WEBVTT 1 00:00:30.800 --> 00:00:33.600 Welcome to mid Rats with sal from Commander Salamander, an 2 00:00:33.679 --> 00:00:36.960 Eagle one from Eagle Speak at Seer Shore your home 3 00:00:37.000 --> 00:00:40.320 for a discussion of national security issues and all things maritime. 4 00:00:41.200 --> 00:00:44.000 And welcome goard everybody. Glad to have you after a 5 00:00:44.079 --> 00:00:46.560 few weeks off that you're gonna take some time to 6 00:00:46.679 --> 00:00:49.320 join us today for another edition of mid Rats, and 7 00:00:49.359 --> 00:00:53.119 we are live, so if you are with that cohort live, 8 00:00:53.159 --> 00:00:55.280 we'd just like to go ahead and extend the invitation 9 00:00:55.359 --> 00:00:57.679 as always to you. You can go over and find 10 00:00:57.719 --> 00:01:01.520 the chat room join in. Today is a great time 11 00:01:01.520 --> 00:01:02.920 to be in a chat room because it's a free 12 00:01:02.960 --> 00:01:04.959 for all. We have the things that we want to 13 00:01:05.000 --> 00:01:07.439 talk about, and we'll always love to get your input 14 00:01:07.519 --> 00:01:08.959 or even if there's a topic that you would like 15 00:01:09.000 --> 00:01:11.280 for us to talk about, we are more than open 16 00:01:11.319 --> 00:01:13.200 to it and we'll be monitoring in the chat room 17 00:01:13.280 --> 00:01:16.280 during the course of the day. And as always, if 18 00:01:16.319 --> 00:01:18.640 you either are getting the podcast now or you are 19 00:01:18.760 --> 00:01:21.760 listening to us live because life is busy. If you 20 00:01:22.200 --> 00:01:26.000 haven't already, go over to spreaker iTunes wherever you get 21 00:01:26.040 --> 00:01:29.439 your podcast, find us and subscribe to mid Rights. That 22 00:01:29.480 --> 00:01:31.680 way we can be there at a time for more 23 00:01:32.040 --> 00:01:36.040 to your convenience and after most of the May doing 24 00:01:36.079 --> 00:01:38.840 what life has equal one glad to have you on board, 25 00:01:38.879 --> 00:01:40.000 to have a chance to talk again. 26 00:01:40.159 --> 00:01:43.040 Yeah, it's good to be back. I don't know if 27 00:01:43.040 --> 00:01:45.280 everybody else is missed talking to you, but I've kind 28 00:01:45.280 --> 00:01:45.680 of missed it. 29 00:01:45.959 --> 00:01:47.359 That's a high compliment. 30 00:01:47.439 --> 00:01:47.519 Now. 31 00:01:47.760 --> 00:01:48.760 It's one of the things that. 32 00:01:50.400 --> 00:01:54.640 I exchange emails with an individual that I rather value 33 00:01:54.640 --> 00:01:57.200 his opinion earlier today and he said a couple of 34 00:01:57.280 --> 00:02:00.560 nice things like, well, I'm just a guy with a keyboard, 35 00:02:00.719 --> 00:02:03.439 coffee and inability to shut up, and the rats is 36 00:02:03.480 --> 00:02:06.239 always a good opportunity to talk about the things that 37 00:02:06.319 --> 00:02:10.199 are happening. And we picked the right day because the 38 00:02:10.240 --> 00:02:14.400 breaking news on the national security front from the Russia 39 00:02:14.479 --> 00:02:17.960 Ukrainian war, it seems to hit a whole bunch of 40 00:02:18.280 --> 00:02:20.919 hot button items that we've been talking about here on 41 00:02:20.960 --> 00:02:22.039 the show since twenty. 42 00:02:21.800 --> 00:02:24.199 Cent Yeah, it's uh, you know, I love the fact 43 00:02:24.199 --> 00:02:27.840 that people are beginning to extrapolate what the Ukrainians have 44 00:02:27.960 --> 00:02:30.560 done to things that could happen. And I mean, we 45 00:02:30.599 --> 00:02:32.159 can get into a lot of that later on, but 46 00:02:32.319 --> 00:02:34.439 it you know, John Conrad has been beating the drum 47 00:02:34.479 --> 00:02:37.360 about the danger of some of these container ships bringing 48 00:02:37.360 --> 00:02:39.680 stuff in and people have been pooh pooing that because 49 00:02:40.000 --> 00:02:42.439 you know, he was focusing i think originally on the 50 00:02:42.439 --> 00:02:45.319 missiles or you know, club whatever that club thing is, 51 00:02:45.360 --> 00:02:48.240 the pup k the Russians have. But you know this, 52 00:02:48.439 --> 00:02:51.280 these are if you've seen the videos of the drones 53 00:02:51.319 --> 00:02:54.080 that have been used for these attacks, that they're not complicated. 54 00:02:54.319 --> 00:02:56.759 I mean, they're just looks like things you could go 55 00:02:56.800 --> 00:02:59.080 down to your local hobby store and pick up and 56 00:02:59.240 --> 00:03:01.520 strap a a bump to it. You can to wipe 57 00:03:01.560 --> 00:03:02.520 out up a nice air. 58 00:03:02.360 --> 00:03:04.919 Force base, and most of it seemed to be the type. 59 00:03:04.919 --> 00:03:08.960 And there's some really good photos that the Ukrainian government 60 00:03:09.000 --> 00:03:13.000 have already released on how the trucks were configured and 61 00:03:13.039 --> 00:03:15.159 the type of drones that they had there Mark one 62 00:03:15.240 --> 00:03:19.159 Mod zero three D printed with a few other things 63 00:03:19.159 --> 00:03:22.520 that you bolt on afterwards. It is you've got to 64 00:03:22.599 --> 00:03:25.479 tip the hat to the Ukrainians. They're in their fourth 65 00:03:25.560 --> 00:03:28.960 year of war against a nation that has better demographics 66 00:03:28.960 --> 00:03:31.639 than they do, is four times larger than they are, 67 00:03:31.759 --> 00:03:34.319 and already took some of their most strategical land. They 68 00:03:34.319 --> 00:03:37.400 manage to push it back and they are schooling the 69 00:03:37.439 --> 00:03:41.639 rest of the world on what the future possibilities are 70 00:03:41.919 --> 00:03:46.039 when it comes to combat, how these things can change 71 00:03:46.199 --> 00:03:49.159 and adjust, and the you know, more than a golf 72 00:03:49.199 --> 00:03:52.479 clap to the Ukrainians, regardless of where you stand. I 73 00:03:52.520 --> 00:03:54.080 know there are there are some people out there that 74 00:03:54.120 --> 00:03:57.199 are pro Russian who aren't bad actors or just have 75 00:03:57.319 --> 00:03:59.879 interesting ideas, but don't care. You know where you are. 76 00:04:00.400 --> 00:04:03.840 You have to respect the audacity. And the Ukrainian put 77 00:04:03.840 --> 00:04:06.159 out that they've been spending about eighteen months planning that. 78 00:04:06.599 --> 00:04:13.599 I don't doubt that because anybody who before I was 79 00:04:13.680 --> 00:04:17.560 last in Russia two thousand and nine, and the security 80 00:04:17.600 --> 00:04:19.959 getting out of there is not what you would think 81 00:04:20.279 --> 00:04:22.639 in the West. It's still got a little bit Soviet 82 00:04:22.680 --> 00:04:26.600 tends to it. But to get from Siberia to the 83 00:04:26.680 --> 00:04:28.920 airfield that I can't pronounce, it begins with an o 84 00:04:29.160 --> 00:04:33.399 that's up there right south of Murmansk that houses the 85 00:04:33.439 --> 00:04:36.439 Northern Fleet, which originally their indications like they're hitting the 86 00:04:36.480 --> 00:04:39.480 Northern Fleet headquarters, but looks like they're hitting the strategic 87 00:04:39.519 --> 00:04:42.800 aviation at the airfield that's south is there, which makes 88 00:04:42.839 --> 00:04:48.160 sense with the larger effort, and even for those that 89 00:04:49.079 --> 00:04:53.120 have peacetime sensitivity towards attacks. If just back up and 90 00:04:53.160 --> 00:04:56.560 look at the initial primary effect, you would have trouble 91 00:04:56.600 --> 00:05:00.519 picking a better target set, even if you We can 92 00:05:00.519 --> 00:05:03.519 talk about later on. There's some really positive second and 93 00:05:03.680 --> 00:05:06.240 third order effects to this, but the primary effect is 94 00:05:07.279 --> 00:05:10.920 the Ukrainian people on an almost nightly basis, are being 95 00:05:11.120 --> 00:05:15.120 attacked in their cities various locations, and the worst of 96 00:05:15.120 --> 00:05:17.879 the attacks are coming via air launched missiles. It can 97 00:05:17.920 --> 00:05:20.800 only be carried by heavy bombers, the bears, the backfires, 98 00:05:20.800 --> 00:05:24.959 et cetera. And these are high demand, low density assets. 99 00:05:25.199 --> 00:05:27.480 They can only put as many missiles on target as 100 00:05:27.480 --> 00:05:30.759 they can get mission capable birds in the air, and 101 00:05:30.800 --> 00:05:35.439 they're not building backfires and bear bombers like a shoe factory. 102 00:05:35.680 --> 00:05:39.439 So they've taken out a lot of their units that 103 00:05:39.639 --> 00:05:44.319 are really hitting their civilian populations hard. So it's great internally, 104 00:05:44.600 --> 00:05:48.399 it's great from a operational point of view, and it 105 00:05:48.439 --> 00:05:50.800 also begs the question. This gets into some of the 106 00:05:50.879 --> 00:05:54.879 second third order effects, the psychological maybe little SI outs 107 00:05:54.879 --> 00:05:58.120 that they play it right. This also plays right into 108 00:05:58.879 --> 00:06:02.959 a century old Russian fear and why they have no 109 00:06:03.079 --> 00:06:07.040 natural borders and continue to expand they're highly insecure, and 110 00:06:07.079 --> 00:06:10.680 we all remember during World War Two as the Russia, 111 00:06:10.680 --> 00:06:13.680 as the Germans advanced, they would take things apart and 112 00:06:13.720 --> 00:06:16.399 move back into the interior because they have defense and depth, 113 00:06:16.720 --> 00:06:18.879 kind of like how we think we have the Atlantic 114 00:06:18.920 --> 00:06:23.079 and the Pacific oceans to protect us. This undermines that 115 00:06:23.600 --> 00:06:27.800 critical psychological center of gravity for Russia, and I think 116 00:06:28.360 --> 00:06:31.319 internally the Russians are going to react to that in 117 00:06:31.399 --> 00:06:35.480 ways that will also benefit Ukraine and the conflict. 118 00:06:35.600 --> 00:06:39.480 Yeah, I'm curious about whether they've I think the Russians 119 00:06:39.480 --> 00:06:42.040 are going to accuse the Fens and the Swedes or 120 00:06:42.079 --> 00:06:44.519 the Norwegians whoever. You know, they have all that border 121 00:06:44.600 --> 00:06:46.519 up there at the top, and if they're attacking Urmask 122 00:06:46.600 --> 00:06:49.360 and they're attacking those air bases to the east of that, 123 00:06:49.720 --> 00:06:51.199 how are they getting the you know, we saw the 124 00:06:51.319 --> 00:06:53.240 drones flying out of the trucks. How are they getting 125 00:06:53.240 --> 00:06:55.800 those things up there? And whose roads were they using 126 00:06:55.839 --> 00:06:57.879 to get them there? So if I were the Russians, 127 00:06:57.959 --> 00:07:00.680 Fens and the Swedes and the Norwa'd be gone. 128 00:07:01.000 --> 00:07:02.800 And the also, you know, the Russians have got to 129 00:07:02.800 --> 00:07:07.240 be thinking to themselves and I'm paraphrasing for those that 130 00:07:07.439 --> 00:07:10.000 know him and they follow him on ext Joshua Steinmon 131 00:07:10.319 --> 00:07:12.680 what he's been asking for years is we left it. 132 00:07:12.839 --> 00:07:16.160 Let in millions of unvetted people across our southern border, 133 00:07:16.279 --> 00:07:18.959 tens of thousands of them are citizens of the PRC. 134 00:07:19.279 --> 00:07:22.519 How many Savage Hodge teams are already in place here? 135 00:07:22.759 --> 00:07:25.879 So the Russians have to be asking themselves the same thing. Okay, 136 00:07:25.920 --> 00:07:30.319 did did the Ukrainians? Did they fire all of their 137 00:07:30.360 --> 00:07:34.319 capabilities on one day? Or their follow up attacks? And 138 00:07:34.360 --> 00:07:38.560 you can really come up a nation really fast if 139 00:07:38.639 --> 00:07:42.519 you get paranoid about every truck, everybody who doesn't have 140 00:07:42.639 --> 00:07:45.800 a pure Russian accent that you run into down the 141 00:07:45.839 --> 00:07:48.560 side of the road. And I think it's a viable concern. 142 00:07:48.720 --> 00:07:49.160 Maybe you do. 143 00:07:49.360 --> 00:07:51.360 This was one of those things that the Ukrainians they 144 00:07:51.360 --> 00:07:53.120 had one shot, they were going to take it. But 145 00:07:53.160 --> 00:07:55.439 there's a non zero chance they have other teams and 146 00:07:55.519 --> 00:07:57.439 other targets that they're going to wait and pull that 147 00:07:57.560 --> 00:08:00.560 card out at a time of their conveniences. Have got 148 00:08:00.600 --> 00:08:03.120 to react to that, and there is a really good 149 00:08:03.199 --> 00:08:05.879 lesson for everybody to take in that regard as well. 150 00:08:06.040 --> 00:08:08.120 Yeah, I'm sitting there thinking, well, we saw this you know, 151 00:08:08.160 --> 00:08:11.959 they were apparently using fairly large cargo trucks. You know, 152 00:08:12.079 --> 00:08:15.639 a Honda Odyssey could carry five or six of these things, 153 00:08:15.639 --> 00:08:19.040 I guess in the back. And somebody was really determined 154 00:08:19.040 --> 00:08:21.199 to do some damage. Out of the scale of this, 155 00:08:21.279 --> 00:08:26.199 but enough to really affect things. I mean, power stations, 156 00:08:26.439 --> 00:08:29.439 pipelines a little harder, John, because most of them are underground. 157 00:08:29.560 --> 00:08:33.000 But there are the places where they do them up 158 00:08:33.000 --> 00:08:34.600 out of the ground, and they got big storage tanks. 159 00:08:34.600 --> 00:08:36.200 There are whole bunch of players where they are. I 160 00:08:36.279 --> 00:08:41.080 just don't know, you know what systems we see these 161 00:08:41.120 --> 00:08:44.679 guys fly these drones into buildings, in and out of buildings, 162 00:08:44.720 --> 00:08:47.759 down into into caves. You know, that's pretty impressive, and 163 00:08:47.799 --> 00:08:50.320 I'm thinking, you know, if they're that good, what what 164 00:08:50.440 --> 00:08:52.639 kind of net can you put up that protects at 165 00:08:52.720 --> 00:08:54.799 aircraft to the point that how do you get it 166 00:08:54.840 --> 00:08:57.039 out of there without you know, opening up the net 167 00:08:57.080 --> 00:09:00.720 to lingering a lingering drune. You know, these are all 168 00:09:00.759 --> 00:09:03.159 questions that can't be answered right now, but it is 169 00:09:03.240 --> 00:09:05.120 as you said, there are so many things that make 170 00:09:05.200 --> 00:09:09.399 you ponder the what ifs, and a lot of our imaginations. 171 00:09:09.799 --> 00:09:12.240 One thing that really caught my attention is there's an 172 00:09:12.279 --> 00:09:15.799 interesting video out there. They evidently while their attack drones 173 00:09:15.840 --> 00:09:20.559 were attacking, they had a reconnaissance drone right over the 174 00:09:20.960 --> 00:09:23.840 flight line where a bunch of bare bombers were lined 175 00:09:23.919 --> 00:09:26.799 up as the attacks were going. So they're getting real 176 00:09:26.879 --> 00:09:29.679 time post strike analysis because they have one of their 177 00:09:29.759 --> 00:09:34.000 drones uplinking via However, they're uplinking watching it. Okay here, 178 00:09:34.120 --> 00:09:36.559 you know this is probably a full kill. This is 179 00:09:36.559 --> 00:09:38.200 probably a mission kill. This one they might be able 180 00:09:38.200 --> 00:09:40.559 to fix. We missed this. So they're getting real time 181 00:09:40.679 --> 00:09:42.919 data on what they're attacking. And of course you have 182 00:09:43.000 --> 00:09:46.360 all the syops involved in that as well. And the 183 00:09:46.360 --> 00:09:50.440 thing that popped into my head. Everybody's talking about AI 184 00:09:50.679 --> 00:09:54.600 and how wonderful it is. As these were controlled by 185 00:09:54.919 --> 00:09:59.159 operators located some ways communicating somehow getting their live feed 186 00:09:59.200 --> 00:10:03.080 and some interesting. But we are very close to the nexus, 187 00:10:03.080 --> 00:10:05.279 and I know it's in the lab, and it may 188 00:10:05.399 --> 00:10:09.080 very well be in some secret squirrel location already just 189 00:10:09.120 --> 00:10:11.600 waiting for the for the Jags to give it a 190 00:10:11.600 --> 00:10:14.279 thumbs up. But we know other nations won't be as reclusive. 191 00:10:14.879 --> 00:10:18.000 But we are right on the cusp and we should 192 00:10:18.000 --> 00:10:20.440 assume it's already here, just has it been produced at scale. 193 00:10:20.559 --> 00:10:23.279 The wherewareof of the merger of two things. It's no 194 00:10:23.320 --> 00:10:27.720 longer science fiction, it's no longer military fiction. It's reality 195 00:10:27.879 --> 00:10:37.000 of processing ability is required to process multi spectral imagery 196 00:10:37.039 --> 00:10:40.080 coming off a secret heead with producing those secret heads 197 00:10:40.080 --> 00:10:43.120 in a very affordable way, or coming together such that 198 00:10:43.559 --> 00:10:46.919 you don't even need GPS, you don't need fiber optics. 199 00:10:47.200 --> 00:10:51.120 Back for decades we had the ability to fly Tomawk 200 00:10:51.200 --> 00:10:56.159 missiles through people's windows just with train matching software. You know, 201 00:10:56.240 --> 00:10:59.639 run it off of a equivalent chip from the from 202 00:10:59.679 --> 00:11:05.000 the Night teen eighties. So you combine AI's ability to 203 00:11:05.039 --> 00:11:07.480 think fast, the computers that can keep up with that 204 00:11:07.559 --> 00:11:10.919 think fast, and the data stream that's coming off of 205 00:11:11.000 --> 00:11:15.320 affordable seeker heads, we are reaching very much a point 206 00:11:15.360 --> 00:11:19.320 that you can park a truck somewhere and you don't 207 00:11:19.320 --> 00:11:21.240 have to have a man in the loop. You just 208 00:11:21.679 --> 00:11:25.200 tell the logarithm at this time or under the following conditions, 209 00:11:25.360 --> 00:11:27.919 open up the roof. You're looking for this type of 210 00:11:28.200 --> 00:11:31.840 type of return, go forward and do nasty things. That 211 00:11:32.120 --> 00:11:35.120 is what should really keep people up at night, because 212 00:11:35.240 --> 00:11:37.360 then you're if you can't keep them out and away 213 00:11:37.360 --> 00:11:40.480 from your bases. Then how do you defend yourself from 214 00:11:40.679 --> 00:11:41.360 such things? 215 00:11:41.399 --> 00:11:44.039 And that's a hard problem. Is a similar. 216 00:11:43.679 --> 00:11:49.840 Problem to your English Army or French Army brigade leader saying, 217 00:11:49.879 --> 00:11:53.240 how am I going to cross three hundred meters in 218 00:11:53.320 --> 00:11:57.159 the face of an interlocking fire of a maximum machine gun. 219 00:11:57.360 --> 00:11:59.600 It's the same type of challenge. There's an answer to it. 220 00:11:59.720 --> 00:12:02.559 I don't think that, at least at scale, anybody has 221 00:12:02.559 --> 00:12:05.720 an answer to this capability that take what you've seen 222 00:12:05.759 --> 00:12:08.679 today and then assume that can happen without a human 223 00:12:08.679 --> 00:12:10.799 and a loop at all. You just flip the switch 224 00:12:10.840 --> 00:12:13.759 from red to green and drive to the nearest border 225 00:12:13.799 --> 00:12:15.960 and see what happens in twelve hours when it goes off. 226 00:12:16.039 --> 00:12:18.080 It's it's the reality is no longer science fiction. 227 00:12:18.360 --> 00:12:21.600 Yeah, as you were saying, I remember an experiment be 228 00:12:21.679 --> 00:12:25.000 a skinner. The psychologist was training for the for the 229 00:12:25.039 --> 00:12:29.679 government was training pigeons to peck at pictures of targets 230 00:12:29.720 --> 00:12:34.519 to guide weapons to their location during World worked. I'm thinking, well, 231 00:12:34.559 --> 00:12:37.440 you know how much more I mean that was. You're 232 00:12:37.480 --> 00:12:39.360 not the brightest creatures in the face of the planet, 233 00:12:39.440 --> 00:12:41.200 but you don't have to be that bright. You know 234 00:12:41.240 --> 00:12:43.480 if you can know that the image of the image 235 00:12:43.519 --> 00:12:46.279 of what you're looking for, and I assume that even 236 00:12:46.320 --> 00:12:48.720 these fairly dumb chips can do that. You don't need 237 00:12:48.759 --> 00:12:52.320 to really be super sophisticated. You just need to be sophisticated. 238 00:12:52.519 --> 00:12:55.200 Yeah, it's it's just it's a great demonstration. A lot 239 00:12:55.200 --> 00:12:57.159 of times, and we've talked about these issues with a 240 00:12:57.240 --> 00:12:59.799 variety of guests over the years, and it's all in 241 00:13:00.639 --> 00:13:02.440 and will we have this exercise. We have a small 242 00:13:02.440 --> 00:13:07.360 little example. Well, this is something that's real world, very operational, 243 00:13:07.519 --> 00:13:11.240 very hostile environment. It's an order of magnitude more difficult 244 00:13:11.519 --> 00:13:16.360 to get a truckload of attack drones from Siberia to 245 00:13:16.720 --> 00:13:19.879 the outskirts of the Northern Fleet headquarters in Russia than 246 00:13:19.919 --> 00:13:21.559 it is to do the same thing in the US. 247 00:13:21.720 --> 00:13:24.639 And you talk to anybody who does border security where 248 00:13:24.679 --> 00:13:30.960 people hide, you know, fitanol, marijuana, illegal aliens and trucks 249 00:13:31.080 --> 00:13:32.960 and stuff like that. If you have to do more 250 00:13:33.000 --> 00:13:36.879 than a curse research, it gets clogged up tremendously on 251 00:13:36.919 --> 00:13:40.200 your border crossings. Now they have greater border areas to 252 00:13:40.200 --> 00:13:43.480 defend a little more porous, especially in Central Asia and 253 00:13:43.519 --> 00:13:46.200 East Asia. So if you have plenty of time, and 254 00:13:46.240 --> 00:13:48.279 you have a good plan, and you know who all 255 00:13:48.320 --> 00:13:50.960 the coruct people that are easy degrees, you can see 256 00:13:51.159 --> 00:13:54.480 how they got there. And it also had me thinking 257 00:13:54.759 --> 00:13:58.039 about concept that can get some people to roll their 258 00:13:58.080 --> 00:14:00.679 eyes out and can make accountants upset. And I got 259 00:14:00.679 --> 00:14:02.919 to give credit where credit is due. And this I 260 00:14:02.960 --> 00:14:05.000 know this seems like yesterday to you and me, but 261 00:14:05.759 --> 00:14:07.360 it was a while ago. 262 00:14:07.600 --> 00:14:08.200 In some of his. 263 00:14:08.200 --> 00:14:10.960 Final year or year and a half or so, maybe 264 00:14:11.000 --> 00:14:13.799 the last few months that Admiral Harvey was an active 265 00:14:13.840 --> 00:14:16.159 duty he started beating a drum and I found some 266 00:14:16.200 --> 00:14:18.399 stuff that I wrote about it at the time, back 267 00:14:18.440 --> 00:14:20.320 in twenty ten. I believe it is. I don't know 268 00:14:20.360 --> 00:14:22.440 exactly where it was. I couldn't find the article because 269 00:14:22.559 --> 00:14:24.159 so many of the links back to twenty ten are 270 00:14:24.159 --> 00:14:30.480 dead now. But he was emphasizing the need for strategic homeporting. 271 00:14:30.519 --> 00:14:34.200 If you're looking for secondary lessons we need to take 272 00:14:34.360 --> 00:14:37.480 as we think about this, because we need to look 273 00:14:37.679 --> 00:14:41.399 very very hard at strategic homeporting. And I'll have this 274 00:14:41.480 --> 00:14:43.440 link over on the show page, and for those that 275 00:14:43.480 --> 00:14:44.679 are in the chat room, I'll put it up in 276 00:14:44.720 --> 00:14:47.759 the chat room a second for folks to look at 277 00:14:48.519 --> 00:14:51.320 if you're on X you can see it. Tom Shugart 278 00:14:51.720 --> 00:14:56.960 Eback in August of twenty twenty four. And Tom's really 279 00:14:56.960 --> 00:15:01.480 good at seeing these things. He has for all those 280 00:15:01.519 --> 00:15:04.480 that learned navigation training on the East Coast. Everybody knows 281 00:15:04.519 --> 00:15:09.879 about the Craney Island area and thimble Shoals. Anyway, it's 282 00:15:09.879 --> 00:15:12.600 the Norfolk waterfront. And he asked, all the way back 283 00:15:12.720 --> 00:15:15.519 thirteen months ago, quote, what if I told you as 284 00:15:15.559 --> 00:15:18.440 I type this, there is a vessel associated with the 285 00:15:18.519 --> 00:15:22.720 Chinese People's Liberation Army that could be equipped with many 286 00:15:22.840 --> 00:15:26.120 drones of anti ship cruise or anti ship cruise missiles 287 00:15:26.159 --> 00:15:29.159 and was parked less than four miles from the bulk 288 00:15:29.200 --> 00:15:31.879 of the US Atlantic Fleet. And he makes a few 289 00:15:31.919 --> 00:15:34.320 more comments. From there, I think this and this is 290 00:15:34.320 --> 00:15:36.360 a point that we need to be raised again. Six 291 00:15:37.039 --> 00:15:38.480 it actually got written into law. 292 00:15:38.840 --> 00:15:39.559 There was. 293 00:15:40.960 --> 00:15:44.159 A push for strategic homeboarding. If people recall we were 294 00:15:44.399 --> 00:15:47.919 going to have a battleship Service Action Groupe that was 295 00:15:47.960 --> 00:15:50.440 going to be homeboarded in Staten Island of all places. 296 00:15:50.639 --> 00:15:53.879 Going back to your sategic onboarding, because that made sense 297 00:15:54.039 --> 00:15:56.279 when you're facing the Soviet Union and all the little 298 00:15:56.320 --> 00:15:58.759 nuclear missiles fling around, and then there are nineteen nineties 299 00:15:58.759 --> 00:16:02.360 we had that rash of efficiencies and brac closures. There's 300 00:16:02.360 --> 00:16:06.639 a big push for just the opposite master air bases 301 00:16:06.799 --> 00:16:09.440 where we would locate, for instance, in as Jacksonville, it's 302 00:16:09.480 --> 00:16:12.399 a Master ASW base. All the pights and a lot 303 00:16:12.440 --> 00:16:14.879 of helicopters and a lot of other fun things are 304 00:16:14.919 --> 00:16:18.080 located right there at in s Jacksonville, right next to 305 00:16:18.120 --> 00:16:18.919 the Saint John's River. 306 00:16:18.960 --> 00:16:20.120 It's about three miles wide. 307 00:16:20.120 --> 00:16:23.639 There you have the fleet concentration areas of Norfolk, Virginia, 308 00:16:23.639 --> 00:16:27.200 as Tom outlined, and you also have you know, look 309 00:16:27.200 --> 00:16:29.480 at everything we have in San Diego. All you have 310 00:16:29.559 --> 00:16:32.639 to do is some goober to have a one of 311 00:16:32.639 --> 00:16:36.000 those penthouse apartments up there least long enough, and like 312 00:16:36.039 --> 00:16:38.240 that shooter in Vegas years ago, have a few days 313 00:16:38.320 --> 00:16:40.600 going up and down the elevator with a few boxes 314 00:16:40.679 --> 00:16:43.480 and you can wreck some sugdicate significant habits. We are 315 00:16:43.519 --> 00:16:47.600 almost inviting exactly what happened to the Russians, but from 316 00:16:47.679 --> 00:16:51.320 a naval perspective. And just look at what is import 317 00:16:51.720 --> 00:16:55.639 on Christmas in San Diego, in Norfolk, and for lack 318 00:16:55.639 --> 00:16:59.919 of veterforate and even in Mayport, especially with our aircraft carriers, 319 00:17:00.159 --> 00:17:02.799 and then play out what the Ukrainians were able to 320 00:17:02.840 --> 00:17:06.559 do to the Russians. We have intentionally and consciously in 321 00:17:06.680 --> 00:17:11.920 peace created an incredible strategic risk two ours that nobody's 322 00:17:12.000 --> 00:17:13.720 talking about. And again I want to give full credit 323 00:17:13.759 --> 00:17:16.640 to ad Mcharvey. He was the last flag officer who 324 00:17:16.680 --> 00:17:20.759 saw this and was able to mention it back in 325 00:17:21.920 --> 00:17:27.680 twenty ten. And it's only underlined and bold and blaring 326 00:17:27.759 --> 00:17:30.880 and red right now that we need serious people and 327 00:17:31.000 --> 00:17:35.039 serious jobs to talk to the accountants, and we need 328 00:17:35.079 --> 00:17:37.559 to look back at strategic homeporting. We back when you 329 00:17:37.559 --> 00:17:39.640 and I were kids, just on the East coast, we 330 00:17:39.680 --> 00:17:41.880 had chips. I think we had like almost a dozen 331 00:17:41.920 --> 00:17:43.960 ships based in Newport, Rhode Island. 332 00:17:44.480 --> 00:17:45.119 We had them. 333 00:17:45.680 --> 00:17:48.480 Charleston off of Mayport was much larger. I had two 334 00:17:48.519 --> 00:17:50.759 aircraft carrier. As a matter of fact, I also saw 335 00:17:50.799 --> 00:17:53.279 a link back ten years ago when they were going 336 00:17:53.359 --> 00:17:54.920 to put carrier. 337 00:17:55.039 --> 00:17:58.039 In fact, I think I have that let me quote that. 338 00:17:58.039 --> 00:18:00.279 Did I save that article? I think I did, but 339 00:18:01.160 --> 00:18:07.960 at the time it was Andrew Crenshaw. Anyway, not important, 340 00:18:08.319 --> 00:18:10.119 I'll put it up on the show links. But they 341 00:18:10.119 --> 00:18:12.279 were going to move a nuclear carrier, and they said 342 00:18:12.920 --> 00:18:16.039 it should be in There should be a nuclear carrier 343 00:18:16.119 --> 00:18:21.839 homeported in Mayport, Florida, with all the accessories required to 344 00:18:21.880 --> 00:18:23.160 take care of a nuclear power ship. 345 00:18:23.160 --> 00:18:26.559 By twenty nineteen. Of course it never happened. So that 346 00:18:26.720 --> 00:18:29.160 was a get twenty ten, twenty eleven, twenty twelve, something 347 00:18:29.200 --> 00:18:33.559 like that. So we've we've lost another opportunity to protect ourselves. 348 00:18:33.839 --> 00:18:37.000 I don't know whether it'll get footing our traction, but 349 00:18:37.799 --> 00:18:39.799 here we are given another tap on the shoulder. Will 350 00:18:39.839 --> 00:18:42.359 people that make a difference be able to react to it? 351 00:18:42.559 --> 00:18:45.480 Well, I don't know how the aircraft are rate at 352 00:18:46.720 --> 00:18:49.519 at Mayport, but I do know that the aircraft at 353 00:18:49.720 --> 00:18:53.920 some of the we have consolidated all these forces. We 354 00:18:53.960 --> 00:18:57.799 have a bunch of squadrons at an Nassociana. We have 355 00:18:57.799 --> 00:19:02.039 a bunch of squadrons at the base in the middle 356 00:19:02.079 --> 00:19:04.160 of in the middle, but in this in the San 357 00:19:04.240 --> 00:19:08.960 Joaquin Valley, and themore we have a squadron. You know, 358 00:19:09.440 --> 00:19:11.759 we have these different things. But when you go to 359 00:19:11.920 --> 00:19:14.079 visit these sites, or you go to an air force base, 360 00:19:14.759 --> 00:19:17.240 they don't scatter the airplane. And now it looks like 361 00:19:17.319 --> 00:19:20.000 the days of right with the pictures you see of 362 00:19:20.160 --> 00:19:24.279 Pearl Harbor and the Philippines before the Japanese attack, they had, 363 00:19:24.319 --> 00:19:28.799 you know, to prevent sabotage, they clustered all the planes together, 364 00:19:28.839 --> 00:19:31.559 but all that did was making much better target for 365 00:19:31.599 --> 00:19:35.319 the aircraft coming in. And yeah, and your point is 366 00:19:35.559 --> 00:19:37.480 well made. And we do the same thing with the ships. 367 00:19:37.640 --> 00:19:41.119 You know, So if you're on the cruiser destroyer carrier 368 00:19:41.160 --> 00:19:44.319 piers there in Norfolk, that's a that's a very tempting, 369 00:19:44.920 --> 00:19:46.799 I weld think, a very tempting target. 370 00:19:46.960 --> 00:19:48.920 What is the response that we have to take away 371 00:19:48.960 --> 00:19:51.279 from this? We'll get more information on this. 372 00:19:51.839 --> 00:19:54.559 I was wondering. I mean, the Russians have a pretty 373 00:19:54.599 --> 00:19:59.599 good jamming capacity, but it seems not to be it 374 00:20:00.079 --> 00:20:02.640 as far back as the bases that got attacked. You know, 375 00:20:03.200 --> 00:20:06.559 they're they're using this anti jamming equipment or the jamming 376 00:20:06.599 --> 00:20:11.039 equipment locally and on the front, but apparently they were 377 00:20:11.039 --> 00:20:15.000 all lax on using it at these more remote bases. 378 00:20:15.079 --> 00:20:17.000 And then you get into the question, well can you 379 00:20:17.000 --> 00:20:18.759 you know, how do you how many free you know, 380 00:20:18.759 --> 00:20:21.559 do you have frequency skipping jammers that you can place 381 00:20:21.599 --> 00:20:24.039 out there to make sure you've covered all your bases? 382 00:20:24.160 --> 00:20:25.839 Do you. You know, as we're talked a little bit to 383 00:20:25.960 --> 00:20:27.559 some people are going, oh, we need nets over all 384 00:20:27.599 --> 00:20:30.839 this stuff. Good, good luck with that. But you know what, 385 00:20:30.839 --> 00:20:32.920 what what are we going to do? And what kind 386 00:20:32.920 --> 00:20:35.400 of sensitivity of radars we have that can pick up 387 00:20:35.400 --> 00:20:37.480 some of these small things? And if you do have it, 388 00:20:37.559 --> 00:20:39.359 what assets do you have to take them down? 389 00:20:39.480 --> 00:20:39.680 Yeah? 390 00:20:39.880 --> 00:20:42.720 And then you have how long do you keep those running? 391 00:20:42.880 --> 00:20:46.680 And for every countermeasure, there's a there's a counter countermeasure. 392 00:20:46.880 --> 00:20:50.160 And it's fair to say the Russians have gotten complacent. 393 00:20:50.440 --> 00:20:53.359 It's very convenient to keep all your planes lined up 394 00:20:53.519 --> 00:20:56.200 in an ice straight line were, you know, a couple 395 00:20:56.200 --> 00:20:58.720 of thousand kilometers away from the front. You know, what 396 00:20:58.960 --> 00:21:00.720 are they gonna what are they gonna do? Fly a 397 00:21:00.720 --> 00:21:04.079 bunch of quad copters over us? Actually it's exactly what 398 00:21:04.119 --> 00:21:06.519 they're going to do. And so that's another one of 399 00:21:06.519 --> 00:21:08.759 those lessons I hope we take on board because I've 400 00:21:08.759 --> 00:21:11.920 been hearing this since a station there. We have less 401 00:21:11.960 --> 00:21:17.960