1
00:00:38,200 --> 00:00:40,640
Speaker 1: If you want to get the show early and ad free,

2
00:00:41,119 --> 00:00:44,960
head on over to the Peak Kinyonas show dot com.

3
00:00:45,359 --> 00:00:48,000
There you can choose from where you wish to support me.

4
00:00:48,280 --> 00:00:51,200
Now listen very carefully. I've had some people ask me

5
00:00:51,240 --> 00:00:53,520
about this, even though I think on the last ad

6
00:00:54,039 --> 00:00:58,000
I stated it pretty clearly. If you want an RSS feed,

7
00:00:58,359 --> 00:01:02,439
you're going to have to subscribe yourself Substack or through Patreon.

8
00:01:03,039 --> 00:01:06,959
You can also subscribe on my website which is right there,

9
00:01:07,560 --> 00:01:11,799
gum Road and what's the other one, subscribe Star And

10
00:01:12,040 --> 00:01:14,959
if you do that, you will get access to the

11
00:01:15,000 --> 00:01:18,959
audio file. So head on over to the pekan Yonashow

12
00:01:19,120 --> 00:01:21,560
dot com. You'll see all the ways that you can

13
00:01:21,599 --> 00:01:24,959
support me there. And I just want to thank everyone.

14
00:01:25,439 --> 00:01:27,480
It's because of you that I can put out the

15
00:01:27,519 --> 00:01:30,879
amount of material that I do. I can do what

16
00:01:30,959 --> 00:01:33,760
I'm doing with doctor Johnson on two hundred Years Together

17
00:01:34,359 --> 00:01:36,719
and everything else, the things that Thomas and I are

18
00:01:36,719 --> 00:01:39,879
doing together on kindinal philosophy, it's all because of you.

19
00:01:40,560 --> 00:01:43,359
And yeah, I mean, I'll never be able to thank

20
00:01:43,439 --> 00:01:48,120
you enough. So thank you. The pekan Yonashow dot com.

21
00:01:48,159 --> 00:01:52,040
Everything's there. I want to welcome everyone back to the

22
00:01:52,079 --> 00:01:54,719
Peak and Yona show. We had a little bit of

23
00:01:54,760 --> 00:01:57,920
a hiatus because you know, did a little traveling and everything.

24
00:01:58,000 --> 00:02:00,719
But Thomas is back and we're going to finish up

25
00:02:00,760 --> 00:02:05,280
the series on who started World War Two? Who's responsible?

26
00:02:05,439 --> 00:02:09,000
And yeah, so take it away, Thomas.

27
00:02:09,400 --> 00:02:13,520
Speaker 2: Yeah, thanks for hosting me again. There's there's two issues

28
00:02:13,520 --> 00:02:20,280
here and if memory serves, in the first episode of

29
00:02:20,280 --> 00:02:26,199
this little series, we addressed the issue of one exactly

30
00:02:26,240 --> 00:02:30,719
the Second World War started, which seems pedantic, but it's not. It.

31
00:02:30,919 --> 00:02:35,520
This is a real matter of contention for anybody who's

32
00:02:35,759 --> 00:02:40,439
seriously engaged with the subject matter. There's a reason why

33
00:02:41,800 --> 00:02:47,680
court historians claim the opposite of hostilities was September third,

34
00:02:47,759 --> 00:02:53,319
nineteen thirty nine, because that represents a discreetly ideologically coded perspective.

35
00:02:54,080 --> 00:03:02,919
And obviously the intention is to present the global strategic

36
00:03:03,599 --> 00:03:09,479
and geopolitical situation as being one of relative peace until

37
00:03:09,479 --> 00:03:15,360
the German Reich violated that peace through naked aggression against

38
00:03:15,719 --> 00:03:23,199
the Polish state. Okay, that's a problematic perspective for all

39
00:03:23,280 --> 00:03:28,319
kinds of reasons, you know, some of which are political,

40
00:03:28,400 --> 00:03:34,360
some of which are purely historical in nature and factual.

41
00:03:36,639 --> 00:03:40,479
Speaker 3: But what I think is irrebuttable.

42
00:03:42,039 --> 00:03:50,000
Speaker 2: Even if one accepts, you know, the.

43
00:03:48,159 --> 00:03:51,520
Speaker 3: Mainstream view of.

44
00:03:54,479 --> 00:03:58,599
Speaker 2: The onset of hostilities between the German Reich and Poland

45
00:03:59,000 --> 00:04:02,360
and the subsequent words declaration on the German Reich by

46
00:04:02,680 --> 00:04:07,400
France and the United Kingdom. The fact of the matter

47
00:04:07,599 --> 00:04:11,599
is that weeks prior, the Soviet Union assaulted the Japanese

48
00:04:11,639 --> 00:04:16,240
Imperial Army at Chalcan Goal. This was a massive engagement.

49
00:04:16,519 --> 00:04:22,519
This is a massive clash of forces, you know, and

50
00:04:23,680 --> 00:04:29,319
obviously it represented the onset of a state of general

51
00:04:29,319 --> 00:04:32,839
hostilities between two great powers, the Soviet Union and the

52
00:04:32,839 --> 00:04:36,959
Empire of Japan. So I don't really see how anybody

53
00:04:38,360 --> 00:04:42,000
whoks likes to be taken seriously It can claim that

54
00:04:42,040 --> 00:04:45,000
this was some sort of insignificant event or somehow not

55
00:04:45,079 --> 00:04:52,600
related to the broader nexus of causation that you know,

56
00:04:52,720 --> 00:04:58,839
also precipitated the amin of hostilities in Europe.

57
00:05:00,240 --> 00:05:03,240
Speaker 3: You know, either.

58
00:05:06,480 --> 00:05:09,720
Speaker 2: The Soviet Union going to war with Japan in a

59
00:05:09,800 --> 00:05:20,240
scale capacity represented the onset of general hostilities a planetary scale,

60
00:05:20,279 --> 00:05:20,759
or it didn't.

61
00:05:21,759 --> 00:05:24,800
Speaker 3: Okay, So there's that.

62
00:05:26,399 --> 00:05:33,360
Speaker 2: Related to that, but more discreetly political in terms of

63
00:05:35,480 --> 00:05:40,079
the significance of the subject matter vis a vis court history,

64
00:05:40,160 --> 00:05:45,800
narratives and the way that official authorities in the United

65
00:05:45,839 --> 00:05:48,800
States and the United Kingdom and.

66
00:05:50,639 --> 00:05:52,199
Speaker 3: The Buddhist Republic.

67
00:05:53,319 --> 00:06:01,560
Speaker 2: Continue to present, you know, and characterize the Second World

68
00:06:01,639 --> 00:06:07,079
War is the issue with Soviet intentions and what exactly

69
00:06:08,600 --> 00:06:15,759
the state of power political relations was between Moscow and

70
00:06:15,800 --> 00:06:23,240
Berlin as of you know, June twenty second, nineteen forty one.

71
00:06:24,120 --> 00:06:29,079
And it's pretty clear to me, you know, and I

72
00:06:30,720 --> 00:06:35,600
draw a lot in substantial measure on the late Jacham

73
00:06:35,600 --> 00:06:42,120
Hoffmann's exhaustive study of Barbarossa. It's pretty clear to me

74
00:06:42,319 --> 00:06:51,439
that the Soviet Union was eminently going to assault Europe

75
00:06:51,720 --> 00:06:59,959
and the German Rich, not just the Feure but okay,

76
00:07:00,240 --> 00:07:04,639
w as well as you know, various command elements within

77
00:07:04,720 --> 00:07:10,560
the party apparatus, the military and the secular state of

78
00:07:10,560 --> 00:07:18,279
apparatus recognized this reality, as did myriad heads of state

79
00:07:20,759 --> 00:07:25,519
who found themselves allied with the German Reich for various reasons.

80
00:07:25,560 --> 00:07:34,519
You know, this included Croatia, Slovakia, Italy, and you know France.

81
00:07:34,920 --> 00:07:36,920
You know, again, there was no Vhi France. There was

82
00:07:36,959 --> 00:07:43,399
the Government of France, and it was absolutely on the

83
00:07:43,439 --> 00:07:49,399
side of the Axis powers. You know, there were volunteers

84
00:07:49,439 --> 00:08:00,519
from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland throughout this Central Asian Islamic countries.

85
00:08:01,560 --> 00:08:07,600
You know, Romania. Romania contributed a quarter million men, which

86
00:08:07,680 --> 00:08:11,360
is a massive contribution for a country the size of Romania.

87
00:08:12,240 --> 00:08:20,600
You know, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, you know, Belgium, Luxembourg.

88
00:08:21,279 --> 00:08:22,600
Speaker 3: You know, the list goes on and on and on

89
00:08:22,720 --> 00:08:23,720
and on. You know.

90
00:08:23,800 --> 00:08:29,360
Speaker 2: And obviously the Spaniards at Leningrad fought incredibly valiantly. But

91
00:08:32,279 --> 00:08:35,600
you know, there there's this, This wasn't just a matter

92
00:08:35,679 --> 00:08:43,399
of zeitgeist. There some sort of mass hysteria or some

93
00:08:43,440 --> 00:08:47,200
sort of desire to sacrifice one's life, or some sort

94
00:08:47,200 --> 00:08:54,799
of epemeral glory. The Soviet Union, uh had. Aside of

95
00:08:54,799 --> 00:08:59,559
the fact that it was animated by a revolutionary ideology

96
00:08:59,639 --> 00:09:08,320
that was really global in character. It, the Soviet Union

97
00:09:08,360 --> 00:09:13,159
had built a military juggernaut the likes of which the

98
00:09:13,200 --> 00:09:16,840
world had never seen. It was almost unfathomable, and it

99
00:09:16,879 --> 00:09:25,039
was only growing larger and more powerful, you know, And

100
00:09:25,240 --> 00:09:31,120
the like I said to me, this is obvious, Hoffman

101
00:09:31,360 --> 00:09:39,879
Uh and Victor Suvarov and Uh a few other military historians,

102
00:09:40,360 --> 00:09:45,519
all right, says Stope is another one they brought unique

103
00:09:45,519 --> 00:09:48,720
insight to the table, and Hoffman in particular, his data

104
00:09:48,759 --> 00:09:55,360
points were and are exhaustive. And Hoffman too, he he

105
00:09:56,440 --> 00:09:58,759
not that I mean, obviously, I don't have any prejudice

106
00:09:58,759 --> 00:10:03,200
against independence scholars. I am one, but such that people

107
00:10:04,000 --> 00:10:11,000
are prone to dismissing historians who don't have what they

108
00:10:11,080 --> 00:10:19,840
view as adequate credential affiliation with reputable institutions. Well, Hoffmann

109
00:10:20,000 --> 00:10:24,279
when he was alive, he was in the employee of

110
00:10:26,919 --> 00:10:38,200
the official Historical Records division of the Bundesman, you know,

111
00:10:38,240 --> 00:10:43,720
and he was considered to be probably the seminole German

112
00:10:43,840 --> 00:10:48,720
historian on Barbarossa in terms of the military aspects. Okay,

113
00:10:49,759 --> 00:10:51,440
you can't say that he was a crank or that

114
00:10:51,480 --> 00:10:56,159
he was some agrieved guy who was outside of the

115
00:10:56,320 --> 00:11:03,559
establishment of the bundes Republic. He was very much insinuated

116
00:11:03,559 --> 00:11:08,519
into it. Okay, not that that have to make a difference,

117
00:11:08,519 --> 00:11:12,879
but such that it does, you know, I don't see

118
00:11:12,879 --> 00:11:19,080
how people can impeach his credibility, you know. And one

119
00:11:19,080 --> 00:11:23,919
of the issues that Hoffman takes up, because again Hoffman

120
00:11:25,919 --> 00:11:34,200
was very focused on the quantitative military aspects of Barbarossa.

121
00:11:36,840 --> 00:11:41,960
One of the things that he addressed was a lot

122
00:11:42,000 --> 00:11:49,799
of lay people as well as historians and military analysts

123
00:11:49,840 --> 00:11:53,320
who know better, but for cynical reasons. Van Wagen on

124
00:11:53,399 --> 00:11:58,159
this argument, they claim that, well, if the Soviet Union

125
00:11:58,639 --> 00:12:04,679
was so deep we mobilized and had to raise such

126
00:12:04,720 --> 00:12:10,960
a massively scaled war machine, why did they absorb catastrophic casualties. Well,

127
00:12:11,039 --> 00:12:15,840
that's exactly why they did, because they were deployed offensively.

128
00:12:17,240 --> 00:12:22,120
And when you're talking about combined arms, even to this day,

129
00:12:22,200 --> 00:12:26,960
I mean drones in localized autonomous firepower are are definitely

130
00:12:27,039 --> 00:12:32,879
changing things, most strategically and tactically, and nowhere is that

131
00:12:33,159 --> 00:12:42,639
more on display than than in various aspects of tactical

132
00:12:42,639 --> 00:12:49,159
deployment and depth. But even to this day, this remains constant.

133
00:12:49,960 --> 00:12:55,840
If we're talking about combined arms. Modern warfare.

134
00:12:58,200 --> 00:12:58,559
Speaker 3: Were not.

135
00:12:59,159 --> 00:13:02,440
Speaker 2: You can't just call a proverbial audible in the midst

136
00:13:02,440 --> 00:13:11,000
of hostilities if your forces are a rayed to assault

137
00:13:11,600 --> 00:13:17,919
and switch to a defensive paradigm. So coming under assault

138
00:13:18,480 --> 00:13:23,080
when not prepared to defend in depth, it can lead

139
00:13:23,120 --> 00:13:28,840
to catastrophe, particularly when one's opponent is the Wehrmacht. And

140
00:13:28,879 --> 00:13:32,559
I'm gonna get into how exactly that plays out but

141
00:13:34,240 --> 00:13:46,200
not only again, does the attrition rate and specifically the

142
00:13:46,559 --> 00:13:49,480
skewed nature of that attrition rate, not only does that

143
00:13:49,639 --> 00:13:56,559
not tend to rebut the claim before us, it actually

144
00:13:56,639 --> 00:14:00,639
tends to substantiate it. Now, I'll get into some of

145
00:14:00,679 --> 00:14:08,159
these data points, said, you know, to clarify what we're

146
00:14:08,200 --> 00:14:13,519
talking about here. I can't remember if I got into

147
00:14:13,559 --> 00:14:15,679
this or not in the first episode. And please tell

148
00:14:15,720 --> 00:14:17,559
me if I'm repeating myself and know what has need

149
00:14:17,600 --> 00:14:20,600
to correct me. I'm not gonna be offended. Quite the contrary,

150
00:14:20,639 --> 00:14:30,399
You'll be quite gracious. Between November nineteen forty and literally

151
00:14:30,440 --> 00:14:36,840
the eve of Barbarossa in June of nineteen forty one,

152
00:14:39,240 --> 00:14:47,679
the Soviets undertook a massive arms build up. It now,

153
00:14:47,960 --> 00:14:52,200
don't get me wrong. By the autumn of nineteen forty

154
00:14:52,440 --> 00:15:01,840
the Soviets enjoyed numeric and arguably technological superiority pretty much

155
00:15:01,840 --> 00:15:10,960
across the entire spectrum of combined arms. But this punctuated

156
00:15:11,120 --> 00:15:18,440
build up of November nineteen forty to June nineteen forty

157
00:15:18,480 --> 00:15:29,120
one can really only be interpreted as mobilization and anticipation

158
00:15:29,360 --> 00:15:39,519
of offensive operations. On the outbreak of hostilities in June

159
00:15:39,559 --> 00:15:46,720
twenty second, nineteen forty one.

160
00:15:44,440 --> 00:15:45,679
Speaker 3: The Soviet Union.

161
00:15:47,279 --> 00:15:52,799
Speaker 2: Had deployed no less than twenty four thousand tanks, close

162
00:15:52,879 --> 00:15:58,120
to two thousand of which were T thirty fours, which

163
00:15:58,279 --> 00:16:01,279
you know, in those days there weren't battle tanks. There

164
00:16:01,360 --> 00:16:04,679
was light, medium, and heavy tanks. Then are you with

165
00:16:04,879 --> 00:16:10,799
super heavy tanks? But uh, the T thirty four was

166
00:16:11,799 --> 00:16:13,679
I think of it as kind of like the the

167
00:16:13,879 --> 00:16:18,440
the zero of of of armored forces. You know, it

168
00:16:18,480 --> 00:16:22,720
was probably the most effective armored platform of the entire war.

169
00:16:23,360 --> 00:16:28,320
And and all are out in terms. Okay, yeah, obviously

170
00:16:28,639 --> 00:16:31,879
you know, the the Tiger was a superior machine. That's

171
00:16:31,919 --> 00:16:37,720
not what we're talking about, you know, in the the uh,

172
00:16:39,120 --> 00:16:41,240
the ability of T thirty four is to be rolled

173
00:16:41,279 --> 00:16:47,360
off the assembly line rapidly, you know, almost like model

174
00:16:47,440 --> 00:16:52,639
T Fords or something odin that that that itself was

175
00:16:52,679 --> 00:16:58,080
a force multiplier, you know it.

176
00:16:58,279 --> 00:17:01,200
Speaker 3: Uh.

177
00:17:01,519 --> 00:17:05,920
Speaker 2: Between nineteen and thirty eight and June twenty second, nineteen

178
00:17:06,000 --> 00:17:08,519
forty one, the.

179
00:17:10,880 --> 00:17:12,359
Speaker 3: Red Air Force.

180
00:17:13,599 --> 00:17:19,599
Speaker 2: Had acquired over twenty three thousand military aircraft, around thirty

181
00:17:19,599 --> 00:17:23,799
seven one hundred of which could be considered cutting edge.

182
00:17:24,039 --> 00:17:32,119
Probably about half of those had night fighting capability. The

183
00:17:32,200 --> 00:17:34,759
Red Army had close to one hundred and fifty thousand

184
00:17:35,119 --> 00:17:39,319
field artillery pieces and heavy mortars.

185
00:17:39,680 --> 00:17:41,039
Speaker 3: The Red Navy.

186
00:17:42,599 --> 00:17:46,640
Speaker 2: Had over two hundred submarines, which I can't remember if

187
00:17:46,720 --> 00:17:53,440
I mentioned or not, But obviously the submarines are expressly offensive.

188
00:17:53,640 --> 00:17:57,960
There aren't defensive submarines, you know. And to be clear,

189
00:17:59,000 --> 00:18:02,880
this alone, I mean, the Soviet Union wasn't known as

190
00:18:02,880 --> 00:18:03,559
any kind of.

191
00:18:05,000 --> 00:18:06,079
Speaker 3: Maritime power.

192
00:18:06,119 --> 00:18:09,880
Speaker 2: I mean, if anything, you know, the the Tsars Navy

193
00:18:09,880 --> 00:18:12,480
had been sank by the Japanese in nineteen oh five,

194
00:18:12,759 --> 00:18:20,640
and that it further compromised the prestige actual potential of

195
00:18:23,000 --> 00:18:25,279
you know, the Russian Navy is a real force. But

196
00:18:27,640 --> 00:18:34,599
by June twenty second, nineteen forty one, the Soviet Union

197
00:18:34,640 --> 00:18:37,839
by far had the largest submarine fleet in the world,

198
00:18:39,319 --> 00:18:43,640
more than four times that of the Royal Navy, you know,

199
00:18:43,640 --> 00:18:46,960
in the UK was viewed as the foremost naval power

200
00:18:46,960 --> 00:18:50,799
on this planet, you know. I mean, these data points

201
00:18:50,839 --> 00:18:57,440
speak for themselves, you know. And on the political side,

202
00:18:57,799 --> 00:19:02,160
I know I've gotten into this. In pre obvious series

203
00:19:02,200 --> 00:19:08,160
that we've done, I put a lot of emphasis on

204
00:19:08,240 --> 00:19:13,640
direct testimony, owing I'm sure in part to the fact

205
00:19:13,680 --> 00:19:19,079
that my background in part at least is that of

206
00:19:19,319 --> 00:19:28,039
a lawyer, you know. But also if we're talking about intent,

207
00:19:30,119 --> 00:19:38,440
particularly of wartime executives, there's a tendency to be able

208
00:19:38,480 --> 00:19:42,119
to rely upon the statements of a wartime executive or

209
00:19:42,119 --> 00:19:51,400
an executive who is preparing for war. There's a there's

210
00:19:51,440 --> 00:19:56,319
incentivization to telling the truth when the chief executives so

211
00:19:56,440 --> 00:20:03,359
situated as talking to his cabinet or as a general

212
00:20:03,440 --> 00:20:08,440
staff officers, Okay, because what incentive or there be to lie?

213
00:20:08,559 --> 00:20:12,920
Number one, And there's there's there's active disincentives to lie,

214
00:20:13,039 --> 00:20:19,480
because that compromises the ability of subordinate command elements to

215
00:20:19,559 --> 00:20:31,200
effectively execute orders and wage war towards victory conditions.

216
00:20:28,960 --> 00:20:29,200
Speaker 3: You know.

217
00:20:30,880 --> 00:20:34,759
Speaker 2: And so I put a lot of stock in what

218
00:20:34,839 --> 00:20:45,200
Stalin said, and a lot of this testimony from Stalin himself,

219
00:20:46,799 --> 00:20:51,200
you know, that which isn't independently documented by you know,

220
00:20:51,240 --> 00:20:56,920
the minutes of his speeches or or by audio recording.

221
00:21:00,720 --> 00:21:03,720
You know, a lot of Stalin's intimates were the sources

222
00:21:03,759 --> 00:21:14,839
of these statements, including Colonel Volkaganov, who was Stalin's official biographer,

223
00:21:17,799 --> 00:21:18,079
you know.

224
00:21:18,400 --> 00:21:23,880
Speaker 3: And Stalin gave a series of speeches in this.

225
00:21:25,759 --> 00:21:30,920
Speaker 2: In the year preceding Barbarossa, but particularly the six to

226
00:21:30,960 --> 00:21:38,000
eight months immediately proceeding onset of hostilities, which approximately reflects

227
00:21:38,079 --> 00:21:43,319
the final phase of mobilization that we talked about just now,

228
00:21:43,359 --> 00:21:47,799
from November nineteen forty to June nineteen forty one. And

229
00:21:49,200 --> 00:21:58,359
Volkognanov makes the point that Stalin was very taciturn, but

230
00:21:58,759 --> 00:22:03,759
he became quite king ended and quite open within the

231
00:22:03,799 --> 00:22:11,119
cloisters of you know, these command element corridors in his

232
00:22:11,200 --> 00:22:18,480
discussion of you know, what was to be military doctrine

233
00:22:18,519 --> 00:22:22,359
in the next war, which he increasingly discussed as if

234
00:22:22,359 --> 00:22:32,680
it was an imminent possibility. In Volkoganov's own words, in

235
00:22:32,759 --> 00:22:38,359
describing the speech Stalin made on May fifth, nineteen forty one,

236
00:22:40,279 --> 00:22:44,599
he says, quote the leader made it unmistakably, unmistakably clear.

237
00:22:45,799 --> 00:22:49,640
War is inevitable in the future. One must be ready

238
00:22:49,720 --> 00:22:56,440
for the quote unconditional destruction of German fascism. The worl

239
00:22:56,480 --> 00:22:59,400
will be fought on enemy territory and victory will be

240
00:22:59,440 --> 00:23:08,559
achieved with few casualties. And again, this wasn't something that

241
00:23:12,400 --> 00:23:20,359
Stalin merely devised as a polemical device to embolden forces

242
00:23:20,440 --> 00:23:26,240
under his command or to overcome any potential or actual

243
00:23:26,279 --> 00:23:34,480
crises and confidences among the general staff by appeal to

244
00:23:37,599 --> 00:23:47,440
revolutionary fervor. Lenin made clear in identifying the core doctrinal

245
00:23:47,480 --> 00:23:53,440
elements of the Red Army, you know, back in nineteen twenty,

246
00:23:53,559 --> 00:23:57,920
nineteen twenty one, nineteen twenty two, that the Red Army

247
00:23:58,039 --> 00:24:04,119
was an instrumentality of revolutionary imperatives. It wasn't a defensive element,

248
00:24:05,240 --> 00:24:08,920
you know, and it was to be deployed offensively at

249
00:24:08,920 --> 00:24:16,720
all times, you know, because the only rationale for its

250
00:24:16,759 --> 00:24:23,720
existence within the paradigm of Mercist historiography and Leninist revolutionary

251
00:24:23,799 --> 00:24:31,440
doctrine was to facilitate the advance of history and the

252
00:24:31,559 --> 00:24:37,680
victory of the proletariat against the class enemy. So there's

253
00:24:37,720 --> 00:24:45,279
really no there's really no way to interpret Soviet battle

254
00:24:45,400 --> 00:24:55,839
doctrine as anything other than discreetly, ideologically coded and axiomatically offensive,

255
00:24:57,359 --> 00:25:02,880
you know. And this is this is going on, or

256
00:25:03,000 --> 00:25:07,720
this is relying upon the strictures of Marxist Leninist ontology

257
00:25:09,680 --> 00:25:19,920
and the distinct Marxist view of military power and its

258
00:25:20,000 --> 00:25:30,200
utility and its ethical functions. And the Marxist Leninism was

259
00:25:30,839 --> 00:25:40,160
in fact a total philosophical and political system impoverished as

260
00:25:40,160 --> 00:25:44,599
it may have been intellectually in various capacities, and to

261
00:25:44,640 --> 00:25:50,279
be fair, it's sophisticated in others. What's irrebuttable or indisputable

262
00:25:50,480 --> 00:25:56,400
is that it was a total theory of political and

263
00:25:57,240 --> 00:26:05,119
social and thus historical ontology. So the idea that the

264
00:26:05,160 --> 00:26:11,640
party state, which to be clear, by nineteen forty one,

265
00:26:12,039 --> 00:26:21,000
had categorically annihilated millions of people within the Soviet Union

266
00:26:21,799 --> 00:26:30,319
owing to what was identified as their ineducability, you know,

267
00:26:30,400 --> 00:26:31,759
the idea.

268
00:26:31,400 --> 00:26:34,079
Speaker 3: That Stalin.

269
00:26:35,799 --> 00:26:40,519
Speaker 2: Or the Presidium or the pollit Boro Standing Committee, or

270
00:26:40,559 --> 00:26:45,480
these surviving command elements in the Red Army, the idea

271
00:26:45,480 --> 00:26:52,920
that they would somehow hesitate to see through these doctrinal

272
00:26:52,960 --> 00:27:01,240
imperatives is somewhat laughable, you know. And we're not in

273
00:27:01,319 --> 00:27:06,960
the court of law, so it shouldn't be a problem

274
00:27:07,039 --> 00:27:19,799
to invoke subsequent as well as prior precedent, to demonstrate

275
00:27:20,359 --> 00:27:29,279
persuasively what the doctrinal character was of Marxist Leninist revolutionary

276
00:27:29,799 --> 00:27:35,279
military elements. I invoked the case of Cambodia a lot,

277
00:27:37,400 --> 00:27:42,880
you know, from nineteen seventy five to nineteen seventy nine,

278
00:27:43,200 --> 00:27:46,119
and I know for a fact because I hate me

279
00:27:46,160 --> 00:27:52,079
all its effect on things. People suspect I only do

280
00:27:52,240 --> 00:28:04,759
that for the sake of polemical expediency. But that's not why.

281
00:28:07,279 --> 00:28:11,200
Paul Pott was not some simple minded brute. He was

282
00:28:11,279 --> 00:28:15,440
actually a very sophisticated political soldier. He had a very

283
00:28:15,480 --> 00:28:21,039
deep understanding of Marxist Leninism, far more than Mao and

284
00:28:22,799 --> 00:28:30,799
Democratic Kempuccia, as Paul Pott and his cadre branded the

285
00:28:30,839 --> 00:28:38,519
country during their brief tenure, was a very pure Marxist

286
00:28:38,559 --> 00:28:46,359
Leninist stayed in some ways, and there was nothing There

287
00:28:46,599 --> 00:28:53,960
was nothing heterodox in ideological terms about the way they

288
00:28:56,279 --> 00:29:05,319
implemented class adjusting for the discrete conditions on the ground

289
00:29:05,440 --> 00:29:11,839
in Southeast Asia as in nineteen seventy five. So what

290
00:29:11,880 --> 00:29:13,400
I'm getting at, and I'll move on here in a

291
00:29:13,480 --> 00:29:16,440
moment I don't quite understand. Are the same people who

292
00:29:16,480 --> 00:29:24,119
acknowledge that the Soviet Union was this outlier country and uh,

293
00:29:24,480 --> 00:29:28,920
that was unusual in every conceivable sense, you know, in

294
00:29:29,000 --> 00:29:35,759
terms of practice and policy and theoretical foundations and everything else.

295
00:29:36,079 --> 00:29:39,440
Yet they insist that this this didn't somehow impact military

296
00:29:39,480 --> 00:29:47,240
decision making, or that revolutionary ontology somehow, somehow stopped at

297
00:29:47,279 --> 00:29:52,480
the at the point of executive decisionism when it came

298
00:29:52,519 --> 00:30:00,200
to the decision to you know, spread the revolutionary very

299
00:30:00,680 --> 00:30:08,440
cause to Europe and specifically to annihilate the dialectical enemy

300
00:30:08,559 --> 00:30:25,279
in the German Reich. But you know, the Stalin had

301
00:30:26,599 --> 00:30:31,759
spoken again and again as well to the Central Committee,

302
00:30:32,839 --> 00:30:41,279
most notably on January eighth, nineteen forty one, and there

303
00:30:41,359 --> 00:30:49,559
was two high ranking Air Force officers in attendance, and.

304
00:30:52,519 --> 00:30:54,160
Speaker 3: Stalin apparently.

305
00:30:56,799 --> 00:31:04,160
Speaker 2: Spoke directly of the ratio and algorithm that was necessary

306
00:31:04,200 --> 00:31:05,920
to defeat the German Reich.

307
00:31:07,400 --> 00:31:08,119
Speaker 3: According to.

308
00:31:10,839 --> 00:31:19,119
Speaker 2: The General Staff, as well as his own calculations, as

309
00:31:19,400 --> 00:31:22,440
had been explicated to him by authorities that he trusted.

310
00:31:25,119 --> 00:31:28,799
He spoke on this particular day to quote twofold superiority.

311
00:31:29,680 --> 00:31:32,799
He said that, as had been explained to him, twofold

312
00:31:32,839 --> 00:31:37,240
superiority is a law of military science, meaning the two

313
00:31:37,240 --> 00:31:46,359
to one ratio contra the enemy and offensive operations. You know,

314
00:31:46,400 --> 00:31:50,400
whether you're talking about raw numbers or you know, force

315
00:31:50,559 --> 00:31:55,359
multipliers and variables tending to act as force multipliers that

316
00:31:57,880 --> 00:32:01,680
magnify the effectiveness of offensive elements.

317
00:32:02,759 --> 00:32:08,640
Speaker 3: You know, and.

318
00:32:06,319 --> 00:32:12,079
Speaker 2: Stalin stated openly that quote, this is not a game.

319
00:32:12,680 --> 00:32:20,359
The time is approaching for military operations twofold. Superiority is essential,

320
00:32:20,519 --> 00:32:27,400
but greater supurity is even better. And he said that

321
00:32:30,079 --> 00:32:36,720
he spoke specifically of the difficulty of traversing the Carpathians

322
00:32:38,400 --> 00:32:43,480
and the need to designate at least five thousand attack

323
00:32:43,599 --> 00:32:50,359
aircraft in order to neutralize defensive positions that infantry and

324
00:32:50,480 --> 00:32:53,960
armor aren't going to be able to readily traverse owing

325
00:32:54,079 --> 00:32:59,599
to the terrain. Now, this is hugely important for reasons

326
00:32:59,640 --> 00:33:06,359
I'm going to into in a moment, Okay, But from

327
00:33:07,680 --> 00:33:16,839
January of forty one, specifically January eighth until May you know,

328
00:33:16,960 --> 00:33:22,960
only weeks before Barbarossa, Stalin talks again and again about

329
00:33:23,319 --> 00:33:28,640
waging military operations in the Balkans, specifically across the Romanian frontier,

330
00:33:29,480 --> 00:33:36,200
and discrete exigencies that are presented by waging war in

331
00:33:36,279 --> 00:33:52,119
that theater. Okay, in a lecture given in the spring,

332
00:33:54,400 --> 00:33:59,000
I believe March of forty one, but somehow neglected to

333
00:33:59,200 --> 00:34:00,880
sign an execut date.

334
00:34:03,279 --> 00:34:03,880
Speaker 3: He uh.

335
00:34:06,480 --> 00:34:14,639
Speaker 2: Addressed uh the Soviet planopotentiary representative in Belgrade, which.

336
00:34:16,400 --> 00:34:28,800
Speaker 3: At that time was under the.

337
00:34:24,239 --> 00:34:31,639
Speaker 2: Rule briefly of a Chetnik junta, which in turn led

338
00:34:31,679 --> 00:34:38,880
to the German intervention and ultimately the you know, bifurcation

339
00:34:39,119 --> 00:34:47,360
of the Kingdom of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes. But in

340
00:34:47,440 --> 00:34:55,760
addressing the Planopotentiary representative in Belgrade and uh select members

341
00:34:55,760 --> 00:35:00,760
of the Pullet Buro, he said, quote, the USORROW will

342
00:35:00,760 --> 00:35:05,719
only react at the proper time. The powers are scattering

343
00:35:05,760 --> 00:35:09,679
their forces more and more. The USSR is therefore waiting

344
00:35:09,719 --> 00:35:14,079
to act unexpectedly against Germany. And doing so, the USSR

345
00:35:14,159 --> 00:35:17,559
will cross the Carpathias, which lads as the signal for

346
00:35:17,639 --> 00:35:22,440
the revolution in Hungary. Soviet troops will penetrate Yugoslavia from Hungary,

347
00:35:22,679 --> 00:35:25,960
advance the Adriatic Sea, and cut Germany off from the

348
00:35:26,000 --> 00:35:27,199
Balkans in the Middle East.

349
00:35:29,119 --> 00:35:37,360
Speaker 3: Okay, So what does this mean in both.

350
00:35:37,119 --> 00:35:44,239
Speaker 2: Immedia tactical terms and how this impacted the battlefield situation

351
00:35:45,360 --> 00:35:51,400
in Operation Barbarosa as well as in broader strategic terms. Well,

352
00:35:51,440 --> 00:35:56,599
I'll take up the latter question first. For the latter aspect, first,

353
00:36:00,960 --> 00:36:07,400
the Soviet Union planned to assault Europe through Romania. By

354
00:36:07,440 --> 00:36:13,760
capturing Romania, it could deprive Germany of essential access to

355
00:36:13,800 --> 00:36:25,960
petroleum reserves. And also that's commensurate with Soviet deep battle doctrine,

356
00:36:26,840 --> 00:36:36,039
which presuming forces and being ratios that Stalin described as

357
00:36:36,039 --> 00:36:40,559
being you know, at least a twofold advantage and preferably

358
00:36:40,639 --> 00:36:48,079
double or triple that Stalin basically was planning a deep

359
00:36:48,119 --> 00:36:52,280
battle like pincer flanking maneuver across the entirety of the

360
00:36:52,320 --> 00:36:58,920
continent in the north through Sweden and then down to

361
00:36:59,119 --> 00:37:05,559
assault Germany from the north and in the south.

362
00:37:07,199 --> 00:37:07,800
Speaker 3: The main.

363
00:37:09,719 --> 00:37:14,000
Speaker 2: Stair punts would be through Romania. And I'll get into

364
00:37:14,079 --> 00:37:20,159
in a moment. This is why the Army Group Center,

365
00:37:21,880 --> 00:37:27,239
Army Group South Face Savage Resistance and Barbarossa Army Group

366
00:37:27,320 --> 00:37:32,800
Center was moving so fast it was basically like face

367
00:37:32,880 --> 00:37:35,679
with no more than token opposition on the road to Moscow,

368
00:37:35,960 --> 00:37:42,760
which doesn't make any sense unless you understand the deployment

369
00:37:43,239 --> 00:37:50,079
schema of the Red Army, which was totally offensive and

370
00:37:50,320 --> 00:37:59,719
concentrated in the South in a way that wouldn't be

371
00:38:00,079 --> 00:38:02,880
fashionably in a in a defensive.

372
00:38:04,760 --> 00:38:08,519
Speaker 3: Oriented schema. It's a.

373
00:38:11,159 --> 00:38:19,199
Speaker 2: Most uh, most significant everyone, I'm jumping around a bit,

374
00:38:19,320 --> 00:38:25,320
but so please stop me if I'm not being clear.

375
00:38:28,639 --> 00:38:34,840
Most significant. The super hypothesis, in terms of Stalin's declared

376
00:38:34,880 --> 00:38:42,760
intentions was probably what's going to be known as the

377
00:38:42,800 --> 00:38:49,440
secret meeting with the polit Burrow and the Soviet representatives

378
00:38:49,440 --> 00:38:53,079
of the Common Tern who had been called back presumably

379
00:38:53,960 --> 00:38:57,480
to be availed for the specific person being availed to

380
00:38:57,559 --> 00:39:04,320
this speech on a August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, which

381
00:39:04,400 --> 00:39:08,360
obviously coincided with the assault and the Japanese a Kalkan goal.

382
00:39:09,239 --> 00:39:15,199
But this was a surprise secret meeting, and it was

383
00:39:15,280 --> 00:39:19,239
unprecedented for the Russian delegation of the Common Turn to

384
00:39:19,280 --> 00:39:22,159
be called back. Among other things, Stalin didn't have a

385
00:39:22,159 --> 00:39:25,199
lot of He didn't have a lot of respect for

386
00:39:25,239 --> 00:39:30,719
the Common Turn. I mean, in part because the his

387
00:39:30,960 --> 00:39:41,599
UH rigid command doctrine. He didn't I mean, he wasn't

388
00:39:41,639 --> 00:39:52,880
comfortable with uh an ideologic we coded cadre structure, whereby

389
00:39:54,159 --> 00:39:57,760
independent of Moscow, just going to the fact of distance

390
00:39:57,880 --> 00:40:04,079
and you know, remoteness. You know, he didn't he didn't

391
00:40:04,119 --> 00:40:09,639
want some cadre making decisions, even superficially on behalf of

392
00:40:09,639 --> 00:40:14,320
the Soviet Union without his direct oversight. Okay, but nonetheless,

393
00:40:14,880 --> 00:40:18,239
you know, the Common Turn still had tremendous clout in

394
00:40:18,360 --> 00:40:26,440
ninety thirty nine, and especially coming off of the defeat

395
00:40:26,559 --> 00:40:31,599
in Spain, there was a real danger of a fracturing.

396
00:40:33,280 --> 00:40:33,599
Speaker 3: Of a.

397
00:40:35,840 --> 00:40:41,400
Speaker 2: You know, the the broad international front, red front. So

398
00:40:42,599 --> 00:40:46,239
this is highly significant. You know, I guess what I'm

399
00:40:46,239 --> 00:40:51,000
getting at is that Stalin wouldn't have called the Russian

400
00:40:51,000 --> 00:40:53,320
delegation back just for you know, for the sake of

401
00:40:53,360 --> 00:40:56,360
putting on airs or to stand on ceremony or something.

402
00:40:57,639 --> 00:41:01,599
And this is when I think, I excuse me, I

403
00:41:01,599 --> 00:41:04,800
think I briefly addressed this last episode. It was in

404
00:41:04,880 --> 00:41:08,440
this it was in this secret meeting or secret speech

405
00:41:10,079 --> 00:41:19,519
that Stalin declared that, you know, getting the Germans to

406
00:41:20,039 --> 00:41:24,039
getting the right foreign ministry to agree to a non

407
00:41:24,079 --> 00:41:27,760
aggression pact, you know, that would embolden them to act

408
00:41:27,800 --> 00:41:35,360
against Poland, you know, because theretofore the Berlin and specifically

409
00:41:35,440 --> 00:41:41,039
Hitler felt that his hands were tied in resolving the

410
00:41:41,119 --> 00:41:47,440
Polish issue, because an assault on Poland, even in the

411
00:41:47,440 --> 00:41:53,280
wake of a gross provocation or violation of Germany's territorial

412
00:41:53,320 --> 00:41:55,679
integrity on the frontier, you know, what would lead to

413
00:41:55,880 --> 00:42:02,440
a Soviet counter strike that would be devastating. So Stalin's

414
00:42:02,480 --> 00:42:08,199
reasoning was, you know, we will uh will lull Germany

415
00:42:08,280 --> 00:42:13,679
with this non aggression pact, which you know absolutely guarantees

416
00:42:13,760 --> 00:42:16,320
that they will assault Poland, which will then you know,

417
00:42:16,800 --> 00:42:19,599
lead to a ward declaration by the UK and France,

418
00:42:20,840 --> 00:42:24,960
Germany you'll, uh will probably be victorious on the Western front,

419
00:42:25,000 --> 00:42:29,079
but only at pure cost, you know. And then uh,

420
00:42:29,719 --> 00:42:32,760
you know and that this thus, this is the icebreaker

421
00:42:35,039 --> 00:42:42,760
that uh will uh soften uh what would be Europe's

422
00:42:43,159 --> 00:42:45,880
defense in Cordon and allow the Red Army to you know,

423
00:42:46,000 --> 00:42:51,440
just bowl over and annihilate resistance in the West. And

424
00:42:52,519 --> 00:43:01,199
you know, thus uh reverse the reverse the defeat handed

425
00:43:01,239 --> 00:43:04,840
to them and Iberia and you know, conquer the continent

426
00:43:06,079 --> 00:43:11,760
in a rapid and devastating operation.

427
00:43:13,039 --> 00:43:13,920
Speaker 3: And I mean Stalin.

428
00:43:14,119 --> 00:43:17,519
Speaker 2: This is remarkably consistent as far back as nineteen twenty five,

429
00:43:18,079 --> 00:43:22,719
you know, when he was less than three years into

430
00:43:22,760 --> 00:43:30,440
his formal ascendancy as General Secretary, he spoke openly about

431
00:43:31,239 --> 00:43:38,840
the need to act militarily against Europe as soon as possible,

432
00:43:40,159 --> 00:43:46,119
but not until the political climate and the you know,

433
00:43:46,159 --> 00:43:53,760
the myriad it ever sort of changing alliance structure in

434
00:43:53,840 --> 00:44:02,920
the West was such that what Don called the quote

435
00:44:02,960 --> 00:44:09,199
broad field of activity would be realizable in order to

436
00:44:10,679 --> 00:44:16,079
you know, pursue the imperative of world revolution. And to

437
00:44:16,119 --> 00:44:23,039
be clear, you know, not only was a Europe along

438
00:44:23,079 --> 00:44:30,199
with America and Japan, you know, the kind of productive

439
00:44:31,239 --> 00:44:35,360
core of this planet. But you know, the understanding was

440
00:44:35,400 --> 00:44:42,599
that Europe was still the inconceptual terms, you know, the

441
00:44:42,599 --> 00:44:48,199
political center of human affairs, you know, conceptually, you know,

442
00:44:48,280 --> 00:44:55,760
every every every ideological schema you know, came from Europe,

443
00:44:55,800 --> 00:45:03,880
and even even things like the di colonial movement were

444
00:45:03,880 --> 00:45:10,440
fully locked into dialectical uh engagement, you know, with with

445
00:45:10,440 --> 00:45:18,320
with European thoughts. So Stalin's notion was that, you know, first,

446
00:45:18,400 --> 00:45:22,920
last and always your Europe needs to be overrun and annihilated,

447
00:45:23,000 --> 00:45:26,760
and the revolution has to has to be implemented there.

448
00:45:27,440 --> 00:45:29,400
You know, it's a waste of time and it's self

449
00:45:29,400 --> 00:45:35,800
defeating them pursue uh, such imperatives on the periphery that

450
00:45:35,880 --> 00:45:39,679
make no mistake, you know, where ever revolutionary activity jumped

451
00:45:39,679 --> 00:45:44,199
off that had historical momentum and forces in being. Stalin

452
00:45:44,239 --> 00:45:47,119
absolutely was in favor of supporting that and seeing that through.

453
00:45:47,800 --> 00:45:52,360
But the uh, but but the but the core mission

454
00:45:52,360 --> 00:45:56,119
orientation of the Soviet Union had to be you know,

455
00:45:56,199 --> 00:46:03,159
the the you know, the implementing the World Revolution in Europe,

456
00:46:03,360 --> 00:46:07,119
you know, first and foremost, and and that's also why

457
00:46:07,159 --> 00:46:10,000
the Spanish War was so important, you know, it wasn't

458
00:46:10,039 --> 00:46:14,480
just uh, I've read some court historians claim that Stalin

459
00:46:14,559 --> 00:46:17,920
was somehow like reluctantly forced into the Spanish War just

460
00:46:17,920 --> 00:46:21,000
for the sake of appeasing the common term. I mean,

461
00:46:21,000 --> 00:46:24,000
that's that's that's laughable, for all kinds of reasons. But

462
00:46:24,039 --> 00:46:30,360
it also you know, Stalin wasn't as heterodox of a

463
00:46:31,320 --> 00:46:34,400
of a Marxist Leninist as he's often portrayed. I mean,

464
00:46:34,440 --> 00:46:38,599
Stalin was complicated, you know, Like I said, I it's

465
00:46:38,599 --> 00:46:42,920
a lean value, but it's a great book, Carrie Bolton's book,

466
00:46:43,000 --> 00:46:47,079
Stalin The Enduring Legacy. You know, Stalin was a complicated figure,

467
00:46:48,119 --> 00:46:56,480
and there were heterodox aspects to his worldview and his

468
00:46:56,880 --> 00:47:02,119
own Velt politique, but it was a radical divergence.

469
00:47:01,639 --> 00:47:03,559
Speaker 3: Or something, you know.

470
00:47:03,960 --> 00:47:09,760
Speaker 2: And that's important, especially because these days even even some

471
00:47:09,840 --> 00:47:17,519
fairly heterodox political fears and even Summer revisionists seem to

472
00:47:17,519 --> 00:47:18,400
abide that.

473
00:47:19,719 --> 00:47:20,079
Speaker 3: Fiction.

474
00:47:26,480 --> 00:47:31,519
Speaker 2: But yeah, the you can't and in other words, this

475
00:47:31,920 --> 00:47:36,360
you can't you can't extricate the ambition of the Sovietization

476
00:47:36,440 --> 00:47:43,679
of Europe from the existence of the Soviet Union itself.

477
00:47:44,880 --> 00:47:46,360
Speaker 3: You know, these these.

478
00:47:46,159 --> 00:47:51,679
Speaker 2: These ambitions were synonymous, and that's that's also why the

479
00:47:51,760 --> 00:47:58,840
Cold War developed the way they did in.

480
00:47:57,000 --> 00:47:59,000
Speaker 3: In raw geo strategic terms.

481
00:48:02,679 --> 00:48:05,480
Speaker 2: But you know, and I think I can't remember I

482
00:48:05,519 --> 00:48:09,079
mentioned or not this speech and question, you know, the

483
00:48:09,119 --> 00:48:14,079
August nineteen, nineteen thirty nine speech. It was obtained by

484
00:48:15,039 --> 00:48:25,480
the French news agency Havas, and uh.

485
00:48:23,000 --> 00:48:29,239
Speaker 3: The French were kind of notorious for getting a hold.

486
00:48:29,039 --> 00:48:38,079
Speaker 2: Of these kinds of documents and records, you know, and

487
00:48:38,159 --> 00:48:48,000
when uh when the Havas agency by way of Geneva,

488
00:48:49,239 --> 00:48:49,599
when when?

489
00:48:49,639 --> 00:48:49,840
Speaker 3: When?

490
00:48:49,880 --> 00:48:57,679
Speaker 2: When they went public with it? It was published in uh,

491
00:49:00,320 --> 00:49:04,960
some international journal and then in many of the major

492
00:49:05,079 --> 00:49:13,280
French language newspapers. But Moscow's propagandas immediately wanted to overdrive,

493
00:49:13,639 --> 00:49:15,480
you know, and claiming, you know, this is a this

494
00:49:15,559 --> 00:49:20,079
is a forgery. You know this this is confabulated by

495
00:49:20,119 --> 00:49:24,320
the the enemies of Russia and the Soviet Union. You know,

496
00:49:24,360 --> 00:49:29,559
it's fascist propaganda. And uh it did not make us

497
00:49:29,599 --> 00:49:31,960
nearly as big of an impact as one might think,

498
00:49:33,239 --> 00:49:39,199
you know, which is really interesting because it goes to

499
00:49:39,199 --> 00:49:42,760
show you too, how you know, and a lot of

500
00:49:42,760 --> 00:49:46,039
that too had to do with uh, this kind of

501
00:49:46,039 --> 00:49:51,480
deafening silence from American news agencies, you know, and other

502
00:49:51,559 --> 00:49:57,840
than all all the major papers in America, I mean,

503
00:49:57,880 --> 00:50:05,079
other than those brands held by McCormick. We're basically, uh,

504
00:50:05,719 --> 00:50:09,760
mouthpieces for the New Deal regime, you know. But it's

505
00:50:09,760 --> 00:50:12,400
still I mean obviously too.

506
00:50:12,440 --> 00:50:12,920
Speaker 3: I mean this.

507
00:50:14,760 --> 00:50:19,599
Speaker 2: There's a kind of nascent low tech globalism emerging at

508
00:50:19,719 --> 00:50:24,880
least between America and Europe by way of you know,

509
00:50:24,960 --> 00:50:31,000
the UK, but even you know, I mean, it's it's

510
00:50:31,039 --> 00:50:35,079
it's it stort means remarkable that there is basically no

511
00:50:35,320 --> 00:50:37,960
impact in terms of global opinion.

512
00:50:38,960 --> 00:50:42,440
Speaker 3: And uh, I've looked too to see if.

513
00:50:45,320 --> 00:50:51,079
Speaker 2: This pops up in any America first literature, and I

514
00:50:51,119 --> 00:50:57,719
haven't found anything this positive on that question. But that

515
00:50:57,880 --> 00:50:59,960
again goes to show you too, the degree to which

516
00:51:02,639 --> 00:51:09,280
the psychological environment was being actively manipulated, you know, long

517
00:51:09,400 --> 00:51:12,599
before the onset of formal hostilities, which might seem like

518
00:51:12,599 --> 00:51:20,800
an obvious point to you or myself, but people are

519
00:51:20,840 --> 00:51:27,800
inundated in this country with this idea that you know,

520
00:51:28,000 --> 00:51:33,840
somehow the New Dealers had no interest in these goings

521
00:51:33,880 --> 00:51:38,920
on and the European War and the intries from the

522
00:51:38,960 --> 00:51:41,920
Soviet Union, the German Reich, you know, until Pearl Harbor.

523
00:51:41,920 --> 00:51:44,360
When America was attacked, then that changed everything. I mean

524
00:51:44,360 --> 00:51:50,920
that that could not be more false. From the first

525
00:51:51,960 --> 00:51:56,320
months of the New Deal regime, which again coincided almost

526
00:51:56,320 --> 00:52:05,000
precisely with the National Socialist Revolution, which was a totally

527
00:52:05,079 --> 00:52:14,719
legal revolution again, you know, and Roosevelt from the first

528
00:52:14,800 --> 00:52:24,440
days of his administration was pursuing an an absolutely radical

529
00:52:24,480 --> 00:52:33,920
anti fascist imperative as the core mandate of an ambition

530
00:52:34,280 --> 00:52:36,679
of his administration, you know.

531
00:52:36,679 --> 00:52:42,239
Speaker 3: And that can't they can't be denied, you know. In

532
00:52:42,360 --> 00:52:45,599
the I don't want to spin this off to.

533
00:52:48,360 --> 00:52:53,480
Speaker 2: Tangentially, and I know that a lot of people criticize

534
00:52:53,559 --> 00:52:55,400
me for my sources.

535
00:52:56,119 --> 00:52:57,039
Speaker 3: Well, yet they have.

536
00:52:59,679 --> 00:53:02,719
Speaker 2: Yet directly rebut any of these data points that I

537
00:53:02,880 --> 00:53:08,679
have derived from these sources, namely Robert Conquests and.

538
00:53:10,519 --> 00:53:11,440
Speaker 3: Ernst Nolty, and.

539
00:53:13,559 --> 00:53:17,000
Speaker 2: As well as the Black Book of Communism, which is

540
00:53:17,039 --> 00:53:23,400
a great resource. I'm gonna add, but it's indisputable if

541
00:53:23,440 --> 00:53:32,800
the Soviet Union exterminated millions of people between nineteen seventeen

542
00:53:35,320 --> 00:53:41,239
and nineteen forty one, and there was a massive series

543
00:53:41,280 --> 00:53:48,440
of death camps, actual death camps that were employed towards

544
00:53:48,480 --> 00:53:55,119
this incredibly gruesome task, and the degree to which there

545
00:53:55,239 --> 00:54:02,360
was an information blackout about this reality can't be overstated,

546
00:54:03,679 --> 00:54:09,719
you know. And people who raised this issue, you know,

547
00:54:09,760 --> 00:54:17,239
not just not just America Firsters, but Joseph Schumpeter's wife. Interestingly,

548
00:54:18,760 --> 00:54:22,880
she spoke Japanese and she was a big advocate for

549
00:54:23,000 --> 00:54:25,760
Japanese people. She was kind of a human rights type,

550
00:54:25,760 --> 00:54:28,239
but of a genuine sort, not like the twenty first

551
00:54:28,239 --> 00:54:37,280
century sort. And she raised the issue of Soviet annihilation

552
00:54:37,960 --> 00:54:41,920
therapy as an ULTI called it, and she was she

553
00:54:41,960 --> 00:54:45,079
and Schumper were her hassled by the FBI, both for

554
00:54:45,199 --> 00:54:48,519
you know, sympathies for the Axis vis a vis her

555
00:54:50,079 --> 00:54:53,280
you know, dealings with with with Japanese people and stuff,

556
00:54:53,320 --> 00:54:57,519
and particularly Japanese people who are being persecuted by the

557
00:54:57,559 --> 00:55:04,920
New Dealers, but also h you know, propagandizing against the

558
00:55:04,960 --> 00:55:10,159
Soviet Union in their review was this big subversive act,

559
00:55:11,679 --> 00:55:15,559
you know, which seems kind of an incredible I'd imagine

560
00:55:15,559 --> 00:55:16,920
that people today, but.

561
00:55:19,119 --> 00:55:19,599
Speaker 3: They don't.

562
00:55:21,239 --> 00:55:23,760
Speaker 2: I mean, but I mean, it only seems incredible if

563
00:55:23,800 --> 00:55:30,679
one doesn't accept the true nature of a of that regime.

564
00:55:31,519 --> 00:55:41,199
But that aside, it's remarkable that degree to which these

565
00:55:41,239 --> 00:55:46,960
things could in fact be could in fact be hidden,

566
00:55:48,840 --> 00:55:53,800
you know, But that also raised I mean there's there's

567
00:55:53,840 --> 00:56:02,800
also obliquely and conversely it it also begs the question,

568
00:56:04,480 --> 00:56:11,960
you know, if there was this mass murder conspiracy hatched

569
00:56:12,000 --> 00:56:17,480
in the German Reich at Vance in ninety forty two,

570
00:56:18,679 --> 00:56:22,559
like why wasn't anybody you know, publicizing that? I mean

571
00:56:22,559 --> 00:56:24,519
that one would think that would be a godsend to

572
00:56:24,559 --> 00:56:31,800
the New Dealers and a perfect way to portray the

573
00:56:31,880 --> 00:56:37,480
Germans as as these horrific villains, and especially became imperative,

574
00:56:38,960 --> 00:56:45,960
you know by ninety forty four, as the US Army

575
00:56:46,000 --> 00:56:49,320
was quite literally near mutiny, you know, which we've talked about.

576
00:56:49,360 --> 00:56:53,039
That was the real catalyst for the execution of poor

577
00:56:53,119 --> 00:56:56,199
Eddie Slavic. You know, it's.

578
00:56:58,159 --> 00:56:58,480
Speaker 3: People.

579
00:56:58,679 --> 00:57:03,599
Speaker 2: So, you know, the Walter Winschel and the Opposite of

580
00:57:03,599 --> 00:57:13,559
War Information and all these myriad anglophone news agencies, they

581
00:57:13,639 --> 00:57:17,039
just decided not to report on the fact that the

582
00:57:17,119 --> 00:57:20,320
German Reich only existed to exterminate Jewish people, just because

583
00:57:20,320 --> 00:57:23,559
they didn't think it was important, you know, they didn't

584
00:57:23,559 --> 00:57:28,679
think it was a useful way to code propaganda. I

585
00:57:28,679 --> 00:57:32,519
mean that's like a bit tangential, But moving on real quick,

586
00:57:32,559 --> 00:57:39,480
So I realized we're running out of time. I mentioned

587
00:57:40,239 --> 00:57:45,239
a moment ago. Something that's often raised is okay, So

588
00:57:45,280 --> 00:57:50,679
why why was Barbarossa so tactically so tactically successful? And

589
00:57:51,000 --> 00:57:58,079
why was the attrition rate so algorithmically skewed against the

590
00:57:58,119 --> 00:58:05,800
Soviet Union if in fact the Soviet Union was mobilized

591
00:58:05,840 --> 00:58:09,159
for war and planning to attack. But that's exactly why

592
00:58:09,199 --> 00:58:16,000
these things did develop that way. The Soviets were planning

593
00:58:16,039 --> 00:58:23,559
to assault Romania by autumn of forty one, and that's

594
00:58:23,599 --> 00:58:33,559
exactly why, like I said, army groups South encountered comparatively

595
00:58:33,639 --> 00:58:34,719
savage resistance.

596
00:58:35,440 --> 00:58:36,760
Speaker 3: And that's also why.

597
00:58:39,199 --> 00:58:42,199
Speaker 2: That's also why there was a There was powerful reserve

598
00:58:42,239 --> 00:58:49,360
elements in Ukraine because essentially they were there to rapidly

599
00:58:49,400 --> 00:58:54,360
reinforce the shock element that was going to assault the Balkans.

600
00:58:55,119 --> 00:58:58,800
So there was this awkwardly unbalanced deployment schema of Soviet

601
00:58:58,880 --> 00:59:07,519
field armies where Soviet forces blocking the corridor to the

602
00:59:07,559 --> 00:59:12,360
Moscow Leningrad deployment space, they were exponentially weaker than those

603
00:59:12,400 --> 00:59:16,719
deployed to Ukraine, which doesn't make any sense unless you

604
00:59:16,760 --> 00:59:20,800
account for the fact that they were deployed in an

605
00:59:20,880 --> 00:59:27,440
offensive posture. The share punk of which was you know,

606
00:59:30,440 --> 00:59:38,800
in the south to assault Romania through the Carpathians. Now,

607
00:59:38,800 --> 00:59:42,199
don't get me wrong, the Soviets were sensitive to the

608
00:59:42,280 --> 00:59:57,039
fact that Moscow was being left relatively undefended. But you know,

609
00:59:57,440 --> 01:00:02,719
it doesn't like, it doesn't track any other way other

610
01:00:02,760 --> 01:00:06,199
than accept what I just acknowledged. And it's also you know,

611
01:00:06,280 --> 01:00:12,320
again this idea that's endlessly banned to this day, that

612
01:00:12,320 --> 01:00:15,920
that Stalin was afraid of Hitler, or that the Soviet

613
01:00:15,960 --> 01:00:18,159
Union was afraid of the Vermach That it's like, well,

614
01:00:18,199 --> 01:00:21,800
I mean, okay, that's preposterous anyway, but so Stalin was

615
01:00:21,840 --> 01:00:25,840
so afraid of the ver Manx that he he there

616
01:00:25,920 --> 01:00:34,119
there basically was a token deployment on the path to Moscow.

617
01:00:36,000 --> 01:00:37,800
You know, I mean, how how is heply does that work?

618
01:00:40,400 --> 01:00:51,639
Any uh? I mean, any interpretation is uh, it can

619
01:00:51,679 --> 01:00:57,800
only result in a conclusion that the Soviets were poised

620
01:00:57,800 --> 01:01:03,079
for exclusively offensive uppers. I mean, unless you can it's

621
01:01:03,119 --> 01:01:05,280
a tortured kind of logic. I mean, I guess you

622
01:01:05,320 --> 01:01:11,119
could claim that the Soviets wanted to draw the Germans

623
01:01:11,159 --> 01:01:16,000
in and funnel the main line of funnel under to

624
01:01:16,079 --> 01:01:19,119
the main line of resistance at the gates of Moscow

625
01:01:19,239 --> 01:01:23,719
and stop them their tracks. But that Moscow practically felt

626
01:01:24,039 --> 01:01:29,920
you know, that doesn't make any sense. I've read people

627
01:01:30,000 --> 01:01:32,400
who try to make some variation of that argument, but

628
01:01:32,440 --> 01:01:35,360
it's it's so preposterous. I don't really think it warrants

629
01:01:35,360 --> 01:01:43,280
to kind of blow by blow rebuttal but that's really,

630
01:01:45,079 --> 01:01:54,079
you know, an example of extent conditions. Speaking of herself

631
01:01:54,559 --> 01:01:58,119
and the resistance that every group center did encounter. To

632
01:01:58,199 --> 01:02:03,159
be clear, they were defensively deployed either there wasn't any

633
01:02:03,280 --> 01:02:11,840
depth to their deployment schema, and they in fact were

634
01:02:11,920 --> 01:02:20,960
forward deployed with a heavily armed shock element in the lead,

635
01:02:22,800 --> 01:02:28,039
you know, which is one reason why our group center, especially,

636
01:02:28,119 --> 01:02:31,880
they didn't counter resistance. They got hit with a lot

637
01:02:31,920 --> 01:02:41,840
of firepower that was immediately exhausted, and then when counterattacking

638
01:02:41,880 --> 01:02:45,840
the Vermont immediately broke Soviet lines because there was again

639
01:02:45,880 --> 01:02:49,719
there wasn't any there wasn't any depth to the deployment.

640
01:02:51,039 --> 01:02:55,880
You know, if you know anything, I'm not any I'm

641
01:02:55,920 --> 01:03:00,360
not at all like a military type person, but I

642
01:03:00,400 --> 01:03:05,719
do know something about the internal logic of modern warfare.

643
01:03:07,159 --> 01:03:11,039
You know, in an abstract deployment since I mean, and

644
01:03:11,079 --> 01:03:14,840
if you know anything about this, just not even really

645
01:03:14,840 --> 01:03:19,039
deep diving into the numerical data points and stuff, but

646
01:03:19,079 --> 01:03:21,519
it's literally looking at the map of the deployment schema,

647
01:03:21,559 --> 01:03:25,239
they should jump right out at you. It's it's almost

648
01:03:25,280 --> 01:03:30,559
like you know those a you know, it's like illusion pictures.

649
01:03:30,599 --> 01:03:33,599
They used to see them a lot, like beer companies.

650
01:03:33,639 --> 01:03:35,840
And it's like you look at some picture and it

651
01:03:35,880 --> 01:03:39,400
looks like it's like a bunch of old pictures, a

652
01:03:39,440 --> 01:03:41,599
Spudge mackenzie or something. But then you see it and

653
01:03:41,639 --> 01:03:44,199
it's like a sexy girl or something. And then once

654
01:03:44,199 --> 01:03:47,719
you see that, like you can't unsee it. What's like that? Okay?

655
01:03:47,800 --> 01:03:51,480
I mean you look at you look at an deployment

656
01:03:51,559 --> 01:04:03,119
map of the Moscow, Leningrad Gorky battlespace on June twenty second,

657
01:04:03,199 --> 01:04:09,079
ninety forty one, and you realize like what it is,

658
01:04:09,559 --> 01:04:11,960
and then and then you can't undersee it, you know.

659
01:04:12,079 --> 01:04:15,920
So the fact anybody makes an argument of the contrary,

660
01:04:15,920 --> 01:04:19,760
I got to assume they're being dishonest or they're just

661
01:04:20,119 --> 01:04:23,920
profoundly ignorant to the subject matter. Yeah, it looks like

662
01:04:23,920 --> 01:04:26,039
we've gone over an hour. I hope that wasn't too

663
01:04:26,079 --> 01:04:27,039
skater shot man.

664
01:04:29,119 --> 01:04:32,039
Speaker 1: Let me let me hit you up with one question

665
01:04:32,119 --> 01:04:35,000
before we go, and this is this is a little

666
01:04:35,000 --> 01:04:37,199
bit off topic, but it's a question I wanted to

667
01:04:37,199 --> 01:04:41,039
ask since we were talking about Stalin so much. Yeah,

668
01:04:41,400 --> 01:04:43,760
did Stalin take half of Europe at the end of

669
01:04:43,760 --> 01:04:45,800
the war or was he given half of Europe at

670
01:04:45,840 --> 01:04:46,480
the end of the war?

671
01:04:47,320 --> 01:04:50,760
Speaker 3: I mean both, That's what was decided at Yalta.

672
01:04:51,920 --> 01:04:58,239
Speaker 2: If if if Stal's going to be precluded from taking Germany,

673
01:04:58,559 --> 01:05:03,679
that meant that I Hower and Montgomery would have had

674
01:05:03,679 --> 01:05:07,920
to assault Berlin. And had they done that, what would

675
01:05:07,960 --> 01:05:19,440
have happened was even accounting for the punitive and purely

676
01:05:19,599 --> 01:05:26,400
a lot purely ideologically motivated and additional surrender demand, vermacht

677
01:05:26,480 --> 01:05:29,360
Off and SS elements would have basically welcomed them in

678
01:05:30,239 --> 01:05:34,360
because that would have prevented the literal rape of and

679
01:05:34,440 --> 01:05:41,880
destruction of the German Reich. And once it was clear

680
01:05:42,000 --> 01:05:49,199
that Anglo American forces intended to take Berlin, Stalwoin immediately

681
01:05:52,159 --> 01:05:56,679
shifted to a footing of hostility cot for the United

682
01:05:56,719 --> 01:06:03,440
States and the UK. And even before that happened, it's

683
01:06:03,480 --> 01:06:11,880
conceivable that these elements that were driving for Berlin on

684
01:06:11,960 --> 01:06:19,119
the Soviet side, like first Ukrainian Shock Army, which I

685
01:06:19,159 --> 01:06:22,480
think was under Rock. I think that I think First

686
01:06:22,599 --> 01:06:27,400
Ukrainian Shock Army was enter Timoshenko. But whoever whatever formation

687
01:06:27,679 --> 01:06:35,639
cone of and Rakasovski respectively were commanding, it's very conceivable

688
01:06:35,800 --> 01:06:42,840
that they would have ordered down the company level commanders

689
01:06:42,880 --> 01:06:46,400
to treat U, the US and the UK as enemies

690
01:06:47,119 --> 01:06:50,519
who were literally trying to race to Berlin, as to

691
01:06:50,599 --> 01:06:54,119
act as a blocking element. And the Soviet view, you know,

692
01:06:54,239 --> 01:07:01,199
for the Germans so America to found itself at war

693
01:07:01,280 --> 01:07:09,039
with the Soviet Union. You know, that's the only alternative.

694
01:07:09,599 --> 01:07:11,599
But I mean, that's what that you like, I said,

695
01:07:11,639 --> 01:07:14,679
the thing was decided at Yelt It's I mean, I

696
01:07:14,760 --> 01:07:25,480
don't you can uh. On the one hand, yeah, it

697
01:07:25,559 --> 01:07:27,920
was the new it was the New Dealers who kept

698
01:07:27,920 --> 01:07:34,079
the Soviet Union in the war. But like von Manstein,

699
01:07:34,119 --> 01:07:39,119
I highly recommend von Manstein's it's marketed as his memoirs,

700
01:07:39,119 --> 01:07:41,800
it's called Loss Victories, but in reality it was just

701
01:07:41,920 --> 01:07:45,960
debriefing by the War Department, which obviously was very interested

702
01:07:46,760 --> 01:07:50,840
in learning as much as they could about fighting the

703
01:07:50,880 --> 01:07:55,639
Soviet Union with combined conventional combined arms with an emphasis

704
01:07:55,679 --> 01:08:03,119
on armored columns, obviously, but Manstein, who really was like

705
01:08:03,119 --> 01:08:07,159
a kind of Prussian martinet and a very prejudiced guy,

706
01:08:08,199 --> 01:08:14,159
he stipulated that the Soviet army was unbelievably tough. They

707
01:08:14,159 --> 01:08:21,560
could absorb catastrophic attrition and not fall apart, and much

708
01:08:21,600 --> 01:08:26,840
as in the Western world, as we might view their

709
01:08:27,000 --> 01:08:31,520
doctrinal orientation on the battlefield as exhibiting a kind of

710
01:08:31,520 --> 01:08:40,159
callous disregard for human life, it was and is highly effective.

711
01:08:41,279 --> 01:08:44,880
And those things are all true. You can't really take

712
01:08:44,920 --> 01:08:49,840
away from the gameness and just the raw toughness of

713
01:08:49,880 --> 01:08:52,840
the Red Army, you know. So I'm not going to

714
01:08:52,880 --> 01:08:56,399
sit here and say that, oh, Shtalin was just handed

715
01:08:56,399 --> 01:09:01,640
a gift by you know, the New Dealer and in

716
01:09:01,800 --> 01:09:07,159
general Eisenhower. You know, because the Soviet Union fought for

717
01:09:07,239 --> 01:09:13,359
every single inch of ground that they won back, and uh,

718
01:09:15,199 --> 01:09:21,359
the the attrition they endured is almost unfathomable. Yet by

719
01:09:21,399 --> 01:09:23,880
the time they reached Berlin, their morale was great and

720
01:09:23,880 --> 01:09:25,239
they were acting like they were at a party.

721
01:09:25,720 --> 01:09:29,199
Speaker 3: I'm not being flippant. They were doing utterly horrible, horrible things.

722
01:09:29,600 --> 01:09:32,680
Speaker 2: By my point being the enronment that arrived in Berlin

723
01:09:32,800 --> 01:09:35,880
wasn't some broken ragtag for so it was a very game,

724
01:09:38,079 --> 01:09:41,920
very aggressive, very high morale element, which is one of

725
01:09:42,000 --> 01:09:45,840
reasons why they were so dangerous. Like it's realistic and

726
01:09:45,920 --> 01:09:52,319
through Utergang where Troutle young, you know, she's trying to

727
01:09:52,359 --> 01:09:55,279
pass through Soviet lines and then like the kid runs

728
01:09:55,319 --> 01:09:56,279
up and grabs her hand.

729
01:09:56,720 --> 01:09:56,880
Speaker 3: You know.

730
01:09:57,000 --> 01:10:01,560
Speaker 2: It so which a really poignant scene. But uh there's

731
01:10:01,600 --> 01:10:04,800
the Soviet infantry men and they're like Guzlin vodka and

732
01:10:04,920 --> 01:10:07,239
like dancing like you're at a party. You know, these

733
01:10:07,239 --> 01:10:10,920
guys have just been in action for the you know,

734
01:10:11,039 --> 01:10:13,920
these guys probably were the last they were probably like

735
01:10:13,920 --> 01:10:15,920
the last element drafted. They were probably the guys who

736
01:10:16,000 --> 01:10:20,600
turned eighteen, you know in uh in a in the

737
01:10:21,359 --> 01:10:25,039
in January of nineteen forty five, you know, and then

738
01:10:25,079 --> 01:10:28,239
took you know, like eighty percent casualties. You know, they're

739
01:10:28,319 --> 01:10:30,560
and they're they're like the surviving element and they're they're

740
01:10:30,560 --> 01:10:34,319
acting like you're at a party. You know, they most

741
01:10:34,760 --> 01:10:37,600
most people would have fallen apart, you know, even when

742
01:10:37,640 --> 01:10:40,960
they had the kind of that kind of momentum in

743
01:10:40,960 --> 01:10:44,800
in broad strategic terms, just because it was so it

744
01:10:44,840 --> 01:10:48,119
was so brutal and so catastrophic. So yeah, I'm not

745
01:10:48,159 --> 01:10:50,239
I'm not gonna take anything away from the Ivans in

746
01:10:50,319 --> 01:10:53,399
terms of their toughness and gameness, but it you know,

747
01:10:53,560 --> 01:11:01,359
I a race to Berlin between Montgomery and Eisenhower and

748
01:11:01,359 --> 01:11:07,079
and uh, the Soviets would have meant war. So that's

749
01:11:07,079 --> 01:11:08,199
the best answer I can give.

750
01:11:09,760 --> 01:11:13,399
Speaker 1: Awesome, All right, Well, I will encourage people to go

751
01:11:13,399 --> 01:11:16,640
over to Thomas's substack. That's real Thomas seven seven seven

752
01:11:16,680 --> 01:11:20,359
dot substack dot com and you can connect to him

753
01:11:21,359 --> 01:11:26,079
from from there to anywhere that he's at and check

754
01:11:26,119 --> 01:11:30,079
him out on Twitter, and make sure to subscribe to

755
01:11:30,119 --> 01:11:35,880
a substack so you can get the episodes and hear them. So, yeah,

756
01:11:36,199 --> 01:11:38,800
that's at Thomas. This was a This was a great series.

757
01:11:38,840 --> 01:11:40,560
I thought this was a series that needed to get

758
01:11:40,560 --> 01:11:45,720
out there, especially after reading after reading suver Off and

759
01:11:47,119 --> 01:11:50,399
getting a little of the way through Hoffman and having

760
01:11:50,439 --> 01:11:55,159
to finish Hoffman. It's just vital information that people are

761
01:11:56,359 --> 01:12:00,279
you're not going to hear even if you you exit

762
01:12:00,319 --> 01:12:03,880
court history. This is stuff that's hidden and there's a

763
01:12:03,920 --> 01:12:06,720
reason why both of those books. If you want original

764
01:12:06,720 --> 01:12:08,800
copies of both of those books, you're paying to three

765
01:12:08,880 --> 01:12:09,520
hundred dollars.

766
01:12:10,199 --> 01:12:12,680
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, no, I agree on all accounts.

767
01:12:12,680 --> 01:12:16,039
Speaker 2: And yeah, thanks thanks for including me man or rather

768
01:12:16,119 --> 01:12:20,439
for inviting me to participate in lieu of somebody else.

769
01:12:21,000 --> 01:12:21,680
That's just great.

770
01:12:22,800 --> 01:12:24,840
Speaker 3: Really, thank you, Tomas.

771
01:12:24,880 --> 01:12:25,439
Speaker 1: Take care now,