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<v Speaker 1>Get ready.

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<v Speaker 2>September eighteen, twenty twenty four. Allegedly, according to that thing

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<v Speaker 2>we call a calendar, this is the Ocelly effect, and

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<v Speaker 2>we are live on a Wednesday, middle of the week.

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<v Speaker 2>So last night I could not get to the microphone

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<v Speaker 2>because Coxx Internet was out in my area. So there

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<v Speaker 2>you go. I revealed who I use, but they had

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<v Speaker 2>an area outage. Nothing I could do about it. So

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<v Speaker 2>the news show that I was going to do on

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<v Speaker 2>a Tuesday, I'm going to have to do on a

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<v Speaker 2>Thursday tomorrow night. Anyway, tonight, what we have very special

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<v Speaker 2>because I screwed up on the dates and thought that

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<v Speaker 2>I was supposed to have Larry Hancock scheduled for this week.

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<v Speaker 2>I didn't, but Larry said, let's do it anyway. So

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<v Speaker 2>I have the author, Larry Hancock, and you can go

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<v Speaker 2>to Larry dash Hancock dot com keep track of his works,

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<v Speaker 2>his blog, all of that stuff, Larry Hypenhancock dot com

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<v Speaker 2>or Larry Dashancock dot com. Either way, you'll see it

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<v Speaker 2>in the show notes and his books. Many books take

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<v Speaker 2>up a lot of space on my bookshelf, and they

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<v Speaker 2>don't just take up space. They're extremely important, especially in

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<v Speaker 2>today's very strange times where we're looking at the way

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<v Speaker 2>intelligence agencies behave, we're looking at the political spheres of

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<v Speaker 2>influence and things like that. You could have looked at

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<v Speaker 2>surprise Attack, you could have looked at shadow warfare. You

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<v Speaker 2>could have looked at a book that might come up

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<v Speaker 2>during tonight's conversation, Creating Chaos. Anyway, all of those I

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<v Speaker 2>recommend every one of those books by Larryhancock and again

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<v Speaker 2>Larry Dashancock dot com. So what is happening in the

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<v Speaker 2>news that I didn't get to cover? Am I going

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<v Speaker 2>to talk to Larry tonight about what's going on with

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<v Speaker 2>Diddy and how he got his bail denied? No, I'm not,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, not of interest generally to Larry. Usually I

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<v Speaker 2>think I don't. You're not a big hip hop guy,

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<v Speaker 2>are you, Larry? I'm strangely no, Okay, you know, I

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<v Speaker 2>know it was an odd ball thing, but maybe anyhow so.

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<v Speaker 2>But things that are going on in the news, which

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<v Speaker 2>you're gonna have a lot to do with what we're

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<v Speaker 2>talking about. No, not another possible shooter with Trump, although

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<v Speaker 2>that would be relevant. We're not going to discuss that

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<v Speaker 2>tomorrow night. I'll get to it. But other things are happening.

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<v Speaker 2>I'm reading about the Iranians allegedly taking stolen documents from

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<v Speaker 2>the Trump campaign, hacking somehow, and then trying to offer

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<v Speaker 2>them to the Biden campaign when it was the Biden campaign.

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<v Speaker 2>The FBI made that statement a little while ago. Plus

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<v Speaker 2>we have other allegations of guess what, once again, the

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<v Speaker 2>Russians being in play and doing this and that, and

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<v Speaker 2>the Chinese supposedly. Now all of that's happening with the

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<v Speaker 2>backdrop of let's see the IDF is exploding pagers and

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<v Speaker 2>walkie talkies in Lebanon. We have a very strange landscape, folks,

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<v Speaker 2>a very strange landscape where multiple levels of warfare are

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<v Speaker 2>being conducted, the psychological, the technological, the military. Not so

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<v Speaker 2>much in the blatant standard sense at this moment in time,

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<v Speaker 2>but all of it does lead to some of that stuff.

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<v Speaker 2>And don't worry, there's plenty of shooting to be had

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<v Speaker 2>and possibilities upcoming. But as I take a look at

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<v Speaker 2>the technological end of the warfare, Larry, we're in a

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<v Speaker 2>strange time here. I mean, the Iranians are supposedly helping

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<v Speaker 2>the Biden campaign, the Russians, well putin is endorsing Kamala Harris,

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<v Speaker 2>but who knows what his intelligence agencies are doing. Meanwhile,

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<v Speaker 2>the Chinese have something else going that. Quite frankly, I'm

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<v Speaker 2>having the difficulty get in my mind wrapped around entirely.

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<v Speaker 2>Where do we begin to deal with this and the

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<v Speaker 2>technological the other side of warfare that again doesn't have

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<v Speaker 2>to do necessarily with live shootooting, but it's definitely shooting

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<v Speaker 2>lots of technological assets in the put one way or

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<v Speaker 2>another and causing an effect in the real world. How

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<v Speaker 2>do we begin to wrap our minds around this, Larry?

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, should we begin with the Chinese discussion? I

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<v Speaker 2>mean where do we go?

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<v Speaker 1>Well, it's important. I think one of the things that

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<v Speaker 1>is is differentiate what the Chinese are doing from what

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<v Speaker 1>the Russians, the Iranians and others are doing, because they

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<v Speaker 1>have different strategic goals. I think the context for both

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<v Speaker 1>of these actually, if you kind of cut down to

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<v Speaker 1>the core at the strategic level, it hasn't changed. It's

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<v Speaker 1>not really new. The tactics are the same. We've discussed

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<v Speaker 1>this before. Back in twenty fourteen, I was writing about

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<v Speaker 1>political warfare and how political warfare is conducted more in

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<v Speaker 1>the modern era. I think because of the technologies that

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<v Speaker 1>are available to us, simply it's simply possible to plant

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<v Speaker 1>information in a more convoluted fashion than it used to be.

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<v Speaker 1>In the fifties, sixties or seventies. You had to have,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, reporters on a string, You had to manipulate

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<v Speaker 1>a wire service with false documents. You know, that was done.

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<v Speaker 1>It was done. But these days you can do it

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<v Speaker 1>much more efficiently and on a much larger scale. For

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<v Speaker 1>an example, And I think I think one of the

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<v Speaker 1>things we have to keep in mind when we're talking

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<v Speaker 1>about comparing the Russians and the Chinese and Iranians is

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<v Speaker 1>that the objective for the political warfare that's being conducted

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<v Speaker 1>with false information or acquiring information and planting it somewhere else,

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<v Speaker 1>which is somewhat the same thing. The whole design for

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<v Speaker 1>that is it really to support a candidate. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>that's not the way it goes the holes. The whole

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<v Speaker 1>design for that strategy is to create chaos, to essentially

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<v Speaker 1>marginalize the regular political process, to bring things into a

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<v Speaker 1>state where you create a non functional government. The Russians

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<v Speaker 1>and the Iranians don't really care. Now, it's true that

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<v Speaker 1>Putin might care about Trump personally, but what they really

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<v Speaker 1>care about, what the FSB cares about, what the strategy

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<v Speaker 1>is to essentially newter the American political process. And if

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<v Speaker 1>you look at what's been going on for Congress for

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<v Speaker 1>months and years and now is going on with the

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<v Speaker 1>budgetary fight, where you know, we can't fund a budget,

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<v Speaker 1>we can't fund arm spending, we can't fund the defense

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<v Speaker 1>package because there is so much political chaos in the

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<v Speaker 1>House and the Senate and it's so factionalized' that's the

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<v Speaker 1>whole point. The whole point is actually it makes it

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<v Speaker 1>It makes it better to have everyone at everyone's throats

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<v Speaker 1>so that nothing happens, rather than taking a chance that

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<v Speaker 1>something might happen by having someone in control. So you

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<v Speaker 1>and I've talked about this before. It's chaos is the

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<v Speaker 1>goal of the game. Political chaos is away is the strategy.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's what we see. That's what we see Russia

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<v Speaker 1>and Iran doing. You mentioned feeding information to the Biden campaign.

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<v Speaker 1>Probably much more effectively, though, is what the news stories

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<v Speaker 1>that came out last week and the week before of

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<v Speaker 1>how the Russians were funding funneling money in to major

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<v Speaker 1>right wing commentators who's run.

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<v Speaker 2>Now.

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<v Speaker 1>That's basically opposing everything the government does now, which is

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<v Speaker 1>really what the Russians would like to do. Oppose everything

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<v Speaker 1>that the government does, so nothing happens well.

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<v Speaker 2>And this is not unusual in the Russian strategy as

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<v Speaker 2>far as you know, sort of infiltrating the alternative media

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<v Speaker 2>what they did for a while and becoming a standard

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<v Speaker 2>with things like Russia today. RT, right, and the English

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<v Speaker 2>RT was an essential part of a PR campaign that

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<v Speaker 2>was being run to sort of bolster Putin, to make

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<v Speaker 2>him a good guy, to make him because there were

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<v Speaker 2>all of these anti American sentiments built around the anti

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<v Speaker 2>Obama sentimentality, Right, this guy was weak, This guy was

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<v Speaker 2>a you know, a do nothing liberal, et cetera. We'd

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<v Speaker 2>rather have a strong man like Vladimir Putin. Look, his

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<v Speaker 2>RT is telling us the truth when our American is

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<v Speaker 2>lying to us. All that kind of stuff. And that

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<v Speaker 2>was well funded and well put out there and was

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<v Speaker 2>effective for about a decade.

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<v Speaker 3>But they have.

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<v Speaker 2>Since gone into funding and giving warm interactions and interviews

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<v Speaker 2>with people like Tucker Carlson once he was not connected

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<v Speaker 2>to Fox News anymore, and stuff like that, taking the outliers,

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<v Speaker 2>if you will, and pumping them full of information and

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<v Speaker 2>contrarian stuff that kind of dovetails nicely with the sentiment

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<v Speaker 2>they already have out there, the lack of trust with

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<v Speaker 2>the government. We're being infiltrated, Our government's being infiltrated, our

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<v Speaker 2>country's being infiltrated. Well, yeah they are, and you know what,

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<v Speaker 2>we have more reasonable government over here. They keep making

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<v Speaker 2>us the bad guys, but look at how bad they are, etc.

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<v Speaker 2>That's almost exactly what the strategy is. Or am I

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<v Speaker 2>reading this wrong, Larry.

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<v Speaker 1>No, that's the whole whole point of that. And it's

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<v Speaker 1>evolved over time. You know, it evolved from essentially kind

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<v Speaker 1>of feeding major media outlets and putting them head to

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<v Speaker 1>head against each other, right, because again, that's what you want.

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<v Speaker 1>You want to silo this information. The last thing in

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<v Speaker 1>the world is you want everybody hearing the full story

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<v Speaker 1>that that does not work to your strategy. You want

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<v Speaker 1>to silo the information so that people just listen to

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<v Speaker 1>their favorite outlet, So that first that would happen to

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<v Speaker 1>say with Fox and MSNBC. Then okay, then we can

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<v Speaker 1>grab hold of figures like Tucker Colson and he moves

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<v Speaker 1>out of the media landscape. But then we bring him

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<v Speaker 1>into our environment. Okay, I think what we saw in

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<v Speaker 1>the link kind I sent you for the show in

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<v Speaker 1>terms of what's going on with the figures now, as

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<v Speaker 1>some of these independent media figures have become so large scale,

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<v Speaker 1>which sex you are, audience, I think the Russians have

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<v Speaker 1>determined that they probably are more attractive because they can

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<v Speaker 1>get to them quite easily, and because they appear to

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<v Speaker 1>be totally independent. I mean, the more independent your source is,

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<v Speaker 1>the better it works if you can control it right,

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<v Speaker 1>because it's trusted. Because these people are independent, they wouldn't

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<v Speaker 1>take money from anybody. You know, we're on our own here.

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<v Speaker 1>And some of the stories that have come out of

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<v Speaker 1>this though, that one individual was took one hundred thousand

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<v Speaker 1>dollars through a deniable chain. He didn't realize it, but

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<v Speaker 1>it was Russian money, and when asked about it, it's

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<v Speaker 1>kind of like, well, are you going to donate it

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<v Speaker 1>to charity or something? The guy's going one hundred thousand

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<v Speaker 1>dollars means nothing to me. I'll probably never even touch

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<v Speaker 1>the money. I don't need the money. That's not significant

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<v Speaker 1>to me, and then goes on to say to the

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<v Speaker 1>document show that when he was originally approached or somebody's

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<v Speaker 1>appreachiably roast with a contract. It was like four million

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<v Speaker 1>dollars and they said, no, I need at least five million. Dog.

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<v Speaker 1>Think about this. Think about these so called independent people

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<v Speaker 1>who are making so much money that it it. Those

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<v Speaker 1>kind of figures mean nothing to them, yet you can

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<v Speaker 1>influence them. Well, it's a guy thinking about it.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, there are guys out there acting like they're basically me, Larry. Uh.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, I put out my own thing. I do

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<v Speaker 2>it just funded on really listeners. Listeners fund this all

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<v Speaker 2>one way or another, Okay, and that's it. That's what

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<v Speaker 2>I do. And I'm not accepting corporate stuff where they

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<v Speaker 2>get in and start telling me, hey be nice to

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<v Speaker 2>Puvisor because you know we're actually a subsidiary of them

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<v Speaker 2>or whatever. Right, I don't have those influences from advertisers.

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<v Speaker 2>So I'm an independent guy doing it on my own,

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<v Speaker 2>so I can't be bought. I'm not part of the

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<v Speaker 2>influence machine that you see on the corporate media in

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<v Speaker 2>any way, shape or form. But guys like me, once

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<v Speaker 2>they get a large enough audience, they become targets for

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<v Speaker 2>this because quite honestly, you're not making a lot of money.

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<v Speaker 2>To start with, you're barely getting by or barely paying

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<v Speaker 2>the bills in some cases. And then if you get

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<v Speaker 2>money funnel to you which appears to be from some

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<v Speaker 2>source that is just you know, downright wanting to support

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<v Speaker 2>you and take care of you, you generally accept it

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<v Speaker 2>quite honestly, right. I mean, look, if somebody came to

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<v Speaker 2>me and said, I love all you working the JFK stuff,

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<v Speaker 2>and I've been a JFK guy for a long time,

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<v Speaker 2>but I'm behind the scenes. I want to fund you

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<v Speaker 2>because I know you're getting good JFK stuff out there

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<v Speaker 2>and we need a voice like you. And somebody like

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<v Speaker 2>that just basically gives me fifty sixty thousand dollars, Well,

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<v Speaker 2>that's a huge amount of money to me. And yes, indeed,

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<v Speaker 2>I might listen to some things they have to say

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<v Speaker 2>after they do that, and they could be completely seemingly

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<v Speaker 2>you know, benign, just supporter. Right. Some of these guys

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<v Speaker 2>got approached like that, or they got given sweet deals

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<v Speaker 2>with you know, some company allegedly where it's like, if

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<v Speaker 2>you do this, then you won't have to bend and

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<v Speaker 2>scrape to some you know, corporate entsity. You won't have

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<v Speaker 2>to run McDonald's commercials or utilize the Google machine to

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<v Speaker 2>try and gain your pennies per download or whatever. We'll

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<v Speaker 2>just give you the money and we'll give you a

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<v Speaker 2>product that you like to support, and they get them

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<v Speaker 2>that way. And meanwhile, it doesn't matter if they sell

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<v Speaker 2>the product or not, because the real front, that's just

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<v Speaker 2>the front. The real thing about this is to get

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<v Speaker 2>in on the other influence game. And the next thing

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<v Speaker 2>you know is these guys are being fed other information. Hey,

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<v Speaker 2>I'm a great supporter of yours. Here's some great information

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<v Speaker 2>you need to look into. Here's some filmmakers that I

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<v Speaker 2>think are making great stuff, etc. They'll start to feed

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<v Speaker 2>stuff to you, and I watch this happen, Larry, to

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<v Speaker 2>be honest with you, I don't want to name names,

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<v Speaker 2>but I've kind of watched this happen where somebody comes

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<v Speaker 2>in and picks somebody up who is in this kind

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<v Speaker 2>of shape that I've been in all this time, and

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<v Speaker 2>raises them up a bit. And I see this list

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<v Speaker 2>of names, and I realize that some of these people

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<v Speaker 2>went next level all of a sudden, And you do,

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<v Speaker 2>wonder where did all that money come from? You know,

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, it's not Joe Rogan who's getting two hundred

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<v Speaker 2>and fifty million dollars right, he's got a two hundred

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<v Speaker 2>and fifty million dollar contract. It's not those two football

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<v Speaker 2>player brothers who have one hundred and fifty million dollar contract.

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<v Speaker 2>It's not one of those. But some of these independent guys,

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<v Speaker 2>all of a sudden they've got a lot of money

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<v Speaker 2>and it came from somewhere. And isn't it interesting you

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<v Speaker 2>got a track where this stuff comes from, and really

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<v Speaker 2>check into the background of whatever or whoever is like,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, funding you Otherwise you never know where it

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<v Speaker 2>really came from. Or am I crazy?

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<v Speaker 4>Larry?

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<v Speaker 1>I think part of it is, well, one thing is

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<v Speaker 1>at a certain level they are out of the equation

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<v Speaker 1>themselves personally. You know, they have a media person, they

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<v Speaker 1>have an agent, you know, in between them, and people

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<v Speaker 1>are approaching them with money. And in this one instance,

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<v Speaker 1>a media company simply approached this fellow and said, I

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<v Speaker 1>want to buy a couple of shows. I want you

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<v Speaker 1>to do a couple of shows on these topics, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>and it would and and because of this person's approach,

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<v Speaker 1>and you know, you know what kind of show he's

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<v Speaker 1>going to do. You don't have to tell him what

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<v Speaker 1>kind of show he's going to do. You know, if

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<v Speaker 1>you can just get that topic planted, you know what's

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<v Speaker 1>going to come out, and he does. It's just it's

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<v Speaker 1>another contract I'm getting I'm getting spits. The people want

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<v Speaker 1>me to talk about all sorts of things all the time,

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<v Speaker 1>and somebody walks in and says, Okay, we scheduled you

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<v Speaker 1>to do a show on this. He's not involved in

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<v Speaker 1>the process. I think in one instance. In one instance, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>the per personality actually pushed back because it was like

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<v Speaker 1>a four million dollar d from multiple shows, and it's

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<v Speaker 1>kind of like, well, who are these people? Well, a

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<v Speaker 1>cover was created. This is a European individual, here's the

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<v Speaker 1>background and and and they actually created a cover. We

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<v Speaker 1>talked about this last week, right, Chuck. You know the

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<v Speaker 1>CIA can create covers. Well, these folks can create cover.

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<v Speaker 1>The the FSB has always been equal to are better

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<v Speaker 1>than the CIA and creating covers. So they just created

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<v Speaker 1>a cover, fed it back to them. It's kind of like, well,

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<v Speaker 1>that's cool. And by the way, I want five million,

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<v Speaker 1>not four million. Okay, fine, not a problem and money

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<v Speaker 1>it's not a problem. So you know, at that level,

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<v Speaker 1>it just it becomes a matter of production. You know.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like big media. People are buying shows, they're buying commentary,

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<v Speaker 1>and the people are just talented and it's all a

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<v Speaker 1>process and it becomes obvious to intelligence agencies like I say,

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<v Speaker 1>how they can play this game. And since that, the

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<v Speaker 1>goal and all of the political action is always keep

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<v Speaker 1>the playing field moving, you know, don't do one thing

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<v Speaker 1>too long or you're going to get caught. Be prepared

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<v Speaker 1>to do another thing, you know, So it makes perfect

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<v Speaker 1>sense that they were cycling through just another option. Well.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, And there's the fascinating thing again, is if you

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<v Speaker 2>came to me and said, look, I want you to

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<v Speaker 2>do a show on political assassinations, and I've got some

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<v Speaker 2>guests for you, and I'll tell you what we'll do.

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<v Speaker 2>Since i'm buying, you know, I'm buying a block of shows,

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<v Speaker 2>I'm going to pay you to do them. Well, I

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<v Speaker 2>would have already done those shows, so that's great, I'll

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<v Speaker 2>take them. That might be as easy as it is

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<v Speaker 2>to begin with. Right. And then the next thing is,

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<v Speaker 2>since I've approached you with something that you're very friendly to,

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<v Speaker 2>maybe I try, well, this is something that you're kind

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<v Speaker 2>of friendly to let's see if you'll do this, And

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<v Speaker 2>they feed them a few different things and build them up,

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<v Speaker 2>and the next thing, you know is they might give

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<v Speaker 2>them access to some great, really insider, interesting guests too.

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<v Speaker 2>That's another thing right where it's like, hey, look, it

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<v Speaker 2>just so happens. I know somebody who you know, that

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<v Speaker 2>interview that nobody can get because they're you know, an

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<v Speaker 2>exclusive with this lawyer who worked for this foundation or

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<v Speaker 2>whatever that nobody else can get. I'll get them for

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<v Speaker 2>you all of a sudden, right. And again, if you're

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<v Speaker 2>an independent media person, you're struggling to survive, and you're really, well, gee,

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<v Speaker 2>I would have done this show anyway. Plus, they're going

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<v Speaker 2>to throw me some cash because I'm taking care of

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<v Speaker 2>you know, their particular client for a little bit. Not

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<v Speaker 2>a problem. It's a temporary contract. I'm not signing away

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<v Speaker 2>years of my life, you know, sure. And I think

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<v Speaker 2>it gets done about that easily, Larry, what do you think?

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<v Speaker 1>Oh? Absolutely, it gets done that easily. And one of

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<v Speaker 1>the things that makes that at easy is those people

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<v Speaker 1>have established a pattern in their shows. Right, you know

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<v Speaker 1>what position they're going to take, you know what they're

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<v Speaker 1>going to say on a given top you'd you know,

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<v Speaker 1>it's kind of like RTI interviewing Tucker Carlson. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>this is no shock as to what the man is

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<v Speaker 1>going to say, you know, so you just have to

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<v Speaker 1>get it scheduled. So these folks kind of by being

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<v Speaker 1>so politicized, have set them up sells up for this

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<v Speaker 1>in a way because it's easy to go through. It's

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<v Speaker 1>easy to go through the list and know what's going

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<v Speaker 1>to happen on that show. I just have to make

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<v Speaker 1>sure that the show happens and the topic is covered

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<v Speaker 1>at a particular point in time. And as I said,

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<v Speaker 1>it's the sad thing about it is it doesn't it

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't have to be all that credible. We talked about

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<v Speaker 1>this this like last week and terms of deniability. We've

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<v Speaker 1>reached a stage where I'm not expecting this person to

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<v Speaker 1>address a broad audience or conduct a thorough or objective discussion.

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<v Speaker 1>That's I don't want that, you know. So that makes

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<v Speaker 1>this really easy because I know exactly what I'm buying.

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<v Speaker 1>When I was trying to control a media outlet for

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<v Speaker 1>political action, I might have to worry. Even with Fox

353
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<v Speaker 1>or MSNBC, you know, there might be some balance. They

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<v Speaker 1>have people from one part of the spectrum and other s.

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<v Speaker 1>So this is not a concern. I know exactly how

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<v Speaker 1>this is going to go. So it actually makes things easier.

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<v Speaker 1>We have made it easier for them than it was

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<v Speaker 1>in twenty fourteen. If you compare what they were doing

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<v Speaker 1>in twenty fourteen, it was small scale social media. They

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<v Speaker 1>were actually having to go out to individuals to create

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<v Speaker 1>their own foe organizations. Remember last time we talked about

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<v Speaker 1>this Texas secessionist organization that was being cultivated by the FSB.

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<v Speaker 1>The trolling that was being done in twenty fourteen, it

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<v Speaker 1>was minor compared to what's going on now with the

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<v Speaker 1>ability to reach in and control these kind of people

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<v Speaker 1>and use them all right, I mean because there, I

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<v Speaker 1>didn't have to make up any anything fake. I didn't

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<v Speaker 1>have to have somebody and you know inside Russia trolling

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<v Speaker 1>and a troll farm. I just routed money to the

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<v Speaker 1>right person and bingo, I've got it. So like nowadays,

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<v Speaker 1>elevated to another level.

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<v Speaker 2>Right Like nowadays, I know he's kind of been shelved

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<v Speaker 2>at the moment, but he's not gone. Alex Jones, Like,

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<v Speaker 2>if you wanted to approach him, you knew already what

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<v Speaker 2>it was that he would support. So if any of

376
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<v Speaker 2>that fit with your agenda, you could feed extra stuff

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<v Speaker 2>to him happily, right, And you knew what kind of

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<v Speaker 2>audience you were getting. You knew what kind of thing

379
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<v Speaker 2>he was doing, you know, the editorial staff over there.

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<v Speaker 2>Ultimately he was the one guy making the decisions. And

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<v Speaker 2>that's the thing with a bunch of these other all

382
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<v Speaker 2>media guys. They have a couple of volunteers, or maybe

383
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<v Speaker 2>they have somebody who worked for them, but it is

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<v Speaker 2>a very small staff or no staff that makes the decision.

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<v Speaker 2>If you're coming to me, guess what, I got no staff.

386
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<v Speaker 2>So I mean I'd be an easy target if I

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<v Speaker 2>was willing to say some of the stuff that was

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<v Speaker 2>helpful to you. You know, here I am imagining myself

389
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<v Speaker 2>as an easy target, right, But this is the truth.

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<v Speaker 2>And if I had a bit more of a foothold

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<v Speaker 2>in certain communities, I could be very useful to some

392
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<v Speaker 2>of these people because I've already got you know, a

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<v Speaker 2>bunch of people that you know hear all the time

394
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<v Speaker 2>about how America is involved in so many different conspiracies.

395
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<v Speaker 2>The government is, the agencies are. All you got to

396
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<v Speaker 2>do is drop another one into me real easy, right,

397
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<v Speaker 2>I mean, I'm not so easy about it, but some

398
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<v Speaker 2>people are. They literally will have contradictory guests on one

399
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<v Speaker 2>after the other and kind of tout both of them

400
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<v Speaker 2>as legitimate. And I've listened to them do it. And

401
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<v Speaker 2>interesting story coming up toward the end of this week.

402
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<v Speaker 2>I might talk about it on Friday. By the way,

403
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<v Speaker 2>is a particular media outlet that had millions of dollars

404
00:24:04.079 --> 00:24:07.599
<v Speaker 2>and all of a sudden maybe doesn't, but anyway, not

405
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<v Speaker 2>sure if that's because the recent discoveries are not. We're

406
00:24:09.920 --> 00:24:11.720
<v Speaker 2>gonna have to keep an eye on it, but it

407
00:24:11.720 --> 00:24:15.279
<v Speaker 2>ought to be interesting on Friday. Anyway, I'm watching somebody.

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<v Speaker 1>We also have to consider the multiplier effect, which but

409
00:24:19.640 --> 00:24:21.880
<v Speaker 1>to kind of sum that up, when you compare this

410
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<v Speaker 1>story about what the Uranians did with you know, getting

411
00:24:25.720 --> 00:24:29.000
<v Speaker 1>a dossier informations feeding into a campaign, I mean, that

412
00:24:29.200 --> 00:24:32.640
<v Speaker 1>is so twenty fourteen, right, compared to what the Russians

413
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<v Speaker 1>are doing. The Uranians are just way behind the curve

414
00:24:36.440 --> 00:24:40.839
<v Speaker 1>on this one. But talk about the multiplier effect. How

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<v Speaker 1>can I do this again? I'm wearing my FSB hat.

416
00:24:44.000 --> 00:24:47.640
<v Speaker 1>How can I make things even more chaotic? What could

417
00:24:47.680 --> 00:24:50.720
<v Speaker 1>I do to create the kind of I mean, one

418
00:24:50.759 --> 00:24:54.480
<v Speaker 1>thing that was evident in twenty fourteen was they managed

419
00:24:54.519 --> 00:24:59.759
<v Speaker 1>to use troll form farms to plant things that caused riots, right,

420
00:25:00.160 --> 00:25:04.000
<v Speaker 1>And we've discussed that that's in creative creating chaos. There's

421
00:25:04.079 --> 00:25:07.920
<v Speaker 1>no doubt about that they actually created race riots a

422
00:25:07.960 --> 00:25:12.960
<v Speaker 1>small to medium scale just by seeding the right stories

423
00:25:12.960 --> 00:25:16.680
<v Speaker 1>to the right people, they made it happen. Well, this time,

424
00:25:17.119 --> 00:25:19.960
<v Speaker 1>it is so much easier because their targeting can be

425
00:25:20.079 --> 00:25:23.920
<v Speaker 1>so sophisticated. They now know that all they've got to

426
00:25:23.960 --> 00:25:27.640
<v Speaker 1>do is go to the right media person who is

427
00:25:27.799 --> 00:25:34.680
<v Speaker 1>listened to by Donald Trump, Jade events, any politician who's

428
00:25:34.880 --> 00:25:37.920
<v Speaker 1>likely to monitor that newsfeed and repeat it. And they

429
00:25:38.000 --> 00:25:41.279
<v Speaker 1>know how that's working because they're monitoring their Twitter accounts,

430
00:25:41.319 --> 00:25:44.640
<v Speaker 1>their Trump's social or whatever, or it could be, it

431
00:25:44.640 --> 00:25:48.240
<v Speaker 1>doesn't matter. I'm picking that out because a prime example

432
00:25:48.279 --> 00:25:52.319
<v Speaker 1>would be to feed them a rumor that they repeat

433
00:25:52.720 --> 00:25:56.680
<v Speaker 1>that is going to cause a problem, which nobody can

434
00:25:56.720 --> 00:25:59.599
<v Speaker 1>deny that. That's what we're seeing in Springfield, right.

435
00:25:59.640 --> 00:26:02.319
<v Speaker 2>I was going to say, Look, the whole eating your

436
00:26:02.319 --> 00:26:07.000
<v Speaker 2>Cat's thing, right, is based on there's one lady who

437
00:26:07.039 --> 00:26:09.480
<v Speaker 2>came out with a story and it got run with

438
00:26:10.160 --> 00:26:13.119
<v Speaker 2>and it's interesting how it got cycled through social media

439
00:26:13.559 --> 00:26:15.440
<v Speaker 2>and the next thing you know is it shows up

440
00:26:15.480 --> 00:26:19.200
<v Speaker 2>and it's literally being mentioned every half hour on every

441
00:26:19.240 --> 00:26:23.200
<v Speaker 2>news broadcast that's covering the election. Right, they're having to

442
00:26:23.200 --> 00:26:25.440
<v Speaker 2>bring this up. They're having to mention it, even if

443
00:26:25.480 --> 00:26:29.319
<v Speaker 2>it's just to shoot it down, and it's having an effect.

444
00:26:29.359 --> 00:26:32.240
<v Speaker 2>It's continuing to go on. Now, somebody who doesn't trust say,

445
00:26:32.279 --> 00:26:35.720
<v Speaker 2>you know, okay, the liberal media. You know they always lie,

446
00:26:35.759 --> 00:26:37.799
<v Speaker 2>so they're going to try and cover it up. Somebody

447
00:26:37.799 --> 00:26:41.480
<v Speaker 2>who's in that sort of orientation takes even the repetition

448
00:26:41.640 --> 00:26:46.960
<v Speaker 2>of them denying it as confirmation, and this causes it

449
00:26:47.000 --> 00:26:50.440
<v Speaker 2>to be fueled even more. Meanwhile, it started with one

450
00:26:50.519 --> 00:26:55.359
<v Speaker 2>lady who allegedly misspoke because now her neighbor came out

451
00:26:55.400 --> 00:26:57.839
<v Speaker 2>and said, this was a you know, her misspeaking about

452
00:26:57.880 --> 00:27:01.720
<v Speaker 2>my situation even and it turns out that one little

453
00:27:01.759 --> 00:27:05.839
<v Speaker 2>thing that one post on Facebook or whatever to start with,

454
00:27:06.440 --> 00:27:10.119
<v Speaker 2>has grown into this massive thing now where like I said,

455
00:27:10.200 --> 00:27:11.920
<v Speaker 2>every electronic media is having to.

456
00:27:11.880 --> 00:27:15.680
<v Speaker 1>Mention it, Larry, And as you said, it's bi directional, Chuck,

457
00:27:15.759 --> 00:27:19.640
<v Speaker 1>It will work either direction once you get it started,

458
00:27:20.079 --> 00:27:23.039
<v Speaker 1>and if you step back for a minute here. You

459
00:27:23.039 --> 00:27:27.839
<v Speaker 1>you have managed to close down colleges, you have managed

460
00:27:27.960 --> 00:27:32.640
<v Speaker 1>to cause people to lose business big time in the

461
00:27:32.640 --> 00:27:37.200
<v Speaker 1>capital of a state. You're turning people against each other.

462
00:27:37.720 --> 00:27:40.640
<v Speaker 1>And I did that simply by making sure that the

463
00:27:40.839 --> 00:27:44.920
<v Speaker 1>right person who has a platform saw the story.

464
00:27:45.359 --> 00:27:45.559
<v Speaker 2>Right.

465
00:27:46.319 --> 00:27:50.079
<v Speaker 1>If I'm kind of thinking, the only job I want

466
00:27:50.160 --> 00:27:54.319
<v Speaker 1>inside Russia now is to be an FSB political action officer,

467
00:27:54.960 --> 00:27:58.839
<v Speaker 1>because this is like so easy. It's shooting fish in

468
00:27:58.880 --> 00:28:00.880
<v Speaker 1>a barrow. You know, I don't want to be in

469
00:28:00.920 --> 00:28:02.440
<v Speaker 1>the trenches. I don't even want to be in a

470
00:28:02.519 --> 00:28:05.759
<v Speaker 1>drunk this is it. We have made it so easy

471
00:28:05.799 --> 00:28:11.160
<v Speaker 1>for them, it's pitiful. And the multiplier effect of these,

472
00:28:11.559 --> 00:28:15.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, making sure that these stories, it's like these

473
00:28:15.920 --> 00:28:18.240
<v Speaker 1>stories happen all the time. You and I both know

474
00:28:18.359 --> 00:28:20.680
<v Speaker 1>that you can go over social media and find things

475
00:28:20.759 --> 00:28:23.759
<v Speaker 1>that are sensational. So it's not that you had to

476
00:28:23.799 --> 00:28:26.359
<v Speaker 1>create them. It's even better you don't have to create them,

477
00:28:26.720 --> 00:28:28.759
<v Speaker 1>which is what they had to do in twenty fourteen.

478
00:28:29.160 --> 00:28:32.400
<v Speaker 1>Now you just pick them and make sure that they

479
00:28:32.440 --> 00:28:34.279
<v Speaker 1>get in front of someone who's going to repeat them.

480
00:28:34.680 --> 00:28:34.799
<v Speaker 2>Right.

481
00:28:34.920 --> 00:28:38.119
<v Speaker 1>And they learned how to do that last time. They

482
00:28:38.240 --> 00:28:41.960
<v Speaker 1>learned the value of Twitter last time, and they are

483
00:28:43.000 --> 00:28:46.960
<v Speaker 1>maximizing terrifically. I mean, heck, now they've got the guy

484
00:28:46.960 --> 00:28:51.319
<v Speaker 1>who owns Twitter repeating the stories. I'm not sorry, owns

485
00:28:51.400 --> 00:28:53.960
<v Speaker 1>acts repeating the stories. What don' want to get that? Right?

486
00:28:55.759 --> 00:29:02.079
<v Speaker 1>So I have to give them from a professional standpoint,

487
00:29:02.200 --> 00:29:07.079
<v Speaker 1>they have learned their lessons. They saw what worked to

488
00:29:07.160 --> 00:29:10.599
<v Speaker 1>a small extent in twenty fourteen, and man are they

489
00:29:11.319 --> 00:29:15.400
<v Speaker 1>they're profiting from that in this election and not even

490
00:29:15.440 --> 00:29:18.839
<v Speaker 1>the election again, as I say, they don't even care

491
00:29:19.000 --> 00:29:23.359
<v Speaker 1>about the election. They just want chaos in American society,

492
00:29:23.680 --> 00:29:30.079
<v Speaker 1>which translates into a neutralized American government, which is what

493
00:29:30.160 --> 00:29:33.240
<v Speaker 1>you get when you tie up Congress, and it's you know,

494
00:29:33.720 --> 00:29:35.640
<v Speaker 1>nothing happens in Congress.

495
00:29:36.119 --> 00:29:39.240
<v Speaker 2>Right, And here we go. So how do we parse

496
00:29:39.279 --> 00:29:42.039
<v Speaker 2>this out? How do we separate what the you know,

497
00:29:42.079 --> 00:29:44.599
<v Speaker 2>what the Chinese are doing from what the Russians are

498
00:29:44.599 --> 00:29:47.880
<v Speaker 2>doing from you know, again, the Iranians, as you said,

499
00:29:47.920 --> 00:29:51.720
<v Speaker 2>they're kind of working on the twenty fourteen sort of templates,

500
00:29:51.759 --> 00:29:54.160
<v Speaker 2>so they're behind the times a bit. But it looks

501
00:29:54.200 --> 00:29:56.640
<v Speaker 2>to me like the Russians and the Chinese are on

502
00:29:56.680 --> 00:29:59.440
<v Speaker 2>the curve. They're not behind the curve. They're on it.

503
00:29:59.480 --> 00:29:59.960
<v Speaker 2>What do you think.

504
00:30:00.759 --> 00:30:04.200
<v Speaker 1>The Chinese are very much on the same curve that

505
00:30:04.240 --> 00:30:08.200
<v Speaker 1>the Israelis demonstrated that they were in the last three days.

506
00:30:09.039 --> 00:30:14.720
<v Speaker 1>The Chinese understand technology. The Chinese manufacture things right. This

507
00:30:14.799 --> 00:30:17.559
<v Speaker 1>is something the Russians and Iranians can't do to the US,

508
00:30:17.839 --> 00:30:23.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, that's harder. The Chinese manufacture all kinds of software.

509
00:30:24.799 --> 00:30:28.960
<v Speaker 1>They manufacture all kinds of products that have chips in

510
00:30:29.000 --> 00:30:33.519
<v Speaker 1>them that have the bottom line is the Chinese are

511
00:30:33.559 --> 00:30:38.839
<v Speaker 1>in an excellent position to connect conduct technological warfare, covert

512
00:30:38.960 --> 00:30:45.599
<v Speaker 1>technological warfare. They by embedding software. And that's if you

513
00:30:45.680 --> 00:30:49.799
<v Speaker 1>look at the botnet article again that I sent today

514
00:30:49.920 --> 00:30:53.519
<v Speaker 1>that the Justice Department has moved on them today. There

515
00:30:53.880 --> 00:30:56.000
<v Speaker 1>have been concerns that they were doing this for some

516
00:30:56.119 --> 00:31:00.559
<v Speaker 1>time about I mean, I think the first time that

517
00:31:00.599 --> 00:31:04.279
<v Speaker 1>it really came to my attention was when it became

518
00:31:04.599 --> 00:31:10.000
<v Speaker 1>a concern that some of the wireless systems that were

519
00:31:10.039 --> 00:31:14.960
<v Speaker 1>being manufactured by Chinese companies were determined to have code

520
00:31:14.960 --> 00:31:18.200
<v Speaker 1>in them that was questionable, code that could be remotely

521
00:31:18.240 --> 00:31:21.359
<v Speaker 1>activated that had nothing to do with the actual functional

522
00:31:21.400 --> 00:31:25.759
<v Speaker 1>operation of the device. And when it became clear that

523
00:31:25.839 --> 00:31:30.559
<v Speaker 1>those things were emplaced in wireless towers all around our

524
00:31:30.599 --> 00:31:36.440
<v Speaker 1>strategic weapon centers, all around our missile bases, our ICBM basis.

525
00:31:37.000 --> 00:31:40.599
<v Speaker 1>So much so that the government and the military began

526
00:31:40.759 --> 00:31:44.519
<v Speaker 1>pushing back and trying. Not so much the government at first,

527
00:31:44.559 --> 00:31:50.039
<v Speaker 1>the military became surfaced this threat and tried to surface

528
00:31:50.079 --> 00:31:54.160
<v Speaker 1>it to the government and to the administration and to

529
00:31:54.200 --> 00:31:58.359
<v Speaker 1>the Justice Department. And there was pushback because this is

530
00:31:58.400 --> 00:32:02.440
<v Speaker 1>not just happening in the US, It's happening globally. The

531
00:32:02.480 --> 00:32:06.599
<v Speaker 1>same thing was happening to NADO installations. And over the

532
00:32:06.680 --> 00:32:08.599
<v Speaker 1>last three or four years there have been a big

533
00:32:08.720 --> 00:32:15.559
<v Speaker 1>pushback against some of these, especially Chinese wireless companies, wireless communications,

534
00:32:16.279 --> 00:32:20.000
<v Speaker 1>cell phone whatever, companies, big pushback against.

535
00:32:19.640 --> 00:32:22.240
<v Speaker 2>That and right, and that was a hot topic of

536
00:32:22.319 --> 00:32:25.920
<v Speaker 2>conversation a few years back with Huawei and why is

537
00:32:25.960 --> 00:32:29.960
<v Speaker 2>there this other stuff that's come along with Initially there

538
00:32:29.960 --> 00:32:33.440
<v Speaker 2>were drones being purchased and used by the government, right,

539
00:32:33.559 --> 00:32:36.119
<v Speaker 2>And they were wondering about the extra software that came

540
00:32:36.160 --> 00:32:38.960
<v Speaker 2>along with it. And these things are being used for

541
00:32:39.039 --> 00:32:43.480
<v Speaker 2>crowd control. I think back during George Floyd time, right,

542
00:32:43.880 --> 00:32:47.799
<v Speaker 2>I mean, and there it was they were speculating, what's

543
00:32:47.839 --> 00:32:50.039
<v Speaker 2>the problem with this, This could be a major issue.

544
00:32:50.200 --> 00:32:51.920
<v Speaker 2>We got to get rid of all this stuff because

545
00:32:51.960 --> 00:32:54.240
<v Speaker 2>it's going to create back doors, et cetera, et cetera.

546
00:32:55.279 --> 00:32:59.960
<v Speaker 2>And meanwhile, our government is foolishly acquiring the Chinese technology

547
00:33:00.119 --> 00:33:05.200
<v Speaker 2>not knowing all of what's on board with it. Issue. Yeah,

548
00:33:05.279 --> 00:33:07.839
<v Speaker 2>low cost bidding, but it was a real issue. What

549
00:33:07.960 --> 00:33:11.680
<v Speaker 2>else are you buying along with the functional drones? Right?

550
00:33:11.799 --> 00:33:14.359
<v Speaker 2>I mean this was a real world problem. And then

551
00:33:14.400 --> 00:33:16.920
<v Speaker 2>they said, well that could give us issues with them

552
00:33:16.960 --> 00:33:20.960
<v Speaker 2>hacking into our grid and infrastructure and so on and

553
00:33:21.000 --> 00:33:23.559
<v Speaker 2>so forth. I mean, that was the big scare. Then

554
00:33:24.160 --> 00:33:27.240
<v Speaker 2>nobody's really talked about it since then, and yet here

555
00:33:27.279 --> 00:33:29.559
<v Speaker 2>we go. Right, what's going on is.

556
00:33:30.079 --> 00:33:32.920
<v Speaker 1>Over the last six months, there have been a number

557
00:33:32.960 --> 00:33:36.640
<v Speaker 1>of instances and it's quite frankly not have gotten the

558
00:33:36.680 --> 00:33:39.559
<v Speaker 1>press that I would have expected it would. But we

559
00:33:39.640 --> 00:33:44.880
<v Speaker 1>have seen it out here of communities having their water

560
00:33:44.960 --> 00:33:52.960
<v Speaker 1>systems taking down, their power systems taking down. It's a hacker.

561
00:33:53.920 --> 00:33:56.519
<v Speaker 1>It's very hard to trace the source of this stuff,

562
00:33:56.519 --> 00:34:02.839
<v Speaker 1>but it's it's being done by embedded code, and some

563
00:34:02.920 --> 00:34:06.279
<v Speaker 1>of it has been linked back to Russia more or

564
00:34:06.400 --> 00:34:09.440
<v Speaker 1>I shouldn't say Russia in terms of the SB It's

565
00:34:10.000 --> 00:34:14.559
<v Speaker 1>very hard to differentiate sometimes because a lot of times

566
00:34:14.960 --> 00:34:21.239
<v Speaker 1>it's accompanied by blackmail. You know, it's kind of like

567
00:34:21.280 --> 00:34:24.400
<v Speaker 1>the scams fulled against the banking institutions. It's sort of

568
00:34:24.480 --> 00:34:29.280
<v Speaker 1>like stuff. It's ransomware things, so you don't really know

569
00:34:29.679 --> 00:34:33.079
<v Speaker 1>if it's government act or if it truly is you know,

570
00:34:33.599 --> 00:34:38.239
<v Speaker 1>piracy basically. But again, being the suspicious person that I am,

571
00:34:38.280 --> 00:34:41.719
<v Speaker 1>if I were doing this as an adversary government, I

572
00:34:41.760 --> 00:34:45.239
<v Speaker 1>would use ransomware as my cover. Oh, there are all

573
00:34:45.239 --> 00:34:48.039
<v Speaker 1>these bad guys in Eastern Europe that keep doing this.

574
00:34:48.880 --> 00:34:51.000
<v Speaker 1>Why are all the bad guys in Eastern Europe? I

575
00:34:51.000 --> 00:34:57.519
<v Speaker 1>don't understand. You know, in former Soviet republics.

576
00:34:57.320 --> 00:34:59.360
<v Speaker 2>They have nothing else to do over there, Larry, don't

577
00:34:59.360 --> 00:35:01.480
<v Speaker 2>you know they're sitting on it. They're a fat guys

578
00:35:01.480 --> 00:35:03.440
<v Speaker 2>sitting on a bed or whatever somebody said.

579
00:35:03.239 --> 00:35:05.679
<v Speaker 1>About I guess that's what it is. But there has

580
00:35:05.840 --> 00:35:08.000
<v Speaker 1>there have been a number of instances about that, and

581
00:35:08.000 --> 00:35:11.440
<v Speaker 1>there have been warnings. I've seen warnings issued to to

582
00:35:11.760 --> 00:35:18.679
<v Speaker 1>community governments, county governments, metropolitan governments. This is it's this

583
00:35:18.760 --> 00:35:22.960
<v Speaker 1>is the next step forward. It's not just collecting information,

584
00:35:23.679 --> 00:35:27.920
<v Speaker 1>it's putting the infrastructure at risk. So that's kind of

585
00:35:27.960 --> 00:35:32.039
<v Speaker 1>phase two. The first step is as passive. I put

586
00:35:32.079 --> 00:35:35.239
<v Speaker 1>code in this stuff that just allows me to you know,

587
00:35:35.280 --> 00:35:38.119
<v Speaker 1>it's kind of what's happening with your TV set or

588
00:35:38.159 --> 00:35:41.880
<v Speaker 1>with your wireless system. If you can talk to it,

589
00:35:41.880 --> 00:35:43.920
<v Speaker 1>it can talk to you. It's listening to you all

590
00:35:43.960 --> 00:35:46.760
<v Speaker 1>the time, so it can collect information.

591
00:35:46.719 --> 00:35:48.960
<v Speaker 2>And welcome to go with that center traffic.

592
00:35:48.800 --> 00:35:54.960
<v Speaker 1>Patterns or what what sources using what frequency? Great stuff

593
00:35:55.039 --> 00:35:56.679
<v Speaker 1>in all of that. But that's that's kind of like

594
00:35:56.679 --> 00:36:01.079
<v Speaker 1>the first here. But the ability to act interfere with

595
00:36:01.199 --> 00:36:02.880
<v Speaker 1>infrastructures the second tier.

596
00:36:04.119 --> 00:36:06.880
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, well, until you get to interfering with infrastructure as

597
00:36:06.880 --> 00:36:09.440
<v Speaker 2>far as I know anyway, I mean, welcome to modern

598
00:36:09.519 --> 00:36:13.679
<v Speaker 2>Google from the pedestrian and commercial side of things that

599
00:36:13.760 --> 00:36:16.480
<v Speaker 2>you know, the public gets to interact with every single day.

600
00:36:16.880 --> 00:36:22.000
<v Speaker 2>I mean, Google does this right, they track everything. It's

601
00:36:22.119 --> 00:36:25.280
<v Speaker 2>it's amazing. But now as far as you know, wanting

602
00:36:25.320 --> 00:36:28.039
<v Speaker 2>to do harm or is it there just to you know,

603
00:36:28.559 --> 00:36:31.280
<v Speaker 2>turn all of your data into the best commodity possible.

604
00:36:31.719 --> 00:36:35.239
<v Speaker 2>There's the other issue. But meanwhile, these foreign nations not

605
00:36:35.360 --> 00:36:39.559
<v Speaker 2>necessarily looking to turn a profit. Maybe they're looking to

606
00:36:39.599 --> 00:36:42.760
<v Speaker 2>turn other kinds of profits, right, and.

607
00:36:42.880 --> 00:36:47.360
<v Speaker 1>You never you're never sure when when somebody decides to

608
00:36:47.400 --> 00:36:51.599
<v Speaker 1>throw the switch. You know, the Israelis decided to throw

609
00:36:51.639 --> 00:36:58.719
<v Speaker 1>the switch, okay, and look what happened. We have and

610
00:36:58.760 --> 00:37:01.239
<v Speaker 1>now it looks like it was the capability that they

611
00:37:01.280 --> 00:37:03.119
<v Speaker 1>wanted and they found out that they were going to

612
00:37:03.159 --> 00:37:05.519
<v Speaker 1>be discovered and they decided to use it. You know,

613
00:37:05.960 --> 00:37:09.400
<v Speaker 1>that doesn't mean that China is going to throw the switch. However,

614
00:37:09.519 --> 00:37:13.559
<v Speaker 1>quite frankly, if someday China decides then wants to enforce

615
00:37:14.280 --> 00:37:18.800
<v Speaker 1>their territorial domains in the South China Sea and they

616
00:37:19.519 --> 00:37:22.400
<v Speaker 1>decide to throw the switch and shut down major chunks

617
00:37:22.400 --> 00:37:27.119
<v Speaker 1>of American infrastructure in a fashion that's deniable. What are

618
00:37:27.159 --> 00:37:27.679
<v Speaker 1>we going to do?

619
00:37:27.880 --> 00:37:30.400
<v Speaker 2>Right? And meanwhile, some of these things are piggybacked onto

620
00:37:30.440 --> 00:37:33.480
<v Speaker 2>other things. I mean, this guy from the Golden Apollo Company,

621
00:37:33.719 --> 00:37:36.079
<v Speaker 2>the Taiwanese company, the owner of it, is sitting there

622
00:37:36.079 --> 00:37:39.280
<v Speaker 2>going I had no idea that my stuff could have

623
00:37:39.320 --> 00:37:41.440
<v Speaker 2>done this or anything else or be involved in this.

624
00:37:42.199 --> 00:37:44.440
<v Speaker 2>Maybe it's got something to do with this again, Eastern

625
00:37:44.480 --> 00:37:47.880
<v Speaker 2>European company that had a licensing deal with US, but

626
00:37:48.000 --> 00:37:50.679
<v Speaker 2>we didn't do this. It's very strange. Some of these

627
00:37:50.679 --> 00:37:55.960
<v Speaker 2>things are piggybacked in with other people's hardware, other people's businesses,

628
00:37:56.400 --> 00:37:58.840
<v Speaker 2>and it's not necessarily like, well, just don't buy anything

629
00:37:58.840 --> 00:38:02.639
<v Speaker 2>from China then stupid and you'll be fine. No, that's

630
00:38:02.639 --> 00:38:05.519
<v Speaker 2>not necessarily the way it works. You could be dealing

631
00:38:05.559 --> 00:38:09.199
<v Speaker 2>with something that came through that was you know, sort

632
00:38:09.239 --> 00:38:13.199
<v Speaker 2>of just added and comes in like the Trojan Horse, right,

633
00:38:13.320 --> 00:38:17.280
<v Speaker 2>I mean you're talking about and talk was exploding in Lebanon,

634
00:38:17.320 --> 00:38:19.039
<v Speaker 2>for God's sake. Could Yeah.

635
00:38:19.079 --> 00:38:21.920
<v Speaker 1>I remember reading a book this is from the fifties,

636
00:38:21.960 --> 00:38:25.079
<v Speaker 1>which I thought was I couldn't understand it at the time,

637
00:38:25.119 --> 00:38:27.920
<v Speaker 1>but it was called The Death of America, and basically

638
00:38:27.960 --> 00:38:32.400
<v Speaker 1>the concept was an adversary nation put a lot of

639
00:38:32.440 --> 00:38:38.159
<v Speaker 1>atomic weapons in orbit and started bombarding America. The problem

640
00:38:38.320 --> 00:38:41.840
<v Speaker 1>was they had already been in orbit. You couldn't prove

641
00:38:41.960 --> 00:38:45.800
<v Speaker 1>who they were, who it was, You couldn't absolutely prove

642
00:38:45.920 --> 00:38:50.519
<v Speaker 1>who was attacking you, so you couldn't unleash a retaliatory strike.

643
00:38:50.920 --> 00:38:55.119
<v Speaker 1>You know, you were neutralized. And I thought that was

644
00:38:55.159 --> 00:38:59.360
<v Speaker 1>silly at the time, but I mean it's the same concept.

645
00:38:58.920 --> 00:39:04.880
<v Speaker 1>You have a real hard time retaliating against that sort

646
00:39:04.920 --> 00:39:08.400
<v Speaker 1>of situation, you know, where you can't really for sure

647
00:39:08.519 --> 00:39:10.000
<v Speaker 1>determine the aggressor.

648
00:39:10.000 --> 00:39:10.920
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, you can't determine it.

649
00:39:11.000 --> 00:39:13.320
<v Speaker 1>I hope to keep going back to creating chaos. But

650
00:39:14.000 --> 00:39:21.480
<v Speaker 1>we saw during starting in about how twenty well, twenty twelve,

651
00:39:21.599 --> 00:39:24.800
<v Speaker 1>twenty eleven, that sort of thing that was the sort

652
00:39:24.840 --> 00:39:28.000
<v Speaker 1>of thing that happens began to happen in Eastern European

653
00:39:28.119 --> 00:39:31.639
<v Speaker 1>nations who had been part of the Soviet Bloc but

654
00:39:31.800 --> 00:39:34.440
<v Speaker 1>had had left and we're very happy not to be

655
00:39:34.480 --> 00:39:37.960
<v Speaker 1>affiliated with Russia. And they started getting those kind of

656
00:39:38.000 --> 00:39:41.320
<v Speaker 1>infrastructure attacks, and it's quite clear that it was the

657
00:39:41.400 --> 00:39:44.119
<v Speaker 1>Russians that were doing it, but it was so highly

658
00:39:44.199 --> 00:39:47.159
<v Speaker 1>deniable that you know, all you could say is, well,

659
00:39:47.199 --> 00:39:50.039
<v Speaker 1>it looks like it was, and so you can't you

660
00:39:50.079 --> 00:39:53.920
<v Speaker 1>can't retaliate, you can't even suffer damages. So and I

661
00:39:54.000 --> 00:39:56.119
<v Speaker 1>bring up one of the things that we're looking at.

662
00:39:56.079 --> 00:39:58.000
<v Speaker 2>And I bring up this time on these company because

663
00:39:58.039 --> 00:40:00.480
<v Speaker 2>they're over there kicking in the door pretty much going

664
00:40:00.559 --> 00:40:03.239
<v Speaker 2>after it and then looking to investigate. Let me tell you,

665
00:40:03.239 --> 00:40:06.039
<v Speaker 2>the most brilliant thing would be to turn an American

666
00:40:06.119 --> 00:40:10.760
<v Speaker 2>company somehow into the delivery system for something. And of

667
00:40:10.800 --> 00:40:14.880
<v Speaker 2>course our DOJ would go after that American company, start investigating,

668
00:40:14.920 --> 00:40:17.639
<v Speaker 2>looking around, and they might find that it has nothing

669
00:40:17.639 --> 00:40:19.800
<v Speaker 2>to do with that American company. It's something that was

670
00:40:20.239 --> 00:40:23.400
<v Speaker 2>added into them from some other foreign nation that might

671
00:40:23.440 --> 00:40:25.519
<v Speaker 2>have two or three steps behind it, in which case

672
00:40:25.559 --> 00:40:28.440
<v Speaker 2>you have no idea who the actual aggress you know,

673
00:40:28.559 --> 00:40:32.199
<v Speaker 2>like you said, aggressor her perpetrator is, because it's three

674
00:40:32.280 --> 00:40:35.679
<v Speaker 2>levels deep and hidden within a shell company that actually

675
00:40:35.760 --> 00:40:37.920
<v Speaker 2>delivered this stuff. But they put it in there three

676
00:40:38.000 --> 00:40:40.360
<v Speaker 2>years ago. And it so happens that you bought this

677
00:40:40.440 --> 00:40:42.960
<v Speaker 2>stuff this year. You don't even know it because it's

678
00:40:42.960 --> 00:40:44.679
<v Speaker 2>so far in the past it should have nothing to

679
00:40:44.679 --> 00:40:47.400
<v Speaker 2>do with it. I mean, did I just make that

680
00:40:47.480 --> 00:40:49.719
<v Speaker 2>more convoluted than it needs to be? Maybe I did.

681
00:40:50.840 --> 00:40:53.880
<v Speaker 1>Unfortunately you made it just as convoluted as it probably

682
00:40:53.960 --> 00:40:54.639
<v Speaker 1>will be.

683
00:40:54.760 --> 00:40:56.599
<v Speaker 2>Right, I mean, but this is the type of stuff

684
00:40:56.599 --> 00:40:59.480
<v Speaker 2>we're talking about here, Like I said, this Golden Apollo company,

685
00:41:00.280 --> 00:41:02.840
<v Speaker 2>you know, supposedly they're the ones who made the pagers

686
00:41:02.920 --> 00:41:06.719
<v Speaker 2>and the walkie talkies or whatever, right, and they have

687
00:41:07.039 --> 00:41:10.760
<v Speaker 2>no design on having these things blow up. You know.

688
00:41:10.840 --> 00:41:13.639
<v Speaker 2>The guy from the company's like, this would destroy my company.

689
00:41:13.679 --> 00:41:16.199
<v Speaker 2>I got exploding devices. I don't want to do this,

690
00:41:17.400 --> 00:41:20.199
<v Speaker 2>you know. Basically he's pleading to the press like don't

691
00:41:20.199 --> 00:41:24.000
<v Speaker 2>blame me for this. But meanwhile, it's all his hardware, right,

692
00:41:25.320 --> 00:41:28.079
<v Speaker 2>So you know, there you go. So somebody's got to

693
00:41:28.079 --> 00:41:32.360
<v Speaker 2>figure out what the actual origin was and is that

694
00:41:32.400 --> 00:41:32.960
<v Speaker 2>going to be easy?

695
00:41:33.039 --> 00:41:37.239
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, go ahead, since we're talking about so what's different

696
00:41:37.360 --> 00:41:40.400
<v Speaker 1>between the Russians and the Chinese.

697
00:41:40.599 --> 00:41:42.039
<v Speaker 2>Yes, let's get back to the point in time.

698
00:41:42.599 --> 00:41:48.400
<v Speaker 1>Russians are primarily engaged in political warfare creating chaos, while

699
00:41:48.440 --> 00:41:53.320
<v Speaker 1>the Chinese appear to be engaged in something a bit removed,

700
00:41:53.599 --> 00:41:58.679
<v Speaker 1>which is literally setting up the context for either you know,

701
00:41:58.840 --> 00:42:03.719
<v Speaker 1>covertly collecting information or putting them in a position for

702
00:42:04.760 --> 00:42:08.320
<v Speaker 1>more proactive damaging action if they should type decide to

703
00:42:08.360 --> 00:42:11.159
<v Speaker 1>do it. So they're they're looking a little bit more

704
00:42:11.239 --> 00:42:13.800
<v Speaker 1>like Israel. I think. The other thing that's going on

705
00:42:13.880 --> 00:42:17.440
<v Speaker 1>that that that people aren't really into the military side

706
00:42:17.440 --> 00:42:22.079
<v Speaker 1>of things are not aware of, is that the Chinese

707
00:42:22.360 --> 00:42:28.760
<v Speaker 1>provably have been so active in operating drones over American

708
00:42:28.960 --> 00:42:36.480
<v Speaker 1>military targets, infrastructure elements like airports and atomic power plants.

709
00:42:38.679 --> 00:42:41.159
<v Speaker 1>You don't see this in the news that much. It's

710
00:42:41.239 --> 00:42:44.280
<v Speaker 1>it's kind of I see it because it sets over

711
00:42:44.360 --> 00:42:49.840
<v Speaker 1>in the either the military or the UFO genre of

712
00:42:50.079 --> 00:42:58.199
<v Speaker 1>just a constant stream of unidentified objects in military spaces,

713
00:42:58.360 --> 00:43:04.360
<v Speaker 1>restricted military space, These atomic power plants operating over our

714
00:43:04.440 --> 00:43:09.159
<v Speaker 1>navy forces. That things. What is now being floated and

715
00:43:09.239 --> 00:43:13.000
<v Speaker 1>actually as even surfacing in Congress is we need to

716
00:43:13.039 --> 00:43:17.880
<v Speaker 1>spend hundreds of billions of dollars setting up a new

717
00:43:18.199 --> 00:43:27.280
<v Speaker 1>nationwide air defense network. And what they have proven is,

718
00:43:28.119 --> 00:43:32.079
<v Speaker 1>of course we've seen this in Ukraine. And what they

719
00:43:32.119 --> 00:43:36.639
<v Speaker 1>have proven is they have the ability to covertly operate

720
00:43:36.719 --> 00:43:41.960
<v Speaker 1>drones at will over the United States, which is a threat.

721
00:43:42.239 --> 00:43:46.920
<v Speaker 1>And now we've seen how easily those drones can be weaponized.

722
00:43:47.519 --> 00:43:50.159
<v Speaker 1>It is a threat. Are we going to spend money?

723
00:43:50.679 --> 00:43:54.039
<v Speaker 1>You know, we during the Cold War we had missile

724
00:43:54.079 --> 00:43:59.159
<v Speaker 1>defenses against around every major metropolitan area, hundreds of them,

725
00:43:59.639 --> 00:44:05.760
<v Speaker 1>with atomic warriors to take down bombers. Are they trying

726
00:44:05.760 --> 00:44:08.480
<v Speaker 1>to tempt us into doing that again? Do we need

727
00:44:08.519 --> 00:44:11.760
<v Speaker 1>to do that again again? It's it's a it's a

728
00:44:11.880 --> 00:44:15.719
<v Speaker 1>kind of a mental judo in a way. They can

729
00:44:15.760 --> 00:44:21.480
<v Speaker 1>spend virtually no money and really raise our military concerns

730
00:44:21.480 --> 00:44:28.360
<v Speaker 1>and potentially our military spending far over What what is

731
00:44:28.400 --> 00:44:29.719
<v Speaker 1>causing them to worry us?

732
00:44:32.559 --> 00:44:36.760
<v Speaker 2>No, it's just the whole thing is amazing. It just

733
00:44:36.960 --> 00:44:40.679
<v Speaker 2>is I mean so again separating this from what we

734
00:44:40.719 --> 00:44:44.039
<v Speaker 2>see in the headlines, right there is the political end

735
00:44:44.039 --> 00:44:47.079
<v Speaker 2>of this and all of that, and that's sort of

736
00:44:47.119 --> 00:44:50.840
<v Speaker 2>a wave of influence, and then there's a decisively more

737
00:44:51.079 --> 00:44:54.159
<v Speaker 2>practical military application here, is there not?

738
00:44:55.199 --> 00:44:59.760
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, it is creating. If we have creating chaos and

739
00:44:59.800 --> 00:45:04.000
<v Speaker 1>the political space, we have creating chaos in the military space.

740
00:45:04.119 --> 00:45:06.679
<v Speaker 1>If you if you follow it, you'll see that the

741
00:45:06.719 --> 00:45:09.719
<v Speaker 1>air Force and the Army and the Marines, but in

742
00:45:09.760 --> 00:45:14.519
<v Speaker 1>particular the Air Force are stepping back from several major

743
00:45:14.599 --> 00:45:18.280
<v Speaker 1>programs that they have spent billions on in terms of

744
00:45:18.440 --> 00:45:24.920
<v Speaker 1>next generation fighters, next generation tankers because the the battle

745
00:45:24.960 --> 00:45:28.920
<v Speaker 1>space is being changed, and it's kind of like, wait

746
00:45:28.960 --> 00:45:31.639
<v Speaker 1>a minute, we thought we knew what the battlespace was

747
00:45:31.639 --> 00:45:35.159
<v Speaker 1>going to look like. Now, you know, we don't think

748
00:45:35.199 --> 00:45:37.599
<v Speaker 1>the Russians are going to use it against us, but

749
00:45:37.639 --> 00:45:40.400
<v Speaker 1>it's very clear that the Chinese have been playing this

750
00:45:40.559 --> 00:45:44.119
<v Speaker 1>game and are in a space in the Pacific where

751
00:45:44.159 --> 00:45:46.320
<v Speaker 1>they can play it in a big way. You know,

752
00:45:46.760 --> 00:45:51.920
<v Speaker 1>we're we're having it's creating military chaos in our strategic

753
00:45:52.000 --> 00:45:57.320
<v Speaker 1>planning and our spending is the big thing. Locke just

754
00:45:57.440 --> 00:46:01.760
<v Speaker 1>backed out of a multi billion dollar contract because of

755
00:46:02.440 --> 00:46:05.800
<v Speaker 1>a change in basically strategy as far as the Air

756
00:46:05.840 --> 00:46:09.199
<v Speaker 1>Force saying, well, now we realize that we don't need that,

757
00:46:09.320 --> 00:46:14.400
<v Speaker 1>we need something else. So big aerospace companies are losing

758
00:46:14.519 --> 00:46:18.840
<v Speaker 1>major investments because the battlespace is being made more chaotic.

759
00:46:20.519 --> 00:46:23.159
<v Speaker 1>And I'm sure our show this evening is doing a

760
00:46:23.159 --> 00:46:27.360
<v Speaker 1>lot to make people feel good, Chuck. You know, well,

761
00:46:27.519 --> 00:46:29.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, it didn't really occur to me when we started,

762
00:46:29.800 --> 00:46:31.239
<v Speaker 1>but now I'm feeling bad too.

763
00:46:31.599 --> 00:46:35.119
<v Speaker 2>Well, lots of adversarial stuff is happening, right, and what

764
00:46:35.280 --> 00:46:36.960
<v Speaker 2>is the purpose of it all At the end of

765
00:46:37.039 --> 00:46:40.280
<v Speaker 2>the day, It's definitely not to make things better for

766
00:46:40.679 --> 00:46:44.400
<v Speaker 2>those of us, you know, having to endure it here

767
00:46:44.480 --> 00:46:47.719
<v Speaker 2>in the United States. I mean, what can I do.

768
00:46:47.800 --> 00:46:51.039
<v Speaker 2>I can't avoid the fact that it's you know, not

769
00:46:51.239 --> 00:46:53.039
<v Speaker 2>meant to be a big hug and a kiss in

770
00:46:53.119 --> 00:46:54.840
<v Speaker 2>Merry Christmas, you know.

771
00:46:55.719 --> 00:46:59.559
<v Speaker 1>And it's like we're being targeted from two directions, two

772
00:46:59.639 --> 00:47:04.679
<v Speaker 1>different types of adversaries, two different types of strategies, two

773
00:47:04.719 --> 00:47:08.159
<v Speaker 1>different types of weapons, if you will. At the same time,

774
00:47:09.039 --> 00:47:11.559
<v Speaker 1>you know, and you really have to be sympathetic as

775
00:47:11.599 --> 00:47:15.440
<v Speaker 1>to how any administration could get their heads around this,

776
00:47:16.440 --> 00:47:19.239
<v Speaker 1>regardless of politics. How how do you get your head

777
00:47:19.280 --> 00:47:21.920
<v Speaker 1>around this? How do you? How do you the Justice

778
00:47:21.920 --> 00:47:25.599
<v Speaker 1>Department deal with it? How do the military services deal

779
00:47:25.679 --> 00:47:27.679
<v Speaker 1>with it? How do you? How do you come up

780
00:47:27.760 --> 00:47:32.800
<v Speaker 1>with a strategy to concurrently deal with two totally different

781
00:47:32.840 --> 00:47:37.519
<v Speaker 1>types of attack, especially when one of them is specifically

782
00:47:37.639 --> 00:47:43.159
<v Speaker 1>designed to keep you from doing anything in Congress even

783
00:47:43.239 --> 00:47:44.400
<v Speaker 1>if you had a strategy.

784
00:47:45.079 --> 00:47:47.920
<v Speaker 2>Well, see, here's the thing that that that occurs to me,

785
00:47:48.000 --> 00:47:50.280
<v Speaker 2>and again this is my loose thinking on it, and

786
00:47:50.599 --> 00:47:53.440
<v Speaker 2>that is that we have to have our own sort

787
00:47:53.480 --> 00:47:58.960
<v Speaker 2>of uh cyber attackers, right with our own hackers, US

788
00:47:59.000 --> 00:48:02.480
<v Speaker 2>based hackers and attackers of source in order to counter this.

789
00:48:02.519 --> 00:48:05.079
<v Speaker 2>Wouldn't that be the way that the US would normally

790
00:48:05.119 --> 00:48:09.159
<v Speaker 2>answer something like this? If they have a special you

791
00:48:09.159 --> 00:48:12.480
<v Speaker 2>know program to do xyz, then that means we need one,

792
00:48:13.079 --> 00:48:16.480
<v Speaker 2>and we need one that counters theirs or or am

793
00:48:16.519 --> 00:48:17.400
<v Speaker 2>I thinking.

794
00:48:17.199 --> 00:48:24.239
<v Speaker 1>To the problem from a technology standpoint, we could do that,

795
00:48:24.360 --> 00:48:26.840
<v Speaker 1>but let's look at the advantage is that they have.

796
00:48:27.639 --> 00:48:33.599
<v Speaker 1>If we come up with a a political action package

797
00:48:33.719 --> 00:48:40.679
<v Speaker 1>that involves disinformation, misinformation, social networking, you know, social messaging,

798
00:48:41.079 --> 00:48:45.039
<v Speaker 1>is that going to work against Russia? Absolutely not. Putin

799
00:48:45.119 --> 00:48:49.639
<v Speaker 1>has such total control over Russian media, there is virtually

800
00:48:49.719 --> 00:48:52.360
<v Speaker 1>nothing that we can do. I mean, at this point

801
00:48:52.400 --> 00:48:57.480
<v Speaker 1>in time, they've had over sixty thousand casualties and it's

802
00:48:57.519 --> 00:49:01.039
<v Speaker 1>not even touched them because the ability to keep that

803
00:49:01.119 --> 00:49:05.639
<v Speaker 1>out of the media. So that's a political warfare against

804
00:49:06.000 --> 00:49:08.719
<v Speaker 1>Putin's regime at this point in time. It's just not

805
00:49:08.800 --> 00:49:14.480
<v Speaker 1>in the cards. But it is in the cards against us. Unfortunately,

806
00:49:14.519 --> 00:49:20.960
<v Speaker 1>it's unilateral. Okay, let's talk about China. Yeah, absolutely, we

807
00:49:21.079 --> 00:49:24.440
<v Speaker 1>can come up with counters for drones. We can, but

808
00:49:25.079 --> 00:49:29.880
<v Speaker 1>what about this manufacturing capability? How much American stuff is

809
00:49:30.000 --> 00:49:34.079
<v Speaker 1>used in China? The Chinese Over the last three or

810
00:49:34.079 --> 00:49:41.000
<v Speaker 1>four years, Chinese government has created an absolute phobia against

811
00:49:41.039 --> 00:49:44.679
<v Speaker 1>foreigners in China. I say this, but I mean, you're

812
00:49:44.719 --> 00:49:47.079
<v Speaker 1>at the point now where there was a story a

813
00:49:47.079 --> 00:49:51.440
<v Speaker 1>few months ago where and a sports team they've decided

814
00:49:51.440 --> 00:49:54.119
<v Speaker 1>to play in Japan and not China, and it was

815
00:49:54.280 --> 00:50:00.400
<v Speaker 1>like a huge national they're disrespecting us, They're Okay, there

816
00:50:00.440 --> 00:50:05.360
<v Speaker 1>really is a great deal of anti it's not anti

817
00:50:05.559 --> 00:50:10.599
<v Speaker 1>all foreigners, but anti Western feeling in China. So the

818
00:50:10.679 --> 00:50:14.800
<v Speaker 1>question is how much are our sales of equipment in China.

819
00:50:15.320 --> 00:50:18.800
<v Speaker 1>Can we do anything on the order that they could

820
00:50:18.840 --> 00:50:23.119
<v Speaker 1>do with you know, chip embeds and software embeds and

821
00:50:23.119 --> 00:50:25.400
<v Speaker 1>that sort of stuff in terms of selling to US

822
00:50:26.199 --> 00:50:28.559
<v Speaker 1>and selling through third parties to us. Is that even

823
00:50:28.639 --> 00:50:32.199
<v Speaker 1>on the table that we could balance that out. I'm

824
00:50:32.199 --> 00:50:33.119
<v Speaker 1>not sure that it is.

825
00:50:36.239 --> 00:50:39.360
<v Speaker 2>I don't know. I don't know, And I have a

826
00:50:39.440 --> 00:50:44.239
<v Speaker 2>chatter mentioning the Iranian thing against Trump, but I don't

827
00:50:44.239 --> 00:50:47.079
<v Speaker 2>know how it is. That's a whole mixed up thing.

828
00:50:47.119 --> 00:50:49.559
<v Speaker 2>I'm seeing where they went and they got documents from

829
00:50:49.559 --> 00:50:52.000
<v Speaker 2>his campaign and we're trying to hand him over to

830
00:50:52.039 --> 00:50:55.159
<v Speaker 2>the Biden campaign. Were there other Iranian moves against Trump

831
00:50:56.480 --> 00:50:57.079
<v Speaker 2>that I missed?

832
00:50:57.840 --> 00:51:00.719
<v Speaker 1>I'm the only one I'm aware of is the uh

833
00:51:02.039 --> 00:51:06.000
<v Speaker 1>document package. And again that's that's very much just a

834
00:51:06.079 --> 00:51:09.159
<v Speaker 1>repeat of It's it's kind of like Hillary's emails or

835
00:51:09.159 --> 00:51:13.800
<v Speaker 1>something like that. You know, that's I think that's and

836
00:51:13.840 --> 00:51:16.440
<v Speaker 1>that's Biden, right. This is months old at this point

837
00:51:16.440 --> 00:51:16.840
<v Speaker 1>in time.

838
00:51:17.239 --> 00:51:19.280
<v Speaker 2>It's had to be because they were.

839
00:51:21.920 --> 00:51:26.519
<v Speaker 1>I've seen some talk of maybe social messaging coming out

840
00:51:26.559 --> 00:51:35.960
<v Speaker 1>of Iran against Trump, but you know, nothing, nothing to

841
00:51:36.079 --> 00:51:39.280
<v Speaker 1>compete with the other stuff that's going on. So now

842
00:51:39.440 --> 00:51:42.360
<v Speaker 1>I can't say that I've seen anything of the same

843
00:51:42.440 --> 00:51:44.320
<v Speaker 1>magnitude at all coming from Iran.

844
00:51:44.880 --> 00:51:48.719
<v Speaker 2>M All right, Hey, I don't know, but how do

845
00:51:48.760 --> 00:51:50.880
<v Speaker 2>we how do we kind of tie a bow around

846
00:51:50.920 --> 00:51:53.960
<v Speaker 2>this though and bring it all to a conclusion about

847
00:51:53.960 --> 00:51:56.360
<v Speaker 2>what does this mean? You know, all of this action?

848
00:51:56.920 --> 00:51:58.760
<v Speaker 2>And oh, by the way, every time I see a

849
00:51:58.760 --> 00:52:01.719
<v Speaker 2>bunch of stuff like this, Larry, I always think to myself, Yeah,

850
00:52:01.719 --> 00:52:04.320
<v Speaker 2>that's the part of it that we know about. Now

851
00:52:04.480 --> 00:52:07.559
<v Speaker 2>what else is going on that we're not being told

852
00:52:07.639 --> 00:52:11.280
<v Speaker 2>yet or we're never going to be told even as

853
00:52:11.280 --> 00:52:15.440
<v Speaker 2>it keeps happening, right, I mean, that's the other true.

854
00:52:15.440 --> 00:52:19.159
<v Speaker 1>Rather running screaming to the exits, which you know would

855
00:52:19.199 --> 00:52:21.719
<v Speaker 1>seem to be the call for I think there are

856
00:52:21.719 --> 00:52:24.199
<v Speaker 1>a couple of things we can do. One I think

857
00:52:24.280 --> 00:52:27.800
<v Speaker 1>we can trust And you just brought it up that

858
00:52:28.039 --> 00:52:33.480
<v Speaker 1>we are developing the resources to respond to the kind

859
00:52:33.519 --> 00:52:36.320
<v Speaker 1>of threat that we see coming from China. And I

860
00:52:36.360 --> 00:52:40.719
<v Speaker 1>think that's very clear because like the announcement we saw today,

861
00:52:41.000 --> 00:52:43.559
<v Speaker 1>Justice is very well aware of it, the military is

862
00:52:43.679 --> 00:52:47.559
<v Speaker 1>very well They're no longer taking us by surprise. So

863
00:52:47.960 --> 00:52:52.880
<v Speaker 1>there is an active defense against the Chinese on all fronts.

864
00:52:53.119 --> 00:52:56.400
<v Speaker 1>There is an active defense. There is not an active

865
00:52:56.480 --> 00:53:03.480
<v Speaker 1>defense against Russia's political warfare because we until we stop

866
00:53:04.000 --> 00:53:06.880
<v Speaker 1>doing it to ourselves. I mean, they're just making us

867
00:53:06.920 --> 00:53:12.440
<v Speaker 1>do it to ourselves. They're siloing us, they're making us

868
00:53:12.599 --> 00:53:15.360
<v Speaker 1>not talk to each other, they're making us not listen

869
00:53:15.400 --> 00:53:18.599
<v Speaker 1>to each other, and we're the only ones that can

870
00:53:18.599 --> 00:53:23.920
<v Speaker 1>fix that. Until we become less politicized, there's no solution

871
00:53:24.119 --> 00:53:28.519
<v Speaker 1>because they're just taking advantage of us. So the answer

872
00:53:28.559 --> 00:53:32.119
<v Speaker 1>there is really obvious, and that's quite frankly not to

873
00:53:32.159 --> 00:53:34.400
<v Speaker 1>be preachy, but we got to stop hating each other

874
00:53:34.920 --> 00:53:38.079
<v Speaker 1>and we've got to start looking for compromised solutions and

875
00:53:38.599 --> 00:53:42.239
<v Speaker 1>reaching across the aisle and not be POI. It's just

876
00:53:42.480 --> 00:53:46.119
<v Speaker 1>it's like it's fertile ground for them and nothing's going

877
00:53:46.199 --> 00:53:46.880
<v Speaker 1>to make it better.

878
00:53:47.159 --> 00:53:49.880
<v Speaker 2>Well, as long as you pretty much draw a line

879
00:53:49.920 --> 00:53:51.960
<v Speaker 2>where it's like, look, everything that is not on my

880
00:53:52.119 --> 00:53:54.679
<v Speaker 2>side of the line is absolute evil and needs to

881
00:53:54.719 --> 00:53:58.159
<v Speaker 2>be confronted, you know, this is where you get extremist action,

882
00:53:58.760 --> 00:54:01.079
<v Speaker 2>which is weird because you know, we're now being faced

883
00:54:01.119 --> 00:54:04.639
<v Speaker 2>with who's to blame for different things that occur. Right,

884
00:54:04.679 --> 00:54:07.880
<v Speaker 2>That's the other thing that happens after another event happens

885
00:54:08.280 --> 00:54:12.039
<v Speaker 2>where look, we have all this discord being sewed every

886
00:54:12.079 --> 00:54:15.159
<v Speaker 2>which way, and then somebody says, well, it's really their

887
00:54:15.239 --> 00:54:18.440
<v Speaker 2>fault that they've been attacking us. No, it's actually their

888
00:54:18.480 --> 00:54:22.719
<v Speaker 2>fault that they've been attacking us. And meanwhile, both sides

889
00:54:22.760 --> 00:54:27.800
<v Speaker 2>will blame each other over the same thing, and it's

890
00:54:27.880 --> 00:54:29.079
<v Speaker 2>you know, it's irrelevant.

891
00:54:29.079 --> 00:54:32.800
<v Speaker 1>The blame game is a political warfare tool, right, I mean,

892
00:54:33.840 --> 00:54:35.840
<v Speaker 1>live with it. People, If you do that, you just

893
00:54:37.119 --> 00:54:41.559
<v Speaker 1>it's like, keep asking yourself, is someone taking advantage of me?

894
00:54:44.280 --> 00:54:47.599
<v Speaker 2>And there it is? Anyway, Larry, try not to take

895
00:54:47.599 --> 00:54:49.599
<v Speaker 2>advantage of you. You've been with me about an hour

896
00:54:49.760 --> 00:54:54.480
<v Speaker 2>here going through this amazing you know, sorry, but crap

897
00:54:54.519 --> 00:54:58.079
<v Speaker 2>show of what's happening. You know, we are dealing with

898
00:54:58.159 --> 00:55:02.760
<v Speaker 2>a new age of technological advances that allow things to

899
00:55:03.519 --> 00:55:08.119
<v Speaker 2>occur in the subtlest of ways, and you have this

900
00:55:09.239 --> 00:55:12.199
<v Speaker 2>It's back to the spheres of influence once again. Right,

901
00:55:13.320 --> 00:55:17.280
<v Speaker 2>It's really about that, Who is manipulating that? For what purpose?

902
00:55:17.880 --> 00:55:22.239
<v Speaker 2>And why are they utilizing all of these modern tools now?

903
00:55:22.280 --> 00:55:25.360
<v Speaker 2>Because they're the best tools to utilize. You get the

904
00:55:25.360 --> 00:55:29.079
<v Speaker 2>biggest bang for your buck, so to speak. In going

905
00:55:29.119 --> 00:55:33.639
<v Speaker 2>through these different avenues creating these ripple effects, sure, grab

906
00:55:33.679 --> 00:55:36.119
<v Speaker 2>yourself a couple of alt media people along the way

907
00:55:36.599 --> 00:55:39.079
<v Speaker 2>to make sure that your message gets pushed. But it's

908
00:55:39.119 --> 00:55:42.400
<v Speaker 2>not really about them. It's about all of their listeners

909
00:55:42.400 --> 00:55:46.119
<v Speaker 2>that are gonna then take that and become even more

910
00:55:46.239 --> 00:55:51.239
<v Speaker 2>engaged in the strife between each other. They're going to

911
00:55:51.360 --> 00:55:53.559
<v Speaker 2>argue more with each other, They're gonna argue more with

912
00:55:53.639 --> 00:55:57.239
<v Speaker 2>the with the prescribed enemy, one way or another. And

913
00:55:57.320 --> 00:56:01.400
<v Speaker 2>so long as we're subdividing amongst ourselves and turning our

914
00:56:01.480 --> 00:56:05.360
<v Speaker 2>anger and turning our finger pointing at people that are here,

915
00:56:06.000 --> 00:56:08.480
<v Speaker 2>well we can't possibly focus on them and whatever the

916
00:56:08.480 --> 00:56:11.079
<v Speaker 2>hell they're doing I mean, or am I wrong?

917
00:56:11.760 --> 00:56:16.840
<v Speaker 1>No, And it's asymmetrical. But as again we talked in

918
00:56:17.840 --> 00:56:21.800
<v Speaker 1>as we talked last week, this is another form of

919
00:56:21.840 --> 00:56:25.679
<v Speaker 1>deniable warfare, which we have always done very poorly in

920
00:56:25.719 --> 00:56:29.400
<v Speaker 1>the Russians in particular, and Chinese have always done very well.

921
00:56:29.519 --> 00:56:32.679
<v Speaker 1>They just do it, they don't deny it, and they

922
00:56:32.800 --> 00:56:38.480
<v Speaker 1>just keep doing it and it works. So yeah, absolutely,

923
00:56:38.599 --> 00:56:44.000
<v Speaker 1>you just have to be aware that it's going on.

924
00:56:44.159 --> 00:56:46.480
<v Speaker 1>I think if people were just aware that was going on,

925
00:56:47.000 --> 00:56:50.840
<v Speaker 1>we have become so introspective and just like looking in

926
00:56:51.039 --> 00:56:55.239
<v Speaker 1>our side, ourselves like, it's just America. Let's just look

927
00:56:55.280 --> 00:56:57.639
<v Speaker 1>at ourselves and find bad guys.

928
00:56:57.400 --> 00:57:00.519
<v Speaker 2>Here well in the large Yeah, yeah.

929
00:57:00.800 --> 00:57:04.440
<v Speaker 1>The bad guys are all here. Certainly. Oh, should somebody

930
00:57:04.480 --> 00:57:07.039
<v Speaker 1>be taking advantage of us? Well, the bad guys are

931
00:57:07.079 --> 00:57:07.440
<v Speaker 1>all here.

932
00:57:08.960 --> 00:57:12.079
<v Speaker 2>Well. I think the most profound thing to recognize is that,

933
00:57:12.280 --> 00:57:15.400
<v Speaker 2>at all times, you know what, most of these arguments

934
00:57:15.440 --> 00:57:19.599
<v Speaker 2>are not ones that we created, but we've been we've

935
00:57:19.599 --> 00:57:23.199
<v Speaker 2>been influenced to engage in. And I think one of

936
00:57:23.239 --> 00:57:25.280
<v Speaker 2>the things that would bother the American people if they

937
00:57:25.320 --> 00:57:29.400
<v Speaker 2>would accept it, if they would truly accept it, is

938
00:57:29.920 --> 00:57:32.360
<v Speaker 2>it would truly bother them. It would disturb them, and

939
00:57:32.400 --> 00:57:35.880
<v Speaker 2>it might even change their direction if they thought that

940
00:57:36.159 --> 00:57:40.000
<v Speaker 2>all of these things were being manufactured and fabricated by

941
00:57:40.119 --> 00:57:42.800
<v Speaker 2>people who do not have our best interests at heart.

942
00:57:43.079 --> 00:57:46.199
<v Speaker 2>And I don't mean your political adversaries here. I mean

943
00:57:46.280 --> 00:57:50.119
<v Speaker 2>people that want to create chaos for the sake of

944
00:57:50.199 --> 00:57:54.039
<v Speaker 2>making sure that we are incoherent and at each other's

945
00:57:54.039 --> 00:57:58.440
<v Speaker 2>throats and definitely mistrusting of one another. Any of our

946
00:57:58.480 --> 00:58:03.400
<v Speaker 2>political situations be damned. If we are all turned against

947
00:58:03.400 --> 00:58:06.320
<v Speaker 2>one another, we never have a chance to honestly look

948
00:58:06.360 --> 00:58:09.519
<v Speaker 2>at them, because all of our focus against one another,

949
00:58:10.039 --> 00:58:14.199
<v Speaker 2>and that if that's being manufactured by people not here,

950
00:58:14.280 --> 00:58:18.039
<v Speaker 2>it's not organic. If it's an artificial thing that has been,

951
00:58:19.360 --> 00:58:23.599
<v Speaker 2>you know, thrust upon us, and people really recognize that,

952
00:58:23.880 --> 00:58:26.559
<v Speaker 2>I think they might object. I think they might try

953
00:58:26.599 --> 00:58:29.559
<v Speaker 2>to reevaluate if they thought to themselves, this is an

954
00:58:29.679 --> 00:58:34.440
<v Speaker 2>organic This is all being manufactured by somebody else who

955
00:58:34.480 --> 00:58:36.960
<v Speaker 2>wants to pull our strings from a distance.

956
00:58:37.159 --> 00:58:39.599
<v Speaker 1>Chuck, Chuck, I think you need to link in that

957
00:58:39.679 --> 00:58:43.440
<v Speaker 1>Twilight Zone episode, Remember the one I'm talking about where

958
00:58:43.480 --> 00:58:47.159
<v Speaker 1>it's this local neighborhood where suddenly the you know, the

959
00:58:47.239 --> 00:58:50.760
<v Speaker 1>lights go out, there's no more radio broadcast yea, and

960
00:58:52.360 --> 00:58:54.960
<v Speaker 1>by the end, everybody is at each other's throats.

961
00:58:55.599 --> 00:58:55.800
<v Speaker 2>Right.

962
00:58:56.000 --> 00:58:58.360
<v Speaker 1>I think that's a perfect illustration of what you were

963
00:58:58.440 --> 00:58:59.280
<v Speaker 1>just talking about.

964
00:58:59.360 --> 00:59:01.280
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, the one where all of a sudden, the one

965
00:59:01.280 --> 00:59:04.039
<v Speaker 2>guy has electricity, and then everybody goes and tax his

966
00:59:04.079 --> 00:59:08.320
<v Speaker 2>house because suddenly he has power on exactly then people

967
00:59:08.400 --> 00:59:11.079
<v Speaker 2>standing way back, they're supposed to be aliens, but it

968
00:59:11.119 --> 00:59:14.239
<v Speaker 2>doesn't matter, standing way back goes. Look, it's that easy.

969
00:59:14.719 --> 00:59:16.559
<v Speaker 2>We can turn them against each other just like this.

970
00:59:16.719 --> 00:59:19.480
<v Speaker 2>We don't have to do a single thing. Yeah, you know,

971
00:59:19.760 --> 00:59:20.599
<v Speaker 2>it reminds me off.

972
00:59:20.800 --> 00:59:22.760
<v Speaker 1>I'll be forced to watch that once a pay and

973
00:59:22.800 --> 00:59:23.519
<v Speaker 1>think about it.

974
00:59:23.639 --> 00:59:25.920
<v Speaker 2>Really, it reminds me of the days when somebody was

975
00:59:25.960 --> 00:59:28.079
<v Speaker 2>banging their shoe on the on the uh you know,

976
00:59:28.360 --> 00:59:32.480
<v Speaker 2>on the uh uh on the lecturn at the un

977
00:59:32.519 --> 00:59:36.199
<v Speaker 2>and saying we'll bury you without without taking a shot. Yep,

978
00:59:36.400 --> 00:59:41.320
<v Speaker 2>it can be done, and perhaps it is being done anyway. Larry. Yeah,

979
00:59:41.400 --> 00:59:43.840
<v Speaker 2>there you go. Positive note to end things on and uh,

980
00:59:43.840 --> 00:59:47.639
<v Speaker 2>don't you feel good? I don't necessarily, but you can

981
00:59:47.639 --> 00:59:52.679
<v Speaker 2>feel better and educate yourself with Larry Hancock's work larrydash

982
00:59:52.719 --> 00:59:55.360
<v Speaker 2>Handcock dot com. Again, I recommend all of his books,

983
00:59:55.639 --> 00:59:59.760
<v Speaker 2>and especially tonight we discussed a bit of creating chaos

984
00:59:59.800 --> 01:00:03.039
<v Speaker 2>for sure, not necessarily about what's in that book, but

985
01:00:03.079 --> 01:00:06.039
<v Speaker 2>then again, maybe some of what's in that book. So

986
01:00:06.480 --> 01:00:08.440
<v Speaker 2>all I can tell you is stay tuned and Larry,

987
01:00:08.880 --> 01:00:10.239
<v Speaker 2>thanks a lot for doing this with me.

988
01:00:11.079 --> 01:00:13.800
<v Speaker 1>You bet have a nice evening, Chuck you too.

989
01:00:13.760 --> 01:00:16.519
<v Speaker 2>And as for you guys, I am merely O'Kelly. All

990
01:00:16.599 --> 01:00:19.039
<v Speaker 2>of you are indeed the effect. Go to Larry dash

991
01:00:19.119 --> 01:00:23.239
<v Speaker 2>Hancock dot com and follow his work, get his books.

992
01:00:23.280 --> 01:00:26.840
<v Speaker 2>They will educate you and also feel free to drop

993
01:00:26.840 --> 01:00:29.760
<v Speaker 2>in something at o'helly dot com. I could use your

994
01:00:29.760 --> 01:00:33.239
<v Speaker 2>help at any time, but especially now. Thanks a lot

995
01:00:33.280 --> 01:00:37.719
<v Speaker 2>for listening again, I'm ocelly, You're the effect. Good night.

996
01:01:09.760 --> 01:01:14.480
<v Speaker 4>In Denial Secret Wars with Air Strikes and Tanks by

997
01:01:14.599 --> 01:01:19.039
<v Speaker 4>Larry Hancock. Secret wars became a staple of US covert

998
01:01:19.079 --> 01:01:23.519
<v Speaker 4>operations and are still happening today. Larryhancock's book In Denial

999
01:01:23.719 --> 01:01:26.880
<v Speaker 4>rips the cover off many of them, using new files.

1000
01:01:26.920 --> 01:01:29.320
<v Speaker 4>It exposes things about the Bay of Pigs that no

1001
01:01:29.360 --> 01:01:32.400
<v Speaker 4>one has ever written about before. It shows why it

1002
01:01:32.440 --> 01:01:34.920
<v Speaker 4>really failed and why the United States did.

1003
01:01:34.800 --> 01:01:37.719
<v Speaker 3>Not learn from it. It also shows why other countries

1004
01:01:37.719 --> 01:01:41.679
<v Speaker 3>today are doing secret operations with more success. This is

1005
01:01:41.679 --> 01:01:44.960
<v Speaker 3>the book that puts what some want to deny into

1006
01:01:45.119 --> 01:01:49.199
<v Speaker 3>the light. In Denial, Secret Wars with Air Strikes and

1007
01:01:49.320 --> 01:01:55.119
<v Speaker 3>Tanks Larryhancock. For more information, go to Larry hyphen Handcock

1008
01:01:55.280 --> 01:01:58.079
<v Speaker 3>dot com. Pick up your copy of In Denial at

1009
01:01:58.119 --> 01:01:59.480
<v Speaker 3>Amazon dot com.

1010
01:01:59.519 --> 01:02:03.639
<v Speaker 4>In Digital or Physical Revelation Through Conversation, The.

1011
01:02:03.599 --> 01:02:07.360
<v Speaker 5>War State by Michael Swanson explains the great national transformation

1012
01:02:07.440 --> 01:02:09.840
<v Speaker 5>that took place and put the Kennedy presidency in the

1013
01:02:09.880 --> 01:02:13.679
<v Speaker 5>context of the times, and reveals never before published information

1014
01:02:13.800 --> 01:02:17.039
<v Speaker 5>about the Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy would not have

1015
01:02:17.079 --> 01:02:20.159
<v Speaker 5>been assassinated if he had been president two hundred years ago.

1016
01:02:20.519 --> 01:02:23.440
<v Speaker 5>His assassination took place in the context of the Cold

1017
01:02:23.480 --> 01:02:26.440
<v Speaker 5>War and the rise of the national security state. Before

1018
01:02:26.480 --> 01:02:29.599
<v Speaker 5>World War II, the United States was a continental republic.

1019
01:02:29.960 --> 01:02:33.039
<v Speaker 5>In the decade that followed, it became an imperial superpower.

1020
01:02:33.280 --> 01:02:36.880
<v Speaker 5>Generals such as Curtis LeMay not only wanted to invade Cuba,

1021
01:02:36.920 --> 01:02:39.199
<v Speaker 5>but knew that there were short range missiles on the

1022
01:02:39.199 --> 01:02:42.360
<v Speaker 5>island armed with nuclear warheads that they could not destroy

1023
01:02:42.440 --> 01:02:45.280
<v Speaker 5>because they were on mobile launchers. Their invasion could have

1024
01:02:45.360 --> 01:02:48.360
<v Speaker 5>led to a Third World War, and they wanted to

1025
01:02:48.400 --> 01:02:51.719
<v Speaker 5>go to war anyway. The War State by Michael Swanson

1026
01:02:51.960 --> 01:02:54.719
<v Speaker 5>reveals why and will show you what President Kennedy was

1027
01:02:54.800 --> 01:02:59.199
<v Speaker 5>up against. For more information, the Warstate dot com.

1028
01:02:58.719 --> 01:03:01.840
<v Speaker 6>Yo yova's Doug Campbell, host of the Dallas Action podcast

1029
01:03:01.920 --> 01:03:05.119
<v Speaker 6>presented by Wall Street Window, and you are listening to

1030
01:03:05.199 --> 01:03:09.480
<v Speaker 6>the O'Kelly effect revelation through conversation.

1031
01:03:09.880 --> 01:03:11.800
<v Speaker 3>When you was expressed by caller schools, there anyone else

1032
01:03:11.840 --> 01:03:13.400
<v Speaker 3>who happens to get on the air of Jelley dot com.

1033
01:03:13.480 --> 01:03:17.119
<v Speaker 3>You've not necessarily reflect views of door and we are

1034
01:03:17.159 --> 01:03:17.800
<v Speaker 3>not responsible.

1035
01:03:17.840 --> 01:03:19.320
<v Speaker 2>We're any stupidity which might ensue.

1036
01:03:19.440 --> 01:03:19.760
<v Speaker 6>Thank you.

1037
01:03:19.840 --> 01:03:22.880
<v Speaker 7>Do you like history, Real history that you were never

1038
01:03:23.000 --> 01:03:27.440
<v Speaker 7>taught in schools? Why the Vietnam War, Nuclear Bombs and

1039
01:03:27.599 --> 01:03:31.599
<v Speaker 7>Nation Building in Southeast Asia by author Mike Swanson, with

1040
01:03:31.760 --> 01:03:36.079
<v Speaker 7>new documentation never seen before that'll open your eyes to

1041
01:03:36.199 --> 01:03:39.679
<v Speaker 7>events that led up to this. Why the Vietnam War,

1042
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<v Speaker 7>Nuclear Bombs and Nation Building in Southeast Asia nineteen forty

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<v Speaker 7>five through nineteen sixty one. Get your copy today at

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<v Speaker 7>Amazon dot com. Why the Vietnam War by author Mike Swanson.

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<v Speaker 4>Omega My You