WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.280 --> 00:00:06.120 Chapter seventeen of Considerations on Representative Government. This LibriVox recording 2 00:00:06.160 --> 00:00:10.640 is in the public domain. Considerations on Representative Government by 3 00:00:10.720 --> 00:00:18.879 John Stuart Mill, Chapter seventeen of Federal Representative Governments. Portions 4 00:00:18.879 --> 00:00:21.800 of mankind who are not fitted or not disposed to 5 00:00:21.920 --> 00:00:25.399 live under the same internal government may, often, with advantage, 6 00:00:25.440 --> 00:00:29.679 be federally united as to their relations with foreigners, both 7 00:00:29.679 --> 00:00:32.600 to prevent wars among themselves and for the sake of 8 00:00:32.640 --> 00:00:38.560 more effectual protection against the aggression of powerful states. To 9 00:00:38.640 --> 00:00:43.200 render a federation advisable, several conditions are necessary. The first 10 00:00:43.280 --> 00:00:45.600 is that there should be a sufficient amount of mutual 11 00:00:45.640 --> 00:00:50.399 sympathy among the populations. The federation binds them always to 12 00:00:50.479 --> 00:00:53.119 fight on the same side, and if they have such 13 00:00:53.119 --> 00:00:56.880 feelings toward one another, or such diversity of feeling toward 14 00:00:56.920 --> 00:00:59.640 their neighbors, that they would generally prefer to fight on 15 00:00:59.679 --> 00:01:03.359 oppas sides. The federal tie is neither likely to be 16 00:01:03.439 --> 00:01:07.239 of long duration nor to be well observed while it subsists. 17 00:01:08.760 --> 00:01:13.799 The sympathies available for the purpose are those of race, language, religion, 18 00:01:14.000 --> 00:01:18.000 and above all of political institutions, as conducing most to 19 00:01:18.040 --> 00:01:21.920 a feeling of identity of political interest when a few 20 00:01:22.040 --> 00:01:26.319 free states, separately insufficient for their own defense, are hemmed 21 00:01:26.319 --> 00:01:30.359 in on all sides by military or feudal monarchs who 22 00:01:30.439 --> 00:01:34.040 hate and despise freedom even in a neighbor, those states 23 00:01:34.079 --> 00:01:37.560 have no chance for preserving liberty and its blessings, but 24 00:01:37.680 --> 00:01:41.719 by a federal union. The common interest arising from this 25 00:01:41.879 --> 00:01:46.239 cause has in Switzerland for several centuries been found adequate 26 00:01:46.280 --> 00:01:50.439 to maintain efficiently the federal bond, in spite not only 27 00:01:50.480 --> 00:01:53.439 of difference of religion, when religion was the grand source 28 00:01:53.439 --> 00:01:58.159 of irreconcilable political enmity throughout Europe, but also in spite 29 00:01:58.200 --> 00:02:01.719 of great weakness in the constitution of the federation itself 30 00:02:02.359 --> 00:02:05.599 in America, where all the conditions for the maintenance of 31 00:02:05.840 --> 00:02:09.400 union existed at the highest point with the sole drawback 32 00:02:09.479 --> 00:02:12.840 of difference of institutions in the single but most important 33 00:02:12.919 --> 00:02:16.560 article of slavery. This one difference goes so far in 34 00:02:16.680 --> 00:02:20.400 alienating from each other's sympathies the two divisions of the 35 00:02:20.520 --> 00:02:24.639 Union as to be now actually effecting the disruption of 36 00:02:24.680 --> 00:02:28.560 a tie of so much value to them both. A 37 00:02:28.639 --> 00:02:32.120 second condition of the stability of federal government is that 38 00:02:32.159 --> 00:02:34.479 the separate states be not so powerful as to be 39 00:02:34.520 --> 00:02:38.439 able to rely for protection against foreign encroachment on their 40 00:02:38.439 --> 00:02:41.599 individual strength. If they are, they will be apt to 41 00:02:41.599 --> 00:02:43.680 think that they do not gain by a union with 42 00:02:43.719 --> 00:02:46.680 others the equivalent of what they sacrifice in their own 43 00:02:46.719 --> 00:02:51.199 liberty of action. And consequently, whenever the policy of the 44 00:02:51.319 --> 00:02:55.840 confederation in things reserved to its cognizance is different from 45 00:02:55.840 --> 00:02:59.280 that which any of its members would separately pursue, the 46 00:02:59.319 --> 00:03:04.199 internal and sectional breach, will, through absence of sufficient anxiety 47 00:03:04.280 --> 00:03:06.960 to preserve the union, be in danger of going so 48 00:03:07.120 --> 00:03:11.319 far as to dissolve it. A third condition, not less 49 00:03:11.319 --> 00:03:14.080 important than the two others, is that there be not 50 00:03:14.280 --> 00:03:18.360 a very marked inequality of strength among the several contracting states. 51 00:03:18.919 --> 00:03:23.400 They cannot, indeed be exactly equal in resources. In all federations, 52 00:03:23.479 --> 00:03:26.000 there will be a gradation of power among the members. 53 00:03:26.479 --> 00:03:29.599 Some will be more populous, rich, and civilized than others. 54 00:03:30.240 --> 00:03:33.039 There is a wide difference in wealth and population between 55 00:03:33.039 --> 00:03:37.159 New York and Rhode Island, between Berne and Zug or Glaris. 56 00:03:37.840 --> 00:03:40.439 The essential is that there should not be any one 57 00:03:40.520 --> 00:03:43.919 state so much more powerful than the rest as to 58 00:03:43.960 --> 00:03:46.960 be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined. 59 00:03:48.000 --> 00:03:51.039 If there be such a one and only one, it 60 00:03:51.039 --> 00:03:54.919 will insist on being master of the joint deliberations. If 61 00:03:54.919 --> 00:03:58.039 there be two, they will be irresistible when they agree, 62 00:03:58.800 --> 00:04:01.680 and whenever they differ, everything will be decided by a 63 00:04:01.719 --> 00:04:06.159 struggle for ascendency between the rivals. This cause is alone 64 00:04:06.280 --> 00:04:09.800 enough to reduce the German Bund to almost a nullity. 65 00:04:10.159 --> 00:04:14.800 Independently of its wretched internal constitution, it affects none of 66 00:04:14.840 --> 00:04:18.680 the real purposes of a confederation. It is never bestowed 67 00:04:18.680 --> 00:04:22.480 on Germany a uniform system of customs, nor so much 68 00:04:22.480 --> 00:04:25.519 as a uniform coinage. It has served only to give 69 00:04:25.560 --> 00:04:28.759 Austria and Prussia a legal right of pouring in their 70 00:04:28.800 --> 00:04:32.279 troops to assist the local sovereigns in keeping their subjects 71 00:04:32.319 --> 00:04:37.120 obedient to despotism, while in regard to external concerns, the 72 00:04:37.199 --> 00:04:41.040 Bund would make all Germany a dependency of Prussia if 73 00:04:41.079 --> 00:04:44.079 there were no Austria, and of Austria if there were 74 00:04:44.120 --> 00:04:48.879 no Prussia. And in the meantime, each petty prince has 75 00:04:49.040 --> 00:04:52.120 little choice but to be a partisan of one or 76 00:04:52.120 --> 00:04:55.600 the other, or to intrigue with foreign governments against both. 77 00:04:57.319 --> 00:04:59.959 There are two different modes of organizing a federal union. 78 00:05:00.439 --> 00:05:04.439 The federal authorities may represent the governments solely, and their 79 00:05:04.480 --> 00:05:07.560 acts may be obligatory only on the governments as such, 80 00:05:08.279 --> 00:05:10.399 or they may have the power of enacting laws and 81 00:05:10.519 --> 00:05:14.920 issuing orders which are binding directly on individual citizens. The 82 00:05:15.000 --> 00:05:17.879 former is the plan of the German so called Confederation 83 00:05:18.160 --> 00:05:22.279 and of the Swiss Constitution previous to eighteen forty seven. 84 00:05:23.240 --> 00:05:25.839 It was tried in America for a few years immediately 85 00:05:25.920 --> 00:05:29.399 following the War of Independence. The other principle is that 86 00:05:29.480 --> 00:05:33.000 of the existing Constitution of the United States, and has 87 00:05:33.040 --> 00:05:36.959 been adopted within the last dozen years by the Swiss Confederacy. 88 00:05:37.639 --> 00:05:41.120 The Federal Congress of the American Union is a substantive 89 00:05:41.160 --> 00:05:45.000 part of the government of every individual state within the 90 00:05:45.079 --> 00:05:48.480 limits of its attributions. It makes laws which are obeyed 91 00:05:48.519 --> 00:05:52.759 by every citizen individually, executes them through its own officers, 92 00:05:53.279 --> 00:05:57.800 and enforces them by its own tribunals. This is the 93 00:05:57.800 --> 00:06:00.519 only principle which has been found or which is ever 94 00:06:00.680 --> 00:06:04.639 likely to produce an effective federal government. A union between 95 00:06:04.839 --> 00:06:08.480 the governments only is a mere alliance and subject to 96 00:06:08.519 --> 00:06:13.560 all the contingencies which render alliances precarious. If the acts 97 00:06:13.600 --> 00:06:16.279 of the President and of Congress were binding solely on 98 00:06:16.319 --> 00:06:20.160 the governments of New York, Virginia, or Pennsylvania, and could 99 00:06:20.199 --> 00:06:22.920 only be carried into effect through orders issued by those 100 00:06:22.959 --> 00:06:27.680 governments to officers appointed by them under the responsibility to 101 00:06:27.720 --> 00:06:31.199 their own courts of justice. No mandates of the federal 102 00:06:31.279 --> 00:06:35.120 government which were disagreeable to a local majority would ever 103 00:06:35.160 --> 00:06:39.600 be executed. Requisitions issued to a government have no other 104 00:06:39.680 --> 00:06:42.920 sanction or means of enforcement than war, and a federal 105 00:06:43.040 --> 00:06:45.920 army would have to be always in readiness to enforce 106 00:06:45.959 --> 00:06:50.360 the decrees of the Federation against any recalcitrant state, subject 107 00:06:50.399 --> 00:06:54.399 to the probability that other states, sympathizing with the recusant 108 00:06:54.839 --> 00:06:58.399 and perhaps sharing its sentiments on the particular point in dispute, 109 00:06:58.839 --> 00:07:02.000 would withhold their contingents, if not send them to fight 110 00:07:02.040 --> 00:07:05.720 in the ranks of the disobedient state. Such a federation 111 00:07:05.879 --> 00:07:08.199 is more likely to be a cause than a preventive 112 00:07:08.360 --> 00:07:11.600 of internal wars, and if such was not its effect 113 00:07:11.680 --> 00:07:15.000 in Switzerland until the events of the years immediately preceding 114 00:07:15.040 --> 00:07:18.680 eighteen forty seven, it was only because the federal government 115 00:07:18.720 --> 00:07:22.160 felt its weakness so strongly that it hardly ever attempted 116 00:07:22.480 --> 00:07:27.639 to exercise any real authority in America, The experiment of 117 00:07:27.680 --> 00:07:30.959 a federation on this principle broke down in the first 118 00:07:30.959 --> 00:07:34.120 few years of its existence, happily, while the men of 119 00:07:34.199 --> 00:07:38.639 enlarged knowledge and acquired ascendancy who founded the independence of 120 00:07:38.680 --> 00:07:41.360 the Republic were still alive to guide it through the 121 00:07:41.399 --> 00:07:46.319 difficult transition. The Federalist, a collection of papers by three 122 00:07:46.360 --> 00:07:50.839 of these eminent men, written in the explanation and defense 123 00:07:50.839 --> 00:07:55.319 of the new Federal Constitution, while still awaiting the national acceptance, 124 00:07:56.160 --> 00:07:59.040 is even now the most instructive treatise we possess on 125 00:07:59.120 --> 00:08:03.279 federal government. In Germany. The more imperfect kind of federation, 126 00:08:03.959 --> 00:08:06.759 as all know, has not even answered the purpose of 127 00:08:06.800 --> 00:08:11.279 maintaining an alliance. It has never, in any European war 128 00:08:11.439 --> 00:08:15.360 prevented single members of the confederation from allying themselves with 129 00:08:15.480 --> 00:08:18.560 foreign powers against the rest. Yet this is the only 130 00:08:18.560 --> 00:08:23.199 federation which seems possible among monarchical states. A king who 131 00:08:23.199 --> 00:08:26.920 holds his power by inheritance, not by delegation, and who 132 00:08:26.920 --> 00:08:30.120 cannot be deprived of it nor made responsible to any 133 00:08:30.160 --> 00:08:33.159 one for its use, is not likely to renounce having 134 00:08:33.200 --> 00:08:36.159 a separate army, or to brook the exercise of sovereign 135 00:08:36.240 --> 00:08:40.480 authority over his own subjects, not through him, but directly 136 00:08:40.519 --> 00:08:43.879 by another power. To enable two or more countries under 137 00:08:43.960 --> 00:08:47.440 kingly government to be joined together in an effectual confederation, 138 00:08:47.879 --> 00:08:50.399 it seems necessary that they should all be under the 139 00:08:50.440 --> 00:08:53.759 same king. England and Scotland were a federation of this 140 00:08:53.919 --> 00:08:57.399 description during the interval of about a century between the 141 00:08:57.480 --> 00:09:01.039 union of the crowns and that of the Parliaments. Even 142 00:09:01.080 --> 00:09:05.159 this was effective not through federal institutions, for none existed, 143 00:09:05.639 --> 00:09:09.159 but because the regal power in both constitutions was so 144 00:09:09.279 --> 00:09:12.399 nearly absolute as to enable the foreign policy of both 145 00:09:12.799 --> 00:09:17.799 to be shaped according to a single will. Under the 146 00:09:17.840 --> 00:09:21.039 more perfect mode of federation, where every citizen of each 147 00:09:21.080 --> 00:09:24.080 particular state owes obedience to two governments, that of his 148 00:09:24.200 --> 00:09:27.320 own state and that of the federation, it is evidently 149 00:09:27.519 --> 00:09:31.519 necessary not only that the constitutional limits of the authority 150 00:09:31.559 --> 00:09:35.320 of each should be precisely and clearly defined, but that 151 00:09:35.320 --> 00:09:37.639 the power to decide between them in any case of 152 00:09:37.679 --> 00:09:41.240 dispute should not reside in either of the governments, or 153 00:09:41.279 --> 00:09:44.600 in any functionary subject to it, but in an umpire 154 00:09:44.720 --> 00:09:48.200 independent of both. There must be a supreme court of 155 00:09:48.360 --> 00:09:52.000 justice and a system of subordinate courts in every state 156 00:09:52.039 --> 00:09:55.600 of the Union, before whom such questions shall be carried, 157 00:09:56.039 --> 00:09:58.519 and whose judgment on them in the last stage of 158 00:09:58.559 --> 00:10:02.559 appeal shall be final. Every state of the Union and 159 00:10:02.600 --> 00:10:06.480 the federal government itself, as well as every functionary of each, 160 00:10:06.840 --> 00:10:09.480 must be liable to be sued in those courts for 161 00:10:09.600 --> 00:10:14.320 exceeding their powers or for non performance of their federal duties, 162 00:10:14.600 --> 00:10:18.039 and must in general be obliged to employ those courts 163 00:10:18.440 --> 00:10:22.559 as the instrument for enforcing their federal rights. This involves 164 00:10:22.600 --> 00:10:26.360 the remarkable consequence actually realized in the United States, that 165 00:10:26.440 --> 00:10:30.519 a court of justice, the highest federal tribunal, is supreme 166 00:10:30.600 --> 00:10:34.200 over the various governments, both state and federal, having the 167 00:10:34.279 --> 00:10:37.159 right to declare that any law made or act done 168 00:10:37.200 --> 00:10:40.759 by them exceeds the powers assigned to them by the 169 00:10:40.759 --> 00:10:46.399 Federal Constitution, and in consequence has no legal validity. It 170 00:10:46.440 --> 00:10:49.679 was natural to feel strong doubts before trial had been made, 171 00:10:50.120 --> 00:10:53.720 how such a provision would work, whether the tribunal would 172 00:10:53.720 --> 00:10:58.519 have the courage to exercise its constitutional power if it did, 173 00:10:58.600 --> 00:11:01.799 whether it would exercise it wisely, and whether the governments 174 00:11:01.840 --> 00:11:06.279 would consent to submit peaceably to its decision. The discussions 175 00:11:06.320 --> 00:11:10.679 on the American Constitution before its final adoption give evidence 176 00:11:10.759 --> 00:11:14.759 that these natural apprehensions were strongly felt, But they are 177 00:11:14.799 --> 00:11:19.360 now entirely quieted. Since during the two generations and more 178 00:11:19.440 --> 00:11:23.639 which have subsequently elapsed, nothing has occurred to verify them, 179 00:11:23.840 --> 00:11:27.200 though there have at times been disputes of considerable acrimony 180 00:11:27.679 --> 00:11:30.840 and which became the badges of parties respecting the limits 181 00:11:30.879 --> 00:11:34.360 of the authority of the federal and state governments. The 182 00:11:34.399 --> 00:11:38.919 eminently beneficial working of so singular a provision is probably, 183 00:11:39.039 --> 00:11:43.960 as Monsieur Destouqueville remarks, in a great measure attributable to 184 00:11:44.039 --> 00:11:49.039 the peculiarity inherent in a court of justice acting as such, namely, 185 00:11:49.399 --> 00:11:52.960 that it does not declare the law i nominee and 186 00:11:53.080 --> 00:11:56.799 in the abstract, but waits until a case between man 187 00:11:56.919 --> 00:12:00.399 and man is brought before it judicially involving the point 188 00:12:00.440 --> 00:12:04.320 in dispute, from which arises the happy effect that its 189 00:12:04.360 --> 00:12:07.440 declarations are not made in a very early stage of 190 00:12:07.440 --> 00:12:12.480 the controversy, that much popular discussion usually precedes them. That 191 00:12:12.519 --> 00:12:15.320 the court decides, after hearing the point fully argued on 192 00:12:15.360 --> 00:12:19.879 both sides by lawyers of reputation, decides only as much 193 00:12:19.919 --> 00:12:22.200 of the question at a time as is required by 194 00:12:22.200 --> 00:12:25.840 the case before it, and its decision, instead of being 195 00:12:25.919 --> 00:12:29.360 volunteered for political purposes, is drawn from it by the 196 00:12:29.440 --> 00:12:33.720 duty which it cannot refuse to fulfill of dispensing justice 197 00:12:33.840 --> 00:12:39.360 impartially between adverse litigants. Even these grounds of confidence could 198 00:12:39.440 --> 00:12:43.759 not have sufficed to produce the respectful submission with which 199 00:12:43.799 --> 00:12:46.759 all authorities have yielded to the decisions of the Supreme 200 00:12:46.799 --> 00:12:50.519 Court on the interpretation of the Constitution, were it not 201 00:12:50.639 --> 00:12:53.840 that complete reliance has been felt not only on the 202 00:12:53.879 --> 00:12:58.039 intellectual pre eminence of the judges composing that exalted tribunal, 203 00:12:58.799 --> 00:13:03.720 but on their entire superieriority over either private or sectional partialities. 204 00:13:05.519 --> 00:13:08.399 This reliance has been, in the main justified. But there 205 00:13:08.440 --> 00:13:12.120 is nothing which more vitally imports the American people than 206 00:13:12.159 --> 00:13:15.440 to guard with the most watchful solicitude against everything which 207 00:13:15.480 --> 00:13:19.799 has the remotest tendency to produce deterioration in the quality 208 00:13:19.840 --> 00:13:24.120 of this great national institution. The confidence on which depends 209 00:13:24.159 --> 00:13:27.720 the stability of federal institutions has been for the first 210 00:13:27.759 --> 00:13:31.000 time impaired by the judgment declaring slavery to be of 211 00:13:31.039 --> 00:13:35.360 common right and consequently lawful in the territories. While not 212 00:13:35.440 --> 00:13:38.720 yet constituted as states, even against the will of a 213 00:13:38.799 --> 00:13:42.240 majority of their inhabitants. The main pillar of the American 214 00:13:42.320 --> 00:13:47.080 Constitution is scarcely strong enough to bear many more such shocks. 215 00:13:48.279 --> 00:13:51.399 The tribunals, which act as umpires between the federal and 216 00:13:51.480 --> 00:13:55.919 the state governments, naturally also decide all disputes between two states, 217 00:13:56.559 --> 00:13:58.919 or between a citizen of one state and the government 218 00:13:59.000 --> 00:14:03.559 of another. The usual remedies between nations, war and diplomacy 219 00:14:03.879 --> 00:14:07.480 being precluded by the federal Union, it is necessary that 220 00:14:07.559 --> 00:14:11.799 a judicial remedy should supply their place. The Supreme Court 221 00:14:11.840 --> 00:14:15.759 of the Federation dispenses international law, and is the first 222 00:14:15.799 --> 00:14:17.919 great example of what is now one of the most 223 00:14:17.960 --> 00:14:24.600 prominent wants of civilized society, a real international tribunal. The 224 00:14:24.600 --> 00:14:27.919 powers of a federal government naturally extend not only to 225 00:14:28.000 --> 00:14:30.840 peace and war, and all questions which arise between the 226 00:14:30.879 --> 00:14:35.039 country and foreign governments, but to making any other arrangements 227 00:14:35.080 --> 00:14:37.559 which are, in the opinion of the states necessary to 228 00:14:37.639 --> 00:14:40.919 their enjoyment of the full benefits of union. For example, 229 00:14:41.519 --> 00:14:43.919 it is a great advantage to them that their mutual 230 00:14:44.000 --> 00:14:48.120 commerce should be free without the impediment of frontier duties 231 00:14:48.279 --> 00:14:51.759 and custom houses. But this internal freedom cannot exist of 232 00:14:51.840 --> 00:14:54.559 each state has the power of fixing the duties on 233 00:14:54.720 --> 00:14:59.320 interchange of commodities between itself and foreign countries, since every 234 00:14:59.360 --> 00:15:02.080 foreign product let in by one state would be let 235 00:15:02.120 --> 00:15:05.360 into all the rest, and hence all custom duties and 236 00:15:05.440 --> 00:15:09.440 trade regulations in the United States are made or repealed 237 00:15:09.440 --> 00:15:13.759 by the federal government exclusively. Again, it is a great 238 00:15:13.840 --> 00:15:17.440 convenience to the states to have but one coinage and 239 00:15:17.480 --> 00:15:20.320 but one system of weights and measures, which can only 240 00:15:20.360 --> 00:15:23.679 be ensured if the regulation of these matters is entrusted 241 00:15:23.679 --> 00:15:27.799 to the federal government. The certainty and celerity of post 242 00:15:27.799 --> 00:15:32.720 office communication is impeded and its expense increased if a 243 00:15:32.799 --> 00:15:35.480 letter has to pass through half a dozen sets of 244 00:15:35.559 --> 00:15:41.120 public offices subject to different supreme authorities. It is convenient, therefore, 245 00:15:41.360 --> 00:15:44.399 that all post offices should be under the federal government. 246 00:15:45.000 --> 00:15:47.919 But on such questions, the feelings of different communities are 247 00:15:47.960 --> 00:15:52.200 liable to be different. One of the American states under 248 00:15:52.240 --> 00:15:55.200 the guidance of a man who has displayed powers as 249 00:15:55.240 --> 00:15:59.279 a speculative political thinker superior to any who has appeared 250 00:15:59.320 --> 00:16:04.000 in American per politics. Since the authors of the Federalist footnote, 251 00:16:04.360 --> 00:16:09.200 mister Calhoun end footnote claimed a veto for each state 252 00:16:09.279 --> 00:16:12.559 on the custom of laws of the Federal Congress, and 253 00:16:12.600 --> 00:16:16.279 that statesman, in a posthumous work of great ability, which 254 00:16:16.279 --> 00:16:19.320 has been printed and widely circulated by the legislature of 255 00:16:19.320 --> 00:16:23.799 South Carolina, vindicated this pretension on the general principle of 256 00:16:23.840 --> 00:16:27.879 limiting the tyranny of the majority and protecting minorities by 257 00:16:27.879 --> 00:16:32.720 admitting them to a substantial participation in political power. One 258 00:16:32.759 --> 00:16:36.159 of the most disputed topics in American politics during the 259 00:16:36.200 --> 00:16:38.799 early part of this country was whether the power of 260 00:16:38.799 --> 00:16:42.960 the federal government ought to extend, and whether, by the Constitution, 261 00:16:43.120 --> 00:16:46.639 it did extend to making roads and canals at the 262 00:16:46.639 --> 00:16:49.799 cost of the union. It is only in transactions with 263 00:16:49.879 --> 00:16:53.519 foreign powers that the authority of the federal government is 264 00:16:53.600 --> 00:16:58.679 of necessity complete on every other subject. The question depends 265 00:16:58.720 --> 00:17:01.879 on how closely the people in general wish to draw 266 00:17:01.919 --> 00:17:05.920 the federal tie, what portion of their local freedom of 267 00:17:05.960 --> 00:17:08.680 action they are willing to surrender in order to enjoy 268 00:17:09.039 --> 00:17:13.799 more fully the benefit of being one nation. Respecting the 269 00:17:13.839 --> 00:17:18.079 fitting constitution of a federal government within itself, much need 270 00:17:18.119 --> 00:17:21.880 not be said. It, of course, consists of a legislative 271 00:17:21.880 --> 00:17:25.240 branch and an executive, and the constitution of each is 272 00:17:25.279 --> 00:17:29.640 amenable to the same principles as that of representative governments. Generally, 273 00:17:30.400 --> 00:17:33.359 as regards the mode of adapting these general principles to 274 00:17:33.400 --> 00:17:37.400 a federal government, the provision of the American Constitution seems 275 00:17:37.440 --> 00:17:42.000 exceedingly judicious that Congress should consist of two houses, and 276 00:17:42.039 --> 00:17:44.960 that while one of them is constituted according to population, 277 00:17:45.440 --> 00:17:48.599 each state being entitled to representatives in the ratio of 278 00:17:48.640 --> 00:17:51.799 the number of its inhabitants, the other should represent not 279 00:17:51.920 --> 00:17:55.599 the citizens but the state governments, and every state, whether 280 00:17:55.720 --> 00:17:59.160 large or small, should be represented in it by the 281 00:17:59.200 --> 00:18:03.279 same number of men members. This provision precludes any undue 282 00:18:03.279 --> 00:18:06.799 power from being exercised by the more powerful states over 283 00:18:06.839 --> 00:18:10.759 the rest, and guarantees the reserved rights of the state 284 00:18:10.880 --> 00:18:14.039 governments by making it impossible, as far as the mode 285 00:18:14.079 --> 00:18:18.559 of representation can prevent, that any measure should pass Congress 286 00:18:18.920 --> 00:18:22.039 unless approved not only by a majority of the citizens, 287 00:18:22.480 --> 00:18:25.920 but by a majority of the states. I have before 288 00:18:25.960 --> 00:18:29.519 adverted to the further incidental advantage obtained of raising the 289 00:18:29.559 --> 00:18:34.079 standard of qualifications in one of the houses being nominated 290 00:18:34.119 --> 00:18:38.039 by select bodies the legislatures of the various states whose choice, 291 00:18:38.319 --> 00:18:41.279 for reasons already indicated, is more likely to fall on 292 00:18:41.720 --> 00:18:46.200 eminent men than any popular election, who have not only 293 00:18:46.240 --> 00:18:49.440 the power of electing such but a strong motive to 294 00:18:49.519 --> 00:18:52.279 do so, because the influence of their state in the 295 00:18:52.319 --> 00:18:56.599 general deliberations must be materially affected by the personal weight 296 00:18:56.880 --> 00:19:00.799 and abilities of its representatives. The Senate of the United States, 297 00:19:00.920 --> 00:19:04.920 thus chosen, has always contained nearly all the political men 298 00:19:04.960 --> 00:19:08.319 of established and high reputation in the Union, while the 299 00:19:08.359 --> 00:19:12.519 Lower House of Congress has, in the opinion of competent observers, 300 00:19:12.839 --> 00:19:17.240 been generally as remarkable for the absence of conspicuous personal 301 00:19:17.400 --> 00:19:22.160 merit as the Upper House for its presence. When the 302 00:19:22.160 --> 00:19:26.279 conditions exist for the formation of efficient and durable federal unions, 303 00:19:26.319 --> 00:19:29.240 the multiplication of them is always a benefit to the world. 304 00:19:30.160 --> 00:19:33.640 It has the same salutary effect as any other extension 305 00:19:33.680 --> 00:19:37.640 of the practice of cooperation, through which the weak, by uniting, 306 00:19:37.720 --> 00:19:41.400 can meet on equal terms with the strong. By diminishing 307 00:19:41.440 --> 00:19:44.079 the number of those petty states which are not equal 308 00:19:44.079 --> 00:19:47.519 to their own defense, it weakens the temptations to an 309 00:19:47.559 --> 00:19:52.319 aggressive policy, whether working directly by arms or through the 310 00:19:52.359 --> 00:19:56.000 prestige of superior power. It, of course puts an end 311 00:19:56.119 --> 00:20:00.359 to war and diplomatic quarrels, and usually also to restricttions 312 00:20:00.359 --> 00:20:04.599 on commerce between the states composing the Union, while in 313 00:20:04.640 --> 00:20:09.039 reference to neighboring nations, the increased military strength conferred by 314 00:20:09.079 --> 00:20:12.039 it is of a kind to be almost exclusively available 315 00:20:12.319 --> 00:20:17.680 for defensive scarcely at all for aggressive purposes. A federal 316 00:20:17.759 --> 00:20:22.519 government has not a sufficiently concentrated authority to conduct with 317 00:20:22.640 --> 00:20:26.079 much efficiency any war but one of self defense, in 318 00:20:26.119 --> 00:20:30.119 which it can rely on the voluntary cooperation of every citizen. 319 00:20:31.400 --> 00:20:34.559 Nor is there anything very flattering to national vanity or 320 00:20:34.599 --> 00:20:39.400 ambition in acquiring by a successful war, not subjects or 321 00:20:39.440 --> 00:20:43.720 even fellow citizens, but only new and perhaps troublesome independent 322 00:20:43.839 --> 00:20:48.960 members of the confederation. The warlike proceedings of the Americans 323 00:20:48.960 --> 00:20:53.640 in Mexico was purely exceptional, having been carried on principally 324 00:20:53.799 --> 00:20:59.000 by volunteers, under the influence of the migratory propensity, which 325 00:20:59.119 --> 00:21:03.519 prompts individual rual Americans to possess themselves of unoccupied land, 326 00:21:03.960 --> 00:21:07.400 and stimulated, if by any public motive, not by that 327 00:21:07.480 --> 00:21:12.000 of national aggrandizement, but by the purely sectional purpose of 328 00:21:12.160 --> 00:21:16.480 extending slavery. There are few signs in the proceedings of 329 00:21:16.519 --> 00:21:21.319 Americans nationally or individually, that the desire of territorial acquisition 330 00:21:21.440 --> 00:21:25.559 for their country as such has any considerable power over them. 331 00:21:26.160 --> 00:21:30.400 Their hankering after Cuba is in the same manner merely sectional, 332 00:21:30.880 --> 00:21:34.240 and the Northern States, those opposed to slavery, have never 333 00:21:34.359 --> 00:21:38.359 in any way favored it. The question may present itself, 334 00:21:38.400 --> 00:21:41.279 as in Italy at its present uprising, whether a country 335 00:21:41.319 --> 00:21:43.960 which is determined to be united should form a complete 336 00:21:44.319 --> 00:21:47.880 or a merely federal union. The point is sometimes necessarily 337 00:21:47.880 --> 00:21:51.880 decided by the mere territorial magnitude of the United whole. 338 00:21:52.200 --> 00:21:54.279 There is a limit to the extent of country which 339 00:21:54.319 --> 00:21:58.519 can advantageously be governed, or even whose government can be 340 00:21:58.680 --> 00:22:03.200 conveniently superintended from a single center. There are vast countries 341 00:22:03.240 --> 00:22:06.920 so governed, but they, or at least their distant provinces, 342 00:22:07.160 --> 00:22:10.680 are in general deplorably ill administered, and it is only 343 00:22:10.720 --> 00:22:13.839 when the inhabitants are almost savages that they could not 344 00:22:13.960 --> 00:22:18.200 manage their affairs better. Separately, this obstacle does not exist 345 00:22:18.240 --> 00:22:20.759 in the case of Italy, the size of which does 346 00:22:20.799 --> 00:22:23.960 not come up to that of several very efficiently governed 347 00:22:24.079 --> 00:22:27.880 single states. In past and present times. The question, then, 348 00:22:28.000 --> 00:22:31.119 is whether the different parts of the nation require to 349 00:22:31.119 --> 00:22:34.240 be governed in a way so essentially different that it 350 00:22:34.279 --> 00:22:37.920 is not probable the same legislature and the same ministry 351 00:22:38.039 --> 00:22:42.640 or administrative body will give satisfaction to them all. Unless 352 00:22:42.640 --> 00:22:45.200 this be the case, which is a question of fact, 353 00:22:45.480 --> 00:22:48.680 it is better for them to be completely united. That 354 00:22:48.759 --> 00:22:52.200 a totally different system of laws and very different administrative 355 00:22:52.240 --> 00:22:56.200 institutions may exist in two portions of a country without 356 00:22:56.240 --> 00:23:00.519 being any obstacle to legislative unity is proof by the 357 00:23:00.519 --> 00:23:05.599 case of England and Scotland. Perhaps, however, this undisturbed coexistence 358 00:23:05.640 --> 00:23:10.680 of two legal systems under one united legislature making different 359 00:23:10.720 --> 00:23:13.519 laws for the two sections of the country in adaptation 360 00:23:13.960 --> 00:23:17.400 to the previous differences, might not be so well preserved, 361 00:23:17.880 --> 00:23:20.799 or the same confidence might not be felt in its 362 00:23:21.039 --> 00:23:25.119 preservation in a country whose legislators are more possessed, as 363 00:23:25.200 --> 00:23:27.680 is apt to be the case on the continent with 364 00:23:27.799 --> 00:23:32.119 the mania for uniformity, a people having that unbounded toleration 365 00:23:32.200 --> 00:23:36.039 which is characteristic of this country for every description of anomaly, 366 00:23:36.559 --> 00:23:40.000 so long as those whose interests it concerns do not 367 00:23:40.119 --> 00:23:44.920 feel aggrieved by it, afforded an exceptionally advantageous field for 368 00:23:45.000 --> 00:23:49.400 trying this difficult experiment. In most countries, if it was 369 00:23:49.440 --> 00:23:52.480 an object to retain different systems of law, it might 370 00:23:52.599 --> 00:23:57.920 probably be necessary to retain distinct legislatures as guardians of them, 371 00:23:58.200 --> 00:24:02.279 which is perfectly compatible the national parliament and king, or 372 00:24:02.319 --> 00:24:06.319 a national parliament without a king supreme over the external 373 00:24:06.359 --> 00:24:10.559 relations of all the members of the body. Whenever it 374 00:24:10.640 --> 00:24:14.039 is not deemed necessary to maintain permanently in the different 375 00:24:14.079 --> 00:24:19.440 provinces different systems of jurisprudence and fundamental institutions grounded on 376 00:24:19.480 --> 00:24:24.720 different principles, it is always practicable to reconcile minor diversities 377 00:24:24.799 --> 00:24:28.279 with the maintenance of unity of government. All that is 378 00:24:28.359 --> 00:24:31.440 needful is to give a sufficiently large sphere of action 379 00:24:31.599 --> 00:24:35.799 to the local authorities under one and the same central government. 380 00:24:35.799 --> 00:24:39.839 There may be local governors and provincial assemblies for local purposes. 381 00:24:40.960 --> 00:24:44.000 It may happen, for instance, that the people of different 382 00:24:44.079 --> 00:24:48.160 provinces may have preferences in favor of different modes of taxation. 383 00:24:49.279 --> 00:24:52.119 If the general legislature could not be depended on for 384 00:24:52.200 --> 00:24:55.200 being guided by the members for each province. In modifying 385 00:24:55.519 --> 00:24:59.480 the general system of taxation to suit that province. The 386 00:24:59.519 --> 00:25:02.640 constitute tuition might provide that as many of the expenses 387 00:25:02.680 --> 00:25:06.319 of the government as could by any possibility be made local, 388 00:25:06.519 --> 00:25:10.599 should be defrayed by local rates imposed by the provincial assemblies, 389 00:25:11.079 --> 00:25:14.279 and that those which must of necessity be general, such 390 00:25:14.279 --> 00:25:17.079 as the support of an army and navy, should, in 391 00:25:17.119 --> 00:25:19.920 the estimates for the year, be apportioned among the different 392 00:25:19.960 --> 00:25:24.119 provinces according to some general estimate of their resources, the 393 00:25:24.200 --> 00:25:27.640 amount assigned to each being levied by the local assembly 394 00:25:28.000 --> 00:25:31.920 on the principles most acceptable to the locality, and paid 395 00:25:32.160 --> 00:25:37.000 umbloc into the national treasury. A practice approaching to this 396 00:25:37.160 --> 00:25:40.240 existed even in the old French monarchy, so far as 397 00:25:40.279 --> 00:25:44.200 regarded the pay destas, each of which, having consented or 398 00:25:44.240 --> 00:25:47.559 been required to furnish a fixed sum, was left to 399 00:25:47.599 --> 00:25:51.640 assess it upon the inhabitants by its own officers, thus 400 00:25:51.799 --> 00:25:57.319 escaping the grinding despotism of the royal intendant and subde 401 00:25:57.400 --> 00:26:01.839