400 --> 00:30:15,440 places really stood out as the most dangerous. 626 00:30:15,680 --> 00:30:21,039 Speaker 2: He listed Yemen, Somalia, Gaza, Afghanistan, and parts of Pakistan 627 00:30:21,559 --> 00:30:24,200 places where you have to, as he says, sleep with 628 00:30:24,279 --> 00:30:28,319 one eye open. His experience in Yemen was particularly harrowing. 629 00:30:28,559 --> 00:30:31,000 Speaker 1: Right on his last trip there, the threat was so 630 00:30:31,160 --> 00:30:33,279 high he had to stay in a hotel that was 631 00:30:33,359 --> 00:30:35,960 only considered safe because it had a thirty foot blast 632 00:30:36,000 --> 00:30:36,839 wall around it. 633 00:30:36,920 --> 00:30:40,279 Speaker 2: And the danger was immediate. The day after he got there, 634 00:30:40,400 --> 00:30:43,400 six South Korean diplomats were ambushed and killed on the 635 00:30:43,480 --> 00:30:46,559 road from the airport. A few days later, the South 636 00:30:46,599 --> 00:30:49,880 Korean intelligence officers who flew in to investigate those murders 637 00:30:50,000 --> 00:30:51,640 were also ambushed and murdered. 638 00:30:51,680 --> 00:30:53,880 Speaker 1: So South Korea has closed its embassy and left. 639 00:30:53,960 --> 00:30:57,000 Speaker 2: They had to. That's the kind of constant lethal threat 640 00:30:57,000 --> 00:30:59,400 that agents are facing every single day in these places. 641 00:30:59,519 --> 00:31:02,559 Speaker 1: Now shift to our allies. He compared the massive CIA 642 00:31:02,720 --> 00:31:06,440 to the UK's six. He calls them both top tier, 643 00:31:06,519 --> 00:31:08,480 but they work in completely different ways. 644 00:31:08,640 --> 00:31:12,480 Speaker 2: The CIA is all about scale. It's budget absolute dwarfs six. 645 00:31:12,519 --> 00:31:15,279 It has satellite spyplanes, all the high tech toys. But 646 00:31:15,319 --> 00:31:17,680 he said that CIA officers often wish they could be more. 647 00:31:17,559 --> 00:31:20,079 Speaker 1: Like six because six is small and lean. 648 00:31:20,519 --> 00:31:25,079 Speaker 2: Small and lean, and the key difference is bureaucracy versus agility. 649 00:31:25,480 --> 00:31:28,400 To get a major operation approved to the CIA, he says, 650 00:31:28,920 --> 00:31:32,720 you need six layers of bureaucratic approval, you need lawyers 651 00:31:32,759 --> 00:31:35,960 to sign off, and often you need the president's signature. 652 00:31:36,519 --> 00:31:40,559 It's slow and rigid. Whereas six six reports directly to 653 00:31:40,599 --> 00:31:43,279 the Prime Minister. They can just get things done with 654 00:31:43,400 --> 00:31:47,519 incredible speed and efficiency. So the CIA has size and tech, 655 00:31:47,880 --> 00:31:49,519 but six has speed and agility. 656 00:31:49,640 --> 00:31:52,240 Speaker 1: Finally, he gave this assessment of the China threat that 657 00:31:52,319 --> 00:31:54,920 really goes against the common narrative you here in the West. 658 00:31:55,240 --> 00:31:58,400 Speaker 2: His argument is purely historical. He says China simply does 659 00:31:58,440 --> 00:32:01,400 not have a history of expansionism, with the exception of Tibet, 660 00:32:01,640 --> 00:32:04,240 which they claim with their own territory. Anyway, he points 661 00:32:04,279 --> 00:32:07,079 to only minor border skirmishes, you know, with Vietnam in 662 00:32:07,119 --> 00:32:09,400 the seventies and Indian the sixties. 663 00:32:09,000 --> 00:32:10,960 Speaker 1: And their military footprint today backs. 664 00:32:10,680 --> 00:32:13,920 Speaker 2: That up absolutely. China has only one military base outside 665 00:32:13,920 --> 00:32:17,039 of its own borders. It's in Djibouti, and ironically they 666 00:32:17,119 --> 00:32:18,279 share it with the United States. 667 00:32:18,319 --> 00:32:21,319 Speaker 1: So he's saying the Chinese are just confused by all 668 00:32:21,319 --> 00:32:22,039 the suspicion. 669 00:32:22,359 --> 00:32:25,799 Speaker 2: He says they're genuinely perplexed as to why the US, 670 00:32:26,039 --> 00:32:30,039 Australia and the Philippines distrust them so much. While he 671 00:32:30,079 --> 00:32:34,039 acknowledges the political threat to Taiwan is real because China 672 00:32:34,119 --> 00:32:36,960 sees it as a part of China, he maintains there's 673 00:32:37,039 --> 00:32:40,480 no indication that China is actually preparing for a large 674 00:32:40,480 --> 00:32:43,480 scale invasion. It suggests the current threat level might be 675 00:32:43,519 --> 00:32:47,240 driven more by strategic competition than actual Chinese aggression. 676 00:32:47,720 --> 00:32:50,039 Speaker 1: So this whole deep dive shows that the CIA needs 677 00:32:50,119 --> 00:32:52,759 these ruthless operatives, but they also need people with just 678 00:32:52,960 --> 00:32:57,279 exceptional and sometimes very unique skills. It's clearly a merit 679 00:32:57,319 --> 00:32:58,160 based system. 680 00:32:58,279 --> 00:33:00,920 Speaker 2: Oh completely. He says. Your background doesn't matter at all 681 00:33:01,000 --> 00:33:03,519 if you have a talent that can be weaponized for intelligence, 682 00:33:04,119 --> 00:33:06,039 and that leads to some hires you would never. 683 00:33:05,960 --> 00:33:07,920 Speaker 1: Ever expect, like the director of Disguise. 684 00:33:08,160 --> 00:33:11,799 Speaker 2: An incredible example, CIA hired a woman who's only credential 685 00:33:11,839 --> 00:33:14,839 was that she graduated from the Falls Church, Virginia Academy 686 00:33:14,839 --> 00:33:15,240 of Beauty. 687 00:33:15,400 --> 00:33:16,839 Speaker 1: A beauty school graduate. 688 00:33:16,680 --> 00:33:20,680 Speaker 2: Her skills with hair, makeup, wigs, and facial prosthetics made 689 00:33:20,720 --> 00:33:25,000 her the agency's master disguise maker, a talent she developed 690 00:33:25,000 --> 00:33:29,039 for proms and weddings was directly applicable to the highest 691 00:33:29,119 --> 00:33:30,200 levels of espionage. 692 00:33:30,279 --> 00:33:33,039 Speaker 1: And the master forger came from a college newspaper. 693 00:33:33,079 --> 00:33:35,519 Speaker 2: Yeah, he was a cartoonist who drew a popular comic strip. 694 00:33:36,039 --> 00:33:39,480 But his artistic ability, his eye for detail, his skill 695 00:33:39,839 --> 00:33:43,720 in perfectly replicating tiny visual details, that's exactly what you 696 00:33:43,799 --> 00:33:46,599 need to be a master forger of passports, documents and 697 00:33:46,640 --> 00:33:47,480 official seals. 698 00:33:47,759 --> 00:33:50,599 Speaker 1: It just shows they'll find talent absolutely anywhere. Now, since 699 00:33:50,640 --> 00:33:52,839 we all watch spy movies, we have to ask how 700 00:33:52,880 --> 00:33:54,160 accurate is Hollywood. 701 00:33:54,480 --> 00:33:58,200 Speaker 2: Kiriakou confirms that all CIA officers watch every spy movie 702 00:33:58,200 --> 00:34:01,640 and TV show. He's even consulted on a few. He says, 703 00:34:01,640 --> 00:34:05,559 in terms of TV, Homeland is very accurate. Really procedural stuff, 704 00:34:05,559 --> 00:34:09,360 the internal politics, the operational tension. That's all real, with 705 00:34:09,480 --> 00:34:13,159 one big exception mental health. If an agent had a 706 00:34:13,159 --> 00:34:15,360 breakdown like the main character does, they would be sent 707 00:34:15,400 --> 00:34:17,639 to a hospital until they were stable. They would not 708 00:34:17,679 --> 00:34:18,960 be sent right back into the field. 709 00:34:19,039 --> 00:34:21,519 Speaker 1: And what about movies. He mentioned the Recruit from two 710 00:34:21,559 --> 00:34:22,199 thousand and four. 711 00:34:22,480 --> 00:34:24,639 Speaker 2: He said, the first half of that movie, the part 712 00:34:24,719 --> 00:34:27,519 that shows the training process at the farm is one 713 00:34:27,639 --> 00:34:31,519 hundred percent accurate, the psychological manipulation, the stress tests, all 714 00:34:31,559 --> 00:34:35,559 of it, except, he adds, they didn't beat us in training. 715 00:34:35,719 --> 00:34:39,440 Speaker 1: Good to know. So, is there a giveaway a piece 716 00:34:39,480 --> 00:34:41,960 of jargon that tells you if a movie is legit 717 00:34:42,039 --> 00:34:42,199 or not? 718 00:34:42,400 --> 00:34:44,800 Speaker 2: There is if you hear anyone in a movie or 719 00:34:44,840 --> 00:34:47,719 a TV show referred to the CIA as the company, 720 00:34:48,039 --> 00:34:52,079 turn it off. He says, that's completely inaccurate, outdated jargon. 721 00:34:52,320 --> 00:34:54,880 That's a dead giveaway that the writers didn't do their homework. 722 00:34:54,920 --> 00:34:57,840 Speaker 1: Okay, good tip. Shifting back to real world trade craft, 723 00:34:58,079 --> 00:35:01,039 he says Russia is still the undis world leader in 724 00:35:01,159 --> 00:35:02,239 using sleeper agents. 725 00:35:02,480 --> 00:35:04,920 Speaker 2: It's a specialty they have that the US and other 726 00:35:04,920 --> 00:35:08,639 Western countries don't really do. Their program is incredibly sophisticated. 727 00:35:08,639 --> 00:35:10,880 They train agents, send them to a country like the 728 00:35:11,000 --> 00:35:12,840 US or the UK, and tell them to just get 729 00:35:12,840 --> 00:35:16,840 a normal job, build a life, assume a complete national identity. 730 00:35:16,960 --> 00:35:19,320 Speaker 1: And those arrests in Northern Virginia a few years ago 731 00:35:19,440 --> 00:35:20,400 really brought that home. 732 00:35:20,559 --> 00:35:23,559 Speaker 2: They really did. This group of Russian sleepers they arrested 733 00:35:23,760 --> 00:35:26,880 had lived these totally normal lives for years. One was 734 00:35:26,920 --> 00:35:29,880 an elementary school teacher. Another was an airline worker. They 735 00:35:29,920 --> 00:35:33,280 were completely blended in and their job was just to 736 00:35:33,400 --> 00:35:37,559 quietly collect classified information, mostly from the fence contractors in 737 00:35:37,599 --> 00:35:40,320 the area, and secretly send it back to Moscow. 738 00:35:40,599 --> 00:35:43,360 Speaker 1: They're so hard to detect because they're not doing anything dramatic. 739 00:35:43,440 --> 00:35:46,360 They're just living and waiting and watching exactly. 740 00:35:46,679 --> 00:35:48,400 Speaker 2: And finally we have to come back to where this 741 00:35:48,519 --> 00:35:52,519 modern intelligence state really began. September eleventh, two thousand and one. 742 00:35:53,000 --> 00:35:55,199 Kiriaku was at CIA headquarters that morning. 743 00:35:55,440 --> 00:35:58,280 Speaker 1: The emotional impact of that day on the intelligence community 744 00:35:58,360 --> 00:35:59,280 must have been immense. 745 00:35:59,480 --> 00:36:01,840 Speaker 2: You described the moment they realized what was happening, just 746 00:36:01,880 --> 00:36:04,719 the immediate thought we knew we were at war, and 747 00:36:04,760 --> 00:36:07,679 then this chilling second thought that followed. Does Osama bin 748 00:36:07,760 --> 00:36:09,760 Laden have any idea what he's done? Does he have 749 00:36:09,840 --> 00:36:11,760 any idea how many people are going to die? Now? 750 00:36:11,920 --> 00:36:13,480 Speaker 1: He knew the American response was going. 751 00:36:13,400 --> 00:36:17,639 Speaker 2: To be merciless, immediate and merciless. And now, almost twenty 752 00:36:17,679 --> 00:36:21,239 four years later, we are all still living with the consequences. 753 00:36:21,599 --> 00:36:24,039 The security state is just a permanent part of our lives. 754 00:36:24,440 --> 00:36:27,199 Trillions of dollars spent, the way we travel, the way 755 00:36:27,239 --> 00:36:30,639 our foreign policy is shaped. That permanent wartime economy he 756 00:36:30,679 --> 00:36:33,519 talked about born on nine to eleven is probably never 757 00:36:33,559 --> 00:36:34,119 going away. 758 00:36:34,440 --> 00:36:38,159 Speaker 1: This whole journey inside the CIA has been well, it's 759 00:36:38,199 --> 00:36:42,679 been terrifying, enlightening, and ultimately deeply sobering. We've seen the 760 00:36:42,679 --> 00:36:47,360 calculated ruthlessness they recruit for, the way COTS technology turns 761 00:36:47,400 --> 00:36:51,440 your smart TV into a microphone, and the just the 762 00:36:51,480 --> 00:36:53,880 bureaucratic banality of a weekly kill list. 763 00:36:54,039 --> 00:36:56,239 Speaker 2: And we've also seen the immense human cost of trying 764 00:36:56,280 --> 00:36:59,800 to maintain your integrity inside that black box. Kiriku's life 765 00:36:59,800 --> 00:37:01,840 style is a testament to his belief that the law 766 00:37:01,920 --> 00:37:04,519 never changed on torture, that some things, even in the 767 00:37:04,519 --> 00:37:06,239 world of espionage, are just black. 768 00:37:06,079 --> 00:37:08,800 Speaker 1: And white, right or wrong, and he sacrificed his freedom 769 00:37:08,840 --> 00:37:11,639 to prove that point. He endured prison and financial ruin, 770 00:37:11,719 --> 00:37:15,239 but he got the McCain Feinstein Amendment past, which permanently 771 00:37:15,280 --> 00:37:18,719 banned torture. That act of defiance speaks volumes about the 772 00:37:18,760 --> 00:37:21,599 need for a personal moral compass even when you're ordered 773 00:37:21,599 --> 00:37:22,840 to operate in a grey zone. 774 00:37:23,360 --> 00:37:26,599 Speaker 2: And all of these systems we've discussed, from Volt seven's 775 00:37:26,599 --> 00:37:30,360 power to hack your car to the NSC's killless procedure. 776 00:37:30,440 --> 00:37:32,719 They're always justified by the need to prevent the next 777 00:37:32,800 --> 00:37:35,840 nine to eleven. D rationale is always security, but the 778 00:37:35,920 --> 00:37:38,519 cost is always privacy and due process. 779 00:37:38,559 --> 00:37:41,320 Speaker 1: Which brings us to our final provocative thought for you 780 00:37:41,400 --> 00:37:43,679 to consider, now that you've heard this reality from a 781 00:37:43,719 --> 00:37:47,800 true insider, Given the scope of these state sanctioned surveillance 782 00:37:47,880 --> 00:37:51,519 powers and lethal capabilities, and knowing that the security state 783 00:37:51,599 --> 00:37:53,199 is always pushing that ethical. 784 00:37:53,039 --> 00:37:55,920 Speaker 2: Envelope, how much of your own personal privacy are you 785 00:37:55,960 --> 00:37:58,559 willing to sacrifice for the promise of avoiding the next 786 00:37:58,679 --> 00:38:00,920 nine to eleven? And where do you you personally draw 787 00:38:00,960 --> 00:38:03,800 the line between what is an operational necessity and what 788 00:38:03,960 --> 00:38:07,400 you believe is an unacceptable ethical failure. It's a tough question, 789 00:38:07,440 --> 00:38:09,719 and we encourage you to reflect on where that boundary 790 00:38:09,719 --> 00:38:10,559 should truly lie.