Speaker 1: I want to welcome everyone back to the Pee Kenyanas show. Thomas,
we got a new series that you wanted to start here.
You mentioned it, and I was like, we need to
jump all over it, especially since you mentioned the Oppenheimer
movie that's out and that this would be, uh, this
would be a good supplement or side by side to it.
So tell everybody a little bit about what's your what's
you're thinking.
Speaker 2: I want to discuss the German atomic bomb, but like
everything about it, like if such a program existed, you know,
conceptually what you know, what what was the cattos for it?
You know what what was the state of of science
at the time. And also in in kind of more
apocal terms, you know, I want to talk about nuclear
weapons generally, or atomic weapons in that era. You know,
people people I misunderstanding about about about the bomb and
about nuclear weapons generally. They uh, people like Thomas Schilling
and like Herman Khan. They made the point that nuclear
weapons are like any other weapons, they're just far far
more muscle bound. The uh, the ability to impose you know,
devastating attrition in an instant the system, you know, marks
them apart, as does you know, very like strategic variables
relating to their destructive power and creates peculiar paradigms. I mean,
oh that is true, okay, but they don't have they
don't have great utility in any kind of like general
applied sense, and there's there's actually very few paradigms where
they really are are a game changer or that they
really advance, you know, the the themiliar rangers of the state,
you know, instantaneously, you know, like it there's this kind
of like there's this kind of like mythical belief and
super weapons just I mean, it's like an ongoing thing
that it just seems to have people assign a kind
of mystique, you know, to wartech and I guess like
nuclear weapons could be viewed it's kind of like the
zenus of that. So I mean there's just that, But
beyond that, there's deliberately cultivated narratives around around the issue. Historically,
like the development of the first atomic bomb. A lot
of this has to do with anti fascism, you know,
like ideologically anti fascism. A lot of this has to
do with rationalizations for you know, America's development of the
bomb and attempt to defend its monopoly on such capabilities,
you know, the there so there's this idea that was
presented by the War Department in the aftermath of you know,
the the nuclear assault in Japan that well, we developed
this thing because you know, the Third Reich was was
feverously developing an atomic capability, and you know that would
have that would have that would have changed everything, you know,
and and this this evil tyrannical regime set benting world domination.
Could I hold hold the planet hostage with atomic weapons?
That's and that's preprocess for a lot of reasons, but
it does beg the question as to was was the
German Reich developing an atomic bomb actively? Uh? That's a
complicated question for a lot of reasons, not the least
of which not not uh not, the least of which
not for reasons, not the least of which is the
fact that Oppenheimer was not the quote father of the
atomic bomb. Now there was Einstein. A man named Otto
Hahn was and this didn't used to be controversial. Okay,
Who is Ato Haanohan was born in eighteen seventy nine.
He died when he was quite elderly, in July nineteen
sixty eight. Han is the father of nuclear chemistry and
specifically nuclear fission. Okay, Hahn and his assistant, a lady
named let's say Miitner, they discovered the radioactive isotopes of radium, thorium,
protecting them, and most importantly, uranium. In the second episode,
I'm no physics guy, but I do know something as
much as a layman can kind of understand these things.
We'll get into why uranium is so important and like
what uranium actually is. I'm gonna like bore everybody to death,
but it's important to understand and applied capacities. You know,
how atomic research developed into a a a discreetly military endeavor. Okay,
but Han also through his experience, through his experiments, which
were myriad, he discovered the phenomena what's called atomic recoil
in nuclear nuclear isomerism and UH he pioneered UH a
lot of the techniques that ultimately gave rise to carbon dating. Okay,
So the guy was a The guy was a was
was was an intellectual giant. But quite literally everybody subsequent,
every every researcher engaged in nuclear science and specifically UH
weapons based nuclear research. There they were literally they were
literally borrowing from Han's research Okay, that's indisputable. And like
I said, at in the epoch he was credited as such,
it's this idea that you know, like, oh, that the
Germans were just like these crazy fools and they didn't
understand physics or something or I mean, that's as nine
to be unbelief. Also like this idea that like, oh,
like you know, because of anti Semitism, you know, the
Germans didn't have a coterie of of top signific minds
like that, that's preposterous. Like not only is that preposterous,
but quite literally, you know, the technology that facilitated the
development of nuclear weapons was literally invented by the Germans. Okay,
now for background too, Han he received in ninety forty
four the Nobel Prize for Chemistry. And and just we'll
get into this again in a second and third episodes.
I think we I think it should probably be a
three part series. But the but but just nuclear fission
was that wasn't is the basis for nuclear reactors as
well as nuclear weapons. Okay, it makes all those things
pot not just possible, but concealable. Okay. Interestingly, interestingly, during
World War One, because uh Hans a little bit older,
he served with love Landvan Regiment, which you know in
the Kaisers in the kaiser Reich was like a reserve regiment,
generally consistent, like it was kind of like the Home
Guard or like what the British is called the Territorial Army.
But uh, he actually was mobilized and deployed and uh
he was Uh he was attached to a chemical weapons unit,
chemical warfare unit headed by Fritz Hobert on the Western Front,
Eastern Front, and Italian Front. He was in heavy action
and yet he was awarded the Iron Crossed second Class.
So I mean, he why do I raise this specifically?
It's not just because it's it's not just because it's
interesting trivia, but it to I am, I'm trying to
demonstrate the aspect of Hans' character. Hans was not averse
to the you know, applying science in in in military endeavors, okay,
in including the somewhat horrible endeavor of chemical warfare. All right,
This becomes an issue later on as to what Hans's
view was of, you know, applying nuclear fission to to
weapons development. Okay. And plus it's just interesting background and
there's I I I believe this is very much I
believe there's very much a natural progression conceptually, okay, from
chemical warfare to nuclear warfare, and I that it's arguable,
but I think it's important. And I think people people
understand people who understand institutional thinking and the men who
populated was institutions and the way they kind of paradigms
that they play with, as it were. I think that
it's somewhat inarguable. But this kind of thing was very
much on on on the minds of of uh of
European physicists. Okay, the concrete engineering of what became the
atomic bomb wasn't and we'll get into why that was.
But uh, it's like I said, there's this like mythology,
there's this punative mythology that it's that both somehow simultaneously.
The Germans were idiots who had no idea how to
apply uh, what was called the new physics to war
fighting and the engineering of weapons. But in the other hand,
they were like these maniacs hell bent on and developing
an atomic bomb, and you know, only the only only these,
like only the only these, like you know, genius askenasm
like you know, we're able to save the day. And
of course, like Einstein is the father of nuclear physics,
and and Oppenheimer is the fire of the atomic bomb.
That's total nonsense, okay, And that's not a partisan take
and arguable for those I'm sure are gonna send me
hate messages about it. That's just not true. It's like, well,
I can you know, I can source all of these claims.
The let's jump to the end of the war, because
I think Irving's book The Virus House as well as
which is a source I rely on tremendously. It's the
best book in the German talkic bomb. There's also a
book by not By It's about It's about Edmund Teller,
And the narrative kind of begins on the date that
the of the Hiroshima attack, because that's really people don't
realizing the degree to or some Mahatant project truly was
secret and at uh the attack that shocked the world.
It's rather amazing the degree to which the Manhattan Project
was able to maintain operational security. But I say let's
start there for a few reasons, as will become evident.
It's the point at which the world was quite literally
introduced to the atomic bomb, including a coterie of German
scientists who had been taken prisoner by six and squirrelled
off to the United Kingdom. So August sixth ninety forty five,
the BBC Home Service they broadcast the first news that
an atomic bomb had been dropped in Hiroshima. The boat
announced that the bomb in question contained as much explosive
power as two thousand of the rif ten Ton bombs.
President Truman had declared that the Germans had worked feverishly
to find a way to use atomic energy but had failed.
Now at a premise it's called farm Hall. This is
a country house near Huntington in UH. The in in England,
a coterie of German physicists were being held prisoner there
incident what was called Operation Epsilon. Operating Epsilon was the
code name for this endeavor that took place in May
one in June thirtieth, nineteen forty five, whereby the Allies
identified ten German scientists who were believed of worked on
the German atomic bomb program. And UH these men were
they were captured, and they were again they were squirrelled
away to UH to England and detained. And this in
this kind of mansion house near Cambridge called farm Hall. Okay,
the proximity to the university is not an accident either,
because it was it was a weird kind of incarceration
that these guys endured, because on the one hand, it
was very punitive. On the other hand, you know, if
they if you wanted these men to speak, you know,
London wanted these men to speak to the you know,
their own academics about the you know, about the bomb
and things and if you're and if you're just you know,
kind of like treating people like for for them to live,
you know, like like you know, like abject and squalor
or whatever, or you know, or abject prisoners in the
traditional sense that wouldn't have happened. So, I mean, it's
it kind of reminds me of the early days of
like spears attention Okay, although obviously he ultimately endured true horrors,
as we got into in an earlier series. But the uh,
the goal nominally, and I think this is basically true.
What what m I six and the US War Department
both claimed independently was that the goal was to determine
how close the German roy had come of the development
of a viable atomic bomb. First among the detainees with
Ata Han okay it uh. And this was attested to
not just by not not just by his fellow attainees,
but but by his interrogators and and and the you know,
in the m I six men who were guarding him
and debriefing him. There there was concern that Han would
commit suicide because he was so beside himself that this
bomb had been created, and he blamed himself. You know,
it's not uh like you know that this was this
is very poignant, okay, and I don't. This is on
my mind, like as I watched the open Hiram movie
the other day, Like this idea that like Oppenheimer's single
like single humanly created the atomic bomb and lived with
this terrible guilt, that's ridiculous, Like that's not you know,
it's it's it's as if they like extrapolated like Hans's
life and mind and memories and you know, transposed it
out to this kind of character of Oppenheimer, who has
has some relation to the historical man was become kind
of like this, you know, it's almost like mythical figure.
But the uh A major thh Writtener. He was the
British officer in charge at farm Hall. He he he,
he asked for Han, and he brought to his office
immediately to make sure that his he was stable of mind,
and also just wanted to speak to him about, you know,
what had just happened. According to Rittner, Han was horrified
and again he felt personally responsible for the that's one
hundred thousands of people, he told written er Han, Han
told Writtener, And apparently according to in the and witnesses
not just written her himself, Rittner developed something of a
rapport okay during his time there, and uh Han had
told Writtener, you know, on on multiple occasions that he
he'd had forebodings about the potentialities of of his discovery
of of nuclear fission, but he never thought that, you know,
a weapon would be rapidly engineered and deployed with that
kind of destructive power, like not because it was impossible.
But we'll get into what what you know, he thought
would give a wo would would give the scientific community
pause and other things. Now, who are the other detainees
of farm Hall. There were doctor Eric Baggi or Bog,
doctor Kurt Diener, a professor named Walter Garreluck, odo Han,
of course, Paul Hartek, the famous Werner Heisenberg, a man
named Horst Coursing, a professor named Max von Lau, another
professor named Carl Frederick von Weisker, and the doctor Carl Wurtz.
Now the the the premises at Farmer Hall were bugged. Okay,
everywhere was from you know, the kind of common recreation
area to the private court of the men. And this
wasn't just this wasn't just incidental. One of the key
purposes of detaining the German atomic scientists was the eavesdrop
on the conversations between that, you know, the men themselves.
Now as the what the myrophones picked up as the
as the news was was h relaid, was that Heisenberg.
Heisenberg disputed the possibility that the Americans even had a
bomb and dropped it, Like he didn't dispute that Hiroshimos destroyed.
But uh he he. He believed it was some kind
of conventional like some kind of muscle bound conventional weapon
or series of firebomb raids like had been conducted over Tokyo.
Over one hundred thousand people died in twenty four hours.
Like he thought this was He thought this was propaganda, Okay,
not because it would be impossible to create a bomb,
but he you know, the scientific community was it was
a peculiar thing. And the even even you know, even
on the EVA hostilities, the number of men who truly understood,
you know, the new physics and were insinuated into, you know,
the applied research of these things, it was incredibly small fraternity, Okay,
And men like that then kind of looked at themselves,
with the exception of a certain coterie they ended up
in America, they looked at themselves as being part of
a community that kind of transcended politics. Okay. Heisenberg he
was personally, uh friendly with a doctor Goudsmith, who was
the head of the American Intelligence Mission, which had debriefed
when he was initially taken prisoner, and gout Schmidt, uh
was a fellow physicist, and they Heisenberg Gousmit knew of
each other, and uh, Heisenberger developed like a pretty good
rapport with him, and uh he'd asked gods Goutschmidt whether, uh,
whether atomic weapons research was something that the Allies were
endeavoring to uh, you know, take on or if I
or if there was any you know, background of such
apply experiments, you know, the end goal of uh of
weaponizing atomic energy. And Goutsman assured him that was not
the case. And I Goutsmant I guarantee had no idea
about the mainhadan project. He was speaking totally honestly. Okay,
so maybe it was naivete some people might say in
the part of Heisenberg thinking like that, you know, the
kind of the kind of the kind of fraternity of
pure science would mean that you know, no one would know,
no colleague would a lie to another, and such an
important and like literally earthshaking matter. But that again it
was different times, it was different. You know, it was uh,
these guys weren't ordinary academics or scientists, you know, they
they were like the elite of the elite of the elite.
And also again like Goutsmith I believe was telling the truth,
like he didn't know about the Manhaddan project, you know.
And plus two, I mean, like the it shocked everybody,
was like the war in Europe was done, Like Japan
was utterly destroyed and couldn't even defend itself. You know,
that's why was like that, like there's there's this lame
like defense, like oh, Japan had to be invaded because
they were just crazy and like a million Americans would
have died like that, that's ridiculous. The bomb was deployed.
These things developed their own momentum. The bomb was gonna
be deployed somewhere. It had been developed to destroy Europe,
which is totally insane if you think about that, you know,
like genociding your own race with with nuclear weapons. But
it but aside from that, it's I don't think the
Soviets would have stopped, you know, and they you know,
they they were, they were, they were actively the Soviets
had had gone to war against Japan in the final days,
you know, like who's to say, who's to say they
would have abided, you know, Truman's demands had UH had
the bombs plural not been deployed. But in any event,
that's the rapidity to which too, that's something they keep
in mind, like the kind of the core concepts of
UH weaponizing nuclear energy. This is really only six years old, okay,
So I believe there was something of this idea that
America could just rapidly, you know, kind of develop a
competency in the new physics, you know, and and within
basically half a decade, you know, develop a weaponized capability
like it seemed unlikely. You know, it's it was extraordinary
and putting oneself in the shoes of Heisenberg, I mean,
think about the disorientation of of what he had just
endured and and kind of like what of the German
like experience generally like in you know, ninety six. And
finally too, the uh, the Americans in the British came
who you know, in operational terms, they worked fairly closely
in the immediate aftermath of the German defeat for for
practical reason that those are political ones. The UH. The
last German uranium pile laboratory to be seized, that was
the library staffed by Issacar and verts. It was actually
located in the French occupation zone. And UH, the US Army,
with the sentence of the British at all costs, aimed
to prevent radio active material and the research data from
this pile laborate uranian pile laboratory from falling into French hands.
Like they they were singularly fixated on this, okay, and
the Germans knew this, and that's and that's how UH
and that's why Wicker and Verts ended up in the
hands of of the British and not the first. But
the reasoning too, in Heisenberg's mind was like, okay, like
if you, if you guys have the bomb, like why
why why you fixated on you know, grabbing all the
uranium you can and preventing it from falling into you know,
rival hands or whatever like it just but again too nobody,
nobody knew about the Manhattan Project other than those involved,
and you know, the uh, the the the five stars
around Truman himself, but uh. Overall the feelings of the Germans,
Irving characterized it as a sense of recrimination. They were
shocked by the fanaticism of people who are not under
direct like physical threat, who just developed, like rapidly develop
an atomic bomb at uh. Like in their mind, it's
like the kind of fanaticism that had been like a
sterically attreated to them in the Japanese by the New Dealers.
You know, it's like you guys, haven't you guys have
you guys have an ocean between the people you claim
your enemy and you're like feverishly developing atomic bombs like
that's there's something frankly insane about that. It.
Speaker 1: Uh, well, let me ask Han, could they could they
really have been shocked?
Speaker 3: I mean it, how would Han and Eisenberg? How how
up would they have been on new deal? What the
new Deal was bringing in?
Speaker 1: What what was basically going to happen where Yeah, of
course this group of people once once uh control of
the bomb, they're megal and moniacal.
Speaker 2: Because these guys are scientists, not politicians. And again too
it we're speaking of things that happened eighty years ago
and that we take for granted like it didn't you know,
and and and also I believe they thought that you know,
the degree to which the degree to I mean, listen
to listen to the Hitler's December eleventh, ninety forty one speech.
You know, it's some people were people were somewhat flabberg
acid that America was literally talking about making total war
on Europe for frankly ambiguous reasons, you know what I mean.
Then people didn't even there's a question as to whether
you know, an atomic bomb would even work as intended.
You know, there's a fact, there's a fact that we
addressed at the beginning of you know what, military utility
doesn't really have outside of very narrow kind of strategic paradigms,
other than the fact that you can like kill a
whole lot of people immediately, you know, and America had,
Germany was in ruins, the Red Army was in Berlin.
The Japanese, uh, Japan's literally a pile of rubble that
was getting bombed the Stone Age every day. Like deploying
uh like, like launching a nuclear attack on like a
ruined country under those conditions, that's somewhat shocking, you know.
I mean, even even if one understands the character of
the men in control of the enterprise. So yeah, I
don't think I don't I don't think he was like feigning,
putting on errors or something. And uh, like I said, too,
these are the guys who actually made this possible. It
wasn't Oppenheimer, it wasn't Einstein, you know, it wasn't in
Rico Fermi. You know, it was these guys, you know,
And it's I mean, there's something you know. Yeah, it's
a trope that scientists are naive, but it's also kind
of true. It was certainly true here. I mean, like
I said, who are these guys faking it to? Like
they you know, they had, they weren't. Uh and like
none of these none of these guys were national socialist.
It's not like they were going out like it's not
like they were playing a gearing and saying like I
got to protect the historical record and you know, wrong
foot my enemies like that didn't even feature in the equation,
you know, like Heisenberg was a national socialist. Hahn actually
like was at odds at the regime not to do
something liberal, but he just he just didn't like national
socialism and he didn't you know, he was he wasn't
a guy who was willing to unlike von Braun and
it was, you know, willing to go along and be pragmatic.
You know, these guys were, you know, but von Braun
was a was a was basically like a you know,
a mechanical engineer and like an aviation prodigy, you know,
like he wasn't. That's a different Like the theoretical physics
is a weird thing, and it's like it's it's it's
it's very it's it's like both concrete and abstract, and
it tends to it tends to with it tends to
with a track kind of you know, dreamy hyper intellectual
personalities and stuff. So no, I don't I don't think
there's anything fake about it. But the uh Han Hanna
described and people and and independent witnesses a tested to this,
like people had been with him when he was first uh,
when he had his first breakthroughs in his you know,
fish and research. When Han first learned the potentiality or
the implications. Rather, it wasn't clear what the concrete potential
was of uranum uranium fishing discovery. He said that, considering
that war was obviously imminent, he contemplated uh, seizing as
much uranium as possible, the majority of which in Europe
was in Belgium, and literally throwing it into throwing it
into the sea, or otherwise hiding it to ward off
some kind of catastrophe, you know, resulting from a one
of the combat and states attempting to weaponize it. And
then he realized that's not practicable, and also, uh, you know,
I get, but I mean, I you know, that's that's
that's that's that's the core, because the core of your question,
like Han had those kinds of thoughts because that in
his mind, that's what any remotely kind of like morally,
anybody was remotely normal, normal like moral constitution would have
those kinds of thoughts like he wouldn't just like, you know,
there's something wrong here with the Americans and British. It's
like putting up huge factories and like feverishly like you know,
producing pure uranium like without without question because like you know,
and it's like why like was was was the Red
Army storming across America? Was like no, I mean was
with a JIP and he's threatening America Like no, I mean,
like there's something there's something unseemly about it, you know,
and like it's not I I I totally understand what
he's getting at or what's getting at. And I'm not
at all some peacenick. In fact, like it's scale on
these questions. I think I'm pretty callous, Okay, at least
That's what I'm told. The interestingly coursing what he stated
in the course of this conversation with his fellow detainees
after the broadcast that you know, Hiroshima had been destroyed.
What he said and what he what he and what
he reiterated later was that the level of cooperation, you know,
under military auspices obviously that facilitated the Manhattan Project, that
would have been impossible in Germany. You know, he made
the point. He's like, he's like, you know, if the
men in the room, he's like, some of us didn't
wouldn't have wanted to do it on principle. But uh
he's like, even if we had, you know, there would
have there would have been different ideas on how to
proceed with this, and there would have been different ideas
on you know, managing outcomes potentially you know, and like
and trying to like build in you know, safeguards into
the into the structure itself, or you know, there would
have been there would have been resentments from you know,
taking orders from party men, you know. And that's your point. Yeah,
that's the subtext of what he said. Of what Coursing
said is that these men who worked on that man
Handing project they were they were like absolute fanatics, like
they were you know, they they were they were frankly crazy.
And that uh yeah, that that goes without saying, especially
if you consider the confessional background and motives and things
of these men in America. I mean, but it the uh, now,
what what was the background here of just gonna introduce
the background of what if any understanding of the weapons
potential of Hans experiments existed. On April twenty ninth, nineteen
thirty nine, this was, uh, this was kind of when
the world became aware of the potential of some kind
of potential potentially you know, game changing of the new physics.
Hans experiments and widely publicized obviously throughout Europe. And there's
a French professor named Frederick jeelo or Jeloit. He was
the son in law of Madame Curry. He reproduced Hans
experiments meticulously and he and his team they were confirmed,
uh like like it it was confirmed that like Han
was you know what what what he what he had
stated to have proven as regards, among other things, the
existence in neutrons during the press of uranium fision and
their situation like that that it was it was signed
off on is yes, this is legitimate. Not a letter
to Nature magazine, which in those days was was like
a leading kind of like it was a combination that
kind of like pop science stuff but also like major
scientific discoveries that's where they would be featured in which
it metally sounds weird today about it. I mean, that's
the way things work. You know. It's this French team
led by Joeloid. Their letter was titled quote Liberation of
Neutrons and the nuclear explosion of uranium and uh essentially
that was sort of like the first kind of like
public declaration of uh, you know, nuclear fish and having
like tremendous weapons potential. But I emphasized potential. You know,
there was nothing there. There's nothing demonishably proven here. But uh,
the uh what this led to was in the next
few days and UH Gottingen, which is a renowned university town,
or at least it was then in Germany at uh
the Physics Colloquium. Uh, a guy named wil Helm hanld Hanley,
who was Ah, he didn't know Han, but he was
like a protege of him, because, like, you know, he
was an up and coming physicist, you know, everybody you know,
he was kind of the he was kind of like
the grand old man everybody looked to. He read a
short paper on, uh, what do you call the uranium
burning engine? I mean we was talking about a nuclear reactor, okay,
and that like little paper by this guy. The trajectory
of German atomic research was basically going towards nuclear reactors.
You know, the idea of like or like a uranium
burning engine, okay, you know, like an endless energy source,
and that frankly that would have solved what became Germany's
quagmire militarily in part more so than an atomic bomb would.
And that's a really interesting counterfactual. But that and amidst
all of this kind of excitement, you know, it's got
to be said, despite the impression people have, I mean
not just court historians, even people who you know are
are more kind of critical and they're thinking about historical topics.
There's this idea that the so that that that the
German Reich was some kind was almost some kind of
like rightest mirror of the Soviet Union. It's not true
at all. You know, like the National Socialist Party it was,
it was it was literally elected Hitler himself by the
Enabling Act and by various referendums. He had tremendous power.
But even that wasn't really unprecedented, you know, like the
Reich president had had literally like extra constitutional authority as
he saw fit. But you know, the German state and
the National Socialist Party were discreete entities and it it
there were there were, there was tension there, like structurally,
you know, and there was even beyond that, even uh,
it wasn't it wasn't. It wasn't simply because there's plenty
of professors who weren't National Socialists, even the guys who
were basically sympathetic, like they didn't want the government messing
in their affairs, you know, like these were not just
guys who you know owed their oh their careers and prestige,
you know, something the Berlin government had done for them,
you know. And they also they didn't want to be
ordered to work with other people, you know, like they
that they didn't feel comfortable with or didn't you know,
respect or whatever. It was like very provincial, kind of
like very ego driven, but also just very you know.
I mean that that's the nature of academ you know,
and that's that's especially you know, especially the especially the
hard sciences and especially what was then called the New physics,
which was literally like the cutting edge of of a
scientific endeavor, you know. So I mean it's some it
was like trying to herd cats, you know. This this
idea that you know, this is this idea that the
Reich was like just some party state is nonsense, has
this idea that like Germans like you know, some Prussian
some Prussian officer types just like snapped his fingers and
then like the crowd saw like, you know, do what
they're told. Like that's that's nonsense too. Like it was uh,
you know, it's it's uh, it's it was. It was, uh,
it was. It was highly chaotic, you know this Uh.
The subsequent conference that was a that that was arranged
based on all these based on all these you know
kind of findings, and confirmed them, confirmed them, and and
confirmed the research. It ultimately was uh held in secrecy
at uh at in in Berlin at a building on
uh Winter then Linden the U, and this was when
the War Department U got very interested in what was
going on the UH the War Office as well as
Reich ministries attached to it actually or or just kind
of like practically because they were in the same orbit
or had overlapping series of authority. In a very short
space of time. In nineteen thirty nine, had begun their
own uranium research program. It was low key. It was
basically uh, you know, corralling data that had already been produced,
you know, in France and in the German Reich, you know,
and kind of running a comparative analysis and trying and
again like duplicating some of these experiments to make sure
that you know, this was in fact the results were
what they purported to be. And this led to UH.
This led to a Hamburg professor, Hamburg professor named Paul
Hartzek and his assistant, a guy named doctor Wilhelm Groth.
They'd written a letter to the War Office just before UH,
just before the Berlin conference and about ten days after
the publication of the of the of the Paris of
the French physicist letter Nature magazine. And this letter was
cited again and again and again by American new dealer
media as well as like oss types all in Sundry.
The letter stated, quote, and this is the letter of
the War Office, okay, by these by this Hamburg professor.
It said, quote, we take the liberty of calling your
attention to the newest development in nuclear physics, which, in
our opinion, will probably make it pass to produce an
explosive many orders of magnitude more powerful than the conventional ones.
That wasn't really a groundbreaking statement. I mean, yeah, people
speculated that that was true, and UH, Obviously, what was
right into this statement was that, uh, this is some
sort of a this is some sort of like uh
you know, low key almost kind of hidden communication between
German Scientific academ and the War Office saying like, look
like this is not only possible, this is you know, essential.
We've got to beat the allies the punch and you know,
pursue this course of research. Essentially, like take this letter
of the Fear and the Arments Ministry and like let's
make it happen. There's no evidence that that's what this
letter indicated, Okay, And frankly, like if that's what it was, like,
why wouldn't open a letter be written, you know, like
it's not really other things are done. But you know
so I think some of what is argued around these
these these surviving kind of statements my sort of say
surviving I mean, you know, like a literal letter forum.
I think some of is in bad faith. The uh
you know, and again the uh something uh. The letter
concluded with quote the country that makes first use of
unsurpassable advantage over the others. I believe what he meant
by it is just nuclear fission generally. And again, the
trajectory of this kind of research was towards nuclear reactors, okay,
or a uranium burning engine. I believe that's what they
were getting at, and which is true, okay. I mean,
any anybody who found a way to you know, utilize
atomic energy for uh an inductil military purpose like yeah,
obviously like first use compares confers a massive advantage. But
I don't read it as being like again, some kind
of secret agreement, you know, to pursue atomic weapons research
in concert. And I don't read that final sentences a
statement to the effect of, you know, we have got
to develop and deploy atomic bombs as soon as possible.
That's not in context, That's not what it means. And
I'm not playing lawyer ball at all. And frankly too,
it's a bit outside the scope. But the course of
German scientific research, not just relating to the new physics,
but even in conventional engineering and other things, it makes
sense that a nuclear reactor would kind of be the
would kind of be the holy grail of German research,
if that makes any sense, you know, And again that
would have alleviated not just emergent exigencies in the Second
World War, but you know, problems that had compromised Germany's
operational effectiveness and its ability to survive protracted wars as generally, Okay,
I mean in the preceding you know, millennia or what
have you, But that the reaction in London was especially
kind of severe to the French physicist letter, you know,
the Nature magazine letter. The British press when they you know,
just like as they did subsequently when in sei wating
mister Churchill into office, they undertook us like full court
press full of lowered accounts of a new quote superbomb
based on uranium fishing and that was being developed in Germany.
You know, like they just presented this as a foremon conclusion,
as a fact. You know. The four days after the
letter appeared, both the British Treasury and the Foreign Office
were approached uh by Sir Henry Tizzard. He was chairman
of this commit chairman of the Committee on the Scientific
Survey of Air Defense, which had outsized power, as did
pretty much every everything related to the Air Ministry. I
think we talked about that in our tertial series. He
said that in uncertain terms Britain should take preemptive action
to deny large sources of uranium to the Germans. And
as I stated, the largest stockpile of uranium in Europe
was in Belgium, and the the sizeable industry for extracting
urate for extracting radium from uranium from uranium oars imported
from the Belgian congo as well. So like get in Belgium,
you didn't just have you know, like the raw stores
of uranium. It was like the infrastruct sure to you know,
process it in basic ways to make it utah. So
essentially with Tizzard was suggesting or demanding perhaps was uh,
you know that Britain find a way to you know,
wage war on the continent and capture whatever uranium Belgium had,
you know, with hostility, which operationally obviously there was that
was not going to happen. But the fact that this
was well within their contemplation, and I don't think this
was just propaganda. In the case of the UK, I
think they probably actually believed this. I mean, obviously their
conceptual horizon was totally corrupted by this kind of hysterical
idea of you know, Germany as our enemy, but within
the bound irrationality of that that paradigm, I think they
actually did believe that, uh, a fishion bomb was was
was at that moment possible. And that's kind of a
fascinating uh that that's kind of a there's a that's
that's that's like it's like Frederic foresight stuff but in
real life. And I think that's kind of fascinating. And
there's many many intrigues, uh really you know, like espionage
and stuff and and what have you that like around that.
But I uh, I'm a I'm gonna stop here and uh,
second episode, Uh, I think we'll have to go a
little bit longer, and I want to get into the
uh I want to get into with the actual Virus House,
which is the title of the book, which was the
dedicated research facility for the German atomic bomb, such that
it could be said to have existed as a dedicated,
dedicated program. And then in the third episode we'll deal
with uh kind of like the aftermath and uh things
of that nature. That sounds good.
Speaker 1: Are you going to address the popular conception that the
Fear was adamant about getting a bomb and that the
scientists were working against him.
Speaker 2: Yeah, And I think it's basically like Heisenberg said and
some of his colleagues said, when when he said that,
you know, we didn't really want to develop a bomb.
He was talking in terms of like personal conscience, not
like the hell with Hitler unless sabotage the war efforts.
It was that if you know, if they'd been ordered
in it in a formal capacity, or if the or
if the or if the atomic program had been like
the rocket program and underdirect military authority, you know that
they would have resisted that because you know, the unpredictability
of outcomes and just kind of like the in their mind,
like the naked immorality of of just unleashing that much
power U when not you know, necessary for you know,
in a matter of existential survival. I think that's uh,
I mean, that's the way to understand it. But people
want people want to rehabilitate Heisenberg, and I mean they should, like,
no German needs to be rehabilitated, but in their mind
they want to think of Heisenberg and and Hans, you know,
good guys. So they like exaggerate the degree to which
you know, these men had some kind of ideological objection
to finishism. But yeah, we'll get into that. We'll start
with just like a brief understanding of what uranium is
very much a layman. Okay, So I mean, like I,
I'm not suggesting, I'm not being panantic like I when
I started reading about this topic, like I had to
read up on uranium. So I will take like ten
million minutes next episode and like learn about our friend uranium,
and then we'll get into you know, uh, we'll get
into the uh the views of the of the warm
and is re you know, contra the New Dealer War Department,
you know, and and the kind of lack of a
convergence respectively of uh of a common understanding of uh
the military potential of atomic weapons. And you know, like
I said, I I want to get into like the
motivations of why America developed a bomb and uh, you
know that's a complicated topic. But yeah, we'll try to
wrap it up in three episodes.
Speaker 3: All right, do plugs and we'll end this.
Speaker 2: Yeah. Uh. You can still find me on Twitter, which
I guess that was X or whatever like formerly burb
app capital R E A L underscore number seven hm
A S seven seven seven. You can always find me
on substack, which is my primary platform. It's real R
e A E L Underscore Thomas seven seven dot subsec
dot com. You know, it's find me on my website
number seven H seven seven seven dot com. I'm a
I'm preparing season two of the Mind Phaser podcast and
as well as uh I'm going to Utah in a
couple of weeks to film the first dedicated episode of
Thomas TV on the channel. My YouTube channel is Thomas
TV number seven him as TV. So exciting things are afoot.
In addition, h to like this, you know, Pete and
Keith Woods and other fellows are nice enough to host
me and you know, like be looking out for that
stuff too. But yeah, that's all I got.
Speaker 3: Thank you until the next time.
Speaker 2: Yeah, thank you man.
Speaker 1: I want to welcome everyone back to the Pecana Show,
Part two on what I'm calling the German Bomb series
little mini series with Thomas. How are you doing, Thomas
and where are we going today?
Speaker 2: I wanted to continue kind of with you know, the
background of you know what the state of what was
called the new physics was in the lead up to
the Second World War, especially because as we touched on
were than touchdown as we as we got into but
not completely last time. There's this idea very much reinforced
by the Oppenheimer's film, which in some ways I thought
was a good film. In other ways I thought it
was not a good film at all. I mean, well,
we can get into that maybe when it's more apropos.
But there's this narrative that there was this kind of
mad race. There's two one or two narratives. It's either
that there was this race by all major powers to
weaponize atomic energy and feverishly you know, at Cambridge versus
of Chicago, versus Berlin, you know, presumably somewhere in the
Soviet Union. You know, this was all going on, and
you know this, this desperate race was proverbially speaking, was
one you know, by the Manhattan Project team. That's not
true at all, Nothing like that was afoot. The other,
the other, the other kind of narrative is that, you know,
the Einstein Memo was born of some kind of secret
knowledge Einstein presumably had, or that he had gleaned, you know,
from the kind of German fraternity, as it were, of
of you know, researchers in the new physics that you know,
Heisenberg presumably was, you know, had come to in the
knowledge presumably, you know, borrowing from Fermi's concrete experiments, that
you know, uranium could be weaponized into a into a
super bomb. So Einstein desperately, you know, contacted you know,
people he knew and and then close to the New
Deal regime. You know they you know, including people he
talked about in another series, you know, on the Board
of Jewish Deputies, the American Jewish Committee. They put him
in touch with Sacks. You know, Uh Einstein, I said
Rolys wall street Man, who then said, oh my god,
you know this is you know, there's like like some
corny movie plot, like you know that this evil Nazi
regime is you know, months away from from this super weapon.
You know, we've we've got to alert mister Roosevelt immediately.
Like that. That's ridiculous. I mean, aside from the aside
many like value judgments they were in about the combatant regimes,
like this was not underway at all, like we talked
about last time, literally on the Evil War in ninety
thirty nine, the best minds in Germany. First of all,
there was no there was no organization here, like the
War Office, which itself was kind of a hodgepodge of
of academics, you know, like bureaucratic administrators, you know, like
party men, like guys, you know, like military men, at
least in a liaison capacity, you know, who had some
idea that you know, what's there that you know that
there's a you know that there's some kind of applied
potential you know, to atomic physics. But the direction they
were going was what we consider to be, you know,
conceptualizing what am I to a crude nuclear reactor. Okay,
that did change somewhat as time went on, but there
was never not only was there never uh a Third
Reich version of the Manhattan Project underway, but that wasn't
even within anybody's contemplation, and nor nor was the kind
of organization in place to do that, you know. I mean,
anybody will tell you when you're talking about academics, especially
men a top of their field and in some kind
of experimental science, trying to organize these people in a
dedicated capacity is like hurrying cats number one number two.
You know. The Third Reich was really, uh, the Third
Reich unlike the Soviet Union and frankly unlike the New
Dealer United States. It was uh, it was just kind
of like competing off in hostile like fiefdoms of authority,
and these factions who really didn't like each other, who
were kind of only bound by like faith in the fure.
You know, like it's just kind of like messianic personage.
I don't mean that in crude terms. They're on overly
praising terms. It's just the reality. Okay. So like people
have this kind of mistaken idea, you know, like we
talked about before the Third Reich is kind of like
this like fascistoid like version of the Soviet Union, where
like from the top down just everything was you know,
corralled into the service of the state and its military needs.
Like that wasn't the case at all, and that that's
one of the things that you know, the catalyst for
Gerbal was total wascond be known as the as the
Total warst speech. The catalyst for that was he was
making the case like basically like begging a lot of
some of the patrons of the party, like, look like,
put us out your differences, that we have to mobilize completely,
you know, if we're going to survive. And by that point,
I mean the die was cast, you know, so it
but be that as it may. I'll also say, finally,
and then we'll get into the meat of this there's
this idea in America, and I think, I mean even
among historians with a critical eye, and even with some
people who have military knowledge, I think the direct experience
or based on their theoretical you know, endeavors, there's this
idea that nuclear weapons there's kind of like this trump card,
you know, or that you know, like Thomas Schelling said,
and in the conducts he said it was correct that
they're just like any other weapons, except owing to command
and control nuances, you know, in the computerization and decision
making a key junctures, and the destructive power of them.
You know, they they're just capable of implementing far far
more attrition, far far quicker than you know, conventional weapons.
And that is the correct way to think about them
in conditions of bipolarity as regards to the political map
in general, parody in terms of strategic forces, and being
in a military situation such as the world of nineteen
thirty nine or even of nineteen forty three forty four,
it's not clear how an atomic bomb would have helped Germany.
I mean, Germany could have annihilated the UK, and I mean, yeah,
that would have helped. I mean in terms of obviously
it could no longer be utilized as you know, US
Army Air Corps and Royal Air Forces on singable aircraft
carrier from which to you know, strategically bomb Germany with
and conventional loads. But you know, the path of victory
in World War Two for Germany is the conquest of
the Soviet Union. You know, Moscow has to fall in
ninety forty one, and thereby, you know, Germany becomes a superpower.
You know, it captures the Central Asian world island. If
you want to use mckinder's language, okay, just you know,
atomic bombing Moscow and killing you know, ten million Russians. Well,
I mean the third right killed ten million Russians. I
mean that did that win the war? You know, like
I I think it was uh Ac mcdeinahjadd It was
an interesting guy at least more I mean, he was
at least the most interesting Iranian ahead of state since Komani.
You know, he made the point when kind of Ntnya,
who was at his most kind of historyonic. You know,
it is freaking that everybody's developing a bomb. You know,
all Israel's enemies are developing the bomb. You know, it's like,
did the did nuclear weapons helped the Soviet Union? You know,
like when the Soviet Union went down not with a bang,
with a whimper. I think it had uh. I think
it had something like twelve thousand warheads you know that
could be married uh launch vehicles and deployed you know,
as like strategically you know, like intercontinentally you know, or
at least like within theater, you know, over intermediate distance.
I mean it's that there's like this idea like nuclear
weapons just you know, you like own you own your enemy,
like in and for verbial or actual terms, you just
own the battle space like that. That that that doesn't
make any sense, you know, in the case of America obviously,
I mean America just had to devastate Germany and Japan,
you know, and it could and then and then America
gets the planet, you know, but I mean no nobody
else was in that situation, you know, ironically, in a
totally counterfactual scenario there like a nuclear armed Japan like
that actually, like Japan could have extorted a lot of
concessions if they had nuclear atomic bombs or something comparable.
I've thought about that and not I think not incidentally,
that's why they were so fixated on a biological weapons program,
you know, and like the father of modern bio warfare
is shiro Ishi. And he got poached immediately by US
occupation forces and delivered the the War Department, soon to
be the Defense Department. They ended up actually teaching at
Berkeley of all places, you know, as as like in
this kind of role of civilian roles like this in
old age is like this unassuming like biologists. But he
he was a he was a he was he was
a war master of bioweapons. Okay, that's something of a tangent.
But another event. All these things are important. They're not
They're not just speculative, you know, uh, sort of counterfactuals
that are fun to play with as we uh. I
think we finished last time with the letter the letter
by the French physicists to Nature magazine, you know, was
discussed the potential of of of you know, some kind
some kind of military application of of uranium, you know,
and reactions from uranium if you know, the the isotope
needed could be you know, cultivated. Okay, and this this
really this caused it say it caused a stir in
the scientific community would be a gross understatement. But the
response essentially by the Germans was, uh, a guy named
Abraham Isau. He was chairman of the quote Reich Bureau
of Standards. What translates the right grous the right grou
of standards in education, specifically the physical sciences. Was it's,
you know, a domain of authority and kind of keeping
you know, such that the universities could be corralled into
a directly military role. It was, you know this this
was this was kind of like this, this is kind
of like the party's way of uh of, uh of
not just keeping tabs on these things, but trying but
you know, if we're trying to direct such potential as
it he emerged in a constructive capacity. But of course,
again we're talking about you know, literally cutting edge theoretical
physics here. Like you can't pick and choose like who
you want to stay aff these things. You need people
actually understand the damn thing in question. You need and
beyond the people are competent. It's like he wasn't any
kind of like national socialist or party man, but he
was basically patriotic. He uh, he'd been, uh, he've been
a leading a already on high frequency electronics. He'd been
an academic physicist for most of his career, but he
was politically active. Again, he wasn't he wasn't any kind
of like party loyalist, but he had followed kind of
the sentence of nationalism in Germany and he was like
definitely behind it, you at least in like a but
but frankly, I mean like patriarch Germany's generally were you know,
but he uh, he was excited at you know, kind
of nuclear physics being brought within his you know, kind
of a number of authority tron lay that way, and
he convened a conference I think we mentioned the GENA conference,
which was directly convened in response, you know, to the
UH announcement by the by the French researchers UH on
their applied UH experiments on a short lasted course was
you know, ada Han Hahn was unable to attend because
he was engaged otherwise in Sweden. Professor a guy named
Professor Joseph Mattok from Vienna UH was uh was was
deputized in favor of his you know, regular assistant Lisa Meitner,
who is also in Sweden, you know, with the man
himself to like to speak for him, mber like sit
in for him. The conference took place in you know,
relative se Recey April twenty ninth, nineteen thirty nine, at
the Ministry of Education building. As we talked about the
UH doctor uh doctor doms who's the head of the
Ministry's research department, he vocally attagged Hahn in absentia for publishing,
you know, his vital discovery. What he perceived is like
his vital discovery, you know, to the scientific to the
wider sign offic community. And that's not the way science works, okay,
unless you're I mean, if head had just been two
years later, you know, and had Germany been UH actively
at war, I think that case could be made. But
even then, again, this was not the main Hadant project. Nobody,
nobody had, nobody among this coterie of new physicists in UH,
in Germany or Austria, you know, had an idea that
you know, this is a military technology. I mean beyond
the fact that excuse me, I'm sorry, beyond the fact
that you know any kind of any kind of apply
technology where you're talking about a truly renewable energy source
that theoretically, at least you know is is essentially inexhaustible.
I mean, yeah, obviously the military implications of that, just say,
the military implications and everything else. But that's but that
was that that that would have been like saying you
know that you know that would that would have been
like saying that, you know, aviation something should have been
kept secret, you know, as it was under as you know,
as as trials underway in America to you know, perfect
the truly viable aircraft, but American elsewhere. But the uh
but uh, Matt talk took up. Uh he went to
bed very much on Hans's behalf, and he uh he
basically cowed the committee into silence. You know things, we're
not We're not a military, this is not a military.
This is not neither a party nor a military you
know conference, you know, we're not We're not under your
authority or anybody else's. You know, basically like, how dare
you insult the man who's you know, basically changed the
world by his research and discoveries. And that honestly set
the tenor man like not not just in the Genda conference,
but moving onward again like it something like it described
never could have happened in the Soviet Union, Like no
matter what no matter what the technology under discussion was,
even if it was a purely speculative technology at that
at that juncture, you know, so it's there is there
is more of a you know, I say this is important,
not just because I've got you know, peculiar fixations as
a as a researcher, but you know, it's it's it's
important to you know, developing a a properly characteristic view
of the German Reich and and its internal situation. You know,
this is not a place where scientists or cowed by
the party or by the regime. You know, there certainly
were as always representative official doom. We try to throw
their weight around, but they were not in the driver's
se here at all for a lot of reasons. The
uh basically the long story short, in addition to a
lot of theoretical postulates unrelated directly, you know, to the
subject at hand, which I'm no understanding of because I'm
not physicists at all. I'm not even like an educated
leaman in physics. Okay, and first admit that, but to uh,
they kind of highlight of the event if you want
to look at those terms. To Gottingen professors, uh, got injuiced,
and it got even Honley. They they they outlined once again,
I mean not them once again, but they'd outlined again
as was on the mind of every man present, you know, ah,
the practicability of of of a quote uranium burner. Okay,
I mean this was again, this was such that there
could be said to be uh a sort of priority
afforded any conceptual model. I mean this, this was it okay,
And again that that obviously has tremendous military application. But
it but not in the way that was being bandied
by you know, uh people, uh, people like Einstein later on,
and and also by some uh some uh some people,
particularly in m I six and uh later on oss
in the case the former I it's interesting and we'll
get into that the uh, the I don't want to
jump people ahead. We'll get into the kind of the
take from London or the view from London and the
potentiality of an atomic bomb. But and in the event,
the h there's been a general band placed uh on
the export of uranium compounds from Germany, and uh the
right Ministry of Economics was uh they were adjusting, uh well,
they they were They're trying to determine like there was
a recently capture minds in Czechoslovakia. I cannot pronounce uh
yakima jakumal if anybody on deck, like in the comments,
I'm sorry if I'm butchering that, I first admit I
I'm terrible with these pronunciations. But Central Europe is uh
is rich in in uh in uranium war, okay, like
natural uranium war. The uh this this hadn't been mined yet,
but it, you know, had been accessed in some basic capacity.
But you know, uh who basically who is going to
get get it first? Like hadn't been decided? You know,
was it just gonna be spirreled away and given to
the you know, given to the O k W to
basically sit on so nobody else could have it? You know?
Was it was it gonna be given to you know
this uh to what what? What would was basically gonna
be given it? Like you know the the Burgening kind
of committee, that uh Burgning kind of quorum that attended
the conference at Jenna, Like what what would become of it?
But it uh what they had allowed was a uranium
sample had had been dispatched to Gotha gen for special
analysis and the special analyst, uh who was uh dispatched
you know to essentially to to report his findings. Was
was was a guy from the War Office? Okay, and
what was not known to the attendees of the GENA
conference and was not probably known to really anybody the
right chancery. I'm sure that there was some line of
communication there and Hitler himself, I speculate, and again this
is pure speculation, probably knew just because he was so
hands on in terms of UH weapons development and things
like that. The War Office had begun its own uranium
research program. But again, you know, it's if they were
developing a bomb, and if this was like the Raizon
deetra Avid, you know, like why why why why why
why were they appealing to civilians at all? You know,
I mean it because that would presume the knowledge that
that would presume not just the the conceptual basis for
such a program, but the knowledge in order to implement it,
as well as the political will. And it's just not
you know, it depics. What develops here is I think
an dis futal picture of you know, basically everybody, uh,
everybody within the party administration who had understanding, you know,
who's realistic about you know, the fact that you know,
inevitably like a war is going to emerge between you know,
the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. Anybody in the
scientemic community you know, who was at all engaged you
know with the reality in national politics at the time,
and anybody who uh you know had uh had been
paying attention, you know to to the new physics with
any with any sort of understanding of it beyond that
of a layman, like understood that there was some kind
of like great applied potential for this, but that might
not be emergent for twenty years. You know, it might
you know, it might never be fully realized. But again
too like it wasn't clear what that was, and such
that there was any kind of like agreement in these
like very kind of crude conceptual terms. In Germany it
was as you know, it was basically as like this
is an energy source. That's one who changed the world,
you know, it was not like this is this is
how we built super bombs, you know. And interestingly, but uh,
such that the United Kingdom had a view of this.
After the chairman of a Belgian mining concern he uh
he got wind of the situation in Czechoslovakia with respect
to uranium. A a guy named m Edgar c Ga.
He was president of the Belgian Mining consider and a
union miniere. Okay, I think that's how you pronounced it.
He contacted, uh, a guy named Tizard who was chairman
of the Committee and the Scientific Survey of Air Defense
in London, Okay. And when he did, uh, the outcome
of their meeting was basically, Tizard he was unwilling to
he was willing to provide the funds or the authority
for Sindiire or Cindiata to to purchase all available uranium stocks,
which there were several thousand tons in Belgium and far
more available in the open market that it had been
extricated from Czechoslovakia or extracted you know, before the before
the before the country fell apart and uh, you know
what have you when and became came under the dominion
of the Reich. But you know it, Uh, the fact was,
I mean it this was not it was the UK
was very much by this point, this was May of
nineteen thirty nine, you know, they were shifting to a
war footing, you know, I mean, it can't be argued
that this was you know, oh, you know, the climate
of appeasement was ruling and nobody you know realized you know,
the danger that lay ahead. If you want to take
that kind of court historian's view, I mean that that
they can't be argued. Okay, the the uh what Tizard
did say is that, uh, if some kind of mass
of UH uranium reserves or at least that which was
then available in the open market, if the bulk of
that ED should fall into enemy hands, he said that
maybe something that you know, that that could be catastrophic
and strategic terms. But I mean it wasn't it wasn't
clear what they was. You know. It's like it was
basically that, you know, we hear that, you know, the
crowds want it, so we don't want you know, because
they wanted We want them to not have it, you know,
but we don't want it either because it may be nothing.
You know. The uh, the Admiral basically just are like
took this to the annualty which you know in in
the UK. Then as I assume now even I always
said always had outsized clout in terms of like war
and peace questions, they said that, you know, they said that, uh,
you know, not only to went out of the funds
they gamble with on this like literally but they said
the possibility of developing a quote explosive of unprecedented power
from uranium was so remote as to be negligible. So
again this was like science fiction. Okay, it kind of
reminds me of if you keep up with I don't
know if anybody does, but I and maybe they've moved
on from this kind of fixation. But like some years back,
you know, if you picked up parameters, you know, like
the USM ME War College magazine or read these uh
speaking of the bridge, right, some of these like Royal
Navy publications they was talking about like rail guns and
these kind of like super guns that we're gonna that
were were primarily gonna be based on you know, Uh,
there's basically gonna be like there's some kind of new
like quasi surface warfare platform that's just going to like
change everything. You know. It was a lot of uh,
I mean that is now like I mean now it's
more you know, guys kind of trying to rationalize already
bloated budgets and stuff. But there's there's always there's always
there's always uh, there's always generals and admirables, as well
as civilian analysts and intelligence men, you know, like like
sounding alarm bells about about some future you know, like
super weapon. You know, this was not like this was
not something new, Okay, yeah, I mean they the twentieth
century is remarkable in terms of the punctuated the punctuated
equilibrium as so to speak of you know, scientific advancement
by by leaps and bounds. But this this idea that
you know, there was there was a firm understanding of
the potential of uranium that and that you know this
somehow would you know as we make you know, Germany
it's strategic situation as it was in thirty nine, you know,
the master of the world. Like that's that's ridiculous. G. P.
Thompson had an interesting take. Uh he was, he was.
He was a leading British physicist, perhaps perhaps the leading
physicist who was close to uh you know, the like
not just the War Party as it were, but to uh,
you know, military circles and uh both intelligence and the admiralty.
He said, uh, you know, it's highly he said, he said,
the Germans are probably more afraid of US developing some
uranian based technology. You know is is than than we
are of them. And uh he suggested, he suggested a
dis info campaign indicating that the British had in fact
tested uranium bombs of unprecedented force, you know, so potent
that the authorities in you know stopped uh stopped testing
of them for fear of of compromising the uh compromising
the uh the program completely, you know it. Uh. Churchill
himself he said that, and he talked of am I
do like church was like something of a technology. I mean,
on the one hand, he's like pans a lighte, which
he was and he and he he he he was
a disaster as a as as a commander in chief,
but he did have like a fetish for like wartech,
you know, I albeit not in an informed way, but
his view was the same. He said that, like any
any German, talk of a quote superbomb is pure bluff,
you know. Uh. He's like, you know this is ridiculous,
Like nothing like this. There's there's no indicators, there's no
kind of reindicators that something like this is going to
be deployed, you know. And he said, even if it was,
you know, the the uh you know that both the
Admiralty and the Air Ministry as well as the army.
You know, their their view is that, you know, even
if such an application have been cultivated, it would you know,
anything that would lead to results on a large scale
would not be emergent for years, you know. And this
was Churchill talking. You know, this is like arts Wormont
or ChIL you know. So, I mean it's uh the
uh he asked a question.
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, could that the line of, you know, we've
been testing these plutonium based weapons and it's remarkable what
the kind of power they have. Could that be a
way of propagandizing and saying, we know what these things
can do, we can't allow the enemy to have them.
Speaker 2: Yeah. I think that that's where I think that. I
think that I think the people who were agitating for
that disinvo campaign, I think that was the subtext of
it too. You know, it wasn't just to you know,
kind of like bluff the Germans, because frankly, the UK
did not really have the forces and being to to
bluff in other ways other than Ledgard Maine. But yeah,
also I think it could have it could have served yeah,
exactly what you said. It could have served as you know,
an ongoing pretext as well, you know, like these kinds
of things are being developed in and enemy hands. Oh
my god, like basically became you know, kind of like
the the Lbit. It was, it was, it was, it
was top secret. But what became, you know, like the
the New Dealer rationale for the Manhattan Project. But it's
but again, I mean the reason it didn't is because
it's seeming, it like, just so outlandish. And again, these weren't.
These weren't a bunch of you know, these weren't a
bunch of World War One generals. I go, and I
don't know about this. You know, this this this high
fluting science like you know, these were like these were
guys at the top of the field, you know in
the UK, you know, in the nineteen thirties. I mean
to say that like they they didn't you know, have
an indigenous you know, uh, academic community that was very
much on the cusp of new physics research. I mean
that it is preposterous. It just didn't seem it just
it just wasn't. It wasn't what people were thinking. Okay,
And I mean, yeah, okay, anytime you're talking about anytime
you're talking about anytime you're talking about a rare element. Okay,
obviously like explosives, whthing comes to mind, this is like
the nature of it. But that wasn't This was not
something that was just a universe. Like the way it's
presented is that there's just something that was like universally
understood to be like you know, the potential of a
you know, of a of uranium, and it was only
a matter of time before you know, the the correct
formula as it were, was calculated in order to like
bring it into reality, you know, And that's uh, you know,
all we can the closest we can get to literally
peeking inside the minds of people in the epoch is
you know there you know, their their declarations, either their
either you know there were there there's you know there
either their private diaries and their correspondences or you know,
their their public declarations or their statements. The presence of witnesses,
and there's not any there's not any indication that you know,
anybody within the scientific or military community in Europe as
of nineteen thirty nine, you know, had this in within
their contemplation. And again part of this was part of
this was uh, you know, part of this was a
conceptual bias because again, like it if you're if you're
if you're a Felt marshal in the Wehrmacht, or you know,
if you're a British admiral of the Royal Navy, Like
why what what's what's an atomic bomb gonna do for you? You know,
like what like honestly, like how how is that gonna solve?
You know, the the exigencies that you're charged with resolving?
You know, I mean it's Germany, Germany becomes a superpower
and and and and resolves. Uh, it's uh and and
resolves like the long emergency. It's it's faced with if
it if it, if it can drop atomic bombs on people.
I mean, it's not you know again it it's there's
a very there's very there's a very peculiar strategic configuration
where where nuclear weapons have real utility and that basically
never emerges. And you know it certainly it certainly wasn't
emergent in the case of Germany in nineteen thirty nine,
you know, And people can argue that point. I ate want,
but I don't I get to come across a convincing
case otherwise, even in even in uh, even in the
abstract and more concrete terms relying on UH. Relying on
the direct UH advice and claims of a professor F. A.
Lindemann and later Lord Cherwell. Churchill wrote to the Secretary
of State for UH for Air Defense, for air and
Air Defense saying that you know, any suggestion of of UH,
of quoting Nazi super weapons were without foundation. He said,
only UH, you know, as is expert, namely Lindham and
had told him, UH, only a minor constituent of uranium
was effective, which which which you know was took which
took quote many years to extract. You know, the chain
process can take place only I've concentrated in a large mass.
You know, the as soon as the energy develops, you know, uh,
it's you know likely that you know, it would acquire
a mild detonation instead of a chain reaction which presumably
you know, would would would would incerate you know, like
the uranium core that was needed in the first place.
And you know or you know, based on this based
on the nature of these things and you know, unknown variables.
You know, if an adequate mass were cultivated, you know,
the chain reaction could ensue that you know, it was
just massively destructive, you know, and uh in ways we
can't even conceptualize, you know, all the basic uh not
that bassic in terms of uninformed because this was a
new science, but all the kind of all all the
kind of you know, usual objections of the time to
you know, why you know we don't this is you know,
we don't want to We don't want to tickle the
dragon's tail as it were, you know. And this was
Churchill himself, like relying on his experts, you know. And
it's again like what if anything he had he had
an incentive to you know, confabulate you know, some kind
of threat where there wasn't one, not not diminish a
threat where you know where it was. I mean obviously
it's but that uh and just uh for those who
don't know a lot about this, and I mean I'm
one of them, so I'm not being pedantic, Like what
is uranium and why uranium? Again, uranium is what was
available central Europe is uh one of the uh natural
you know deposits of uranium that can be uh harvested
and or extracted mind and you know utilized in weapons development. Obviously,
uranium is a chemical element. Uh, what is a chemical element.
It's an irreducible substance that cannot be broken down into
other substances. It's symbols you. It's atomic number is ninety
two UH. In solid form, it's a silvery gray metal.
It UH. Uranium atoms ninety two protons and ninety two electrons,
of which six are valanced electrons. UH. Uranium radioactively decays
by emitting alpha radiation. And the halflight of this is
it's between something like two hundred thousand and like four
point five billion years sort of isotopes, so like uranium
like this is this was like revolutionary medium like date
the Earth like quite literally I did not know that
until recently. But the most common isotopes in natural uranium
is uranium two thirty eight and uranium two thirty five. Okay,
and uranium incidentally is the highest atomic weight of the
primordially occurring element primordially occurring elements. Now why uranium two
thirty five urinum two thirty five is uh, it's uh.
It's in every in every every thousand parts about in
every thousand parts of natural uranium, there's about seven parts
called lighter isotope, which is the mass number two thirty
five the chemical properties are the same obviously, but the
physical properties differ. Uranium thre thirty five. Essentially, it's gotta
be the uh, the atomic structure of it's got to
be manipulated in a way so that, in very crude terms,
it does not absorb, uh, what it is being bombarded with,
you know, like the the reaction has to actually be cultivated. Okay,
and this can only be achieved with the uranium twe
thirty five isotope. Okay. The uh. Such that Professor Esau
had any idea the urnium two thirty five was like
something was like special that it, you know, it was
distinguishable in terms of its potential for you know, applied
applied utility, you know, like military or otherwise. He if
he knew, if he had a deeper understanding than his
colleagues of why, he didn't disclose that, but he did
say that at once, we should secure all of the
able uranium stocks in Germany and we should cultivate uranium
two thirty five where we find it. He said that
it joints research group over his administration, but representing you know,
like all interested factions you know, party, state, military, you know. Uh,
And this was you know, people kind of like shrug
this off, like well, that's other asyl like trying to
you know, insinuate himself into some kind of you know,
hancho role, I mean, which within with under under the
under the German Reich, especially you know in the pre
war years that was not uncommon, but or they kind
of viewed him as just you know, another scientists kind
of you know, being hysterical. And for most of the
people present at the at the GENA conference and these
subsequent sin of meetings of this coterie that had you know,
that was involved in the uh you know, or that
there that was know within this kind of core of
people from the Department of Educational Standards as well as
the War Office. You know that nobody had heard about
uranium or uranium research until until the war broke out.
You know, as it happened. When the war did break out,
there was ah, you know, there was the there was
there was the there was the nominally civilian research team
that we just mentioned that the War Office had kind
of secretly you know organized and like I said, like
I I believe there's a direct line from them to
the chance for Adolf Hitler, although I can't prove that.
But uh, there were actually two teams in total working
on relatedly small scale uranium research like on the day
World War two broke out. Okay, at doctor Kurt Diebner,
who's the who's the here the armies expert on nuclear
physics of these uh? The uh the the the Deepners
was sam honestly dismantled the very day after Brendan, France
declared one in Germany PROSESL somehow to hear an interview
with General Becker, who's the chief of Army Ordnance. He
obtained a promise of full War Office support and full
and exclusive support for his uh, for his you know,
for his team's research endeavors that the expensed that Deepeners. Now,
some people will speculate it's kind of like the dog
that didn't bark in evidentiary terms, like, well, how do
you pull this off? Especially considering he was a civilian
and Deepner was insinuated into the army establishment. He must
have he must have promised some kind of results. I
don't think that. I don't I don't see that as
possible because I mean, you know, Becker, among other things,
you know, he get to that position without under having
a basic understanding of of of of you know, of
chemistry at least, you know, I mean it was You're
not talking about some man in the street as relates
to applied science, you know, even something that was then
as kind of theoretically uh abstract or you know, unknown,
as as as atomic physics. But I I don't, you know,
I don't. I don't see what Ese could have produced
either in order to kind of like in consider or
in consideration of that guarantee that supposedly would have been
made that Deebner couldn't have. I speculated just comes down
to Becker having more confidence in one man over the other.
But again, who knows. I think all of this is
kind of much ado about nothing, because the point I
think the key takeaway is that this was not viewed
as a priority, you know, not that it was uh
you know, I I think probably improved terms. Becker didn't
really give a shit, you know. I mean he Germany
was now at war with Britain and France, you know,
and his priority was, you know, doing what he had
to win that war. You know, like what one agghead
is bringing to the table versus another one. Well, he
makes the better argument. He gets the you know, he
gets the he gets the shudder, you know. I mean
that's these things so often are. And like I said,
I mean the speculation is basically people filling in the
gaps with what they want to to substantiate a narrative
that's you know, not this not uh substantiated by the record,
you know. I mean, so that's species. Anyway, what Becker
did agree to, what Esau did come away with, aside
from like a promise of you know, kind of funding
and support, uh was an official voucher certifying the military
importance of the project for the war efforts. But I mean,
like all kinds of all kinds of things we're kind
of given that proverbial stand, especially later on and kind
of more liberally by the s s believe or not,
I mean anything and against the sas basically whatever you've
givens him or like any kind of signific merit, you know,
whether it was you know, like uh, you know if
id you know, transforming like you know, corny to jet
fu wooler and I mean silly, but you know what
I mean, like it, I don't like the fact that
the fact that I was able to the that he
was able to get you know, like the Chief Army ordinance,
you know, to to sign off on his research. I
mean that basically means he was competent then like whatever
he came up with, like probably would you know, be utile,
and whether it was or not, you know, like whatever
he came up with belong to the army, you know,
not not to not to not to any you know,
private sector or university patron. So that's oh, that's that's
kind of the foundation of uh, that's kind of the
foundation of you know, like leading into the war, like
what what the state of uh, you know, atomic research was.
Of course, ultimately like during the war the title uh,
mister Irvings book the Virus House, I mean that was
the heavy water facility that was dedicated to you know,
that was dedicated to you know, cultivating uranium two thirty five.
So I mean there's something there. Yeah, and uh, I
hope not boring everybody to death. I'll try to wrap
this up in the next episode, but it but yeah,
that's I don't want to I don't want to get
into that now because then we'd be talking for the
next hour. But yeah, that's uh, that's uh, basically the
the foundation and you know, like I said, I think
it's the reason why I wanted to cover this now
was I think it's timely gonna ground to the ab
and Iron movie, which in a lot of ways is
not a bad film. I suppose you were Hollywood, and
like some people, I believe chrits reh Nolan was kind
of surreptigially signaling the political things. I mean, that's a
subject for another stream. But I thought it was timely.
Speaker 3: Man.
Speaker 2: I hope people are. I mean, it's it's essential understanding
the total picture of the conflict. So I hope people
are getting something out of it. The Feedbackcine's good so far.
Speaker 3: Yeah, I think the.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I think the very first time we ever talked,
we talked about the spelling and changing narratives, and you.
Speaker 3: Know, the narrative of this is.
Speaker 1: Wrong. The narrative that people believe of the German bomb
program is wrong. So I don't see how anybody can
if one of the goals, if one of the goals
is to open people's eyes to World War two and
exactly what it was, I think there's no more important
there's no more important, uh subject, than a potential you
know bomb that you know, they oh, he would.
Speaker 2: Have just dropped everywhere. No, I mean and and people too,
like I said, the important you know, I spent a
lot of time with game theory and like formal logic.
I mean it's like my background like educationally, but also
it uh, you know, the Cold War was so I
mean nuclear weapon Like the Cold War can only understood
within the context of the nuclear paradigm, you know, like
it was just it literally defined every aspect of it,
like military, political, philosophical, Like people can't get their minds
around really the idea that you know, in a different
strategic paradigm, let alone one in the twentieth century that
you know, nuclear weapons could have not been you know,
the kind of trump card the or like the key
to victory that oviated you know, all like lesser killing
technologies you know, and like I cannonize that enough. It's
like again like even people, I'm not any people have
got their own conceptual prejudices one or the other about
the Third Reich, Like it's not put that out of
your mind totally. Think it's really strategic terms about irrationality
of what Berlin had to accomplish in order to realize
it's war aims. And win the war. Like again, how
would an atomic bomb facilitate that? I mean, on the
one hand, like, yeah, it's better always to have like
potential firepower on hand. That's devastating, But it's not okay,
I mean, it's it's you know, it's not. Uh, it's
it's not like like the utility of these weapons is
not there's not a spectrum, a wide spectrum utility to them,
you know it. And I think people forget that, you know,
even people who are basically informed about things and you know,
conceptually literate. But yeah, all right, I'm rambling. Man. I won't,
I won't. I won't keep you any longer. But thanks
so much for hosting me. Man, I owe you a
lot with friends, and I appreciate being able to cover
these things. But I really really appreciate the chance to
appear on your program. Like believe that.
Speaker 3: I'm very always You're always welcome.
Speaker 1: All you have to do is contact me with the subject.
Speaker 3: Then you know, we'll do it.
Speaker 1: But before we do that, hit up some plugs and
uh we'll get out of here.
Speaker 2: Yeah, legit. I'm always on substack and in September, I'll
be dropping season two of the podcast in the interim.
I'll keep dropping like one off content that you can
listen to, like the Nego Cloud interview and other stuff.
I promise. But in September, season two will drop, and
when it does, all all all other content, all other
podcas As content will be free. It's real Thomas seven
seven seven dot subsect dot com. Uh. You can find
me on the app formally known as Twitter. It's real
R capital R E A L underscore number seven h
O M A S seven seven seven. I'm on Telegram.
It's at Thomas Graham number seven h O M A
S seven seven seven Graham. Or no, it's Thomas. Yeah, no,
it's that's right. That's right. I'm not going c isle.
I'm just tired. And that's uh. The YouTube channel, there's
nothing there yet except a couple one off things, you know,
like an intro and you know, some stuff that I've
recorded with friends, like my dear friend Carrie. On my
YouTube channel, it's Thomas t V. That's uh. When I
go to Utah in a couple of weeks, it's to
begin shooting dedicated content for Thomas TV. So I'm excited
about that. You know, we're doing a lot more with
the brand, not just like sexing up the production values,
which I owe to my dear friend Rake and his team,
like literally, like I could not do any of this
stuff without them. They're the guys who do all like
the editing and stuff and make things like presentable, like
legit I'd be if it was just me, Like i'd
be like some like a hobo, like looking like he
was on Public Access and like nineteen eighty or something like,
I'd be like something from like yeah, it'd be like
something from like Public Access and like some alternate dimension
of shit. But uh, some keep that in mind that
they're the guys who really are owed props for anything
I'd do in this regard. But yeah, that's about where
we're at. I uh, I'm hoping to be able to
drop steel Storm three my early spring Nuremberg by summer,
and that's all I got for right.
Speaker 3: Now until part three. Thank you, Thomas, Yeah, thank you for.
Speaker 1: I want to welcome everyone back to the Pekanana Show.
I'm here with Thomas. How are you doing, Thomas, I'm
doing very well.
Speaker 2: Thanks for hosting me again. I hope, I hope people
have been getting something out of this series. You know.
I'm I'm a I'm a historical writer, and I know
something about political theory, in the law and in formal logic,
but I'm not I'm not a scientist at all. I'm
not even like a layman who you know is is
just highly competent in science or something. So I I
hope I'm not embarrassing myself in the way I explain
some of these things. But I've gotten feedback. Like a
friend of ours who's a German dude who also has
a degree in physics, like told me that, like He's like, yeah,
if I'm proud of you for like not totally fucking
this up. That made me feel kind of good. Like
our German friends as well as like our physicist friends
generally don't pull any punches in that regard. So but today,
I mean, there's just a lot here. Okay, I mean,
but I think we'll maybe go one more episode just
as a you know, after this one. It's kind of
a bookend, and maybe field questions. But I'll explain what
I mean with the statement I'm about to issue forth
as we get into the meat of today's episode. But
you know, the German the German atomic bomb program such
that it such that there could even be said to
be one that existed. It was basically strangling Utero when
when the Vermacht was like stopping his tracks at the
gates of Moscow. Okay, I'll get into what I mean
by that as we move along. Okay, if nothing else,
you know, military exigencies and and and the long emergency
of of a of a long war, a prolonged war
which Germany cannot afford to wage, may rendered any any
kind of German version of Manhattan Project, you know, not feasible,
even if it was strategically sound as regards you know,
its impetus, you know what, it would it even resolve
Germany's military quagmire emergent military quagmire. But there's a lot
in between, you know, nineteen thirty nine and December nineteen
forty one. They still needs to be addressed. And the
person at Heisenberg features very prominently here. Okay, for those
who know, Heisenberg was not an experimental physicist. He was
a very much a theoretical physicist and frankly something of
a philosopher with theological interests. You know, he was not
he was not really the counterpart to Oppenheimer or something
you know, and I say that like in the most
praising terms. I think a guy like both Gang Smith
is kind of very much a descendant, the spiritual descendant
of Heisenberg. So the fact that Heisenberg came to be
you know what kind of helm the virus house research
and all attendant projects. I mean that tells you something too,
you know. I mean it's some and I'll expand upon
that with discrete facts and testimony, but that's something you
need to keep in mind. You know. It's just there's
a lot of connecting the peribial dots and the absence
of direct testimony or concrete evidence to point to in
order to you know, paint a picture of what this
of what this endeavor was, and you know what gave
rise to it and how it was not what was claimed,
but you know to what degree? To what? To what
degree it was? Uh, the people who claimed the German
atomic bond program was was was well underway and a
dedicated capacity. The degree to which that was propaganda deliberately
cultivated by interested parties contra. You know, people actually believing
this was the case owing to the not just the
fog of war, but you know, the kind of opaque
nature of of what was then you know, the new science,
you know, and and everything else. It's hard to say.
I think it depends on who we were talking about,
but we'll get into that too, particularly the views of
people like Stimson versus you know, those in you know,
I mean Stimpson was an outlier in the New Deal
administration anyway, but you know, he the view of him
versus you know people, uh who who people in the
administration who are most receptive to Einstein and Sax's claim.
I mean, there's a there was a there's a difference
in inconceptual horizon there. But I want to get into
we left off last time with the April twenty ninth,
I mean thirty nine conference, and as as we as
we got into, uh the focus of that discussion really
was the feasibility of a of a quote uranium engine,
you know, like we said such that these such such
that these discussions among this coterie that the War Office
had corralled had had it had a focus, and later
like such that there such that their experimental activities, you know,
had a discrete focus. It It was it was really
towards well we conceptually what we'd consider a nuclear reactor
and that becomes relevant, that becomes independently relevant as a
as time went on. We really relating to the weaponization
of of of of uranium two thirty five as we'll see,
but a few days prior, a guy named Neils Borr,
who was a Dane, but he was in some way
he had like an outsized impact on German physics, okay,
and he was very much like a mentor of Heisenberg
among other among other luminaries. He and uh a guy
named J. E. Wheeler, they published the American Physical Review,
which was read pretty much by everybody in the Western
world who's it all involved in physics even throughout the war,
you know, this endured it uh it uh it reiterated
the idea that uranium two thirty five had weapons potential.
You know, so this was even independent of any New
Deal propaganda, independent of any you know kind of anxieties
uh well founded or not within the British intelligence establishment,
like there were just like worldwide, there were people who
were arguably you know, like explendidly disinterested in the political
climate and the burgaining you know, battle lines who were
playing with this idea. You know, it was at least
on their radar. Okay, So the climate, the intellectual climate
into which everybody was sort of thrust who was taking
on a role in experimental physics and in any combatant
nation actual or potential you know, there was there was
there was this kind of subtext of you know, military
potentially a direct military potential here. Okay, So I mean
to be fair, like that's got to uh, that's got
to be accounted for Ada Han, who you know, who
was an experimental physicist and who did have trumendous clout,
uh just just just across the board, like not just
but it's particularly within the uh, within the committee in
uh Berlin. Uh. He said that any project essentially, you know,
try and cultivate uranium two thirty five, it it'd be
it'd be astronomically expensive anyway to present you know, just
insoluble difficulties. Professor Bagey, who was uh a pre eminent
researcher and he was kind of the top researcher who
was attached to Heisenberg in a direct capacity, like he
was literally his protege. He said, well, let's call it
Heisenberg himself. And you know, if if this is possible
or if this is just you know, a pipe dream,
not even the development of a bomb. Isn't that It's
not that's not the question on the table, just you know, uh,
the uh the you know, the but the the extraction
of light uranium isotope in appreciable quantities, you know, like
he if if this is possible and if it's feasible,
you know, uh within you know our present means you know,
he'd be the man who could uh who could you know,
sort of shed light on this. Now, heisenbergola universally respected.
Like again, there was a basic element of disdain for
theoretical physics among uh many of these experimental physicists, and
that very much that that verific of a parent when
Heisenberg kind of joined this, join this this this this
quorum not a qual I mean, it was anything but
a quorum as a coterie, you know. In that Uh,
there was a lot of there's there's a lot of
there's a lot of contrarianism for his own sake, uh,
kind of thrown up in these discussions, which I think
David Irving in his book makes that point. And he
had opportunity to you know, speak to some of the
men who actually were in attendance at these meetings, at
least in like a more than oblique capacity. The UH,
well was finally agreed upon, was basically that if there
was any if there was if there's any slight the
official statement what was decided, like the minutes of of
these kinds of like the collected minutes of these these
debates discussions was UH what Professor Geiger said, if there
was any if there was even the slightest chance of
liberating energy from the atomic nucleus, it was, you know,
in any of these experiments, that it had to be
followed up. Okay, the UH it was recommended that General Becker,
you know, the the Ornaments Department chief, UH, that that
dedicated to quote Nuclear Physics Research Group. The organized under
these auspices, and you know, like we talked about last time,
like ESA had an amicable relationship already with Becker and
UH so so it was it was it was. It
was made so for security reasons, and this too, I
think clouded perception of the Allies, at least in those
who were within military intelligence. For security reasons. The project
UH the language employed UH in documents relating to it,
it was all characterized as as research for the creation
of potential fuel sources for rocket propulsion. Okay, Like the
actual Reich rocket program was, it became, it came into
the auspices of of the s S eventually, you know.
That's why von Braun like actually was in was in
was in uniform in the s S, you know, like
he was, you know, you like, it was formally incorporated
into the organization and in a very top down way.
You know, the rocket program is an example of how
of everything that you know, the that that that the
virus house program wasn't you know. And I also believe
owing to the intrinsically uh military language of uh you know,
this kind of deliberate mischaracterization of the program as a
rocket program, I think that may have convinced people who
came across kind of scraps and and statements out of
the ear, you know, who were spying on the Third Reich.
I I think they just made they they axiomatically determined, like,
you know, well, this is this is a direct this
is a this is a direct military endeavor, you know,
and uh that that's not unreasonable, It's not unreasonable conclusion
to draw, especially if one understood how the German General
staff system work and kind of what the interplay was
between you know, technological research within what was nominally the
private sector, and you know, it's it's the ability of uh,
the military to capitalize on on these on these developments,
you know. But it's I think that's uh, I think
that's interesting. And it's also, uh it goes too like
we're priorities were you know, like kind of the people,
uh people in the Wehrmacht kind of like they viewed
as like the zenith kind of of of of vartech,
you know, was uh what was aerospace stuff. You know,
it's like with with with with rocketry obviously kind of
being the the absolute diseenth of of that. But the
uh it uh. What also happened was on a on
on September sixteenth, for the the Kurt Diebner, who he
talked about last time. He was appointed to lead at
least nominally in the Nuclear Physics Research Group under Ordnance
Department auspices. Doctor Bagge, who began keeping a diary for
the first time in his life, because I mean, I
think he realized, I'm sure he realized that whatever the
outcome of these endeavors, it was something you know, he
was participating in scientific history. You know as he was
being made. But on the UH he notes that on
September sixteenth, nineteen thirty nine, Diebner summoned him personally UH
to report the Army Ordnance Department. He writes, participating the
quote conference about an important matter, then returned to Leipzig.
This was the last from this point on the reason
why he uses that UH, that deliberately minimalist language. Any
reference to the possibilities of uranium for any any of
any application, reactors, UH, super bombs, anything was considered was
classified as a state secret, okay, And all all references
the possibilities of uranium and energy derived from uranium was
was actively suppressed, okay the first instance. And again this
goes to show you the kind of frosty relationship between
the private sector and the army in this regard, you know,
kind of splendidly contrary the situation is existed between the
aviation industry and UH, the military establishment, which was positively incestuous.
A Semens research chemist, you know, a Semen research physicists.
You know. Semens was a huge conglomerate, you know, like
they uh, they're basically insinuated everything on the cutting edge
of of UH of applied sciences, you know, as related
to industry and everything else. The UH he submitted in
an article UH to the main like German news agency.
It contained a detailed description of UH, you know, like
a kind of like the atomic science of the day,
you know, and it's it's supposed, you know, like marvelous
potential for purposes civilian and military. And it refers specifically
of the power contained in the uranium nucleus. And it said, quote,
it potentially contained enough to blast the ruins of a
giant city up into the stratosphere. What terrific powers of
annihilation and erfs were have It could fight an enemy
with bombs like these end quote. And the writer called
UH and knowing certain terms or increased experiments UH with
masses of uranium, which again the Reich had access to
in Czechoslovakia. There were uranium reserves in Portugal too, and
later on late late, very late in the war, even
the British work convinced that this played into some of
the kind of you know, the reasons why like in
their view, UH, the fear sort of treated UH Franco
with kid gloves. The majority of these the majority of
these resources were in Portugal. But obviously you know it
it uh that that the key to the uh to
the peninsula was Ibran peninsula, Spain. But that's something of
a tangent. But the uh, the this this, this article
was totally suppressed, and UH the author was warned like
nothing of this nature can appear in print. When uh
there was a papers on general atomic research were allowed,
including uh directly related to you know, experience involving uranium
and uh including the light isotope, but uh, no direct
mention of their context was to be made, and certainly
not any even speculative suggestion about you know, their employment
and weapons programs. Now we can look at that in
a number of ways, you know, like it's like we
talked about before, and I think you raised when you're
looking ahead. I mean, the Germans were actively at war
by this point. This was the you know, the two
weeks prior the United Kingdom in France and declared law
in Germany. But even at even at nominal peace, you know,
in a strategic landscape such that Germany was situated. You know,
the way, you've got to be careful with what you
introduced into the stream of information. You gotta be careful
about the disinformation you insinuate, and probably it was in
the minds of plenty of people that the last thing
that the right and needed was uh, you know, the
new dealers in the British being able to seize upon
statements by top scientists that Germany is working on super weapons.
You know, Hitler especially was very consent of this, like
so is Gerbels and that uh that there's there's there's
a very interesting give and take around both men's respective
ideas on the role of you know, media at war
and as a political apparatus. But my point is that
it's not it's not just like prema fashion evidence that
oh Berlin demanded this be suppressed. They obviously were, you know,
this was their goal was to you know, do exactly
that what was suggested in the article by the Siemens physicists.
You know, it's quite a bit more nuanced because I've
run across we're a very basic treatments of that anecdote
that you know, profit precisely that sine conclusion the uh. Now,
one of the problems faced whatever the state of applied
research utilizing uranium two thirty five by the German scientists
was you know, whether whether as a dedicated weapons program
or just as you know, I'm trying to identify what
potentiality existed utilizing these you know, these these this element
specifically uranium thre thirty five is an energy source like whatever,
whatever the whatever the ultimate goal was, there was a
there there's a problem with, uh, there's a problem with
isolating uranium two thirty five and cultivating it. Okay, and uh,
this is such was the you know they're from there
from whence emerges the concern about you know, it just
being a cost prohibitive affair, which makes it, you know,
functionally useless, particularly as a a military a military endeavor.
The UH September nine, the second Conference of the Nuclear
Physicists at the Ordnance Department was held. The subject of
that conference was specifically means of extracting energy from the
uranium nucleus, either in either controlled amounts you know, as
would facilitate a reactor or uranium furnace, or or in
the uncontrolled chain reaction reactive violence of an explosion. Okay,
the first, the first accounlisting the first would would involve
mixing the uranium with some substance caple of literally slowing
down the high energy fast neutron is admitted during the
fission process without absorbing them. For technical reasons I don't
quite understand. Neutrons of a certain energy band are particularly
prone to capture by uranium. So for them not to
be lost, uh, they these these these fishing neutrons had
to be had to be rapidly slowed down by some
kind of breaking substance or in science scientific language like
moderating elements or moderator. Okay, the uh The second uh
them possibility was that if if, if, if, that's gonna
be made to utilize this as an explosive, you know,
if a super bomb was in fact possible. You know.
The uh it was the rare I hope that was
needed to fish in with thermal neutrons. Okay, so how
do you how do you how do you get the
how do you get the uranium two three, five that
you need? You know? In the case of the first question,
a professor Harvik he discussed the design of the uranium
reactor to solve both problems. Okay. He had a colleague
named doctor Hans Seuss, not doctor Seuss, the guy who
wrote like the cat in the head, Like this guy
is like an actual like doctor named Seuss like take
from that way you will. I know, some dick is
gonna mention starability, sneeches or something like. It's not about that,
Sue said, proposed that heavy water was uh, it was
was to be used in the in the UH as
as as as as the moderating element. Okay, what is
heavy water. It's a form of water. Obviously, we whose
hydrogen atoms are all dueterium, also known as heavy hydrogen,
rather than the common hydrogen isotope that makes it most
of the hydrogen and normal water. The presence of heavy
of heavier hydrogen, the heavier hydrogen isotope, it gives the
water different nuclear properties, and the increase in mass alters
the uh the physical and chemical properties as relates to
normal water. Okay. Now, so as this research went on,
in other words, you know, kind of like the challenges
like stacked up and up and up, and as I'm
sure you've gleaned, basically, uh, what became clear according to
the path the course of German research, and America was
able to avoid this entirely owing to plutonium. And we'll
get into that briefly if there's time or if people
are interested. But basically, like when it came clear of
the second conference, what was being floated is that, well,
it's not a question of do we build a bomb
or do we build a reactor or not not even
dew we but like what what's the potential here? Is
that if you want, if you want to do anything
like the latter, you you have to develop the former anyway, Okay,
something this is just becoming like who's going to pay
for all this when this may not even be possible
and we may not even have access to the uranium
uranium pile reserves that we need in order to accomplish it.
The Heisenberg Enter Heisenberg he was commissioned specifically to investigate
theoretically whether a chain reaction in uranium was possible given
the known UH properties of of of neutron fusion and
uranium fission and the characteristics there. And over time, this
is pre nineteen forty one. After ninety forty one, things changed.
Reasons we'll get into that kind of became the focus
of such that they're gonna be said to be like
a dedicated focus towards a uh A directly military application. Okay.
I think this is when discussions corral discreetly around the
potential of an atomic bomb, okay, within German physics quarters
generally and specifically within this Ordnance department coterie of great
physics minds. Okay. And partly yeah, obviously because partly like
that's something that you know, the Wehrmacht needed to know
about if this was possible, you know, owing to the
fact that Germany was now at war. But also I mean,
if that's possible, if you know, basically like it's you know,
if if there's potential for you know, energy release at all,
you know, like the most kind of the most kind
of concrete way you know, to understand that in experimental
terms is to determine if you know, like an explosive
chain reaction can be cultivated. Okay. I think that must
be accounted for and based upon Heisenberg's own notes, like
I'm talking about like his personal like opinion work product
that was you know, not for anybody else's eyes. This
seems to be the case because he never once talks
about you know, I mean, first of all, there was
his reactions when he was in captivity to the you know,
to the hero seem in Nagasaki texts, but also like
in his own I say, opinion work products. It wasn't
a proper diary. You know, he never wants to write,
you know, some of the effect of you know, like
this we're we're working towards development of a bomb. I mean,
he writes a lot and he and he raised issues,
uh with with colleagues about you know, the reality of
of of this research for various you know, in various capacities.
But number once does want to get the idea that
you know, he saw himself as insinuated into some sort
of like German Manhattan project. The uh around the same time, uh,
the War Office somewhat abruptly, uh, they took over the
they took over the building on the camps of the
Kaiservillehelm Institute of Physics. Okay, because it had it had
the best equipment for for for applied atomic research, probably
probably in Europe, definitely within Germany. All uh, all scientists
participating in you know, the uh, the War Office project,
uh were they they were they were asked to transfer
this one central institute, you know, so that like they
basically like all hands to be on deck under one roof.
This is this is absolutely necessary, Okay, especially we're talking
about this kind of advanced research. The problem is these
men all had uh you know, these weren't military men
to a man, they were ah, you know, civilian researchers.
They had egos. Uh. They they were all, you know,
kind of the kingfish of the pond. They were situated
at in their respective institutions. But it's also you know,
some of these guys were young, but a lot of
them weren't. You know, It's like they people become very
attached their research, particularly men I'd have to imagine a
brilliant intellect. You know, they didn't want to They didn't
want to be part of a team. I mean, who
the hell does you know, like in that capacity. So
uh most almost most of them, uh like almost all
of them objected, and many of them just declined. They
just declined, what amount of do a direct order? Okay?
But it's like the cachet that these men had was,
you know, you cannot you can't, you can't replace nuclear physicists, okay.
And like it's the uh who was corralled there uh
at the Berlin Dalum Uh the kinds of Vellam institute
like Weisiker, Vitz, Bob Borman, Fisher and Heisenberg was often present.
So I mean there was like a core uh, there
there was, there was there there was a core like
working group that did exactly what was what was directed.
But it indicated a real you know, it indicated a
real lack of of concrete focus and kind of top
down discipline towards a directed goal, you know. And that's uh,
that's I think that's more symptomatic than causitive. I mean
it's not you know, it's it's not it's That's important
to understand too, is that, you know, when we're not
talking about you know, a true German atomic bomb project,
but that was sabotaged by outside egos and eccentricities. It's uh.
And I want the second key takeaway too, is that
there's this there's this idea that you know, there was
some like brain drain in Germany because like you know,
all the brilliant physicists were Jewish like and got chased out.
That's not true at all. Heisenberg probably was like the
leading physics mind like on this planet, you know, and uh,
you know Weisigerwitz, Bob is Borman. I mean, all these
guys like they were boggy dee neer like they they're
at the top of their game. And frankly, you know,
they weren't. None of these guys were like party men
and were dedicated national socialists, but they weren't about to
reject their father land. Whige frankly had done tremendous things
for them in terms of facilitating their research in all
kinds of ways, and you know, providing them with you know,
not just the material means, but the kind of social
capital and and and structural resources to you know, to
practice there there you know, there their uh, their experiments
and everything else. Or or in Heisenberger's case, you know,
like there was really probably in uh probably in France
and probably in in in like the Nordic countries. I mean,
he would have been like a luminary, but it you know,
he I mean Germany was Germany was uh what was
was was was was the center man, it was the
it was the actual pivot of h of scientific research
and endeavor in Europe. That can't be denied, you know,
and like the that's also uh, there was a disadvantage
here because uh Maut talk uh but his uh one
one of the you know, one of the one of
the researchers. He said I know in certain terms that
you know, he was delighted to be assigned this project
because you know, he could continue with atomic research and
his young colleagues, who we thought had great potential. He said,
we could protect them from getting called up to the draft.
You know, we could continue our scientific research in a
matter which we were accustomed like whether other people had
to tighten their belts, you know, other other young guys,
you know, who had a bright future and whatever career field.
You know, we're having to go fight, you know, for
the fatherland. You know. He's like, we were basically unmolested,
you know, So, I mean that's that's totally different, totally
of an idea or sensibility. That was the case with
the Manhattan product scientists and in the UK man like
there was uh the uh you know, there was like
we talked about, you know, Churchill had very uh he
in his in the and his sponsors. I mean they
re effectively you know, kind of kind of drown out
dissident voices as respect to the war effort, you know,
and it had becomes something of a career killer, and
especially in university life, which frankly, you know, was there
was a lot of Jewish influence there. You know, these
these uh, these guys in the UK or the counterparts
you know, to the UH to the Virus House UH
team as well as the Manhattan Project team. You know,
they they were very much, uh, they were very much
working in a dedicated capacity after nineteen forty one to
weaponize atomic energy to be turned against Germany. And they
had no qualms with this at all, you know. I
mean it wasn't even a question of qualms with the Germans.
This wasn't even on the radar, you know. I mean,
I can't eemhacize that enough. And if this was in
the military's mind, which I don't think it could have been,
because I mean they that the men who could conceptualize
these things, we're all you know in in academ i.
You know, if you if you're if the men who
can actually perform the experiments as required to facilitate the
engineering of such devices as will be coveted by the
arn't forces. I mean, if you can't, you can't make
them do that. I mean you're you're pissing into the wind. Uh. No,
what changed in nineteen forty one the Germans. Everything changed
in December, but before that, in July nineteen forty one.
The Ministry of Aircraft Production, which has something of an
outsized role in the UH. In what we can think
of is kind of like the Churchill Defense Establishment or
like you know, arms establishment, I mean for obvious reasons,
you know, I mean and UH, I mean the UK
realized early on and it hit a transition to UH,
a major make transition to a major air power. Otherwise,
you know, like the Royal Navy would only be as
dominant as a as A as the Royal Air Force
could be to defendant. So they so they so the
air mindustry and all of its attendant kind of appendages
UH developed a lot of clout. There was a special
committee appointed UH to research UH the UH the potential
of atomic energy. Okay, it can alluted that and effective
uranium bomb and again uranium out until UH, until American
research became kind of known to the world, like after
forty five in a complete capacity. Everybody's you know, uranium
was what everybody thought of when they thought of weapons potential.
The UH. This UH, the Aircraft Production Committee's report was
that about twenty five pounds of uranium two thirty five
the yield could be equivalent to about each inndred tons
of TNT and UH the committee. The committee's conclusion was
that Germany, having a taken steps to cultivate heavy water,
coupled with uh, you know, their uh, their increase in
my ding of uranium war within uh you know, they
newly that they newly gained access to in what was Czechoslovakia,
that it's obvious that you know, uh, even you know
they they're the state of Germany is and that they're
not they're not looking to utilize this for peaceful purposes.
You know. The only immediate benefit to the German Reich
of finding ways to release the energy contained there in
would be you know, in a weaponized capacity. I think
by this point, I think the British probably believed this.
I mean, who the hell knows. I mean, like we
talked about these guys were zealous anyway, but considering that,
you know, uh, there was far less known. I mean,
bring that some top signed is, but there's far less
known there than it was known in America, you know,
about what the kind of real world application of these
things would look like. I think that they probably believe,
like you know, anything, that the Germans were willing to
dedicate this kind of effort too, is UH is going
to be explicitly military and probably you know, some kind
of massive force multiplier that's misguided for a lot of reasons,
not ethically, if actually, but in a fog of war
kind of scenario with the state of science at the time,
that was UH, you know, available even to an expert.
I I I think they probably believed what they conveyed
the Churchill the UH. They further said that the material
for an atomic weapon UH at the earliest, at the
very earliest, could be available to Britain by the end
of nineteen forty three, you know. But that also, you know,
begs the question as to like, what would we do
with it and would it even work? But the UH
this of course led the British to UH try and
see if they could find out about the Uranian research
program through their contexts in Norway, the UH the primary
German heavy water facility was at Razuken, Norway. If I'm
butchering that, forgive me Juken, I think r j U
k A N. The problem is, as I think the
subscribers know, because we got into it in our Churchill episodes,
the Norwegians are not a particularly warm feelings about the British,
particularly when the British had intended to assault and invade
and occupy Norway preemptively. So throughout the summer nine forty one,
as UH intelligence came in from UH Trondheim to London,
you know from their intelligence operatives that uh, you know,
heavy water production that Rajukan you know, was steadily increasing.
The uh. The UH, the priority of UH, the priority
of the Prime Minister, you know, as well as everybody
in the intelligence into military establishment was to uh you know,
bring the Norwegian UH intelligence service on board and uh,
you know, essentially get somebody to you know, kind of
penetrate there was Jukan facility, or or at least uh,
you know, develop a a way of conveying information back
to London that might be usable in terms of how
you know, the facility could be could be compromised and
uh derailed from its purpose. They UH Norwegian essentially told
him to go to hell, you know, they they UH.
The official response from UH there was a guy named Welsh.
He was a lieutenant commander in UH British in u
in in UH in the British Army went on to
serve in the intelligence service. He'd married a Norwegian woman
and he was chief the Norwegian section of UH the
intelligence service. He UH he contacted UH when he when
he contacted his counterparts in Norwegian intelligence, apparently they literally
said to him a telegram, blood is thicker than heavy water,
you know, like basically go fund yourself, you know, like
we're not. We're not. We do. We want to be
thrilled that they that that, you know, the the bare
amount is here and we don't know what the hell
they're doing, you know, at this facility, but you know,
we're not. We're not gonna help you in Piggy Churchill
will find other ways to attack our country, you know.
And I think that's really interesting, especially considering how in UH,
particularly in in in English history books and like Quizzling
is held out it's just this like it's just this buffoon,
when in reality he was a great man. But also
they it's pretended that like Norway was a either fully
on board with the Allies with this like victim state,
you know, like a lot like you know, there was
a about five sweet five and ten thousand Norwegians like
joining vafen SS and for a populationized in Norway. That's substantial.
Like Nude Hampson, it was kind of like the National
Scribe in Norway. You know, he literally wrote a eulogy
to add off Hitler like they I mean there Rwegians
are great people, but I and it's just an interesting
kind of wrinkle that you know, they refuse to participate
in kind of these UH, these designs of of London,
even at the height of the of the of the
early phase of the war. At the UH same time
the UH, the British approached, at least as we know
from the record, the British approached the senior British scientific
representative and UH in the in in in the air
Mistry Committee. He wrote, he wrote to the chairman of UH,
Roosevelt's Scientific Advisory Committee, like when he was in Washington,
I believe like if I read that right, you know,
basically like you know, kind of feeling out, you know,
the the Yanks about you know, what the state of
their research was. And of course like they nobody else
had the Manhattan Project, you know, like knew anything. Like
even if they had, I it's I mean, it's debatable
if they would have just closed that or not. But
you know, there was a it was a security was
very very tight, to say the least. But he voted
the question, you know, this is it proves possible to
manufacture a uranium bomb, you know, should in fact be used?
You know, like should we should should it should? You
know one of our respective general staffs are both like
are they willing and should they sanction the total destruction
of Berlin and the entire you know, or or like
the entire country in Germany, you know, with with a
weapons such as this, you know, And it's uh, that's
really the only the kind of the kind of lame
indirect reply was from Stimson, who in Stimpson, like I
mentioned earlier tonight, but also like in the past I've
mentioned that Stimpson was a you know, an outlier in
the new New Dealer regime. But you know, he said
years after the fact that you know, in ninety three
we believed, based on you know, intelligence derived that we
consider reliable, that you know, the Germans were far ahead
of us and weaponized atomic research. I think Stimpson probably
believed that. But it's interesting I raised the issue of
the UK scientific representative like not only raising this moral quagmire,
but you know, kind of putting it to paper literally
in the documentary record. That's the only that's the only
such moral qualm I've ever heard from a British source
about about the about the atomic bomb from you know,
from the era before it was it even you know,
had been devised into existence. Bomber Harris, uh spoke very
candidly and intelligently and the morality of strategic bombing you
know later on, but that not of the out of
the nuclear question. But it's uh, I think the stuff's
useful to kind of it paints a picture of what
was in the minds of the relevant players, you know,
like I said by them, I in reality, America was
far ahead of everybody in terms of you know, applied
atomic weapons research. Plutonium was first synthesized, synthetically produced, and
isolated in late nineteen forty by deuteron bombardment of uranium
two thirty eight in a cyclotron at Unity of California, Berkeley, Okay,
and the ultimately plutonium plutonium proved to be a game changer.
The Nagasaki bomb was a was a plutonium bomb, okay.
But even like, aside from that, just uh at separating
uh plutonium from a chain you're acting uranium pile and
then using that as an atomic explosive. Just the fact
that possibility had been recognized, that meant that you know,
from you know, basically from inception of the Manhattan Project
was like on the path like developing an atomic bomb,
like in concrete terms, which is pretty remarkable. I mean
in all kinds of ways, I mean, like good and bad.
But the the uh, yeah, I was gonna say, Oh,
the UH summer of nineteen forty one in Germany, the UH,
the Army of Research Department had formally contracted Norwegian Hydro
for a supply of fifteen hundred kilograms of heavy water
between October and the end of the year or but
from October nineteen end of the year only three to
sixty one kilgrams have been delivered. It was slow going.
In other words, like if if this was in a
like even if even the process which was outlined at
the second Berlin Conference, which essentially amount of, do you know,
the creation of a reactor and subsequently you know, the
utilization of that reactor and the heavy water cooling to uh,
you know, to cultivate uranium two thirty five, Like even
if that, even if that was the objective and it
was on track. Arguably in terms of you know, both
intent and capability. This seems far too slow a process
to make any kind of difference on the battlefeel. We'll
get into exactly what I mean in a minute. But
what's important is that once, once, this, once this heavy
water cultivation got underway, Heisenberg attested. He said it was
from September forty one. He's like, we saw an open
a road ahead of us leading to an atomic bomb. Okay,
It's like, this is when I became convinced it was
at least possible. And that's when, uh, you know, just
kind of a what was what was gleaned from you know,
just these processes that were actively underway. Things came into
focus and a kind of conceptual capacity. Ethemics like, I'm
not a scientist, so I take these guys words for
it in their testimony when they suggest that this is
this is a you know, a real process. Whatever the
endeavor is, Neil's borr uh, and this is important. The
end of October ninety forty one, heis Montreil the Denmark
to seek out Neils Borr, who was one of the
pre eminent physics minds on this planet, and heisen he
was something of a mentor tot Heisenberg. Heisenberg asked him
in at Boor's home, he said, you know, and I
was Heisenberg wasn't being loose lipped and telling him like
what he was working on. He asked for just you know,
basically like, you know, what, what do you think of
the like is there a moral obligation and not cultivate,
you know, a weapon from atomic energy? Like basically, like,
what's the moral implications of working on an atomic bomb
in wartime if such a thing were possible? You know?
Orr said that you know it, you know, well, you
know the responsibility once fatherland versus you know, his duty
to you know, the scientific community as well as you know,
like human progress, all these things only need to be weighed.
Borr afterwards came away believing that this was like Heisenberg's
kind of like it was either Heisenberg sort of like
thinly veiled confession, or it was him trying to convey
to him and sort of like a culted language that
he was building an atomic bomb quite literally, and he
he see He later said Bored that he was deeply
shocked this. I believe Borr basically told all of his
intimates within kind of the small fraternity of European physicists
that you know, Heisenberg came to see me, and the
Reich is building a bomb, okay. And I think that's
when the kind of myth of the German atomic bomb
program really kind of took off in earnest, not in
a propaganic capacity. I think people actually believe this, and
I think Bora actually believed this too. But even if
that were true, and I'm gonna wrap up here in
a moment, but as fall became winter in nineteen forty one,
the Wehrmacht was stopped dead its tracks at the gates
of Moscow, you know, and as we talked about many
times in our series, you know, the right the Soviet
Union had to fall in December, you know, the the
entire German state, it's national economics, everything about it was
configured towards quote short wars with long respites, you know.
Like That's why I always emphasized that the Third Reich
was not some like mirror the Soviet Union. It was
not mobilized for war from the top down. It did
not even have a wartime mobilization scheme on play you
know until Lany forty three. You know, this was uh
the fact that, uh, the assault on Moscow failed. I mean,
this was a disaster, like ultimately this cost the war.
But immediately, uh, in December forty one, Hitler issued the
edicts that the need to the German national economy or
to give way to the necessities the arment's economy, and
that meant that, you know, uh, Fritz Toad on December third,
and for those who don't know, Fritz Toad was the
Albert Spear succeeded Fritz Toad as Armaments and Munitions Minister
after Toad was killed. Toads informed Hitler that the economy
was literally at the breaking point, and from then on,
any expansion in one sector to meet military necessities had
to be balanced by you know, reduction in another. You know,
Hitler drafted a decree essentially with like Toast's uh input
as to a you know what what this would entail,
you know, and essentially like shedding all like non essential
projects from like any firms or institutions like engaged in
applied research of a non military nature. Like essentially like
that was over. You know, it's uh. Professor Schumann, one
of the Genda conference attendees, he drafted an open letter
to all institutes working in the arene In project and
he said, he said to no one certain terms that
the quote, the work and the project undertaken by the
research group is making demands which can be justified in
the current recruiting and raw materials crisis only if there's
a certainty of getting some benefit from it in the
near few. Sure, you know, and that uh and that
uh and that that was that man, it's we can
there's more to the story of the virus house. As
the war went on, and particularly as you know the
tide truly turned, I mean and seek was no longer
a possibility after December forty one, but after Stalingrad, you know,
it can there's obviously like an opening a new questions
like why did the Iranian project continue? But that oh
do uh? That oh do I that old kind of
the nature of of modern modern bureaucracy, particularly in a
state of total war, you know, like these things that
are earmarked for funding of a way even an emergency
was kind of continuing to go on, you know, were
there were there's some people too, like within Dutch just
the research group, but within the military establishment, who had
who did understand the implications of this uranium research and
did think that there was potential for a real viable
device to be cultivated from it, you know, in a
way that could like help Germany. Yeah, I think there were.
David Ermi certainly seemed to think there were. We get
into some of that next episode, and I promise, I
I'll wrap it up. But there's just a lot here, man,
you know, and like, uh, I think, uh, I think
the entire story needs to be told. But yeah, that's
a I'm getting uncomfortable with form, like sitting for this
hour rightly, and I don't want to bore people at death.
But yeah, well we'll take this up in for a
part four and I'll I'll wrap it up then, I promise.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I don't think it's boring. I think people are
getting a lot out of this, So yeah, we'll do
we'll do wrap it up.
Speaker 2: With part.
Speaker 3: Yeah, but do plugs real quick and we'll get it.
We'll get out of it.
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah. You can find me on Twitter still or
X rather. I hate all like porny that scenes like
I don't like, I don't like I was like I
was on my phone like on the fucking train. It
was like some chick next to me and like you
only over the abs gonna be X. It's like, man,
I don't that just looks fucking I just don't like it.
But it's a real capital R E A L underscore
number seven h one e S seven seven seven on
on bird app or x app or whatever. The whole
of my podcast and some of my like longer form
stuff is on substack. That's the prime primary place to
hit me up. And it's a real Thomas seven seven
seven dot substick dot com. You can find my website
which is still under construction, but there's stuff there. It's uh,
just Thomas seven seven seven dot com number seven H
one E S seven seven seven dot com. My YouTube
channel is Thomas TV. I'm leaving for Utah on a
few days. Issue dedicated content for it, which I'm excited about.
As time goes on, we're gonna do more with that.
But I got a lot going on right now. I'll
be dropping more long form like books like in the spring.
You know, Season two of the pod is coming up
in September. Yeah, all kinds of stuff.
Speaker 3: Man, I appreciate it.
Speaker 1: Safe travels until the next time,