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<v Speaker 1>Ever wonder how prepared, like really prepared your organization is

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<v Speaker 1>for a.

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<v Speaker 2>Cyber attack, like not just checking the box, yes.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, like actually facing down a real threat.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>That's where red teaming comes in exactly. It's like ethical

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<v Speaker 1>hacking on steroids. We're diving deep into the book Red

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<v Speaker 1>Team Development and Operations.

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<v Speaker 2>Great book.

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<v Speaker 1>Think of it as our playbook for understanding this whole world.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a fascinating world because red teaming goes way beyond

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<v Speaker 2>just like finding a vulnerability, Okay, you know, it's about

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<v Speaker 2>understanding how an attacker would actually exploit those weaknesses. Kind

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<v Speaker 2>like a stress test for your security, but instead of

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<v Speaker 2>just looking at technical specs, it simulates a real attack scenario.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so let's say someone is listening and they're thinking,

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<v Speaker 1>all right, but isn't that what penetration testing is for.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so pen testing is definitely a part of it,

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<v Speaker 2>but red teaming takes a much broader view. Okay, Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>imagine security is like a fortress. Okay, pen testing might

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<v Speaker 2>if the walls are strong. Red teaming is trying to

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<v Speaker 2>sneak in, maybe disguised as a delivery person, or even

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<v Speaker 2>digging a tunnel underneath.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow.

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<v Speaker 2>It tests the people, processes, and technology all at once.

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<v Speaker 1>That's a great analogy, and it reminds me of the

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<v Speaker 1>story from the book about a company where the leadership

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<v Speaker 1>just assumed that only five people had access to their

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<v Speaker 1>accounting systems, but when the red team came in.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, they found a bunch more people who actually had access,

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<v Speaker 2>which obviously creates a much bigger security risk. It's a

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<v Speaker 2>classic example of how red teaming challenges assumptions. It forces

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<v Speaker 2>you to look beyond the obvious and consider all the

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<v Speaker 2>potential attack vectors.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's not about if you have a weaknesses, it's

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<v Speaker 1>about how an attacker would actually exploit them and what

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<v Speaker 1>would happen if they did exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And that brings us to a really helpful visual. The

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<v Speaker 2>book uses the inverted triangle. It shows the relationship between

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<v Speaker 2>vulnerability assessments, penetration testing, and red teaming. At the very top,

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<v Speaker 2>you've got vulnerability assessments. Think of this is casting a

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<v Speaker 2>wide net to find as many potential weak points as possible.

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<v Speaker 2>It gives you a broad overview but doesn't go into

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of depth.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, that makes sense. So it's like a basic scan

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<v Speaker 1>to identify the low hanging fruit.

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<v Speaker 2>Then what Then you move down the triangle to penetration testing.

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<v Speaker 2>This is where you actually try to exploit those vulnerabilities.

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<v Speaker 2>You poke and prod to see if you can actually

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<v Speaker 2>get in. It's a deeper dive, but still primarily focused

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<v Speaker 2>on technical weaknesses.

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<v Speaker 1>And then at the very bottom of the triangle the

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<v Speaker 1>tip yep, that's where red teaming comes in.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly. Red teaming encompasses all of it. You're looking at

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<v Speaker 2>the vulnerability scans, the penetration test results, but you're also

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<v Speaker 2>factoring in the human element. Okay, how do employees respond

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<v Speaker 2>to phishing attempts? Are there gaps in security procedures? Could

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<v Speaker 2>someone literally tailgate their way into a secure area? It's

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<v Speaker 2>about seeing how the entire system, people, processes, and technology

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<v Speaker 2>would hold up against a determined attacker.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so it's like a full blown simulation of real

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<v Speaker 1>world attack taking everything into account. That's pretty intense. But

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<v Speaker 1>how do they even begin to plant something like that?

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<v Speaker 1>Do they just pick a random attack scenario and go

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<v Speaker 1>for it?

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<v Speaker 2>Not at all. Red teams use threat intelligence and frameworks

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<v Speaker 2>like mitre, ATT and CK to understand real world tactics

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<v Speaker 2>and techniques. Basically, they create a profile of the threat

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<v Speaker 2>they're simulating based on real world adversaries.

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<v Speaker 1>So instead of just throwing spaghetti at the wall and

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<v Speaker 1>seeing what sticks, they're actually studying the playbook of real

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<v Speaker 1>attackers and saying, Okay, how would this group target our organization?

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<v Speaker 2>You got it? And they don't try to simulate everything

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<v Speaker 2>at once. The book calls it decomposing the threat. They

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<v Speaker 2>break down a complex adversary into their core components. What

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<v Speaker 2>are their goals, what tactics are they known for, what

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<v Speaker 2>tools do they use? This helps them focus on what's

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<v Speaker 2>feasible within the time and budget constraints of.

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<v Speaker 1>The engagement, right because you can't simulate every single aspect

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<v Speaker 1>of a sophisticated attack, but you can focus on the

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<v Speaker 1>key elements that are most elevant to the organization you're testing.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's say they've identified the threat they want to emulate.

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<v Speaker 1>What happens next.

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<v Speaker 2>This is where it gets really interesting. Red teams have

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<v Speaker 2>to decide what type of engagement they're going to conduct.

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<v Speaker 2>There are two main types, announced and unannounced.

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<v Speaker 1>Wooh unannounced that sounds like it could get a little spicy.

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<v Speaker 2>They can with an announced engagement, the organization knows the

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<v Speaker 2>test is coming. They might be a little more prepared,

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<v Speaker 2>maybe they've patched some known vulnerabilities where they're on high

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<v Speaker 2>alert for phishing emails.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's more of a controlled experiment exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>But unannounced engagements, those are designed to be more like

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<v Speaker 2>a real attack. Okay, the organization has no idea its coming,

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<v Speaker 2>so they're caught completely off guard.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow, that must be a real eye opener for them.

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<v Speaker 1>You get to see their true reactions and how well

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<v Speaker 1>they would actually respond to a real world attack exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And the book has this Red Team tip that I love.

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<v Speaker 2>It says unannounced engagements are best for understanding overall security

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<v Speaker 2>operations effectiveness, while announced engagements are better for testing specific capabilities.

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<v Speaker 2>So if you want to see how your incident response

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<v Speaker 2>team would handle a ransomware attack, an announced engagement might

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<v Speaker 2>be a better fit. But if you want a truly

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<v Speaker 2>realistic assessment of your overall security posture, unannounced is the

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<v Speaker 2>way to go.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like the difference between a fire drill and an

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<v Speaker 1>actual fire. Right, one is a practice run, the other

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<v Speaker 1>is the real deal.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a great way to put it. And then there's

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<v Speaker 2>another type of engagement that's worth mentioning. The assumed breach model. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>this is where the red team is given initial access

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<v Speaker 2>to the system. They skip the getting in part and

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<v Speaker 2>go straight to seeing what they can do once they're inside.

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<v Speaker 1>Hold on. So it's like saying, Okay, we know someone

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<v Speaker 1>could get in, so let's just focus on what happens next.

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<v Speaker 1>Isn't that a bit risky?

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<v Speaker 2>It can be, but it's also incredibly valuable for understanding

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<v Speaker 2>an organization's ability to detect and respond to an active threat.

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<v Speaker 2>It's like saying, Okay, the alarm bells are already ringing.

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<v Speaker 2>Now let's see how quickly and effectively you can contain

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<v Speaker 2>the damage.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's about understanding how far an attacker could get

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<v Speaker 1>once they're passed the initial defenses. That makes a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of sense, but it does raise another question. If they're

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<v Speaker 1>already inside, how do they actually operate without getting caught?

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<v Speaker 2>Right?

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, isn't there a ton of monitoring and security

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<v Speaker 1>software that would pick up on unusual activity?

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, that's where tradecraft comes in. The art of stealthy operations.

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<v Speaker 2>Red teams are all about being as quiet and undetected

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<v Speaker 2>as possible. I think ninja's of the cybersecurity world. They

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<v Speaker 2>have to blend in, avoid detection and minimize their footprint.

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<v Speaker 2>They don't want to tip anyone off that they're.

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<v Speaker 1>There, so they're not just brute forcing their way in.

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<v Speaker 1>They're being strategic and careful about every move.

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<v Speaker 2>They make exactly. For example, they might minimize callback volume

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<v Speaker 2>to avoid detection by network monitoring tools. Instead of constantly

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<v Speaker 2>sending data back and forth, which could raise red flags,

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<v Speaker 2>they'll try to limit their communication as much as possible.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's not just about what they do, it's about

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<v Speaker 1>how they do it. It's about being stealthy and understanding

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<v Speaker 1>how to operate under the radar. If that raises the question,

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<v Speaker 1>how do they actually get commands to their tools once

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<v Speaker 1>they're inside.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a great question, and it gets into some of

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<v Speaker 2>the more advanced tactics that red teams use. Okay, we'll

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<v Speaker 2>dig into that more in just a moment.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so we've covered a lot of ground here. We've

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<v Speaker 1>talked about what red teaming is, the different types of engagements,

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<v Speaker 1>and even a bit about the tradecraft involved. But before

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<v Speaker 1>we go, let me ask you this, why should someone

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<v Speaker 1>listening care about all of this? I mean, if you're

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<v Speaker 1>not a security professional, doesn't really matter.

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<v Speaker 2>It absolutely matters, because here's the thing. Red teaming isn't

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<v Speaker 2>just about protecting organizations. It's about protecting you. Think about

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<v Speaker 2>all the data you have stored online. Your bank accounts,

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<v Speaker 2>your social media profiles, your medical records, all of that

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<v Speaker 2>is potentially vulnerable.

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<v Speaker 1>To attack, right, And even if you're not a target yourself,

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<v Speaker 1>you could be collateral damage in a larger attack, right,

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<v Speaker 1>Like if a company you do business with gets hacked,

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<v Speaker 1>your data could be compromised exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>So understanding how red teaming works gives you a better

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<v Speaker 2>understanding of the threats you face and how to protect yourself.

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<v Speaker 2>It's about being aware of the risks and taking steps

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<v Speaker 2>to mitigate them.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's not just about technology, it's about awareness and

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<v Speaker 1>education and maybe a little bit of healthy paranoia. We'll

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<v Speaker 1>be back in just a moment to continue our deep

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<v Speaker 1>dive into red teaming. Don't go anywhere.

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<v Speaker 2>Looking forward to it. So before the break, we were

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<v Speaker 2>talking about how red teams stay stealthy once they're inside

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<v Speaker 2>a system, right, right, And it reminded me of this

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<v Speaker 2>passage in the book that talks about how even a

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<v Speaker 2>simple command can be a giveaway if you're not cures.

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<v Speaker 1>Wait, really, like, what kind of command are we talking.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a great example because it shows just how detail

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<v Speaker 2>oriented red teams have to be. Okay, the book mentions

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<v Speaker 2>the netstack command, which is used to display network connections. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>it seems pretty basically yeah, yeah, but the thing is

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<v Speaker 2>it behaves differently on Windows and Linux systems.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh huh.

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<v Speaker 2>So if a red teamer is operating on a Windows

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<v Speaker 2>system but accidentally uses the Linux version of the command, oh,

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<v Speaker 2>I see, they've blown their cover. It's a dead giveaway

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<v Speaker 2>that something's not right. Wow, and that's just one tiny example. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>Red teamers need to be incredibly meticulous and have a

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<v Speaker 2>deep understanding of the tools and systems they're working with.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like they have to be fluent in multiple computer languages,

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<v Speaker 1>but instead of speaking, they're typing exactly, and any little

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<v Speaker 1>grammatical error, yes, could get them caught.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a fantastic analogy, and it brings us back to

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<v Speaker 2>that idea of threat planning and using frameworks like miterre

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<v Speaker 2>att and CK.

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<v Speaker 1>Right.

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<v Speaker 2>Remember, it's like a giant catalog of tactics and techniques

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<v Speaker 2>that real world attackers use.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, So instead of reinventing the wheel, red teams can

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<v Speaker 1>draw on this knowledge base of proven tactics, right, but

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<v Speaker 1>how does that actually work in practice.

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<v Speaker 2>Let's say the red team is emulating a group known

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<v Speaker 2>for using spearfishing to deliver malware. Okay, they'd start by

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<v Speaker 2>looking at the att and CK matrix for techniques related

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<v Speaker 2>to fishing, like spearfishing attachment or spearfishing link.

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<v Speaker 1>So they're looking for specific technique that match the adversary

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<v Speaker 1>they're trying to emulate exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And they wouldn't just copy a technique blindly. They would

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<v Speaker 2>research those techniques in detail, okay, to understand how they work,

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<v Speaker 2>what kinds of lures are effective, and what tools and

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<v Speaker 2>infrastructure are typically used.

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<v Speaker 1>So if I'm picturing this correctly, they're going through this

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<v Speaker 1>massive database of attack techniques, reading about how real attackers

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<v Speaker 1>have used them in the past, and then figuring out

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<v Speaker 1>how to adapt those techniques to the specific organization they're targeting.

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<v Speaker 2>You're getting it. It's about replicating the specific tactics and

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<v Speaker 2>techniques of a real adversary, not just finding generic vulnerabilities.

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<v Speaker 2>And that level of detail is what makes red teaming

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<v Speaker 2>so effective.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like they're writing a screenplay for a cyber attack. Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>based on a true story, but instead of actors, they're

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<v Speaker 1>using malware and exploits.

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<v Speaker 2>I love that You've got it exactly Now. Once they've

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<v Speaker 2>chosen their techniques, it's time to start thinking about how

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<v Speaker 2>to actually tells the organization's defenses. Okay, remember those three

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<v Speaker 2>main phases we discussed earlier, Get in, stay in, and.

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<v Speaker 1>Act right like a cyberheist movie. Yes, first you got

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<v Speaker 1>to get inside the vault. Then you have to stay

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<v Speaker 1>hidden long enough to crack the safe, and then you

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<v Speaker 1>make your move.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a great way to think about it. Uh huh,

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<v Speaker 2>So let's break down each phase. Okay, get in is

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<v Speaker 2>pretty straightforward. That's the initial point of entry. This is

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<v Speaker 2>often where social engineering techniques like phishing come into play.

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<v Speaker 2>The red team might send a carefully crafted email designed

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<v Speaker 2>to trick an employee into clicking a malicious link or

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<v Speaker 2>opening an infected attachment.

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<v Speaker 1>And we all know how easy it is to fall

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<v Speaker 1>for a well crafted phishing email. I mean, I've even

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<v Speaker 1>seen security professionals get fooled by some of these things.

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<v Speaker 2>It happens to the best of us, right. Humans are

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<v Speaker 2>often the weakest link in the security chain, and attackers

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<v Speaker 2>know that red teaming helps organizations understand how susceptible their

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<v Speaker 2>employees are to social engineering, and how to train them

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<v Speaker 2>to be more vigilant.

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<v Speaker 1>It's not just looking for technical vulnerabilities and systems. They're

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<v Speaker 1>looking for vulnerabilities and human behavior as well.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly. It's about understanding how people react under pressure and

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<v Speaker 2>how to build a security culture that encourages vigilance and awareness.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so let's say the Red team successfully gains access

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<v Speaker 1>through a phishing attack. Okay, what happens next? That's the

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<v Speaker 1>stay in phase, right right.

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<v Speaker 2>Once they have a foothold, they need to maintain their

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<v Speaker 2>access and avoid detection. Okay, this is where persistence comes in.

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<v Speaker 2>They're essentially setting up shophand finding ways to stay embedded

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<v Speaker 2>in the system without raising any alarms.

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<v Speaker 1>I can only imagine how nerve racking that must be.

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<v Speaker 1>They're like a secret agent operating behind enemy lines, trying

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<v Speaker 1>to blend in and avoid detection. But what specific tactics

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<v Speaker 1>do they use to stay hidden.

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<v Speaker 2>They might install back doors, create rogue user accounts, or

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<v Speaker 2>even hijack legitimate processes to blend in with normal system activity.

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<v Speaker 1>So they're basically camouflaging themselves within the system exactly. But

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<v Speaker 1>all of that must take a lot of technical skill

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<v Speaker 1>and knowledge.

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<v Speaker 2>It does, and it's a reminder that security is not

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<v Speaker 2>a one time fix. It's an ongoing battle.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>Organizations need to be constantly monitoring their systems for suspicious

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<v Speaker 2>activity and looking for signs of compromise.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, because once an attacker is inside, they can potentially

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<v Speaker 1>lie dormant for months or even years before they actually

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<v Speaker 1>make their move.

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<v Speaker 2>That's right, And that brings us to the final phase act. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>this is where the red team actually carries out their objective,

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<v Speaker 2>which could be anything from stealing sensitive data to disrupting

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<v Speaker 2>operations to demonstrating that they were able to achieve a

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<v Speaker 2>specific goal.

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<v Speaker 1>It's showtime.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, but it's not.

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<v Speaker 1>Just about proving that they can get in. No, it's

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<v Speaker 1>about showing what they can do once they're inside and

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<v Speaker 1>what the real world consequences could be exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And that brings us to one of the most fascinating

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<v Speaker 2>aspects of red teaming operational impacts. Okay, this is where

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<v Speaker 2>things can get really interesting and potentially a little uncomfortable

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<v Speaker 2>for the organization.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so we're talking about actually simulating the effects of

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<v Speaker 1>a real world attack, right, what kind of things are

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<v Speaker 1>we talking about here.

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<v Speaker 2>It could be anything from simulating a denial of service attack,

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<v Speaker 2>to disrupting critical business processes to even manipulating industrial control systems.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow, that's pretty intense, but I can see how it

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<v Speaker 1>would be a powerful way to get the organization's attention

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<v Speaker 1>and make the risks feel real.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like, look, we're not just playing games here. This

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<v Speaker 1>is what could happen if you don't take security seriously.

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<v Speaker 2>That's exactly the point. It's one thing to read a

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<v Speaker 2>report about a vulnerability. It's another thing entirely to experience

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<v Speaker 2>the impact of that vulnerability firsthand.

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<v Speaker 1>Right. It's like the difference between reading about a fire

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<v Speaker 1>and actually feeling the heat exactly. It makes it much

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<v Speaker 1>more real and immediate, exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And that's why operational impacts can be so effective in

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<v Speaker 2>driving change.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>They help organizations move beyond the theoretical realm of risk

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<v Speaker 2>and into the realm of tangible consequences.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like a wake up call, yes, but instead of

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<v Speaker 1>a loud noise, it's a simulated cyber attack.

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<v Speaker 2>I like that. And it's important to remember that the

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<v Speaker 2>Red Team isn't doing this to punish the organization, right,

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<v Speaker 2>They're doing it to help them improve their security posture.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's not about scaring people, it's about motivating them

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<v Speaker 1>to take action and improve their security precisely.

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<v Speaker 2>And that's why it's so important for the red team

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<v Speaker 2>and the organization to work closely together throughout the engagement. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>they need to understand the organization's business goals, risk tolerance,

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<v Speaker 2>and operational constraints in order to design meaningful operational impacts.

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<v Speaker 1>It makes sense that you wouldn't want to simulate an

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<v Speaker 1>attack that would cripple the organization or put their operations

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<v Speaker 1>at risk. You need to find that balance between demonstrating

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<v Speaker 1>the impact and avoiding any real world damage exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>And that's where the planning phase of a red team

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<v Speaker 2>engagement is so critical. Okay, it's not just about using

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<v Speaker 2>the right tools and techniques. It's about understanding the target

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<v Speaker 2>organization and tailoring the engagement to their specific needs and objectives.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's really a customized approach, almost like a tailored suit. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>you're taking into account all the unique factors of that organization,

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<v Speaker 1>their size, their industry, their risk profile, and designing an

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<v Speaker 1>engagement that will be both effective and meaningful for them.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, and that brings us back to the importance of reporting. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>the Red Team report isn't just a list of vulnerabilities.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a roadmap for improvement. It should tell the story

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<v Speaker 2>of the attack, highlight key observations, and provide actionable recommendations

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<v Speaker 2>for strengthening defenses.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's almost like a consulting engagement, with the Red

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<v Speaker 1>Team acting as trusted advisors to help the organization improve

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<v Speaker 1>their security posture. But I'm curious how do they actually

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<v Speaker 1>go about writing a report like that. I mean, it

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<v Speaker 1>can't be as simple as just saying, hey, you guys

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<v Speaker 1>have some vulnerabilities, you should fix them, right.

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<v Speaker 2>It needs to be much more detailed and insightful than that. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>one of the things that stood up to me in

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<v Speaker 2>the book is that they talk about using attack flow

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<v Speaker 2>diagrams to visually represent the steps taken by the Red Team.

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<v Speaker 2>I think that would be incredibly helpful for organizations to

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<v Speaker 2>see exactly how the attack unfolded and what areas need

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<v Speaker 2>the most attention.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like giving them a blueprint of the attack, so

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<v Speaker 1>they can see exactly where the weak points are and

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<v Speaker 1>how to fortify them. But what about risk ratings? Do

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<v Speaker 1>Red Team reports use the traditional high, medium, low scale.

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<v Speaker 2>They can, but the book actually proposes an alternative approach

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<v Speaker 2>that I find much more compelling.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay.

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<v Speaker 2>Instead of relying on a subjective risk matrix, right, they

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<v Speaker 2>suggest using metrics based on the red team's goals.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh interesting.

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<v Speaker 2>Instead of saying this vulnerability has a high likelihood of

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<v Speaker 2>being exploited, they might say we were able to achieve

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<v Speaker 2>our goal of stealing sensitive data within twenty four hours.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh wow. And this approach provides much more actionable information

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<v Speaker 2>for the organization. It's not just about the euoretical risk

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<v Speaker 2>of a vulnerability, it's about the demonstrable impact of a

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<v Speaker 2>successful attack, and it really brings the risks to life.

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<v Speaker 1>That's a great point. This all makes perfect sense, but

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<v Speaker 1>it does raise another question. We've talked a lot about

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<v Speaker 1>the technical aspects of red teaming, right, but what about

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<v Speaker 1>the human element? I mean, how do they account for

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<v Speaker 1>the fact that people are often the weakest link in

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<v Speaker 1>the security chain.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a great question, and it's something that RID teams

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<v Speaker 2>are very aware of. Remember those social engineering techniques we

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<v Speaker 2>talked about earlier, Yes, things like phishing, pre texting, and baiting.

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<v Speaker 2>Red teams use those techniques to test an organization's human defenses.

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<v Speaker 1>So they might send a phishing email that looks like

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<v Speaker 1>it's from the IT department, asking employees to reset their passwords.

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<v Speaker 2>Exactly, and they'll track how many employees click on the link,

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<v Speaker 2>how many enter their credentials, and how far they get

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<v Speaker 2>before they realize it's a scam. They might also conduct

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<v Speaker 2>physical security tests, like seeing if they can gain access

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<v Speaker 2>to secure areas by tailgating employees or maintenance workers.

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<v Speaker 1>It sounds like they're really thinking outside the box, looking

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<v Speaker 1>for any potential weak points in the organization's security. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>and that brings up another question. How do they ensure

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<v Speaker 1>they don't cause unintended damage? Right? I mean, some of

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<v Speaker 1>these operational impacts could have serious consequences if they're not

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<v Speaker 1>carefully controlled.

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<v Speaker 2>That's where the concept of deconfliction comes in. It's all

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<v Speaker 2>about making sure that the Red Team's activities are clearly

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<v Speaker 2>distinguishable from real world attacks and that everyone is on

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<v Speaker 2>the same page.

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<v Speaker 1>Right.

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<v Speaker 2>We'll be back after the break to discuss that and more.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so we've covered a lot of ground here, but

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<v Speaker 1>it sounds like we're just getting started. Stay tuned, Welcome

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<v Speaker 1>back to the deep dive. We're wrapping up our exploration

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<v Speaker 1>of red teaming, and honestly, my mind is still buzzing

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<v Speaker 1>from all of this incredible information. We were just talking

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<v Speaker 1>about the importance of deconfliction, right right, making sure those

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<v Speaker 1>Red team attacks don't get mistaken for the real deal.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's crucial, especially during those unannounced engagements. Imagine the

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<v Speaker 2>chaos if this security team saw this suspicious activity and

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<v Speaker 2>thought it was a genuine threat, you would have like

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<v Speaker 2>a full blown incidant response for nothing.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh, talk about a fire drill gone wrong. So how

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<v Speaker 1>do they prevent that kind of mix up?

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<v Speaker 2>Communication is key? Okay, The Red and Blue teams need

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<v Speaker 2>to have like clear channels of communication. Okay, maybe predefined

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<v Speaker 2>contact points, shared logs, or even real time monitoring of

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<v Speaker 2>the Red team's activities.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's like having a referee on hand to make

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<v Speaker 1>sure everyone's playing by the rules and knows what's going

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<v Speaker 1>on exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and there needs to be a clear process for

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<v Speaker 2>reporting and verifying anything suspicious. If the Blue team see

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<v Speaker 2>something that looks like it could be the Red team,

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<v Speaker 2>they need a way to quickly confirm.

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<v Speaker 1>Makes sense, And if it's not the Red team.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, then it's game on for a real incident response.

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<v Speaker 2>But the key is to avoid those false alarms, especially

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<v Speaker 2>when you're trying to assess how the organization would handle

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<v Speaker 2>a real attack. But it's not just about deconfliction. Red

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<v Speaker 2>teams also need to keep meticulous records of everything.

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<v Speaker 1>They do, right I imagine, documentation is super important, not

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<v Speaker 1>just to avoid confusion, but also so the organization can

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<v Speaker 1>actually learn from the experience.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely meticulous record keeping is essential for that post engagement analysis.

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<v Speaker 2>The red team needs to be able to explain exactly

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<v Speaker 2>what they did, how they did it, and what the

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<v Speaker 2>organization can learn from it.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like leaving a trail of breadcrumbs, but instead of

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<v Speaker 1>leading to a gingerbread house, it leads to better security.

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<v Speaker 2>I love that, and that's where those operator logs come in.

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<v Speaker 2>The red team should document every single action they take,

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<v Speaker 2>every command, every file they access, almost like a forensic investigation,

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<v Speaker 2>but in reverse.

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<v Speaker 1>So you can see exactly how they got in, where

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<v Speaker 1>they went, and what they did once they were inside.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like a step by step guide to hacking your

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<v Speaker 1>own organization, but in a good way, of course, precisely.

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<v Speaker 2>And those logs are invaluable for the Blue team as

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<v Speaker 2>they try to understand the attack path and identify areas

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<v Speaker 2>for improvement.

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<v Speaker 1>Absolutely, So, to wrap things up, I think it's safe

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<v Speaker 1>to say that that red teaming is a critical part

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<v Speaker 1>of any organization's security strategy. It's not just about finding vulnerabilities.

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<v Speaker 1>It's about understanding how attackers think, how they operate, and

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<v Speaker 1>what they're capable of. And it's about using that knowledge

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<v Speaker 1>to build stronger defenses and protect ourselves from real world threats.

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<v Speaker 2>It really is. And the more we understand about how

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<v Speaker 2>attackers operate, the better equipped will be to defend ourselves.

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<v Speaker 1>And have said it better myself, this has been an

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<v Speaker 1>incredible journey exploring this topic with you for our listeners.

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<v Speaker 1>If you're interested in learning more about red teaming, we

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<v Speaker 1>highly recommend checking out the book Red Team Development and Operations.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a fantastic resource for anyone who wants to understand

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00:22:40.039 --> 00:22:43.839
<v Speaker 1>this increasingly important field of cybersecurity. Well that's all the

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<v Speaker 1>time we have for today's deep dive. Thanks for joining

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<v Speaker 1>us on this journey into the world of red teaming.

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<v Speaker 1>We'll be back next week with another deep dive into

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<v Speaker 1>a different fascinating topic. Until then, stay curious stay informed

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<v Speaker 1>and stay secure.
