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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to the deep dive. We're diving into the world

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<v Speaker 1>of red teaming today and our guide is going to

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<v Speaker 1>be hands on red team tactics by Himanshu Sharma and

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<v Speaker 1>heartbreat Singh and these authors.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, they're not just they're not just theorists. Himanshu

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<v Speaker 2>has found vulnerabilities in major companies Apple, Google, Microsoft, Wow,

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<v Speaker 2>even help celebrities get their accounts back after they were hacked.

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<v Speaker 1>That's the kind of experience I want on my side.

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<v Speaker 1>And Hartrey brings years of ethical hacking red teaming expertise,

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<v Speaker 1>working with huge banks, racking up top certifications. So you know,

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<v Speaker 1>the preface of this book really got me thinking, Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>what if you could simulate a real world attack to

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<v Speaker 1>test your company's defenses. Yeah, that's what red teaming is

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<v Speaker 1>all about.

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<v Speaker 2>No, it is about pushing the boundaries, finding those weaknesses

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<v Speaker 2>before the bad guys do. Right. It goes beyond your

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<v Speaker 2>typical security checks, uncovering vulnerabilities that you know might slip

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<v Speaker 2>through the cracks.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's more than just like a basic penetration test. Absolutely,

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<v Speaker 1>it's like really stepping into the shoes of a real attacker,

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<v Speaker 1>trying to think like they do.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's about understanding their mindset, the tactics they use

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<v Speaker 2>in the real world.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, I used to think that penetration testing and

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<v Speaker 1>red teaming were the same thing, but reading this book,

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<v Speaker 1>I realized there are some key differences.

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<v Speaker 2>You're right. Penetration testing or pen testing, it usually follows

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<v Speaker 2>a more structured process, often guided by industry standards, things like, okay,

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<v Speaker 2>the Penetration Testing Execution Standard PTE, PTEs, GUYSWAPS, STMM, and ISF.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so those are like those those are kind of.

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<v Speaker 2>Like the frameworks, right, framework the guidelines for how these

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<v Speaker 2>tests should be conducted.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, So let's break down PTEs a little bit.

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<v Speaker 1>What are the steps involved there?

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<v Speaker 2>So PTEs starts with pre engagement interactions, defining the scope, right, okay,

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<v Speaker 2>making sure everybod he's on the same page. Then there's

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<v Speaker 2>intelligence gathering, rep modeling, vulnerability analysis, and of course the

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<v Speaker 2>actual exploitation phase right right where you try to break in,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, see if you can get through the defenses,

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<v Speaker 2>put it to the test. And finally there's post exploitation

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<v Speaker 2>and reporting. Okay, so documenting what you found, what you

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<v Speaker 2>were able to do, right.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's very thorough, Yeah, It's kind of like a

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<v Speaker 1>scheduled checkup, you know.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, you know what to expect when you're going in

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<v Speaker 2>for appentist red teaming. It's all about surprise. Oh okay,

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<v Speaker 2>imagine the organization doesn't even know what's happening, right. That

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<v Speaker 2>element of surprise really helps you see how they would

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<v Speaker 2>react to a real world attack.

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<v Speaker 1>That makes sense. Yeah, this book, it dives into a

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<v Speaker 1>whole bunch of tools that red teams use. Yeah, some

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<v Speaker 1>are familiar, like metasploit and map, but the pin Testing

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<v Speaker 1>twenty eighteen chapter introduce me to some nuance.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, like the MSF payload creator okay, MSFPC MSFPC, which

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<v Speaker 2>makes generating payloads, especially for those tricky reverse shell connections,

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<v Speaker 2>so much easier.

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<v Speaker 1>We'll have to get into those verse shells a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit later, definitely. But you also mentioned another tool that

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<v Speaker 1>caught my eye. What's interesting about Kowitic?

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<v Speaker 2>So what's interesting about koatic is okay, it uses Windows

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<v Speaker 2>script hosts to execute its payloads. A lot of anti

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<v Speaker 2>virus programs these days, Yes, they're focused on PowerShell activity,

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<v Speaker 2>and so this can help Koitic fly under the radar

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<v Speaker 2>a little bit, just like.

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<v Speaker 1>A ninja sneaking path to the defenses.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>It seems like staying hidden is crucial for red teams.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely. Yeah, red teams need to operate undetected if they

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<v Speaker 2>really want to accurately assess an organization's security.

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<v Speaker 1>Makes sense, right, speaking of essential tools. Yeah, no, red

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<v Speaker 1>teaming conversation is complete right without talking about the metasploit framework.

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<v Speaker 1>I've messed around with it a little bit myself, Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>but maybe we could do a quick refresher.

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<v Speaker 2>Sure, the book assumes some familiarity, so we don't need

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<v Speaker 2>to go too deep. But think of metasploit like a toolbox, okay,

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<v Speaker 2>filled with modules, little programs designed for specific tasks. There

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<v Speaker 2>are auxiliaries, which are helper tools for things like scanning

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<v Speaker 2>exploits to target vulnerabilities, and payloads, which are the actions

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<v Speaker 2>taken after a successful.

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<v Speaker 1>Exploit, like opening a back door, right.

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<v Speaker 2>Opening a back door, stealing data, stealing beta, things like that,

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<v Speaker 2>And then you have encoders to make those payloads harder

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<v Speaker 2>to detect.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, Yeah. I remember using armitage, yeah, which is that

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<v Speaker 1>graphical interface for metasploity, just to make things a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit easier to manage.

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<v Speaker 2>Armitage is great for streamlining attacks.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, you can even automate tasks with Quortana scripting.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh wow. Yeah, speaking of powerful tools, there's another one

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<v Speaker 2>that came up a lot in this book.

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<v Speaker 1>Cooboal Strike Cobalt strikes.

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<v Speaker 2>It sounds like a favorite.

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<v Speaker 1>It is, It's a favorite among Red teamers. Cobalt Strike

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<v Speaker 1>is really about simulating those advanced persistent threats that you

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<v Speaker 1>hear about so much. It's built for those later stages

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<v Speaker 1>of an engagement, and it uses what's called a team

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<v Speaker 1>server as a central hub for controlling those compromise systems.

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<v Speaker 2>So like a command center for the Red Team. Sounds

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<v Speaker 2>like Cobalt Strike is designed to really mimic what those

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<v Speaker 2>really sophisticated attackers do.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, the real deal, those nation state actors, APT groups,

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<v Speaker 1>that kind of thing. So to really understand how it's used,

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<v Speaker 1>we need to talk about what's called the Cyber Kill

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<v Speaker 1>Chain the CKC. It's a framework that breaks down and

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<v Speaker 1>attack into stages. Okay, I'm intrigued. What are the stages?

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<v Speaker 2>Think of it like planning a heist, right, Okay, First

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<v Speaker 2>you need to gather information about your target, right, that's reconnaissance. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>Then you prepare your tools your weapons. That's weaponization makes sense.

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<v Speaker 2>Next comes figuring out how to deliver your attack. Right.

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<v Speaker 2>Then the exploitation phase. You actually break in right, right,

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<v Speaker 2>you know you're through the door.

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<v Speaker 1>Now, okay, So it's not just about getting in, it's.

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<v Speaker 2>About it's about what you do once you're in.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, So after you've exploited a vulnerability, you need to

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<v Speaker 2>install your tools and establish a way to maintain control.

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<v Speaker 1>Right.

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<v Speaker 2>That's installation and command and control. And finally you carry

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<v Speaker 2>out your objective, right, whether it's stealing data, disrupting operations,

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<v Speaker 2>whatever it might be.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's a whole operation, like a multi phase.

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<v Speaker 2>It is a campaign, it's not just a smash and grab,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, gotcha, And Cobalt Strike gives you the tools

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<v Speaker 2>to carry out each of these phases.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's like a comprehensive toolkit. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>It helps them simulate that full life cycle of a

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<v Speaker 2>really sophisticated attack from the very beginning to achieving those objectives.

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<v Speaker 1>Now, one technique that keeps popping up is the reverse shell,

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<v Speaker 1>and it sounds like a really clever way to get

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<v Speaker 1>around it is those pesky firewalls, yes, that block incoming connections.

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<v Speaker 2>So a reverse shell allows the attacker to gain control

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<v Speaker 2>of a system by having the target system initiate a

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<v Speaker 2>connection back to the attacker's machine.

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<v Speaker 1>So instead of the attacker trying to force their way in,

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<v Speaker 1>they're tricking the target into reaching out to them exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>It's kind of like a judo move. You're using their

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<v Speaker 2>own momentum against them.

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<v Speaker 1>Makes sense, and this.

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<v Speaker 2>Can be really helpful, especially when you have those firewalls

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<v Speaker 2>that are blocking incoming connections but they allow outgoing traffic.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a common configuration and reverse shells take advantage of that.

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<v Speaker 1>It sounds pretty sneaky. It is, it is, but I

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<v Speaker 1>imagine there are different ways to establish.

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<v Speaker 2>There areless way is to use a tool like netcat. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>but that creates an unencrypted connection, right, which can be

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<v Speaker 2>easily detected if somebody's looking for it. Makes sense, so

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<v Speaker 2>for stealth red teamers use encryption with tools like OpenSSL

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<v Speaker 2>and cat, socat, crypt cat, all sorts of tools out there.

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<v Speaker 1>Can I see that metasploid also has dedicated tayloads. It

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<v Speaker 1>does yeah for this, like reverse CRAP and reverse CPRC four,

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<v Speaker 1>I bet that RC four adds it does.

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<v Speaker 2>RC four is an encryption algorithm. It adds an extra

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<v Speaker 2>layer of encryption to make it even harder to detect.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's all about blending in. It is with that

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<v Speaker 1>normal network.

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<v Speaker 2>Traffic hiding in plane sight, right, that's the name of

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<v Speaker 2>the game.

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<v Speaker 1>And once a red team has that initial foothold, they

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<v Speaker 1>often need to move deeper into the network. And that's

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<v Speaker 1>where pivoting comes in.

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<v Speaker 2>Pivoting exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>Imagine pivoting is like it is using one compromise system

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<v Speaker 1>to hop to another like a stepping stone. Like a

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<v Speaker 1>stepping stone exactly, you.

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<v Speaker 2>Get a foothold on one machine and then you use

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<v Speaker 2>that to reach another one makes sense deeper into the network.

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<v Speaker 1>So the book covers a few it does pivoting techniques.

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<v Speaker 2>One is SSH tunneling, where you use SSH to access

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<v Speaker 2>hidden services on a compromise machine, you know, something like

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<v Speaker 2>V and C. You can tunnel that traffic over SSH.

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<v Speaker 2>And then there's interpreter port forwarding, which creates tunnels through

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<v Speaker 2>an interpreter session to reach other machines.

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<v Speaker 1>And then there's the level pivoting, multi level pivoting, which

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<v Speaker 1>is where it gets really fun. Yeah, that's where you

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<v Speaker 1>chain those pivots together, okay, to access multiple subnets. You're

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<v Speaker 1>expanding that attack surface. You're really going you going deep.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like exploring a maze. You know. Wow, it's amazing

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<v Speaker 1>how Red teams can they can navigate these complex networks.

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<v Speaker 2>They do. It's a skill. Yeah, it takes practice for sure, But.

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<v Speaker 1>I imagine managing all those compromise systems maintaining that access.

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<v Speaker 1>It can be pretty tricky.

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<v Speaker 2>It is. That's where that's where post exploitation frameworks come in.

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<v Speaker 2>Post exploitations frameworks, they're essential for maintaining that control and persistence.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, So one that stands out in this book is Empire.

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<v Speaker 1>Empire Empire.

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<v Speaker 2>So Empire gives Red teams a centralized platform to manage

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<v Speaker 2>all those compromise systems, execute commands and pivot deeper into

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<v Speaker 2>the network. It's like a remote control for all those

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<v Speaker 2>compromised devices.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like the puppet master. It is pulling the strings

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<v Speaker 1>behind the scenes.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, you got it. I'm curious how it works.

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<v Speaker 1>So the core concept and Empire is setting up what's

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<v Speaker 1>called a listener, similar to a handler in metasploitt. The

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<v Speaker 1>listener is just waiting for connections from those compromise systems,

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<v Speaker 1>which are called agents in Empire agents. So those compromises

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<v Speaker 1>they connect back to the Empire server, to the Empire server.

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<v Speaker 2>But how does that happen?

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<v Speaker 1>Through a process called staging. Okay, so Empire generates a

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<v Speaker 1>little piece of code called a stager that gets executed

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<v Speaker 1>on the target system, and that stager reaches out and

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<v Speaker 1>pulls down a larger agent which establishes that connection.

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<v Speaker 2>So it's like a covert channel.

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<v Speaker 1>It is a covert channel for communication.

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<v Speaker 2>And once that connection is made.

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<v Speaker 1>Then the fun begins. The Red team can really start digging.

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<v Speaker 2>In, can really dig in.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah. Empire has this huge library it does of post exploitation.

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<v Speaker 2>Modules, some massive library.

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<v Speaker 1>Categorized by function. So there are modules for executing code,

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<v Speaker 1>collecting data, stealing credentials, xfiltrating information, basically anything you can

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<v Speaker 1>think of. Ye, pretty much anything that a sophisticated attacker would.

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<v Speaker 2>Do, that a sophisticated attacker would want to do.

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<v Speaker 1>It is a toolbox.

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<v Speaker 2>For all those post exploitation activity post exploitation activities.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like you've gotten in, now what are you going

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<v Speaker 1>to do? Empire gives you the tools to do it.

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<v Speaker 2>And I see that it can target oh yeah, Windows, Linux,

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<v Speaker 2>even macOS.

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<v Speaker 1>It's incredibly versatile. Wow, you can use it in so

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<v Speaker 1>many different situations.

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<v Speaker 2>So it's really valuable for red teams that are operating

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<v Speaker 2>in all these different environments. No, imagine a red team

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<v Speaker 2>gets into an enterprise network. What would be their ultimate goal?

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<v Speaker 1>What do you think if they really want to cause

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<v Speaker 1>some chaos, wouldn't they go for the domain controller?

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<v Speaker 2>You're thinking like a red team or already? The domain

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<v Speaker 2>controller is the heart of the network. It's the keys

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<v Speaker 2>to the kingdom. If you can compromise the domain controller,

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<v Speaker 2>you basically control the whole domain. And the book actually

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<v Speaker 2>details how Empire can be used to target domain controllers, right,

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<v Speaker 2>I'm all yours. First, they need to gain higher privileges

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<v Speaker 2>on a compromised machine, so Empire has modules for that,

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<v Speaker 2>things like bypasswas vnlwright. Then they need to steal credentials.

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<v Speaker 2>Oftentimes they'll use a tool called mimicats to extract passwords

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<v Speaker 2>from memory, and that might include domain user credentials.

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<v Speaker 1>So they escalate privileges. Yeah, grab those credentials.

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<v Speaker 2>Then what then they use those stolen credentials to laterally

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<v Speaker 2>move to the domain controller itself. Once they're on the domain.

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<v Speaker 1>Controller, yeah, they're on the driver's seat, and I.

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<v Speaker 2>Read about this script called death Star. Death Star, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>that can actually automate. It can the whole process.

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<v Speaker 1>It can automate a lot of that.

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<v Speaker 2>Yet exploiting active directory to gain domain admin access.

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<v Speaker 1>It could do it in seconds. It's a really powerful tool.

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<v Speaker 1>It just shows you the power of automation.

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<v Speaker 2>So death Star is like the Red Teams.

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<v Speaker 1>He's kind of like they're step secret weapon. Yeah, okay,

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<v Speaker 1>it's a very effective tool.

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<v Speaker 2>We've talked a lot about Empire, but let's circle back

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<v Speaker 2>to Cobalt Strike. The book really emphasizes its usefulness in

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<v Speaker 2>those later stages.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a post exploitation powerhouse. Oh okay, it's designed for

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<v Speaker 1>those later stages of a Red Team engagement. So what

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<v Speaker 1>makes it so, what's fascinating about Cobalt Strike is that

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<v Speaker 1>it goes beyond just the initial exploitation. It gives you

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<v Speaker 1>a whole suite of tools.

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<v Speaker 2>For post exploitation activities.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's really a comprehensive platform. It is.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a platform for Red teaming.

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<v Speaker 1>Tell me more about those advanced capabilities.

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<v Speaker 2>So one of the things that excels at is payload generation.

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<v Speaker 2>It supports all sorts of attack vectors. You know, packages,

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<v Speaker 2>web drive buys, spear phishing.

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<v Speaker 1>Wow.

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<v Speaker 2>And once they're in, Cobalt Strike gives you all sorts

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<v Speaker 2>of post exploitation tools, you know, screen shot capture, keystroke logging,

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<v Speaker 2>process injection, file browsing, you name.

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<v Speaker 1>It sounds like a spy's dream toolkit.

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<v Speaker 2>It's pretty powerful stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>And we can't forget about pivoting. We can't forget pivoting.

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<v Speaker 2>Some kind of pivoting methods.

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<v Speaker 1>So Cobalt Strike gives you several different options. You can

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<v Speaker 1>set up a soocks server, you can create listeners that

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<v Speaker 1>tunnel traffic through compromise systems. You can even deploy VPNs

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<v Speaker 1>wow for covert communication.

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<v Speaker 2>It sounds like they thought of everything.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, they really did. I read about this aggressor script.

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<v Speaker 1>Aggressor script which lets you automate tasks and customize attacks.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a scripting language.

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<v Speaker 1>Within Cobalt Strike.

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<v Speaker 2>Built right into cobalt strikes.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so what can you tell me about that?

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<v Speaker 2>So aggressorscript is really powerful.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay.

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<v Speaker 2>You can define custom behaviors, automate complex sequences of actions. So,

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<v Speaker 2>for example, you could use it to automatically gather information

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<v Speaker 2>about a target network or launch a series of attacks

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<v Speaker 2>against specific systems, can get really creative with it.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, it's powerful stuff. It is regardless of what tools

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<v Speaker 1>are being used, command and control or C two.

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<v Speaker 2>C two, it's the heart of it.

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<v Speaker 1>All is crucial for any Red Team operation.

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<v Speaker 2>Could you read more? C two servers are those central

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<v Speaker 2>hubs for communicating with all those compromise systems. They allow

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<v Speaker 2>the Red Team to issue commands, receive data, maintain that

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<v Speaker 2>persistent access.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, and this is where things is where it gets

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<v Speaker 1>get really interesting because the book dives into some really

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<v Speaker 1>ingenious techniques for setting up and disguising those C two servers.

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<v Speaker 2>You have to be creative. You can't just use the

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<v Speaker 2>same old techniques.

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<v Speaker 1>So one that stood out to me was using cloud

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<v Speaker 1>based file sharing services like Dropbox. And one drives two.

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<v Speaker 2>Channels, so you're using drop Box red teaming.

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<v Speaker 1>It's all about blending in with legitimate traffic.

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<v Speaker 2>Okay, how does that work?

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<v Speaker 1>You can set up a listener in Empire that communicates

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<v Speaker 1>through Dropbox, so all that C two traffic just looks

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<v Speaker 1>like normal file uploads and downloads.

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<v Speaker 2>So you're hiding in plane site, you.

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<v Speaker 1>Are, You're hiding in plane sighte wow. And one drive

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<v Speaker 1>can be used in a similar way. But the book

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<v Speaker 1>also talks about C two covert channels, which take things

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<v Speaker 1>to a whole new level. What are covert channels?

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<v Speaker 2>So, covert channels are all about hiding the very existence

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<v Speaker 2>of communication. So it's not just encrypting the data. You're

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<v Speaker 2>using existing protocols like DNA, S, HTTP, ICMP, WebDAV to

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<v Speaker 2>create hidden tunnels for your C two traffic.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like whispering secrets. It is in a crowded room,

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<v Speaker 1>but digitally nobody even knows.

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<v Speaker 2>Nobody even knows the conversation is happening.

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<v Speaker 1>Conversations happening. That's a great analogy.

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<v Speaker 2>I like that one.

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<v Speaker 1>But even with these techniques, yeah, C two servers can

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<v Speaker 1>still be detected, we can and blocked. Right. That's where

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<v Speaker 1>redirectors come. Indirectors, redirectors. Okay, I'm sensing another layer.

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<v Speaker 2>Another layer of obfuscation here, exactly. So a redirector acts

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<v Speaker 2>as a proxy, Okay, it forwards traffic to the actual

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<v Speaker 2>C two server, right, but it masks its true IP address.

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<v Speaker 1>So if the blue team exactly detects the redirector, they're

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<v Speaker 1>not actually.

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<v Speaker 2>Getting getting to the real C two server, to the

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<v Speaker 2>C two server. Right, it's like a decoy, Okay, it

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<v Speaker 2>draws attention away from the real target.

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<v Speaker 1>So the book discusses different types of redirection it does.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, from simple forwarding using a tool like socat to

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<v Speaker 2>more sophisticated methods that mimic legitimate traffic. You can even

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<v Speaker 2>use web services like Apache wow, to make it look

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<v Speaker 2>like you're just communicating with a web server. And then

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<v Speaker 2>there's this technique, and then there's domain funding domain fronting,

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<v Speaker 2>which sounds really advanced.

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<v Speaker 1>It's pretty advanced, okay, So what is that Domain fronting

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<v Speaker 1>leverages legitimate services like Google app Engine or cloud flare

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<v Speaker 1>to mask that C two traffic as communication with trusted domains.

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<v Speaker 2>So it's like hiding it is a secret message and

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<v Speaker 2>an official envelope exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>Nobody's going to question that.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, it looks completely legitimate. Wow, Okay, not a clever technique. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>rub out my head around that one a little bit more, definitely.

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<v Speaker 2>But let's talk about the end game, all right, Data

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<v Speaker 2>ex filtration, Data ex filtration, getting the goods out right,

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<v Speaker 2>that's the whole point.

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<v Speaker 1>Right yea, So how do red teams actually get that

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<v Speaker 1>data out?

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<v Speaker 2>So there are lots of different methods, each with its

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<v Speaker 2>pros and cons. You know, basic tools like netcat and

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<v Speaker 2>open SSL they lack stealth. Okay, PowerShell can be used

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<v Speaker 2>to exfiltrate data over HTTP. But you got to be

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<v Speaker 2>careful with your scripting. Okay, make sure you're not tripping

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<v Speaker 2>any alarms.

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<v Speaker 1>Right, you know.

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<v Speaker 2>The book also mentions steganography, Yes, steganogaway, which is basically

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<v Speaker 2>hiding data within seemingly innocent files. Right, It's like hiding

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<v Speaker 2>a message in plain sight.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, so you could hide sensitive information.

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<v Speaker 2>You could hide it in a recipe, wow, in a

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<v Speaker 2>news article. Anything you can think of.

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<v Speaker 1>That's wild.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a clever technique, okay. And then there's DNS tunneling

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<v Speaker 2>DNS tunneling, which uses DNS requests. DNS tunneling uses DNS

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<v Speaker 2>requests to kind of sneak data out of the network.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay.

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<v Speaker 2>The book mentions a tool called dn.

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<v Speaker 1>Steel dn steel for this purpose.

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<v Speaker 2>And of course Empire has its own yeah, modules for

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<v Speaker 2>data exfiltration.

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<v Speaker 1>Absolutely, Empire has modules for all sorts of things.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, So Empire's modules offer a lot of flexibility control

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<v Speaker 2>over the exfiltration process.

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<v Speaker 1>You got it.

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<v Speaker 2>But you know, the goal of red teaming isn't just

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<v Speaker 2>to steal data.

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<v Speaker 1>It's not just about getting in and grabbing stuff. It's

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<v Speaker 1>about maintaining that access, demonstrating the potential impact of a

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<v Speaker 1>real attack which brings us to which it brings.

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<v Speaker 2>Us to persistence.

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<v Speaker 1>Persistence.

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<v Speaker 2>Yet, that art of staying under the radar and keeping

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<v Speaker 2>that access even if the initial entry points are closed.

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<v Speaker 1>You get a persistence is all about making.

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<v Speaker 2>Sure that the red team can maintain access. Right those

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00:21:27.359 --> 00:21:29.799
<v Speaker 2>back doors, Yeah, those back door those implants.

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<v Speaker 1>Yah, those implants they leave behind.

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<v Speaker 2>You've got to have a way to get back in.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm eager to learn about the specifics.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah. So one common method is manipulating scheduled tasks. Okay,

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00:21:40.680 --> 00:21:42.599
<v Speaker 2>you know these are tasks that are set to run

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<v Speaker 2>automatically at certain times. Attackers can hijack these to launch

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00:21:47.880 --> 00:21:52.119
<v Speaker 2>their own malicious payloads. So they're blending in hiding their

401
00:21:52.279 --> 00:21:57.200
<v Speaker 2>activity within legitimate system processes exactly.

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00:21:57.279 --> 00:22:00.480
<v Speaker 1>They're making it look like their activity is just normal

403
00:22:00.519 --> 00:22:01.400
<v Speaker 1>system activity.

404
00:22:01.519 --> 00:22:02.599
<v Speaker 2>Pretty clever, it is.

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00:22:02.680 --> 00:22:05.359
<v Speaker 1>It's a very effective technique. So they might tweak they

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00:22:05.440 --> 00:22:08.839
<v Speaker 1>might tweak an existing schedule task, or they might create

407
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<v Speaker 1>a new one that looks completely harmless but secretly it's

408
00:22:12.920 --> 00:22:14.400
<v Speaker 1>executing their code in the background.

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00:22:14.720 --> 00:22:17.640
<v Speaker 2>Okay, and I bet registry keys are another prime target.

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00:22:17.759 --> 00:22:19.920
<v Speaker 1>Oh yeah, Registry keys are a gold mine for.

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00:22:19.920 --> 00:22:23.400
<v Speaker 2>Persistence, for persistence. Yeah, the registry is like the control

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<v Speaker 2>center for Windows. Attackers can modify keys that determine which

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00:22:27.920 --> 00:22:31.480
<v Speaker 2>programs launch on startup or during certain.

414
00:22:31.200 --> 00:22:34.319
<v Speaker 1>Events, so they could ensure their payload runs every time

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00:22:34.359 --> 00:22:35.160
<v Speaker 1>the computer.

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00:22:34.839 --> 00:22:37.039
<v Speaker 2>Starts, every time the computer starts. You got it.

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00:22:37.279 --> 00:22:38.680
<v Speaker 1>And I imagine they use.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh, they use all sorts of obfuscation techniques, obfuscation and

419
00:22:42.319 --> 00:22:44.119
<v Speaker 2>anti forensic technique to.

420
00:22:44.119 --> 00:22:46.200
<v Speaker 1>Make those modifications harder to spot.

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<v Speaker 2>To make it as difficult as possible for the blue

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00:22:48.880 --> 00:22:49.880
<v Speaker 2>team to find them.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like trying to find it is a needle in

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00:22:52.319 --> 00:22:53.319
<v Speaker 1>a haystack, exactly.

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00:22:53.359 --> 00:22:57.559
<v Speaker 2>It's a very apt analogy. And then they're rogue services.

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00:22:57.680 --> 00:22:58.960
<v Speaker 1>Rogue services, yeah.

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00:22:58.759 --> 00:23:02.880
<v Speaker 2>Are those essentially make services disguised.

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00:23:02.279 --> 00:23:07.839
<v Speaker 1>As disguised as legitimate system processes. Yeah, yep. Attackers can

429
00:23:07.920 --> 00:23:12.880
<v Speaker 1>create services that run in the background and execute their code.

430
00:23:13.119 --> 00:23:17.799
<v Speaker 1>They'll often use names that mimic legitimate services.

431
00:23:17.680 --> 00:23:21.839
<v Speaker 2>To avoid to avoid raising suspicion. If you see a

432
00:23:21.920 --> 00:23:26.079
<v Speaker 2>service running that looks like a normal system service, Yeah,

433
00:23:26.559 --> 00:23:28.839
<v Speaker 2>you're not going to think twice about it. This is

434
00:23:28.839 --> 00:23:31.359
<v Speaker 2>getting into some deep technical.

435
00:23:31.039 --> 00:23:35.000
<v Speaker 1>Sep technical territory sounds incredibly difficult.

436
00:23:35.160 --> 00:23:39.440
<v Speaker 2>It is. It's not easy to root out these back doors.

437
00:23:39.519 --> 00:23:45.079
<v Speaker 2>It requires specialized knowledge and tools, and that's why one

438
00:23:45.119 --> 00:23:47.960
<v Speaker 2>of the key reasons why red teaming is so valuable.

439
00:23:48.000 --> 00:23:49.359
<v Speaker 1>Absolutely, it helps.

440
00:23:49.279 --> 00:23:52.920
<v Speaker 2>Organizations understand these sophisticated.

441
00:23:52.119 --> 00:23:56.039
<v Speaker 1>Tactics that real world exposure they need and develop to

442
00:23:56.200 --> 00:23:58.640
<v Speaker 1>develop those countermeasures countermeasures.

443
00:23:58.640 --> 00:24:02.000
<v Speaker 2>So it's like this never it is game of cat.

444
00:24:01.799 --> 00:24:05.880
<v Speaker 1>And mouse, Cat and mouse. Yeah, the cybersecurity landscape.

445
00:24:05.640 --> 00:24:08.519
<v Speaker 2>Attackers is constantly evolving fenders.

446
00:24:08.720 --> 00:24:12.960
<v Speaker 1>Attackers are always coming up with new methods, and defenders

447
00:24:13.240 --> 00:24:17.759
<v Speaker 1>have to adapt and stay one step ahead. So given

448
00:24:17.839 --> 00:24:21.400
<v Speaker 1>all this, what can organizations actually do?

449
00:24:21.799 --> 00:24:23.599
<v Speaker 2>That's the million dollar question.

450
00:24:23.440 --> 00:24:25.759
<v Speaker 1>To protect themselves from these.

451
00:24:25.839 --> 00:24:29.519
<v Speaker 2>They can't just rely threat on traditional security measures anymore.

452
00:24:29.920 --> 00:24:34.480
<v Speaker 2>You firewalls, anti virus software, those are important, but they're

453
00:24:34.519 --> 00:24:37.720
<v Speaker 2>not enough. They're enough, not in today's threat landscape.

454
00:24:37.799 --> 00:24:39.319
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so what else can they do?

455
00:24:39.480 --> 00:24:43.240
<v Speaker 2>So they need a multi layered approach that combines prevention

456
00:24:44.200 --> 00:24:48.880
<v Speaker 2>with proactive threat hunting and incident response capabilities.

457
00:24:49.119 --> 00:24:50.599
<v Speaker 1>So it's not just about.

458
00:24:50.559 --> 00:24:52.240
<v Speaker 2>It's not just about building walls.

459
00:24:52.279 --> 00:24:52.960
<v Speaker 1>Building walls.

460
00:24:52.960 --> 00:24:57.000
<v Speaker 2>It's about having eyes on the inside right actively looking

461
00:24:57.039 --> 00:24:59.799
<v Speaker 2>for those subtle signs of an attack.

462
00:25:00.039 --> 00:25:02.359
<v Speaker 1>So you got to operate under the assumption. You have

463
00:25:02.480 --> 00:25:05.720
<v Speaker 1>to that breaches are inevitable, breaches are going to happen,

464
00:25:05.759 --> 00:25:08.519
<v Speaker 1>and focus on minimizing the impact exactly.

465
00:25:08.599 --> 00:25:12.359
<v Speaker 2>You've got to be able to detect them quickly, respond effectively,

466
00:25:12.880 --> 00:25:15.640
<v Speaker 2>contain the damage, and recover efficiently.

467
00:25:15.960 --> 00:25:17.119
<v Speaker 1>And that's where and.

468
00:25:17.039 --> 00:25:18.599
<v Speaker 2>That's where red teaming really shines.

469
00:25:18.680 --> 00:25:22.839
<v Speaker 1>Red teaming comes in. Yet by simulating those real world attacks,

470
00:25:22.880 --> 00:25:30.160
<v Speaker 1>simulating organizations can thoroughly test their defenses, pinpoint those weaknesses,

471
00:25:30.200 --> 00:25:33.240
<v Speaker 1>and improve their overall security posture.

472
00:25:34.240 --> 00:25:36.240
<v Speaker 2>So it's like a fire drill. Like a fire drill,

473
00:25:36.519 --> 00:25:38.119
<v Speaker 2>but for your cybersecurity.

474
00:25:38.359 --> 00:25:42.359
<v Speaker 1>This deep dive has really given me a much deeper appreciation.

475
00:25:42.519 --> 00:25:43.799
<v Speaker 2>Good. I'm glad to hear that for.

476
00:25:43.759 --> 00:25:45.240
<v Speaker 1>The complexity of cybersecurity.

477
00:25:45.279 --> 00:25:47.759
<v Speaker 2>It is complex, Yeah, there's no doubt about that.

478
00:25:47.920 --> 00:25:50.759
<v Speaker 1>And the challenges that organizations face.

479
00:25:50.880 --> 00:25:51.920
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's a tough job.

480
00:25:51.960 --> 00:25:54.599
<v Speaker 1>But I gotta admit, yeah, it's a little overwhelming.

481
00:25:54.839 --> 00:25:55.599
<v Speaker 2>It can be.

482
00:25:55.880 --> 00:25:58.319
<v Speaker 1>To think about the sheer scale, It is a lot

483
00:25:58.359 --> 00:26:00.160
<v Speaker 1>to take in and sophistication a.

484
00:26:00.240 --> 00:26:03.240
<v Speaker 2>Threat landscape is constantly evolving.

485
00:26:02.920 --> 00:26:03.720
<v Speaker 1>Of these attacks.

486
00:26:03.880 --> 00:26:06.279
<v Speaker 2>New threats are emerging all the time, so it's a

487
00:26:06.319 --> 00:26:08.720
<v Speaker 2>lot to keep up with, it is, But the key

488
00:26:08.759 --> 00:26:13.039
<v Speaker 2>takeaway here is that security is an ongoing journey. It's

489
00:26:13.039 --> 00:26:15.400
<v Speaker 2>not a destination. You never really arrive.

490
00:26:17.240 --> 00:26:19.160
<v Speaker 1>Just check a box and you're done, set it and

491
00:26:19.200 --> 00:26:19.680
<v Speaker 1>forget it.

492
00:26:19.920 --> 00:26:21.759
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, you can't do that with security.

493
00:26:21.839 --> 00:26:24.839
<v Speaker 1>It's about continuously improvement and resilience.

494
00:26:24.880 --> 00:26:27.960
<v Speaker 2>Constant improvement, yeah, okay. And resilience being able to bounce

495
00:26:28.039 --> 00:26:31.079
<v Speaker 2>back when those attacks inevitably happen.

496
00:26:30.880 --> 00:26:34.000
<v Speaker 1>Because they will they will. So by staying informed about

497
00:26:34.000 --> 00:26:36.440
<v Speaker 1>those emerging threats yep, gott to stay up to date,

498
00:26:36.599 --> 00:26:41.119
<v Speaker 1>adopting those best practices, and regularly testing those defenses.

499
00:26:41.279 --> 00:26:46.359
<v Speaker 2>Testing is crucial. Organizations can organizations can really reduce their.

500
00:26:46.319 --> 00:26:48.359
<v Speaker 1>Risk, significantly reduce their risk.

501
00:26:48.400 --> 00:26:53.519
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, you can't eliminate risk entirely, but you can manage it.

502
00:26:54.400 --> 00:26:57.480
<v Speaker 1>Okay. So shifting gears a bit, let's delve a little

503
00:26:57.559 --> 00:27:00.960
<v Speaker 1>deeper into and kobolts the world of cobalt strike.

504
00:27:01.119 --> 00:27:01.640
<v Speaker 2>Let's do it.

505
00:27:01.759 --> 00:27:04.960
<v Speaker 1>You mentioned earlier how versatile it is it is, especially

506
00:27:05.000 --> 00:27:06.079
<v Speaker 1>in those later stages.

507
00:27:06.200 --> 00:27:09.119
<v Speaker 2>It's a post exploitation powerhouse.

508
00:27:08.920 --> 00:27:11.759
<v Speaker 1>Of a Red Team engagement. So it's fascinating.

509
00:27:11.799 --> 00:27:15.599
<v Speaker 2>So it's fascinating about Cobalt Strike. Is it really enables

510
00:27:16.000 --> 00:27:21.640
<v Speaker 2>Red teamers to act like those stealthy advanced attackers, you know,

511
00:27:21.680 --> 00:27:24.039
<v Speaker 2>those apts, those nation state actors.

512
00:27:24.039 --> 00:27:25.039
<v Speaker 1>Oh, we hear so much about it.

513
00:27:25.119 --> 00:27:29.839
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's designed to mimic their tactics and help organizations

514
00:27:29.920 --> 00:27:33.279
<v Speaker 2>understand how those threats actually operate in the real world.

515
00:27:33.319 --> 00:27:35.960
<v Speaker 1>That makes sense. Yeah, so can you walk me through

516
00:27:36.359 --> 00:27:37.559
<v Speaker 1>sure some of the ways.

517
00:27:37.759 --> 00:27:41.400
<v Speaker 2>So one of the key aspects of cobolt strike is

518
00:27:41.440 --> 00:27:46.559
<v Speaker 2>its beaconing behavioral beconing. So instead of constantly communicating with

519
00:27:46.680 --> 00:27:50.960
<v Speaker 2>the C two server, beacons only check in periodically. So

520
00:27:51.039 --> 00:27:54.799
<v Speaker 2>it's like it's like a spy sending coded messages, coded

521
00:27:54.799 --> 00:27:58.359
<v Speaker 2>messages at irregular intervals. Okay, So that low and slow approach,

522
00:27:58.640 --> 00:28:02.000
<v Speaker 2>right helps Cobalt Strike blend in with all the other

523
00:28:02.319 --> 00:28:03.240
<v Speaker 2>network activity.

524
00:28:03.400 --> 00:28:06.000
<v Speaker 1>Makes it harder to detect, much harder to detect. And

525
00:28:06.039 --> 00:28:09.039
<v Speaker 1>what about those post exploitation capabilities. Oh, yeah, that we

526
00:28:09.079 --> 00:28:09.880
<v Speaker 1>talked about earlier.

527
00:28:09.920 --> 00:28:12.079
<v Speaker 2>Cobalt Strike excels in that area as well.

528
00:28:12.200 --> 00:28:13.039
<v Speaker 1>Okay, it gives you.

529
00:28:13.000 --> 00:28:17.640
<v Speaker 2>A wide array of tools for lateral movement, privileged escalation,

530
00:28:18.279 --> 00:28:21.519
<v Speaker 2>credential theft, data expiltration.

531
00:28:21.039 --> 00:28:21.640
<v Speaker 1>You name it.

532
00:28:21.640 --> 00:28:24.279
<v Speaker 2>It's like it's like a Swiss army knife, a Swiss

533
00:28:24.400 --> 00:28:26.440
<v Speaker 2>army knife for post exploitation.

534
00:28:26.000 --> 00:28:29.759
<v Speaker 1>Or post exploitation activities. Yeah, it sounds incredibly powerful.

535
00:28:29.839 --> 00:28:31.319
<v Speaker 2>It is. It's very powerful stuff.

536
00:28:31.359 --> 00:28:35.559
<v Speaker 1>I remember reading about mimicats, which can extract passwords from memory.

537
00:28:35.880 --> 00:28:38.319
<v Speaker 2>Mimicats is a favorite among attackers.

538
00:28:38.400 --> 00:28:40.240
<v Speaker 1>Is that something that Cobalt Strike utilizes.

539
00:28:40.359 --> 00:28:46.519
<v Speaker 2>Oh yeah, Cobalt Strike integrates with mimicats seamlessly. Red teamers

540
00:28:46.559 --> 00:28:50.599
<v Speaker 2>can use mimic cats okay, to gather credentials a move

541
00:28:50.839 --> 00:28:55.079
<v Speaker 2>laterally within a network. Wow, just like real attackers would.

542
00:28:55.359 --> 00:28:57.319
<v Speaker 1>It's fascinating, but also a little scary.

543
00:28:57.440 --> 00:28:58.759
<v Speaker 2>It is a little bit scary.

544
00:28:58.559 --> 00:29:01.480
<v Speaker 1>Think about how effect if these tools can be in

545
00:29:01.519 --> 00:29:02.240
<v Speaker 1>the wrong hands.

546
00:29:02.279 --> 00:29:03.440
<v Speaker 2>These tools can be.

547
00:29:03.359 --> 00:29:05.319
<v Speaker 1>Very dangerous in the wrong hands.

548
00:29:06.160 --> 00:29:10.559
<v Speaker 2>That's why responsible red teaming is so important. It's about

549
00:29:10.680 --> 00:29:15.839
<v Speaker 2>using these powerful tools ethically responsibly to help organizations improve

550
00:29:15.839 --> 00:29:17.559
<v Speaker 2>their security.

551
00:29:17.759 --> 00:29:21.559
<v Speaker 1>Speaking of responsible red teaming, yeah, I'm curious about the

552
00:29:22.039 --> 00:29:24.839
<v Speaker 1>ethical consideration, absolutely so.

553
00:29:24.920 --> 00:29:29.880
<v Speaker 2>Ethical red teaming requires transparency, a shared understanding between the

554
00:29:29.920 --> 00:29:34.039
<v Speaker 2>red team and the organization that's being assessed. So it's

555
00:29:34.079 --> 00:29:36.880
<v Speaker 2>like a a partnership, partnership where both sides.

556
00:29:36.599 --> 00:29:38.680
<v Speaker 1>Are both sides are working together, working.

557
00:29:38.400 --> 00:29:42.200
<v Speaker 2>Together to achieve that common goal of improving security.

558
00:29:42.240 --> 00:29:47.519
<v Speaker 1>Improving security exactly, clear communication, well defined scope, a strong

559
00:29:47.599 --> 00:29:51.839
<v Speaker 1>focus on ethical considerations. Okay, these are all essential for

560
00:29:51.920 --> 00:29:54.160
<v Speaker 1>those for successful.

561
00:29:53.559 --> 00:29:57.160
<v Speaker 2>Successful red team engagement. Red team engagements, you got it now,

562
00:29:57.200 --> 00:30:00.720
<v Speaker 2>Before we move on, I want to circle back, okay

563
00:30:00.960 --> 00:30:02.440
<v Speaker 2>to data X filtrate right, and.

564
00:30:02.440 --> 00:30:06.000
<v Speaker 1>Discuss some techniques earlier, But I'm curious to learn more

565
00:30:06.039 --> 00:30:09.000
<v Speaker 1>about how red teams choose.

566
00:30:09.160 --> 00:30:13.079
<v Speaker 2>So choosing the right exfiltration method depends on a lot

567
00:30:13.119 --> 00:30:15.839
<v Speaker 2>of different factors. You know, how much data are you

568
00:30:15.839 --> 00:30:19.359
<v Speaker 2>trying to get out, how sensitive is that data, what's

569
00:30:19.400 --> 00:30:20.400
<v Speaker 2>the network environment?

570
00:30:20.640 --> 00:30:20.720
<v Speaker 1>Like?

571
00:30:21.279 --> 00:30:24.240
<v Speaker 2>What level of detection are you trying to avoid? So

572
00:30:24.279 --> 00:30:26.960
<v Speaker 2>it's really it's a strategic decision.

573
00:30:26.680 --> 00:30:28.960
<v Speaker 1>A strategic decision based on.

574
00:30:29.200 --> 00:30:33.200
<v Speaker 2>Based on the specific goals and constraints of that engagement,

575
00:30:33.279 --> 00:30:36.680
<v Speaker 2>the engagement exactly. So for example, if they need to exfiltrate,

576
00:30:36.799 --> 00:30:37.400
<v Speaker 2>if you need.

577
00:30:37.319 --> 00:30:39.279
<v Speaker 1>To get a lot of data.

578
00:30:38.920 --> 00:30:41.880
<v Speaker 2>Out, a large amount of data quickly, Yeah, and you

579
00:30:41.920 --> 00:30:43.920
<v Speaker 2>need to do it quickly, I might use a method like.

580
00:30:44.240 --> 00:30:47.599
<v Speaker 1>You might use something like FTP.

581
00:30:46.640 --> 00:30:49.400
<v Speaker 2>PAYP, but if stealth is paramount.

582
00:30:48.960 --> 00:30:52.039
<v Speaker 1>But if you need to be really sneaky, then you

583
00:30:52.119 --> 00:30:57.519
<v Speaker 1>might choose something more covert, like DNS tunneling or staganography.

584
00:30:57.680 --> 00:31:00.759
<v Speaker 2>So it's really is a balancing act, a balancing app

585
00:31:00.799 --> 00:31:04.720
<v Speaker 2>between speed, between speed stell and how much data you

586
00:31:04.720 --> 00:31:07.960
<v Speaker 2>need to extract and a skilled Red team, a skilled

587
00:31:08.000 --> 00:31:12.640
<v Speaker 2>Red team will carefully weigh all these factors to choose

588
00:31:12.720 --> 00:31:17.680
<v Speaker 2>the most effective and discrete exiltration method. Refiltration method. You

589
00:31:17.759 --> 00:31:18.119
<v Speaker 2>got it?

590
00:31:18.160 --> 00:31:21.480
<v Speaker 1>Well, this has been It has been a whirlwind.

591
00:31:21.000 --> 00:31:23.160
<v Speaker 2>Tour, a whirlwind tour of.

592
00:31:23.200 --> 00:31:25.160
<v Speaker 1>Red Team tactics and technique.

593
00:31:25.200 --> 00:31:27.200
<v Speaker 2>Tactics and techniques. Yeah, it's amazing.

594
00:31:28.039 --> 00:31:31.400
<v Speaker 1>We've covered a lot, how much we've covered from initial accents.

595
00:31:31.160 --> 00:31:35.559
<v Speaker 2>Persistence to persistence, mann and control, man and control, data exfiltration,

596
00:31:35.720 --> 00:31:39.200
<v Speaker 2>data exciltration. We've hit all the major points, but I.

597
00:31:39.160 --> 00:31:41.000
<v Speaker 1>Feel like we've only just scratched the surface.

598
00:31:41.039 --> 00:31:42.799
<v Speaker 2>We've just scratched the surface of this.

599
00:31:43.319 --> 00:31:44.920
<v Speaker 1>There's so much more to learn.

600
00:31:45.079 --> 00:31:46.160
<v Speaker 2>Fascinating field.

601
00:31:46.279 --> 00:31:48.000
<v Speaker 1>It's a fascinating field for sure.

602
00:31:48.359 --> 00:31:52.759
<v Speaker 2>So as we wrap up this deep dive, what's the one.

603
00:31:52.599 --> 00:31:55.279
<v Speaker 1>The one key takeaway? Key takeaway?

604
00:31:55.319 --> 00:31:57.640
<v Speaker 2>You want our listener to walk away.

605
00:31:57.400 --> 00:31:59.920
<v Speaker 1>With our listener to walk away with Remember that site.

606
00:32:00.000 --> 00:32:04.640
<v Speaker 2>Our security is an ongoing process. Okay, there's no finish line, right,

607
00:32:04.839 --> 00:32:11.160
<v Speaker 2>It's about continuously learning, adapting, and strengthening those defenses.

608
00:32:11.599 --> 00:32:14.839
<v Speaker 1>So for our listener, yeah, if you were taffed with,

609
00:32:15.000 --> 00:32:16.240
<v Speaker 1>if you were in charge of.

610
00:32:16.759 --> 00:32:20.599
<v Speaker 2>Defending your organization, defending your organizations from these types of attacks,

611
00:32:20.599 --> 00:32:22.519
<v Speaker 2>from these Red Team attacks.

612
00:32:22.359 --> 00:32:27.359
<v Speaker 1>What would be priority after learning about based on what

613
00:32:27.359 --> 00:32:29.559
<v Speaker 1>you've learned today, all these Red Team tactics.

614
00:32:29.640 --> 00:32:32.799
<v Speaker 2>That's a great question to ponder as we conclude our

615
00:32:32.799 --> 00:32:33.279
<v Speaker 2>deep dive.

616
00:32:33.480 --> 00:32:36.640
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, that's something you can think about. All right, let's uh,

617
00:32:36.880 --> 00:32:40.720
<v Speaker 1>let's jump back into those persistence techniques. Okay, we were

618
00:32:40.759 --> 00:32:45.680
<v Speaker 1>talking about manipulating scheduled tasks right right. Remember those are

619
00:32:45.720 --> 00:32:50.039
<v Speaker 1>tasks that are set to run automatically and attackers can

620
00:32:50.119 --> 00:32:54.279
<v Speaker 1>kind of hijack them to launch their malicious code.

621
00:32:54.440 --> 00:32:56.400
<v Speaker 2>So they're building in and blending in yeah, with.

622
00:32:56.400 --> 00:32:58.880
<v Speaker 1>Those normal system process.

623
00:32:58.599 --> 00:33:01.359
<v Speaker 2>With normal system activity to avoid detection.

624
00:33:01.640 --> 00:33:04.079
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, So it's all about being stealthy.

625
00:33:03.640 --> 00:33:05.039
<v Speaker 2>It is. It's all about being stealthy.

626
00:33:05.119 --> 00:33:06.759
<v Speaker 1>And we also talked about registry keys.

627
00:33:06.920 --> 00:33:09.920
<v Speaker 2>Oh yeah, register keys are a gold mine.

628
00:33:10.200 --> 00:33:13.880
<v Speaker 1>Another area that's ripe for exploitation. Absolutely, the registry is

629
00:33:13.920 --> 00:33:18.319
<v Speaker 1>like the central nervous system of Windows. Attackers can modify

630
00:33:18.359 --> 00:33:22.599
<v Speaker 1>those keys that determine what programs run on startup or

631
00:33:22.720 --> 00:33:23.960
<v Speaker 1>during specific.

632
00:33:23.480 --> 00:33:28.079
<v Speaker 2>Events, so they could ensure they could that their malicious

633
00:33:28.160 --> 00:33:29.240
<v Speaker 2>code runs.

634
00:33:29.319 --> 00:33:31.960
<v Speaker 1>They could make sure that it runs every time the computer.

635
00:33:31.640 --> 00:33:33.960
<v Speaker 2>Boots up, every time the computer starts up. You got it,

636
00:33:34.279 --> 00:33:36.279
<v Speaker 2>And I imagine, oh yeah. They use all sorts of

637
00:33:36.519 --> 00:33:38.240
<v Speaker 2>use occuscation techniques.

638
00:33:37.880 --> 00:33:40.480
<v Speaker 1>Obfuscation techniques, anti forensic technique to.

639
00:33:40.480 --> 00:33:42.720
<v Speaker 2>Make those modifications harder to spot, to.

640
00:33:42.680 --> 00:33:45.039
<v Speaker 1>Make it as difficult as possible for the blue team

641
00:33:45.160 --> 00:33:46.000
<v Speaker 1>to find them.

642
00:33:46.200 --> 00:33:47.519
<v Speaker 2>It's like trying to find a needle.

643
00:33:47.759 --> 00:33:51.720
<v Speaker 1>It is. It's a very apt analogy in a haystack. Yeah,

644
00:33:51.799 --> 00:33:53.599
<v Speaker 1>and then there are rogue services.

645
00:33:53.720 --> 00:33:54.960
<v Speaker 2>Rogue services, right.

646
00:33:54.839 --> 00:33:57.000
<v Speaker 1>Are those basically fake services.

647
00:33:56.599 --> 00:34:02.400
<v Speaker 2>Disguised disguis does legitimate system processes himan ones. Attackers can

648
00:34:02.440 --> 00:34:07.359
<v Speaker 2>create services that run in the background and execute their code,

649
00:34:07.960 --> 00:34:12.239
<v Speaker 2>and they'll often use names that mimic legitimate services right

650
00:34:12.280 --> 00:34:15.639
<v Speaker 2>to avoid suspicion, To avoid raising suspicion. If you see

651
00:34:15.639 --> 00:34:18.320
<v Speaker 2>a service running right, if it looks like a like.

652
00:34:18.320 --> 00:34:20.920
<v Speaker 1>A normal system, you're not going to think twice or

653
00:34:21.159 --> 00:34:24.639
<v Speaker 1>think twice about it. So this is getting into deep

654
00:34:25.000 --> 00:34:29.159
<v Speaker 1>it's deep technical, deep technical territory. Yeah, and it sounds

655
00:34:29.199 --> 00:34:33.400
<v Speaker 1>incredibly difficult. It's not easy to root out these back doors.

656
00:34:33.519 --> 00:34:37.440
<v Speaker 2>It requires specialized knowledge and tools. And that's why, and

657
00:34:37.480 --> 00:34:39.639
<v Speaker 2>that's one of the big reasons why red teaming is

658
00:34:39.639 --> 00:34:40.440
<v Speaker 2>so valuable.

659
00:34:40.679 --> 00:34:42.119
<v Speaker 1>Red teaming is so valuable.

660
00:34:42.199 --> 00:34:43.639
<v Speaker 2>It gives organizations.

661
00:34:43.760 --> 00:34:46.199
<v Speaker 1>It helps organizations understand.

662
00:34:45.719 --> 00:34:49.679
<v Speaker 2>That real world exposure, the sophisticated tactics that they need

663
00:34:49.719 --> 00:34:50.679
<v Speaker 2>to develop those.

664
00:34:50.519 --> 00:34:52.639
<v Speaker 1>Countermeasures countermeasures against them.

665
00:34:52.760 --> 00:34:53.440
<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

666
00:34:53.519 --> 00:34:56.320
<v Speaker 1>So it's like this never ending is it's a.

667
00:34:56.199 --> 00:34:59.639
<v Speaker 2>Cat and mouse give of cat mouse. The cybersecurity landscape

668
00:34:59.679 --> 00:35:00.880
<v Speaker 2>is cond instantly.

669
00:35:00.480 --> 00:35:02.840
<v Speaker 1>Evolving between attackers and defenders.

670
00:35:02.920 --> 00:35:05.480
<v Speaker 2>Attackers are always coming up with new methods, right, and

671
00:35:05.599 --> 00:35:08.280
<v Speaker 2>defenders have to adapt and stay one step ahead.

672
00:35:08.360 --> 00:35:11.679
<v Speaker 1>So given all this, given all this, yeah, what can

673
00:35:11.800 --> 00:35:13.280
<v Speaker 1>organizations actually do?

674
00:35:13.480 --> 00:35:15.199
<v Speaker 2>That's the million dollar questions.

675
00:35:14.920 --> 00:35:18.039
<v Speaker 1>To protect themselves? Yeah, from these advanced threats.

676
00:35:18.480 --> 00:35:22.960
<v Speaker 2>Organizations can't rely on those traditional security measures anymore. Okay,

677
00:35:23.079 --> 00:35:26.880
<v Speaker 2>you know your firewalls and antivirus software. Those are important, right,

678
00:35:27.199 --> 00:35:29.800
<v Speaker 2>but they're not enough. They're not enough these days, not

679
00:35:29.840 --> 00:35:31.320
<v Speaker 2>in today's threat landscape.

680
00:35:31.360 --> 00:35:32.559
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so what else can they do?

681
00:35:32.800 --> 00:35:36.760
<v Speaker 2>They need a multi layered approach. Okay, that combines prevention

682
00:35:37.400 --> 00:35:40.800
<v Speaker 2>with proactive threat hunting and incident response capabilities.

683
00:35:41.000 --> 00:35:43.360
<v Speaker 1>So it's not just about it's not just about building

684
00:35:43.480 --> 00:35:44.679
<v Speaker 1>walls building walls.

685
00:35:44.719 --> 00:35:48.800
<v Speaker 2>It's about having eyes on the inside rights actively looking

686
00:35:48.840 --> 00:35:50.760
<v Speaker 2>for those subtle signs of an attack.

687
00:35:51.039 --> 00:35:53.320
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, you've got to operate under the assumption. You have

688
00:35:53.360 --> 00:35:56.119
<v Speaker 1>to that breaches are inevitable, breaches are going to happen, right,

689
00:35:56.320 --> 00:35:59.320
<v Speaker 1>and focus on minimizing the impactly those breaches.

690
00:35:59.360 --> 00:36:03.079
<v Speaker 2>You got to be able to attect them quickly, respond effectively,

691
00:36:03.639 --> 00:36:08.239
<v Speaker 2>contain the damage, and recover efficiently. And that's where and

692
00:36:08.239 --> 00:36:09.800
<v Speaker 2>that's where red teaming comes in.

693
00:36:10.079 --> 00:36:14.559
<v Speaker 1>Red teaming really shines. Yeah, right, by simulating those real

694
00:36:14.599 --> 00:36:15.400
<v Speaker 1>world attacks.

695
00:36:15.480 --> 00:36:21.320
<v Speaker 2>By simulating those real world attacks, organizations can organizations can really.

696
00:36:21.119 --> 00:36:22.480
<v Speaker 1>Thoroughly test their defense.

697
00:36:22.320 --> 00:36:26.840
<v Speaker 2>Thoroughly test their defenses, pinpoint those weakness and point those weaknesses,

698
00:36:26.840 --> 00:36:30.159
<v Speaker 2>and so it's can improve that overall security posture.

699
00:36:29.800 --> 00:36:33.599
<v Speaker 1>Improve their overall security posture. Yeah, it's like a fire drill.

700
00:36:33.800 --> 00:36:35.039
<v Speaker 2>It is. It's like a fire.

701
00:36:34.880 --> 00:36:36.639
<v Speaker 1>Drill, but for cybersecurity.

702
00:36:36.760 --> 00:36:38.400
<v Speaker 2>But for your cybersecurity.

703
00:36:38.480 --> 00:36:41.119
<v Speaker 1>And this deep dive has it has been given me

704
00:36:41.159 --> 00:36:41.880
<v Speaker 1>a deep.

705
00:36:41.679 --> 00:36:44.440
<v Speaker 2>Dive, such a deeper appreciation good.

706
00:36:44.480 --> 00:36:45.360
<v Speaker 1>I'm glad to hear that.

707
00:36:45.920 --> 00:36:47.800
<v Speaker 2>For the complexity of cybersecurity.

708
00:36:47.880 --> 00:36:49.840
<v Speaker 1>It is a complex field, there's no doubt about it

709
00:36:49.880 --> 00:36:50.599
<v Speaker 1>and the challenges.

710
00:36:50.679 --> 00:36:53.000
<v Speaker 2>It is a cross organization's.

711
00:36:52.360 --> 00:36:53.960
<v Speaker 1>Face evolving field as well.

712
00:36:54.119 --> 00:36:56.519
<v Speaker 2>But I have to admit it is it can be overwhelming,

713
00:36:56.639 --> 00:36:57.960
<v Speaker 2>a little overwhelming to think about.

714
00:36:58.280 --> 00:36:59.440
<v Speaker 1>It could be a lot to take.

715
00:36:59.320 --> 00:37:01.760
<v Speaker 2>In the sheer scale and sophistication.

716
00:37:02.199 --> 00:37:06.079
<v Speaker 1>The threat landscape is constantly evolving. New threats are emerging

717
00:37:06.119 --> 00:37:06.440
<v Speaker 1>all the.

718
00:37:06.400 --> 00:37:07.599
<v Speaker 2>Time of these attacks.

719
00:37:07.920 --> 00:37:09.599
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, so it is a lot to keep up with.

720
00:37:09.800 --> 00:37:14.119
<v Speaker 1>But the key takeaway here is that security is an

721
00:37:14.159 --> 00:37:18.079
<v Speaker 1>ongoing journey. Yeah, it's not a destination. You never really arrive.

722
00:37:18.400 --> 00:37:20.719
<v Speaker 2>It's not like you don't just set it and forget it,

723
00:37:20.800 --> 00:37:22.119
<v Speaker 2>check a box and you're done.

724
00:37:22.360 --> 00:37:26.199
<v Speaker 1>You can't do that with security. It's about continuous.

725
00:37:25.559 --> 00:37:29.280
<v Speaker 2>Improvement, continuous improvement and resilience.

726
00:37:28.719 --> 00:37:32.800
<v Speaker 1>And resilience being able to bounce back when those attacks

727
00:37:32.880 --> 00:37:35.880
<v Speaker 1>inevitably happen, right because they will, because they will. So

728
00:37:35.920 --> 00:37:38.440
<v Speaker 1>by staying informed about those emerging.

729
00:37:38.039 --> 00:37:39.920
<v Speaker 2>Threats, you got to stay up today.

730
00:37:39.760 --> 00:37:44.440
<v Speaker 1>Adopting those best practices, regularly testing those defenses.

731
00:37:44.599 --> 00:37:49.840
<v Speaker 2>Testing is crucial. Organizations can organizations can really reduce their.

732
00:37:49.760 --> 00:37:51.280
<v Speaker 1>Risks, really reduce their risks.

733
00:37:51.360 --> 00:37:54.960
<v Speaker 2>You can't eliminate it entirely, but you can manage it.

734
00:37:55.800 --> 00:37:56.159
<v Speaker 1>Well.

735
00:37:56.360 --> 00:37:58.280
<v Speaker 2>This has been It has been quite a journey, an

736
00:37:58.320 --> 00:37:59.360
<v Speaker 2>amazing journey, a.

737
00:37:59.320 --> 00:38:02.519
<v Speaker 1>Whirlwind tour of Red Team tactics and techniques.

738
00:38:02.639 --> 00:38:05.519
<v Speaker 2>Right, we've gone from those basic concepts.

739
00:38:05.000 --> 00:38:06.920
<v Speaker 1>We've hit all the major points to those.

740
00:38:06.760 --> 00:38:11.480
<v Speaker 2>Really sneaky persistence techniques. We dug deep and everything in

741
00:38:11.519 --> 00:38:13.400
<v Speaker 2>between we did. So we've really.

742
00:38:13.199 --> 00:38:16.679
<v Speaker 1>Hopefully this deep dive has sparked your curiosity.

743
00:38:16.159 --> 00:38:21.000
<v Speaker 2>Explored the depths about cybersecurity.

744
00:38:20.239 --> 00:38:22.280
<v Speaker 1>Of hands on Red Team tac days and.

745
00:38:22.360 --> 00:38:25.559
<v Speaker 2>A constant battle between attackers.

746
00:38:24.920 --> 00:38:27.440
<v Speaker 1>And a wealth of knowledge about Red teaming.

747
00:38:27.800 --> 00:38:29.199
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, there's always more to learn.

748
00:38:29.320 --> 00:38:31.880
<v Speaker 1>It certainly has for me. So as we wrap up

749
00:38:31.920 --> 00:38:34.559
<v Speaker 1>this final episode, all right, this deep dive.

750
00:38:34.480 --> 00:38:36.800
<v Speaker 2>The final episode of this deep dive.

751
00:38:36.920 --> 00:38:38.639
<v Speaker 1>What is the one key takeaway?

752
00:38:38.840 --> 00:38:41.320
<v Speaker 2>One key takeaway you want our listener, what do you

753
00:38:41.320 --> 00:38:44.920
<v Speaker 2>want them to to walk away with to remember remember

754
00:38:45.039 --> 00:38:48.480
<v Speaker 2>that cybersecurity is an ongoing process. Okay, there is no

755
00:38:48.559 --> 00:38:49.280
<v Speaker 2>finish line.

756
00:38:49.320 --> 00:38:52.119
<v Speaker 1>You never really arrived, right, It's about continuous learning.

757
00:38:52.159 --> 00:38:57.800
<v Speaker 2>It's about continually learning, adapting and strengthening those defenses. And

758
00:38:57.840 --> 00:38:59.920
<v Speaker 2>for our listeners, there are our listeners out there.

759
00:39:00.000 --> 00:39:02.320
<v Speaker 1>If you were tasked with defending your organization, if.

760
00:39:02.239 --> 00:39:05.679
<v Speaker 2>You're in charge of defending your organization from these types

761
00:39:05.719 --> 00:39:08.199
<v Speaker 2>of attacks, from these Red Team attacks.

762
00:39:07.760 --> 00:39:08.760
<v Speaker 1>What would you prioritize?

763
00:39:08.800 --> 00:39:10.960
<v Speaker 2>What would you prioritize.

764
00:39:10.159 --> 00:39:12.119
<v Speaker 1>After learning about all these Red Team tactics?

765
00:39:12.199 --> 00:39:14.480
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, what would you do differently? What would you focus on?

766
00:39:15.639 --> 00:39:16.519
<v Speaker 1>That is the question.

767
00:39:16.800 --> 00:39:20.039
<v Speaker 2>That's the question to ponder, the ponder as we conclude

768
00:39:20.079 --> 00:39:20.920
<v Speaker 2>our deep dive.

769
00:39:21.000 --> 00:39:23.079
<v Speaker 1>As we conclude this deep dive into the world of

770
00:39:23.119 --> 00:39:27.719
<v Speaker 1>Red teaming, exactly this has been. It has been truly insightful.

771
00:39:27.480 --> 00:39:30.079
<v Speaker 2>Truly insightful exploration.

772
00:39:29.559 --> 00:39:31.119
<v Speaker 1>Exploration into the world of.

773
00:39:31.079 --> 00:39:33.760
<v Speaker 2>Red teaming, into the world of Red teaming, that's for sure.

774
00:39:34.000 --> 00:39:36.000
<v Speaker 1>Thank you for joining us, Thanks for being here on

775
00:39:36.079 --> 00:39:36.800
<v Speaker 1>this deep dive.

776
00:39:37.000 --> 00:39:38.159
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's been fun.

777
00:39:38.199 --> 00:39:42.000
<v Speaker 1>And until next time. Until next time, stay curious, stay

778
00:39:42.000 --> 00:39:42.639
<v Speaker 1>in form.

779
00:39:42.480 --> 00:39:45.880
<v Speaker 2>Stay curious, stay in form, and stay secure. And stay secure.
