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Speaker 1: Hello, how are you.

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Speaker 2: All right? Man? We hear you, We hear you. Welcome

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to the Big Podcast on this What is this? Tuesday,

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the twenty fourth day of June, Year of Our Lord,

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twenty twenty five. My name is Tom Sullivan. So we've

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got what is this? The day after the day after,

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and everybody's watching to see what happens next. The President

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has declared that they are going to have a ceasefire,

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and it started off badly, and now the President is

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saying that he's mad at both Israel and Iran and

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he's trying to hold them to a ceasefire, which are

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all always a fragile event in any case. Surprising polling

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coming out, and it really shows more about how we

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are so divided in this country. I mean, we know

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that already, but on the polling regarding the fact that

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we went and bombed the nuclear facilities in Iran, it's

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very much the Republicans are very much in favor of it,

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Democrats very much against it. So it's awfully hard to

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conceive how you can be so far away from each other.

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But we are here in New York today. It is

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election day, and it is the Democrat primary election, which

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has been They had early voting for the last week

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and a half something like that, But today's the election day.

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Polls are open until nine o'clock tonight, so we won't

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probably know until probably tomorrow, maybe nextday, because it's banked

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rank choice voting, which means it takes a couple of

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days for them to figure out who's number one and

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who's number two. What's interesting about this is Andrew Cuomo,

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the former governor who resigned in disgrace. He was in

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the lead, but now you've got this up and coming socialist,

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avowed socialist, who wants to be the mayor, and he

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is now neck and neck with Cuomo, and AOC is

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backing him. Of course, so is David Hogg, the guy

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they just threw out of the DNC Supreme Court last night,

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ruled in favor of Donald Trump on the ability of

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this country to deport people to countries other than from

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where they came. So we'll get into all of that,

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and we've got an interview this podcast with Ira Victor,

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and Ira Victor is the technology guru that we have

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talked to for a number of years. There was a

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hack of sixteen billion passwords along with solid security numbers

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and names and everything else, and so sixteen billion. Basically

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you and me and everybody else. Probably our passwords are

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out there in the wind. So we'll talk to Ira

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Victors stick around for all of that. He's always got

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great tips on keeping your technology safe. But let's start

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today with the polling. Here's Harryton from the CNN statistician.

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Speaker 3: Things are moving quite quickly, but these are initial readings,

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and I will say, from a historical perspective, I am

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surprised that the net approval rating is so low on

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these strikes. And it's in two different polls. It's our

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CNN SSRs Paul twelve points underwater, one thumbs down. How

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about the Rotterer sipsos Paul, look at that the exact

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same reading, minus nine points underwater, two thumbs down. And

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why am I so surprised from historical perspective, because usually

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air strikes rate fairly highly. What are we talking about.

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Let's go back through the time machine net approval of

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US air strikes. You see it here around minus eleven

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points underwater on the average, compared to isis back in

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twenty fourteen, fifty eight points in the positive direction. So

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this is a nearly seventy point difference. That is why

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I'm so surprised from a historical perspective, because normally these

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air strikes rate quite highly, but this one, you go

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back through history, it rates as the lowest that I

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could possibly find on the historical record. I think there's

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this idea. Okay, maybe the MAGA base wouldn't necessarily like this. Look,

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this is Donald Trump's Republican Party. That's why I think

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is so important to note GOP on the US air

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strikes and run seventy six percent in the average of

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the two Poles approved compared to just eighteen percent who disapproved. Now, well,

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note that is a bit higher than Donald Trump's disapprove

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a rating within the Republican Party. But overall Republicans are

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with Donald Trump on this, Tucker Carlson B darn. The

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bottom line is he does not speak for the majority

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of the Republican base. The majority of the Republican base

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is with Donald Trump.

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Speaker 2: You'll notice that Harry talked about the twenty fourteen airstrikes.

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That was when President Obama was in the White House.

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So is it just another one of these cases where

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if Obama did it, the country was fine with it.

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If Trump doesn't know because they don't like Trump. In fact,

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I got a clip from Van Jones and he points

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that out that people don't like Israel, Democrats don't, and

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Democrats don't like Trump, and Democrats don't like bb net

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and Yahoo. So that's more. What this is is a

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big split between Democrats and Republicans. Republicans, well, we'll get

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to that. Here's Lee Carter, she's a Republican strategist.

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Speaker 4: From her Strober perspective, I agree, it's actually really surprising

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how negative the pulling is. But from where we are

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right now, we're such a divided country that this reflects

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exactly what the pulling says. If you support the president,

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you support what he did. If you oppose the president,

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you oppose what he did. I think the other thing

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about this poll that's remarkable is it doesn't capture the

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not shores. I think there's a lot of people who say, Okay,

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I approve of it, but I'm waiting to see what's

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the output's going to be that those that disapprove it say,

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I'm really scared that this isn't going to result in peace,

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and I'm worried about what's going to happen here on

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American soil. So I think there's a lot of people

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out there that are saying, let's wait and see that's

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not reflected in this poll. And I think we're going

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to see that in the coming days for sure.

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Speaker 2: And Jones, the big Democrats strategist, this is his take on.

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Speaker 5: It, like Trump wants to be the puppet master and

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the controller of everything. But you can't control bb Net

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and Yahoo, you cannot control the Orian regime, you can't

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control podin, And it just turns out that being president

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of the United States is not being king of the

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universe or God emperor of all reality, and so he's

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going to have to deal with that. I do want

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to point out though, that, you know, the difference between

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ISIS and Iran is Isis did not have a pr budget.

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Iran is doing a remarkable job of shaping public perception online.

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If you look at if you look at TikTok, they're

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presenting themselves as a victim party that had a deal

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with America, that America tore up the deal and they've

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been trying to get along and now they're being bullied

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and that is being very effective. And so ISIS had

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no PR budget. They were just chopping heads off and

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people could see what they are. They could see Isis

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for what it is. People are having a hard time

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seeing Iran for what it is, which is a brutal,

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horrific dictatorship that kills gays, that blinds women, and that

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has had a whole circling campaign around Israel of people

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firing rockets and killing people. So Iran's public image is

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very different than Isis.

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Speaker 2: Which is fascinating because this is the same sort of

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story that came out after Hamas attacked Israel on October

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seventh of twenty twenty three, and they came out and

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they literally said, we are the victims. Hamas attacked and

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killed innocent civilians in Israel, and they were able to

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turn the left media in this country and the left

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politicians in the feeling sorry for Hamas after they had

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just brutally murdered all kinds of Israelis in their homes

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on a Saturday morning. But they have a PR team,

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and the people that buy the PR are the media

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in this country, and they're doing the same thing again

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here and Iran as a PR team, and as Van

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Jones said, which I thought was fascinating is Isis did not,

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and that is the difference. One Republican that doesn't think

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that this is the end of hostilities between Iran and

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Israel is Carlos Jimenez, the Republican from Florida. He says,

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they're going to kind of take a pause and come

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back and fight again.

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Speaker 6: I support one hundred percent what the President has done,

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all right, I do. But you know, looking at the future,

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you know, maybe we're going to be facing a stronger Iran.

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You know, four or five years from now, when they

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find themselves down they want to negotiate. Give me some room,

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and now I'll come back. I'll go back to the gym,

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get stronger, and then we'll go at it again when

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I think I can beat you.

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Speaker 2: So will Iran come back? Will they rise from the ashes?

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Or are the ashes really ashes? Are there are the

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nuke materials still intact? Nobody really knows yet. Jeffrey Lewis,

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he's with a think tank that studies all this international

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foreign policy ideas, and he thinks, no, there's still a

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lot of nuke material for Iran to come back from

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the from the ashes.

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Speaker 7: Well, I mean, I think a lot of it depends

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on whether this sees fire holds. But if it does hold,

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I think you're going to see expectation from the Trump

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administration that there are some kind of talks. You know,

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the strikes, as impressive as they have been, have left

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a lot of nuclear capacity still in Iran, and at

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the end of the day, that's going to have to be.

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Speaker 1: Dealt with diplomat. Well.

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Speaker 7: When the conflict started, Prime Minister Netanyahu's identified the fact

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that Iran had enough nuclear material, he said for nine

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nuclear weapons. What he was talking about was four hundred

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kilograms or eight hundred pounds of highly enriched uranium that

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Iran had stored under tunnels in a mountain near a

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place called Natans. That material was not struck, those tunnels

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are not destroyed. There are pretty credible reports that Iranians

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have moved it. They're still in possession of that material,

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as well as a number of facilities where they are

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able to make centrifuges, as well as at least one

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facility where they were planning on installing centrifuges just a

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few days ago. So the reality is is Iran can

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still make centrifuges, It still has the material that started

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with the war with and it still has underground facilities

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that have not been struck. So the things they hit

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brilliantly and it's I am very impressed, But you got

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to hit it all, you know, you can't just.

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Speaker 2: Hit part Obviously, he thinks that they're still in pretty

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good shape. The dust off of you things and they're

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right back in business. So this again, it's going to

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take a while for us to figure out just exactly

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what was the results of the bombing and what is

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going to happen next with Iran and Israel. Mark Seeson

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kind of agrees in a weird way with Jeffrey Lewis,

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basically saying Israel doesn't want to have a cease fire.

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They want to finish the job because they think there

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is more to do.

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Speaker 8: Well, first of all, I understand where Israel is coming from,

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because look, they've destroyed Iran's air defenses, They've taken out

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more than half of their missile launchers. Aaron is pretty

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much completely vulnerable. So they want to take advantage of

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that opportunity. But Donald Trump has earned the right to

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say he wants to try diplomacy, and so he's got

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the right to do that. This is a guy who

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took one of the most consequential, boldest decisions of any

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commander in chief in my lifetime and taken sending B

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two bombers to store the Iranian nuclear program. And so

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that's earned him a little bit of space here to

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to try this. If the Iranians break the ceasefire, Israel's

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going to whack them. So they should sit back and

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let let's let's see what Iran does next. As we've

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found throughout our history, dictatorships are not necessarily rational actors.

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Speaker 1: Uh.

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Speaker 8: And the reality is that that Israel. You know, they

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they want to finish the job. They want to eliminate

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the threat. Once you've taken the risk of starting attacking Iran, uh,

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then you then you want to finish the job. But look,

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the hardest part is attacking the first time, breaking that taboo.

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Now they've done it. You know, there's a famous you know,

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Colon Powell doctrine that you know, if you break it,

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you buy it. No, actually you can break it over

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and over and over again, and you don't have to

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buy it if they if if Iran try you know,

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the Iranian nuclear chief said the other day, he said,

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yesterday we're going to start up our nuclear program again.

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Speaker 1: Good luck to you.

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Speaker 8: If we start seeing that they're just starting their nuclear

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program again, Iran's gonna Israel's going to whack them, and

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maybe the US will too, so you know, we want

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to keep our boots on their necks.

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Speaker 2: Oh my gosh.

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Speaker 8: After the strikes on Iran, he's positioned as the strongest

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world leader to stet foot at NATO in a generation.

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And look he's got His position is essential is that

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he supports NATO as long as they pay there to

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pay their way and carry their weight. And that's exactly

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where the mega movement is. By the way, the Reagan

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Institute has a new poll out showing that seventy one

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percent of self described NATO MAGA Republicans say that if

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a NATO ally is attacked, the US should come to

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their defense, But that drops to forty four percent if

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that country is not paying their way. And that's exactly

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Donald Trump's position. And he's saved NATO when he came

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and when he came into office, only three NATO countries

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were meeting their NATO commitments. He got them to spend

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four hundred billion dollars more on defense, and now he's

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raising the Anti to five percent of GDP. All the

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Eastern European allies are there. Poland is on track to

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do that this year, Lithuania, Latvian Estonia are going to

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between five and six percent. It's time for Germany and

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France and Canada, which is the laggard is only at

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one point six percent, to get there as well.

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Speaker 1: Well.

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Speaker 2: Let's also talk about a big Supreme Court ruling that

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came in last night, big win for the Trump administration.

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This is Chad Wolf, former Acting Director of the Department

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of Homeland Security, on the Supreme Court ruling six to

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three that the United States can deport illegals to third countries.

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In other words, not necessarily back to the country they

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came from, because some countries they came from don't want

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them back. So the court said, yes, you can send

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them to a third country. Here's Chad Wolf.

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Speaker 9: Yeah, I think this is a really important and incredible

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ruling that DHS has here, and it goes to the

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concept of the United States is not the only country

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that can take in refugees or assyl ees. And so

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this idea is that if you come here and you

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come to the United States, that we can send you

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back to a safe third country that gives you the

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protections that you need if you are in danger from

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your own home country. So that's why it's called a

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safe third country agreement of some kind. And so there's

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many countries around the world that, as you know, that

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don't take their foreign nationals back. And so rather than

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just keeping them here in the United States for decades,

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which we've seen flemarly with Chinese nationals, you can now

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what the Trump administration is now going to do is

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going to remove those to other third countries that will

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keep them safe that we have agreements with. That starts

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to diminish the pool factors that we talk about here,

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because more and more people will come if they know

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they can't get sent back to their home countries, they're

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just going to keep coming to the United States. This

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takes away that pool factor that anyone and everyone can

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come to the United States, regardless of who they are,

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regardless of any kind of status in the United States

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needs to keep them here in the country and release

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them so that perhaps they can reaffec end and address

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and come to a lot of Americans. And it's just

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not right. I mean, the ability the Trump administration has

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been saying for some time now that if you're a

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criminally legal alien here in the United States, we're going

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to arrest you and we are going to remove you

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gone or the days where you just get released into

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the American communities to reoffend. And I think that's what

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the Trump administration that will be kind of what they

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are known for this term, and they are well on

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their way. And it doesn't surprise me that you have

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Democrats that are upset about that. These are the same

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folks that praise Joe Biden and Kamala Harris for four years.

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Speaker 2: Then the question is what about the godaways, what about

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the Iranian nationals that are in this country that came

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across the border, and what are they doing now?

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Speaker 9: Yeah, this is a big issue. Obviously, for four years

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we had any number of individuals coming across, and so

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the consequences of four years of an open border are

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going to obviously manifest itself differently. And so we know

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that has Bellah Hamas and others are here in the

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United States. Will see if they are activated, We see

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if they are inspires the FBI and local law enforcement.

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I know we're doing everything that they can, but this

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is a real concern and unfortunately four years of the

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Biden administration will eventually have consequences.

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Speaker 2: And I mentioned at the beginning of the podcast today

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that the election, the mayoral election in New York City

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is underway today. It had a primary or early voting

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about a week and a half ago, last week and

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a half, but today is election day. And the guy

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who what a choice New Yorkers have. It's going to

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be ranked choice voting. But the choices are Andrew Cuomo,

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who has been in the lead, the former governor who

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resigned in disgrace. Yeah, that's what that's considered the best choice.

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The other guy who's come on strong and now may

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win the thing. We'll find out in a couple of

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days because of rank choice voting, takes a couple of

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days for them to tally everything up. But this guy's

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name is Ma'm Danny, and mister man Danny's a vowed socialist.

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He wants universal free childcare. He wants free buses for all.

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He wants city run grocery stores. Yeah, the city will

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run grocery stores, no cost childcare, new anti police safety department.

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We don't like the police, no, So we're going to

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have a anti police Safety Department, and he's going to

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create an office of LGBTQIA plus affairs. So that's the

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primary stuff that he is promoting, and I'm sure he

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has many other ideas that are very, very similar. So

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even the Chicago Tribune today wrote about their mayor brand

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and Johnson and what a mess it's been for the

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city of Chicago, and they said, please New York learn

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from us. You do not want a socialist mayor. So

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we'll see what happens from there, all right. The story

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about the sixteen billion passwords that have been stolen, this

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is from a number of sites today where you can

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find the story about it. Sixteen billion passwords along with

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your name and your social Security number and everything else.

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And so I thought the guy to talk to you

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about all of this is the digital forensic expert that

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we rely on so many times over over the years,

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Ira Victor. He's with Discovery Technician dot com. And here's

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my conversation with Ira about not only the stealing of

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the passwords, but how it all works and what can

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you do to protect yourself? This story about the hack.

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There's all always lots of stories like you that come along,

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but this one is sixteen billion Google, Apple, other passwords

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were leaked and what do I do? What do people

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do if their passwords are leaked out? I have a

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password program that I pay for, and so do I

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have to go through that and change every one of

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my passwords?

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Speaker 8: Well?

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Speaker 1: All right, So the first thing to understand is this

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is not a breach from the big tech companies, not

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from their servers. This particular breach is not from their servers.

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This is a drip drip drip from breaches that have

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been going on for quite a long time and continue

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to happen. The question is where's the source of the breach?

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And all the reports are that the source of the

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breach for this data are from people's individual devices, So

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not from from the Google cloud, not from the Apple iCloud,

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not from Facebook's cloud, but the credentials to those systems

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and more there are copies of those on people's devices,

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and this is what's called credent credential stealing, and this

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is ongoing. It isn't in the past, it's ongoing.

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Speaker 2: So from that they're stealing from people's phones. Is that

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what you're saying?

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Speaker 1: Bones, yeah, bones, desktops, tablet yeah, network table yeah. And uh,

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you know, Willie Sutton said, why do you rob banks?

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That's where the money is. We want to go. You

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want to steal, you want to steal the credentials. The

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easiest place to steal them is from the devices because

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these devices were designed, they were engineered tom to be

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open and promiscuous. That's that's the word we use. They're

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promiscuous devices. They're designed to connect and talk to everything,

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and cyber criminals leverage that.

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Speaker 2: So but I mean, I'm not own. People have gone

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out of their way to try to make sure that

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their passwords are protected. And what do I do? How

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do I is there? Are you telling me there's not

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a way.

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Speaker 1: Though there is a way, There absolutely is a way.

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I'm not saying that at all. And here's the mantra

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to remember. Do you remember nothing else from listening to

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me today? Good DataX, strong data security and privacy is

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more about process than products. The industry wants you to think.

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The security industry, most of the vendors want you to

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think it's about buying more products, more hardware, more software,

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more clouds. This moor that sure, because that drives up

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their valuation that they that they make money on by

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taking that into the public market, to the stock market.

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Sure that that's their goal, that's their primary goal. My

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contention is, and I'm in I'm in a camp that says, no,

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it's about more about process than products. So and therefore

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it's not a lot. It's not about spending a lot

401
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of money, you know, much to the to the sadness

402
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of a lot of the security vendors. I want you

403
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to think, you know, throw a lot of money at

404
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the problem and then you'll solve it. That doesn't because

405
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clearly if that work, we would have had.

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Speaker 2: The problem solved, right, Tom, Well, we talked about it

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a lot of times that corporate America doesn't spend enough

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money on security on their tech. But you're saying, this

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is a different road. This isn't the normal.

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Speaker 1: That's right.

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Speaker 2: This is on the device.

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Speaker 1: So a password manager is a So first, let's the

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a couple of things. One is I can I can,

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I can tell you about this particular kind of attack,

415
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which is credential stealing, and some tips to reduce the

416
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likelihood of credential stealing. But keep in mind today it's

417
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credential steel. There are a bunch of gangs, cybercriminal gangs,

418
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doing the credential stealing. Meanwhile, there are other cyber criminal

419
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gangs doing other types of effect. So this isn't This

420
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is this approach of like we we called a fire

421
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droll approach. Oh there's a there's an arsonist over here,

422
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go put out that fire. There's an arsonist over there,

423
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go put out this fire. Maybe we should think more

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about fireproof fire resistant buildings rather than than than more

425
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fire departments. But let's just talk about the fire right here.

426
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With with credential stealing passwords, we call that credentials or

427
00:24:54,640 --> 00:24:58,039
authentication right right away. What people can do right away,

428
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What people can do the browser companies in order to

429
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get you to stick with their browser companies. And just

430
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for those that don't know, Google Chrome is an example

431
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of a browser. Microsoft Edge is an example of browser,

432
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Apple Safari a, Mozilla Firefox. These are all browser companies.

433
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In an effort for them to get you to stick

434
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with their browser, they give you a feature where the

435
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browser remembers your passwords, and most many many people use that.

436
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And you see the pop up do you want to

437
00:25:31,440 --> 00:25:35,240
number this password? You go? Sure? Makes it easier, yeah,

438
00:25:35,279 --> 00:25:38,480
and it's making it easier for the cyber criminals. Because

439
00:25:38,480 --> 00:25:43,880
they're stealing it. Let me be very selfish about this.

440
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You mentioned password manager. I have a password manager. In fact,

441
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there was one password manager that I use for a

442
00:25:51,799 --> 00:25:55,240
few years and all of a sudden, their big, super

443
00:25:55,319 --> 00:25:58,759
duper security got busted and I left them like a

444
00:25:59,000 --> 00:26:02,359
hot potato and went to a different password manager that's

445
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supposed to be the greatest password manager ever. And so

446
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are they working on this for me?

447
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Speaker 2: Are they doing something? Because when something comes up, it says,

448
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do you want us to remember your password? I go no,

449
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I use my password manager to filler in.

450
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Speaker 1: That's right. So this is an important distinction, Tom, And

451
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I'll say the name of the company. I'll take the

452
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slack on this. It was Last Pass and I actually

453
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had some conversations with the founders many moons ago, and

454
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they were they were very conscientious, but they got acquired

455
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by private equity and all that mattered. And again, I'm

456
00:26:37,240 --> 00:26:39,920
a free market here, but that doesn't mean that they're

457
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I mean the free market caveat m tour. That's another principle,

458
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the free market buy or beware the private equity guys.

459
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When they got control of the company, all they cared

460
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about was the next quarter's earning. Sure, and so they

461
00:26:52,839 --> 00:26:55,079
they you know, they repted on their laurels, and they

462
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let security go bad in my opinion, and therefore they

463
00:26:58,799 --> 00:27:01,960
things got really messed up. And I too recommended people

464
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step away from that company that was it was too

465
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risky in my opinion.

466
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Speaker 2: Well, that's right. I read. I read that tons of

467
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people were you weren't alone. Every tech article out there

468
00:27:12,480 --> 00:27:15,119
said leave them, go run away as fast as you can.

469
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So I don't know if they're I'm sure their business

470
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was hurt by them trying to take shortcuts.

471
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Speaker 1: It it was, so I'm talking about. What I was

472
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talking about a few moments ago, was the built in

473
00:27:29,160 --> 00:27:33,119
password saving feature of a web browser that you don't

474
00:27:33,160 --> 00:27:38,000
want to use. Skip that, and you're talking so far,

475
00:27:38,119 --> 00:27:41,559
so far. I feel better because I always skip that.

476
00:27:42,960 --> 00:27:48,160
But yeah, that's great. So the third party password managers,

477
00:27:48,200 --> 00:27:53,039
those are good, but you need to there are some

478
00:27:53,119 --> 00:27:56,319
good ones out there. And by the way, for home consumers,

479
00:27:56,359 --> 00:27:59,599
the basic features, there are companies out there that provide

480
00:27:59,599 --> 00:28:02,480
this for free, the basic version for free, and for

481
00:28:02,599 --> 00:28:06,680
many home users, the free version is perfectly satisfactory. If

482
00:28:06,720 --> 00:28:10,400
you're a business, the paid versions of that will help

483
00:28:10,440 --> 00:28:13,720
you manage the passwords better for your your staff. But

484
00:28:13,799 --> 00:28:18,480
if you're a home user, you don't need that. So

485
00:28:19,960 --> 00:28:23,200
a good password manager, though, will allow you to assign

486
00:28:24,240 --> 00:28:27,640
a not just something you know. That's what we call

487
00:28:27,720 --> 00:28:31,799
one factor. A factor is something you know, like a

488
00:28:31,920 --> 00:28:35,720
user name and password. Another factor can be something that

489
00:28:35,759 --> 00:28:40,559
you have, like an app on your phone. Another factor

490
00:28:40,559 --> 00:28:45,000
could be something that you are, like the fingerprint or really, come,

491
00:28:45,039 --> 00:28:47,480
I'm not making this up. It's that science fiction. There

492
00:28:47,519 --> 00:28:50,799
are these scanners now that scan the veins in your hand,

493
00:28:51,160 --> 00:28:53,519
the palm of your hand. And even if I had

494
00:28:53,559 --> 00:28:55,960
a yeah, and even if I had an identical twin,

495
00:28:56,160 --> 00:28:59,480
God forbid, the veins in my in my in my

496
00:28:59,559 --> 00:29:02,279
twin others hands would be different than mine because as

497
00:29:02,319 --> 00:29:05,240
we grew, the veins are different. And I don't need

498
00:29:05,240 --> 00:29:07,240
to be morbid about it. But if you cut off

499
00:29:07,279 --> 00:29:11,000
the hand, yeah, the veins collapse, so you the person

500
00:29:11,039 --> 00:29:14,119
needs to be alive. Sorry to be so morbid. No, no, no,

501
00:29:14,240 --> 00:29:15,359
but those are.

502
00:29:15,319 --> 00:29:17,359
Speaker 2: But I thought you were going to go down the

503
00:29:17,640 --> 00:29:20,519
road of where I've talked about this on the on

504
00:29:20,559 --> 00:29:23,440
the show, and people have been very upset with it.

505
00:29:23,480 --> 00:29:28,319
Is the I recognition, the what do you call it

506
00:29:28,319 --> 00:29:29,960
the airlines eye scanner.

507
00:29:30,160 --> 00:29:35,359
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's right. Yeah, the TSASA is using that. That's right,

508
00:29:35,400 --> 00:29:38,640
iris recognition. So those are all factors. So when we

509
00:29:38,680 --> 00:29:42,240
say two factor authentication, I don't really like the term

510
00:29:42,240 --> 00:29:45,759
because it's confusing because people say, and I understand why

511
00:29:45,799 --> 00:29:49,640
a username A username that's one factor, A password that's another.

512
00:29:49,799 --> 00:29:53,799
I got two factor? No, because those are something that

513
00:29:53,880 --> 00:29:58,359
you know, k N O W. You know something that's

514
00:29:58,519 --> 00:30:02,720
a factor. Then you have something like a little device

515
00:30:02,799 --> 00:30:04,880
you can carry out in your pocket, or a app

516
00:30:04,920 --> 00:30:08,880
on your phone that's something you have that's a second factor,

517
00:30:09,200 --> 00:30:13,079
or your eyeball scan that's something you are that's another

518
00:30:13,559 --> 00:30:16,480
second or third factor, however you want to classify it.

519
00:30:16,559 --> 00:30:21,240
So the good password managers, even the ones that are free,

520
00:30:21,279 --> 00:30:24,200
there are good ones that are free, allow you to

521
00:30:24,279 --> 00:30:28,119
set up a strong two factor authentication. And what I

522
00:30:28,160 --> 00:30:32,400
mean by that is that either a small device you're

523
00:30:32,400 --> 00:30:34,519
carry in your pocket. I wear one around my neck.

524
00:30:34,559 --> 00:30:37,759
Actually it's the thickness of a credit card and I

525
00:30:37,759 --> 00:30:40,240
can plug it into a computer and press a button

526
00:30:40,680 --> 00:30:43,680
and it synchronizes, and then I also put in my password.

527
00:30:44,319 --> 00:30:46,759
And so it's something that I know and something that

528
00:30:46,799 --> 00:30:50,839
I have. You can also have an app on your phone,

529
00:30:50,880 --> 00:30:54,000
not quite as not as good as the device that

530
00:30:54,039 --> 00:30:57,000
are wearing around my neck like a lanyard, but still

531
00:30:57,039 --> 00:31:01,279
a decent second factor is an app on your phone.

532
00:31:01,799 --> 00:31:06,480
The poor second factors there, really weak second factors are

533
00:31:06,559 --> 00:31:11,240
a text message or an email because those systems are easy,

534
00:31:11,480 --> 00:31:14,279
very easy to compromise, so they're not a good second factor.

535
00:31:14,720 --> 00:31:17,839
Speaker 2: They send, they send you the code you want to,

536
00:31:17,920 --> 00:31:20,000
we'll send you know, we want to make sure you

537
00:31:20,079 --> 00:31:22,680
are who you are, so we'll send you a text

538
00:31:22,720 --> 00:31:26,480
message and it'll it'll have one, two, three, four five.

539
00:31:26,599 --> 00:31:29,640
You type that in and everything's good. And you're saying,

540
00:31:29,680 --> 00:31:31,319
that's not all that good of a security.

541
00:31:32,440 --> 00:31:36,559
Speaker 1: It's it's better than one factor. But all that's only

542
00:31:36,599 --> 00:31:41,160
because one factor is so bad that that it's better

543
00:31:41,200 --> 00:31:44,119
than nothing. But it is the weakest form of two factor,

544
00:31:44,519 --> 00:31:47,200
a text message or an email, and the weakest form

545
00:31:47,240 --> 00:31:47,480
of two.

546
00:31:47,960 --> 00:31:50,079
Speaker 2: So what I'm getting you want to what I'm getting

547
00:31:50,079 --> 00:31:55,240
a lot now is authentic something to my authenticator. I

548
00:31:55,319 --> 00:31:59,200
got three authenticator apps on my phone. I don't know

549
00:31:59,240 --> 00:32:01,720
why I have three read but I have three, and

550
00:32:01,759 --> 00:32:03,799
so I look and one will fire up when they

551
00:32:03,839 --> 00:32:07,319
send me something to authenticate it. Is that better?

552
00:32:07,920 --> 00:32:11,640
Speaker 1: Right? That's better because that's an app that's not that

553
00:32:11,759 --> 00:32:15,880
and that's encrypted from the from the vendor or in

554
00:32:15,880 --> 00:32:18,119
this case of the example we're using, I'm using as

555
00:32:18,119 --> 00:32:21,279
a password manager, but also can be directly from a

556
00:32:21,359 --> 00:32:24,440
service provider on the internet and they send you an

557
00:32:24,559 --> 00:32:28,359
encrypted message to your phone and then you accept it,

558
00:32:29,400 --> 00:32:33,440
and that's better. But here's the weakness with that. If

559
00:32:33,480 --> 00:32:36,640
you're doing and I don't recommend people doing this, doing

560
00:32:36,839 --> 00:32:41,799
banking or other sensitive data on your phone is really dangerous.

561
00:32:43,000 --> 00:32:48,359
Your phone is not is an extremely promiscuous device, and

562
00:32:48,400 --> 00:32:51,599
you can easily someone can you know, you can misplace

563
00:32:51,640 --> 00:32:54,559
it temporarily, someone can trick you to get their hands

564
00:32:54,559 --> 00:32:57,400
on it. They are all sorts of attacks against phones.

565
00:32:58,079 --> 00:33:01,480
And so it's if you if you're set factor something

566
00:33:01,519 --> 00:33:04,920
that you have is the device you're logging into. It's

567
00:33:05,000 --> 00:33:07,759
not strong two factor. So you want to you want

568
00:33:07,759 --> 00:33:12,039
to do your online banking, you want to do insurance finance,

569
00:33:12,559 --> 00:33:17,559
these confidential items on a computer, a more secure computer,

570
00:33:17,640 --> 00:33:21,880
ideally a computer, so that your phone is not the

571
00:33:21,920 --> 00:33:24,599
same device you're doing the activity on, because if they've

572
00:33:24,640 --> 00:33:27,359
compromised your phone then who cares if the factors sent

573
00:33:27,440 --> 00:33:30,960
to your phone? The bad guys get that. Everything seems fine,

574
00:33:31,079 --> 00:33:36,200
but they're stealing that. So I know this is complex, Tom,

575
00:33:36,240 --> 00:33:39,200
I'm not denying it to people that this is complex

576
00:33:39,319 --> 00:33:44,640
and difficult. If security and privacy didn't take effort, everyone

577
00:33:44,680 --> 00:33:46,440
would be doing it. Tom.

578
00:33:46,880 --> 00:33:51,920
Speaker 2: So I have done. I have a couple of bank

579
00:33:51,960 --> 00:33:56,160
accounts that I have an app for on my phone.

580
00:33:56,440 --> 00:34:00,400
I don't delete them. I don't be banking bank keen,

581
00:34:01,039 --> 00:34:05,680
but they will say you have a battlece on your

582
00:34:05,680 --> 00:34:08,840
credit card, and so I'll go on and I won't

583
00:34:08,840 --> 00:34:10,559
go into my bank accounts, but I'll go to the

584
00:34:10,559 --> 00:34:14,360
credit card and pay the credit card. You're saying, that's yeah,

585
00:34:14,400 --> 00:34:16,920
I'm exposing I don't do that.

586
00:34:16,920 --> 00:34:19,239
Speaker 1: That's right, It's that is So here's the thing, Tom.

587
00:34:19,800 --> 00:34:22,760
Imagine you're going out with buddies and they're they're drinking

588
00:34:22,800 --> 00:34:26,760
a few cocktails on a Friday night. Msiah. Everybody drinks

589
00:34:26,760 --> 00:34:29,079
a few cocktails on a Friday night after work. It's

590
00:34:29,079 --> 00:34:32,119
miller time, and then they drive home. But Tom, you're

591
00:34:32,119 --> 00:34:35,519
a former law enforcement that's not a that's a risky

592
00:34:35,599 --> 00:34:37,719
thing to do, right. We do right?

593
00:34:38,000 --> 00:34:38,199
Speaker 7: Right?

594
00:34:38,800 --> 00:34:40,920
Speaker 1: So I don't do that. When I go out with

595
00:34:40,960 --> 00:34:44,920
my buddies after work, I won't drink three cocktails and

596
00:34:44,960 --> 00:34:46,840
get it and get behind the wheel of an automobile.

597
00:34:47,440 --> 00:34:50,079
Now I know that a lot of people do. That

598
00:34:50,119 --> 00:34:52,280
doesn't mean that it's smart. I know that a lot

599
00:34:52,280 --> 00:34:55,000
of people. So what do I have finances on this smartphone?

600
00:34:55,039 --> 00:34:58,320
Speaker 2: What do I so so to delete the bank apps?

601
00:34:58,440 --> 00:35:01,239
Is what you're saying your phone?

602
00:35:01,320 --> 00:35:06,519
Speaker 1: Right? Use your phone for communications, but not for your money,

603
00:35:08,519 --> 00:35:13,199
not for your money in and what I recommend people

604
00:35:13,280 --> 00:35:17,280
do and and what I've set up many people to

605
00:35:17,320 --> 00:35:20,760
do this and I do this with my family members,

606
00:35:21,239 --> 00:35:25,159
is I have a separate, segregated computer that has a

607
00:35:25,239 --> 00:35:28,559
high security operating system on it. I actually buy them

608
00:35:28,599 --> 00:35:32,440
on eBay. These are twelve hundred dollars computers that won't

609
00:35:32,519 --> 00:35:35,840
run the latest version of Windows or Map and you,

610
00:35:36,119 --> 00:35:40,119
and they're still an outstanding condition, refurbished, they look almost new,

611
00:35:40,840 --> 00:35:42,639
and I can pick them up for less than two

612
00:35:42,679 --> 00:35:46,400
hundred dollars. Fifteen twelve fifty hundred dollar computers new a

613
00:35:46,400 --> 00:35:49,119
couple of years later sell for pennies on the dollar

614
00:35:49,400 --> 00:35:49,960
book there.

615
00:35:49,880 --> 00:35:53,159
Speaker 2: You buy them from. There used to be a computer

616
00:35:53,199 --> 00:35:58,719
company in California that was close by, and I went

617
00:35:58,719 --> 00:36:01,239
over and they had a store where you could buy

618
00:36:01,280 --> 00:36:06,440
refurbished and they were great because all they were was

619
00:36:06,920 --> 00:36:09,880
maybe they were part of a shipment that got dropped

620
00:36:09,920 --> 00:36:13,000
and three of the computers out of the twelve were damaged.

621
00:36:13,239 --> 00:36:15,880
They had to send those back and call them refurbished.

622
00:36:16,480 --> 00:36:21,679
Or a retailer ordered one hundred of them and could

623
00:36:21,760 --> 00:36:24,599
only and only sold thirty of them. They sent the

624
00:36:24,679 --> 00:36:26,760
others back. They were brand new.

625
00:36:26,960 --> 00:36:29,840
Speaker 1: Yep. But they are a company.

626
00:36:30,199 --> 00:36:32,400
Speaker 2: They're cheap, really cheap to buy.

627
00:36:32,480 --> 00:36:36,400
Speaker 1: They're cheap. This is what I mentioned under Tom, a

628
00:36:36,519 --> 00:36:39,480
tech guy, and who knows he might be listening. He

629
00:36:39,559 --> 00:36:41,559
let's your show. And he used to say, I or

630
00:36:41,719 --> 00:36:46,119
my boy. It's the difference between the clueless and the clueful. Yah.

631
00:36:48,679 --> 00:36:52,880
And so I buy these. I buy a refurbished laptop

632
00:36:53,000 --> 00:36:56,159
or a desktop with a warranty on it. I set

633
00:36:56,239 --> 00:36:58,679
up a high security operating system on it. And I

634
00:36:58,800 --> 00:37:02,840
tell people whoever, this is for family members, friends, clients,

635
00:37:03,519 --> 00:37:07,559
and I say, do your finances on this computer, because

636
00:37:07,599 --> 00:37:10,679
here's what happens, Tom, when fraud happens. They'll give everyone

637
00:37:10,719 --> 00:37:15,880
an example. Last year alone, the online banking app known

638
00:37:15,920 --> 00:37:18,719
as Dell. You may have heard of it. Tom's very popular. Yep.

639
00:37:19,440 --> 00:37:23,760
They had last year alone, they had over a billion

640
00:37:23,880 --> 00:37:27,280
dollars of fraud. That's b as in B two bomber

641
00:37:28,519 --> 00:37:31,679
a billion dollars. Over a billion dollars of fraud on

642
00:37:31,800 --> 00:37:36,480
Zell last year one year. Wow. So what the loss

643
00:37:36,519 --> 00:37:39,920
says is that the customer. This is the second most

644
00:37:39,960 --> 00:37:45,119
important thing about this interview today, Tom, the customer and

645
00:37:45,800 --> 00:37:51,000
the financial institution share in the liability when fraud occurs.

646
00:37:51,599 --> 00:37:56,840
Speaker 2: I've heard that about Zell is dangerous because the bank

647
00:37:56,880 --> 00:38:00,599
will tell you, sorry, you lost your money, don't talk

648
00:38:00,639 --> 00:38:02,840
to us. It's your fault, right.

649
00:38:03,280 --> 00:38:07,400
Speaker 1: Your device is promiscuous, and they're right it is. That

650
00:38:07,480 --> 00:38:09,599
doesn't mean that that was the cause of the fraud,

651
00:38:10,039 --> 00:38:12,599
but they don't care about that. They care about next

652
00:38:12,679 --> 00:38:16,800
quarter's earning. That's their priority, not your security of privacy.

653
00:38:16,880 --> 00:38:18,360
Speaker 2: So let me go back to let me go back

654
00:38:18,400 --> 00:38:22,159
to the banking. So I'll delete my apps, my banking apps.

655
00:38:22,320 --> 00:38:25,119
I just looked on my phone. I've got four of them.

656
00:38:25,280 --> 00:38:29,039
One of the things about my banking is that I

657
00:38:29,119 --> 00:38:31,679
told you I had a password manager. I got a

658
00:38:31,679 --> 00:38:36,039
password manager in there for this company and that company,

659
00:38:36,039 --> 00:38:39,119
every kind of company out there, but I don't have

660
00:38:39,400 --> 00:38:43,239
for my four banking relationships. I do not use them

661
00:38:43,599 --> 00:38:48,440
because I don't want to give anybody even a password manager,

662
00:38:48,440 --> 00:38:53,559
because they could be hacked the user name and password

663
00:38:53,679 --> 00:38:55,800
for my bank accounts.

664
00:38:55,840 --> 00:38:59,679
Speaker 1: And I understand that Tom, and I don't. I guess

665
00:38:59,760 --> 00:39:02,639
they could get hacked. It's a matter of relative risk.

666
00:39:03,079 --> 00:39:05,599
Here's the way to lower your relative risk, and anyone

667
00:39:05,639 --> 00:39:08,760
to lower your relative risk. Take one of these laptops,

668
00:39:08,960 --> 00:39:12,320
high security operating system on it, and then you do

669
00:39:12,480 --> 00:39:14,960
all you and then you you can. You keep your

670
00:39:15,000 --> 00:39:18,039
passwords handy, but not on that kid. You don't write

671
00:39:18,079 --> 00:39:20,079
them down on that computer. You have them, you have

672
00:39:20,119 --> 00:39:25,239
them somewhere else. You keep that information handy. You use

673
00:39:25,320 --> 00:39:27,960
that computer, and that computer only to check your balance,

674
00:39:28,039 --> 00:39:31,039
to make payments, to check on anything. That the only

675
00:39:31,159 --> 00:39:35,199
place that those credentials can be stolen from from you

676
00:39:35,519 --> 00:39:38,360
is on that device. And then if you lose money

677
00:39:38,400 --> 00:39:43,679
in your account, that computer becomes forensic evidence in your

678
00:39:43,800 --> 00:39:48,719
claim that your security was equal to or greater than

679
00:39:48,760 --> 00:39:52,920
the banks, and you can prove it with that computer.

680
00:39:53,159 --> 00:39:55,920
How do I know the scales of justice him?

681
00:39:56,280 --> 00:39:59,039
Speaker 2: How do I know that I'm getting your high security

682
00:40:00,559 --> 00:40:02,079
refurbished laptop.

683
00:40:03,519 --> 00:40:06,400
Speaker 1: You you you buy the lab, I buy the laptop

684
00:40:06,440 --> 00:40:09,280
with a promiscuous operating system in it, and it and

685
00:40:09,320 --> 00:40:14,960
it is wiped completely gone. And then there are there

686
00:40:15,079 --> 00:40:18,559
this Center for Internet This is actually I'm I'm I'm

687
00:40:18,559 --> 00:40:21,440
giving your audience news that is that I can talk

688
00:40:21,480 --> 00:40:25,719
about but is not publicly known yet, wasn't wasn't planned

689
00:40:25,760 --> 00:40:31,760
for today, Tom. This the the global standard that that

690
00:40:31,840 --> 00:40:36,840
defines legally reasonable security and privacy. Well that's important and

691
00:40:36,920 --> 00:40:40,280
getting your money back is a standard called the Center

692
00:40:40,400 --> 00:40:44,639
for Internet Security Controls c i S Center for Internet

693
00:40:44,679 --> 00:40:50,360
Security Controls cisecurity dot org. And they have they are

694
00:40:50,480 --> 00:40:56,679
the they are nonprofit that that manages the standard that

695
00:40:56,760 --> 00:41:02,320
defines reasonable security. And I am i'm, I'm an ambassador

696
00:41:02,400 --> 00:41:06,920
for that standard TOP and I have been part of

697
00:41:06,960 --> 00:41:10,360
an effort that will be launching at the uh BY

698
00:41:10,400 --> 00:41:13,239
in fourth schedule to launch in fourth quarter of this year.

699
00:41:14,559 --> 00:41:21,840
Five a free high security operating system available to download

700
00:41:21,880 --> 00:41:25,360
from the Center for Internet Security. You load it on

701
00:41:25,360 --> 00:41:28,519
one of those those computers are loaded up, you fine

702
00:41:28,599 --> 00:41:33,840
tune it and now you have security that is that

703
00:41:34,199 --> 00:41:38,159
meets the legal burden. So you can shift the liability

704
00:41:38,719 --> 00:41:42,920
your best chance of shifting the liability from you like

705
00:41:43,000 --> 00:41:47,639
the bank wants to do over to the financial institution.

706
00:41:48,400 --> 00:41:51,119
Speaker 2: I just because I just typed it in. I just

707
00:41:51,159 --> 00:41:55,159
typed it in and it has a nice little home page.

708
00:41:55,519 --> 00:41:58,800
Twenty five years it's been around the Center for Internet Security,

709
00:41:59,679 --> 00:42:02,480
so we just heard about it.

710
00:42:02,639 --> 00:42:05,920
Speaker 1: Well. Yeah, so, as I like to say, Tom, I've

711
00:42:05,920 --> 00:42:09,039
said this to the leadership. I said, Center for Internet

712
00:42:09,119 --> 00:42:12,280
Security has got large mind share, but not sorry, large

713
00:42:12,320 --> 00:42:16,840
market share, but small mind share. People don't know about it.

714
00:42:16,920 --> 00:42:24,599
Speaker 2: Yeah, but it's great alert level guarded. So they're basically

715
00:42:24,639 --> 00:42:27,599
saying that there's bad guys floating around out there.

716
00:42:28,360 --> 00:42:32,320
Speaker 1: There are there are now, Tom, I wanted to talk

717
00:42:32,400 --> 00:42:36,360
to a moment about this topic. In regards to Iran,

718
00:42:36,440 --> 00:42:39,679
the people may not be a perfect be aware of them.

719
00:42:39,719 --> 00:42:41,679
Put the dots together perfect, all right. You're not going

720
00:42:41,760 --> 00:42:44,360
to hear this any other place, I don't think so.

721
00:42:44,840 --> 00:42:51,760
Fifteen years ago, the Israeli government snuff malicious code via

722
00:42:52,000 --> 00:42:58,440
USB into the Natan's Nuclear Center Development Center in Iran.

723
00:42:58,679 --> 00:43:01,559
This was part of the attack at over the weekend,

724
00:43:01,719 --> 00:43:07,239
wasn't the tons And what happened was the malicious code

725
00:43:08,079 --> 00:43:12,599
lived inside of the centrifusions and the control the control

726
00:43:12,719 --> 00:43:17,559
systems for the centerfusion. And when all the control all

727
00:43:17,599 --> 00:43:20,519
the operators are there. And look, you can say many

728
00:43:20,559 --> 00:43:24,599
things about the Iranians. They're not fools. They're very smart.

729
00:43:25,000 --> 00:43:28,639
There are many very smart educated Iranians. I know Iranian

730
00:43:28,840 --> 00:43:33,400
patriots here in the United States, very smart, smart people, right,

731
00:43:33,440 --> 00:43:37,400
good business people, very smart. And so they had their

732
00:43:37,559 --> 00:43:44,559
smart nuclear physicists in this lap and the malware was

733
00:43:44,599 --> 00:43:47,599
designed so that all their computer strengths is everything's fine,

734
00:43:47,880 --> 00:43:54,719
everything's good, we're making nuclear we're processing the uraniums. Everything's good.

735
00:43:53,840 --> 00:43:56,559
Speaker 2: And are you are you telling me we did not

736
00:43:56,760 --> 00:44:01,000
need to drop a bomb? We already had a bomb inside.

737
00:44:01,039 --> 00:44:07,079
Speaker 1: The reason we the reason it was at twenty twenty

738
00:44:07,079 --> 00:44:11,719
five that Iran still apparently does not have nuclear weapons

739
00:44:12,920 --> 00:44:16,320
was in part because of the stucks net virus in

740
00:44:16,360 --> 00:44:21,440
twenty ten. That's right written but written by the Israelis all.

741
00:44:21,719 --> 00:44:24,360
I mean, there's been no official disclosure, but it's kind

742
00:44:24,400 --> 00:44:28,840
of an open secret written. Uh, there's been there have

743
00:44:28,880 --> 00:44:32,760
been books written about it. Kim Kim Zelder wrote one

744
00:44:32,760 --> 00:44:37,119
of the great books about it, about Stuck's Net and so.

745
00:44:38,880 --> 00:44:39,039
Speaker 8: This.

746
00:44:39,199 --> 00:44:43,440
Speaker 1: But the reason I bring this up is that this,

747
00:44:43,440 --> 00:44:46,639
this is this is a known method of attack where

748
00:44:46,679 --> 00:44:50,039
you infiltrate the system and everything works fine. Hey my

749
00:44:50,159 --> 00:44:53,519
phones were my phones working fine? Ira, I moved, I

750
00:44:53,639 --> 00:44:57,199
moved fifty thousand dollars yesterday everything was fine. Yeah, just

751
00:44:57,320 --> 00:45:01,400
like stucks net. Everything was fine until it wasn't so.

752
00:45:02,159 --> 00:45:08,679
And today today there are sixteen billion passwords leaked out.

753
00:45:09,280 --> 00:45:12,039
And tomorrow will be another attack, and another attack, and

754
00:45:12,119 --> 00:45:16,679
a different kind of attack, a ransomware attack, an attack

755
00:45:16,719 --> 00:45:19,880
that takes out a water system, There'll be other types

756
00:45:19,920 --> 00:45:25,800
of attacks. We need to think differently about our devices

757
00:45:25,840 --> 00:45:29,719
and how we're using them. The conventional wisdom of everybody

758
00:45:29,760 --> 00:45:31,960
does it this way, so it must be fine. Yeah,

759
00:45:32,000 --> 00:45:33,159
that's not the case.

760
00:45:33,800 --> 00:45:37,039
Speaker 2: A lot of the military experts that we're listening to

761
00:45:37,199 --> 00:45:40,599
on various houses of media are talking about, you know,

762
00:45:40,719 --> 00:45:44,480
be prepared. Ron will probably respond, they may send a missile,

763
00:45:44,519 --> 00:45:48,000
they may do this, they may do that. But some

764
00:45:48,079 --> 00:45:51,800
of the generals have said, and of course cyber attacks,

765
00:45:52,280 --> 00:45:54,079
and that's what you're talking about.

766
00:45:54,800 --> 00:45:58,039
Speaker 1: So I am and yesterday, yeah, and yesterday, Tom your

767
00:45:58,119 --> 00:46:02,400
guest from the New NYPD, the ant terrorism expert from

768
00:46:02,480 --> 00:46:06,679
NYPD you had on yesterday he talked about he acknowledged,

769
00:46:06,679 --> 00:46:08,760
he didn't say it, but this is his tone was,

770
00:46:08,760 --> 00:46:11,800
the Iranians are very smart. They run reconnaissance. Remember when

771
00:46:11,840 --> 00:46:16,519
he said that, Tom, They scope out buildings, They run reconnaissance,

772
00:46:16,639 --> 00:46:20,199
just like when you were law enforcement and the thief

773
00:46:20,480 --> 00:46:23,079
would case the liquor store the day before he'd actually

774
00:46:23,159 --> 00:46:28,000
rob it. Yes, and so that's happening with site in

775
00:46:28,000 --> 00:46:32,960
information security and attacks right now, Tom. Right now, the

776
00:46:33,079 --> 00:46:36,360
case thing is going on, and whether it's whether it's

777
00:46:36,360 --> 00:46:40,679
to steal credentials, whether it's other types of attacks on

778
00:46:42,239 --> 00:46:46,079
all sorts of infrastructure and computers and systems of all

779
00:46:46,119 --> 00:46:51,079
sorts that's going on. We know that, we know that

780
00:46:51,079 --> 00:46:53,800
that's going on, and there is I'm hearing and seeing

781
00:46:53,920 --> 00:46:57,639
heightened alerts on critical infrastructure in the United States and

782
00:46:57,679 --> 00:47:00,400
that's a good thing. But people also need to be

783
00:47:00,440 --> 00:47:04,800
aware that the Iranians running reconnaissance, scoping out the joint

784
00:47:05,800 --> 00:47:09,639
is not just limited to you know, a water treatment

785
00:47:09,679 --> 00:47:13,719
plant or an electric company. It's it's it's wide and

786
00:47:13,760 --> 00:47:17,960
it's broad. And so this is this this you don't

787
00:47:17,960 --> 00:47:19,239
want to be a chain in that.

788
00:47:19,519 --> 00:47:23,639
Speaker 2: Yeah, this is just a yeah, it's it's it's not

789
00:47:23,840 --> 00:47:27,360
your world, but it but it is, but it is.

790
00:47:29,039 --> 00:47:32,079
We've got to be aware that this is how wars

791
00:47:32,079 --> 00:47:33,559
will be fought in the future.

792
00:47:35,079 --> 00:47:36,559
Speaker 1: Instead of combination.

793
00:47:37,119 --> 00:47:39,440
Speaker 2: Yeah, well it sounds like that's what's going on now

794
00:47:39,920 --> 00:47:45,159
is a combination of good old fashioned military bombing and

795
00:47:45,519 --> 00:47:52,880
kinetic warfare along with cyber warfare. I had an interview

796
00:47:53,079 --> 00:47:59,079
with the former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. I'm going back

797
00:48:01,039 --> 00:48:04,840
six seven eight years ago and we started down the road.

798
00:48:04,880 --> 00:48:08,599
He brought up cybersecurity, a cyber attacks, and I said, so,

799
00:48:09,519 --> 00:48:12,400
you know, what level is it at. When's it going

800
00:48:12,400 --> 00:48:15,800
to be there? He says, it's there now. That was

801
00:48:16,039 --> 00:48:20,360
seven eight years ago. Rumsfeld passed away since then. So

802
00:48:20,480 --> 00:48:23,360
this is something that's been going on for a long time.

803
00:48:23,519 --> 00:48:26,920
Keep people like you in business. I mean, I'm glad

804
00:48:26,920 --> 00:48:27,559
you're there.

805
00:48:30,039 --> 00:48:32,920
Speaker 1: Thank you. I would I would happily give up that

806
00:48:33,039 --> 00:48:35,760
part of my business if we wouldn't have the attacks.

807
00:48:35,800 --> 00:48:40,559
But yes, this is this is important and it is

808
00:48:40,719 --> 00:48:44,199
And just because everything is working fine doesn't mean that

809
00:48:44,239 --> 00:48:48,039
it is from from your handheld to networks to have

810
00:48:48,239 --> 00:48:51,880
work and what people are doing, this is this is

811
00:48:51,880 --> 00:48:54,719
out there. You don't want to panic. It's not the

812
00:48:54,840 --> 00:48:57,519
end of the world, but you need to be vigilant

813
00:48:57,639 --> 00:48:59,559
and you don't want to be the one that also

814
00:48:59,639 --> 00:49:02,719
that that drinks the three cocktails and gets behind the wheel.

815
00:49:02,920 --> 00:49:09,159
Speaker 2: Well, all right, so let's review. Uh. One is take

816
00:49:09,239 --> 00:49:11,920
my banking apps off my phone.

817
00:49:13,119 --> 00:49:16,159
Speaker 1: And read and then reboot your phone after you remove

818
00:49:16,199 --> 00:49:17,280
the apps, reboot your phone.

819
00:49:17,320 --> 00:49:20,960
Speaker 2: Okay, all right? And then secondly is to start reading

820
00:49:21,079 --> 00:49:25,199
up on this Center for Internet Security and stay in

821
00:49:25,239 --> 00:49:30,079
touch with That's right. I see a big science register register. Now,

822
00:49:30,119 --> 00:49:32,800
oh that's for a one day course. Never mind if you.

823
00:49:32,800 --> 00:49:35,639
Speaker 1: Want to go, if you want to learn about the standard.

824
00:49:36,159 --> 00:49:39,440
Because of my work in this area, I have the

825
00:49:39,480 --> 00:49:42,159
Center for Internet Security make a page that just goes

826
00:49:42,519 --> 00:49:45,079
right to sign up to get the standard. It's called

827
00:49:45,280 --> 00:49:49,320
C and it's the standard is free. See I Security,

828
00:49:50,000 --> 00:49:54,679
like center, I like India Security dot org slash Nevada

829
00:49:55,079 --> 00:49:59,239
but it's applicable anywhere in the country. But see I Security.

830
00:50:00,079 --> 00:50:02,079
Speaker 2: Last time you got your you got your own thing

831
00:50:02,159 --> 00:50:04,960
going with them because you're you're you're in Nevada and

832
00:50:06,360 --> 00:50:08,199
huh nice.

833
00:50:08,199 --> 00:50:12,280
Speaker 1: Nevada was Nevada was one of the early states that

834
00:50:12,519 --> 00:50:19,159
made this standard in statute, the law that defines reasonable security.

835
00:50:19,239 --> 00:50:21,079
Nevada was one of the early states to do that.

836
00:50:21,119 --> 00:50:23,519
I was part of that effort, and now it has

837
00:50:23,519 --> 00:50:28,000
spread across the country. So we we've we we've we've

838
00:50:28,039 --> 00:50:31,079
set the pace for other states across the country.

839
00:50:31,480 --> 00:50:31,679
Speaker 2: Uh.

840
00:50:31,719 --> 00:50:33,960
Speaker 1: And I do this work to help people. If people

841
00:50:34,000 --> 00:50:37,440
want help, I will help them get compliant with the standard,

842
00:50:38,159 --> 00:50:40,840
or they can crack the books and learn it on

843
00:50:41,079 --> 00:50:43,440
learn it on their own. And and and that's that's

844
00:50:43,480 --> 00:50:43,960
great too.

845
00:50:45,559 --> 00:50:51,199
Speaker 2: I'm looking at it. I did the ci Security dot

846
00:50:51,320 --> 00:50:55,440
org slash Nevada, and I'm looking for.

847
00:50:56,719 --> 00:50:58,960
Speaker 1: A put your name in there and then well there

848
00:50:59,039 --> 00:51:01,239
you put your name in there and they'll send you

849
00:51:01,280 --> 00:51:04,360
a link. The organization will send you a link of

850
00:51:04,400 --> 00:51:08,280
a package that has the information about the standard.

851
00:51:08,920 --> 00:51:10,320
Speaker 2: I'm looking at it. I'm looking at it.

852
00:51:11,760 --> 00:51:14,000
Speaker 1: I'm going to go to my computer to explore.

853
00:51:13,800 --> 00:51:21,519
Speaker 2: CIS Controls version eight point one. If the latest controls,

854
00:51:21,599 --> 00:51:22,800
it can download something.

855
00:51:22,960 --> 00:51:26,400
Speaker 1: That's it. That's it, the latest controls.

856
00:51:26,840 --> 00:51:29,880
Speaker 2: The latest version. You have to stroll down to it

857
00:51:30,360 --> 00:51:34,639
download CIS Controls version eight point one. Well, I'm on

858
00:51:34,960 --> 00:51:39,280
I'm on a company computer. And as you can imagine,

859
00:51:39,320 --> 00:51:43,599
what My next thought is I can't download anything. I

860
00:51:43,679 --> 00:51:45,760
have to go through the well, they'll detect people.

861
00:51:47,119 --> 00:51:51,079
Speaker 1: They'll send you an email which you can send home. Oh,

862
00:51:51,320 --> 00:51:55,320
send you an email that'll give you a free download

863
00:51:55,360 --> 00:51:57,480
for the link. What they're doing, Tom, I'll tell you

864
00:51:57,719 --> 00:52:01,880
full transparency. That's I'm big on that. They're asking for

865
00:52:01,960 --> 00:52:05,360
the email because they want to see where people are

866
00:52:05,400 --> 00:52:09,599
making the requests for the standard. They're tracking that. And

867
00:52:09,599 --> 00:52:13,320
here's fastening. Fun fact. It used to be very large,

868
00:52:13,599 --> 00:52:17,480
mostly the United States. Now people around the world are

869
00:52:17,639 --> 00:52:20,280
are downloading this standard and starting to adopt this. It

870
00:52:20,639 --> 00:52:26,400
really is continuing that march to being the uh uh,

871
00:52:26,559 --> 00:52:31,239
the standard that defines reasonable security and privacy.

872
00:52:31,920 --> 00:52:33,400
Speaker 2: I'm filling it out as you're talking.

873
00:52:34,719 --> 00:52:37,280
Speaker 1: There you go, and I'll tell you I'm gonna I'm

874
00:52:37,320 --> 00:52:41,519
gonna I'm gonna give a spoiler alert. Center, the Center

875
00:52:41,519 --> 00:52:46,000
for Internet Security Controls is mostly about process, not about

876
00:52:46,039 --> 00:52:51,320
buying tons of products, because good security is a mostly

877
00:52:51,400 --> 00:52:52,239
about process.

878
00:52:55,119 --> 00:52:59,559
Speaker 2: Interesting, all right, I'm I'm filling this whole thing out.

879
00:53:01,119 --> 00:53:05,000
So the people that God hacked it was because of

880
00:53:05,039 --> 00:53:10,320
the device, is not because of Google or Apple or

881
00:53:10,320 --> 00:53:14,199
anybody else having weak systems fascinating.

882
00:53:14,039 --> 00:53:18,400
Speaker 1: This particular story. There'll be another breach, another story, sure,

883
00:53:19,199 --> 00:53:22,400
but yes, this particular one. That's right, all right?

884
00:53:23,360 --> 00:53:27,679
Speaker 2: The warning before we leave you, Ira, would you mind

885
00:53:27,960 --> 00:53:32,119
giving us the whole spiel on on you because I

886
00:53:32,159 --> 00:53:33,840
always want to give you credit for all this.

887
00:53:35,519 --> 00:53:39,079
Speaker 1: Thank you very much. I am a digital forensics expert

888
00:53:40,320 --> 00:53:45,239
and I help individuals and companies protect their data and

889
00:53:45,280 --> 00:53:49,559
their privacy by using standards and I when we hope

890
00:53:49,559 --> 00:53:53,880
that everyone does the the the protective work, or as

891
00:53:53,920 --> 00:53:56,440
I like to say it, the fluorite treatments. But when

892
00:53:56,480 --> 00:53:59,159
things go south and you end up in court, which

893
00:53:59,199 --> 00:54:03,079
is like roots can, it's the most painful part. I

894
00:54:03,119 --> 00:54:07,519
am my digital forensics expertise. I am a consultant and

895
00:54:07,599 --> 00:54:13,960
expert witness for legal cases to help attorneys with their

896
00:54:14,039 --> 00:54:16,840
cases and help their clients. And I can be reached

897
00:54:17,239 --> 00:54:23,480
on Discovery Technician. It's fanatic Discovery Technician dot com. And

898
00:54:23,519 --> 00:54:24,400
I'm out of Nevada.

899
00:54:26,880 --> 00:54:33,320
Speaker 2: Okay, Hira Victor, thank you a million times, appreciate your help,

900
00:54:33,800 --> 00:54:37,280
and I'm sure we'll be talking again with the next

901
00:54:37,719 --> 00:54:40,119
one of these breaches or whatever. Thought. I love the

902
00:54:40,519 --> 00:54:44,760
connection to the war story about fifteen years ago they

903
00:54:44,840 --> 00:54:49,719
put put the code in there into the nuclear site

904
00:54:49,719 --> 00:54:52,679
that we just bomb one of them. Ira, thank you

905
00:54:52,880 --> 00:54:56,239
very much and we'll talk soon. Welcome some so on

906
00:54:56,280 --> 00:55:00,719
the market today, Wall Street loved the idea obvious seas fire.

907
00:55:00,760 --> 00:55:03,119
We'll see if it holds or not. But the idea

908
00:55:03,199 --> 00:55:07,199
of a ceasefire gave Wall Street a big boost. The

909
00:55:07,239 --> 00:55:13,679
Dow Jones industrials shot up. Oil prices cratered investors obviously

910
00:55:13,840 --> 00:55:18,360
betting or deeping their fingers crossed that the truce between

911
00:55:18,519 --> 00:55:22,800
Israel and Iran will hold. The Dow finished up five

912
00:55:22,960 --> 00:55:27,239
hundred and seven points to forty three thousand and eighty nine,

913
00:55:27,320 --> 00:55:32,440
so above above forty three thousand. The SMP is a

914
00:55:32,480 --> 00:55:35,440
hair breadth away from a new record, up sixty seven

915
00:55:36,119 --> 00:55:41,320
to six thousand ninety two. NASDAK also a new record,

916
00:55:41,679 --> 00:55:45,039
up two hundred and eighty one the nineteen thy nine

917
00:55:45,079 --> 00:55:48,400
to twelve so records or near records on Wall Street today,

918
00:55:49,159 --> 00:55:52,559
gold prices the flight to safety. They obviously feel like

919
00:55:52,599 --> 00:55:55,599
they don't need to fly to safety. Are the Gold

920
00:55:55,679 --> 00:55:59,639
down fifty seven dollars to thirty three thirty seven in oil,

921
00:56:00,519 --> 00:56:03,400
another indicator that people on Wall Street are thinking that

922
00:56:03,440 --> 00:56:08,400
the ceasefire will hold oil down almost four dollars today

923
00:56:09,000 --> 00:56:12,840
to sixty five dollars for one barrel of oil. So

924
00:56:12,920 --> 00:56:15,880
that's it for today. Thank you for coming by. We'll

925
00:56:15,920 --> 00:56:18,599
be back again tomorrow. Hope to see you then.