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Speaker 1: Everything's there. I want to welcome everyone back to the
Speaker 1: Peak and Yona show. We had a little bit of
Speaker 1: a hiatus because you know, did a little traveling and everything.
Speaker 1: But Thomas is back and we're going to finish up
Speaker 1: the series on who started World War Two? Who's responsible?
Speaker 1: And yeah, so take it away, Thomas.
Speaker 2: Yeah, thanks for hosting me again. There's there's two issues
Speaker 2: here and if memory serves, in the first episode of
Speaker 2: this little series, we addressed the issue of one exactly
Speaker 2: the Second World War started, which seems pedantic, but it's not. It.
Speaker 2: This is a real matter of contention for anybody who's
Speaker 2: seriously engaged with the subject matter. There's a reason why
Speaker 2: court historians claim the opposite of hostilities was September third,
Speaker 2: nineteen thirty nine, because that represents a discreetly ideologically coded perspective.
Speaker 2: And obviously the intention is to present the global strategic
Speaker 2: and geopolitical situation as being one of relative peace until
Speaker 2: the German Reich violated that peace through naked aggression against
Speaker 2: the Polish state. Okay, that's a problematic perspective for all
Speaker 2: kinds of reasons, you know, some of which are political,
Speaker 2: some of which are purely historical in nature and factual.
Speaker 3: But what I think is irrebuttable.
Speaker 2: Even if one accepts, you know, the.
Speaker 3: Mainstream view of.
Speaker 2: The onset of hostilities between the German Reich and Poland
Speaker 2: and the subsequent words declaration on the German Reich by
Speaker 2: France and the United Kingdom. The fact of the matter
Speaker 2: is that weeks prior, the Soviet Union assaulted the Japanese
Speaker 2: Imperial Army at Chalcan Goal. This was a massive engagement.
Speaker 2: This is a massive clash of forces, you know, and
Speaker 2: obviously it represented the onset of a state of general
Speaker 2: hostilities between two great powers, the Soviet Union and the
Speaker 2: Empire of Japan. So I don't really see how anybody
Speaker 2: whoks likes to be taken seriously It can claim that
Speaker 2: this was some sort of insignificant event or somehow not
Speaker 2: related to the broader nexus of causation that you know,
Speaker 2: also precipitated the amin of hostilities in Europe.
Speaker 3: You know, either.
Speaker 2: The Soviet Union going to war with Japan in a
Speaker 2: scale capacity represented the onset of general hostilities a planetary scale,
Speaker 2: or it didn't.
Speaker 3: Okay, So there's that.
Speaker 2: Related to that, but more discreetly political in terms of
Speaker 2: the significance of the subject matter vis a vis court history,
Speaker 2: narratives and the way that official authorities in the United
Speaker 2: States and the United Kingdom and.
Speaker 3: The Buddhist Republic.
Speaker 2: Continue to present, you know, and characterize the Second World
Speaker 2: War is the issue with Soviet intentions and what exactly
Speaker 2: the state of power political relations was between Moscow and
Speaker 2: Berlin as of you know, June twenty second, nineteen forty one.
Speaker 2: And it's pretty clear to me, you know, and I
Speaker 2: draw a lot in substantial measure on the late Jacham
Speaker 2: Hoffmann's exhaustive study of Barbarossa. It's pretty clear to me
Speaker 2: that the Soviet Union was eminently going to assault Europe
Speaker 2: and the German Rich, not just the Feure but okay,
Speaker 2: w as well as you know, various command elements within
Speaker 2: the party apparatus, the military and the secular state of
Speaker 2: apparatus recognized this reality, as did myriad heads of state
Speaker 2: who found themselves allied with the German Reich for various reasons.
Speaker 2: You know, this included Croatia, Slovakia, Italy, and you know France.
Speaker 2: You know, again, there was no Vhi France. There was
Speaker 2: the Government of France, and it was absolutely on the
Speaker 2: side of the Axis powers. You know, there were volunteers
Speaker 2: from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland throughout this Central Asian Islamic countries.
Speaker 2: You know, Romania. Romania contributed a quarter million men, which
Speaker 2: is a massive contribution for a country the size of Romania.
Speaker 2: You know, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, you know, Belgium, Luxembourg.
Speaker 3: You know, the list goes on and on and on
Speaker 3: and on. You know.
Speaker 2: And obviously the Spaniards at Leningrad fought incredibly valiantly. But
Speaker 2: you know, there there's this, This wasn't just a matter
Speaker 2: of zeitgeist. There some sort of mass hysteria or some
Speaker 2: sort of desire to sacrifice one's life, or some sort
Speaker 2: of epemeral glory. The Soviet Union, uh had. Aside of
Speaker 2: the fact that it was animated by a revolutionary ideology
Speaker 2: that was really global in character. It, the Soviet Union
Speaker 2: had built a military juggernaut the likes of which the
Speaker 2: world had never seen. It was almost unfathomable, and it
Speaker 2: was only growing larger and more powerful, you know, And
Speaker 2: the like I said to me, this is obvious, Hoffman
Speaker 2: Uh and Victor Suvarov and Uh a few other military historians,
Speaker 2: all right, says Stope is another one they brought unique
Speaker 2: insight to the table, and Hoffman in particular, his data
Speaker 2: points were and are exhaustive. And Hoffman too, he he
Speaker 2: not that I mean, obviously, I don't have any prejudice
Speaker 2: against independence scholars. I am one, but such that people
Speaker 2: are prone to dismissing historians who don't have what they
Speaker 2: view as adequate credential affiliation with reputable institutions. Well, Hoffmann
Speaker 2: when he was alive, he was in the employee of
Speaker 2: the official Historical Records division of the Bundesman, you know,
Speaker 2: and he was considered to be probably the seminole German
Speaker 2: historian on Barbarossa in terms of the military aspects. Okay,
Speaker 2: you can't say that he was a crank or that
Speaker 2: he was some agrieved guy who was outside of the
Speaker 2: establishment of the bundes Republic. He was very much insinuated
Speaker 2: into it. Okay, not that that have to make a difference,
Speaker 2: but such that it does, you know, I don't see
Speaker 2: how people can impeach his credibility, you know. And one
Speaker 2: of the issues that Hoffman takes up, because again Hoffman
Speaker 2: was very focused on the quantitative military aspects of Barbarossa.
Speaker 2: One of the things that he addressed was a lot
Speaker 2: of lay people as well as historians and military analysts
Speaker 2: who know better, but for cynical reasons. Van Wagen on
Speaker 2: this argument, they claim that, well, if the Soviet Union
Speaker 2: was so deep we mobilized and had to raise such
Speaker 2: a massively scaled war machine, why did they absorb catastrophic casualties. Well,
Speaker 2: that's exactly why they did, because they were deployed offensively.
Speaker 2: And when you're talking about combined arms, even to this day,
Speaker 2: I mean drones in localized autonomous firepower are are definitely
Speaker 2: changing things, most strategically and tactically, and nowhere is that
Speaker 2: more on display than than in various aspects of tactical
Speaker 2: deployment and depth. But even to this day, this remains constant.
Speaker 2: If we're talking about combined arms. Modern warfare.
Speaker 3: Were not.
Speaker 2: You can't just call a proverbial audible in the midst
Speaker 2: of hostilities if your forces are a rayed to assault
Speaker 2: and switch to a defensive paradigm. So coming under assault
Speaker 2: when not prepared to defend in depth, it can lead
Speaker 2: to catastrophe, particularly when one's opponent is the Wehrmacht. And
Speaker 2: I'm gonna get into how exactly that plays out but
Speaker 2: not only again, does the attrition rate and specifically the
Speaker 2: skewed nature of that attrition rate, not only does that
Speaker 2: not tend to rebut the claim before us, it actually
Speaker 2: tends to substantiate it. Now, I'll get into some of
Speaker 2: these data points, said, you know, to clarify what we're
Speaker 2: talking about here. I can't remember if I got into
Speaker 2: this or not in the first episode. And please tell
Speaker 2: me if I'm repeating myself and know what has need
Speaker 2: to correct me. I'm not gonna be offended. Quite the contrary,
Speaker 2: You'll be quite gracious. Between November nineteen forty and literally
Speaker 2: the eve of Barbarossa in June of nineteen forty one,
Speaker 2: the Soviets undertook a massive arms build up. It now,
Speaker 2: don't get me wrong. By the autumn of nineteen forty
Speaker 2: the Soviets enjoyed numeric and arguably technological superiority pretty much
Speaker 2: across the entire spectrum of combined arms. But this punctuated
Speaker 2: build up of November nineteen forty to June nineteen forty
Speaker 2: one can really only be interpreted as mobilization and anticipation
Speaker 2: of offensive operations. On the outbreak of hostilities in June
Speaker 2: twenty second, nineteen forty one.
Speaker 3: The Soviet Union.
Speaker 2: Had deployed no less than twenty four thousand tanks, close
Speaker 2: to two thousand of which were T thirty fours, which
Speaker 2: you know, in those days there weren't battle tanks. There
Speaker 2: was light, medium, and heavy tanks. Then are you with
Speaker 2: super heavy tanks? But uh, the T thirty four was
Speaker 2: I think of it as kind of like the the
Speaker 2: the zero of of of armored forces. You know, it
Speaker 2: was probably the most effective armored platform of the entire war.
Speaker 2: And and all are out in terms. Okay, yeah, obviously
Speaker 2: you know, the the Tiger was a superior machine. That's
Speaker 2: not what we're talking about, you know, in the the uh,
Speaker 2: the ability of T thirty four is to be rolled
Speaker 2: off the assembly line rapidly, you know, almost like model
Speaker 2: T Fords or something odin that that that itself was
Speaker 2: a force multiplier, you know it.
Speaker 3: Uh.
Speaker 2: Between nineteen and thirty eight and June twenty second, nineteen
Speaker 2: forty one, the.
Speaker 3: Red Air Force.
Speaker 2: Had acquired over twenty three thousand military aircraft, around thirty
Speaker 2: seven one hundred of which could be considered cutting edge.
Speaker 2: Probably about half of those had night fighting capability. The
Speaker 2: Red Army had close to one hundred and fifty thousand
Speaker 2: field artillery pieces and heavy mortars.
Speaker 3: The Red Navy.
Speaker 2: Had over two hundred submarines, which I can't remember if
Speaker 2: I mentioned or not, But obviously the submarines are expressly offensive.
Speaker 2: There aren't defensive submarines, you know. And to be clear,
Speaker 2: this alone, I mean, the Soviet Union wasn't known as
Speaker 2: any kind of.
Speaker 3: Maritime power.
Speaker 2: I mean, if anything, you know, the the Tsars Navy
Speaker 2: had been sank by the Japanese in nineteen oh five,
Speaker 2: and that it further compromised the prestige actual potential of
Speaker 2: you know, the Russian Navy is a real force. But
Speaker 2: by June twenty second, nineteen forty one, the Soviet Union
Speaker 2: by far had the largest submarine fleet in the world,
Speaker 2: more than four times that of the Royal Navy, you know,
Speaker 2: in the UK was viewed as the foremost naval power
Speaker 2: on this planet, you know. I mean, these data points
Speaker 2: speak for themselves, you know. And on the political side,
Speaker 2: I know I've gotten into this. In pre obvious series
Speaker 2: that we've done, I put a lot of emphasis on
Speaker 2: direct testimony, owing I'm sure in part to the fact
Speaker 2: that my background in part at least is that of
Speaker 2: a lawyer, you know. But also if we're talking about intent,
Speaker 2: particularly of wartime executives, there's a tendency to be able
Speaker 2: to rely upon the statements of a wartime executive or
Speaker 2: an executive who is preparing for war. There's a there's
Speaker 2: incentivization to telling the truth when the chief executives so
Speaker 2: situated as talking to his cabinet or as a general
Speaker 2: staff officers, Okay, because what incentive or there be to lie?
Speaker 2: Number one, And there's there's there's active disincentives to lie,
Speaker 2: because that compromises the ability of subordinate command elements to
Speaker 2: effectively execute orders and wage war towards victory conditions.
Speaker 3: You know.
Speaker 2: And so I put a lot of stock in what
Speaker 2: Stalin said, and a lot of this testimony from Stalin himself,
Speaker 2: you know, that which isn't independently documented by you know,
Speaker 2: the minutes of his speeches or or by audio recording.
Speaker 2: You know, a lot of Stalin's intimates were the sources
Speaker 2: of these statements, including Colonel Volkaganov, who was Stalin's official biographer,
Speaker 2: you know.
Speaker 3: And Stalin gave a series of speeches in this.
Speaker 2: In the year preceding Barbarossa, but particularly the six to
Speaker 2: eight months immediately proceeding onset of hostilities, which approximately reflects
Speaker 2: the final phase of mobilization that we talked about just now,
Speaker 2: from November nineteen forty to June nineteen forty one. And
Speaker 2: Volkognanov makes the point that Stalin was very taciturn, but
Speaker 2: he became quite king ended and quite open within the
Speaker 2: cloisters of you know, these command element corridors in his
Speaker 2: discussion of you know, what was to be military doctrine
Speaker 2: in the next war, which he increasingly discussed as if
Speaker 2: it was an imminent possibility. In Volkoganov's own words, in
Speaker 2: describing the speech Stalin made on May fifth, nineteen forty one,
Speaker 2: he says, quote the leader made it unmistakably, unmistakably clear.
Speaker 2: War is inevitable in the future. One must be ready
Speaker 2: for the quote unconditional destruction of German fascism. The worl
Speaker 2: will be fought on enemy territory and victory will be
Speaker 2: achieved with few casualties. And again, this wasn't something that
Speaker 2: Stalin merely devised as a polemical device to embolden forces
Speaker 2: under his command or to overcome any potential or actual
Speaker 2: crises and confidences among the general staff by appeal to
Speaker 2: revolutionary fervor. Lenin made clear in identifying the core doctrinal
Speaker 2: elements of the Red Army, you know, back in nineteen twenty,
Speaker 2: nineteen twenty one, nineteen twenty two, that the Red Army
Speaker 2: was an instrumentality of revolutionary imperatives. It wasn't a defensive element,
Speaker 2: you know, and it was to be deployed offensively at
Speaker 2: all times, you know, because the only rationale for its
Speaker 2: existence within the paradigm of Mercist historiography and Leninist revolutionary
Speaker 2: doctrine was to facilitate the advance of history and the
Speaker 2: victory of the proletariat against the class enemy. So there's
Speaker 2: really no there's really no way to interpret Soviet battle
Speaker 2: doctrine as anything other than discreetly, ideologically coded and axiomatically offensive,
Speaker 2: you know. And this is this is going on, or
Speaker 2: this is relying upon the strictures of Marxist Leninist ontology
Speaker 2: and the distinct Marxist view of military power and its
Speaker 2: utility and its ethical functions. And the Marxist Leninism was
Speaker 2: in fact a total philosophical and political system impoverished as
Speaker 2: it may have been intellectually in various capacities, and to
Speaker 2: be fair, it's sophisticated in others. What's irrebuttable or indisputable
Speaker 2: is that it was a total theory of political and
Speaker 2: social and thus historical ontology. So the idea that the
Speaker 2: party state, which to be clear, by nineteen forty one,
Speaker 2: had categorically annihilated millions of people within the Soviet Union
Speaker 2: owing to what was identified as their ineducability, you know,
Speaker 2: the idea.
Speaker 3: That Stalin.
Speaker 2: Or the Presidium or the pollit Boro Standing Committee, or
Speaker 2: these surviving command elements in the Red Army, the idea
Speaker 2: that they would somehow hesitate to see through these doctrinal
Speaker 2: imperatives is somewhat laughable, you know. And we're not in
Speaker 2: the court of law, so it shouldn't be a problem
Speaker 2: to invoke subsequent as well as prior precedent, to demonstrate
Speaker 2: persuasively what the doctrinal character was of Marxist Leninist revolutionary
Speaker 2: military elements. I invoked the case of Cambodia a lot,
Speaker 2: you know, from nineteen seventy five to nineteen seventy nine,
Speaker 2: and I know for a fact because I hate me
Speaker 2: all its effect on things. People suspect I only do
Speaker 2: that for the sake of polemical expediency. But that's not why.
Speaker 2: Paul Pott was not some simple minded brute. He was
Speaker 2: actually a very sophisticated political soldier. He had a very
Speaker 2: deep understanding of Marxist Leninism, far more than Mao and
Speaker 2: Democratic Kempuccia, as Paul Pott and his cadre branded the
Speaker 2: country during their brief tenure, was a very pure Marxist
Speaker 2: Leninist stayed in some ways, and there was nothing There
Speaker 2: was nothing heterodox in ideological terms about the way they
Speaker 2: implemented class adjusting for the discrete conditions on the ground
Speaker 2: in Southeast Asia as in nineteen seventy five. So what
Speaker 2: I'm getting at, and I'll move on here in a
Speaker 2: moment I don't quite understand. Are the same people who
Speaker 2: acknowledge that the Soviet Union was this outlier country and uh,
Speaker 2: that was unusual in every conceivable sense, you know, in
Speaker 2: terms of practice and policy and theoretical foundations and everything else.
Speaker 2: Yet they insist that this this didn't somehow impact military
Speaker 2: decision making, or that revolutionary ontology somehow, somehow stopped at
Speaker 2: the at the point of executive decisionism when it came
Speaker 2: to the decision to you know, spread the revolutionary very
Speaker 2: cause to Europe and specifically to annihilate the dialectical enemy
Speaker 2: in the German Reich. But you know, the Stalin had
Speaker 2: spoken again and again as well to the Central Committee,
Speaker 2: most notably on January eighth, nineteen forty one, and there
Speaker 2: was two high ranking Air Force officers in attendance, and.
Speaker 3: Stalin apparently.
Speaker 2: Spoke directly of the ratio and algorithm that was necessary
Speaker 2: to defeat the German Reich.
Speaker 3: According to.
Speaker 2: The General Staff, as well as his own calculations, as
Speaker 2: had been explicated to him by authorities that he trusted.
Speaker 2: He spoke on this particular day to quote twofold superiority.
Speaker 2: He said that, as had been explained to him, twofold
Speaker 2: superiority is a law of military science, meaning the two
Speaker 2: to one ratio contra the enemy and offensive operations. You know,
Speaker 2: whether you're talking about raw numbers or you know, force
Speaker 2: multipliers and variables tending to act as force multipliers that
Speaker 2: magnify the effectiveness of offensive elements.
Speaker 3: You know, and.
Speaker 2: Stalin stated openly that quote, this is not a game.
Speaker 2: The time is approaching for military operations twofold. Superiority is essential,
Speaker 2: but greater supurity is even better. And he said that
Speaker 2: he spoke specifically of the difficulty of traversing the Carpathians
Speaker 2: and the need to designate at least five thousand attack
Speaker 2: aircraft in order to neutralize defensive positions that infantry and
Speaker 2: armor aren't going to be able to readily traverse owing
Speaker 2: to the terrain. Now, this is hugely important for reasons
Speaker 2: I'm going to into in a moment, Okay, But from
Speaker 2: January of forty one, specifically January eighth until May you know,
Speaker 2: only weeks before Barbarossa, Stalin talks again and again about
Speaker 2: waging military operations in the Balkans, specifically across the Romanian frontier,
Speaker 2: and discrete exigencies that are presented by waging war in
Speaker 2: that theater. Okay, in a lecture given in the spring,
Speaker 2: I believe March of forty one, but somehow neglected to
Speaker 2: sign an execut date.
Speaker 3: He uh.
Speaker 2: Addressed uh the Soviet planopotentiary representative in Belgrade, which.
Speaker 3: At that time was under the.
Speaker 2: Rule briefly of a Chetnik junta, which in turn led
Speaker 2: to the German intervention and ultimately the you know, bifurcation
Speaker 2: of the Kingdom of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes. But in
Speaker 2: addressing the Planopotentiary representative in Belgrade and uh select members
Speaker 2: of the Pullet Buro, he said, quote, the USORROW will
Speaker 2: only react at the proper time. The powers are scattering
Speaker 2: their forces more and more. The USSR is therefore waiting
Speaker 2: to act unexpectedly against Germany. And doing so, the USSR
Speaker 2: will cross the Carpathias, which lads as the signal for
Speaker 2: the revolution in Hungary. Soviet troops will penetrate Yugoslavia from Hungary,
Speaker 2: advance the Adriatic Sea, and cut Germany off from the
Speaker 2: Balkans in the Middle East.
Speaker 3: Okay, So what does this mean in both.
Speaker 2: Immedia tactical terms and how this impacted the battlefield situation
Speaker 2: in Operation Barbarosa as well as in broader strategic terms. Well,
Speaker 2: I'll take up the latter question first. For the latter aspect, first,
Speaker 2: the Soviet Union planned to assault Europe through Romania. By
Speaker 2: capturing Romania, it could deprive Germany of essential access to
Speaker 2: petroleum reserves. And also that's commensurate with Soviet deep battle doctrine,
Speaker 2: which presuming forces and being ratios that Stalin described as
Speaker 2: being you know, at least a twofold advantage and preferably
Speaker 2: double or triple that Stalin basically was planning a deep
Speaker 2: battle like pincer flanking maneuver across the entirety of the
Speaker 2: continent in the north through Sweden and then down to
Speaker 2: assault Germany from the north and in the south.
Speaker 3: The main.
Speaker 2: Stair punts would be through Romania. And I'll get into
Speaker 2: in a moment. This is why the Army Group Center,
Speaker 2: Army Group South Face Savage Resistance and Barbarossa Army Group
Speaker 2: Center was moving so fast it was basically like face
Speaker 2: with no more than token opposition on the road to Moscow,
Speaker 2: which doesn't make any sense unless you understand the deployment
Speaker 2: schema of the Red Army, which was totally offensive and
Speaker 2: concentrated in the South in a way that wouldn't be
Speaker 2: fashionably in a in a defensive.
Speaker 3: Oriented schema. It's a.
Speaker 2: Most uh, most significant everyone, I'm jumping around a bit,
Speaker 2: but so please stop me if I'm not being clear.
Speaker 2: Most significant. The super hypothesis, in terms of Stalin's declared
Speaker 2: intentions was probably what's going to be known as the
Speaker 2: secret meeting with the polit Burrow and the Soviet representatives
Speaker 2: of the Common Tern who had been called back presumably
Speaker 2: to be availed for the specific person being availed to
Speaker 2: this speech on a August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, which
Speaker 2: obviously coincided with the assault and the Japanese a Kalkan goal.
Speaker 2: But this was a surprise secret meeting, and it was
Speaker 2: unprecedented for the Russian delegation of the Common Turn to
Speaker 2: be called back. Among other things, Stalin didn't have a
Speaker 2: lot of He didn't have a lot of respect for
Speaker 2: the Common Turn. I mean, in part because the his
Speaker 2: UH rigid command doctrine. He didn't I mean, he wasn't
Speaker 2: comfortable with uh an ideologic we coded cadre structure, whereby
Speaker 2: independent of Moscow, just going to the fact of distance
Speaker 2: and you know, remoteness. You know, he didn't he didn't
Speaker 2: want some cadre making decisions, even superficially on behalf of
Speaker 2: the Soviet Union without his direct oversight. Okay, but nonetheless,
Speaker 2: you know, the Common Turn still had tremendous clout in
Speaker 2: ninety thirty nine, and especially coming off of the defeat
Speaker 2: in Spain, there was a real danger of a fracturing.
Speaker 3: Of a.
Speaker 2: You know, the the broad international front, red front. So
Speaker 2: this is highly significant. You know, I guess what I'm
Speaker 2: getting at is that Stalin wouldn't have called the Russian
Speaker 2: delegation back just for you know, for the sake of
Speaker 2: putting on airs or to stand on ceremony or something.
Speaker 2: And this is when I think, I excuse me, I
Speaker 2: think I briefly addressed this last episode. It was in
Speaker 2: this it was in this secret meeting or secret speech
Speaker 2: that Stalin declared that, you know, getting the Germans to
Speaker 2: getting the right foreign ministry to agree to a non
Speaker 2: aggression pact, you know, that would embolden them to act
Speaker 2: against Poland, you know, because theretofore the Berlin and specifically
Speaker 2: Hitler felt that his hands were tied in resolving the
Speaker 2: Polish issue, because an assault on Poland, even in the
Speaker 2: wake of a gross provocation or violation of Germany's territorial
Speaker 2: integrity on the frontier, you know, what would lead to
Speaker 2: a Soviet counter strike that would be devastating. So Stalin's
Speaker 2: reasoning was, you know, we will uh will lull Germany
Speaker 2: with this non aggression pact, which you know absolutely guarantees
Speaker 2: that they will assault Poland, which will then you know,
Speaker 2: lead to a ward declaration by the UK and France,
Speaker 2: Germany you'll, uh will probably be victorious on the Western front,
Speaker 2: but only at pure cost, you know. And then uh,
Speaker 2: you know and that this thus, this is the icebreaker
Speaker 2: that uh will uh soften uh what would be Europe's
Speaker 2: defense in Cordon and allow the Red Army to you know,
Speaker 2: just bowl over and annihilate resistance in the West. And
Speaker 2: you know, thus uh reverse the reverse the defeat handed
Speaker 2: to them and Iberia and you know, conquer the continent
Speaker 2: in a rapid and devastating operation.
Speaker 3: And I mean Stalin.
Speaker 2: This is remarkably consistent as far back as nineteen twenty five,
Speaker 2: you know, when he was less than three years into
Speaker 2: his formal ascendancy as General Secretary, he spoke openly about
Speaker 2: the need to act militarily against Europe as soon as possible,
Speaker 2: but not until the political climate and the you know,
Speaker 2: the myriad it ever sort of changing alliance structure in
Speaker 2: the West was such that what Don called the quote
Speaker 2: broad field of activity would be realizable in order to
Speaker 2: you know, pursue the imperative of world revolution. And to
Speaker 2: be clear, you know, not only was a Europe along
Speaker 2: with America and Japan, you know, the kind of productive
Speaker 2: core of this planet. But you know, the understanding was
Speaker 2: that Europe was still the inconceptual terms, you know, the
Speaker 2: political center of human affairs, you know, conceptually, you know,
Speaker 2: every every every ideological schema you know, came from Europe,
Speaker 2: and even even things like the di colonial movement were
Speaker 2: fully locked into dialectical uh engagement, you know, with with
Speaker 2: with European thoughts. So Stalin's notion was that, you know, first,
Speaker 2: last and always your Europe needs to be overrun and annihilated,
Speaker 2: and the revolution has to has to be implemented there.
Speaker 2: You know, it's a waste of time and it's self
Speaker 2: defeating them pursue uh, such imperatives on the periphery that
Speaker 2: make no mistake, you know, where ever revolutionary activity jumped
Speaker 2: off that had historical momentum and forces in being. Stalin
Speaker 2: absolutely was in favor of supporting that and seeing that through.
Speaker 2: But the uh, but but the but the core mission
Speaker 2: orientation of the Soviet Union had to be you know,
Speaker 2: the the you know, the implementing the World Revolution in Europe,
Speaker 2: you know, first and foremost, and and that's also why
Speaker 2: the Spanish War was so important, you know, it wasn't
Speaker 2: just uh, I've read some court historians claim that Stalin
Speaker 2: was somehow like reluctantly forced into the Spanish War just
Speaker 2: for the sake of appeasing the common term. I mean,
Speaker 2: that's that's that's laughable, for all kinds of reasons. But
Speaker 2: it also you know, Stalin wasn't as heterodox of a
Speaker 2: of a Marxist Leninist as he's often portrayed. I mean,
Speaker 2: Stalin was complicated, you know, Like I said, I it's
Speaker 2: a lean value, but it's a great book, Carrie Bolton's book,
Speaker 2: Stalin The Enduring Legacy. You know, Stalin was a complicated figure,
Speaker 2: and there were heterodox aspects to his worldview and his
Speaker 2: own Velt politique, but it was a radical divergence.
Speaker 3: Or something, you know.
Speaker 2: And that's important, especially because these days even even some
Speaker 2: fairly heterodox political fears and even Summer revisionists seem to
Speaker 2: abide that.
Speaker 3: Fiction.
Speaker 2: But yeah, the you can't and in other words, this
Speaker 2: you can't you can't extricate the ambition of the Sovietization
Speaker 2: of Europe from the existence of the Soviet Union itself.
Speaker 3: You know, these these.
Speaker 2: These ambitions were synonymous, and that's that's also why the
Speaker 2: Cold War developed the way they did in.
Speaker 3: In raw geo strategic terms.
Speaker 2: But you know, and I think I can't remember I
Speaker 2: mentioned or not this speech and question, you know, the
Speaker 2: August nineteen, nineteen thirty nine speech. It was obtained by
Speaker 2: the French news agency Havas, and uh.
Speaker 3: The French were kind of notorious for getting a hold.
Speaker 2: Of these kinds of documents and records, you know, and
Speaker 2: when uh when the Havas agency by way of Geneva,
Speaker 2: when when?
Speaker 3: When?
Speaker 2: When they went public with it? It was published in uh,
Speaker 2: some international journal and then in many of the major
Speaker 2: French language newspapers. But Moscow's propagandas immediately wanted to overdrive,
Speaker 2: you know, and claiming, you know, this is a this
Speaker 2: is a forgery. You know this this is confabulated by
Speaker 2: the the enemies of Russia and the Soviet Union. You know,
Speaker 2: it's fascist propaganda. And uh it did not make us
Speaker 2: nearly as big of an impact as one might think,
Speaker 2: you know, which is really interesting because it goes to
Speaker 2: show you too, how you know, and a lot of
Speaker 2: that too had to do with uh, this kind of
Speaker 2: deafening silence from American news agencies, you know, and other
Speaker 2: than all all the major papers in America, I mean,
Speaker 2: other than those brands held by McCormick. We're basically, uh,
Speaker 2: mouthpieces for the New Deal regime, you know. But it's
Speaker 2: still I mean obviously too.
Speaker 3: I mean this.
Speaker 2: There's a kind of nascent low tech globalism emerging at
Speaker 2: least between America and Europe by way of you know,
Speaker 2: the UK, but even you know, I mean, it's it's
Speaker 2: it's it stort means remarkable that there is basically no
Speaker 2: impact in terms of global opinion.
Speaker 3: And uh, I've looked too to see if.
Speaker 2: This pops up in any America first literature, and I
Speaker 2: haven't found anything this positive on that question. But that
Speaker 2: again goes to show you too, the degree to which
Speaker 2: the psychological environment was being actively manipulated, you know, long
Speaker 2: before the onset of formal hostilities, which might seem like
Speaker 2: an obvious point to you or myself, but people are
Speaker 2: inundated in this country with this idea that you know,
Speaker 2: somehow the New Dealers had no interest in these goings
Speaker 2: on and the European War and the intries from the
Speaker 2: Soviet Union, the German Reich, you know, until Pearl Harbor.
Speaker 2: When America was attacked, then that changed everything. I mean
Speaker 2: that that could not be more false. From the first
Speaker 2: months of the New Deal regime, which again coincided almost
Speaker 2: precisely with the National Socialist Revolution, which was a totally
Speaker 2: legal revolution again, you know, and Roosevelt from the first
Speaker 2: days of his administration was pursuing an an absolutely radical
Speaker 2: anti fascist imperative as the core mandate of an ambition
Speaker 2: of his administration, you know.
Speaker 3: And that can't they can't be denied, you know. In
Speaker 3: the I don't want to spin this off to.
Speaker 2: Tangentially, and I know that a lot of people criticize
Speaker 2: me for my sources.
Speaker 3: Well, yet they have.
Speaker 2: Yet directly rebut any of these data points that I
Speaker 2: have derived from these sources, namely Robert Conquests and.
Speaker 3: Ernst Nolty, and.
Speaker 2: As well as the Black Book of Communism, which is
Speaker 2: a great resource. I'm gonna add, but it's indisputable if
Speaker 2: the Soviet Union exterminated millions of people between nineteen seventeen
Speaker 2: and nineteen forty one, and there was a massive series
Speaker 2: of death camps, actual death camps that were employed towards
Speaker 2: this incredibly gruesome task, and the degree to which there
Speaker 2: was an information blackout about this reality can't be overstated,
Speaker 2: you know. And people who raised this issue, you know,
Speaker 2: not just not just America Firsters, but Joseph Schumpeter's wife. Interestingly,
Speaker 2: she spoke Japanese and she was a big advocate for
Speaker 2: Japanese people. She was kind of a human rights type,
Speaker 2: but of a genuine sort, not like the twenty first
Speaker 2: century sort. And she raised the issue of Soviet annihilation
Speaker 2: therapy as an ULTI called it, and she was she
Speaker 2: and Schumper were her hassled by the FBI, both for
Speaker 2: you know, sympathies for the Axis vis a vis her
Speaker 2: you know, dealings with with with Japanese people and stuff,
Speaker 2: and particularly Japanese people who are being persecuted by the
Speaker 2: New Dealers, but also h you know, propagandizing against the
Speaker 2: Soviet Union in their review was this big subversive act,
Speaker 2: you know, which seems kind of an incredible I'd imagine
Speaker 2: that people today, but.
Speaker 3: They don't.
Speaker 2: I mean, but I mean, it only seems incredible if
Speaker 2: one doesn't accept the true nature of a of that regime.
Speaker 2: But that aside, it's remarkable that degree to which these
Speaker 2: things could in fact be could in fact be hidden,
Speaker 2: you know, But that also raised I mean there's there's
Speaker 2: also obliquely and conversely it it also begs the question,
Speaker 2: you know, if there was this mass murder conspiracy hatched
Speaker 2: in the German Reich at Vance in ninety forty two,
Speaker 2: like why wasn't anybody you know, publicizing that? I mean
Speaker 2: that one would think that would be a godsend to
Speaker 2: the New Dealers and a perfect way to portray the
Speaker 2: Germans as as these horrific villains, and especially became imperative,
Speaker 2: you know by ninety forty four, as the US Army
Speaker 2: was quite literally near mutiny, you know, which we've talked about.
Speaker 2: That was the real catalyst for the execution of poor
Speaker 2: Eddie Slavic. You know, it's.
Speaker 3: People.
Speaker 2: So, you know, the Walter Winschel and the Opposite of
Speaker 2: War Information and all these myriad anglophone news agencies, they
Speaker 2: just decided not to report on the fact that the
Speaker 2: German Reich only existed to exterminate Jewish people, just because
Speaker 2: they didn't think it was important, you know, they didn't
Speaker 2: think it was a useful way to code propaganda. I
Speaker 2: mean that's like a bit tangential, But moving on real quick,
Speaker 2: So I realized we're running out of time. I mentioned
Speaker 2: a moment ago. Something that's often raised is okay, So
Speaker 2: why why was Barbarossa so tactically so tactically successful? And
Speaker 2: why was the attrition rate so algorithmically skewed against the
Speaker 2: Soviet Union if in fact the Soviet Union was mobilized
Speaker 2: for war and planning to attack. But that's exactly why
Speaker 2: these things did develop that way. The Soviets were planning
Speaker 2: to assault Romania by autumn of forty one, and that's
Speaker 2: exactly why, like I said, army groups South encountered comparatively
Speaker 2: savage resistance.
Speaker 3: And that's also why.
Speaker 2: That's also why there was a There was powerful reserve
Speaker 2: elements in Ukraine because essentially they were there to rapidly
Speaker 2: reinforce the shock element that was going to assault the Balkans.
Speaker 2: So there was this awkwardly unbalanced deployment schema of Soviet
Speaker 2: field armies where Soviet forces blocking the corridor to the
Speaker 2: Moscow Leningrad deployment space, they were exponentially weaker than those
Speaker 2: deployed to Ukraine, which doesn't make any sense unless you
Speaker 2: account for the fact that they were deployed in an
Speaker 2: offensive posture. The share punk of which was you know,
Speaker 2: in the south to assault Romania through the Carpathians. Now,
Speaker 2: don't get me wrong, the Soviets were sensitive to the
Speaker 2: fact that Moscow was being left relatively undefended. But you know,
Speaker 2: it doesn't like, it doesn't track any other way other
Speaker 2: than accept what I just acknowledged. And it's also you know,
Speaker 2: again this idea that's endlessly banned to this day, that
Speaker 2: that Stalin was afraid of Hitler, or that the Soviet
Speaker 2: Union was afraid of the Vermach That it's like, well,
Speaker 2: I mean, okay, that's preposterous anyway, but so Stalin was
Speaker 2: so afraid of the ver Manx that he he there
Speaker 2: there basically was a token deployment on the path to Moscow.
Speaker 2: You know, I mean, how how is heply does that work?
Speaker 2: Any uh? I mean, any interpretation is uh, it can
Speaker 2: only result in a conclusion that the Soviets were poised
Speaker 2: for exclusively offensive uppers. I mean, unless you can it's
Speaker 2: a tortured kind of logic. I mean, I guess you
Speaker 2: could claim that the Soviets wanted to draw the Germans
Speaker 2: in and funnel the main line of funnel under to
Speaker 2: the main line of resistance at the gates of Moscow
Speaker 2: and stop them their tracks. But that Moscow practically felt
Speaker 2: you know, that doesn't make any sense. I've read people
Speaker 2: who try to make some variation of that argument, but
Speaker 2: it's it's so preposterous. I don't really think it warrants
Speaker 2: to kind of blow by blow rebuttal but that's really,
Speaker 2: you know, an example of extent conditions. Speaking of herself
Speaker 2: and the resistance that every group center did encounter. To
Speaker 2: be clear, they were defensively deployed either there wasn't any
Speaker 2: depth to their deployment schema, and they in fact were
Speaker 2: forward deployed with a heavily armed shock element in the lead,
Speaker 2: you know, which is one reason why our group center, especially,
Speaker 2: they didn't counter resistance. They got hit with a lot
Speaker 2: of firepower that was immediately exhausted, and then when counterattacking
Speaker 2: the Vermont immediately broke Soviet lines because there was again
Speaker 2: there wasn't any there wasn't any depth to the deployment.
Speaker 2: You know, if you know anything, I'm not any I'm
Speaker 2: not at all like a military type person, but I
Speaker 2: do know something about the internal logic of modern warfare.
Speaker 2: You know, in an abstract deployment since I mean, and
Speaker 2: if you know anything about this, just not even really
Speaker 2: deep diving into the numerical data points and stuff, but
Speaker 2: it's literally looking at the map of the deployment schema,
Speaker 2: they should jump right out at you. It's it's almost
Speaker 2: like you know those a you know, it's like illusion pictures.
Speaker 2: They used to see them a lot, like beer companies.
Speaker 2: And it's like you look at some picture and it
Speaker 2: looks like it's like a bunch of old pictures, a
Speaker 2: Spudge mackenzie or something. But then you see it and
Speaker 2: it's like a sexy girl or something. And then once
Speaker 2: you see that, like you can't unsee it. What's like that? Okay?
Speaker 2: I mean you look at you look at an deployment
Speaker 2: map of the Moscow, Leningrad Gorky battlespace on June twenty second,
Speaker 2: ninety forty one, and you realize like what it is,
Speaker 2: and then and then you can't undersee it, you know.
Speaker 2: So the fact anybody makes an argument of the contrary,
Speaker 2: I got to assume they're being dishonest or they're just
Speaker 2: profoundly ignorant to the subject matter. Yeah, it looks like
Speaker 2: we've gone over an hour. I hope that wasn't too
Speaker 2: skater shot man.
Speaker 1: Let me let me hit you up with one question
Speaker 1: before we go, and this is this is a little
Speaker 1: bit off topic, but it's a question I wanted to
Speaker 1: ask since we were talking about Stalin so much. Yeah,
Speaker 1: did Stalin take half of Europe at the end of
Speaker 1: the war or was he given half of Europe at
Speaker 1: the end of the war?
Speaker 3: I mean both, That's what was decided at Yalta.
Speaker 2: If if if Stal's going to be precluded from taking Germany,
Speaker 2: that meant that I Hower and Montgomery would have had
Speaker 2: to assault Berlin. And had they done that, what would
Speaker 2: have happened was even accounting for the punitive and purely
Speaker 2: a lot purely ideologically motivated and additional surrender demand, vermacht
Speaker 2: Off and SS elements would have basically welcomed them in
Speaker 2: because that would have prevented the literal rape of and
Speaker 2: destruction of the German Reich. And once it was clear
Speaker 2: that Anglo American forces intended to take Berlin, Stalwoin immediately
Speaker 2: shifted to a footing of hostility cot for the United
Speaker 2: States and the UK. And even before that happened, it's
Speaker 2: conceivable that these elements that were driving for Berlin on
Speaker 2: the Soviet side, like first Ukrainian Shock Army, which I
Speaker 2: think was under Rock. I think that I think First
Speaker 2: Ukrainian Shock Army was enter Timoshenko. But whoever whatever formation
Speaker 2: cone of and Rakasovski respectively were commanding, it's very conceivable
Speaker 2: that they would have ordered down the company level commanders
Speaker 2: to treat U, the US and the UK as enemies
Speaker 2: who were literally trying to race to Berlin, as to
Speaker 2: act as a blocking element. And the Soviet view, you know,
Speaker 2: for the Germans so America to found itself at war
Speaker 2: with the Soviet Union. You know, that's the only alternative.
Speaker 2: But I mean, that's what that you like, I said,
Speaker 2: the thing was decided at Yelt It's I mean, I
Speaker 2: don't you can uh. On the one hand, yeah, it
Speaker 2: was the new it was the New Dealers who kept
Speaker 2: the Soviet Union in the war. But like von Manstein,
Speaker 2: I highly recommend von Manstein's it's marketed as his memoirs,
Speaker 2: it's called Loss Victories, but in reality it was just
Speaker 2: debriefing by the War Department, which obviously was very interested
Speaker 2: in learning as much as they could about fighting the
Speaker 2: Soviet Union with combined conventional combined arms with an emphasis
Speaker 2: on armored columns, obviously, but Manstein, who really was like
Speaker 2: a kind of Prussian martinet and a very prejudiced guy,
Speaker 2: he stipulated that the Soviet army was unbelievably tough. They
Speaker 2: could absorb catastrophic attrition and not fall apart, and much
Speaker 2: as in the Western world, as we might view their
Speaker 2: doctrinal orientation on the battlefield as exhibiting a kind of
Speaker 2: callous disregard for human life, it was and is highly effective.
Speaker 2: And those things are all true. You can't really take
Speaker 2: away from the gameness and just the raw toughness of
Speaker 2: the Red Army, you know. So I'm not going to
Speaker 2: sit here and say that, oh, Shtalin was just handed
Speaker 2: a gift by you know, the New Dealer and in
Speaker 2: general Eisenhower. You know, because the Soviet Union fought for
Speaker 2: every single inch of ground that they won back, and uh,
Speaker 2: the the attrition they endured is almost unfathomable. Yet by
Speaker 2: the time they reached Berlin, their morale was great and
Speaker 2: they were acting like they were at a party.
Speaker 3: I'm not being flippant. They were doing utterly horrible, horrible things.
Speaker 2: By my point being the enronment that arrived in Berlin
Speaker 2: wasn't some broken ragtag for so it was a very game,
Speaker 2: very aggressive, very high morale element, which is one of
Speaker 2: reasons why they were so dangerous. Like it's realistic and
Speaker 2: through Utergang where Troutle young, you know, she's trying to
Speaker 2: pass through Soviet lines and then like the kid runs
Speaker 2: up and grabs her hand.
Speaker 3: You know.
Speaker 2: It so which a really poignant scene. But uh there's
Speaker 2: the Soviet infantry men and they're like Guzlin vodka and
Speaker 2: like dancing like you're at a party. You know, these
Speaker 2: guys have just been in action for the you know,
Speaker 2: these guys probably were the last they were probably like
Speaker 2: the last element drafted. They were probably the guys who
Speaker 2: turned eighteen, you know in uh in a in the
Speaker 2: in January of nineteen forty five, you know, and then
Speaker 2: took you know, like eighty percent casualties. You know, they're
Speaker 2: and they're they're like the surviving element and they're they're
Speaker 2: acting like you're at a party. You know, they most
Speaker 2: most people would have fallen apart, you know, even when
Speaker 2: they had the kind of that kind of momentum in
Speaker 2: in broad strategic terms, just because it was so it
Speaker 2: was so brutal and so catastrophic. So yeah, I'm not
Speaker 2: I'm not gonna take anything away from the Ivans in
Speaker 2: terms of their toughness and gameness, but it you know,
Speaker 2: I a race to Berlin between Montgomery and Eisenhower and
Speaker 2: and uh, the Soviets would have meant war. So that's
Speaker 2: the best answer I can give.
Speaker 1: Awesome, All right, Well, I will encourage people to go
Speaker 1: over to Thomas's substack. That's real Thomas seven seven seven
Speaker 1: dot substack dot com and you can connect to him
Speaker 1: from from there to anywhere that he's at and check
Speaker 1: him out on Twitter, and make sure to subscribe to
Speaker 1: a substack so you can get the episodes and hear them. So, yeah,
Speaker 1: that's at Thomas. This was a This was a great series.
Speaker 1: I thought this was a series that needed to get
Speaker 1: out there, especially after reading after reading suver Off and
Speaker 1: getting a little of the way through Hoffman and having
Speaker 1: to finish Hoffman. It's just vital information that people are
Speaker 1: you're not going to hear even if you you exit
Speaker 1: court history. This is stuff that's hidden and there's a
Speaker 1: reason why both of those books. If you want original
Speaker 1: copies of both of those books, you're paying to three
Speaker 1: hundred dollars.
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, no, I agree on all accounts.
Speaker 2: And yeah, thanks thanks for including me man or rather
Speaker 2: for inviting me to participate in lieu of somebody else.
Speaker 2: That's just great.
Speaker 3: Really, thank you, Tomas.
Speaker 1: Take care now,