Speaker 1: Chapter seventeen of Considerations on Representative Government. This LibriVox recording
Speaker 1: is in the public domain. Considerations on Representative Government by
Speaker 1: John Stuart Mill, Chapter seventeen of Federal Representative Governments. Portions
Speaker 1: of mankind who are not fitted or not disposed to
Speaker 1: live under the same internal government may, often, with advantage,
Speaker 1: be federally united as to their relations with foreigners, both
Speaker 1: to prevent wars among themselves and for the sake of
Speaker 1: more effectual protection against the aggression of powerful states. To
Speaker 1: render a federation advisable, several conditions are necessary. The first
Speaker 1: is that there should be a sufficient amount of mutual
Speaker 1: sympathy among the populations. The federation binds them always to
Speaker 1: fight on the same side, and if they have such
Speaker 1: feelings toward one another, or such diversity of feeling toward
Speaker 1: their neighbors, that they would generally prefer to fight on
Speaker 1: oppas sides. The federal tie is neither likely to be
Speaker 1: of long duration nor to be well observed while it subsists.
Speaker 1: The sympathies available for the purpose are those of race, language, religion,
Speaker 1: and above all of political institutions, as conducing most to
Speaker 1: a feeling of identity of political interest when a few
Speaker 1: free states, separately insufficient for their own defense, are hemmed
Speaker 1: in on all sides by military or feudal monarchs who
Speaker 1: hate and despise freedom even in a neighbor, those states
Speaker 1: have no chance for preserving liberty and its blessings, but
Speaker 1: by a federal union. The common interest arising from this
Speaker 1: cause has in Switzerland for several centuries been found adequate
Speaker 1: to maintain efficiently the federal bond, in spite not only
Speaker 1: of difference of religion, when religion was the grand source
Speaker 1: of irreconcilable political enmity throughout Europe, but also in spite
Speaker 1: of great weakness in the constitution of the federation itself
Speaker 1: in America, where all the conditions for the maintenance of
Speaker 1: union existed at the highest point with the sole drawback
Speaker 1: of difference of institutions in the single but most important
Speaker 1: article of slavery. This one difference goes so far in
Speaker 1: alienating from each other's sympathies the two divisions of the
Speaker 1: Union as to be now actually effecting the disruption of
Speaker 1: a tie of so much value to them both. A
Speaker 1: second condition of the stability of federal government is that
Speaker 1: the separate states be not so powerful as to be
Speaker 1: able to rely for protection against foreign encroachment on their
Speaker 1: individual strength. If they are, they will be apt to
Speaker 1: think that they do not gain by a union with
Speaker 1: others the equivalent of what they sacrifice in their own
Speaker 1: liberty of action. And consequently, whenever the policy of the
Speaker 1: confederation in things reserved to its cognizance is different from
Speaker 1: that which any of its members would separately pursue, the
Speaker 1: internal and sectional breach, will, through absence of sufficient anxiety
Speaker 1: to preserve the union, be in danger of going so
Speaker 1: far as to dissolve it. A third condition, not less
Speaker 1: important than the two others, is that there be not
Speaker 1: a very marked inequality of strength among the several contracting states.
Speaker 1: They cannot, indeed be exactly equal in resources. In all federations,
Speaker 1: there will be a gradation of power among the members.
Speaker 1: Some will be more populous, rich, and civilized than others.
Speaker 1: There is a wide difference in wealth and population between
Speaker 1: New York and Rhode Island, between Berne and Zug or Glaris.
Speaker 1: The essential is that there should not be any one
Speaker 1: state so much more powerful than the rest as to
Speaker 1: be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined.
Speaker 1: If there be such a one and only one, it
Speaker 1: will insist on being master of the joint deliberations. If
Speaker 1: there be two, they will be irresistible when they agree,
Speaker 1: and whenever they differ, everything will be decided by a
Speaker 1: struggle for ascendency between the rivals. This cause is alone
Speaker 1: enough to reduce the German Bund to almost a nullity.
Speaker 1: Independently of its wretched internal constitution, it affects none of
Speaker 1: the real purposes of a confederation. It is never bestowed
Speaker 1: on Germany a uniform system of customs, nor so much
Speaker 1: as a uniform coinage. It has served only to give
Speaker 1: Austria and Prussia a legal right of pouring in their
Speaker 1: troops to assist the local sovereigns in keeping their subjects
Speaker 1: obedient to despotism, while in regard to external concerns, the
Speaker 1: Bund would make all Germany a dependency of Prussia if
Speaker 1: there were no Austria, and of Austria if there were
Speaker 1: no Prussia. And in the meantime, each petty prince has
Speaker 1: little choice but to be a partisan of one or
Speaker 1: the other, or to intrigue with foreign governments against both.
Speaker 1: There are two different modes of organizing a federal union.
Speaker 1: The federal authorities may represent the governments solely, and their
Speaker 1: acts may be obligatory only on the governments as such,
Speaker 1: or they may have the power of enacting laws and
Speaker 1: issuing orders which are binding directly on individual citizens. The
Speaker 1: former is the plan of the German so called Confederation
Speaker 1: and of the Swiss Constitution previous to eighteen forty seven.
Speaker 1: It was tried in America for a few years immediately
Speaker 1: following the War of Independence. The other principle is that
Speaker 1: of the existing Constitution of the United States, and has
Speaker 1: been adopted within the last dozen years by the Swiss Confederacy.
Speaker 1: The Federal Congress of the American Union is a substantive
Speaker 1: part of the government of every individual state within the
Speaker 1: limits of its attributions. It makes laws which are obeyed
Speaker 1: by every citizen individually, executes them through its own officers,
Speaker 1: and enforces them by its own tribunals. This is the
Speaker 1: only principle which has been found or which is ever
Speaker 1: likely to produce an effective federal government. A union between
Speaker 1: the governments only is a mere alliance and subject to
Speaker 1: all the contingencies which render alliances precarious. If the acts
Speaker 1: of the President and of Congress were binding solely on
Speaker 1: the governments of New York, Virginia, or Pennsylvania, and could
Speaker 1: only be carried into effect through orders issued by those
Speaker 1: governments to officers appointed by them under the responsibility to
Speaker 1: their own courts of justice. No mandates of the federal
Speaker 1: government which were disagreeable to a local majority would ever
Speaker 1: be executed. Requisitions issued to a government have no other
Speaker 1: sanction or means of enforcement than war, and a federal
Speaker 1: army would have to be always in readiness to enforce
Speaker 1: the decrees of the Federation against any recalcitrant state, subject
Speaker 1: to the probability that other states, sympathizing with the recusant
Speaker 1: and perhaps sharing its sentiments on the particular point in dispute,
Speaker 1: would withhold their contingents, if not send them to fight
Speaker 1: in the ranks of the disobedient state. Such a federation
Speaker 1: is more likely to be a cause than a preventive
Speaker 1: of internal wars, and if such was not its effect
Speaker 1: in Switzerland until the events of the years immediately preceding
Speaker 1: eighteen forty seven, it was only because the federal government
Speaker 1: felt its weakness so strongly that it hardly ever attempted
Speaker 1: to exercise any real authority in America, The experiment of
Speaker 1: a federation on this principle broke down in the first
Speaker 1: few years of its existence, happily, while the men of
Speaker 1: enlarged knowledge and acquired ascendancy who founded the independence of
Speaker 1: the Republic were still alive to guide it through the
Speaker 1: difficult transition. The Federalist, a collection of papers by three
Speaker 1: of these eminent men, written in the explanation and defense
Speaker 1: of the new Federal Constitution, while still awaiting the national acceptance,
Speaker 1: is even now the most instructive treatise we possess on
Speaker 1: federal government. In Germany. The more imperfect kind of federation,
Speaker 1: as all know, has not even answered the purpose of
Speaker 1: maintaining an alliance. It has never, in any European war
Speaker 1: prevented single members of the confederation from allying themselves with
Speaker 1: foreign powers against the rest. Yet this is the only
Speaker 1: federation which seems possible among monarchical states. A king who
Speaker 1: holds his power by inheritance, not by delegation, and who
Speaker 1: cannot be deprived of it nor made responsible to any
Speaker 1: one for its use, is not likely to renounce having
Speaker 1: a separate army, or to brook the exercise of sovereign
Speaker 1: authority over his own subjects, not through him, but directly
Speaker 1: by another power. To enable two or more countries under
Speaker 1: kingly government to be joined together in an effectual confederation,
Speaker 1: it seems necessary that they should all be under the
Speaker 1: same king. England and Scotland were a federation of this
Speaker 1: description during the interval of about a century between the
Speaker 1: union of the crowns and that of the Parliaments. Even
Speaker 1: this was effective not through federal institutions, for none existed,
Speaker 1: but because the regal power in both constitutions was so
Speaker 1: nearly absolute as to enable the foreign policy of both
Speaker 1: to be shaped according to a single will. Under the
Speaker 1: more perfect mode of federation, where every citizen of each
Speaker 1: particular state owes obedience to two governments, that of his
Speaker 1: own state and that of the federation, it is evidently
Speaker 1: necessary not only that the constitutional limits of the authority
Speaker 1: of each should be precisely and clearly defined, but that
Speaker 1: the power to decide between them in any case of
Speaker 1: dispute should not reside in either of the governments, or
Speaker 1: in any functionary subject to it, but in an umpire
Speaker 1: independent of both. There must be a supreme court of
Speaker 1: justice and a system of subordinate courts in every state
Speaker 1: of the Union, before whom such questions shall be carried,
Speaker 1: and whose judgment on them in the last stage of
Speaker 1: appeal shall be final. Every state of the Union and
Speaker 1: the federal government itself, as well as every functionary of each,
Speaker 1: must be liable to be sued in those courts for
Speaker 1: exceeding their powers or for non performance of their federal duties,
Speaker 1: and must in general be obliged to employ those courts
Speaker 1: as the instrument for enforcing their federal rights. This involves
Speaker 1: the remarkable consequence actually realized in the United States, that
Speaker 1: a court of justice, the highest federal tribunal, is supreme
Speaker 1: over the various governments, both state and federal, having the
Speaker 1: right to declare that any law made or act done
Speaker 1: by them exceeds the powers assigned to them by the
Speaker 1: Federal Constitution, and in consequence has no legal validity. It
Speaker 1: was natural to feel strong doubts before trial had been made,
Speaker 1: how such a provision would work, whether the tribunal would
Speaker 1: have the courage to exercise its constitutional power if it did,
Speaker 1: whether it would exercise it wisely, and whether the governments
Speaker 1: would consent to submit peaceably to its decision. The discussions
Speaker 1: on the American Constitution before its final adoption give evidence
Speaker 1: that these natural apprehensions were strongly felt, But they are
Speaker 1: now entirely quieted. Since during the two generations and more
Speaker 1: which have subsequently elapsed, nothing has occurred to verify them,
Speaker 1: though there have at times been disputes of considerable acrimony
Speaker 1: and which became the badges of parties respecting the limits
Speaker 1: of the authority of the federal and state governments. The
Speaker 1: eminently beneficial working of so singular a provision is probably,
Speaker 1: as Monsieur Destouqueville remarks, in a great measure attributable to
Speaker 1: the peculiarity inherent in a court of justice acting as such, namely,
Speaker 1: that it does not declare the law i nominee and
Speaker 1: in the abstract, but waits until a case between man
Speaker 1: and man is brought before it judicially involving the point
Speaker 1: in dispute, from which arises the happy effect that its
Speaker 1: declarations are not made in a very early stage of
Speaker 1: the controversy, that much popular discussion usually precedes them. That
Speaker 1: the court decides, after hearing the point fully argued on
Speaker 1: both sides by lawyers of reputation, decides only as much
Speaker 1: of the question at a time as is required by
Speaker 1: the case before it, and its decision, instead of being
Speaker 1: volunteered for political purposes, is drawn from it by the
Speaker 1: duty which it cannot refuse to fulfill of dispensing justice
Speaker 1: impartially between adverse litigants. Even these grounds of confidence could
Speaker 1: not have sufficed to produce the respectful submission with which
Speaker 1: all authorities have yielded to the decisions of the Supreme
Speaker 1: Court on the interpretation of the Constitution, were it not
Speaker 1: that complete reliance has been felt not only on the
Speaker 1: intellectual pre eminence of the judges composing that exalted tribunal,
Speaker 1: but on their entire superieriority over either private or sectional partialities.
Speaker 1: This reliance has been, in the main justified. But there
Speaker 1: is nothing which more vitally imports the American people than
Speaker 1: to guard with the most watchful solicitude against everything which
Speaker 1: has the remotest tendency to produce deterioration in the quality
Speaker 1: of this great national institution. The confidence on which depends
Speaker 1: the stability of federal institutions has been for the first
Speaker 1: time impaired by the judgment declaring slavery to be of
Speaker 1: common right and consequently lawful in the territories. While not
Speaker 1: yet constituted as states, even against the will of a
Speaker 1: majority of their inhabitants. The main pillar of the American
Speaker 1: Constitution is scarcely strong enough to bear many more such shocks.
Speaker 1: The tribunals, which act as umpires between the federal and
Speaker 1: the state governments, naturally also decide all disputes between two states,
Speaker 1: or between a citizen of one state and the government
Speaker 1: of another. The usual remedies between nations, war and diplomacy
Speaker 1: being precluded by the federal Union, it is necessary that
Speaker 1: a judicial remedy should supply their place. The Supreme Court
Speaker 1: of the Federation dispenses international law, and is the first
Speaker 1: great example of what is now one of the most
Speaker 1: prominent wants of civilized society, a real international tribunal. The
Speaker 1: powers of a federal government naturally extend not only to
Speaker 1: peace and war, and all questions which arise between the
Speaker 1: country and foreign governments, but to making any other arrangements
Speaker 1: which are, in the opinion of the states necessary to
Speaker 1: their enjoyment of the full benefits of union. For example,
Speaker 1: it is a great advantage to them that their mutual
Speaker 1: commerce should be free without the impediment of frontier duties
Speaker 1: and custom houses. But this internal freedom cannot exist of
Speaker 1: each state has the power of fixing the duties on
Speaker 1: interchange of commodities between itself and foreign countries, since every
Speaker 1: foreign product let in by one state would be let
Speaker 1: into all the rest, and hence all custom duties and
Speaker 1: trade regulations in the United States are made or repealed
Speaker 1: by the federal government exclusively. Again, it is a great
Speaker 1: convenience to the states to have but one coinage and
Speaker 1: but one system of weights and measures, which can only
Speaker 1: be ensured if the regulation of these matters is entrusted
Speaker 1: to the federal government. The certainty and celerity of post
Speaker 1: office communication is impeded and its expense increased if a
Speaker 1: letter has to pass through half a dozen sets of
Speaker 1: public offices subject to different supreme authorities. It is convenient, therefore,
Speaker 1: that all post offices should be under the federal government.
Speaker 1: But on such questions, the feelings of different communities are
Speaker 1: liable to be different. One of the American states under
Speaker 1: the guidance of a man who has displayed powers as
Speaker 1: a speculative political thinker superior to any who has appeared
Speaker 1: in American per politics. Since the authors of the Federalist footnote,
Speaker 1: mister Calhoun end footnote claimed a veto for each state
Speaker 1: on the custom of laws of the Federal Congress, and
Speaker 1: that statesman, in a posthumous work of great ability, which
Speaker 1: has been printed and widely circulated by the legislature of
Speaker 1: South Carolina, vindicated this pretension on the general principle of
Speaker 1: limiting the tyranny of the majority and protecting minorities by
Speaker 1: admitting them to a substantial participation in political power. One
Speaker 1: of the most disputed topics in American politics during the
Speaker 1: early part of this country was whether the power of
Speaker 1: the federal government ought to extend, and whether, by the Constitution,
Speaker 1: it did extend to making roads and canals at the
Speaker 1: cost of the union. It is only in transactions with
Speaker 1: foreign powers that the authority of the federal government is
Speaker 1: of necessity complete on every other subject. The question depends
Speaker 1: on how closely the people in general wish to draw
Speaker 1: the federal tie, what portion of their local freedom of
Speaker 1: action they are willing to surrender in order to enjoy
Speaker 1: more fully the benefit of being one nation. Respecting the
Speaker 1: fitting constitution of a federal government within itself, much need
Speaker 1: not be said. It, of course, consists of a legislative
Speaker 1: branch and an executive, and the constitution of each is
Speaker 1: amenable to the same principles as that of representative governments. Generally,
Speaker 1: as regards the mode of adapting these general principles to
Speaker 1: a federal government, the provision of the American Constitution seems
Speaker 1: exceedingly judicious that Congress should consist of two houses, and
Speaker 1: that while one of them is constituted according to population,
Speaker 1: each state being entitled to representatives in the ratio of
Speaker 1: the number of its inhabitants, the other should represent not
Speaker 1: the citizens but the state governments, and every state, whether
Speaker 1: large or small, should be represented in it by the
Speaker 1: same number of men members. This provision precludes any undue
Speaker 1: power from being exercised by the more powerful states over
Speaker 1: the rest, and guarantees the reserved rights of the state
Speaker 1: governments by making it impossible, as far as the mode
Speaker 1: of representation can prevent, that any measure should pass Congress
Speaker 1: unless approved not only by a majority of the citizens,
Speaker 1: but by a majority of the states. I have before
Speaker 1: adverted to the further incidental advantage obtained of raising the
Speaker 1: standard of qualifications in one of the houses being nominated
Speaker 1: by select bodies the legislatures of the various states whose choice,
Speaker 1: for reasons already indicated, is more likely to fall on
Speaker 1: eminent men than any popular election, who have not only
Speaker 1: the power of electing such but a strong motive to
Speaker 1: do so, because the influence of their state in the
Speaker 1: general deliberations must be materially affected by the personal weight
Speaker 1: and abilities of its representatives. The Senate of the United States,
Speaker 1: thus chosen, has always contained nearly all the political men
Speaker 1: of established and high reputation in the Union, while the
Speaker 1: Lower House of Congress has, in the opinion of competent observers,
Speaker 1: been generally as remarkable for the absence of conspicuous personal
Speaker 1: merit as the Upper House for its presence. When the
Speaker 1: conditions exist for the formation of efficient and durable federal unions,
Speaker 1: the multiplication of them is always a benefit to the world.
Speaker 1: It has the same salutary effect as any other extension
Speaker 1: of the practice of cooperation, through which the weak, by uniting,
Speaker 1: can meet on equal terms with the strong. By diminishing
Speaker 1: the number of those petty states which are not equal
Speaker 1: to their own defense, it weakens the temptations to an
Speaker 1: aggressive policy, whether working directly by arms or through the
Speaker 1: prestige of superior power. It, of course puts an end
Speaker 1: to war and diplomatic quarrels, and usually also to restricttions
Speaker 1: on commerce between the states composing the Union, while in
Speaker 1: reference to neighboring nations, the increased military strength conferred by
Speaker 1: it is of a kind to be almost exclusively available
Speaker 1: for defensive scarcely at all for aggressive purposes. A federal
Speaker 1: government has not a sufficiently concentrated authority to conduct with
Speaker 1: much efficiency any war but one of self defense, in
Speaker 1: which it can rely on the voluntary cooperation of every citizen.
Speaker 1: Nor is there anything very flattering to national vanity or
Speaker 1: ambition in acquiring by a successful war, not subjects or
Speaker 1: even fellow citizens, but only new and perhaps troublesome independent
Speaker 1: members of the confederation. The warlike proceedings of the Americans
Speaker 1: in Mexico was purely exceptional, having been carried on principally
Speaker 1: by volunteers, under the influence of the migratory propensity, which
Speaker 1: prompts individual rual Americans to possess themselves of unoccupied land,
Speaker 1: and stimulated, if by any public motive, not by that
Speaker 1: of national aggrandizement, but by the purely sectional purpose of
Speaker 1: extending slavery. There are few signs in the proceedings of
Speaker 1: Americans nationally or individually, that the desire of territorial acquisition
Speaker 1: for their country as such has any considerable power over them.
Speaker 1: Their hankering after Cuba is in the same manner merely sectional,
Speaker 1: and the Northern States, those opposed to slavery, have never
Speaker 1: in any way favored it. The question may present itself,
Speaker 1: as in Italy at its present uprising, whether a country
Speaker 1: which is determined to be united should form a complete
Speaker 1: or a merely federal union. The point is sometimes necessarily
Speaker 1: decided by the mere territorial magnitude of the United whole.
Speaker 1: There is a limit to the extent of country which
Speaker 1: can advantageously be governed, or even whose government can be
Speaker 1: conveniently superintended from a single center. There are vast countries
Speaker 1: so governed, but they, or at least their distant provinces,
Speaker 1: are in general deplorably ill administered, and it is only
Speaker 1: when the inhabitants are almost savages that they could not
Speaker 1: manage their affairs better. Separately, this obstacle does not exist
Speaker 1: in the case of Italy, the size of which does
Speaker 1: not come up to that of several very efficiently governed
Speaker 1: single states. In past and present times. The question, then,
Speaker 1: is whether the different parts of the nation require to
Speaker 1: be governed in a way so essentially different that it
Speaker 1: is not probable the same legislature and the same ministry
Speaker 1: or administrative body will give satisfaction to them all. Unless
Speaker 1: this be the case, which is a question of fact,
Speaker 1: it is better for them to be completely united. That
Speaker 1: a totally different system of laws and very different administrative
Speaker 1: institutions may exist in two portions of a country without
Speaker 1: being any obstacle to legislative unity is proof by the
Speaker 1: case of England and Scotland. Perhaps, however, this undisturbed coexistence
Speaker 1: of two legal systems under one united legislature making different
Speaker 1: laws for the two sections of the country in adaptation
Speaker 1: to the previous differences, might not be so well preserved,
Speaker 1: or the same confidence might not be felt in its
Speaker 1: preservation in a country whose legislators are more possessed, as
Speaker 1: is apt to be the case on the continent with
Speaker 1: the mania for uniformity, a people having that unbounded toleration
Speaker 1: which is characteristic of this country for every description of anomaly,
Speaker 1: so long as those whose interests it concerns do not
Speaker 1: feel aggrieved by it, afforded an exceptionally advantageous field for
Speaker 1: trying this difficult experiment. In most countries, if it was
Speaker 1: an object to retain different systems of law, it might
Speaker 1: probably be necessary to retain distinct legislatures as guardians of them,
Speaker 1: which is perfectly compatible the national parliament and king, or
Speaker 1: a national parliament without a king supreme over the external
Speaker 1: relations of all the members of the body. Whenever it
Speaker 1: is not deemed necessary to maintain permanently in the different
Speaker 1: provinces different systems of jurisprudence and fundamental institutions grounded on
Speaker 1: different principles, it is always practicable to reconcile minor diversities
Speaker 1: with the maintenance of unity of government. All that is
Speaker 1: needful is to give a sufficiently large sphere of action
Speaker 1: to the local authorities under one and the same central government.
Speaker 1: There may be local governors and provincial assemblies for local purposes.
Speaker 1: It may happen, for instance, that the people of different
Speaker 1: provinces may have preferences in favor of different modes of taxation.
Speaker 1: If the general legislature could not be depended on for
Speaker 1: being guided by the members for each province. In modifying
Speaker 1: the general system of taxation to suit that province. The
Speaker 1: constitute tuition might provide that as many of the expenses
Speaker 1: of the government as could by any possibility be made local,
Speaker 1: should be defrayed by local rates imposed by the provincial assemblies,
Speaker 1: and that those which must of necessity be general, such
Speaker 1: as the support of an army and navy, should, in
Speaker 1: the estimates for the year, be apportioned among the different
Speaker 1: provinces according to some general estimate of their resources, the
Speaker 1: amount assigned to each being levied by the local assembly
Speaker 1: on the principles most acceptable to the locality, and paid
Speaker 1: umbloc into the national treasury. A practice approaching to this
Speaker 1: existed even in the old French monarchy, so far as
Speaker 1: regarded the pay destas, each of which, having consented or
Speaker 1: been required to furnish a fixed sum, was left to
Speaker 1: assess it upon the inhabitants by its own officers, thus
Speaker 1: escaping the grinding despotism of the royal intendant and subde
Speaker 1: la gay. And this privilege is always mentioned as one
Speaker 1: of the advantages which mainly contributed to render them, as
Speaker 1: some of them were, the most flourishing provinces of France.
Speaker 1: Identity of central government is compatible with many different degrees
Speaker 1: of centralization, not only administrative, but even legislative. A people
Speaker 1: may have the desire and capacity for a closer union
Speaker 1: than one merely federal, while yet their local peculiarities and
Speaker 1: antecedents render considerable diversities desirable in the details of their government.
Speaker 1: But if there is a real desire on all hands
Speaker 1: to make the experiment successful, their needs seldom be any
Speaker 1: difficulty in not only preserving these diversities, but giving them
Speaker 1: the guarantee of a constitutional provision against any attempt at assimilation,
Speaker 1: except by the voluntary act of those who would be
Speaker 1: affected by the change. End of Chapter seventeen. Recording by
Speaker 1: Bill Burst