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Speaker 1: We hear about cyber attacks all the time, right, data breaches, ransomware,

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that sort of thing. But have you ever stopped to

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think about what would happen if what if the piece

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of code could actually reach out from the digital world

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and break things like physically. I mean not just you know,

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shut down a computer. I'm talking about causing real physical

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machinery to like self destruct.

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Speaker 2: It sounds like something out of a sci fi.

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Speaker 1: Movie, yeah, exactly, but it actually happened. Back in twenty ten,

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we discovered this computer virus called stucks neet, and it

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was unlike anything we'd ever seen. It wasn't about stealing

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data or holding systems hostage. This thing was purely about sabotage,

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digital sabotage on a global scale.

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Speaker 2: And it's true.

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Speaker 3: The thing that really set stucks in apart right from

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the start was its sheer ambition. You know, we weren't

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looking at some amateur code, some script kitty messing around.

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This was meticulously crafted, I mean really really carefully put together,

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and it had the potential to disrupt critical infrastructure. We're

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talking oil pipelines grinding to a halt, water treatment plants

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shutting down, maybe even even entire power grids collapsing all

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because of lines of code.

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Speaker 1: It's kind of terrifying when you think about it. And

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it all started with these seemingly unconnected events in Iran

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at their tens uranium enrichment facility. You had these super

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sensitive centrifuges essential for their nuclear program, and they just

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started well, they began to tear themselves apart. The engineers

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over there had no idea what was going on. At

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the same time, a security firm over in Belarus gets

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a call from an Iranian client. This client's computers were

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stuck in this crazy loop of rebooting and wiping data.

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So on the surface, it looked like two completely separate issues,

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you know, thousands of miles apart.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, absolutely, And for a while they were treated as

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just that isolated incidence. But then the security experts in Belarus,

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while they were examining the infected machines, they found something

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really really strange, this complex piece of code, and it

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had a very specific purpose. They called it stucksnet and

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get this, it was spreading internationally. But at that point,

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nobody knew that it was the missing link between those

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failing centrifuges in Uran and those those bizarre computer failures.

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Speaker 2: We were talking about.

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Speaker 1: So this Stuck's Net was more than just a virus.

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It was like a digital weapon specifically designed to cause

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physical damage. And it was spreading like wildfire exactly.

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Speaker 3: And the crazy thing is nobody had ever seen anything

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like it before. Most malware at the time was, you know,

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pretty small, ten twenty kilobytes maybe, yeah, But Stuck's Net.

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This thing was huge, five hundred kilobytes expanding to one

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point two megabytes uncompressed.

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Speaker 1: Wow, that's that's a huge difference, like what almost one

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hundred times bigger?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, pretty much. And that size that was actually part

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of his genius, believe it or not. Because it was

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so big and so complicated, it could basically hide in

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clean sight. It just slipped right past the standard anti

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virus software.

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Speaker 1: So it was like trying to find a needle in

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a haystack, except the haystack was made.

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Speaker 2: Of cod exactly.

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Speaker 3: It was so massive that security software couldn't even identify

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it as malicious, let alone, you know, understand what it

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was trying to do and get this. When cybersecurity analysts

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finally got their hands on it, they took it to

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these ultra scure labs.

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Speaker 2: I mean we're talking Fort Knox for digital.

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Speaker 3: Threats, right, and the virus it infected their systems immediately,

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no clicking, no warnings, nothing, It just went right.

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Speaker 1: And how is that even possible?

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Speaker 3: Well, this is where things get even more interesting. When

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you install software, like legitimate software, it comes with a

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digital signature, right. Basically, it's a way for your computer

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to know that the software is the real deal and

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hasn't been messed with, right, like.

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Speaker 1: A seal of approval from the developer exactly.

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Speaker 3: But most malware it tries to bypass that or fake it,

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and that's what usually sets off alarm bells for your

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anti virus. But stucksne it didn't have to fake anything.

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It had real valid digital certificate.

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Speaker 1: Wait, would like stolen ones yep.

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Speaker 3: Stolen from two legitimate companies Jmicron and real Tech.

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Speaker 2: These companies make drivers.

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Speaker 3: For all sorts of computer hardware, hard drives, USB ports,

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things like that, So chances are you probably even have

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some of their software running on your machine right now.

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Speaker 1: So stucks Net basically stole these companies' IDs and use

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them to trick computers into thinking it was safe.

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Speaker 3: Exactly by signing its malicious code with these these stolen

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but totally valid certificates, it was basically telling Windows, Hey,

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I'm the good guy, you can install me, don't worry

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about it. And it worked because the certificates were real.

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The operating system just just let it in, no questions asked.

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Speaker 1: It's crazy how you know something like a digital signature

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can be exploited like that. It really makes you think

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about the security of well, everything.

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Speaker 3: It does, and stealing those certificates in the first place,

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that would have been incredibly difficult too. I mean, it

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would have required a deep understanding of security protocols and

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probably some serious infiltration. This wasn't the work of some

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some random hacker.

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Speaker 1: So we're talking a very sophisticated operation here.

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Speaker 3: Absolutely, this was a well planned, well executed attack. And

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it gets even even more devious. Once stucksnet got onto computer,

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it immediately started looking for USB drives, and because of

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those stolen certificates Windows, it actually helps stucks net copy

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itself onto any USB stick that was plugged.

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Speaker 1: In, So it was using USB drives to spread.

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Speaker 3: Itself exactly, and think about how often those things are used,

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you know, passed around between different computers, even taken into

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networks that are supposed to be completely isolated. Stuck's Net

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basically weaponize those everyday devices, turning them into these these

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silent carriers of its malicious code.

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Speaker 1: Okay, so we've got this incredibly sophisticated virus spreading rapidly

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and designed to trick computers into letting it in. But

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what was it actually after.

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Speaker 3: Well that's the really interesting part. Stuck's Net wasn't interested

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in your average computer files. It was looking for something

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very specific Siemens programmable logic controllers or PLCs plcus.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 3: PLCs are like they're like industrial grade computers that control

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machinery and all sorts of critical systems factories, power plans,

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water treatment plants.

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Speaker 1: Oh okay, so they're like the brains behind the operation

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of all these essential services.

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Speaker 3: And by controlling them, you can control those physical processes.

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I mean you can speed up motors, you can open valves,

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you can change temperatures, all through lines of code.

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Speaker 1: So if someone could hack into these PLCs, they could

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cause some serious damage.

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Speaker 2: Absolutely, and that was Stucksnet's goal.

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Speaker 1: So it wasn't just targeting any computer. It was specifically

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looking for these PLCs.

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Speaker 3: Exactly, and even more specifically, it was targeting the exact

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models of PLCs used in the Iranian nuclear facility.

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Speaker 1: At Natans, So this wasn't random. It was a targeted attack.

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Speaker 2: Out of doubt.

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Speaker 1: Okay, But but who would have the resources and the

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expertise to create something like stex net and why target

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Uran's nuclear program.

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Speaker 3: Well, the consensus among cybersecurity experts is that it was

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a nation state attack, and all signs point to the

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United States, probably with some help from Israel.

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Speaker 1: So it was a covert operation pretty much.

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Speaker 3: I mean, nobody's ever officially claimed responsibility. But you know,

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you look at the complexity of stuxnet, sources required to

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develop it, and the target, it all adds up.

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Speaker 1: So if it was a state sponsored attack, how did

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they get it into Naden's I mean, you'd think a

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nuclear facility would have top notch security.

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Speaker 2: They did.

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Speaker 3: I mean their systems were air gapped, which means they

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were physically isolated from the Internet and any external networks.

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Speaker 1: So like completely disconnected.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, pretty much, but stucksnets still got in how through

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those USB drives we were talking about earlier. Apparently contractors

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who worked at the facility unknowingly brought infected USB's sticks

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with them, and once those sticks were plugged into a

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computer inside NEE tens Well, stucks net had a way in.

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Speaker 1: So even with all that security, they still had a vulnerability.

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Speaker 2: The human element. It's often the weakest link.

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Speaker 1: And one stuck snet got inside. What did it do.

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Speaker 2: Well, it was pretty clever. Actually.

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Speaker 3: For the first thirteen days after infecting the PLCs, it

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didn't do anything.

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Speaker 2: You know, overtly malicious.

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Speaker 3: It just kind of sat there quietly monitoring and logging

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all the operationational data from the centrifuges.

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Speaker 1: It was gathering intel.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, basically it was learning how the centrifuges normally operated

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so it could manipulate them without anyone noticing.

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Speaker 1: So it was playing the long game.

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Speaker 3: Definitely, And after those thirteen days it started its attack.

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It began subtly messing with the speed of the centrifuges,

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making them spin faster and then slower every fifteen minutes,

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and all the while it was sending false data back

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to the control systems, making it look like everything was

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running smoothly, so.

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Speaker 1: The operators had no idea what was happening.

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Speaker 3: Nope, they were completely in the dark. And these centrifuges,

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they're very sensitive machines. Even slight changes in their speed

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can cause them to become unstable, and.

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Speaker 1: That's exactly what Stucksnett was doing. It was pushing those

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centrifuges to their breaking point over and over again until

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they literally tore themselves apart.

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Speaker 2: Precisely.

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Speaker 3: It also messed with the power supply and disabled the

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emergency shutdown systems just to make sure the damage was

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as extensive as possible.

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Speaker 1: Wow. So what was the impact.

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Speaker 3: Well, over a thousand centrifuges were destroyed, which set back

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Iran's nuclear program by by months, if not years. It

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was a huge success for whoever was behind stucksnet.

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Speaker 1: So it achieved its goal, but it also raised a

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lot of questions about about cyber warfare and what it

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means for the future of conflict.

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Speaker 3: Absolutely, I mean, was this an act of war? Where

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do we draw the line when it comes to cyber attacks?

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These are questions we're still grappling with today.

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Speaker 1: And how did a run response.

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Speaker 2: Well, they didn't take it lying down.

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Speaker 3: They invested heavily in their own cyber capabilities and launched

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a series of retaliatory attacks like what Well, one of

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the most notable was an attack on Saudi Aramco, the

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world's largest oil company. They wiped data from something like

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thirty thousand computers and caused major disruptions to their operations.

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Speaker 1: That's a big target.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. They also targeted US financial institutions banks like Wells

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Fargo and Bank of America, causing all sorts of problems

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for their online banking systems.

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Speaker 1: So they were basically saying, you attack us, we attack you, exactly.

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Speaker 2: It was a tit for tat response.

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Speaker 1: Duck Net basically opened up this whole new world of

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cyber warfare where nations are attacking each other's critical infrastructure.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and the scary thing is it's only going to

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get more sophisticated from here.

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Speaker 1: And as we mentioned earlier, once something like stux Net

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is out there, it can be copied, studied, modified. It's

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not like a traditional weapon that could be confiscated or contained, exactly.

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Speaker 3: And we've already seen other malware strains that were clearly

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inspired by stuck Net, like Doco Flame and in Destroyer.

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These things have been used to target industrial facilities in

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other countries, causing power outages and all sorts of other problems.

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Speaker 1: And it's not just nation states that are a threat

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what if terrorist organizations get their hands on this kind

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of technology.

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Speaker 2: That's a very real concern.

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Speaker 3: I mean, imagine what a group like ISIS could do

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if they had the ability to launch a stucks net

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level attack.

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Speaker 2: It's a chilling thought.

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Speaker 1: And we know that a lot of critical infrastructure around

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the world is still running on old software and has

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poor security. I mean, if they could get into Natan's,

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which was supposed to be one of the most secure

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facilities in the world, what about all the other vulnerable

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systems out there.

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Speaker 3: It's a recipe for disaster and there's no easy solution.

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I mean, we're talking about a fundamental shift in how

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we think about security and warfare.

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Speaker 1: So where do we go from here? I mean, is

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this just the new normal? Are we going to be

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constantly fighting these cyber battles.

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Speaker 3: It's hard to say, but one thing's for sure. The

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world has changed. Cyber warfare is a reality, and it's

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something we all need to be aware of.

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Speaker 1: So what can people do to protect themselves?

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Speaker 3: Well, on an individual level, it's about being vigilant, be

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careful what you click on, be suspicious of unexpected emails,

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and keep your software up to date. But really, this

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is a much bigger issue that requires government action and

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international cooperation. We need to be investing in cybersecurity, developing

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new defenses, and working together to establish some kind of

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rules of engagement in this new digital battleground.

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Speaker 1: Because the stakes are incredibly high. We're not just talking

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about stolen data or money anymore. We're talking about the

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potential for widespread disruption, physical damage, and even loss of life.

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Speaker 3: Absolutely, and as technology continues to advance, the threats are

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only going to become more sophisticated and more dangerous.

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Speaker 1: So this is a conversation that needs to continue. We

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need to be talking about these issues, raising awareness and

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pushing for solutions.

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Speaker 3: I agree the more we understand about cyber warfare, the

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better equipped will be to protect ourselves and hopefully prevent

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the worst case scenarios from happening.

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Speaker 1: Well, I think that's a good place to leave it

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for today, but as always, we encourage you to keep digging,

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keep learning, and stay safe out there in the digital world.

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Speaker 2: That's good advice. Thanks for having me on, Thanks for

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joining us.