Speaker 1: Michael the news break says that the Iranians moved most
Speaker 1: of the uranium or the nuclear products before the air strike.
Speaker 2: I thought Israel had air dominance.
Speaker 1: Why didn't they take out all those trucks.
Speaker 2: This sounds like a cluster.
Speaker 3: Let's walk through that, because I spent probably too much
Speaker 3: time last night trying to figure out what, what do
Speaker 3: we know or what's being said about the strikes on
Speaker 3: Iran's nuclear facilities back on June twenty second. Remember it
Speaker 3: targeted three sites, Fordeau, the Tons and Isfahan, Operation Midnight
Speaker 3: Hammer B two Spirit stealth bombers, fourteen bunker buster bombs,
Speaker 3: the GBU fifty seven massive ordnance penetrators. We had a
Speaker 3: submarin that more I think more than two dozen Tomahawk
Speaker 3: cruise missiles. And then Trump comes out. The President comes
Speaker 3: out and claims the strikes quote completely and totally obliterated
Speaker 3: Rand's nuclear enrichment capabilities. But then when I start digging,
Speaker 3: and I'm not yet willing to fall on one side
Speaker 3: or the other, and let me explain why, because I'm
Speaker 3: not trying to be you know, wishy washy here, and
Speaker 3: I'm not trying to be.
Speaker 2: You know, the lawyer well, you know, consider this.
Speaker 3: But on the other hand, it's because I know how
Speaker 3: intelligence reports are given. I know how intelligence is collected,
Speaker 3: and I know that sometimes intelligence is the facts may
Speaker 3: be there, but nobody asks the right questions, and so
Speaker 3: the summary, the briefing doesn't get to the heart of
Speaker 3: what you really want to know. And I don't know
Speaker 3: whether that's the case here or not. And I also
Speaker 3: don't know whether politics is playing a part of this
Speaker 3: or not. So I just went through every publicly available
Speaker 3: source that I can have access to. I ask a
Speaker 3: couple of people that might have some tangential knowledge about
Speaker 3: it to find out what's real and what's not real.
Speaker 3: So let's just think in terms of damage assessment, and
Speaker 3: let's go first to FOURDEH, because that's around's most fortified
Speaker 3: nuclear facility, very deep, with than a mountaineer calm, and
Speaker 3: it is designed specifically to withstand air strikes.
Speaker 2: It's an uranium enrichment.
Speaker 3: Site capable of holding up to two thousand, nine hundred
Speaker 3: and seventy six centrifuges. It is probably the most critical
Speaker 3: part of Iran's nuclear program because of the hardened structure.
Speaker 3: So on that particular site, we deployed twelve mops on
Speaker 3: four doh each wayh you know, thirty thousand pounds each
Speaker 3: capable of penetrating up to sixty meters of earth or
Speaker 3: eighteen meters of concrete. We dropped twelve of those twelve
Speaker 3: times well sixty meters depending on how many you know
Speaker 3: initially of earth, and then twelve times however many that
Speaker 3: you know through eighteen meters of concrete. Maxar Technologies, part
Speaker 3: of which is actually Colorado, I think. Their satellite imagery
Speaker 3: captured on June twenty second shows six large craters clustered
Speaker 3: around two entry points on the ridge above the facility,
Speaker 3: and then you see dustined debris scattered all across the
Speaker 3: mountain side. Tunnel entrances appear on the satellite imagery to
Speaker 3: be blocked now because of the strike shock waves or
Speaker 3: where there are preemptive Iranian actions to seal the entryways. Now,
Speaker 3: I'm really sure it makes any difference. The entry points
Speaker 3: appear to be shut down, sealed off. So what's the
Speaker 3: damage assessment? Well, the damage as assessment itself is the
Speaker 3: significant surface damage craters blocked tunnel entrances. The so called
Speaker 3: experts suggest that the mops likely targeted ventilation structures or
Speaker 3: other infrastructure on the surface to maximize penetration. The extent
Speaker 3: of the damage to the underground centrifuge halls and the
Speaker 3: enrichment equipment, honestly, I think remains unclear now. The director
Speaker 3: of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, a guy
Speaker 3: by the name of Raphael Grossi, he has stated, and
Speaker 3: I quote, no one could be able to tell you
Speaker 3: how much it has been damaged underground, as the IAEA
Speaker 3: inspectors have not yet accessed the site. The facility's depth
Speaker 3: estimated that forty five to ninety meters of bedrock. An
Speaker 3: iron's use of high strength concrete concrete may have limited
Speaker 3: the bomb's effectiveness. I emphasized may have because we don't know.
Speaker 3: There are a few experts. Jeffrey Lewis from Middlebury Institute
Speaker 3: of International Studies. He says the strikes did not appear
Speaker 3: to target RAN's highly enriched uranium stockpiles, which are likely
Speaker 3: sorted underground tunnels. Now, I tried to figure out what
Speaker 3: was he talking about, tunnels inside the facility, Tunnels that
Speaker 3: like you know, tentacles somehow go outside, still beneath the mountain,
Speaker 3: still within the mountain, but outside, you know, like like
Speaker 3: imagine a big giant room in the middle, you know
Speaker 3: what would to be forty five or ninety meters below bedrock,
Speaker 3: and then from their tentacles out in those titles they
Speaker 3: throw of those titles.
Speaker 2: Well, that's what he says.
Speaker 3: The Institute for Science and International Security YAHOO by the
Speaker 3: name of I shouldn't say YEAHO docause David Albright. He
Speaker 3: suggests that thousands of the uninstalled centrifuges may remain intact elsewhere, which,
Speaker 3: of course, he argues, would allow Iran to reconstitute its
Speaker 3: enrichment capacity. The only Israeli commentary is anonymous speakers that
Speaker 3: describe the damage as serious but not complete destruction, which
Speaker 3: obviously would contradict Trump's claim of literated. And of course
Speaker 3: it gets to the definition of obliterated, which in my
Speaker 3: vernacular is under destruction, totally destroyed. Aron's Atomic Energy Organization says, oh,
Speaker 3: just minor damage. But what would you what would you
Speaker 3: expect them to say? So for FEDOR, it's sustained severe
Speaker 3: surface damage, probably disruption to underground operations. The core underground
Speaker 3: enrichment capabilities, including the centrifuges and the uranium stockpiles may
Speaker 3: not have been fully destroyed, and part of the facility
Speaker 3: may remain partially intact. But is it accessible and is
Speaker 3: it operational? My guess is that it is not operational.
Speaker 3: It's certainly probably not accessible at all, but that doesn't
Speaker 3: mean that parts of it inside the very core may
Speaker 3: some of it may remain undamaged. It just you know,
Speaker 3: you know when you blow something up that you know
Speaker 3: you have pieces and parts whatever that remain intact and
Speaker 3: other pieces are just shredded. So that's my assessment of
Speaker 3: for door Matons. The Isfahan province now, it is Iran's
Speaker 3: primary uranium enrichment site. It has both above and underground facilities.
Speaker 3: It housed cascades ofentrifuges, including those at sixty percent enriched,
Speaker 3: and that was what some have described as the cornerstone
Speaker 3: of the urine Iranian nuclear program. So two mops were
Speaker 3: dropped into Tons targeting in an underground centrifuge facility. Israel had
Speaker 3: drop bombs prior to that, back a couple of weeks,
Speaker 3: while she s maybe nine or ten days earlier.
Speaker 2: If it already.
Speaker 3: Damaged the above ground infrastructure, including the Iranian's pilot fuel
Speaker 3: enrichment plant. And they also attacked all the electrical substations.
Speaker 3: So what's the damage assessment? Again, you go to Maxar Technologies.
Speaker 3: You can find all these photos online. Significant damage to
Speaker 3: the above ground structures, including that facility that was in
Speaker 3: producing the sixty percent enriched uranium. The IAEA confirmed that
Speaker 3: the above ground part was destroyed, the electrical infrastructure, all
Speaker 3: the substations, the power supplied buildings, all the backup generators
Speaker 3: they were and they used the term obliterated, which I
Speaker 3: just found interesting. So the IAEA says that in terms
Speaker 3: of the toons, the infrastructure was obliterated, But what about
Speaker 3: the underground. Go back to the IAEA, Grossie, the same
Speaker 3: director director general, I think is its title. Notice that
Speaker 3: the sudden loss of external power would have severely damaged,
Speaker 3: if not destroyed, altogether, the underground centrifuge cascades. All right,
Speaker 3: So that's the IAEA destroyed all, you know, probably destroyed altogether.
Speaker 3: Now what got interesting was and the Wall Street Journal
Speaker 3: has a headline today. I've not yet read the story,
Speaker 3: but the let me just pull it up, just saying
Speaker 3: team what the headline is? Wall Street Journal today has
Speaker 3: a headline. The reason this is important, is Hegsath? The
Speaker 3: Defense Secretary says FBI is probing leak of Iran strike report.
Speaker 3: The preliminary preliminary report said strikes on three Iranian nuclear
Speaker 3: facilities step back to RAN's ambitions by only a few months.
Speaker 3: The Israel Iran cease fire appeared to hold for another
Speaker 3: So apparently this information I'm about to share with you
Speaker 3: is information that was supposedly leaked and now the FBI
Speaker 3: is investigating it.
Speaker 2: So what is that?
Speaker 3: A Defense intelligence agency, the DEA, they released a report
Speaker 3: or leaked a report, or somebody got a report on
Speaker 3: June twenty four, that's yesterday, which indicated that core components,
Speaker 3: including some centrifuges, remained intact and could be restarted within months.
Speaker 3: Those are That's the only general quote that I can
Speaker 3: find about the destruction there. So let's go to the
Speaker 3: Institute for Science and International Security. A guy by the
Speaker 3: name of Spencer Farragassa estimated that reconstituting that which could
Speaker 3: remain intact and which could be restarted could take years.
Speaker 3: But he is the one that has suggested that the
Speaker 3: Uranians might have uninstalled centrifuges stored elsewhere, reducing a setback,
Speaker 3: not that they moved any He in particular says that
Speaker 3: they may have uninstalled centrifuges that were stored elsewhere. They
Speaker 3: emphasize that the strikes did not target enriched uranium stockpiles,
Speaker 3: which could and may have been moved to covert sites. Now,
Speaker 3: the Iranians, of course, you know, know, nothing happened, kind
Speaker 3: of Bagdad Bob here, nothing happened. So I would just
Speaker 3: conclude this Natan suffered very extensive damage, particularly to the
Speaker 3: above ground infrastructure and likely to the underground centrifuges because
Speaker 3: of the power disruptions, because those centrifuges need remain powered
Speaker 3: up and if you destroy the power source, then you're
Speaker 3: going to damage the centrifuges. There may be some underground
Speaker 3: capabilities and some uninstalled equipment that may remain intact, but
Speaker 3: that will that limits the long term impact, and that
Speaker 3: doesn't define or I can't find any definition that if
Speaker 3: you took those First of all, let's go back again
Speaker 3: about natons. I don't believe they have access to the
Speaker 3: internal core facility. Now, that will take time to get
Speaker 3: access to that core facility. Once they get in there,
Speaker 3: they may or may not find that there is some
Speaker 3: destruction and it may be obliterated, it may not, but
Speaker 3: we just don't know yet. So some underground capabilities and
Speaker 3: some uninstalled equipment may remain intact, which over I don't know,
Speaker 3: a period of time which I'm not willing to define,
Speaker 3: they could reconstitute.
Speaker 2: Is Fahn.
Speaker 3: Is a key nuclear research and production center. It housed
Speaker 3: the uranium conversion facility, fuel fabrication plants, and again another
Speaker 3: storage area for enriched uranium. It is probably the least
Speaker 3: fortified of the three structures. However, it is critical for
Speaker 3: preparing raw materials and converting uranium into a form for enrichment,
Speaker 3: so it's kind of like it's the least secure, the
Speaker 3: least fortified, and is the initial starting point for their
Speaker 3: conversion process. It was hit by more than two dozen
Speaker 3: Tomahawk cruise missiles. The missiles targeted key surface infrastructure. Again,
Speaker 3: Israel had hit that site earlier in June, damaged four buildings,
Speaker 3: including the uranium conversion facility. So what's the damage assessment? Again,
Speaker 3: go back to MAXR and their satellite imagery. It shows
Speaker 3: heavily damaged buildings, infrastructure, and again the IAEA General Director
Speaker 3: or Director General confirms extensive damage to six additional buildings,
Speaker 3: including a fuel rod production facility. The strikes targeted the
Speaker 3: facilities that with minimal or no nuclear material, so of
Speaker 3: course there was no radiological release. By the way, I
Speaker 3: would just make a comment here that the IAEA says
Speaker 3: they've seen no release of radiation anywhere, and people have
Speaker 3: jumped to the conclusion that means that wasn't damaged. I
Speaker 3: think that's erroneous because if you have the facilities that
Speaker 3: you know, ninety meters below ground, all contained within concrete,
Speaker 3: that's like a nuclear reactor, and so if you then
Speaker 3: bomb that and everything is now piled on top of
Speaker 3: that concrete, than the concrete itself is now damaged and
Speaker 3: is piled onto the uranium, then you're probably not going
Speaker 3: to have any radiation exposure. You're not going to have
Speaker 3: any radiation leaks, because that's how nuclear reactors are designed
Speaker 3: that you know, it keeps it all contained, and if
Speaker 3: you pile the mountain on top of that, it's even
Speaker 3: more contained. But that's just my assessment. They go back
Speaker 3: to the Defense Intelligence Agency, they say the underground structures,
Speaker 3: including storage for the highly enriched uranium, were largely unaffected. Yeah,
Speaker 3: I made the mistake. That's not a mistake. I decided
Speaker 3: to see what are some of these people saying on
Speaker 3: X because it is a good source for news. You
Speaker 3: go back to one account back on June fifteenth, claim
Speaker 3: that a key facility for converting ninety percent enriched uranium
Speaker 3: gas to metal, which is a step weaponization, that it
Speaker 3: was damaged. But I can't find that verified anywhere. Lewis
Speaker 3: and Albright, those two experts I cited earlier, they emphasized
Speaker 3: that the strikes did not destroy the enriched uranium stockpiles,
Speaker 3: which they say may have not that they were, but
Speaker 3: they may have been moved to other secret locations, and
Speaker 3: of course the uraniums. Once again, well, there's nothing wrong here.
Speaker 3: So I would conclude that in terms of ISFAHAN, it
Speaker 3: did sustain severe damage to the above ground infrastructure, but
Speaker 3: the underground storage and some of the critical components may emphasize,
Speaker 3: may remain intact. But that may be so what because
Speaker 3: ISFAHAN their role in uranium conversion and storage makes it
Speaker 3: less central to enrichment. That means it's still important, but
Speaker 3: it's not that sign Now, what is the president, what's
Speaker 3: the administration? And what are some of the independent assessments
Speaker 3: of the overall damage.
Speaker 2: This is where it gets dicey Michael.
Speaker 4: It seems perfectly fitting for Trump to use a term
Speaker 4: like total obliteration for the destruction and Iran. I mean,
Speaker 4: what else is you going to say, big, beautiful obliteration.
Speaker 4: Of course, that's just Trump.
Speaker 3: I agree wholeheartedly, it is just Trump. But I think
Speaker 3: I think it's worth because any anyone who wants to
Speaker 3: use that language against him by showing that there was
Speaker 3: not and I think it's redundant to say complete the
Speaker 3: blitterate because obliteration implies that you've totally destroyed something. They're
Speaker 3: going to use that against him politically, and in fact,
Speaker 3: I think that's what's going on, which is why I
Speaker 3: wanted to go through and see what I could find
Speaker 3: from whatever sources I can access, to see whether or
Speaker 3: not we've really stopped the Iranians or have we paused
Speaker 3: the Iranians? Have we slowed them down? I mean, there's
Speaker 3: a whole spectrum of possibilities here. And I just again
Speaker 3: because the cabal, and in this case, I mean every
Speaker 3: aspect of the cabal, the you know, the tech companies,
Speaker 3: all of the ruling elites, Democrat and Republican They're all
Speaker 3: over the place, and the media is all over the place,
Speaker 3: and so I thought one thing I would try to
Speaker 3: do today is just give objective, an objective survey of
Speaker 3: what I really think has happened, which leads to the
Speaker 3: next thing I wanted to do is just let's look
Speaker 3: at the overall damage assessment from the administration, independent sources
Speaker 3: and the IAEA satellite imagery, and what was what were
Speaker 3: the Iranians doing beforehand? So, as you point out, both
Speaker 3: Trump and the Deaf sect have said that the strikes
Speaker 3: obliterated the facilities, and Trump went on, of course, to
Speaker 3: your point, describing the operation as a spectacular military success.
Speaker 3: But remember that the next day when I played the
Speaker 3: briefing from I played the entire eight minutes of General
Speaker 3: dan Kine determine the Joint Chiefs. When you think back
Speaker 3: on that, he was actually more measured. I'm not going
Speaker 3: to play the whole thing again, except he said this
Speaker 3: that all three sites sustained quote extremely severe damage and destruction,
Speaker 3: but that a full battle damage assessment was pending. And
Speaker 3: then he went on to say, generally speaking to until
Speaker 3: we get that full battle damage assessment, we won't know
Speaker 3: the extent of the extremely severe damage and destruction, which is,
Speaker 3: you know, slightly different than what Trump said, but again
Speaker 3: not surprising the Defense Intelligence Agency. I've got this under
Speaker 3: independent assessments, but I only say that because the DA
Speaker 3: having worked with them, they really do try to be objecting. Now,
Speaker 3: they had a preliminary classified report that was leeure somehow
Speaker 3: obtained yesterday by CNN, The Washington Post, New York Times,
Speaker 3: the Guardian, the usual suspects in the cabal. Now I've
Speaker 3: not seen the report itself, but they conclude that the
Speaker 3: strikes did not destroy core components of the Iranian nuclear program,
Speaker 3: including the centrifuges and the highly enretigrate uranium stockpiles. They
Speaker 3: say the program was set back by a few months
Speaker 3: tops that's a quote from the Times and others, rather
Speaker 3: than years. They do say that the entrances to Fordeau
Speaker 3: and the Times were sealed, but that doesn't necessarily mean
Speaker 3: that the internal underground structures collapsed entirely. Those two experts
Speaker 3: fort Lewis and Albright, they argue that the strikes were incomplete,
Speaker 3: because they still argue their contention is that the Iranians
Speaker 3: likely moved the enriched uranium and retains uninstalled centrifuges that
Speaker 3: were never put into use, so they could take the
Speaker 3: enriched uranium, use those in the uninstalled centrifuges and start
Speaker 3: back up again. The IAEA reported, as I said earlier,
Speaker 3: no off site radiation increases, no major radiological release grows.
Speaker 2: See.
Speaker 3: The Director General noted significant damage at all three sites,
Speaker 3: and he says the toms's above ground facilities were destroyed
Speaker 3: and potential centrifuge damage underground, and they too, as I
Speaker 3: said earlier, waiting to access underground access or at least
Speaker 3: access as far as they can get so they can
Speaker 3: do a damage assessment. And the satellite imagery both from
Speaker 3: Maxar which I've quoted earlier and Planet Labs PBC, does
Speaker 3: show all the surface damage, the craters, the debris, the
Speaker 3: destroyed buildings at all three sides, But obviously that cannot
Speaker 3: show the underground damage, so that's going to be harder
Speaker 3: to gauge because of the depth and the fortification. It
Speaker 3: was interesting that I found satellite and you may have
Speaker 3: seen these, the satellite images from days before the strikes.
Speaker 3: They showed this unusual what they call unusual truck activity
Speaker 3: at four dou Now some will argue that suggests that
Speaker 3: the Uranians were moving enriched uranium or equipment, and in fact,
Speaker 3: a senior IRGC, the Iranian Guard Corps, they actually claim
Speaker 3: back on June twentieth, that all enriched uranium was transferred.
Speaker 3: Now that's unverified, and it's unbelievable because I would expect
Speaker 3: them to say that. But I've looked closely at those trucks.
Speaker 3: Those trucks, now this is concluded. I'm obviously not an expert,
Speaker 3: but those trucks don't look like the kinds of trucks
Speaker 3: that you would use if you're going to be transformed, transforming,
Speaker 3: if you're going to be transferring enrich uranium, either in
Speaker 3: centrifuges or in rich uranium and whatever containers they keep
Speaker 3: them in and centrifuges, those just didn't look like the
Speaker 3: kind of trucks you would use. I would think you
Speaker 3: would have, you know, some sort of more sophisticated equipment
Speaker 3: to move them. So the uranium preparations, based on my
Speaker 3: past experience with.
Speaker 2: The Iraq WMD issue.
Speaker 3: In which we had intelligence that said some of this
Speaker 3: may have been moved to both Russia and into Syria.
Speaker 3: In fact, I still believe to this day that some
Speaker 3: of the some of the WMD, particularly the nerve gases
Speaker 3: and others, probably were moved into Syria because the Syrians
Speaker 3: eventually use those nerve gases against the Kurds and others.
Speaker 3: So I wouldn't be surprised if the Iranians did something
Speaker 3: like the Iraqis did, and you know, in anticipation of
Speaker 3: some strike either by the United States or by the Israelis,
Speaker 3: may indeed move some of it. But I'm want to
Speaker 3: emphasize the only basis on which that claim is made
Speaker 3: is the satellite imagery showing trucks lined up, which they
Speaker 3: claim to be as unusual. I have no clue whether
Speaker 3: it's unusual, unusual or not, but there were indeed trucks
Speaker 3: in some of the satellite imagery days before the strike,
Speaker 3: and they may have been doing something. They may have
Speaker 3: been reinforcing, They may have been bringing more dirt in
Speaker 3: for all I know. But that is the extent of
Speaker 3: the uranium preparations enriched uranium stockpiles. According to the Defense
Speaker 3: Intelligence Agency and all their experts in their analysis, they
Speaker 3: are being quoted saying that Iran moved much of its
Speaker 3: highly indur itched uranium before the strikes, possibly to secret facilities,
Speaker 3: and Lewis, again from I forget whether he was from
Speaker 3: which group he was from, noted that significant amounts of
Speaker 3: this in uranium still exists, but the location remains unknown.
Speaker 2: Now.
Speaker 3: That stockpile, if it really is intact, would allow Aran
Speaker 3: to potentially enrich to ninety percent according to the experts,
Speaker 3: in days two weeks, using any surviving or covert centrifuges
Speaker 3: that they may have hidden elsewhere. So, while the Tonza's
Speaker 3: centrifuges were probably I shouldn't say likely damaged, the Uranians
Speaker 3: probably have uninstalled centrifuges stored elsewhere. I think they probably
Speaker 3: have done that simply because I know that we do
Speaker 3: that sort of thing. You know, we have just to
Speaker 3: take something that's not That's the total opposite pharmaceuticals. We
Speaker 3: have pharmaceutical stockpiles, and some are in incredibly secure facilities
Speaker 3: and some are not in so secure facilities in order
Speaker 3: to have easier access. Well, if we would do with
Speaker 3: that with pharmaceuticals, I know we do that with other
Speaker 3: dangerous things, Well, why wouldn't the Uranians do the same thing.
Speaker 3: We do know that the Iranians were well, I shouldn't
Speaker 3: say we know. It was reported so to the extent
Speaker 3: that the reports are correct, that Iran had had begun
Speaker 3: constructing some new underground centri feud facilities near Neatons before
Speaker 3: the strikes, and that area was not targeted. And again
Speaker 3: the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that Iran may maintain really
Speaker 3: small covert enrichment sites that they purposely put together, so
Speaker 3: they would have some redundancy, some you know, like having
Speaker 3: a generator, you have some ability to keep the power on,
Speaker 3: to keep the process going, albeit at a smaller, more
Speaker 3: discreet level. There is one weaponization expert, Kenneth Pollock from
Speaker 3: the Middle East Institute. He's quoted as emphasizing that the
Speaker 3: Iranian nuclear knowledge is very widespread and that you cannot
Speaker 3: eliminate the knowledge by bombing. Now we know that we've
Speaker 3: killed some scientists. We know we killed, or shouldn't say
Speaker 3: we although there may be some of the facilities. We
Speaker 3: know that the Israelis targeted some of they had scientists.
Speaker 3: But that's all I can find reported is that the
Speaker 3: is Rayley's targeted and did assassinate some of the key
Speaker 3: scientific experts that were in charge of the programs. How
Speaker 3: many assistants did they have. How much knowledge do the
Speaker 3: assistants have Are they capable of stepping into the place
Speaker 3: of those that were assassinated. I can't find any publicly
Speaker 3: available information about that, but I would think again, if
Speaker 3: you're going to build redundancy into your program, you would
Speaker 3: have some of that. You would have some other scientists
Speaker 3: that you know, maybe are just you know, they're fill ins,
Speaker 3: they are understudies, and they follow along to see what's
Speaker 3: going on. So I think we've set it back. The
Speaker 3: question is whether we've obliterated it, totally destroyed it or not.
Speaker 3: And if we accept that there may be redundant sites
Speaker 3: on a smaller scale that remain untouched, then technically, in
Speaker 3: terms of obliterating are we talking about obliterating those three sites?
Speaker 3: Are we talking about obliterating their nuclear program? If it's
Speaker 3: the latter, we probably haven't done that.
Speaker 1: Michael, nothing will change in Iran, and tell there's a
Speaker 1: regime change. When that happens, we have a change of leadership,
Speaker 1: we have a possibility of peace. Until then, they're just
Speaker 1: going to keep working away on, you know, trying to
Speaker 1: kill Americans and Jews.
Speaker 3: Their cockroaches, and that is precisely what they will do
Speaker 3: sixty nine to twenty seven rites that might so we
Speaker 3: can drop a bomb from thirty thousand feet into a
Speaker 3: washing machine, but we can't watch where some trucks went.
Speaker 3: Don't believe it, Well you shouldn't believe it. The satellite
Speaker 3: imagery that's taken by our satellites is constant, so we
Speaker 3: know of the movement, which is why I go back
Speaker 3: to the point about the trucks. The trucks just don't
Speaker 3: period of me to be the type of trucks that
Speaker 3: we would that they would use, or anybody would use
Speaker 3: to transport that kind of dangerous equipment and supplies. So
Speaker 3: I don't believe that things removed, although they may have tried.
Speaker 3: The bottom line would be this. The strikes back on
Speaker 3: the twenty second indeed cause severe damage to their nuclear
Speaker 3: facilities at those three sites, particularly to the above ground structure,
Speaker 3: and I believe to the underground components, but I don't
Speaker 3: think that it was obliterated completely destroyed.
Speaker 2: Some of that blow ground once and if they can.
Speaker 3: Get access to it, can be salvaged, can be used again.
Speaker 3: So the program was set back for a period of time,
Speaker 3: and I don't have the expertise to say whether it's
Speaker 3: months or years or whatever it is. But to the
Speaker 3: talk back point, I do believe this. The Molas are
Speaker 3: like cockroaches. They can survive anything, and they will continue
Speaker 3: to survive, and when they can, they'll sit it out. Now,
Speaker 3: if if Masade or the diaspora outside the country can
Speaker 3: get some sort of revolution going, then we have to
Speaker 3: support that because to your point, the way to ensure
Speaker 3: that they do not reconstitute, restart or pick up the
Speaker 3: program where it left off is regime change. I'm not
Speaker 3: advocating boots on the ground, but I am advocating that
Speaker 3: Right now the Molas are in I mean, they have
Speaker 3: no air force, the IRGC has been, their leadership is
Speaker 3: completely disrupted.
Speaker 2: There have to be some.
Speaker 3: Within the IRGC that are willing and waiting to defect,
Speaker 3: but there needs to be some tipping point that will
Speaker 3: get them doing that, and Masad in the Israelis are
Speaker 3: in the best place to do that.
Speaker 2: That's my take on the damage assessment.
Speaker 3: So I think we ought to all just recognize that
Speaker 3: probably not obliterated, Yes, sat back not totally destroyed, and
Speaker 3: the only way to completely stop it.
Speaker 2: Even if we can, even if it was obliterated.
Speaker 3: If they remain in powered, they'll turn to their allies
Speaker 3: and start it all over again. May take years, but
Speaker 3: they will