WEBVTT

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<v Speaker 1>Meaning a live man like this man letting butterfly, flatting

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<v Speaker 1>and wing big down in the forest. Man, it gonna

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<v Speaker 1>cause a tree fall, letting five thousand miles away.

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<v Speaker 2>Man, nobody see nobody else. See you don't need no

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<v Speaker 2>man like you followed another story and you got directed

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<v Speaker 2>for like that. That's when man don't eat and dag

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<v Speaker 2>on the panel. Man matter? Man? All right?

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<v Speaker 1>Ron Dodson, back from my court mandated U weekly discussion

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<v Speaker 1>on the Iran War.

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<v Speaker 2>How are you doing, man, I'm doing pretty good all

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<v Speaker 2>things consider.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I obviously, just to speak at a sort of

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<v Speaker 1>a broader level, big picture, I understand both sides with

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<v Speaker 1>regards to discussions of Iran, between people on one side

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<v Speaker 1>who say, this is clearly, you know, a massive pressing issue.

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<v Speaker 1>It is the news and has been for five weeks.

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<v Speaker 1>And alternately, I understand why people are sick of it.

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<v Speaker 1>I myself, to a certain degree, I am sick of it,

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<v Speaker 1>and so obviously I'm having rawn on to discuss a

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<v Speaker 1>particular piece of that. This is perhaps a more broad

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<v Speaker 1>topic relevant to this war and our ongoing relations with Iran.

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<v Speaker 1>But I sort of joked when we started, I'm not

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<v Speaker 1>going to go overboard. I think about one show a

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<v Speaker 1>week at least for the duration of this war is

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<v Speaker 1>probably warranted. But ron with all that said, great to

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<v Speaker 1>have you back on. And what are we going to

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<v Speaker 1>launch into.

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<v Speaker 3>Well, I want to talk today about the the what

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<v Speaker 3>I call the nuclear developmental ladder and nuclear proliferation more broadly.

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<v Speaker 2>The purpose of that being so that not so that

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<v Speaker 2>suddenly we can all be a bunch of experts in

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<v Speaker 2>a very technical area, but so that we can have

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<v Speaker 2>we can know when we're being manipulated by the heralds

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<v Speaker 2>of the day, so to speak. Uh. And so there's

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<v Speaker 2>there's some I think this is a pretty balanced message.

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<v Speaker 2>Actually there's hopefully at the end we'll see Okay, maybe

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<v Speaker 2>there's some reason here. But also there's a whole lot

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<v Speaker 2>of misconceptions about nuclear development cycles that just need to

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<v Speaker 2>be dealt with and in a way that that we

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<v Speaker 2>can all just get a firm grasp of when are

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<v Speaker 2>we being when are we being led carrot and stick?

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<v Speaker 2>Because that's not that doesn't make for good voters, good

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<v Speaker 2>Twitter posters, for folks having a just maybe an informed

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<v Speaker 2>conversation with your wife and kids or the guy that

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<v Speaker 2>you work with. So that's kind of the point today

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<v Speaker 2>is let's try to demystify and de mythify some of

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<v Speaker 2>these this nuclear weapons thing.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, so just today or yesterday, I'm not entirely sure.

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<v Speaker 1>When the video dropped, Marco Rubio put out a brief

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<v Speaker 1>two minute video explaining, which you know, it's sort of astounding,

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<v Speaker 1>we've gotten five weeks and this is only now happening.

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<v Speaker 1>Why we are at war with i ran The stated purpose,

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<v Speaker 1>we'll say, which is, effectively, we don't want Iran to

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<v Speaker 1>have a large enough conventional armory that they can shield

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<v Speaker 1>themselves long enough to construct a nuclear one. And therefore

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<v Speaker 1>that is why we are at war with a rant

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<v Speaker 1>to prevent them from becoming a sort of middle eastern

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<v Speaker 1>North Korea. Now, there are several things there. One, it

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<v Speaker 1>assumes that we we could do such a thing, right,

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<v Speaker 1>we'll set that aside. But also it assumes that the

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<v Speaker 1>Iranians have for a long time been pushing for nuclear weapons,

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<v Speaker 1>and as you know, Vamp said, nuclear weapons that could

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<v Speaker 1>be miniaturized to such a degree that they could be

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<v Speaker 1>smuggled into the US, detonated as a suicide bomb, or alternately,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, fire rained down from the sky, right, intercontinists,

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<v Speaker 1>intercontinental nuclear ballistic missiles, the really scary stuff. So obviously,

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<v Speaker 1>the Iranian nuclear program has been in the news for

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<v Speaker 1>much longer than that, certainly going back to the Obama era.

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<v Speaker 1>But let's be honest, we destroyed or were told that

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<v Speaker 1>we destroyed Iran's nuclear sites less than a year ago.

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<v Speaker 1>So ron for the thinking man, where do we start

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<v Speaker 1>with this?

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<v Speaker 2>Right?

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<v Speaker 1>What are you know? The facts as we as we

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<v Speaker 1>can sort of verify it.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, let's let's just take it from Let's just go

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<v Speaker 2>through kind of the chain. And for first of all,

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<v Speaker 2>I think you can admit, and a guy on the

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<v Speaker 2>right can admit, yes, a crude nuclear device maybe within

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<v Speaker 2>the reach of a state like i Ran, but a reliable,

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<v Speaker 2>deliverable nuclear weapon is a product of a really a

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<v Speaker 2>far more demanding chain of engineering, testing and integration than most,

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<v Speaker 2>if not all, the public discussion acknowledges. So that's kind

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<v Speaker 2>of so what does that mean? Well, so you really

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<v Speaker 2>have to go from or to deliverable weapon, and what

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<v Speaker 2>does that require? And what happens is in the in

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<v Speaker 2>the in the in the popular level, you know discussion,

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<v Speaker 2>the Fox News discussion, we equate those two things and

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<v Speaker 2>there's a huge difference between or yellow cake and a

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<v Speaker 2>W eighty seven or W eighty eight. Those are our

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<v Speaker 2>kind of our thermonuclear there's a it's from here to

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<v Speaker 2>the moon from there, So what does that mean? So

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<v Speaker 2>the the claim that you hear on TV is nuclear

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<v Speaker 2>weapons are a flip a switch that you flip, and

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<v Speaker 2>that's not true. It's a ladder that you climb, and

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<v Speaker 2>it's it's it's like the concave climbing wall. Every every

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<v Speaker 2>next handhold gets exponentially harder as one who is a

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<v Speaker 2>horrific climber. This is why I picked that. Uh, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>I I can kind of do the ones that are

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<v Speaker 2>kind of slope the way I like, you know, I'm

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<v Speaker 2>i'm I'm. I'm shocked at the spider monkeys that can

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<v Speaker 2>climb that. And the question is Iran a spider monkey?

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<v Speaker 2>And no, the answer is no. So what are the

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<v Speaker 2>What are the stages? So you can think of it

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<v Speaker 2>kind of in five broad stages, and there's some intermediate steps.

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<v Speaker 2>But again, our job here is not to make us

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<v Speaker 2>all experts. Our job here is to get informed. So

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<v Speaker 2>Stage one is resource acquisition uranium. Iran's great with that,

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<v Speaker 2>they've got three or four sites. Uranium is not a

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<v Speaker 2>rare earth element, it is it is relatively plentiful in

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<v Speaker 2>the Earth's crust. You just got to go dig and

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<v Speaker 2>process it. And they they have and and so they've

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<v Speaker 2>got plenty of uranium domestically and that's not going to change.

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<v Speaker 2>And honestly, that's not a huge deal. Now we get

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<v Speaker 2>to the real stuff, conversion and enrichment. So what does

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<v Speaker 2>conversion mean. Conversion means you've taken it from or into

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<v Speaker 2>a form. You combine uranium with fluoride and so it

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<v Speaker 2>becomes this this new molecule that is easily turned into

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<v Speaker 2>a gas. So at about fifty degrees celsius, you can

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<v Speaker 2>that that uh, that combination of uranium and fluoride becomes

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<v Speaker 2>a gas. And now you can enrich it via centerfuge.

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<v Speaker 2>So how does we'll get into the indo because that's

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<v Speaker 2>where a lot of the talk comes in, is in

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<v Speaker 2>this centerfuge deal. And we'll explain that a little bit

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<v Speaker 2>again without getting too technical and without a bunch of

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<v Speaker 2>pictures and all that kind of thing. We'll describe that.

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<v Speaker 2>So that's stage two conversion enrichment. Stage three is weaponization.

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<v Speaker 2>So that's where you develop a what's called the physics package.

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<v Speaker 2>And that's not just the pit or the part that explodes,

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<v Speaker 2>but all the stuff that goes around it that helps

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<v Speaker 2>it explode. And then you have stage four, which is

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<v Speaker 2>testing in validation, and then STAY five delivery system integration.

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<v Speaker 2>Iran is at stage two. Okay, So those other three

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<v Speaker 2>stages are orders of magnitude harder beyond a certain kind

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<v Speaker 2>of first elementary step, and we'll talk about that. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>So stage one uranium. It's necessary, but it's trivial for

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<v Speaker 2>iran because uranium's not rare mining and milling that these

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<v Speaker 2>are industrial processes. It's not exotic and yellow cake and

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<v Speaker 2>yellow cake. It's it's yellow to our eyes and powdery.

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<v Speaker 2>You've seen pictures. You can go google it right now

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<v Speaker 2>and see what it looks like. That's try let me

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<v Speaker 2>see if I can remember this. Try uranium octo oxide.

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<v Speaker 2>It's it's eight oxygen atoms and three uranium app or

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<v Speaker 2>uranium atoms, and so you're oxidizing uranium to make this

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<v Speaker 2>yellow cake, and that's just makes it stable. And then

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<v Speaker 2>that's not a weapons material. And so in the Earth, uranium,

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<v Speaker 2>which again is plentiful but ninety ninety nine point three

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<v Speaker 2>percent of it is uranium two thirty eight and only

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<v Speaker 2>a point seven percent of it naturally occurring in the

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<v Speaker 2>ores called pitch blend. Maybe you've heard of that before

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<v Speaker 2>in your high school, uh, you know your high school

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<v Speaker 2>science class. Only seven percent of that is uranium two

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<v Speaker 2>thirty five and uranium two thirty five. These different versions

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<v Speaker 2>of the same element are called isotopes. Uranium two thirty

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<v Speaker 2>five is the one that is able to sustain a

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<v Speaker 2>nuclear reaction. So you have to end That's why you

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<v Speaker 2>have to enrich. Okay, so you have to get that

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<v Speaker 2>and you have to get that natural two thirty five

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<v Speaker 2>point seven up to eighty between eighty and ninety five percent,

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<v Speaker 2>and in order for it to be weapons grade. And

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<v Speaker 2>so right now, Iran has I think the latest numbers

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<v Speaker 2>are about four hundred and fifty kilograms. We don't know

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<v Speaker 2>how much of this is accessible. About four hundred and

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<v Speaker 2>fifty kilograms that's enriched to the sixty percent mark, so

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<v Speaker 2>not weapons grade. But to be fair, that distance between

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<v Speaker 2>sixty and eighty to ninety percent is doable in the

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<v Speaker 2>in the not long term. If they have in this

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<v Speaker 2>why well we'll talk about how that happens. So having uranium,

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<v Speaker 2>here's what you need to think of. Here's your big picture.

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<v Speaker 2>Having uranium is like having crude oil. It tells you

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<v Speaker 2>nothing about whether or not you can build a Ferrari,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, a V eight engine, much less a jet engine. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>you might be able to build a very simple two

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<v Speaker 2>stroke engine. And that's kind of where Iran is. And

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<v Speaker 2>we'll talk about what that analog device is. And stop

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<v Speaker 2>me at any point if you have any questions, Jay,

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<v Speaker 2>because this is.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh.

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<v Speaker 2>I don't want to. I don't want to, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>just completely overload listeners without any breaks.

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<v Speaker 1>But so forgive me if this is too far outside

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<v Speaker 1>the scope of what you want to talk about. But

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<v Speaker 1>I think it's important to understand, well, why is Iran

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<v Speaker 1>enriching uranium?

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<v Speaker 2>Right?

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<v Speaker 1>Are they only doing it so they can usher in

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<v Speaker 1>an apocalypse so that they can, you know, turn Los

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<v Speaker 1>Angeles into a smoking crater or is there a legitimate

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<v Speaker 1>reason to go about that.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, there's kind of a legitimate reason. So number one,

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<v Speaker 2>Iran with the help of the Russians, And that sounds scary,

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<v Speaker 2>but it's really not. The Russians don't want nuclear proliferation

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<v Speaker 2>anymore than we do. So. But Iran wanted the ability

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<v Speaker 2>to power their country via cleanly with with with nuclear plants,

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<v Speaker 2>so Russia helped them, uh fuel fuel their plants. But

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<v Speaker 2>other than other than that one plant, and they have

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<v Speaker 2>several uh or have I don't know what the state

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<v Speaker 2>status of them is right now, you know, uh, real

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<v Speaker 2>quick sidebar. Traditionally, when we've gone to war, we've had

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<v Speaker 2>press embedded in you know, Vietnam, World War two, uh,

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<v Speaker 2>the Iraq War one and two, we had press embedded

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<v Speaker 2>in the and and that's kind of a normal thing.

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<v Speaker 2>We've got nothing now. Part of that is it's hard

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<v Speaker 2>to do you embed in in on the you know,

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<v Speaker 2>on an aircraft carrier at the bases and stuff. You know.

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<v Speaker 2>But the fact that we don't have any on site

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<v Speaker 2>press coverage, we're having to rely on a bunch of

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<v Speaker 2>uh uh you know, ocent feeds is a little bit

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<v Speaker 2>problematic to me. But anyway, so they do have So

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<v Speaker 2>you do need to enrich in order to get to

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<v Speaker 2>medical uranium. That's twenty about twenty percent. And you do

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<v Speaker 2>need to enrich to get to a nuclear fuel in

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<v Speaker 2>the sense for a power plant, but that's about five

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<v Speaker 2>to seven percent depending on the design. Older designs require

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<v Speaker 2>a higher like the the graphite reactors. As I understand it,

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<v Speaker 2>the Russian designs needed a higher level of enrichment in

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<v Speaker 2>order to maintain a chain reaction. So anyway, the reason

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<v Speaker 2>they've enriched to sixty percent is so that they can

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<v Speaker 2>have and this is the and I consider this kind

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<v Speaker 2>of legitimate, is so that they can have a bargaining

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<v Speaker 2>chip in order to get out of the sanctions regime.

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<v Speaker 2>And they have offered repeatedly. They're they're now deceased Supreme

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<v Speaker 2>Leader Patata Fatwah against nuclear weapons development. Uh. And it

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<v Speaker 2>has long been the Iranian position that they would submit

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<v Speaker 2>to I a e A inspections upon removal of sanctions.

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<v Speaker 2>This seems like a complex. A no brainer to me

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<v Speaker 2>is why why would we not want a pro if

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<v Speaker 2>and even for the neocons. Honestly, let's take the neocon position.

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<v Speaker 2>The neocon position, you know, says prosperity equals democracy equals

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<v Speaker 2>let's get along with our neighbors, you know, prosperity in trade,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, forget the cosmopolitan byproducts of that. But but

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<v Speaker 2>it seems to me for the longest time, and Obama

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<v Speaker 2>this swhere. You know, we make fun of Obama's palettes

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<v Speaker 2>of cash, but uh, I think Obama. You could make

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<v Speaker 2>the argument Obama hand the Iranians pretty well. They didn't

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<v Speaker 2>cause any problems. They kept in their lane, they didn't

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<v Speaker 2>cause any issues with it. They weren't threatening to send

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<v Speaker 2>missiles all this stuff. So, you know, far be it

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<v Speaker 2>for me to praise one of the worst presidents we've

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<v Speaker 2>ever had, Barack Hassean Obama. But uh, I think he

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<v Speaker 2>handled the Iranians in a you know, at least you

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<v Speaker 2>can argue a rational way. But it's always been their position.

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<v Speaker 2>We don't want nuclear weapons, but we do want out

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<v Speaker 2>of this long term. We're a Shia nation. You need

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<v Speaker 2>to get over it. That's what we are. We self

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<v Speaker 2>identify as that uh you know, and until you quit,

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00:16:40.519 --> 00:16:43.360
<v Speaker 2>get us off the sanctioned regime. UH, We're going to

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<v Speaker 2>keep this enrichment capability. The problem with the Iranians has

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<v Speaker 2>been uh and to jump ahead a little bit, is

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<v Speaker 2>that they have used their oil proceeds to fund uh

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<v Speaker 2>you know, uh hamas uh uh uh some terrorism that

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<v Speaker 2>that uh that tends to uh harass our most beloved

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<v Speaker 2>and trusted ally in the Middle East. So and we

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<v Speaker 2>have long there's a sense in which, you know, the

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<v Speaker 2>the realist or the classical realists says, is it good

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<v Speaker 2>in a balance of power situation to have one actor

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<v Speaker 2>have that much control over one of the world's most

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<v Speaker 2>valuable choke points? What are you going to do about it? Though?

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<v Speaker 2>That's the question, And that's a little bit beyond the

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<v Speaker 2>scope of what I want to talk about, because we

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<v Speaker 2>were told that one of the main reasons we were

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<v Speaker 2>going to war is because they had two weeks towards

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<v Speaker 2>reigning down hell fire on the world. And that's what

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<v Speaker 2>I want to mainly deal with. And if you want

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<v Speaker 2>to talk about some of that other stuff, that's fine too.

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<v Speaker 1>So does that sorry even answer answer were but sorry

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<v Speaker 1>I interrupted you. We were moving up.

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<v Speaker 2>So moving up to change, so, so just real quick,

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<v Speaker 2>so remember Iran is not dependent upon an external uranium supply,

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<v Speaker 2>So no level of sanctions, no level of anything other

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<v Speaker 2>than literally taking the country over, is going to change that.

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<v Speaker 2>They are always going to have access to uranium. Uh,

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<v Speaker 2>so they can internalize the entire fuel cycle. This is

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<v Speaker 2>why enrichment exists, existed to the in the first place,

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<v Speaker 2>and that's why, uh, you're not going to be able

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<v Speaker 2>to completely ever do away with that. So I don't

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<v Speaker 2>know if y'all are concerned with the how the uranium

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<v Speaker 2>enrichment process works, I'm going to be very very brief.

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<v Speaker 2>You convert the this uranium oxid oxidation, you know, the

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<v Speaker 2>U three eight, You convert that to a process to

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<v Speaker 2>this uranium hexafluoride. That's that's the enrichment stuff. You use

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<v Speaker 2>gas centerfuge. You heat it up so that it sublimates,

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<v Speaker 2>it becomes a gas, and then you have a series

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<v Speaker 2>of these gas centrifuges, and all they are is you

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<v Speaker 2>put the gas in this long cylinder that has basically

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<v Speaker 2>kind of a weather van kind of thing inside that

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<v Speaker 2>spins it up really really fast. And because two thirty

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<v Speaker 2>eight the isotope, that doesn't do much for us for

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<v Speaker 2>enrichment because it's just a tiny bit heavier, it moves

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<v Speaker 2>to the outside in the two thirty five generally because

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<v Speaker 2>it's lighter, stays in the middle. So you you you

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<v Speaker 2>try to remove the center part of the centerfuge process

293
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<v Speaker 2>while it's spinning. You remove that you tube thirty five,

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<v Speaker 2>and each stage just is a to nine amount more

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<v Speaker 2>pure and it's a cascade. So you'll have two hundred

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<v Speaker 2>of these centrifuges in a row row, kind of like

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<v Speaker 2>daisy chained hot water heaters, but skinnier. And so as

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<v Speaker 2>it's taking out that you're putting it into a new centerfuge,

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<v Speaker 2>and it's spinning it up. In every stage you get

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<v Speaker 2>a little bit more of the two thirty five versus

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<v Speaker 2>the two thirty eight. So that's how centrifuges work. This

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<v Speaker 2>is what was destroyed by a work of the CIA

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<v Speaker 2>and Masade when the stucks Net program was put in.

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<v Speaker 2>And these are the the older versions of the centrifuges

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<v Speaker 2>were Semens run by Siemens controllers. Semens is a German

306
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<v Speaker 2>electronics giant, and uh so these these centrifuges had Semens controllers.

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<v Speaker 2>Stuck's Net was a program that infected the Semens controllers

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<v Speaker 2>to while they were spinning to stop and start them,

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<v Speaker 2>which would like a dryer that has way too many

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<v Speaker 2>towels on one side, they would get unbalanced and tear

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<v Speaker 2>themselves apart. Amazingly effective. Uh and uh kind of a

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00:21:13.039 --> 00:21:16.759
<v Speaker 2>brilliant look. You got to give those the the Israelis.

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<v Speaker 2>We know the Israelis were behind part of it because

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<v Speaker 2>that stuck'snet code but was actually released. People found it.

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<v Speaker 2>The way it propagated was through through broad propagation, and

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<v Speaker 2>the source code had Miritis in it. Miritus is uh.

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<v Speaker 2>If you go back to your Book of Esther, Esther

318
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<v Speaker 2>is myrtle Latin for esther is is miritis. And so anyway,

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<v Speaker 2>the Book of Esther takes place in Persia. So that's

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<v Speaker 2>how we knew Masad was in on the game. Anyway. Okay,

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<v Speaker 2>so you've got enrichment. What happens after enrichment, well, uh,

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<v Speaker 2>you you so to close that loop? Uh, Iran has

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<v Speaker 2>the capability at varying enriched, varying enrichment levels. But we

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<v Speaker 2>don't know what is left of these of these centrifuge

325
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<v Speaker 2>enrichment cascades. We don't We did bomb their system. These

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00:22:19.440 --> 00:22:24.039
<v Speaker 2>are not super robust. I mean, they're not like, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>super fragile. But if if you you know, you can

328
00:22:28.920 --> 00:22:34.440
<v Speaker 2>damage them or take them offline. If it does, it's

329
00:22:34.680 --> 00:22:38.039
<v Speaker 2>that's not hard. If it's just a matter of getting

330
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<v Speaker 2>to them because you you know, Iran's placed them in

331
00:22:40.880 --> 00:22:46.079
<v Speaker 2>very secured areas. So that and again that leap from

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00:22:46.119 --> 00:22:49.200
<v Speaker 2>sixty percent enrichment to ninety percent in enrichment is smaller

333
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<v Speaker 2>in effort, but it's it requires massive, massive cascade coordination.

334
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<v Speaker 2>So anyway, so enrichment is where it's a way to

335
00:22:59.559 --> 00:23:04.799
<v Speaker 2>think about that is enrichment is where physics meets industrial discipline.

336
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<v Speaker 2>It's not brilliant or conceptually complicated. It just takes sustained competence.

337
00:23:12.799 --> 00:23:17.759
<v Speaker 2>And so you know that's where again, that's where Iran is.

338
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<v Speaker 2>Let's I'm going to skip ahead in my presentation because

339
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<v Speaker 2>you don't I don't you know. There's there's the Basher.

340
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<v Speaker 2>I'm just gonna mention there's the Basher power reactor that's

341
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<v Speaker 2>low proliferation. That's the one the Russians built. That's the

342
00:23:31.720 --> 00:23:36.079
<v Speaker 2>one that the Russians fuel and supply and maintain and

343
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<v Speaker 2>remove the fuel. And they did that because they didn't

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<v Speaker 2>want They said, look, we'll fuel this and we'll remove

345
00:23:41.960 --> 00:23:44.480
<v Speaker 2>the fuel because we don't want you having plutonium because

346
00:23:44.519 --> 00:23:48.079
<v Speaker 2>plutonium you can use if you enrich and then using

347
00:23:48.240 --> 00:23:51.680
<v Speaker 2>rich fuel in a reactor, one of the byproducts can

348
00:23:51.799 --> 00:23:54.720
<v Speaker 2>be plutonium. We don't want you having that, so we'll

349
00:23:54.720 --> 00:23:58.279
<v Speaker 2>remove the fuel. Iran said, that's great. We get basically

350
00:23:58.359 --> 00:24:03.799
<v Speaker 2>we get you're coming and we've got a service contract

351
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<v Speaker 2>with you. Awesome, So that's not a viable path. The

352
00:24:08.359 --> 00:24:13.839
<v Speaker 2>Tran Research reactor uses twenty percent enriched uranium that basically

353
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<v Speaker 2>produces medical isotopes, which provides the justification to twenty percent.

354
00:24:18.839 --> 00:24:23.440
<v Speaker 2>Can they use that twenty percent to jump start their chain? Yeah,

355
00:24:24.039 --> 00:24:29.720
<v Speaker 2>but we've got twenty percent enrichment isotopes all over the US,

356
00:24:30.279 --> 00:24:35.079
<v Speaker 2>you know, But that's is it an issue? Well? I

357
00:24:35.079 --> 00:24:42.519
<v Speaker 2>mean yeah, but inspection fixes all this, right. So Obama

358
00:24:42.599 --> 00:24:46.119
<v Speaker 2>tried to deal with this because the well and then

359
00:24:46.160 --> 00:24:50.519
<v Speaker 2>you have the Iraq a raq A r Ak heavy

360
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<v Speaker 2>water reactor and this is this one's kind of the

361
00:24:53.559 --> 00:24:57.960
<v Speaker 2>problem because that's designed for natural uranium and heavy water

362
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<v Speaker 2>and that's where you get plutonium. So that one's an issue.

363
00:25:03.359 --> 00:25:07.079
<v Speaker 2>That's an issue. Neokon not neokan. This needs to be

364
00:25:07.359 --> 00:25:09.400
<v Speaker 2>I think this this is the one you need to

365
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<v Speaker 2>deal with. And Obama dealt with that under the JCPOA,

366
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<v Speaker 2>the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that was the twenty

367
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<v Speaker 2>fifteen agreement between Iran and the USA, UK, France, China,

368
00:25:24.240 --> 00:25:28.319
<v Speaker 2>Russia and Germany, and that restricts their nuclear program in

369
00:25:28.359 --> 00:25:31.839
<v Speaker 2>exchange for some sanctions relief. That's kind of in a

370
00:25:32.839 --> 00:25:39.000
<v Speaker 2>This war has thrown that into a complete that's out

371
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<v Speaker 2>the door right now. So you know, if you're gonna

372
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<v Speaker 2>bomb us, we're not gonna. But so anyway, that was

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<v Speaker 2>the one area where they submitted to IAEA inspections. So

374
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<v Speaker 2>Iran in that case chose showed their good faith. Look,

375
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<v Speaker 2>will you're worried about this reactor. We're subject to these

376
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<v Speaker 2>uh i a e A inspection the i a e

377
00:26:06.039 --> 00:26:11.279
<v Speaker 2>A Inspection regime here, So they showed good faith not

378
00:26:11.799 --> 00:26:15.160
<v Speaker 2>to the You notice there's one nation that didn't sign

379
00:26:15.799 --> 00:26:22.400
<v Speaker 2>that Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. So all right, so

380
00:26:22.720 --> 00:26:26.400
<v Speaker 2>weapon weaponization. So now we've got we know how we enrich,

381
00:26:27.200 --> 00:26:29.279
<v Speaker 2>we know how we mine, we know how we enrich.

382
00:26:29.880 --> 00:26:33.319
<v Speaker 2>What do we do now? We want to create a weapon.

383
00:26:33.359 --> 00:26:38.920
<v Speaker 2>This is where everybody said, this is where they are, Well, okay,

384
00:26:39.920 --> 00:26:43.440
<v Speaker 2>could they there's there's there's two paths you take to

385
00:26:43.519 --> 00:26:47.079
<v Speaker 2>making a nuclear weapon, well three paths, but but we'll

386
00:26:47.079 --> 00:26:49.359
<v Speaker 2>put the third one aside for a bit. The first

387
00:26:49.440 --> 00:26:53.200
<v Speaker 2>is a gun type of device, and this is one

388
00:26:53.279 --> 00:26:58.160
<v Speaker 2>that if given the materials, you me and three or

389
00:26:58.200 --> 00:27:03.559
<v Speaker 2>four guys and a really good machine shop, and if

390
00:27:03.599 --> 00:27:09.039
<v Speaker 2>we had enough uranium, could possibly build one of these. Okay,

391
00:27:09.119 --> 00:27:13.440
<v Speaker 2>this is not a complex it's a very complex from

392
00:27:12.680 --> 00:27:19.640
<v Speaker 2>an engineering standpoint, it's not complex from a nuclear science standpoint.

393
00:27:19.960 --> 00:27:23.799
<v Speaker 2>So what's the concept. Well, this is the bomb that

394
00:27:23.880 --> 00:27:27.480
<v Speaker 2>was dropped on Hiroshima. Didn't need any testing. It was

395
00:27:27.640 --> 00:27:31.440
<v Speaker 2>just a gun type of device. This was a Little Boy.

396
00:27:31.720 --> 00:27:36.960
<v Speaker 2>And all you're doing is firing one subcritical mass into another.

397
00:27:38.119 --> 00:27:41.559
<v Speaker 2>When you get enough uranium two thirty five together in

398
00:27:41.599 --> 00:27:46.000
<v Speaker 2>a close mass that reaches what's called critical mass, and

399
00:27:46.079 --> 00:27:54.079
<v Speaker 2>you get a sustained you get a sustained nuclear chain reaction,

400
00:27:54.519 --> 00:28:00.000
<v Speaker 2>and if it's super critical, you get an explosive critical reaction.

401
00:28:00.880 --> 00:28:03.519
<v Speaker 2>And this is how we built Little Boy. And what

402
00:28:03.720 --> 00:28:07.319
<v Speaker 2>is that? So there's no need for complex timing or

403
00:28:07.359 --> 00:28:10.480
<v Speaker 2>implosion symmetry. We'll talk about that. This can be built

404
00:28:10.559 --> 00:28:14.039
<v Speaker 2>without testing. You kind of know what you're gonna get.

405
00:28:14.720 --> 00:28:19.559
<v Speaker 2>It does require large amounts of highly enriched uranium. We

406
00:28:19.640 --> 00:28:24.599
<v Speaker 2>only used eighty percent enriched in Little Boy. But that's

407
00:28:24.640 --> 00:28:26.960
<v Speaker 2>why it was so inefficient. Little Boy was only about

408
00:28:27.000 --> 00:28:34.519
<v Speaker 2>one percent efficiency and it's incredibly large and heavy. Why

409
00:28:34.599 --> 00:28:34.880
<v Speaker 2>is that?

410
00:28:35.160 --> 00:28:35.240
<v Speaker 1>So?

411
00:28:36.200 --> 00:28:39.119
<v Speaker 2>How does one of these things work. Imagine a gun barrel,

412
00:28:39.119 --> 00:28:43.480
<v Speaker 2>and we actually used a navy gun barrel. We we

413
00:28:43.519 --> 00:28:51.599
<v Speaker 2>took it from a naval surplus replacement gun barrel, and

414
00:28:51.680 --> 00:28:57.720
<v Speaker 2>we had a a cylinder of uranium eighty percent uranium

415
00:28:57.720 --> 00:29:02.319
<v Speaker 2>two thirty five and then a hall cylinder that was

416
00:29:02.680 --> 00:29:06.680
<v Speaker 2>designed to fit together over here at the other end

417
00:29:06.720 --> 00:29:10.599
<v Speaker 2>of the gun barrel with high explosives behind it. And

418
00:29:10.640 --> 00:29:14.519
<v Speaker 2>the idea is you, just like you're firing a gun,

419
00:29:14.960 --> 00:29:20.599
<v Speaker 2>you draw the explosives, drive this hollow cylinder to meet

420
00:29:20.680 --> 00:29:25.400
<v Speaker 2>up with the with the solid cylinder of machine uranium

421
00:29:25.440 --> 00:29:29.480
<v Speaker 2>two thirty five so fast that they reach super criticality

422
00:29:29.599 --> 00:29:33.160
<v Speaker 2>and it blows up. That's the simple thing. The hard

423
00:29:33.200 --> 00:29:36.559
<v Speaker 2>thing is is around that. In order for this to

424
00:29:36.799 --> 00:29:39.480
<v Speaker 2>really do much of anything, you need what's called a

425
00:29:39.920 --> 00:29:46.759
<v Speaker 2>neutron reflector, usually beryllium, although you can use other heavy things,

426
00:29:46.799 --> 00:29:50.480
<v Speaker 2>and you wrap that around this target area. And what

427
00:29:50.559 --> 00:29:53.400
<v Speaker 2>that does is that makes sure it's neutrons that are

428
00:29:53.400 --> 00:29:57.359
<v Speaker 2>making this chain reaction go. You want those neutrons to

429
00:29:57.400 --> 00:30:02.200
<v Speaker 2>not escape, but stay within this confine pross area to

430
00:30:02.319 --> 00:30:06.119
<v Speaker 2>make the reaction more efficient. You get more neutrons, you

431
00:30:06.160 --> 00:30:11.200
<v Speaker 2>get more fission. Each fission each atom that that uh

432
00:30:11.319 --> 00:30:15.960
<v Speaker 2>undergoes fission reduced produces several million electron vaults. That's what

433
00:30:16.000 --> 00:30:20.440
<v Speaker 2>provides the energy. So you have this, yeah, to.

434
00:30:20.440 --> 00:30:23.640
<v Speaker 1>Take it to a much lower IQ version. Think of

435
00:30:23.680 --> 00:30:27.160
<v Speaker 1>it as you know, one of those like YETI vacuum cups,

436
00:30:27.559 --> 00:30:31.640
<v Speaker 1>right that keeps the heat inside. Yeah, obviously to a

437
00:30:31.720 --> 00:30:33.119
<v Speaker 1>different end, but that's sort of.

438
00:30:33.079 --> 00:30:39.759
<v Speaker 2>The the works. The reflector works as a neutron insulator.

439
00:30:40.000 --> 00:30:44.599
<v Speaker 2>That's exactly right. This is keeping the coffee hot. And

440
00:30:44.680 --> 00:30:49.960
<v Speaker 2>we're talking in microseconds, okay, because these this reaction happens,

441
00:30:50.200 --> 00:30:53.960
<v Speaker 2>you want as many iterations of this chain to happen

442
00:30:54.079 --> 00:30:57.200
<v Speaker 2>before the thing just the heat and ex the heat

443
00:30:57.319 --> 00:31:01.359
<v Speaker 2>makes it blow apart. Okay, So you want that reflector

444
00:31:01.480 --> 00:31:05.000
<v Speaker 2>keeping those neutrons in. Then around that you have in

445
00:31:06.079 --> 00:31:10.240
<v Speaker 2>a five to six inch cylinder what's called a tamper.

446
00:31:10.759 --> 00:31:13.400
<v Speaker 2>And this physically and the best material for that is

447
00:31:13.519 --> 00:31:17.119
<v Speaker 2>uranium two thirty eight. You get a little extra, but

448
00:31:17.200 --> 00:31:21.000
<v Speaker 2>you can use tungsten, you can use, you can use.

449
00:31:21.319 --> 00:31:25.160
<v Speaker 2>But the goal of this is to something that's incredibly

450
00:31:26.039 --> 00:31:29.960
<v Speaker 2>that is going to keep this explosion together for a

451
00:31:30.000 --> 00:31:34.799
<v Speaker 2>couple of more nano micro microseconds, so that more of

452
00:31:34.839 --> 00:31:39.319
<v Speaker 2>this reaction happens because all that matters is the last iteration,

453
00:31:39.920 --> 00:31:44.640
<v Speaker 2>so it's it's a chain reaction, so it's happening logarithmically.

454
00:31:44.920 --> 00:31:48.079
<v Speaker 2>So if you can keep it together for two more iterations,

455
00:31:48.160 --> 00:31:52.799
<v Speaker 2>that's one hundred or one thousand times bigger of an explosion.

456
00:31:52.839 --> 00:31:56.200
<v Speaker 2>Does that make sense. So literally, you have a neutron reflector,

457
00:31:56.599 --> 00:31:59.400
<v Speaker 2>and then you have a tamper, and this is massive

458
00:31:59.559 --> 00:32:03.920
<v Speaker 2>and he to keep the thing together. So this gun device,

459
00:32:05.599 --> 00:32:08.759
<v Speaker 2>the barrel has to be massively heavy just to hold

460
00:32:08.839 --> 00:32:13.119
<v Speaker 2>this together. And then this tamp, this reflector in tamper

461
00:32:13.240 --> 00:32:19.480
<v Speaker 2>together is very is much heavier than the barrel. And

462
00:32:19.519 --> 00:32:24.039
<v Speaker 2>then because this is an inefficient device, you need a

463
00:32:24.039 --> 00:32:27.160
<v Speaker 2>couple hundred pounds of uranium to make it work. So

464
00:32:27.759 --> 00:32:32.880
<v Speaker 2>this gun device is large. Little boy was about eight

465
00:32:32.920 --> 00:32:38.160
<v Speaker 2>feet including the casing and altimeter package and everything about

466
00:32:38.160 --> 00:32:43.559
<v Speaker 2>eight feet long, and was close to twenty thousand pounds

467
00:32:43.640 --> 00:32:47.319
<v Speaker 2>all told. So that's not going on the top of

468
00:32:47.319 --> 00:32:52.640
<v Speaker 2>a missile. The Iranians can put about five hundred kilograms

469
00:32:52.759 --> 00:32:55.480
<v Speaker 2>on top of a missile. They're short range. They have

470
00:32:55.559 --> 00:33:01.119
<v Speaker 2>some space launch vehicles as well, nowhere near. So this

471
00:33:01.920 --> 00:33:05.480
<v Speaker 2>is the type of device they could, theoretically, if left alone,

472
00:33:06.200 --> 00:33:08.440
<v Speaker 2>over time, build without testing.

473
00:33:09.279 --> 00:33:15.920
<v Speaker 1>So Ron, I'm not a physicist or a tailor, but

474
00:33:16.440 --> 00:33:19.279
<v Speaker 1>would it be possible to strap one of those devices

475
00:33:19.279 --> 00:33:21.559
<v Speaker 1>into a vest and walk into a grocery store.

476
00:33:22.079 --> 00:33:22.160
<v Speaker 3>No?

477
00:33:23.640 --> 00:33:27.359
<v Speaker 2>No, And the whole idea of suitcase nukes, those are

478
00:33:27.880 --> 00:33:31.799
<v Speaker 2>that's fantasy. You can't get. There's a there's a threshold

479
00:33:31.799 --> 00:33:36.519
<v Speaker 2>below which you can't go due to you need a

480
00:33:36.559 --> 00:33:38.720
<v Speaker 2>certain amount of critical mass, and then you need a

481
00:33:38.720 --> 00:33:43.279
<v Speaker 2>certain amount of something to make it super critical really fast,

482
00:33:43.640 --> 00:33:47.720
<v Speaker 2>and that just takes size. We got artillery shells, you know,

483
00:33:47.920 --> 00:33:50.720
<v Speaker 2>we got a critical mass down to about this size

484
00:33:51.720 --> 00:33:55.200
<v Speaker 2>with the explosive deal, and those were incredibly unreliable and

485
00:33:55.279 --> 00:34:00.359
<v Speaker 2>incredibly inconsistent. You'd get ten kilo tons or a hundred

486
00:34:00.400 --> 00:34:02.839
<v Speaker 2>kilotons and it was just kind of a roll of

487
00:34:02.880 --> 00:34:07.519
<v Speaker 2>the dice, and so we we stopped that program. But

488
00:34:08.480 --> 00:34:11.320
<v Speaker 2>the suit there's never been a such thing that could

489
00:34:11.400 --> 00:34:16.119
<v Speaker 2>fit in a Haliburton case. That's just science fiction because

490
00:34:16.119 --> 00:34:19.320
<v Speaker 2>of the just the physics involved. But anyway, so this

491
00:34:19.400 --> 00:34:23.599
<v Speaker 2>one device that theoretically you could build without testing is

492
00:34:23.679 --> 00:34:27.320
<v Speaker 2>incredibly large and incredibly heavy. We were able to deliver

493
00:34:27.400 --> 00:34:30.039
<v Speaker 2>it because we had the B twenty nine and it

494
00:34:30.119 --> 00:34:33.039
<v Speaker 2>took a special version. The Anola Gay had to be

495
00:34:33.119 --> 00:34:35.880
<v Speaker 2>stripped of certain amounts of equipment and everything just to

496
00:34:35.920 --> 00:34:41.760
<v Speaker 2>carry this massive thing and deliver it. So anything any

497
00:34:41.800 --> 00:34:44.280
<v Speaker 2>other type of system, when we talk about that, requires

498
00:34:44.400 --> 00:34:47.440
<v Speaker 2>massive amounts of testing. And why does that matter? Because

499
00:34:47.920 --> 00:34:50.920
<v Speaker 2>you test a nuclear device, we're going to know about it.

500
00:34:50.960 --> 00:34:52.639
<v Speaker 2>The Brits are going to know about it, the Russians

501
00:34:52.639 --> 00:34:54.159
<v Speaker 2>are going to know about it, the Chinese are going

502
00:34:54.199 --> 00:34:59.360
<v Speaker 2>to know about it. We have incredible systems underground, atmospheric,

503
00:34:59.760 --> 00:35:05.360
<v Speaker 2>on water. These tests leave a have a very defined signature.

504
00:35:05.800 --> 00:35:09.400
<v Speaker 2>It's why every time the North Koreans, who aren't a

505
00:35:09.679 --> 00:35:15.559
<v Speaker 2>obvious aren't a part to you know, a partner in

506
00:35:15.599 --> 00:35:20.440
<v Speaker 2>the in the Nuclear non Proliferation Agreement. That's why whenever

507
00:35:20.480 --> 00:35:23.320
<v Speaker 2>they test something underground, we know about it. So there's

508
00:35:23.360 --> 00:35:26.119
<v Speaker 2>ways to try to hide it, but you know about it,

509
00:35:26.800 --> 00:35:36.119
<v Speaker 2>usually via seismic It leaves a seismic fingerprint and you

510
00:35:36.159 --> 00:35:43.079
<v Speaker 2>can't help but there be some isotope leakage. So anyway,

511
00:35:43.159 --> 00:35:47.039
<v Speaker 2>so the Iranians aren't going and by the way, we

512
00:35:47.119 --> 00:35:52.079
<v Speaker 2>have no evidence at all that they have any enrichment

513
00:35:52.119 --> 00:35:56.239
<v Speaker 2>beyond sixty percent, which it would to even do one

514
00:35:56.239 --> 00:35:59.519
<v Speaker 2>of these devices. They if they built one of these devices,

515
00:35:59.599 --> 00:36:01.880
<v Speaker 2>they can't deliver it. I mean, in theory they could

516
00:36:03.199 --> 00:36:06.519
<v Speaker 2>put it on a ship and sail it somewhere. Uh,

517
00:36:06.559 --> 00:36:13.679
<v Speaker 2>but we've we've you know where their ships are anyway. Uh,

518
00:36:13.719 --> 00:36:16.440
<v Speaker 2>but they're not putting it on a missile. No way

519
00:36:16.480 --> 00:36:21.679
<v Speaker 2>to do that anything beyond that. So an implosion device,

520
00:36:21.800 --> 00:36:25.280
<v Speaker 2>like all our devices now are implosion devices, and they

521
00:36:25.320 --> 00:36:29.039
<v Speaker 2>all have secondary so thermonuclear secondaries. And that's why we

522
00:36:29.199 --> 00:36:32.800
<v Speaker 2>our re entry vehicles are so small because it's a small,

523
00:36:33.679 --> 00:36:39.719
<v Speaker 2>smaller fission stage and then a fusion stage that fuses

524
00:36:39.920 --> 00:36:45.320
<v Speaker 2>uh uh you know hydrogen deuteride. Uh. Anyway, really cool,

525
00:36:45.760 --> 00:36:48.639
<v Speaker 2>really cool science beyond the scope of this talk. But

526
00:36:48.800 --> 00:36:55.400
<v Speaker 2>we basically construct a miniature sun, which scientifically is really cool.

527
00:36:55.599 --> 00:36:58.440
<v Speaker 2>And uh but that's why, like our re entry vehicles

528
00:36:58.440 --> 00:37:02.320
<v Speaker 2>are only four hundred kilograms and about four feet long

529
00:37:02.360 --> 00:37:06.000
<v Speaker 2>and only this big around that takes such a level

530
00:37:06.000 --> 00:37:14.000
<v Speaker 2>of complexity and testing that Iran is fifty years from

531
00:37:14.079 --> 00:37:15.840
<v Speaker 2>something like that. We would know what they were doing

532
00:37:15.920 --> 00:37:21.079
<v Speaker 2>at every stage, So that's not an issue. The concern

533
00:37:21.159 --> 00:37:24.960
<v Speaker 2>is so anyway, implosion think about it this way, implosion

534
00:37:25.039 --> 00:37:28.039
<v Speaker 2>or that next level of deliverable type of device that

535
00:37:28.119 --> 00:37:30.719
<v Speaker 2>can be made smaller is not just harder. It's a

536
00:37:30.800 --> 00:37:35.559
<v Speaker 2>different category of difficulty and it requires a testable and

537
00:37:35.679 --> 00:37:41.480
<v Speaker 2>mature scientific ecosystem. That's a whole different thing you have.

538
00:37:42.559 --> 00:37:46.360
<v Speaker 2>Most folks don't know. Like we have pantexts in the

539
00:37:47.719 --> 00:37:55.840
<v Speaker 2>Texas Panantal, we have our facility in Tennessee. These are

540
00:37:56.159 --> 00:38:02.000
<v Speaker 2>massive to build tests and house the the pits. So

541
00:38:02.119 --> 00:38:05.639
<v Speaker 2>that's the nuclear material and the science package, which is

542
00:38:05.679 --> 00:38:08.559
<v Speaker 2>what the physics package, which is what turns it into

543
00:38:08.599 --> 00:38:15.840
<v Speaker 2>a deliverable warhead. These are massive scientific undertakings. My cousin

544
00:38:15.880 --> 00:38:20.199
<v Speaker 2>in law who was a contractor for the nuclear UH

545
00:38:20.480 --> 00:38:26.320
<v Speaker 2>in the nuclear UH sub fleet. He participated in the

546
00:38:26.360 --> 00:38:30.960
<v Speaker 2>refueling of nuclear submarines, the Los Angeles Class. He was

547
00:38:30.960 --> 00:38:36.719
<v Speaker 2>recruited to go work for Sandia uh UH and UH

548
00:38:36.840 --> 00:38:42.400
<v Speaker 2>with a possible uh sypath with pantecs and this guy

549
00:38:42.559 --> 00:38:46.840
<v Speaker 2>is He ended up going into the super Computing UH

550
00:38:47.119 --> 00:38:52.800
<v Speaker 2>the Supercomputing uh UH division of Dell Computers. These are

551
00:38:53.559 --> 00:38:59.760
<v Speaker 2>very specialized, highly highly trained. Everybody knows who these people

552
00:38:59.840 --> 00:39:04.199
<v Speaker 2>are are. They work in these massive scientific undertakings. Because

553
00:39:04.239 --> 00:39:09.320
<v Speaker 2>this is a very complex deal and Iran has nothing

554
00:39:09.400 --> 00:39:15.239
<v Speaker 2>like that. So anyway we've talked about testing, we can

555
00:39:15.239 --> 00:39:18.159
<v Speaker 2>talk about miniaturization. I kind of feel like i've, you know,

556
00:39:18.559 --> 00:39:23.679
<v Speaker 2>real quick. So so warhead weight and size restraints. We've

557
00:39:23.719 --> 00:39:26.840
<v Speaker 2>already talked about how the Little Boy guns style device

558
00:39:27.000 --> 00:39:33.960
<v Speaker 2>just can't be miniaturized beyond a certain degree with it's

559
00:39:34.000 --> 00:39:37.239
<v Speaker 2>it's just big and heavy. So if they wanted to

560
00:39:37.920 --> 00:39:42.280
<v Speaker 2>build something that was actually miniaturized and deliverable and hardened,

561
00:39:42.760 --> 00:39:46.719
<v Speaker 2>you're talking about massive weight and size constraints. You would

562
00:39:46.760 --> 00:39:50.119
<v Speaker 2>need a specific re entry vehicle that's different from a

563
00:39:50.199 --> 00:39:54.960
<v Speaker 2>conventional warhead, conventional T and T or the offshoots of

564
00:39:55.000 --> 00:40:00.199
<v Speaker 2>T and T. See the plastic or solid the solid

565
00:40:00.199 --> 00:40:04.199
<v Speaker 2>type of explosives are very hardened. You can there's there's

566
00:40:04.239 --> 00:40:08.760
<v Speaker 2>no real vibration constraints. You get them to wherever you're going,

567
00:40:08.800 --> 00:40:11.239
<v Speaker 2>and as long as you have a good igniter or

568
00:40:14.199 --> 00:40:18.039
<v Speaker 2>you're they're gonna go boom. Very different from a deliverable

569
00:40:18.159 --> 00:40:23.800
<v Speaker 2>physics package. So uh, and then miniaturizing a nuclear device down,

570
00:40:23.840 --> 00:40:25.639
<v Speaker 2>I mean, we talked about that a little bit. You

571
00:40:25.679 --> 00:40:29.480
<v Speaker 2>can go and google the W eighty seven slash W

572
00:40:29.719 --> 00:40:32.719
<v Speaker 2>eighty eight program if you want to, if you're listening

573
00:40:32.719 --> 00:40:35.679
<v Speaker 2>and you really find this interesting and see all that

574
00:40:35.880 --> 00:40:38.519
<v Speaker 2>was in a lot of this. The Federation of American

575
00:40:38.639 --> 00:40:42.719
<v Speaker 2>Scientists have a great site that basically tells you how

576
00:40:42.719 --> 00:40:46.639
<v Speaker 2>this was all put together and built. I mean without

577
00:40:46.960 --> 00:40:49.360
<v Speaker 2>you know, you're not gonna go do this in your backyard,

578
00:40:49.440 --> 00:40:51.880
<v Speaker 2>so it's actually kind of okay. But you can look

579
00:40:51.880 --> 00:40:55.079
<v Speaker 2>at the FAS dot org and read up about all

580
00:40:55.159 --> 00:40:59.199
<v Speaker 2>the steps we we're now most people think we're a

581
00:41:00.519 --> 00:41:02.880
<v Speaker 2>model or two beyond that. This was when I was

582
00:41:02.920 --> 00:41:08.239
<v Speaker 2>studying this in school, when I studied, Yes, I was

583
00:41:08.280 --> 00:41:12.679
<v Speaker 2>accounting finance double major, but I wrote my senior thesis

584
00:41:13.079 --> 00:41:17.159
<v Speaker 2>in well actually infusion and tacamac design. But I studied

585
00:41:17.159 --> 00:41:20.639
<v Speaker 2>all this stuff. That's why it's interesting to me. At

586
00:41:20.679 --> 00:41:23.000
<v Speaker 2>that point, the W eighty seven W eighty eight, which

587
00:41:23.000 --> 00:41:26.119
<v Speaker 2>went on our Poseidon and try it well, our Trident

588
00:41:26.199 --> 00:41:29.400
<v Speaker 2>missiles and our minimm missiles, that warhead was the state

589
00:41:29.400 --> 00:41:30.920
<v Speaker 2>of the art. Then I think we're a stage or

590
00:41:30.960 --> 00:41:33.840
<v Speaker 2>two beyond that. But this is where my training stopped.

591
00:41:35.760 --> 00:41:38.000
<v Speaker 2>You can anyway, you go to FAS dot org and

592
00:41:38.039 --> 00:41:40.239
<v Speaker 2>put in W eighty eight. You can read all about

593
00:41:40.239 --> 00:41:44.599
<v Speaker 2>this if you're really interested about what it would take. So,

594
00:41:44.599 --> 00:41:48.440
<v Speaker 2>so what it matters for nuclear delivery remember warhead mass limits,

595
00:41:48.639 --> 00:41:51.639
<v Speaker 2>re entry vehicle design, and then you have accurate c

596
00:41:51.840 --> 00:41:54.039
<v Speaker 2>versus yield trade off. We're not really worry about that.

597
00:41:54.239 --> 00:41:59.559
<v Speaker 2>So anyway, what does Iran have in the sense of deliverability?

598
00:41:59.679 --> 00:42:02.840
<v Speaker 2>So they have short range ballistic missiles and they have

599
00:42:03.000 --> 00:42:06.199
<v Speaker 2>a couple of intermediate range ballistic missiles. The main thing

600
00:42:06.440 --> 00:42:10.199
<v Speaker 2>the difference is being in range and difficulty of maintenance.

601
00:42:10.679 --> 00:42:14.880
<v Speaker 2>A short range ballistic missile is all solid two stage

602
00:42:14.920 --> 00:42:18.400
<v Speaker 2>and solid fuel. So it's like a firecracker. You can

603
00:42:18.519 --> 00:42:22.159
<v Speaker 2>set it over there, very low maintenance. You like the fuse,

604
00:42:22.360 --> 00:42:26.440
<v Speaker 2>it's going okay, hey this The intermediate range are two stage,

605
00:42:26.480 --> 00:42:31.239
<v Speaker 2>but the upper stage is liquid fuel and that's much harder.

606
00:42:31.760 --> 00:42:35.760
<v Speaker 2>These are. These are much less stable, much less storable.

607
00:42:36.039 --> 00:42:41.880
<v Speaker 2>There's usually a cryogenics, not always the non cryogenic wayte

608
00:42:41.960 --> 00:42:46.280
<v Speaker 2>to fuel. These are very, very toxic. So I think

609
00:42:46.320 --> 00:42:47.880
<v Speaker 2>there was a video that came out the other night

610
00:42:47.920 --> 00:42:51.039
<v Speaker 2>of the upper stage falling in part of Israel and

611
00:42:51.119 --> 00:42:55.079
<v Speaker 2>this red smoke coming out. Dude, that will kill you.

612
00:42:55.079 --> 00:42:57.719
<v Speaker 2>You breathe in that red smoke, you are dead in

613
00:42:57.800 --> 00:43:00.239
<v Speaker 2>five minutes kind of thing. It will eat your longus

614
00:43:00.280 --> 00:43:04.880
<v Speaker 2>out from the inside. So this isn't These aren't fun things.

615
00:43:04.920 --> 00:43:08.000
<v Speaker 2>And then the Iranians have a three stage space launch vehicle.

616
00:43:09.480 --> 00:43:12.880
<v Speaker 2>I think they the space launch vehicle conversion is what

617
00:43:12.920 --> 00:43:16.079
<v Speaker 2>they use to try to launch something towards Diego Garcia,

618
00:43:16.920 --> 00:43:20.920
<v Speaker 2>which was never gonna work. These are completely different guidance packages.

619
00:43:21.119 --> 00:43:25.480
<v Speaker 2>A ballistic missile is like a single use well they're

620
00:43:25.480 --> 00:43:29.159
<v Speaker 2>both single use in theory, but use you use this.

621
00:43:30.320 --> 00:43:34.559
<v Speaker 2>It's designed to hit something on the other end of

622
00:43:34.599 --> 00:43:38.239
<v Speaker 2>a ballistic curve with very good aiming on the front

623
00:43:38.320 --> 00:43:42.400
<v Speaker 2>end and minimal course correction. A space launch vehicle uses

624
00:43:42.440 --> 00:43:47.679
<v Speaker 2>a closed loop, constant course correction type of model so

625
00:43:47.719 --> 00:43:50.320
<v Speaker 2>that you can get something into orbit. But neither one

626
00:43:50.360 --> 00:43:53.639
<v Speaker 2>of them have the capability to have that kind of range,

627
00:43:53.679 --> 00:43:56.760
<v Speaker 2>just due to the to the payload trade off. These

628
00:43:56.760 --> 00:44:00.000
<v Speaker 2>are designed to deliver five hundred kilogram type of things,

629
00:44:00.400 --> 00:44:04.039
<v Speaker 2>and these the range that they needed to get to

630
00:44:04.119 --> 00:44:07.280
<v Speaker 2>Diego Garcia was such that we think they basically didn't

631
00:44:07.320 --> 00:44:10.239
<v Speaker 2>even have much of a payload. They just wanted to

632
00:44:10.239 --> 00:44:13.440
<v Speaker 2>see if they could launch something and you know, taunt us.

633
00:44:13.679 --> 00:44:16.280
<v Speaker 2>That's my opinion. There are people who disagree with that.

634
00:44:16.480 --> 00:44:19.320
<v Speaker 2>So a space launch vehicle proves that you could throw

635
00:44:19.400 --> 00:44:22.400
<v Speaker 2>something into space into orbit. It does not prove that

636
00:44:22.480 --> 00:44:25.719
<v Speaker 2>you can deliver a nuclear weapon through the atmosphere onto

637
00:44:25.760 --> 00:44:30.480
<v Speaker 2>a target. Just a completely different thing. So anyway, that's

638
00:44:30.559 --> 00:44:35.320
<v Speaker 2>kind of let's let's kind of land this plane, so

639
00:44:35.400 --> 00:44:37.960
<v Speaker 2>to speak, and then we can have kind of question.

640
00:44:38.480 --> 00:44:41.000
<v Speaker 2>You know, I'll let you talk because I know I've

641
00:44:41.039 --> 00:44:47.920
<v Speaker 2>been lecturing. Basically, here's the thing. Tier one with Iran

642
00:44:48.159 --> 00:44:52.760
<v Speaker 2>latent capability. They have uranium, they have enrichment infrastructure that

643
00:44:52.800 --> 00:44:57.400
<v Speaker 2>we've tried to we supposedly just completely utterly destroyed. Well

644
00:44:57.440 --> 00:45:00.960
<v Speaker 2>we don't know, but they have a tech nical knowledge base.

645
00:45:01.000 --> 00:45:04.599
<v Speaker 2>I mean the Iranians are these are these are north

646
00:45:04.840 --> 00:45:10.159
<v Speaker 2>of one hundred on the uh uh w ai s

647
00:45:10.599 --> 00:45:15.119
<v Speaker 2>for uh Bell curve. I mean these are this is

648
00:45:15.239 --> 00:45:18.559
<v Speaker 2>as a group a bright people. These are capable people.

649
00:45:20.360 --> 00:45:27.039
<v Speaker 2>They have a crew device potential possibly achievable, not deliverable.

650
00:45:28.559 --> 00:45:32.760
<v Speaker 2>Tier three is a reliable implosion weapon nowhere near nowhere

651
00:45:32.840 --> 00:45:36.840
<v Speaker 2>on the radar nowhere. And they've and they by the way,

652
00:45:37.000 --> 00:45:40.599
<v Speaker 2>that that gun type device again to just hammer this home.

653
00:45:40.960 --> 00:45:44.599
<v Speaker 2>We have no evidence anywhere that they have enriched beyond

654
00:45:44.639 --> 00:45:48.239
<v Speaker 2>sixty percent, or that they've tried to test or construct

655
00:45:48.280 --> 00:45:51.199
<v Speaker 2>any device. And then a Tier four is a deliverable

656
00:45:51.199 --> 00:45:55.480
<v Speaker 2>missile warhead. That's science fiction for the Iranians. So the

657
00:45:55.559 --> 00:45:59.119
<v Speaker 2>debate often jumps from Tier one to Tier four as

658
00:45:59.159 --> 00:46:01.719
<v Speaker 2>if they are adjacent, and they are not. These are

659
00:46:01.760 --> 00:46:05.599
<v Speaker 2>separated by years of compounding difficulty. Again that ladder that

660
00:46:05.880 --> 00:46:10.280
<v Speaker 2>think of it as I'm climbing that I'm at the uh,

661
00:46:10.320 --> 00:46:13.199
<v Speaker 2>I'm at the the climb wall, and it keeps just

662
00:46:13.239 --> 00:46:17.159
<v Speaker 2>getting more and more folding back on itself in difficulty.

663
00:46:17.360 --> 00:46:22.360
<v Speaker 2>So that's how you make that's kind of the ladder

664
00:46:22.440 --> 00:46:26.199
<v Speaker 2>of nuclear development. This is why we have not this

665
00:46:26.239 --> 00:46:29.760
<v Speaker 2>is why it's it's not easy, but you can police

666
00:46:29.800 --> 00:46:34.360
<v Speaker 2>this pretty well. And uh, Iran wasn't. We have no

667
00:46:34.440 --> 00:46:36.639
<v Speaker 2>evidence that they were anywhere close to any of this,

668
00:46:37.599 --> 00:46:42.719
<v Speaker 2>but you scare people with ah, they've got uranium, and uh,

669
00:46:43.000 --> 00:46:44.880
<v Speaker 2>that's kind of where I think we were. So there

670
00:46:44.880 --> 00:46:49.639
<v Speaker 2>were I think obviously either either the players just didn't understand,

671
00:46:49.960 --> 00:46:53.760
<v Speaker 2>or they were being manipulated, or there are other factors involved.

672
00:46:54.239 --> 00:46:58.679
<v Speaker 1>All right, Ron, thank you, that was incredibly informative, and

673
00:46:59.199 --> 00:47:01.079
<v Speaker 1>you sort of touched on what I wanted to bring

674
00:47:01.159 --> 00:47:07.360
<v Speaker 1>up in that last remark. So, to what degree is

675
00:47:08.039 --> 00:47:13.000
<v Speaker 1>the worry over the Iranian nuclear program legitimate? And to

676
00:47:13.079 --> 00:47:18.679
<v Speaker 1>what degree is it effectively uh a post talk justification

677
00:47:18.840 --> 00:47:20.519
<v Speaker 1>for something we wanted to do anyway?

678
00:47:22.519 --> 00:47:24.920
<v Speaker 2>Well, I think it was absolutely a post talk justification

679
00:47:25.000 --> 00:47:28.519
<v Speaker 2>for what we wanted to do anyway. That being said,

680
00:47:30.119 --> 00:47:32.320
<v Speaker 2>I do want to be I want to you know,

681
00:47:32.360 --> 00:47:38.199
<v Speaker 2>I kind of tend towards classical realism. You have to

682
00:47:38.360 --> 00:47:43.440
<v Speaker 2>the Neocon idea, and it's it's it's kind of like, uh,

683
00:47:44.800 --> 00:47:48.440
<v Speaker 2>it's kind of like dispensationalism. It's kind of internally consistent,

684
00:47:48.599 --> 00:47:50.360
<v Speaker 2>but as a meta narrative flawed.

685
00:47:51.039 --> 00:47:52.639
<v Speaker 3>Uh Uh.

686
00:47:53.119 --> 00:47:57.559
<v Speaker 2>The neocon idea is that you bring war to these

687
00:47:57.599 --> 00:48:03.159
<v Speaker 2>people in order to change them. The the classical realist

688
00:48:03.239 --> 00:48:07.079
<v Speaker 2>I do it? I mean, or do you include them?

689
00:48:07.760 --> 00:48:11.199
<v Speaker 2>Do you game theory this in order to incentivize them

690
00:48:11.239 --> 00:48:14.440
<v Speaker 2>playing nice in the sandbox because you have no way

691
00:48:14.480 --> 00:48:17.679
<v Speaker 2>of enforcing anything else. And that's kind of where I am.

692
00:48:17.760 --> 00:48:22.079
<v Speaker 2>I think the the neocon idea is, look, we had

693
00:48:22.480 --> 00:48:27.440
<v Speaker 2>we we we created chaos in in Iraq, in Libya,

694
00:48:27.719 --> 00:48:35.079
<v Speaker 2>in Syria. Uh, why not in Iran? And that deals.

695
00:48:35.119 --> 00:48:38.360
<v Speaker 2>Now we get a bunch of birds with one stone,

696
00:48:39.119 --> 00:48:41.800
<v Speaker 2>and I think that's kind of the way this was thought.

697
00:48:41.880 --> 00:48:45.360
<v Speaker 2>And we can use nuclear this nuclear threat as a

698
00:48:45.400 --> 00:48:49.679
<v Speaker 2>way to move public opinion, because nobody's gonna go sit

699
00:48:49.760 --> 00:48:53.960
<v Speaker 2>through Ron's lecture on nuclear proliferation in the ladder of development.

700
00:48:54.519 --> 00:48:59.320
<v Speaker 2>So that's kind of where I think the calculus was.

701
00:48:59.719 --> 00:49:03.960
<v Speaker 2>Do I think that's where Trump or Rubio or or

702
00:49:04.000 --> 00:49:07.599
<v Speaker 2>any of these other players were. I, you know, I don't.

703
00:49:08.159 --> 00:49:11.639
<v Speaker 2>I don't know these guys, and the guys I do know,

704
00:49:11.760 --> 00:49:14.280
<v Speaker 2>I don't want to. I don't think it's fair to

705
00:49:14.280 --> 00:49:16.400
<v Speaker 2>to talk about them in a public form. They can

706
00:49:16.440 --> 00:49:20.639
<v Speaker 2>speak for themselves, but I just don't have enough visible

707
00:49:20.920 --> 00:49:24.079
<v Speaker 2>I just don't know. I do know very much where

708
00:49:24.079 --> 00:49:26.280
<v Speaker 2>the lobby is on all this. And they were fine

709
00:49:26.320 --> 00:49:31.159
<v Speaker 2>with chaos, uh and using you know, they were fine

710
00:49:31.199 --> 00:49:34.360
<v Speaker 2>with chaos, And I think do I think all of

711
00:49:34.400 --> 00:49:38.519
<v Speaker 2>it was completely dishonest? No. I think that there is

712
00:49:38.599 --> 00:49:45.119
<v Speaker 2>a certain paranoia due to world events, and and you know,

713
00:49:45.119 --> 00:49:46.920
<v Speaker 2>I don't want to paint with a mop that there

714
00:49:47.000 --> 00:49:49.920
<v Speaker 2>is you know, I spoke with I was Tucker and

715
00:49:50.039 --> 00:49:55.400
<v Speaker 2>Darryl Cooper's guest at one of his h when he

716
00:49:55.440 --> 00:49:57.880
<v Speaker 2>was doing the big town hall public town halls and

717
00:49:58.000 --> 00:50:01.880
<v Speaker 2>uh and oh good night. Roseanne Barr was the guest.

718
00:50:03.440 --> 00:50:08.800
<v Speaker 2>And Roseanne was very entertaining and uh she but you know,

719
00:50:08.880 --> 00:50:12.320
<v Speaker 2>she's a Jewish lady, and she was very when I visited,

720
00:50:12.599 --> 00:50:15.199
<v Speaker 2>she visited with us, and she was very open that Look,

721
00:50:15.280 --> 00:50:19.559
<v Speaker 2>we were raised to be afraid everyone is just waiting

722
00:50:19.599 --> 00:50:22.199
<v Speaker 2>to throw us in the ovens and and and indicate.

723
00:50:22.320 --> 00:50:26.000
<v Speaker 2>So there's uh, this is what we were all raised with.

724
00:50:26.079 --> 00:50:28.599
<v Speaker 2>This is what we were We were shown these videos

725
00:50:28.639 --> 00:50:31.840
<v Speaker 2>and movies from a very early age. So I think,

726
00:50:32.199 --> 00:50:33.599
<v Speaker 2>you know, and I had a little bit of a

727
00:50:33.639 --> 00:50:38.639
<v Speaker 2>public falling out with Dave. Uh uh real boy. And

728
00:50:38.880 --> 00:50:41.840
<v Speaker 2>you know I always got along with Dave, but uh,

729
00:50:41.920 --> 00:50:44.440
<v Speaker 2>and I don't want to air anything publicly, but but

730
00:50:44.599 --> 00:50:47.480
<v Speaker 2>he basically accused me of wanting to throw Jews in

731
00:50:47.519 --> 00:50:52.000
<v Speaker 2>the ovens, and which is just ridiculous. But there I

732
00:50:52.039 --> 00:50:55.599
<v Speaker 2>don't think all of that paranoia is dishonest. I think

733
00:50:55.599 --> 00:51:01.880
<v Speaker 2>it's unfounded. I think it may be uh unjustified. But

734
00:51:01.880 --> 00:51:05.199
<v Speaker 2>but but there is a certain amount of this paranoia

735
00:51:05.280 --> 00:51:09.360
<v Speaker 2>that comes from the the way a lot of these

736
00:51:09.400 --> 00:51:12.159
<v Speaker 2>folks will raise the environment and so on and so forth.

737
00:51:12.159 --> 00:51:14.360
<v Speaker 2>Does that make sense? I'm trying to be as fair

738
00:51:14.440 --> 00:51:18.559
<v Speaker 2>as possible to the psychology of this. I don't think

739
00:51:18.559 --> 00:51:25.199
<v Speaker 2>it's born of a faithful following of Torah, uh whatsoever? Uh? I,

740
00:51:25.760 --> 00:51:27.960
<v Speaker 2>you know, and I think this paranoia is used by

741
00:51:28.000 --> 00:51:34.360
<v Speaker 2>certain political actors to advance a a a strategy that

742
00:51:34.440 --> 00:51:40.039
<v Speaker 2>has little or nothing to do with a faithful Jewish

743
00:51:40.119 --> 00:51:43.119
<v Speaker 2>way of life in the levant you know this is.

744
00:51:43.400 --> 00:51:45.440
<v Speaker 2>Does that make sense? Oh?

745
00:51:45.800 --> 00:51:50.519
<v Speaker 1>One hundred percent. You'll you'll hear a similar story from

746
00:51:50.719 --> 00:51:56.480
<v Speaker 1>uh one onn a writer right speaking about very similar experiences,

747
00:51:56.639 --> 00:51:58.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, with her parents, basically saying like, you know,

748
00:51:59.039 --> 00:52:01.559
<v Speaker 1>watch out because all your friends at school one bad

749
00:52:01.639 --> 00:52:05.599
<v Speaker 1>day and they'll throw you in an oven. And okay,

750
00:52:05.679 --> 00:52:08.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, we could say that that's from a certain

751
00:52:08.039 --> 00:52:10.960
<v Speaker 1>level ridiculous, but you've got to understand that does produce

752
00:52:11.000 --> 00:52:15.519
<v Speaker 1>a certain result in people. It does, I think is interesting.

753
00:52:15.800 --> 00:52:19.000
<v Speaker 1>And this is a point that Eric Weinstein made in

754
00:52:19.079 --> 00:52:22.840
<v Speaker 1>both of his conversations with Tucker, which were quite good,

755
00:52:22.960 --> 00:52:26.400
<v Speaker 1>they're worth your time, And he mentioned that there is

756
00:52:26.480 --> 00:52:29.400
<v Speaker 1>sort of a self fulfilling prophecy to these in the

757
00:52:29.440 --> 00:52:36.719
<v Speaker 1>sense that that attitude will produce persecution people won't like you,

758
00:52:36.800 --> 00:52:39.960
<v Speaker 1>either on a personal or a national stage. And to me,

759
00:52:40.679 --> 00:52:42.920
<v Speaker 1>and this is a going back to a conversation you

760
00:52:43.000 --> 00:52:47.840
<v Speaker 1>and I had, geez, I guess the last time, you know,

761
00:52:47.920 --> 00:52:51.920
<v Speaker 1>we kicked off something with Iran, which is effectively, well,

762
00:52:52.280 --> 00:52:55.800
<v Speaker 1>if Iranian leadership didn't want nukes before, they really do

763
00:52:56.000 --> 00:52:59.119
<v Speaker 1>now simply from the perspective of you know we mentioned

764
00:52:59.199 --> 00:53:03.079
<v Speaker 1>Pyongyang early here, Well, if you are the enemy of

765
00:53:04.480 --> 00:53:09.000
<v Speaker 1>the global you know, the global liberal order, well you're

766
00:53:09.000 --> 00:53:12.079
<v Speaker 1>looking around for well, who's made it and who hasn't?

767
00:53:12.719 --> 00:53:16.039
<v Speaker 1>And right, sure there are problems with North Korea, but

768
00:53:17.440 --> 00:53:20.599
<v Speaker 1>you know, no one's launching ill conceived five week wars

769
00:53:20.599 --> 00:53:24.519
<v Speaker 1>with North Korea because you know it's a crazy guy

770
00:53:24.559 --> 00:53:25.079
<v Speaker 1>with a gun.

771
00:53:25.679 --> 00:53:28.840
<v Speaker 2>Well, they have king sex and that's what nuclear development

772
00:53:28.880 --> 00:53:31.679
<v Speaker 2>gives you, and the threat of it gives you a card.

773
00:53:31.719 --> 00:53:33.199
<v Speaker 2>And if you're going to give that up, then you

774
00:53:33.239 --> 00:53:36.760
<v Speaker 2>do because you do have a target. If if your

775
00:53:36.800 --> 00:53:43.920
<v Speaker 2>ideology isn't uh neoliberal, look at the Look would the

776
00:53:44.000 --> 00:53:48.360
<v Speaker 2>Russians have been invaded by NATO had they not had nukes.

777
00:53:50.400 --> 00:53:54.480
<v Speaker 2>I'm talking about after the Soviets, I'm talking about the Russians.

778
00:53:55.199 --> 00:53:57.400
<v Speaker 2>I think there's a you can at least make the

779
00:53:57.519 --> 00:54:01.599
<v Speaker 2>argument that they would have been. And why is it?

780
00:54:01.679 --> 00:54:06.000
<v Speaker 2>Because are the Russians? Uh is Putin really looking to

781
00:54:06.119 --> 00:54:08.480
<v Speaker 2>and everybody goes, oh, well look what he's doing with Ukraine. Well,

782
00:54:08.599 --> 00:54:12.519
<v Speaker 2>we were looking to set up shop next door. Uh provoked.

783
00:54:12.559 --> 00:54:16.199
<v Speaker 2>Go listen to this where Scott Horton is outstanding, his

784
00:54:16.199 --> 00:54:19.920
<v Speaker 2>book provoked outstanding. I'll throw a plug at a at

785
00:54:19.920 --> 00:54:27.519
<v Speaker 2>another podcaster. But uh, the but the the the the

786
00:54:27.559 --> 00:54:30.920
<v Speaker 2>reason the Russians are hated is because they're not neoliberals,

787
00:54:32.079 --> 00:54:36.960
<v Speaker 2>and there's some cultural bias because there's some powerful oligarchs

788
00:54:36.960 --> 00:54:41.119
<v Speaker 2>of a certain ethnic inclination that were muscled out of

789
00:54:41.639 --> 00:54:48.199
<v Speaker 2>being the Northern European cheekdom. So you know, there's part

790
00:54:48.239 --> 00:54:51.920
<v Speaker 2>of that where a true russe in in In Putin

791
00:54:52.760 --> 00:54:55.719
<v Speaker 2>said no, you're you're gonna you're gonna serve Russia or

792
00:54:55.760 --> 00:54:59.719
<v Speaker 2>you're out and we'll take all your wealth. And uh anyway,

793
00:54:59.800 --> 00:55:02.199
<v Speaker 2>that another topic for another day. But but the point

794
00:55:02.239 --> 00:55:05.079
<v Speaker 2>is it's not up for discussion because the Russians have

795
00:55:05.440 --> 00:55:14.280
<v Speaker 2>the King's x uh so, and Iran isn't neoliberal. Okay,

796
00:55:16.559 --> 00:55:21.679
<v Speaker 2>what strikes me is as as non rational is let's

797
00:55:21.679 --> 00:55:23.760
<v Speaker 2>say we do go in the end result of this

798
00:55:23.920 --> 00:55:27.559
<v Speaker 2>is a complete Persian or I say, I keep saying Persia.

799
00:55:27.960 --> 00:55:31.800
<v Speaker 2>There there are a thousand ethnicities within this area. The

800
00:55:31.840 --> 00:55:36.760
<v Speaker 2>Persians are like the Han Chinese, they're the dominant and gifted.

801
00:55:37.119 --> 00:55:42.159
<v Speaker 2>If you know, we're we're human biodiversity realists here right. Uh,

802
00:55:42.280 --> 00:55:45.480
<v Speaker 2>they're the gifted class that and just like the Han

803
00:55:45.480 --> 00:55:51.039
<v Speaker 2>are in in China uh and South Asia uh uh so,

804
00:55:52.599 --> 00:55:56.840
<v Speaker 2>or or Southeast Asia uh so? The so the it's

805
00:55:56.880 --> 00:56:00.760
<v Speaker 2>it's it's the Iranians. Which is this kind of the

806
00:56:00.840 --> 00:56:05.840
<v Speaker 2>result of three thousand years of Persian imperial dominance? Uh?

807
00:56:07.360 --> 00:56:12.280
<v Speaker 2>Are you know they are the way they are? And

808
00:56:12.280 --> 00:56:16.960
<v Speaker 2>and and uh. But if you balkanize this region and

809
00:56:17.000 --> 00:56:19.360
<v Speaker 2>you turn it into chaos, now you're gonna have five

810
00:56:19.440 --> 00:56:24.559
<v Speaker 2>or six actors with with hegemonic with quasi hegemonic control

811
00:56:24.800 --> 00:56:27.360
<v Speaker 2>or the ability to close the straight How does that

812
00:56:27.400 --> 00:56:31.800
<v Speaker 2>make sense as opposed to as opposed to one that

813
00:56:31.880 --> 00:56:37.840
<v Speaker 2>you may not agree with their philosophical, non neoliberal point

814
00:56:37.840 --> 00:56:40.719
<v Speaker 2>of view, but at least it's one group that you

815
00:56:40.800 --> 00:56:43.039
<v Speaker 2>deal with. Now you're gonna deal with five or six

816
00:56:43.400 --> 00:56:45.960
<v Speaker 2>That makes that makes no sense from a from a

817
00:56:45.960 --> 00:56:48.199
<v Speaker 2>game theory standpoint, but I don't think it's been thought of.

818
00:56:48.719 --> 00:56:51.960
<v Speaker 2>I think it's we just want chaos because there's there

819
00:56:52.039 --> 00:56:53.840
<v Speaker 2>is a push for a greater Israel. And I don't

820
00:56:53.840 --> 00:56:57.880
<v Speaker 2>want to be you know, too speculative about Israel's you know,

821
00:56:58.039 --> 00:57:00.599
<v Speaker 2>I don't think there is a monolithic Israel. There's like

822
00:57:00.679 --> 00:57:04.880
<v Speaker 2>Cood and the and the kind of the atheist socialistic

823
00:57:06.760 --> 00:57:09.679
<v Speaker 2>like Cood version of what they want, the Net and

824
00:57:09.760 --> 00:57:13.199
<v Speaker 2>Yahoo vision, and then I don't know what the rest

825
00:57:13.239 --> 00:57:16.079
<v Speaker 2>of Israel wants. They've been out of power for so long.

826
00:57:16.119 --> 00:57:19.760
<v Speaker 2>Who knows, you know, I really don't know. If some

827
00:57:20.000 --> 00:57:24.320
<v Speaker 2>if if one of these other groups got control, who knows,

828
00:57:25.519 --> 00:57:28.639
<v Speaker 2>maybe they'd be just a different same song, you know,

829
00:57:28.760 --> 00:57:29.480
<v Speaker 2>different verse.

830
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<v Speaker 1>So Ron, this has been a fascinating discussion. I learned

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<v Speaker 1>a lot as happy to have you. If people are

832
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<v Speaker 1>interested in you and your work, well where can they

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<v Speaker 1>find more of it?

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<v Speaker 2>I have a piece coming out about this very thing

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<v Speaker 2>in the American mind, the UH, the uh uh out

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<v Speaker 2>output of the more daily and regular output of the

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<v Speaker 2>Claremont Institute that should be coming out either or later

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00:57:59.800 --> 00:58:04.280
<v Speaker 2>to or maybe tomorrow UH. And then I have UH

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<v Speaker 2>and I have other pieces there and then I write

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00:58:06.960 --> 00:58:12.760
<v Speaker 2>for American Reformer on more Christian theological issues, occasionally write

841
00:58:12.800 --> 00:58:15.719
<v Speaker 2>for Responsible state Craft, which is a publication of the

842
00:58:15.800 --> 00:58:20.840
<v Speaker 2>Quincy Institute for UH for Realism and Restraint. And then

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00:58:20.840 --> 00:58:24.239
<v Speaker 2>I write on my substack at the Eyes of Apilles

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<v Speaker 2>or you can find it at Ron Dodson dot substack

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<v Speaker 2>dot com. And then I'm on x causing you know,

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<v Speaker 2>great consternation.

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<v Speaker 1>Well again, man, thank you so much. This was fascinating.

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<v Speaker 1>I'll be sure to grab that piece from the American

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<v Speaker 1>Mind when it's up included in the show notes, sprails

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00:58:41.880 --> 00:58:45.480
<v Speaker 1>everything else as far as my stuff, Jaburton Show anywhere

851
00:58:45.480 --> 00:58:48.159
<v Speaker 1>you listen to podcasts if you want the episodes early

852
00:58:48.199 --> 00:58:50.480
<v Speaker 1>in ad free. I know the ads are irritating, but

853
00:58:51.559 --> 00:58:54.840
<v Speaker 1>I gotta live somehow, so it's sort of ane. Yeah

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<v Speaker 1>pay j yeah, thank you. This is what I've been

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<v Speaker 1>saying for years now. Uh wait, never mind, I'm not

856
00:59:00.960 --> 00:59:05.599
<v Speaker 1>going to make that joke because anyway, five bucks a

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00:59:05.639 --> 00:59:09.119
<v Speaker 1>month on Patreon, substack or comroad no ads early not

858
00:59:09.199 --> 00:59:12.519
<v Speaker 1>a bad deal. It's twenty eighteen cents an hour, I

859
00:59:12.519 --> 00:59:14.440
<v Speaker 1>think is what it comes out to. So I'm working

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00:59:14.480 --> 00:59:16.239
<v Speaker 1>for it, right, I'm not one of these guys that

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<v Speaker 1>puts out one show a month and charge you ten

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00:59:18.440 --> 00:59:23.159
<v Speaker 1>bucks for the privilege. Anyway, Ron, this is fascinating everyone

863
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<v Speaker 1>at home. Keep your head up well, I can't last forever.

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<v Speaker 1>Good Night,
