WEBVTT 1 00:00:12.080 --> 00:00:16.440 This is Veterans Chronicles. I'm Greg Corumbus. Our guest in 2 00:00:16.440 --> 00:00:21.320 this edition is retired US Marine Corps Colonel Anthony Tony Wood. 3 00:00:22.120 --> 00:00:25.760 Colonel Wood spent thirty four years in uniform and secretly 4 00:00:25.839 --> 00:00:30.000 led an effort to plan for and execute the evacuation 5 00:00:30.120 --> 00:00:35.119 of Saigon in nineteen seventy five. April thirtieth, twenty twenty five, 6 00:00:35.640 --> 00:00:39.399 marks fifty years since the fall of Saigon. It's a 7 00:00:39.439 --> 00:00:42.960 painful day triggered by the North Vietnamese violating the Paris 8 00:00:43.000 --> 00:00:48.399 Peace Accords, invading South Vietnam, and eventually overrunning the South 9 00:00:48.520 --> 00:00:51.960 Vietnamese capital. Today, Colonel Wood will walk us through all 10 00:00:52.000 --> 00:00:55.799 of the planning, the many obstacles they've faced while planning, 11 00:00:56.520 --> 00:01:00.560 and the final frantic days and hours in Saigon. Tony 12 00:01:00.600 --> 00:01:03.640 Wood was born in nineteen forty five and grew up 13 00:01:03.640 --> 00:01:08.239 a Marine Corps brat as his dad served in the Corps. Incidentally, 14 00:01:08.439 --> 00:01:11.599 a dust up with his father led to Wood's decision 15 00:01:11.879 --> 00:01:13.879 to become a Marine as well. 16 00:01:14.079 --> 00:01:17.560 Well. I enlisted in the Marine Corps after a fight 17 00:01:17.640 --> 00:01:21.120 with my father in the summer of nineteen sixty four, 18 00:01:21.480 --> 00:01:25.319 and I stayed in the reserves and went back to 19 00:01:25.359 --> 00:01:27.680 school and then the war heated up Vietnam and I 20 00:01:27.680 --> 00:01:30.680 thought I would do my thing, and the Marine Corps 21 00:01:30.719 --> 00:01:33.719 decided to commission me. So I went from sergeant to 22 00:01:35.480 --> 00:01:39.439 second lieutenant and went off to Vietnam, and one thing 23 00:01:39.519 --> 00:01:42.480 led to another after that. Thirty four years later I retired. 24 00:01:42.840 --> 00:01:44.680 Did your father, who was the Marine not want you 25 00:01:44.719 --> 00:01:45.799 to join the Corps? 26 00:01:46.319 --> 00:01:48.560 I don't know what his real attitude was on it, 27 00:01:49.239 --> 00:01:51.000 but it was a good thing that we had. That 28 00:01:52.079 --> 00:01:55.040 we became very close later, but it was time. 29 00:01:56.359 --> 00:02:00.519 To break loose now. When you were deployed to Vietnam. 30 00:02:00.599 --> 00:02:03.519 Your first tour began in nineteen sixty eight as a 31 00:02:03.519 --> 00:02:04.480 platoon commander. 32 00:02:04.879 --> 00:02:10.080 Interestingly enough, I was an infantry officer, but parachute qualified, 33 00:02:11.000 --> 00:02:15.280 and I was assigned an armored platoon tanks and amtraks 34 00:02:15.319 --> 00:02:19.800 and some howitzers mounted on amtraks with the Marine Corps, 35 00:02:19.879 --> 00:02:22.439 I mean, with the Rock Marine Corps Republic of Korea 36 00:02:22.520 --> 00:02:25.479 Marine Corps Blue Dragon Brigade. And it was a very 37 00:02:25.479 --> 00:02:29.960 interesting tour and we got in a lot of combat 38 00:02:30.000 --> 00:02:34.039 with them, supporting the Rocks against the NVA south of 39 00:02:34.080 --> 00:02:36.199 Danang and near Hooyan, Vietnam. 40 00:02:37.639 --> 00:02:40.439 And obviously your deployment nineteen sixty eight. That's a very 41 00:02:40.479 --> 00:02:43.120 sensitive time in the warrior, right after the. 42 00:02:43.080 --> 00:02:46.479 Time was after Ted in sixty eight sixty nine. 43 00:02:46.360 --> 00:02:50.719 Right, And so what was the attitude, the mood, the 44 00:02:50.879 --> 00:02:52.680 urgency at the time that you deployed. 45 00:02:53.719 --> 00:02:58.919 Well, Ted is vastly misinterpreted. And I arrived in Vietnam 46 00:02:59.639 --> 00:03:04.719 basically the US forces had cleaned out the enemy in 47 00:03:04.840 --> 00:03:07.800 tent because what happened, of course, was that the North 48 00:03:07.879 --> 00:03:11.639 Vietnamese encouraged the Viet Cong to rise. The Viet Cong 49 00:03:11.719 --> 00:03:14.800 rose and became very visible, and most of them were killed. 50 00:03:17.159 --> 00:03:20.199 It was interpreted very differently back in the United States. 51 00:03:20.520 --> 00:03:22.840 It was very hard to understand that when you were 52 00:03:22.879 --> 00:03:26.960 over there or explain it to the young Marines. But 53 00:03:28.120 --> 00:03:33.199 so we were still very well engaged all over the 54 00:03:33.199 --> 00:03:37.080 country in nineteen sixty nine, and I came back to 55 00:03:37.319 --> 00:03:40.080 Hawaii to the first Marine Brigade from there when I 56 00:03:40.120 --> 00:03:40.960 finished that tour. 57 00:03:41.560 --> 00:03:45.759 Talk about your interaction both with the Dragon Brigade and 58 00:03:46.120 --> 00:03:49.520 as a platoon commander. What type of combat did you 59 00:03:49.520 --> 00:03:50.560 see at that point. 60 00:03:50.360 --> 00:03:53.280 Well, we were both mounted and dismounted. Mounted times. I 61 00:03:53.439 --> 00:03:56.479 usually broke the platoon into two sections. Let the gunny, 62 00:03:56.680 --> 00:03:59.080 the platoon sergeant take one out. I took the other 63 00:03:59.120 --> 00:04:02.560 one out to support at the Korean Marine Corps in 64 00:04:02.639 --> 00:04:10.120 their operations, we had six tanks, ten troop carrying amphibious 65 00:04:10.159 --> 00:04:15.159 tractors amtraks, and six tractors that really didn't move because 66 00:04:15.159 --> 00:04:17.680 we couldn't get any parts for them that had Howitzer's 67 00:04:17.720 --> 00:04:19.879 assigned on them, So they were kind of a stationary 68 00:04:20.000 --> 00:04:23.240 artillery battery, which of course I had no idea how 69 00:04:23.279 --> 00:04:24.800 to employ, so I had to learn that in a 70 00:04:24.839 --> 00:04:29.639 hurry too. Nor did I know anything about tanks or amtraks, 71 00:04:29.639 --> 00:04:31.639 so I had to learn a lot there. You got 72 00:04:31.639 --> 00:04:35.040 to wonder sometimes how you get assigned to these duties. Anyway, 73 00:04:35.480 --> 00:04:38.959 it was it was a very very exciting tour during 74 00:04:39.000 --> 00:04:40.360 which I learned a great deal. 75 00:04:41.040 --> 00:04:43.399 How quickly did you learn the things he had? 76 00:04:43.639 --> 00:04:48.519 Probably not quickly enough, but we did well, And I 77 00:04:48.519 --> 00:04:52.079 guess I did well largely because of patients on the 78 00:04:52.120 --> 00:04:57.079 part of staff NCOs and some very good n CEOs, 79 00:04:57.839 --> 00:05:01.480 and I I had some very good training from the 80 00:05:01.519 --> 00:05:03.240 Marine Corps before I went over there. 81 00:05:03.639 --> 00:05:08.000 How would you describe the quality of soldiering on? First 82 00:05:08.000 --> 00:05:10.240 of all, on our side of the menu, that you led. 83 00:05:10.600 --> 00:05:16.680 They were superb. They were absolutely superb. Despite Jane Fonda 84 00:05:16.759 --> 00:05:21.560 and some of the others. They were great. And the 85 00:05:21.600 --> 00:05:27.759 casualties were pretty heavy in that war, but yeah, they 86 00:05:28.240 --> 00:05:33.120 were great. Taught me how to cook rice, among other skills. 87 00:05:34.439 --> 00:05:36.519 And what did you notice about the enemy? 88 00:05:37.199 --> 00:05:40.360 They were also very The North Vietnamese Army, the NVA 89 00:05:40.439 --> 00:05:42.199 as we call them, as who we were fighting. The 90 00:05:42.360 --> 00:05:49.800 viet Cong had been eliminated basically in tent but the 91 00:05:49.920 --> 00:05:54.240 NVA was another story. They were very They were very, 92 00:05:54.360 --> 00:05:56.959 very good, and they were artists with tunnels. I remember 93 00:05:57.079 --> 00:06:00.639 once one tunnel was eight stories deep to the ground, 94 00:06:01.439 --> 00:06:04.680 with meeting rooms in a hospital and all kinds of 95 00:06:04.720 --> 00:06:10.480 other things remarkable. And their sappers were also amazing. Sappers 96 00:06:10.519 --> 00:06:15.079 were highly trained, usually very small guys who had slipped 97 00:06:15.120 --> 00:06:18.519 through the wire and bullholes and try to penetrate your perimeters. 98 00:06:18.560 --> 00:06:23.839 They were very They were a respected enemy. The area 99 00:06:23.879 --> 00:06:26.439 had also mines were a problem. The area had been 100 00:06:26.480 --> 00:06:29.240 mined in the thirties by the Vietmen in their fight 101 00:06:29.279 --> 00:06:34.040 against the French. Then it had been mined again in 102 00:06:34.240 --> 00:06:40.120 the in the early fifties, and it was mined a 103 00:06:40.160 --> 00:06:43.279 third time. Of course, when we were fighting, So there 104 00:06:43.319 --> 00:06:46.240 were a lot of mines at various locations, and it 105 00:06:46.240 --> 00:06:51.079 would we never carried marines inside the armored tractors. We 106 00:06:51.240 --> 00:06:55.279 put them on top with three layers of sandbags, and 107 00:06:55.360 --> 00:06:57.560 it was a court martial offense to carry them inside 108 00:06:57.600 --> 00:07:01.040 because of the mines and those in those days, the 109 00:07:01.079 --> 00:07:05.680 Amphibian tractors had gasoline in their bellies, so the mines 110 00:07:05.720 --> 00:07:09.519 had to blow through the gas. And what happened was 111 00:07:10.079 --> 00:07:13.199 I would stand, the platoon commander would stand on one 112 00:07:13.759 --> 00:07:16.759 in one hat standing on the chair, and the tractor 113 00:07:16.800 --> 00:07:19.000 commander would stand in the other one, and the air 114 00:07:19.040 --> 00:07:23.120 bubble would shoot us out like large slow murder rounds 115 00:07:23.720 --> 00:07:25.879 when we hit a mine, and we hit several mines, 116 00:07:26.319 --> 00:07:28.199 got to put a bunch of punctured ear drums. That 117 00:07:28.319 --> 00:07:30.160 was the only thing that happened to me in the 118 00:07:30.279 --> 00:07:36.079 entire tour. Ear drums and the typical cellulitis infections from 119 00:07:36.120 --> 00:07:39.720 the from the you know, the tropical diseases. 120 00:07:40.439 --> 00:07:44.079 How would you describe the situation compared to when you 121 00:07:44.240 --> 00:07:47.839 came on your first tour and to when you left. 122 00:07:47.680 --> 00:07:51.199 Well, when I left, we were beginning to draw down, 123 00:07:51.680 --> 00:07:57.560 just beginning to draw down. In sixty nine, and so 124 00:07:57.800 --> 00:08:01.879 it wasn't radically different. The Blue Dragons were still there 125 00:08:01.920 --> 00:08:04.199 and they were still fighting. The NVA was still there. 126 00:08:04.319 --> 00:08:06.560 They were still fighting us, but we were beginning to 127 00:08:06.639 --> 00:08:09.120 draw down. There was no question about it. And of 128 00:08:09.160 --> 00:08:12.040 course that was the lead up to the Paris Beast Conference, 129 00:08:12.079 --> 00:08:16.360 which a year and a half or two later ended 130 00:08:16.439 --> 00:08:18.839 up basically abandoning the South Vietnamese. 131 00:08:20.600 --> 00:08:24.040 Then after your first tour, I came back to the US. 132 00:08:24.920 --> 00:08:27.000 The Marine Corps thought I needed to be schooled again, 133 00:08:27.079 --> 00:08:29.879 so they they UH, they decided to send me to 134 00:08:29.959 --> 00:08:35.360 school again, to the Amphibious Warfare School, And well, I 135 00:08:35.399 --> 00:08:38.519 was a platoon commander and then a company commander and UH, 136 00:08:38.559 --> 00:08:45.320 first Battalion, third Marines in Hawaii, and we had to 137 00:08:45.320 --> 00:08:48.600 to uh. There was quite a bit of training to 138 00:08:48.679 --> 00:08:51.000 do there. And then they sent me to school, and 139 00:08:51.039 --> 00:08:54.480 then I volunteered and went back to Vietnam. 140 00:08:55.399 --> 00:08:57.399 Then your second tour, I guess the first tour could 141 00:08:57.399 --> 00:09:00.879 be described as more conventional. The second tour was much 142 00:09:00.960 --> 00:09:01.720 less conventional. 143 00:09:02.080 --> 00:09:07.399 The second tour was less conventional. I went back to 144 00:09:09.279 --> 00:09:13.279 Southeast Asia the second time in the late summer of 145 00:09:13.360 --> 00:09:19.320 nineteen seventy four, and my job was to as the 146 00:09:19.360 --> 00:09:22.919 commander for field operations, I had in the search and 147 00:09:22.960 --> 00:09:26.879 the resolution of the MIA cases. We had several thousand 148 00:09:27.000 --> 00:09:31.039 MIA cases that hadn't been resolved, Remains hadn't been found, 149 00:09:32.200 --> 00:09:36.080 and in some cases there were some sightings of apparently 150 00:09:36.200 --> 00:09:40.399 live prisoners, it was not clear. So we were engaged 151 00:09:40.440 --> 00:09:44.159 in that. I had an Army Special Forces team of 152 00:09:44.240 --> 00:09:49.960 about fifty guys, terrific, unbelievably terrific guys, some of the 153 00:09:50.000 --> 00:09:53.360 finest fighters I've ever seen in my life, a small 154 00:09:53.440 --> 00:09:57.360 Navy intelligence dead and an Air Force medical debt. And 155 00:09:57.399 --> 00:09:59.840 of course there were no US facilities of any kind, 156 00:10:00.000 --> 00:10:02.679 and there were no US forces of any kind in Vietnam. 157 00:10:03.399 --> 00:10:07.960 It was completely different, and it was difficult to hold 158 00:10:08.000 --> 00:10:13.960 your head up because despite our pledges that had convinced 159 00:10:14.000 --> 00:10:16.960 the South to agree to the Paris Peace Treaty, we 160 00:10:16.960 --> 00:10:20.559 were abandoning all support of the South Vietnamese armed forces. 161 00:10:21.519 --> 00:10:24.360 And it was so bad that in some cases art 162 00:10:24.360 --> 00:10:28.559 the artillery batteries had one round per day for six guns, 163 00:10:29.519 --> 00:10:32.960 dozens and dozens and dozens of vehicles as each time 164 00:10:33.000 --> 00:10:37.240 you would arrive at a unit park no parts. Gasoline 165 00:10:37.320 --> 00:10:43.039 was scarce, and we were systematically After President Nixon's resignation, 166 00:10:43.759 --> 00:10:47.080 Congress decided to abandon Vietnam, and so they cut off 167 00:10:47.120 --> 00:10:54.279 aid despite President Ford's requests. So the South Vietnamese regarded 168 00:10:54.360 --> 00:10:57.519 us as honorable allies. But it was very hard to 169 00:10:57.519 --> 00:10:58.440 hold your head up. 170 00:10:58.759 --> 00:11:01.960 Going to go back to the clandestine work and resolving 171 00:11:01.960 --> 00:11:04.399 the MIA cases. We got about a minute left in 172 00:11:04.440 --> 00:11:07.840 this segment. How did you actually resolve them? 173 00:11:07.919 --> 00:11:13.799 Well, there had been an ambush. The process was open 174 00:11:14.240 --> 00:11:18.240 until December of nineteen seventy four. That is, we tabled 175 00:11:18.279 --> 00:11:19.840 where we were going to go and what we were 176 00:11:19.919 --> 00:11:22.480 going to do to the Four Power Joint Military Commission, 177 00:11:22.480 --> 00:11:27.320 which included the enemy, the North Vietnamese, and so that 178 00:11:27.440 --> 00:11:30.799 was agreed to in the Paris Accords. And however, in 179 00:11:30.879 --> 00:11:34.000 December of nineteen seventy four, just before I went over there, 180 00:11:34.279 --> 00:11:37.919 they ambushed the American team, killed the captain team leader, 181 00:11:37.919 --> 00:11:41.279 and wounded several others. And so from then on we 182 00:11:41.360 --> 00:11:47.080 never tabled any more operations, and the skirmishing continued in Vietnam. 183 00:11:47.440 --> 00:11:50.000 And what I would do is I had to negotiate 184 00:11:50.080 --> 00:11:52.440 with the Hill tribes and others where we would go 185 00:11:52.559 --> 00:11:57.159 in for security because the popular forces, which they frequently 186 00:11:57.200 --> 00:12:01.120 offered us were really pretty well useless. They were just 187 00:12:01.240 --> 00:12:02.159 villagers armed. 188 00:12:02.519 --> 00:12:02.720 You know. 189 00:12:02.799 --> 00:12:05.399 It's not that they didn't care, it's just they weren't trained. 190 00:12:06.240 --> 00:12:08.279 So I would negotiate, and I spent a lot of 191 00:12:08.279 --> 00:12:10.759 time in the hills and got a lot of parasites 192 00:12:10.799 --> 00:12:12.600 out of that. That eventually caught up with me. 193 00:12:13.440 --> 00:12:16.960 That's retired to US Marine Corps Colonel Tony Wood. When 194 00:12:16.960 --> 00:12:19.679 we come back, you'll hear how Wood got the daunting 195 00:12:19.799 --> 00:12:24.639 challenge of developing an evacuation plan for Americans in Saigon. 196 00:12:25.639 --> 00:12:29.720 I'm Greg Corumbus and this is Veterans Chronicles. 197 00:12:29.600 --> 00:12:31.240 Sixty Seconds of Service. 198 00:12:31.559 --> 00:12:34.480 This sixty Seconds of Service is presented by T Mobile. 199 00:12:34.679 --> 00:12:37.639 T Mobile offers exclusive discounts for a veteran and military 200 00:12:37.679 --> 00:12:41.200 families and are proud supporters of the National Defense Network. 201 00:12:41.399 --> 00:12:44.240 Visit t mobile dot com slash military to learn more 202 00:12:44.279 --> 00:12:47.519 about how they support our military community. 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Prevagen is the number 213 00:13:23.360 --> 00:13:26.759 one pharmacist recommended memory support brand. You can find Prevagen 214 00:13:26.799 --> 00:13:29.320 in the vitamin aisle in stores everywhere. 215 00:13:29.519 --> 00:13:33.519 This is Veterans Chronicles. I'm Greg Corumbus. Our guest in 216 00:13:33.559 --> 00:13:38.080 this addition is retired US Marine Corps Colonel Anthony Tony Wood. 217 00:13:38.799 --> 00:13:41.639 We now pick up his story as Wood explains the 218 00:13:41.679 --> 00:13:45.159 situation leading up to the need for an American evacuation 219 00:13:45.320 --> 00:13:46.720 plan in Saigon. 220 00:13:47.200 --> 00:13:50.919 We had left South Vietnam in nineteen seventy two. There 221 00:13:50.960 --> 00:13:53.519 were no US forces of any kind in the country. 222 00:13:54.440 --> 00:13:58.559 The situation was we had a mission, which is what 223 00:13:58.600 --> 00:14:02.919 the US calls its combination of civilians and military, diplomat 224 00:14:03.639 --> 00:14:06.919 and business supportive anywhere in the world. The mission was 225 00:14:06.919 --> 00:14:11.200 probably twenty five thousand strong in Saigon of civilians and 226 00:14:12.279 --> 00:14:16.759 fifty military officers were allowed by the Paris Peace Accords, 227 00:14:16.759 --> 00:14:19.240 and they were all very senior and they were part 228 00:14:19.320 --> 00:14:23.480 of the Defense Adiche Office Dao Major General Homer Smith, 229 00:14:24.200 --> 00:14:29.720 wonderful man, great leader, and I turned I turned twenty 230 00:14:29.799 --> 00:14:35.240 nine in November of nineteen seventy four, and we went forward. 231 00:14:35.320 --> 00:14:38.759 We were operating out of Thailand in the search for 232 00:14:38.840 --> 00:14:42.679 the resolution operations for the MIAs, and we went forward 233 00:14:42.720 --> 00:14:47.720 to Vietnam to Saigon right after my birthday when I 234 00:14:47.799 --> 00:14:50.960 turned twenty nine in November. And we did that because 235 00:14:51.039 --> 00:14:54.360 the Jolly Green helicopters that we were using for insertion 236 00:14:54.440 --> 00:14:57.879 and extraction left Thailand. At that point, they were the 237 00:14:57.960 --> 00:15:04.279 last US military operation capable outfit that would take us 238 00:15:04.320 --> 00:15:08.960 into Vietnam and for insertion and extraction. And from then on, 239 00:15:09.759 --> 00:15:14.639 in a development that turned out to be critical, we 240 00:15:14.720 --> 00:15:19.399 operated with Air America, the CIA's airline, piloted by terrific 241 00:15:19.759 --> 00:15:24.639 for retired army or former army warrant officers, mostly civilians now, 242 00:15:25.879 --> 00:15:29.440 and they're small hueys, and we flew with them almost 243 00:15:29.480 --> 00:15:35.000 exclusively for insertion and extraction for those operations. So we 244 00:15:35.039 --> 00:15:42.039 were operating out of Saigon in Vietnam on Air America helicopters, 245 00:15:42.600 --> 00:15:45.720 but there were no US forces in the country, and 246 00:15:45.759 --> 00:15:49.320 the senior staff that was in Saigon was it. And 247 00:15:49.360 --> 00:15:53.679 of course they were essentially managing the logistics support of ARVIN, 248 00:15:53.799 --> 00:15:56.120 such as it was ARVIN being the Army of the 249 00:15:56.159 --> 00:16:01.879 Republic of Vietnam. A lot of skirmishing was going on, 250 00:16:02.840 --> 00:16:07.759 and then, of course it didn't take long. A month 251 00:16:07.840 --> 00:16:14.159 later in December, the NVA attacked South Vietnam, despite the 252 00:16:14.159 --> 00:16:19.879 Paris Piece Accords from their sanctuaries in the west, across 253 00:16:19.919 --> 00:16:26.039 the border and took the provincial capital of Fuklong. And 254 00:16:26.919 --> 00:16:29.639 as I'd say when I tell the story occasionally around 255 00:16:29.679 --> 00:16:33.639 the country, it was a test and we failed it. 256 00:16:33.639 --> 00:16:37.080 It didn't take very long. The second week in March 257 00:16:37.799 --> 00:16:42.200 they attacked banned Me two, a key highway intersection in 258 00:16:42.240 --> 00:16:46.559 the west, and Kantum and Plaiku were put at risk, 259 00:16:48.159 --> 00:16:51.559 and an entire South Vietnamese core collapsed because they were 260 00:16:51.559 --> 00:16:55.559 then trapped and one thing led to another, and it 261 00:16:55.639 --> 00:16:58.879 was the beginning of the end. And from March thirteenth 262 00:16:59.159 --> 00:17:03.080 until April the twenty ninth was you could count the 263 00:17:03.159 --> 00:17:07.400 days until fifty some days were left for South Vietnam. 264 00:17:08.200 --> 00:17:11.519 But you had already essentially been tasked with coming up 265 00:17:11.559 --> 00:17:14.160 with an evacuation plan even before those in March. 266 00:17:14.240 --> 00:17:18.519 In the first of March, General Smith, I've to this 267 00:17:18.640 --> 00:17:21.000 day don't know how he made the decision to do this, 268 00:17:21.160 --> 00:17:24.440 because he had, you know, a whole staff of very 269 00:17:24.480 --> 00:17:27.359 senior officers. At any rate, I came in from the 270 00:17:27.359 --> 00:17:29.640 field and I was ordered to report to General Smith. 271 00:17:30.039 --> 00:17:33.200 I did. I'd never seen a major general before, and 272 00:17:34.400 --> 00:17:38.960 wonderful Virginia boy, great, a great officer, just a terrific leader. 273 00:17:39.640 --> 00:17:42.720 And he had that soft Virginia accident. And he said, 274 00:17:43.279 --> 00:17:46.960 Captain Wood, do you know why you are here? And 275 00:17:47.240 --> 00:17:50.240 I said no, sir. He said you are here because 276 00:17:50.279 --> 00:17:52.240 I ordered you here. I said, yes, Sir, I knew that. 277 00:17:53.480 --> 00:17:57.000 And anyway, he said you are going to join this 278 00:17:57.160 --> 00:18:00.599 Special Planning Group. And I didn't open my mouth anymore. 279 00:18:00.640 --> 00:18:02.400 And he went on for a few minutes and said, 280 00:18:02.480 --> 00:18:05.359 everything you do will be secret. You will have to 281 00:18:05.359 --> 00:18:07.920 clear it with me. And I said, he said, do 282 00:18:08.000 --> 00:18:12.240 you have any questions? I had probably two hundred, but 283 00:18:12.319 --> 00:18:16.519 I said, sir, where is the Special Planning Group? And 284 00:18:16.599 --> 00:18:19.480 he said, you are the Special Planning Group. It's wherever 285 00:18:19.599 --> 00:18:24.039 you put it. That's literally what he said. And so 286 00:18:24.119 --> 00:18:26.759 we went down to this bunker, George Petrie, who is 287 00:18:26.839 --> 00:18:30.400 an incredible Army Special Forces hero, who was my deputy 288 00:18:31.000 --> 00:18:33.599 and my friend, and so it was the two of 289 00:18:33.680 --> 00:18:36.519 us and we joined one Marine Major Jim's avatur and 290 00:18:36.599 --> 00:18:39.160 we were the Special Planning So we just called ourselves 291 00:18:39.200 --> 00:18:41.799 the SPG since he said we were a special Planning group, 292 00:18:41.920 --> 00:18:44.920 you know. And we've found a bunker deep in the 293 00:18:44.960 --> 00:18:48.680 depths of the of the former mac V compound they 294 00:18:48.680 --> 00:18:53.440 called the Pentagon East, huge complex directly across from the 295 00:18:53.440 --> 00:18:57.960 Tonsonote Air Base. Very important fact because it plays later 296 00:18:58.000 --> 00:19:02.319 into what happened. So what's the mission. Well, he said, 297 00:19:02.480 --> 00:19:07.200 you are going to evacuate urban sigone, or better precisely, 298 00:19:07.240 --> 00:19:11.319 more precisely, you are going to develop a plan for 299 00:19:11.480 --> 00:19:15.799 the evacuation of the center of the city. And we 300 00:19:15.839 --> 00:19:17.799 went back and sat down. Of course, we had a 301 00:19:17.839 --> 00:19:20.759 million questions, but none of us had ever been in 302 00:19:20.799 --> 00:19:23.000 an evacuation before. None of us had ever been in 303 00:19:23.000 --> 00:19:26.759 a Special Planning Group before, and so we sat down 304 00:19:26.799 --> 00:19:28.680 and we said, okay, we have to figure out who 305 00:19:28.759 --> 00:19:32.599 we're going to evacuate, how many critically. We have to 306 00:19:32.599 --> 00:19:34.640 figure out what's going to happen here in this city, 307 00:19:35.119 --> 00:19:37.319 and we have to figure out what the assets. 308 00:19:36.839 --> 00:19:39.960 Are when we come back. Colonel Wood explains how the 309 00:19:40.000 --> 00:19:45.599 evacuation was developed despite overwhelming obstacles, and how the evacuation 310 00:19:45.759 --> 00:19:50.920 itself unfolded. I'm Greg Corumbus and this is Veterans Chronicles. 311 00:19:52.160 --> 00:19:56.359 This is Veterans Chronicles. I'm Greg Corumbus. Our guest in 312 00:19:56.400 --> 00:20:00.920 this edition is retired US Marine Corps Colonel Anthony Tony Wood. 313 00:20:01.680 --> 00:20:04.960 As Colonel Wood just explained, he was tasked with creating 314 00:20:05.000 --> 00:20:09.599 an evacuation plan for Americans working and living in downtown 315 00:20:09.680 --> 00:20:13.799 Saigon as North Vietnamese forces drew closer and closer to 316 00:20:13.839 --> 00:20:17.440 the city. Colonel Wood now takes us through the hurdles, 317 00:20:17.519 --> 00:20:21.440 the setbacks, the ingenuity, and the execution of the evacuation. 318 00:20:21.920 --> 00:20:24.319 But he picks up his story by explaining that he 319 00:20:24.440 --> 00:20:27.400 and the other planners not only had to keep their 320 00:20:27.440 --> 00:20:30.759 work secret from the North Vietnamese, but also from the 321 00:20:30.880 --> 00:20:34.240 top American diplomat in the country. 322 00:20:34.319 --> 00:20:38.039 It's important to understand the unique situation because it's hard 323 00:20:38.079 --> 00:20:43.319 to believe the Ambassador Graham Martin had forbidden any overt 324 00:20:43.759 --> 00:20:49.319 effort at all to prepare for evacuation. Initially none was permitted, 325 00:20:49.720 --> 00:20:52.759 so our ability to plan had to all be done 326 00:20:52.920 --> 00:20:58.680 in absolute secrecy. And we then asked what the assets 327 00:20:58.680 --> 00:21:03.240 would be, and over a period of weeks, one decision 328 00:21:03.319 --> 00:21:05.960 after another led to the fact that no marines would 329 00:21:05.960 --> 00:21:09.160 be put in to help secure the defense Attachet Office 330 00:21:09.160 --> 00:21:13.640 compound where we were and where we were building in 331 00:21:13.759 --> 00:21:17.839 secret an internment camp for ten thousand for ten days. 332 00:21:17.960 --> 00:21:22.039 Why because we weren't sure that the NVA would let 333 00:21:22.079 --> 00:21:25.799 us wait long enough to get a plan together. You know, 334 00:21:25.880 --> 00:21:28.680 there was no guarantee in my mind at least that 335 00:21:28.720 --> 00:21:32.559 we had thirty days, forty days, whatever we thought we had, 336 00:21:33.240 --> 00:21:36.759 and that's all we thought we had. So that was 337 00:21:36.839 --> 00:21:38.839 being done in secret. And that was the beginning of 338 00:21:38.880 --> 00:21:41.400 the volunteers, which is the whole point of this story, 339 00:21:42.200 --> 00:21:47.000 the real heroes. We recruited about twelve or fifteen American 340 00:21:47.079 --> 00:21:51.720 civilian Secretary's accountants, one who was a Lieutenant general equivalent 341 00:21:51.920 --> 00:21:56.079 Bill Austin, the Area auditor for Southeast Asia, and they 342 00:21:56.200 --> 00:21:59.440 began helping us build Project Alamo, which was the internment 343 00:21:59.519 --> 00:22:04.319 camp secret inside the DAO compound and of course, all 344 00:22:04.400 --> 00:22:07.000 this is in secret from most of the Dao staff too, 345 00:22:08.519 --> 00:22:11.720 And then the ambassador started making one decision after another. 346 00:22:11.839 --> 00:22:14.319 These all didn't occur. First of all, there would be 347 00:22:14.400 --> 00:22:17.880 no security provided for the Dao compound beyond the twelve 348 00:22:17.920 --> 00:22:22.480 marines that we had. Then the next decision he made 349 00:22:22.519 --> 00:22:26.039 was there would be no marines in the city of 350 00:22:26.079 --> 00:22:30.920 Saigon during the actual evacuation. And of course the question 351 00:22:31.000 --> 00:22:34.119 that hit me immediately was, well, how do we secure 352 00:22:34.200 --> 00:22:37.359 the convoy. Our plan included a bus convoy. So we 353 00:22:37.480 --> 00:22:41.640 had been developing a plan that essentially worked in two prongs. 354 00:22:42.480 --> 00:22:45.759 We would operate on eight routes named after the famous 355 00:22:45.799 --> 00:22:49.400 western trails of the United States Oregon, Texas, California, and 356 00:22:49.480 --> 00:22:52.920 so forth. And they would be buses, which we would 357 00:22:53.000 --> 00:22:55.160 armor somehow. We weren't sure how we were going to 358 00:22:55.200 --> 00:22:57.119 armor the buses, but we were going to armor them, 359 00:22:57.279 --> 00:22:58.880 and we were going to armor them in such a 360 00:22:58.920 --> 00:23:01.799 fashion that nobody would notice they were armored. Didn't know 361 00:23:01.799 --> 00:23:03.160 how to do that either, but we were going to 362 00:23:03.160 --> 00:23:06.240 figure it out. This was the plan. Okay, plans are great, 363 00:23:06.599 --> 00:23:10.359 then you have to do them. Then those men and 364 00:23:10.400 --> 00:23:14.039 women Vietnamese third country nationals for whom we had legal 365 00:23:14.079 --> 00:23:17.440 responsibility the US does all over the world, and of 366 00:23:17.480 --> 00:23:20.680 course Americans that we were going to pick up, we 367 00:23:20.720 --> 00:23:24.119 would pick them up on eighteen or twenty designated pickup 368 00:23:24.160 --> 00:23:27.319 points that were special buildings, and those buildings would have 369 00:23:27.440 --> 00:23:31.000 helicopter landing zones prepared on their roofs, which Marine Corps 370 00:23:31.000 --> 00:23:34.400 helicopters would then land on. Then another shoe fell. No 371 00:23:34.519 --> 00:23:37.200 Marine Corps helicopters would be allowed to land in the 372 00:23:37.200 --> 00:23:41.720 city except at the embassy. So remember that I mentioned 373 00:23:41.720 --> 00:23:47.400 to you we had been operating with their America. I 374 00:23:47.480 --> 00:23:50.720 went to Air America and I held a long meeting 375 00:23:50.799 --> 00:23:54.279 with the volunteers. We now had about one hundred volunteers 376 00:23:54.359 --> 00:23:58.279 by the end of March, working on all kinds of things, 377 00:23:58.960 --> 00:24:03.000 and including working with Air America to create hlz's on 378 00:24:03.039 --> 00:24:06.519 the roofs of those buildings. All twenty six are America 379 00:24:07.200 --> 00:24:12.039 pilots volunteered to stay with the volunteers we had and 380 00:24:12.240 --> 00:24:15.920 to evacuate from the rooftops, which in the end they 381 00:24:15.920 --> 00:24:21.200 did well. At that point, the North Vietnamese in the 382 00:24:21.319 --> 00:24:25.240 end of March attacked from the north simultaneously in Quang Tree, 383 00:24:25.319 --> 00:24:29.200 Crang Tree Fell, and in rapid succession wave fell and 384 00:24:29.240 --> 00:24:33.039 then d Nang. D Nang falling is like Chicago falling 385 00:24:33.119 --> 00:24:35.559 in the United States. That's the impact it had on 386 00:24:35.599 --> 00:24:39.519 the country. Now, tens of thousands of Vietnamese are fleeing 387 00:24:39.599 --> 00:24:43.880 south towards Saigon, tens of thousands clogging the roads. Troops 388 00:24:43.920 --> 00:24:47.160 can't move, and the NBA is coming in from the 389 00:24:47.160 --> 00:24:52.599 west and from the north, and they're attacking. And Arvin 390 00:24:52.640 --> 00:24:55.319 is having a terrible time and falling back, mostly because 391 00:24:55.359 --> 00:25:01.319 of lousy leadership. So at this point we go into 392 00:25:01.400 --> 00:25:05.480 override day at night, and when Dnang falls, the South 393 00:25:05.559 --> 00:25:09.640 Vietnamese government Saigon declares martial law. It affects a curfew 394 00:25:09.680 --> 00:25:12.119 and puts barricades up all over the city. Well, this 395 00:25:12.200 --> 00:25:15.720 is a huge problem because we are planning convoys on routes. 396 00:25:16.119 --> 00:25:19.680 So every night, one of us has to run the barricades, 397 00:25:20.480 --> 00:25:25.240 and we have silenced weapons because if we have to shoot, 398 00:25:25.279 --> 00:25:29.400 are going to have to shoot National police South Vietnamese 399 00:25:29.480 --> 00:25:31.920 National Police at the barricades if we get into a fight. 400 00:25:33.079 --> 00:25:35.519 So every night we did that, and then in the 401 00:25:35.519 --> 00:25:38.279