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<v Speaker 1>All right, welcome back in Our guest is ken Block,

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<v Speaker 1>and the book is Disproven, my unbiased search for voter

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<v Speaker 1>fraud and the Trump campaign the data that shows why

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<v Speaker 1>he lost and how we can improve our elections. And

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<v Speaker 1>we're going to spend a lot of time on election reform,

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<v Speaker 1>not so much about litigating twenty twenty. He's got a

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<v Speaker 1>lot to say. How did he get involved in this, Well,

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<v Speaker 1>he is president of a software systems company, Simpatico, software

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<v Speaker 1>engineer and entrepreneur specializes in database technologies and groundbreaking projects,

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<v Speaker 1>such as the country's first statewide debit card benefits system

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<v Speaker 1>in Texas. He saved them billion dollars off of the

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<v Speaker 1>fraud and waste and their snap programs. But as he said,

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<v Speaker 1>he wasn't really interested in getting involved in politics. But

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<v Speaker 1>you know, sometimes we find that politics is interested in us.

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<v Speaker 1>In the past decade, he's analyzed voter data from more

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<v Speaker 1>than forty states. The few that he has yet to

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<v Speaker 1>analyze do not provide their data to the public. He

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<v Speaker 1>has served as an expert and legal challenges that involve

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<v Speaker 1>voting data, voter fraud, and election integrity. So we'll talk

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<v Speaker 1>to him about all of these things and about what

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<v Speaker 1>he has learned as he investigates us, what can we

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<v Speaker 1>do to make sure that we have honest elections that

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<v Speaker 1>are not going to be contested. Thank you for joining us.

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<v Speaker 2>Sir, Thanks for having me.

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<v Speaker 1>It's very important because we've got a lot of people

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<v Speaker 1>are very concerned about this, and rightfully so, a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of people are ready to have a revolution if the

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<v Speaker 1>candidate that they think should win does not win, and

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<v Speaker 1>in a equally divided country like this, half the people

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<v Speaker 1>are pretty much feeling that way. I saw that your

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<v Speaker 1>forward was written by Brad Raffensberger, the Georgia Secretary of State.

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<v Speaker 1>That again over the weekend. I talked about this. At

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<v Speaker 1>the beginning of the program. Trump was furious at Governor Kemp.

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<v Speaker 1>He talk about Raffensberger, but they have in the past,

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<v Speaker 1>and so you know he is and I said this

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<v Speaker 1>about him. I said, it's unfortunate that he is so

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<v Speaker 1>focused on revenge that he can't be focused on even winning,

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<v Speaker 1>let alone on reform. And so I want to talk

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<v Speaker 1>about that. But before we get into what we can

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<v Speaker 1>do for reform, tell us a little bit about your

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<v Speaker 1>take on what happened in Georgia where you investigated.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, it's the idea that in states that are whisker close,

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<v Speaker 3>and we have a bunch of them, we have Arizona, Pennsylvania, Georgia,

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<v Speaker 3>Michigan is not really whisker close, but close enough Nevada.

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<v Speaker 3>The idea that if the election goes one way as

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<v Speaker 3>opposed to another, that the only explanation for it must

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<v Speaker 3>have been fraud is not an accurate way to depict

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<v Speaker 3>what happened in these elections, And in Georgia in twenty twenty,

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<v Speaker 3>there are there's a ready explanation for what happened, and

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<v Speaker 3>Georgia is maybe in a lot of ways the closest

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<v Speaker 3>state that we have in terms of being evenly divided

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<v Speaker 3>between Democrats and Republicans. The results of the twenty twenty

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<v Speaker 3>election have been gone up and down and backwards and

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<v Speaker 3>votes and sideways, and there really hasn't surfaced any credible

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<v Speaker 3>claim of voter fraud that could be proven.

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<v Speaker 2>And in my work for the.

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<v Speaker 4>Trump campaign, I was hired very specifically to do data

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<v Speaker 4>analytics that would stand up in a court of law.

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<v Speaker 4>My job was to find enough voter fraud to matter

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<v Speaker 4>in one of the swing states documented and have it

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<v Speaker 4>be so rock solid that when it got taken to court,

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<v Speaker 4>the other side's experts wouldn't be able to tear it apart.

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<v Speaker 2>That's sort of the gold.

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<v Speaker 4>Standard when you're dealing with legal challenges to elections. You

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<v Speaker 4>have to have have a foundation of fact in which

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<v Speaker 4>to be successful in court. And the simple fact of

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<v Speaker 4>the matter is whether it was Georgia or any of

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<v Speaker 4>the other swing states. While we found some voter fraud,

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<v Speaker 4>we didn't find nearly enough to cover the margin of victory.

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<v Speaker 2>And the margin of victory in Georgia.

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<v Speaker 4>Was roughly twelve thousand votes, It was roughly eleven thousand

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<v Speaker 4>votes in Arizona, roughly ninety thousand votes in Pennsylvania. And

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<v Speaker 4>in none of those states did we find enough voter

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<v Speaker 4>fraud to cover what those margins were. And that's just

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<v Speaker 4>a plain statement of fact. And there were so many

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<v Speaker 4>election challenges that failed in the court system because the

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<v Speaker 4>nature of their proof wasn't acceptable proof in courts.

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<v Speaker 1>Of law, right, And that's just sort of a talk

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<v Speaker 1>about them taking their findings. I know that you were

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<v Speaker 1>there to prepare the findings that they would use argue

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<v Speaker 1>the case, but did they ever talk about taking the

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<v Speaker 1>case instead of to a court to the legislature, because

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<v Speaker 1>I know for these razor thin margin victory for a

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<v Speaker 1>Biden for these states had Republican legislatures were they were

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<v Speaker 1>talking about presenting a case to the legislature to get

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<v Speaker 1>them to acknowledge a Republican slate of electors officially, and

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<v Speaker 1>then you would have had, as Thomas Massey talked about,

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<v Speaker 1>as Pence talked about, as JD. Vance recently talked about,

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<v Speaker 1>to have then a court case as to who gets

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<v Speaker 1>to decide who the electors are. Is it going to

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<v Speaker 1>be the governor and the executive branch? Is it going

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<v Speaker 1>to be the legislative branch. Was there every any talk

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<v Speaker 1>about taking the case to the legislatures?

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<v Speaker 4>So I wasn't part of any strategy meetings inside the campaign.

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<v Speaker 4>My job was incredibly focused and I had thirty days

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<v Speaker 4>to do what amounted to about a year's.

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<v Speaker 2>Worth of work.

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<v Speaker 4>So I was highly occupied and segmented away from everything

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<v Speaker 4>else that was swirling around the campaign at the time.

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<v Speaker 4>What I would say in general is that legislatures probably

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<v Speaker 4>are not the best body to try to ascertain a

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<v Speaker 4>very technical determination, which was did fraud occur and how

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<v Speaker 4>did it occur? You know, many members of legislators don't

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<v Speaker 4>have that in their background, So it would be my

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<v Speaker 4>preference that if it's going to be contested, that it

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<v Speaker 4>gets contested in a venue where they can handle highly

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<v Speaker 4>technical presentations and digest the facts.

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<v Speaker 2>And our court system does that all the time.

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<v Speaker 4>Legislatures typically don't. So that's just from a process perspective.

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<v Speaker 4>That's kind of where I'm at in Georgia. There are

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<v Speaker 4>three different data points that really helped document what really

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<v Speaker 4>happened in Georgia, and I know that in a lot

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<v Speaker 4>of conservative circles, Secretary of Raethlisberger is not well liked.

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<v Speaker 4>But the data that he brought forward and can document,

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<v Speaker 4>has documented and it's hard proof. He showed that about

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<v Speaker 4>thirty thousand GOP presidential primary voters in Georgia in twenty

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<v Speaker 4>twenty took a pass on the general election. Those are

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<v Speaker 4>lost presidential votes for President Trump, and he lost by

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<v Speaker 4>fewer than twelve thousand votes. Now, those thirty thousand votes

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<v Speaker 4>were probably moderate Republicans call um Rhinos whatever you want

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<v Speaker 4>to call him, who probably voted against Trump in the

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<v Speaker 4>primary and then decided they couldn't they couldn't bear to

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<v Speaker 4>vote in the general election. And there was another thirty

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<v Speaker 4>thousand votes that Raefensberger brought forward and has the proof

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<v Speaker 4>for that showed that the presidential selection was left blank,

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<v Speaker 4>but all the down ticket Republicans received votes, and again

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<v Speaker 4>that's a sort of symbolic protest votes by very likely

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<v Speaker 4>middle of the road Republicans who liked down ticket but

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<v Speaker 4>didn't like what was at the top of the ticket.

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<v Speaker 4>And that's hard evidence to overcome. And there's really no

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<v Speaker 4>credible fraud that you can look at that comes close

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<v Speaker 4>to having the solidity of the numbers that Raffensberger brought

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<v Speaker 4>forward that matches with my nationwide findings are and those

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<v Speaker 4>are basically that Trump lost about two and a half

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<v Speaker 4>percent support across the board everywhere in twenty twenty relative

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<v Speaker 4>to twenty sixteen. And those are the rhinos. I'm pretty

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<v Speaker 4>sure those are the rhinos who took a hike and left.

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<v Speaker 4>It's not a lot of voters, but in a whisker

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<v Speaker 4>close election, it was enough.

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<v Speaker 1>Well, it's probably people who were not too happy with

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<v Speaker 1>what had happened the first part of twenty twenty. Let

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<v Speaker 1>me ask you, you know, with the lockdowns and things

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<v Speaker 1>like that, that kind of soured a lot of us

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<v Speaker 1>on what was going on. But let me ask you

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<v Speaker 1>about the vote by mail thing, because that was a

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<v Speaker 1>function of the lockdown as well, and we'd never do

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<v Speaker 1>that before. How did you audit or how did you

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<v Speaker 1>view the vote by mail stuff?

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<v Speaker 4>So we looked at the mail ballots, not so much

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<v Speaker 4>from the process of mail ballots, were their changes to

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<v Speaker 4>rules made to allow mail ballots to be changed, how

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<v Speaker 4>mail ballots were used. My role in looking at them

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<v Speaker 4>was did we're dead votes cast by mail? Did people

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<v Speaker 4>who voted by mail vote twice in two different places?

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<v Speaker 4>It was the nature of what I was looking at

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<v Speaker 4>was those sorts of things.

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<v Speaker 2>You know.

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<v Speaker 4>It was really a remarkable period of time in a

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<v Speaker 4>lot of different ways. And and honestly, I think maybe

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<v Speaker 4>had the had we not had COVID, I actually believe

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<v Speaker 4>there was a better than even money chance that President

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<v Speaker 4>Trump would still be President Trump right now. I think

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<v Speaker 4>COVID cost him dearly in this election action. Did mail

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<v Speaker 4>ballot use tip the balance? I don't think so, because

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<v Speaker 4>I think anybody who was motivated to vote would have

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<v Speaker 4>figured out how to vote one way or the other.

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<v Speaker 4>The presumption is, were mail ballots used for in some

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<v Speaker 4>nefarious way to were's massive mail ballot fraud happening and

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<v Speaker 4>I didn't see evidence of that. I mean, to commit

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<v Speaker 4>mail ballot fraud, you're either going to steal someone's identity

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<v Speaker 4>and vote as somebody else, or you're going to steal

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<v Speaker 4>a deceased person's identity and do that.

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<v Speaker 2>And we found a couple a dozen dead votes in

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<v Speaker 2>most of the swing states.

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<v Speaker 4>We found a couple one hundred duplicate votes across the

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<v Speaker 4>swing states, and the campaign spared no expense on this.

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<v Speaker 4>We exhaustively looked at every single mail ballot to ensure

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<v Speaker 4>that the person in whose name that mail ballot was

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<v Speaker 4>cast was among the living.

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<v Speaker 1>So what did they do to cast about? Do they

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<v Speaker 1>have to request it and is it mailed to them

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<v Speaker 1>at an address or something? They just pick it up

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<v Speaker 1>and then mail it in themselves.

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<v Speaker 4>How did that So.

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<v Speaker 2>What's really frustrating is it's different from state to state

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<v Speaker 2>to state, and we're going to get into that down

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<v Speaker 2>the line.

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<v Speaker 4>In many states, you have to fill out a mail

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<v Speaker 4>ballot application, mail it in, they verify your signature, and

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<v Speaker 4>then when the time is right, they'll mail you a

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<v Speaker 4>ballot that you then return.

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<v Speaker 1>That's like the absentee ballot process that we've had for

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<v Speaker 1>a very long time.

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<v Speaker 4>Right right, Yeah, a few states and this goes this

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<v Speaker 4>happened before. COVID states like California and Oregon and Colorado interestingly,

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<v Speaker 4>have moved to.

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<v Speaker 2>Entirely conducting their elections by mail.

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<v Speaker 4>They send out mail ballots to everybody, and if you

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<v Speaker 4>don't want to vote by mail, you have to take

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<v Speaker 4>extraordinary actions to opt out of voting by mail and

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<v Speaker 4>instead to vote in a different way.

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<v Speaker 2>So we had a mix of those different things.

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<v Speaker 4>Many states made voting by mail easy year in twenty twenty.

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<v Speaker 4>The hardest state in the country to vote by mail

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<v Speaker 4>is I believe it's Louisiana.

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<v Speaker 2>That has a very strict usage in terms of who

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<v Speaker 2>can use it and under what circumstances.

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<v Speaker 4>So it's all over the map. I didn't see any

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<v Speaker 4>artisan slant to the mail ballot fraud that we did find.

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<v Speaker 4>It was pretty evenly divided by Democrats, Republicans, independents, and

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<v Speaker 4>that's been the case of all the voter fraud I've

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<v Speaker 4>documented over the years. I have yet to find a

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<v Speaker 4>form of voter fraud where when it happens, it's just

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<v Speaker 4>sort of a bipartisan activity.

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<v Speaker 1>How would you audit a situation to find out if

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<v Speaker 1>somebody was voting for dead person? And I asked, because

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<v Speaker 1>a friend of my brother in laws in twenty twelve

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<v Speaker 1>in North Carolina, they have at least at that time,

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<v Speaker 1>they had the longest voting period of any state, and

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<v Speaker 1>there was no picture ID, so you could just walk

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<v Speaker 1>in and give them. You could vote early, and when

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<v Speaker 1>you went to vote, you just give them a name

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<v Speaker 1>and address. And there was no validation of that with

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<v Speaker 1>even a driver's license. And so on election day, this

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<v Speaker 1>friend of my brothers brother in law goes in and

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<v Speaker 1>to regually gives them his name and address. And he said,

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<v Speaker 1>you've already voted, and so is this other person that

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<v Speaker 1>you're address And he said, well, that's my mom. She's

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<v Speaker 1>been dead for several years. So how do you audit

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<v Speaker 1>that to know if that is happening in Georgia for example.

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<v Speaker 4>Well, so in twenty twenty, the Trump campaign had us

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<v Speaker 4>process every single mail ballot voter in the Swing States.

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<v Speaker 2>There was about thirty one million of them.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow.

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<v Speaker 4>We process them through a data vendor who matches up

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<v Speaker 4>the voter with their social Security number, and then using

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<v Speaker 4>the social security number, you can look at something called

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<v Speaker 4>the Social Security Death Master File, which is the Social

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<v Speaker 4>Security Administration tracks everybody who dies. So we used that

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<v Speaker 4>mechanism thirty one million times for every mail ballot that

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<v Speaker 4>was cast.

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<v Speaker 1>What did you find?

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<v Speaker 2>Election?

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<v Speaker 4>Like, I said, you know, we found a coup at

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<v Speaker 4>most a couple a dozen in each swing state, not

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<v Speaker 4>nearly enough to matter. I did predict, as I had

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<v Speaker 4>done an analysis in Pennsylvania about a month before the election.

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<v Speaker 4>I found a couple of recently registered dead voters, and

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<v Speaker 4>I predicted that those would become mail ballot fraud and

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<v Speaker 4>they did.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, Now, you you did your research, You presented your

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<v Speaker 1>findings to the Trump campaign and who had hired you,

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<v Speaker 1>to their attorneys, and you also reported to Mark Meadows

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<v Speaker 1>all of your results. Is that correct?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah?

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<v Speaker 4>So I didn't speak directly to Mark Meadow, was the

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<v Speaker 4>lawyer who hired me and who basically was my point

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<v Speaker 4>person throughout this whole thing. Alex Cannon. The basic premise

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<v Speaker 4>of what I did with two different things. I looked

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<v Speaker 4>for duplicate votes, I looked for dead voters, and then

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<v Speaker 4>the campaign used my company to help vet every claim

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<v Speaker 4>of voter fraud that came their way. And there were

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<v Speaker 4>a lot of them from outside of the campaign asking

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<v Speaker 4>He asked us to vet them determine whether they were

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<v Speaker 4>true or not before they would consider taking those claims

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<v Speaker 4>into court. So they were operating in a very careful,

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<v Speaker 4>methodical way. They asked us to review about twenty different

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<v Speaker 4>claims of fraud. Some of them came in through folks

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<v Speaker 4>like Sidney Powell and John Eastman. Others came through academics,

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<v Speaker 4>just random people out there who did their own research.

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<v Speaker 4>And every one of the twenty different claims that we

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<v Speaker 4>looked at, we were able to show why it was wrong.

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<v Speaker 4>When we wrapped things up towards the end of November,

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<v Speaker 4>Canon took the summation of everything that we had done

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<v Speaker 4>and went to Mark Meadows and told Meadows that when

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<v Speaker 4>it came to voter fraud, we looked pretty exhaustively at it.

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<v Speaker 4>All the claims we looked at were false and we

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<v Speaker 4>couldn't find enough voter fraud to have changed the outcome

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<v Speaker 4>in any election.

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<v Speaker 1>And when did when was that presented? What was the

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<v Speaker 1>date that roughly that you presented that stuff?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, so I didn't do a presentation to anybody.

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<v Speaker 4>Every one of the claims I looked at had its

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<v Speaker 4>own email and documentation, and all that landed on Cannon's desk.

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<v Speaker 4>Canon took that all together and went and talked to Meadows,

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<v Speaker 4>I believe, right at the end of November, and gave

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<v Speaker 4>him the summation of everything.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, all right, And so it was December the fourteenth

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<v Speaker 1>that the electoral colleges, you know, the people that were

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<v Speaker 1>selected the elector the site of electors from each party

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<v Speaker 1>that had won, submitted their votes on December fourteenth. January

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<v Speaker 1>the sixth was a formal acceptance of all that stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>But everybody presented that stuff on December fourteenth, so they

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<v Speaker 1>knew the end of November. They knew a couple of

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<v Speaker 1>weeks before the electoral college voted, and then again about

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<v Speaker 1>another about I guess six weeks or so before the

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<v Speaker 1>January the sixth thing they had those results in. What

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<v Speaker 1>did you think about the stop the Steel stuff. You

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<v Speaker 1>mentioned that that you debunked fraud claims while I was

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<v Speaker 1>advancing to stop the Steel initiative. Tell us a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit about that.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I mean, so.

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<v Speaker 4>As I looked at everything, I wasn't aware usually of

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<v Speaker 4>where the claims came from.

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<v Speaker 2>I was able to piece a lot of it together afterwards.

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<v Speaker 4>So you know, from the Sydney Pwell John Eastman perspective,

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<v Speaker 4>I didn't know that the claims that I found were false,

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<v Speaker 4>that they brought came from them until about a year ago.

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<v Speaker 2>Really, so.

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<v Speaker 4>It's you know, the whole problem would stop the steal

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<v Speaker 4>and with a lot of So many people believe firmly

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<v Speaker 4>that the election was stolen, but that belief is based

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<v Speaker 4>upon a set of facts that's at best.

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<v Speaker 2>Really really squishy, right. What I mean by that is.

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<v Speaker 4>The facts on which the claims are being made that

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<v Speaker 4>everybody is grabbing onto it says it was stolen can't

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<v Speaker 4>possibly ever stand up in court, usually for a really

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<v Speaker 4>basic reason, because that reason is it's more usually it's

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<v Speaker 4>hearsay evidence. What I mean by that, hearsay is often

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<v Speaker 4>defined as he said, she said type stuff, right, And

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<v Speaker 4>our courts don't allow that kind of evidence on which

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<v Speaker 4>to convict somebody because someone can easily be lying about

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<v Speaker 4>that right. The court systems want to see fact based

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<v Speaker 4>evidence that can be double and triple checked, you know,

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<v Speaker 4>hard facts. Sure, and most of most of the evidence

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<v Speaker 4>that people are being presented as evidence that the election

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<v Speaker 4>was stolen is squishy evidence.

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<v Speaker 2>It's not the kind of evidence that you could take

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<v Speaker 2>to court and win.

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<v Speaker 4>And that, to me is really something that I have

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<v Speaker 4>a problem with because you.

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<v Speaker 2>Know, I'm a data guy.

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<v Speaker 4>I take data to court, and my data survives legal scrutiny, right,

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<v Speaker 4>So if you can't find data that survives legal scrutiny,

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<v Speaker 4>I think it's sketchy to start bringing forward data that

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<v Speaker 4>can't and then using that information to really get people

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<v Speaker 4>amped up about what happened in our election.

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<v Speaker 2>I do not believe that.

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<v Speaker 4>The election was stolen. I believe that the election in

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<v Speaker 4>twenty twenty was lost.

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<v Speaker 1>I was very skeptical of it from the very beginning. Actually,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, when I worked at info Wars, I had

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<v Speaker 1>a show there and two days after the election, Steve

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<v Speaker 1>Chennick came on and said that there had that it

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<v Speaker 1>was a sting, that they had blockchain watermark ballots that

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<v Speaker 1>had somehow come out of the federal government at some

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<v Speaker 1>central location. But the key thing that was obviously disprovable

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<v Speaker 1>was he said, two days after the election, so we

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<v Speaker 1>got twenty thousand National Guard that are out there resting

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<v Speaker 1>these people who rig the election. Now, that obviously was true,

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<v Speaker 1>and that wasn't going to go down that path. So

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<v Speaker 1>we had all kinds of stuff, but it was so

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<v Speaker 1>many people. Even weeks after that, when there was absolutely

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<v Speaker 1>no evidence of any National Guard troops or any arrests

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<v Speaker 1>or whatever, they were still pushing that. So I can

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<v Speaker 1>imagine that somebody saying, yeah, we got pictures of or

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<v Speaker 1>I know personally about somebody's stuff in a ballot box.

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<v Speaker 1>That's going to be much more believable than the other

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<v Speaker 1>stuff that people were fighting about and willing to go

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<v Speaker 1>to the mat to say, yes, there is some secret

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<v Speaker 1>war that is going on, maybe in Germany, maybe some

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<v Speaker 1>places in the United States where people are actually, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>fighting and going to war over this. It really was.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a strange situation. One more thing I'd like to

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<v Speaker 1>talk about before we start talking about how to reform

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<v Speaker 1>this stuff, and that is the exit polls, which have

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<v Speaker 1>kind of come in to play again with this Venezuelan election.

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<v Speaker 1>The State Department has always used Edison Research, which is

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<v Speaker 1>the exit polling organization here in the United States, and

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<v Speaker 1>they say that and they use them in other countries

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<v Speaker 1>as well, and they say that if the difference between

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<v Speaker 1>Edison researches exit polls and the official results are more

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<v Speaker 1>than five points away from each other. That looks like

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<v Speaker 1>it's a rigged election. Now it's just one particular company,

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<v Speaker 1>and of course that company can be rigged as well.

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<v Speaker 1>We don't know about their integrity, but it is the

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<v Speaker 1>company that is used for the exit polls by all

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<v Speaker 1>of the media organizations in the United States. They typically

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<v Speaker 1>don't give us. I've never seen them give us a

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<v Speaker 1>total and say, well, here's what they say the total is,

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<v Speaker 1>and compare that to what the reported votes were. They'll

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<v Speaker 1>give you demographic cross tabulations, how many men or how

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<v Speaker 1>many women, or this or that voted for this candidate.

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<v Speaker 1>But was there ever any talk about looking at the

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<v Speaker 1>exit polls anything about that.

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<v Speaker 4>So I didn't know it at the time, but I

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<v Speaker 4>learned of this about a year and a half ago.

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<v Speaker 4>The Trump campaign commissioned their top polster to conduct exit

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<v Speaker 4>polls in the twenty twenty election in the Swing States.

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<v Speaker 4>That pollster's name is Tony Fabrizio. And just to be

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<v Speaker 4>fully transparent, I'm a two time candidate for governor here

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<v Speaker 4>in Rhode Island, and in my run in twenty fourteen

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<v Speaker 4>as a Republican, Fabrizio was my pollster as well, so

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<v Speaker 4>I just like to put that out there because I'm

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<v Speaker 4>talking about him, and I just didn't want to.

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<v Speaker 2>Do that without disclosing that.

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<v Speaker 4>Fabrizio conducted a thirty thousand interview exit poll across all

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<v Speaker 4>the swing states, and he created an internal campaign document

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<v Speaker 4>that leaked, and that document made its way to politico

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<v Speaker 4>dot com, so anyone can find it there. But what

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00:23:05.480 --> 00:23:09.599
<v Speaker 4>he determined was that one out of six votes voters

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<v Speaker 4>that they spoke with were disaffected Republicans who chose to

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<v Speaker 4>vote against Trump in that twenty twenty race. Another one

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<v Speaker 4>out of six voters were brand new voters motivated to

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<v Speaker 4>vote against Trump because of COVID. So that's a full

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<v Speaker 4>third of the voters that they had identified were strongly

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<v Speaker 4>against Trump for different sets of reasons.

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<v Speaker 2>So exit polls are typically take it to the.

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<v Speaker 4>Bank type things, right, They're usually considered to be pretty accurate,

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<v Speaker 4>and I've not ever heard of somebody manipulating the results

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<v Speaker 4>of an exit pole. I don't know much, hardly anything

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<v Speaker 4>at all about what's going on down invent In, Venezuela

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<v Speaker 4>right now, other than it's a mess.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's another one of these things, right, So that

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<v Speaker 1>kind of gives us a lead into some of the

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<v Speaker 1>things that we do about how to how to fix

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<v Speaker 1>this based on your insights. But I think that's very important.

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<v Speaker 1>I think that's very interesting that the Trump campaign did

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<v Speaker 1>its own exit polls and they didn't present that data,

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<v Speaker 1>so presumably that data was not favorable to them, didn't

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<v Speaker 1>Didn't you? Am I mistaken? Did you debate Lindell on this,

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<v Speaker 1>Mike Lindell?

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<v Speaker 2>I did?

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<v Speaker 4>He and I appeared on a YouTube channel about a

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<v Speaker 4>month ago and with a host named David Pacman, and yeah,

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<v Speaker 4>we had about a forty five minute conversation about voter

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<v Speaker 4>fraud and what is there, what's not there, and even

429
00:24:47.680 --> 00:24:49.480
<v Speaker 4>we got into a little bit the things that we

430
00:24:49.519 --> 00:24:50.759
<v Speaker 4>need to do to fix things.

431
00:24:51.200 --> 00:24:53.599
<v Speaker 1>And I know that he held a press conference at

432
00:24:53.640 --> 00:24:55.720
<v Speaker 1>one point in time and Steve Bannon was there, a

433
00:24:55.759 --> 00:24:57.880
<v Speaker 1>whole bunch of people, and Steve Bannon was just fed up.

434
00:24:57.880 --> 00:24:59.680
<v Speaker 1>He said, well, we were told that he had receipts,

435
00:24:59.720 --> 00:25:02.759
<v Speaker 1>and he goes, he didn't have any receipts truly, etcetera.

436
00:25:02.920 --> 00:25:04.799
<v Speaker 1>Does he have any receipts yet?

437
00:25:05.720 --> 00:25:06.880
<v Speaker 2>No?

438
00:25:07.559 --> 00:25:11.319
<v Speaker 1>This evidence free, right, That's very interesting. It really is

439
00:25:11.359 --> 00:25:13.359
<v Speaker 1>sad to see. But let's talk about what we can

440
00:25:13.400 --> 00:25:19.119
<v Speaker 1>do to fix the election system based on what you

441
00:25:19.200 --> 00:25:21.359
<v Speaker 1>have seen and your opinions about it.

442
00:25:22.119 --> 00:25:25.200
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, so I think this is the most important thing

443
00:25:25.240 --> 00:25:27.720
<v Speaker 4>to talk about. I mean, twenty twenty is long gone

444
00:25:27.799 --> 00:25:31.240
<v Speaker 4>and it's in the rear mirror. There's nothing that we

445
00:25:31.279 --> 00:25:33.200
<v Speaker 4>can do at this point to alter the course of

446
00:25:33.200 --> 00:25:36.640
<v Speaker 4>what's going to happen in twenty twenty four. It's going

447
00:25:36.720 --> 00:25:39.319
<v Speaker 4>to be very very similar, I believe, to what we

448
00:25:39.440 --> 00:25:40.759
<v Speaker 4>experienced in twenty twenty.

449
00:25:41.400 --> 00:25:42.960
<v Speaker 2>It may be almost virtually identical.

450
00:25:42.960 --> 00:25:46.319
<v Speaker 4>I wouldn't be surprised if the outcome is exactly the same,

451
00:25:46.359 --> 00:25:47.880
<v Speaker 4>because the basic same.

452
00:25:48.759 --> 00:25:51.640
<v Speaker 2>Setup is there that we had four years ago.

453
00:25:54.160 --> 00:25:57.519
<v Speaker 4>The way we conduct our elections in this country is

454
00:25:57.559 --> 00:26:00.440
<v Speaker 4>the way we've done it for hundreds of years, and

455
00:26:00.480 --> 00:26:03.079
<v Speaker 4>it no longer makes any sense, and it causes us

456
00:26:03.079 --> 00:26:06.279
<v Speaker 4>some real problems. And the biggest set of problems that

457
00:26:06.319 --> 00:26:10.400
<v Speaker 4>we have is that different states, and many times different

458
00:26:10.440 --> 00:26:14.519
<v Speaker 4>counties in the same state, conduct the same election differently.

459
00:26:14.960 --> 00:26:17.599
<v Speaker 4>They have different rules, they have different regulations, they have

460
00:26:17.640 --> 00:26:22.759
<v Speaker 4>different hardware. And I'll give you just a simple example

461
00:26:23.440 --> 00:26:27.200
<v Speaker 4>of how these differences can actually affect the outcome of

462
00:26:27.240 --> 00:26:31.839
<v Speaker 4>a specific vote. What do you think happens if you

463
00:26:31.960 --> 00:26:35.319
<v Speaker 4>vote early but then die before election day? Does your

464
00:26:35.400 --> 00:26:37.279
<v Speaker 4>vote count or does your vote not count?

465
00:26:37.640 --> 00:26:39.039
<v Speaker 1>I would think that it would count.

466
00:26:40.240 --> 00:26:41.200
<v Speaker 2>Depends on where you live.

467
00:26:43.480 --> 00:26:43.880
<v Speaker 1>Depends.

468
00:26:43.960 --> 00:26:47.759
<v Speaker 2>Yeah. Yeah, So in Michigan it does not count.

469
00:26:48.440 --> 00:26:51.319
<v Speaker 4>And in twenty twenty, the state of Michigan invalidated about

470
00:26:51.319 --> 00:26:54.960
<v Speaker 4>thirty five hundred votes by voters who voted early and

471
00:26:55.000 --> 00:26:56.799
<v Speaker 4>then passed away before election day.

472
00:26:57.680 --> 00:26:59.519
<v Speaker 2>In Pennsylvania, if you.

473
00:26:59.519 --> 00:27:01.920
<v Speaker 4>Vote early then pass away before the election, your vote

474
00:27:02.119 --> 00:27:05.799
<v Speaker 4>does count. So some of the votes that people identified

475
00:27:05.799 --> 00:27:10.440
<v Speaker 4>as to seized votes actually counted because in Pennsylvania that's

476
00:27:10.480 --> 00:27:12.880
<v Speaker 4>not an illegal situation as long as.

477
00:27:12.799 --> 00:27:14.440
<v Speaker 2>You cast the vote while you're alive.

478
00:27:15.640 --> 00:27:18.119
<v Speaker 4>If you happen to then pass away before election day,

479
00:27:18.119 --> 00:27:21.720
<v Speaker 4>in Pennsylvania, the vote still counts. So it becomes you

480
00:27:21.759 --> 00:27:27.759
<v Speaker 4>can see how just that one scenario causes a voter

481
00:27:27.920 --> 00:27:29.920
<v Speaker 4>that we imagine is in this situation to have a

482
00:27:30.000 --> 00:27:33.680
<v Speaker 4>very different experience as a dead voter in Michigan as

483
00:27:33.720 --> 00:27:35.920
<v Speaker 4>it does opposed to Pennsylvania.

484
00:27:36.000 --> 00:27:37.640
<v Speaker 1>We want me ask you this question before we move on,

485
00:27:38.160 --> 00:27:41.319
<v Speaker 1>because when you get these ballots in, I mean, what

486
00:27:41.680 --> 00:27:44.599
<v Speaker 1>kind of records do you have to look at a

487
00:27:44.720 --> 00:27:49.960
<v Speaker 1>vote an early vote by mail ballot to know that

488
00:27:50.039 --> 00:27:53.559
<v Speaker 1>this person voted that ballot and voted it at that date.

489
00:27:53.799 --> 00:27:56.720
<v Speaker 1>You know, if they're going to count it if the

490
00:27:56.759 --> 00:27:59.279
<v Speaker 1>person is now dead, but they you know, to know

491
00:27:59.359 --> 00:28:03.640
<v Speaker 1>that the person and made this a vote before they died.

492
00:28:03.720 --> 00:28:06.440
<v Speaker 1>How do you do you have How do you audit that?

493
00:28:06.480 --> 00:28:10.400
<v Speaker 1>What kind of information do they have in terms of auditability?

494
00:28:10.519 --> 00:28:13.079
<v Speaker 1>Do they know the postmark date and the person's name

495
00:28:13.160 --> 00:28:14.079
<v Speaker 1>on the ballot.

496
00:28:14.519 --> 00:28:16.160
<v Speaker 2>So they had postmark dates?

497
00:28:16.200 --> 00:28:21.160
<v Speaker 4>They have names and addresses on the ballot application, which

498
00:28:21.200 --> 00:28:24.079
<v Speaker 4>also goes on to the envelope that your mail ballot

499
00:28:24.119 --> 00:28:27.319
<v Speaker 4>gets put into as you mail it back. In The

500
00:28:27.400 --> 00:28:31.839
<v Speaker 4>trick is getting that information and being able to determine

501
00:28:32.000 --> 00:28:34.839
<v Speaker 4>with certainty whether or not that voter is dead and

502
00:28:34.960 --> 00:28:38.960
<v Speaker 4>live or live. And most people who do these analysis

503
00:28:40.400 --> 00:28:43.359
<v Speaker 4>aren't able to arrive at an answer that is rock

504
00:28:43.440 --> 00:28:44.279
<v Speaker 4>solid for sure.

505
00:28:44.519 --> 00:28:48.039
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, a big problem Pennsylvania. You know where it's that

506
00:28:48.480 --> 00:28:50.960
<v Speaker 1>it's okay if they did it and then died. How

507
00:28:51.000 --> 00:28:52.960
<v Speaker 1>do you determine that? That's tough? Right?

508
00:28:53.839 --> 00:28:54.319
<v Speaker 2>Right? Well?

509
00:28:54.440 --> 00:28:59.160
<v Speaker 4>I pointed out to the state of Pennsylvania through lawyers

510
00:28:59.200 --> 00:29:01.480
<v Speaker 4>I was doing some work for in October of twenty

511
00:29:01.519 --> 00:29:07.119
<v Speaker 4>twenty two registered voters who were dead, clearly deceased, identified

512
00:29:07.160 --> 00:29:10.759
<v Speaker 4>them and because they had registered in the last month

513
00:29:11.960 --> 00:29:14.599
<v Speaker 4>back in September of twenty twenty, I said, these will

514
00:29:14.640 --> 00:29:19.000
<v Speaker 4>become very likely fraudulent votes. The state didn't do anything

515
00:29:19.039 --> 00:29:23.000
<v Speaker 4>about those voters. They did, in fact vote by mail

516
00:29:23.160 --> 00:29:26.039
<v Speaker 4>as deceased voters, and it was only after the election

517
00:29:26.640 --> 00:29:33.279
<v Speaker 4>that the people behind those votes were contacted, arrested, and

518
00:29:33.319 --> 00:29:37.400
<v Speaker 4>they pled guilty to election crimes for casting fraudual votes.

519
00:29:38.440 --> 00:29:42.720
<v Speaker 4>It's really hard, in fact, it's so hard to identify

520
00:29:42.799 --> 00:29:47.200
<v Speaker 4>whether or not someone is living or dead. I think

521
00:29:47.240 --> 00:29:51.519
<v Speaker 4>that the only reasonable thing to do is to probably

522
00:29:51.640 --> 00:29:54.839
<v Speaker 4>allow the votes as long as you're alive when you

523
00:29:54.920 --> 00:29:57.720
<v Speaker 4>cast the vote. I think that the vote should count

524
00:29:58.359 --> 00:30:01.640
<v Speaker 4>because it's just so hard for state to determine otherwise

525
00:30:02.039 --> 00:30:04.160
<v Speaker 4>inside a crazy window of time where they're trying to

526
00:30:04.200 --> 00:30:06.599
<v Speaker 4>do a lot of other things, you know. And again,

527
00:30:06.680 --> 00:30:08.920
<v Speaker 4>we only were able to do what we did in

528
00:30:09.039 --> 00:30:13.480
<v Speaker 4>terms of identifying deceased registered voters because the Trump campaign

529
00:30:13.559 --> 00:30:17.119
<v Speaker 4>basically provided an unlimited pile of money that we were

530
00:30:17.160 --> 00:30:19.119
<v Speaker 4>able to spend to do so accurately.

531
00:30:20.119 --> 00:30:23.359
<v Speaker 1>I guess that's really the issue, you know, in terms

532
00:30:23.480 --> 00:30:27.279
<v Speaker 1>of how do you validate that and I guess the

533
00:30:27.359 --> 00:30:30.720
<v Speaker 1>key issue is that people have to have trust in

534
00:30:30.759 --> 00:30:32.759
<v Speaker 1>the election, and so it seems to me like there

535
00:30:32.799 --> 00:30:36.960
<v Speaker 1>needs to be different ways that they can have either

536
00:30:37.480 --> 00:30:41.880
<v Speaker 1>transparency and have the ballots retained. I know that in

537
00:30:41.920 --> 00:30:45.000
<v Speaker 1>Texas it was kind of a standard procedure, even though

538
00:30:45.240 --> 00:30:48.640
<v Speaker 1>it was in the constitution that a fact simile image

539
00:30:48.759 --> 00:30:51.880
<v Speaker 1>of the ballot had to be retained. You had the

540
00:30:53.400 --> 00:30:55.000
<v Speaker 1>guy who was in charge of the Board of Elections

541
00:30:55.039 --> 00:30:58.759
<v Speaker 1>would send out a statement to all of the counties

542
00:30:58.799 --> 00:31:01.319
<v Speaker 1>saying you don't have to retain it, and they would

543
00:31:01.359 --> 00:31:03.319
<v Speaker 1>not retain it in a lot of these counties, and

544
00:31:03.359 --> 00:31:06.480
<v Speaker 1>so that made the auditing process really difficult. But I

545
00:31:06.480 --> 00:31:07.960
<v Speaker 1>think maybe you know a lot of people who are

546
00:31:08.000 --> 00:31:10.559
<v Speaker 1>looking at let's just go simple, let's go to hand

547
00:31:10.599 --> 00:31:12.680
<v Speaker 1>counted ballots. We know that people can always stuff stuff,

548
00:31:12.680 --> 00:31:14.759
<v Speaker 1>but if you've got handcounted balancy and you got observers

549
00:31:14.759 --> 00:31:16.799
<v Speaker 1>from both sides, it seems to me like you need

550
00:31:16.839 --> 00:31:20.000
<v Speaker 1>to have something like that where people can have some

551
00:31:20.240 --> 00:31:23.920
<v Speaker 1>confidence that you know, the fraud has been kept to

552
00:31:23.960 --> 00:31:26.559
<v Speaker 1>a minimum, that there's been eyes on this, that they

553
00:31:26.680 --> 00:31:28.680
<v Speaker 1>have have done that. What do you think about that?

554
00:31:28.720 --> 00:31:32.000
<v Speaker 1>What are your recommendations in terms of paper ballots. I

555
00:31:32.000 --> 00:31:34.880
<v Speaker 1>know that's a big paper chase, But what would you

556
00:31:35.279 --> 00:31:35.960
<v Speaker 1>say about that?

557
00:31:36.680 --> 00:31:40.319
<v Speaker 2>Well, I think, for sure, when you vote, the vote

558
00:31:40.359 --> 00:31:42.519
<v Speaker 2>should be on a paper ballot so that you have

559
00:31:42.599 --> 00:31:45.759
<v Speaker 2>a physical representation of what happened, so that you can

560
00:31:45.839 --> 00:31:46.880
<v Speaker 2>go back and analyze.

561
00:31:46.960 --> 00:31:50.599
<v Speaker 4>Any machine that allows you to vote electronically without paper

562
00:31:50.640 --> 00:31:54.279
<v Speaker 4>ballot backup, I think is a terrible idea and we

563
00:31:54.319 --> 00:31:55.559
<v Speaker 4>shouldn't be there for sure.

564
00:31:56.640 --> 00:32:00.359
<v Speaker 2>Let's use Maricopa County, Arizona is.

565
00:32:02.000 --> 00:32:05.400
<v Speaker 4>Sort of approving ground for whether or not it's reasonable

566
00:32:05.480 --> 00:32:07.920
<v Speaker 4>to count by hand all the ballots.

567
00:32:08.000 --> 00:32:09.519
<v Speaker 2>So Maricopa has.

568
00:32:09.480 --> 00:32:12.279
<v Speaker 4>Roughly one and a half million voters that vote in

569
00:32:12.759 --> 00:32:18.359
<v Speaker 4>its elections. On your typical Maricopa County ballot, there's anywhere

570
00:32:18.359 --> 00:32:21.279
<v Speaker 4>between twenty and thirty different races on that ballot.

571
00:32:21.960 --> 00:32:22.839
<v Speaker 2>It just depends on.

572
00:32:22.799 --> 00:32:24.480
<v Speaker 4>The year and where you are in the cycle of

573
00:32:24.519 --> 00:32:28.640
<v Speaker 4>different things, which means that in your typical election year Americopa,

574
00:32:29.200 --> 00:32:30.799
<v Speaker 4>you have to if you're going to count by hand,

575
00:32:30.880 --> 00:32:34.279
<v Speaker 4>you have to tally up twenty to thirty million different

576
00:32:34.319 --> 00:32:38.640
<v Speaker 4>distinct votes across all the different races that are there.

577
00:32:39.880 --> 00:32:45.319
<v Speaker 4>That is a phenomenally large amount of votes, and no

578
00:32:45.759 --> 00:32:50.240
<v Speaker 4>human counting effort will ever be anywhere near as accurate

579
00:32:50.880 --> 00:32:55.000
<v Speaker 4>as a machine count can be. The problem and the

580
00:32:56.319 --> 00:33:00.720
<v Speaker 4>worry about the machines is that they can be act,

581
00:33:01.079 --> 00:33:06.799
<v Speaker 4>that they can be programmed maliciously before the election, that

582
00:33:06.880 --> 00:33:12.000
<v Speaker 4>kind of thing. And I look at what the casino industry.

583
00:33:11.599 --> 00:33:13.720
<v Speaker 2>Does and brought them in my background. I've done a

584
00:33:13.759 --> 00:33:17.000
<v Speaker 2>lot of work in the gaming industry over the years.

585
00:33:17.960 --> 00:33:22.960
<v Speaker 4>Many many, many casino management systems have defensive software built

586
00:33:22.960 --> 00:33:25.799
<v Speaker 4>into every one of those slot machines so that they

587
00:33:25.960 --> 00:33:29.640
<v Speaker 4>know if the software deviates from what it should be.

588
00:33:30.799 --> 00:33:32.599
<v Speaker 4>And I won't get into the technical details of it,

589
00:33:32.640 --> 00:33:35.680
<v Speaker 4>but it's something that you can absolutely do, and it's

590
00:33:35.759 --> 00:33:38.759
<v Speaker 4>something that you can absolutely bring forward into the election

591
00:33:38.920 --> 00:33:43.240
<v Speaker 4>machine software. We have the ability to know with confidence

592
00:33:43.319 --> 00:33:48.240
<v Speaker 4>what software is running on those machines, and we should

593
00:33:48.240 --> 00:33:51.920
<v Speaker 4>be using it. And as I said to Mike Lindell,

594
00:33:52.079 --> 00:33:55.319
<v Speaker 4>is one of the big, big pushers of we.

595
00:33:55.400 --> 00:33:57.000
<v Speaker 2>Need to be counting by hand. We need to be

596
00:33:57.039 --> 00:33:57.759
<v Speaker 2>counting by hand.

597
00:33:58.119 --> 00:34:00.400
<v Speaker 4>And what I'll say is, first of all, there's just

598
00:34:00.559 --> 00:34:04.599
<v Speaker 4>no way that you can count thirty million votes accurately

599
00:34:04.599 --> 00:34:07.720
<v Speaker 4>by hand. First of all, it would take forever to

600
00:34:07.799 --> 00:34:11.679
<v Speaker 4>do that, right you would need an army of people

601
00:34:11.719 --> 00:34:15.400
<v Speaker 4>conducting the count, and then you know, human beings make

602
00:34:15.480 --> 00:34:16.880
<v Speaker 4>mistakes in that whole thing.

603
00:34:16.920 --> 00:34:17.880
<v Speaker 2>It's just it is.

604
00:34:18.039 --> 00:34:19.920
<v Speaker 4>It is too big a job I think to do it,

605
00:34:20.920 --> 00:34:23.960
<v Speaker 4>to do it manually. And as I said to Mike,

606
00:34:24.000 --> 00:34:29.800
<v Speaker 4>I said, Mike, the problem is you're talking about squishy

607
00:34:29.880 --> 00:34:33.400
<v Speaker 4>reasons to count the mallets by hand, but you actually

608
00:34:33.400 --> 00:34:38.119
<v Speaker 4>haven't pointed out something that is an actual risk that's

609
00:34:38.159 --> 00:34:40.599
<v Speaker 4>happened that justifies making.

610
00:34:40.360 --> 00:34:44.079
<v Speaker 2>Such a big change. So should we harden our machines

611
00:34:44.079 --> 00:34:44.960
<v Speaker 2>one hundred percent?

612
00:34:45.000 --> 00:34:48.199
<v Speaker 4>And we should have federal guidelines that all the machines

613
00:34:48.440 --> 00:34:50.760
<v Speaker 4>have to adhere to so that we can have some

614
00:34:50.800 --> 00:34:53.480
<v Speaker 4>confidence that they have not been hacked, and that the

615
00:34:53.559 --> 00:34:56.719
<v Speaker 4>software that they're running has been vetted and is working

616
00:34:56.760 --> 00:34:59.320
<v Speaker 4>the way it needs to, and all that kind of thing.

617
00:34:59.360 --> 00:35:03.519
<v Speaker 2>That's technology. It's already in place. I just don't see how.

618
00:35:04.760 --> 00:35:06.920
<v Speaker 4>I mean, if you or I were to sit down

619
00:35:06.920 --> 00:35:10.840
<v Speaker 4>and start tallying votes on a ballot, maybe we could

620
00:35:10.840 --> 00:35:14.400
<v Speaker 4>tally if we were working really fast, five hundred votes

621
00:35:14.440 --> 00:35:18.960
<v Speaker 4>an hour, right, maybe? I mean, you know, and now

622
00:35:19.000 --> 00:35:22.599
<v Speaker 4>think about thirty getting to thirty million votes five hundred

623
00:35:22.639 --> 00:35:24.840
<v Speaker 4>votes an hour at a time this kid tells you

624
00:35:24.920 --> 00:35:28.559
<v Speaker 4>how big the number is, the number is probably sixty

625
00:35:28.679 --> 00:35:33.280
<v Speaker 4>thousand hours of work to get that done in Maricopa.

626
00:35:34.199 --> 00:35:36.480
<v Speaker 4>And I don't think going back to the Stone age

627
00:35:36.519 --> 00:35:37.519
<v Speaker 4>for how we count.

628
00:35:37.360 --> 00:35:42.079
<v Speaker 2>Votes is going to be a workable answer for us

629
00:35:42.159 --> 00:35:43.320
<v Speaker 2>in this modern age.

630
00:35:43.599 --> 00:35:47.679
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, it's again. You know, when we look at the

631
00:35:47.719 --> 00:35:51.440
<v Speaker 1>electronics stuff, and I always talk about, and I've shown

632
00:35:51.480 --> 00:35:56.599
<v Speaker 1>several times the an example, going back to the late

633
00:35:56.679 --> 00:36:01.079
<v Speaker 1>nineteen nineties early two thousands, we have local college professors

634
00:36:01.119 --> 00:36:03.280
<v Speaker 1>bring some kids in. They say, well, let's take over

635
00:36:03.320 --> 00:36:06.280
<v Speaker 1>this machine here, and they put a virus on there

636
00:36:06.360 --> 00:36:11.239
<v Speaker 1>that tilts everything according to their predetermined ratios and then

637
00:36:11.320 --> 00:36:15.320
<v Speaker 1>erases itself. And so you know, the vulnerability there, I guess,

638
00:36:15.519 --> 00:36:20.360
<v Speaker 1>is whether or not it's connected to the Internet and

639
00:36:20.760 --> 00:36:25.400
<v Speaker 1>whether or not somebody can reprogram it with you know,

640
00:36:25.440 --> 00:36:28.800
<v Speaker 1>by putting a thumb drive on there and installing some software.

641
00:36:29.119 --> 00:36:31.039
<v Speaker 1>How do you guard against that type of thing, that

642
00:36:31.159 --> 00:36:35.039
<v Speaker 1>kind of custody of the machine, for example, so you.

643
00:36:35.000 --> 00:36:39.320
<v Speaker 4>Know, the physical in the same way that slot machines

644
00:36:39.440 --> 00:36:43.880
<v Speaker 4>have tremendous physical security around them in terms of surveillance,

645
00:36:44.760 --> 00:36:48.480
<v Speaker 4>both electronic and people watching.

646
00:36:50.239 --> 00:36:52.519
<v Speaker 2>The same thing with voting machines.

647
00:36:52.559 --> 00:36:55.599
<v Speaker 4>The sensitive areas of the voting machine should be in

648
00:36:56.159 --> 00:36:57.599
<v Speaker 4>on the back of the machine where.

649
00:36:57.440 --> 00:37:00.599
<v Speaker 2>Nobody is allowed, right. So I mean if you're putting

650
00:37:00.599 --> 00:37:03.079
<v Speaker 2>a USB key in the front of the machine and

651
00:37:03.159 --> 00:37:04.239
<v Speaker 2>someone could close.

652
00:37:04.039 --> 00:37:06.840
<v Speaker 4>The the you know, they can close the curtains and

653
00:37:06.880 --> 00:37:09.320
<v Speaker 4>then plug something in. I mean, that's that's that's a

654
00:37:09.840 --> 00:37:11.280
<v Speaker 4>violated rule one on one.

655
00:37:11.119 --> 00:37:16.639
<v Speaker 2>Of physical security. Uh. You know, it's it's there are

656
00:37:17.960 --> 00:37:21.079
<v Speaker 2>for those who understand machine security and how to make

657
00:37:21.119 --> 00:37:23.880
<v Speaker 2>sure that the software that should be in there is

658
00:37:23.920 --> 00:37:24.360
<v Speaker 2>in there.

659
00:37:24.840 --> 00:37:28.079
<v Speaker 4>It's all that's all a solvable problem.

660
00:37:28.159 --> 00:37:29.320
<v Speaker 2>Uh, it really is, and.

661
00:37:29.280 --> 00:37:32.639
<v Speaker 1>It's part of your auditing. Did you have videotapes of

662
00:37:32.679 --> 00:37:34.360
<v Speaker 1>the physical security situation?

663
00:37:34.920 --> 00:37:38.840
<v Speaker 4>No, No, we were strictly focused on the data the

664
00:37:39.159 --> 00:37:42.320
<v Speaker 4>uh they wanted me on the hard data that was

665
00:37:42.400 --> 00:37:45.360
<v Speaker 4>going uh that they were hoping was going to be

666
00:37:45.360 --> 00:37:48.360
<v Speaker 4>able to go to court. I didn't get involved in

667
00:37:48.480 --> 00:37:51.079
<v Speaker 4>any one specific local issue.

668
00:37:51.599 --> 00:37:51.840
<v Speaker 2>Uh.

669
00:37:51.880 --> 00:37:54.280
<v Speaker 4>And for sure I didn't get into any hearsay claims

670
00:37:54.280 --> 00:37:56.599
<v Speaker 4>of any kind there there was there wasn't the time

671
00:37:56.639 --> 00:37:57.280
<v Speaker 4>to get into that.

672
00:37:58.000 --> 00:37:59.159
<v Speaker 2>You know, look, there there are.

673
00:38:00.639 --> 00:38:02.880
<v Speaker 4>You hear a lot of people talk about election integrity,

674
00:38:02.880 --> 00:38:07.360
<v Speaker 4>and I am a huge proponent of election integrity and

675
00:38:07.400 --> 00:38:11.199
<v Speaker 4>making sure that the data for our elections is as

676
00:38:11.280 --> 00:38:12.199
<v Speaker 4>clean as it can be.

677
00:38:12.880 --> 00:38:15.519
<v Speaker 2>And one of the problems with having the states.

678
00:38:15.320 --> 00:38:20.119
<v Speaker 4>Do their own voter registration maintaining their voter roles differently

679
00:38:20.159 --> 00:38:22.559
<v Speaker 4>from each other is you end up with some states

680
00:38:22.559 --> 00:38:24.119
<v Speaker 4>that do a really good job at it, and you

681
00:38:24.159 --> 00:38:27.559
<v Speaker 4>do you have some states that do an absolutely terrible

682
00:38:27.639 --> 00:38:31.440
<v Speaker 4>job at it, and the terrible side of things, I'm

683
00:38:31.440 --> 00:38:34.639
<v Speaker 4>going to offer up two states, New Jersey and New York.

684
00:38:35.679 --> 00:38:39.039
<v Speaker 4>In New Jersey in twenty twenty, there were roughly twenty

685
00:38:39.079 --> 00:38:42.519
<v Speaker 4>five thousand voters registered who had a year of birth

686
00:38:42.559 --> 00:38:47.079
<v Speaker 4>of eighteen hundred, which, if you do the math, you

687
00:38:47.119 --> 00:38:50.519
<v Speaker 4>realize that there's just no way that any human being

688
00:38:50.519 --> 00:38:53.920
<v Speaker 4>in twenty twenty had a birth date of eighteen hundred,

689
00:38:54.639 --> 00:38:57.639
<v Speaker 4>and of those twenty five thousand registered voters with a

690
00:38:57.679 --> 00:39:02.320
<v Speaker 4>birth date of eighteen hundred cast votes in twenty twenty. Now,

691
00:39:03.119 --> 00:39:05.239
<v Speaker 4>some of your listeners are going to be like, holy moly,

692
00:39:05.320 --> 00:39:09.960
<v Speaker 4>that's voter fraud. It's probably not what happens in a

693
00:39:09.960 --> 00:39:12.119
<v Speaker 4>lot of different computer systems, and this is happening in

694
00:39:12.119 --> 00:39:14.960
<v Speaker 4>New Jersey system if they don't have a data birth

695
00:39:15.000 --> 00:39:18.320
<v Speaker 4>for a voter, they stick eighteen hundred in there as

696
00:39:18.320 --> 00:39:18.960
<v Speaker 4>a placeholder.

697
00:39:19.079 --> 00:39:20.239
<v Speaker 2>They didn't have anything else.

698
00:39:20.920 --> 00:39:24.960
<v Speaker 4>So eight thousand voters in New Jersey cast votes in

699
00:39:25.039 --> 00:39:28.719
<v Speaker 4>twenty twenty. That state election officials don't know when those.

700
00:39:28.599 --> 00:39:29.599
<v Speaker 2>Voters were born.

701
00:39:29.800 --> 00:39:33.320
<v Speaker 4>Okay, now that's a problem all by itself, and it's

702
00:39:33.360 --> 00:39:36.679
<v Speaker 4>one that election officials in New Jersey still haven't fixed.

703
00:39:36.760 --> 00:39:41.960
<v Speaker 4>They have really really dirty data, right, and you see

704
00:39:42.159 --> 00:39:46.480
<v Speaker 4>all kinds of different ways that dirty data can impact

705
00:39:47.199 --> 00:39:51.920
<v Speaker 4>registered voters and ultimately can even impact whether.

706
00:39:51.800 --> 00:39:53.480
<v Speaker 2>People should be voting or not. Right.

707
00:39:53.679 --> 00:39:56.440
<v Speaker 4>I think in New Jersey you might find maybe some

708
00:39:56.519 --> 00:39:58.679
<v Speaker 4>of those eight thousand voters shouldn't have been voting for

709
00:39:58.719 --> 00:39:59.239
<v Speaker 4>some reason.

710
00:39:59.639 --> 00:40:01.880
<v Speaker 2>But this state can't identify who those voters are.

711
00:40:01.960 --> 00:40:04.440
<v Speaker 4>You have to know someone's date of birth to be

712
00:40:04.480 --> 00:40:07.800
<v Speaker 4>able to identify them using data, and New Jersey can't

713
00:40:07.840 --> 00:40:08.079
<v Speaker 4>do that.

714
00:40:08.159 --> 00:40:10.239
<v Speaker 2>New York has a very.

715
00:40:10.039 --> 00:40:12.719
<v Speaker 4>Similar problem and some worse ones. And I don't want

716
00:40:12.760 --> 00:40:15.039
<v Speaker 4>to get too far into it, but there are millions

717
00:40:15.119 --> 00:40:18.159
<v Speaker 4>of votes that happen in New York State in twenty

718
00:40:18.199 --> 00:40:22.199
<v Speaker 4>twenty by voters that they cannot identify because those voters

719
00:40:22.639 --> 00:40:25.079
<v Speaker 4>don't have a social security number, of driver's license on

720
00:40:25.119 --> 00:40:29.159
<v Speaker 4>file with election That's an extraordinary thing, and it's a

721
00:40:29.239 --> 00:40:32.719
<v Speaker 4>huge problem for New York election officials because they can't

722
00:40:32.760 --> 00:40:36.760
<v Speaker 4>possibly maintain the data in their system without having that information.

723
00:40:36.920 --> 00:40:39.800
<v Speaker 4>That's just two examples. When you move from one state

724
00:40:39.840 --> 00:40:43.760
<v Speaker 4>to another, some states are able to track down the

725
00:40:43.880 --> 00:40:47.320
<v Speaker 4>movement and cancel the registration for when somebody moves from

726
00:40:47.400 --> 00:40:49.960
<v Speaker 4>state to state. A lot of other states cannot, and

727
00:40:50.000 --> 00:40:53.079
<v Speaker 4>so we end up with people with duplicate registrations. We

728
00:40:53.239 --> 00:40:56.880
<v Speaker 4>end up sometimes with people with four or five duplicated registrations.

729
00:40:57.920 --> 00:41:00.519
<v Speaker 4>There's all a manner of stuff like that that's happening.

730
00:41:00.559 --> 00:41:05.679
<v Speaker 4>And for me, as a technology professional, I can't stand

731
00:41:05.679 --> 00:41:08.960
<v Speaker 4>the fact that our elections depend on data that at

732
00:41:09.000 --> 00:41:13.199
<v Speaker 4>times can be extraordinarily dirty. And we have the technology

733
00:41:13.239 --> 00:41:15.599
<v Speaker 4>and the means to fix this, and I think it's

734
00:41:15.800 --> 00:41:17.760
<v Speaker 4>criminal that we don't.

735
00:41:18.880 --> 00:41:20.559
<v Speaker 1>And of course we've got a lot of jurisdictions where

736
00:41:20.559 --> 00:41:22.920
<v Speaker 1>they want to give the vote to even non citizens.

737
00:41:23.039 --> 00:41:28.039
<v Speaker 1>So I mean, it's like there's this whole spectrum of

738
00:41:28.079 --> 00:41:30.679
<v Speaker 1>what is out there. So, in your opinion, how do

739
00:41:30.679 --> 00:41:32.559
<v Speaker 1>we what's the best way to fix this? I mean,

740
00:41:32.599 --> 00:41:35.760
<v Speaker 1>do you have to have some kind of a national

741
00:41:35.800 --> 00:41:39.320
<v Speaker 1>standard and some kind of inspectors. I mean, I think

742
00:41:39.400 --> 00:41:41.159
<v Speaker 1>one of the reasons we have the kind of system

743
00:41:41.159 --> 00:41:44.599
<v Speaker 1>that we've got is because there was an aversion to

744
00:41:44.679 --> 00:41:49.320
<v Speaker 1>centralizing things. Because if you centralize things, now you've got

745
00:41:49.320 --> 00:41:52.960
<v Speaker 1>one point that you can corrupt or you can infiltrate,

746
00:41:53.159 --> 00:41:55.320
<v Speaker 1>and now you've got the entire system. So there's a

747
00:41:55.400 --> 00:41:58.239
<v Speaker 1>danger in centralization as well. How would this work out?

748
00:41:59.400 --> 00:42:05.079
<v Speaker 4>So, leaving any ideology out of my answer as a technologist,

749
00:42:05.679 --> 00:42:09.599
<v Speaker 4>the only sane way to conduct our federal elections is

750
00:42:09.639 --> 00:42:14.199
<v Speaker 4>with a federal voter registration database. If we got rid

751
00:42:14.280 --> 00:42:18.880
<v Speaker 4>of the fifty different implementations of the voter registration.

752
00:42:18.559 --> 00:42:19.440
<v Speaker 2>That we have right now.

753
00:42:19.519 --> 00:42:23.840
<v Speaker 4>In fact, it's way more than fifty. Most large states

754
00:42:24.800 --> 00:42:29.880
<v Speaker 4>make the responsibility of elections at the county level, and

755
00:42:29.960 --> 00:42:32.360
<v Speaker 4>so in many ways we have as many as four

756
00:42:32.440 --> 00:42:36.639
<v Speaker 4>thousand or five thousand different election systems that all do

757
00:42:36.760 --> 00:42:41.079
<v Speaker 4>things a bit differently from each other. Technologically speaking, the

758
00:42:41.159 --> 00:42:45.719
<v Speaker 4>right answer, and we would eliminate most of the voter

759
00:42:45.880 --> 00:42:49.480
<v Speaker 4>integrity issues that we suffer from if we had a

760
00:42:49.480 --> 00:42:55.960
<v Speaker 4>federalized voter registry. I understand, with states rights and a

761
00:42:55.960 --> 00:43:00.519
<v Speaker 4>whole bunch of either ideological arguments or even the uh

762
00:43:00.599 --> 00:43:04.400
<v Speaker 4>security argument of well, you know, if you have just one,

763
00:43:04.719 --> 00:43:08.480
<v Speaker 4>you know what happens. I don't believe that the voting

764
00:43:08.679 --> 00:43:12.719
<v Speaker 4>should happen on a federal level with just one system,

765
00:43:13.239 --> 00:43:15.599
<v Speaker 4>but I do believe that the voter registration should be

766
00:43:15.599 --> 00:43:16.239
<v Speaker 4>done that way.

767
00:43:16.800 --> 00:43:19.840
<v Speaker 2>So if somebody hacks a voter registration system.

768
00:43:19.840 --> 00:43:23.199
<v Speaker 4>And by the way, how many counties do you know

769
00:43:23.280 --> 00:43:28.400
<v Speaker 4>that have high quality data employees working for them, technologists

770
00:43:28.480 --> 00:43:33.039
<v Speaker 4>right the lower down we pushed the conduct of our elections,

771
00:43:33.119 --> 00:43:37.519
<v Speaker 4>I believe the more likely it is that those the

772
00:43:38.039 --> 00:43:41.199
<v Speaker 4>county level is where it's most likely that you can

773
00:43:41.239 --> 00:43:45.159
<v Speaker 4>see successful hacking because they just don't have the technological

774
00:43:45.199 --> 00:43:46.679
<v Speaker 4>expertise that you need.

775
00:43:46.719 --> 00:43:48.719
<v Speaker 2>As you would as you move your you move your.

776
00:43:48.599 --> 00:43:52.000
<v Speaker 4>Way up the chain to state level technologists and ultimately

777
00:43:52.000 --> 00:43:53.320
<v Speaker 4>federal level technologists.

778
00:43:53.840 --> 00:43:53.960
<v Speaker 2>Uh.

779
00:43:54.480 --> 00:43:57.599
<v Speaker 1>Of course we've also seen I've also seen the CIA

780
00:43:57.679 --> 00:44:01.800
<v Speaker 1>and the NSA and the FBI and US well from

781
00:44:01.840 --> 00:44:04.480
<v Speaker 1>the top of the bottom is vulnerable. So you know,

782
00:44:04.519 --> 00:44:06.400
<v Speaker 1>it's a real quiet it's a real quandary.

783
00:44:07.000 --> 00:44:09.599
<v Speaker 2>So you know, voter registration in a lot of ways

784
00:44:09.760 --> 00:44:10.480
<v Speaker 2>is less.

785
00:44:11.519 --> 00:44:16.639
<v Speaker 4>Uh, the danger of a hack there is lower than

786
00:44:16.760 --> 00:44:19.280
<v Speaker 4>the danger of a hack to an actual election system

787
00:44:19.760 --> 00:44:24.360
<v Speaker 4>that conducts the process of our election, right right, So, Uh,

788
00:44:24.920 --> 00:44:27.079
<v Speaker 4>I don't believe I believe it would be wrong to

789
00:44:27.159 --> 00:44:31.559
<v Speaker 4>have federalized voting. I only talk about the voter registration

790
00:44:31.760 --> 00:44:34.960
<v Speaker 4>with an eye towards the cleanest data that we can have.

791
00:44:35.719 --> 00:44:39.519
<v Speaker 2>Uh. You know, we live, we live in it.

792
00:44:39.599 --> 00:44:42.239
<v Speaker 4>We live in a in a society, in an age

793
00:44:42.280 --> 00:44:48.320
<v Speaker 4>where there probably isn't a computer system anywhere that's hardened

794
00:44:48.360 --> 00:44:49.159
<v Speaker 4>well enough.

795
00:44:49.519 --> 00:44:52.760
<v Speaker 2>To prevent someone who's really determined to get at it.

796
00:44:52.800 --> 00:44:53.400
<v Speaker 2>To get at it.

797
00:44:54.119 --> 00:44:57.039
<v Speaker 4>Uh, you have to watch it really carefully, and you

798
00:44:57.079 --> 00:44:59.239
<v Speaker 4>have to see what. You have to have the surveillance

799
00:44:59.239 --> 00:45:02.719
<v Speaker 4>systems employees to know when it's happening and to stop

800
00:45:02.760 --> 00:45:05.639
<v Speaker 4>it before it goes. You can put that sort of

801
00:45:05.639 --> 00:45:08.280
<v Speaker 4>stuff in front of a system like the If we

802
00:45:08.280 --> 00:45:11.639
<v Speaker 4>were to do a federalized voter registration system, I think

803
00:45:11.639 --> 00:45:15.119
<v Speaker 4>that that system should also have biometrics on it. You know,

804
00:45:15.599 --> 00:45:19.760
<v Speaker 4>we use social security numbers as the most sensitive identifier

805
00:45:19.880 --> 00:45:22.800
<v Speaker 4>we have. Right If you're working at a job, you

806
00:45:22.800 --> 00:45:24.679
<v Speaker 4>have to supply your social Security number.

807
00:45:25.039 --> 00:45:27.159
<v Speaker 2>It's how you file your taxes, all this stuff.

808
00:45:27.199 --> 00:45:28.960
<v Speaker 4>You have to give a social Security number to any

809
00:45:29.000 --> 00:45:31.000
<v Speaker 4>banks that you want to open up bank accounts with

810
00:45:31.440 --> 00:45:33.800
<v Speaker 4>And the problem is hackers have every one of our

811
00:45:33.840 --> 00:45:37.320
<v Speaker 4>social security numbers, all of them, right, They've been hacked

812
00:45:37.360 --> 00:45:41.360
<v Speaker 4>so many times it's no longer secure. I think we

813
00:45:41.400 --> 00:45:45.800
<v Speaker 4>should replace social security numbers with a new identifier. We're

814
00:45:45.840 --> 00:45:50.880
<v Speaker 4>the only first world country that doesn't have a national identifier.

815
00:45:51.320 --> 00:45:53.719
<v Speaker 1>Well, what happens if you do a biometric and somebody

816
00:45:53.719 --> 00:45:56.719
<v Speaker 1>steals your your data base. Now they're stolen your face,

817
00:45:56.719 --> 00:45:58.159
<v Speaker 1>what do you do? I mean, if they steal your

818
00:45:58.199 --> 00:46:00.519
<v Speaker 1>pass code or something, you get a new one, uh,

819
00:46:00.960 --> 00:46:03.280
<v Speaker 1>to go get plastic surgery or to vote again? What

820
00:46:03.800 --> 00:46:06.519
<v Speaker 1>do you do with that? To me, that's that's a

821
00:46:06.519 --> 00:46:09.280
<v Speaker 1>big issue. And of course, you know, when we look

822
00:46:09.320 --> 00:46:13.480
<v Speaker 1>at creating, you know, a lot of us have very

823
00:46:13.599 --> 00:46:19.360
<v Speaker 1>very strong concerns about you know, creating a centralized state

824
00:46:19.400 --> 00:46:22.000
<v Speaker 1>where we have to have some kind of a centralized ID.

825
00:46:22.239 --> 00:46:25.800
<v Speaker 1>You know, that kind of flows into U a CBDC

826
00:46:26.000 --> 00:46:29.639
<v Speaker 1>type of scenario and other other concerns about a global ID.

827
00:46:30.280 --> 00:46:30.400
<v Speaker 3>Uh.

828
00:46:30.559 --> 00:46:33.360
<v Speaker 1>And so that that gets a lot a lot of

829
00:46:33.480 --> 00:46:35.840
<v Speaker 1>people to take the safety off their gun when you

830
00:46:35.880 --> 00:46:37.199
<v Speaker 1>start talking about that type of thing.

831
00:46:37.440 --> 00:46:38.639
<v Speaker 2>No, I get it, I get it.

832
00:46:38.639 --> 00:46:43.320
<v Speaker 4>But if your concern is election integrity. The biggest threat

833
00:46:43.320 --> 00:46:45.880
<v Speaker 4>to integrity is the way we currently conduct the election.

834
00:46:45.960 --> 00:46:48.840
<v Speaker 4>I mean, that's that's just a simple statement of fact.

835
00:46:49.000 --> 00:46:51.639
<v Speaker 1>Well, I mean, and you know, as unwieldy as it is,

836
00:46:51.760 --> 00:46:55.920
<v Speaker 1>you know, when they ran elections in Iraq, what they

837
00:46:55.920 --> 00:46:59.119
<v Speaker 1>did was they did on one day, and you know,

838
00:46:59.159 --> 00:47:01.280
<v Speaker 1>they couldn't tell these people are legitimate if they'd walked

839
00:47:01.320 --> 00:47:03.639
<v Speaker 1>across the border, but they could keep them from voting

840
00:47:03.679 --> 00:47:05.599
<v Speaker 1>multiple times. And so you would go in and you'd

841
00:47:05.679 --> 00:47:08.760
<v Speaker 1>vote on paper, and then you would get this indelible

842
00:47:08.920 --> 00:47:10.559
<v Speaker 1>stain on your thumb that's going to be there for

843
00:47:10.599 --> 00:47:12.159
<v Speaker 1>the rest of the day, so you couldn't vote again.

844
00:47:12.760 --> 00:47:15.119
<v Speaker 1>If we go ultra crude like that, I know it's

845
00:47:15.159 --> 00:47:18.280
<v Speaker 1>a big hassle to count this stuff, but I mean,

846
00:47:18.280 --> 00:47:25.199
<v Speaker 1>if people really wanted a system, they would invest the

847
00:47:25.239 --> 00:47:27.960
<v Speaker 1>time in terms of maybe volunteering or something like that.

848
00:47:28.000 --> 00:47:31.239
<v Speaker 1>I know that's idealistic, but I mean, why not go

849
00:47:31.400 --> 00:47:34.599
<v Speaker 1>ultra low tech one day and the purple thumb?

850
00:47:36.119 --> 00:47:41.039
<v Speaker 4>I mean, how many elections that way? Do you hear

851
00:47:41.079 --> 00:47:44.840
<v Speaker 4>stories about a whole bunch of ballots being stuffed anyway? Right,

852
00:47:45.280 --> 00:47:49.320
<v Speaker 4>even people have inkstained hands. That doesn't handle the physical

853
00:47:49.320 --> 00:47:53.960
<v Speaker 4>security of the actual ballot box sitting there. You know, Look,

854
00:47:53.760 --> 00:47:56.559
<v Speaker 4>I live in a state where it wasn't all that

855
00:47:56.679 --> 00:48:01.119
<v Speaker 4>long ago where some elected officials were arrested driving around

856
00:48:01.199 --> 00:48:03.440
<v Speaker 4>with a bunch of absentee ballots in the trunks of

857
00:48:03.480 --> 00:48:04.000
<v Speaker 4>their cars.

858
00:48:04.079 --> 00:48:06.000
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, right, and we saw that going back to the

859
00:48:06.039 --> 00:48:08.719
<v Speaker 1>nineteen sixties, or reports of people driving around with the

860
00:48:08.840 --> 00:48:10.480
<v Speaker 1>voting machines in the back of their car and that

861
00:48:10.480 --> 00:48:11.880
<v Speaker 1>type of thing. You're always going to have that, I

862
00:48:11.880 --> 00:48:14.320
<v Speaker 1>guess the thing for me personally, and I've talked about this,

863
00:48:14.400 --> 00:48:17.519
<v Speaker 1>I said, because what scares me about the computerized voting

864
00:48:17.840 --> 00:48:21.599
<v Speaker 1>is that if you're able to hack the actual voting system,

865
00:48:21.639 --> 00:48:23.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, different from the from the ID stuff, but

866
00:48:23.880 --> 00:48:26.119
<v Speaker 1>if you're able to hack the actual voting system that

867
00:48:26.199 --> 00:48:29.519
<v Speaker 1>gives you access from a remote area to be able

868
00:48:29.599 --> 00:48:34.760
<v Speaker 1>to manipulate things across the country, or you can manipulate

869
00:48:34.800 --> 00:48:36.239
<v Speaker 1>from the top of the ballot to the bottom of

870
00:48:36.280 --> 00:48:38.079
<v Speaker 1>the ballot. I mean once you get if you get

871
00:48:38.079 --> 00:48:42.280
<v Speaker 1>in there, the payoff is so incredibly large that it

872
00:48:42.360 --> 00:48:45.519
<v Speaker 1>really is a big honeypot, you know for people in

873
00:48:45.599 --> 00:48:46.719
<v Speaker 1>terms of the allure, I.

874
00:48:46.679 --> 00:48:51.000
<v Speaker 4>Think, no, no differently than casino systems, right, and in

875
00:48:51.159 --> 00:48:55.239
<v Speaker 4>a lot of ways. The you know, rigging a casino

876
00:48:55.320 --> 00:48:57.679
<v Speaker 4>machine to walk out the door of a million dollars

877
00:48:57.719 --> 00:49:00.079
<v Speaker 4>in cash in a lot of ways is probably a

878
00:49:00.159 --> 00:49:05.000
<v Speaker 4>bigger prize and then most other things, and the industry

879
00:49:05.159 --> 00:49:10.280
<v Speaker 4>has dealt with that threat. We can deal with the

880
00:49:10.320 --> 00:49:17.679
<v Speaker 4>threat of the hacking and the cyber attacks on election systems.

881
00:49:17.679 --> 00:49:22.320
<v Speaker 4>We really can. It really comes down to a question

882
00:49:22.360 --> 00:49:25.199
<v Speaker 4>of will and money. But I don't know how we

883
00:49:25.320 --> 00:49:29.519
<v Speaker 4>don't insist that the same protections that go into slot

884
00:49:29.559 --> 00:49:35.920
<v Speaker 4>machines aren't already in most of the machines.

885
00:49:35.440 --> 00:49:38.079
<v Speaker 2>That conduct our elections. I know some of the machines

886
00:49:38.119 --> 00:49:40.559
<v Speaker 2>that conduct our elections do have this in there. They

887
00:49:40.599 --> 00:49:42.239
<v Speaker 2>all should have it, and if we have that, I

888
00:49:42.239 --> 00:49:44.280
<v Speaker 2>think we can all rest a bit easier about it.

889
00:49:44.760 --> 00:49:46.679
<v Speaker 1>Well, that is a good analogy. I guess we'll end

890
00:49:46.719 --> 00:49:49.119
<v Speaker 1>on that. I think that there's many analogies that could

891
00:49:49.119 --> 00:49:54.000
<v Speaker 1>be drawn between the electoral system and the casino. The

892
00:49:54.039 --> 00:49:58.639
<v Speaker 1>house always wins, I think, in both cases. But that

893
00:49:58.800 --> 00:50:01.159
<v Speaker 1>is very interesting, And I'm sure I haven't had a

894
00:50:01.280 --> 00:50:03.079
<v Speaker 1>chance to read your book. I didn't get a copy

895
00:50:03.079 --> 00:50:04.639
<v Speaker 1>of it yet because I wanted to get you on quickly.

896
00:50:05.199 --> 00:50:07.480
<v Speaker 1>But I'm sure, it is very interesting. I think people

897
00:50:07.519 --> 00:50:12.719
<v Speaker 1>be interested to see what you found in twenty twenty

898
00:50:12.719 --> 00:50:16.079
<v Speaker 1>that people are still talking about. And more importantly, what

899
00:50:16.119 --> 00:50:19.280
<v Speaker 1>does that portend for the election that's coming up now

900
00:50:19.280 --> 00:50:21.840
<v Speaker 1>and I guess maybe about ninety days or something like that,

901
00:50:22.239 --> 00:50:25.119
<v Speaker 1>and what can we do. Certainly there's not going to

902
00:50:25.159 --> 00:50:27.119
<v Speaker 1>be a thing that we can do to fix it

903
00:50:27.119 --> 00:50:30.199
<v Speaker 1>between now and then, but it gives us some idea

904
00:50:30.239 --> 00:50:34.079
<v Speaker 1>of what we can still expect. But then we really

905
00:50:34.159 --> 00:50:36.480
<v Speaker 1>do need to take I think one thing everybody agrees

906
00:50:37.000 --> 00:50:40.679
<v Speaker 1>that we need to do something to make the electoral

907
00:50:40.719 --> 00:50:45.119
<v Speaker 1>system more trustworthy, that people have a confidence that their

908
00:50:45.199 --> 00:50:48.480
<v Speaker 1>vote is counted and counted accurately. I think that is

909
00:50:48.519 --> 00:50:51.400
<v Speaker 1>a paramount importance and so it's very I'm glad to

910
00:50:51.400 --> 00:50:54.440
<v Speaker 1>see that you wrote a book about your experience with that.

911
00:50:55.440 --> 00:50:59.079
<v Speaker 1>And again, the book is disproven my unbiased search for

912
00:50:59.199 --> 00:51:02.360
<v Speaker 1>voter fraud for the Trump campaign and the data that

913
00:51:02.440 --> 00:51:05.239
<v Speaker 1>shows why he lost and how we can improve our elections.

914
00:51:05.239 --> 00:51:08.440
<v Speaker 1>And by the way, you can find this at kenblock

915
00:51:08.639 --> 00:51:11.199
<v Speaker 1>dot com. There's a link there to buy the book

916
00:51:11.239 --> 00:51:13.159
<v Speaker 1>and you can get information about it there. Anything else

917
00:51:13.159 --> 00:51:14.880
<v Speaker 1>you'd like to tell us about the book before we

918
00:51:14.960 --> 00:51:15.599
<v Speaker 1>run out of time.

919
00:51:16.119 --> 00:51:18.719
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, I mean, look, the back of the book is

920
00:51:18.719 --> 00:51:22.559
<v Speaker 4>the most important part of the book. Fixing our elections

921
00:51:22.800 --> 00:51:28.320
<v Speaker 4>is patriotic, it's mission critical, it's the most important thing.

922
00:51:28.639 --> 00:51:32.719
<v Speaker 4>Michael Lindell and I disagreed about the outcome of the elections,

923
00:51:32.719 --> 00:51:35.360
<v Speaker 4>but we were in sync on the need to make

924
00:51:35.480 --> 00:51:38.559
<v Speaker 4>changes to make things happen better. I've spoken to Republican

925
00:51:38.679 --> 00:51:42.000
<v Speaker 4>secretaries of state. I've spoken to Democratic secretaries of state.

926
00:51:42.360 --> 00:51:45.760
<v Speaker 4>There is a lot of over agreement, overlap in agreement

927
00:51:46.159 --> 00:51:48.000
<v Speaker 4>on some of the things that we should be doing

928
00:51:48.000 --> 00:51:51.719
<v Speaker 4>to make our elections better. And we need to move

929
00:51:51.800 --> 00:51:54.519
<v Speaker 4>beyond where we're at in terms of our discussions of

930
00:51:54.559 --> 00:51:58.760
<v Speaker 4>elections and looking backwards and dealing with whatever happens here

931
00:51:58.800 --> 00:51:59.480
<v Speaker 4>in November.

932
00:52:00.360 --> 00:52:01.239
<v Speaker 2>To move forward.

933
00:52:01.320 --> 00:52:04.599
<v Speaker 4>We need to have an adult conversation about making our

934
00:52:04.639 --> 00:52:06.960
<v Speaker 4>elections better and get in to it and taking this

935
00:52:07.039 --> 00:52:09.159
<v Speaker 4>moment in time to really improve things.

936
00:52:09.360 --> 00:52:10.159
<v Speaker 2>Yeah. I agree.

937
00:52:10.400 --> 00:52:12.639
<v Speaker 1>And it's not just that we would like to get

938
00:52:12.639 --> 00:52:16.320
<v Speaker 1>the right answers, but I mean, in this time of polarization,

939
00:52:17.400 --> 00:52:20.360
<v Speaker 1>if we don't have trustworthy elections, I'm very concerned that

940
00:52:20.480 --> 00:52:22.960
<v Speaker 1>the the Civil War over it or something like that.

941
00:52:23.000 --> 00:52:25.519
<v Speaker 1>A lot of talk about that on both sides. And

942
00:52:25.599 --> 00:52:29.079
<v Speaker 1>so it's having something that you trust that you can

943
00:52:29.119 --> 00:52:33.880
<v Speaker 1>audit that is really key. So again you've got the

944
00:52:34.320 --> 00:52:37.679
<v Speaker 1>second half of your book is about your recommendations for

945
00:52:37.760 --> 00:52:40.119
<v Speaker 1>how to do that from somebody who is an expert

946
00:52:40.199 --> 00:52:44.320
<v Speaker 1>on auditing it. And you've seen the tricks that can

947
00:52:44.360 --> 00:52:47.239
<v Speaker 1>be pulled, and so that is no system is going

948
00:52:47.280 --> 00:52:50.159
<v Speaker 1>to be perfect. Any system can be infiltrated and has

949
00:52:50.199 --> 00:52:52.519
<v Speaker 1>its own flaws, and so the question is what do

950
00:52:52.559 --> 00:52:57.239
<v Speaker 1>we do to try to minimize that and mitigate those risks.

951
00:52:57.280 --> 00:52:59.039
<v Speaker 1>So thank you so much for the work that you do,

952
00:52:59.079 --> 00:53:03.039
<v Speaker 1>and again you can find us at kenblock dot com.

953
00:53:03.079 --> 00:53:05.440
<v Speaker 1>And the book is disproven. Thank you so much, sir,

954
00:53:05.559 --> 00:53:06.159
<v Speaker 1>appreciate it.

955
00:53:06.159 --> 00:53:09.679
<v Speaker 2>Thanks. Wearing of bias and false neooze has become all

956
00:53:09.719 --> 00:53:27.880
<v Speaker 2>too common on social first unfortunately exactly. And this is

957
00:53:28.000 --> 00:53:31.719
<v Speaker 2>extremely dangerous to our democracy. This is extremely dangerous to

958
00:53:31.800 --> 00:53:32.639
<v Speaker 2>our democracy.

959
00:53:32.960 --> 00:53:35.199
<v Speaker 1>This is extremely dangerous to our democracy.

960
00:53:35.360 --> 00:53:38.480
<v Speaker 2>This is extremely dangerous to our democracy. This is extremely

961
00:53:38.519 --> 00:53:42.679
<v Speaker 2>dangerous to our democracy. This is extremely dangerous to our democracy.

962
00:53:42.880 --> 00:53:45.400
<v Speaker 1>This is extremely dangerous to our democracy.

963
00:53:45.639 --> 00:53:49.360
<v Speaker 2>This is extremely dangerous to our democracy. This is extremely

964
00:53:49.480 --> 00:53:50.760
<v Speaker 2>dangerous to our democracy.

965
00:53:50.960 --> 00:53:53.440
<v Speaker 1>Break free from the usual script with a David Knight

966
00:53:53.519 --> 00:53:57.280
<v Speaker 1>show a fresh perspective bringing you genuine insights on current events.

967
00:53:57.360 --> 00:53:59.119
<v Speaker 1>But if the show is going to stay on the air,

968
00:53:59.280 --> 00:54:03.400
<v Speaker 1>we'll need your cantinued support. Sharing the show, subscribing and

969
00:54:03.480 --> 00:54:06.239
<v Speaker 1>even just hitting the like button all help. And if

970
00:54:06.280 --> 00:54:09.360
<v Speaker 1>you found our show helpful, please consider donating and becoming

971
00:54:09.400 --> 00:54:12.679
<v Speaker 1>a part of a community that values the truth because independent,

972
00:54:12.840 --> 00:54:18.039
<v Speaker 1>listener funded news untouched by corporate globalist agendas, is extremely

973
00:54:18.079 --> 00:54:20.679
<v Speaker 1>important to our liberties.
