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Speaker 1: As we got caught up in the bursting of the

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housing bubble and then the financial crisis, and then this

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extraordinary response that occurred with the bailouts of the investment

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banks and all the other things that were unprecedented historically,

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and that caused so much frustration.

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Speaker 2: I realized that.

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Speaker 1: It appeared we were moving into an environment in terms

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of government involvement in the system, bailouts, the Federal Reserve

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responses to these different things that was unlike anything that

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had happened in my lifetime, and I needed to dig in.

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Speaker 3: You were listening to Carrie Letz's Financial Survival Network, where

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you get valuable information you just can't find anywhere else

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to thrive in today's trying times. You need the Financial

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Survival Network now more than ever. Go to Financial Survivalnetwork

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dot com and get your free newsletter and gift. Financial

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Survival Network now more than.

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Speaker 2: Ever, And welcome.

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Speaker 4: You are listening to and watching the Financial Survival Network.

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Speaker 2: I'm your host, Carrie Lutz.

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Speaker 4: Well hard to believe two thousand and eight the last

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global financial crisis, and it's been sixteen years. Maybe it's

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time for a look back, because certainly one of the

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major issues during this campaign season was housing affordability, and

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housing affordability has never been more out of reach for

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more people than it is now. So the book is

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two thousand and eight. What really Happened? Tod Cheats, the

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author is with us now. Todd, you just released this

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book a month ago. What was the reason you wrote

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the book?

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Speaker 1: Yeah, well, so the reason that I wrote the book

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was as we got caught up in the bursting of

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the housing bubble and then the financial crisis, and then

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this extraordinary response that occurred with the bailouts of the

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investment banks and all the other things that were unprecedented historically,

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and that caused so much frustration.

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Speaker 2: I realized that.

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Speaker 1: You know, it appeared we were moving into an environment

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in terms of government involvement in the system, bailouts, the

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Federal Reserve responses to these different things that was unlike

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anything that had happened in my lifetime, and I needed

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to dig in and start doing a lot more research

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so I understood the history and what really caused this event,

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and then also understood the historical history behind the event

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as well. And so you know, that led to a

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number of years of researching these things, and then the

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process of putting the book together.

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Speaker 4: All right, so what do you think we've learned in

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the past sixteen years. I know what you've learned, but

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what do you think the rest of us have learned?

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Speaker 2: Well?

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Speaker 1: I think unfortunately we kind of ended up as a

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whole taking away the wrong messages from what happened. The

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kind of the dominant narrative that evolved was the idea

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that this occurred because of what I call in the

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book a gradual trend of deregulation, with the idea being

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that this went back to the late Carter years and

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then the Reagan administration.

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Speaker 2: We went down this.

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Speaker 1: Deregulatory trend across a range of different industries, and that

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eventually it spun out of control and it just went

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too far, and that allowed markets to spin out of control,

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which then created a housing bubble and then a panic.

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Speaker 2: And as I.

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Speaker 1: Got into the research on all of this, you know,

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what I saw is basically what really happened could not

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have been further from that understanding. And you know, the

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things that actually caused the housing bubble that led to

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the crisis, and then even the panic and the crisis

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itself were driven by factors, you know, that were completely

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the opposite of this general understanding that occurred, all right.

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Speaker 4: So nobody really understood what was happening. The deregulation was

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definitely a factor. The ability to raise interest rates as

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high as you wanted, getting rid of all the yeasery laws,

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combined with that, I'm sure was a factor. But it

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was a lack of understanding also on the part of

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consumers homeowners when they signed on the dotted line, what

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the effects of these refinancings and negative interest, negative amortization

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mortgages and adjustable mortgages and all this type of stuff,

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what that would actually wind up, how it would wind

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up affecting you.

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Speaker 2: No question.

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Speaker 1: I mean, there was confusion throughout the system, of failure

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to understand and anticipate what was happening at the time,

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and then, as we've talked about, even in the aftermath,

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so you know, at the time. What I show in

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the book is what actually caused the housing bubble was

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the major exp undertaken by the two government sponsored enterprises,

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Fanny May and Freddie Mack, that by the mid nineteen nineties,

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for the first time ever, had come to dominate housing

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housing finance in a way that was unique in our

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country's history, we had always had very predictable, reliable housing markets.

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It was thought of as like a cornerstone of wealth

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for most young families or young people starting.

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Speaker 2: Out in life.

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Speaker 1: You know, go out and buy a home, and if

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you hold it over time, it will grow in value,

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not rapidly, but at a reasonable pace. And that housing

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was generally safe from the kinds of booms and busts

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that we've seen in other areas of the economy. And

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that was basically true. That also is reflected in the

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housing data that goes back to the eighteen eighties had

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But what changed kind of beneath the radar, was that

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beginning in the early nineteen seventies, Fanny May and Freddie Mack,

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which became private institutions traded on the New York Stock Exchange,

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but ones that were also given special government privileges that

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allowed Washington to continue to play a role in housing finance.

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Speaker 2: They started to.

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Speaker 1: Grow, and by the mid nineties they were getting close

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to the point, not quite, but close to the point

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where they were responsible for almost one out of every

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two dollars of single family mortgage finance in this country.

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So when in nineteen ninety eight they undertook a massive

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expansion of their businesses, and it was massive and sudden.

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The year before they had grown by something like six

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or seven percent. In nineteen ninety eight, they grew by

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around fifteen percent, and they continued to grow at that

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rate for the next four years. All of a sudden,

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what we see in the national data is an extraordinary

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and unprecedented escalation in housing prices that began to take

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place at that point in time, and so that started

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luring people into this idea that you know, hey, housing,

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you know is not just to get rich slow mechanism.

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It's something that people can make some real money on

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in the short term as well.

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Speaker 4: Right, So when you when you look at it also,

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you know, one of the things that one of the

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things you think about with a housing crisis, right is

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that you know AIG their failure, and when you go

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back to AIG, you know, it's so funny. A large

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point reason of why AIG failed was because then Attorney General,

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who later on became the disgraced, the disgraced what would

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you say, Governor of New York none other than Andy Cuomo,

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actually caused this guy, who is very conservative, he would

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have never done all these seed you know, collateral default

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CDOs and cmos. But because Cromo pushed him out I

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think his name was Greenberg wound up. The new leadership

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of AIG was very reckless and they did all sorts

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of things that Hank Greenberg would have never done.

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Speaker 1: Yes, I mean, look, we saw this kind of throughout

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the spectrum, from home buyers who were taking on obligations

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that they didn't fully understand and appreciate the risks of

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to financial institutions that were providing loans under terms and

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buying and accumulating in some cases you know, fairly exotic

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mortgage securities that like the ones you referenced, or just

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making you know, regular home loans and maintaining a piece

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of the securitizations on their books. We saw at AIG,

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as you referenced, Merrill Lynch had significant problems in the

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fourth quarter of two thousand and seven. City Group had

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similar problems both situations.

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Speaker 2: Excuse me of two thousand and seven.

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Speaker 1: In both situations, longtime CEOs were filed fired from those

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institutions as well. And as you go back through it,

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you know the thing that connected all of these institutions,

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as the domino started to fall, all of which started

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to happen after the housing bubble began to collapse. But

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the thing that linked all these institutions together was exposure

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in some form to single family home mortgages, whether it

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was securitization pieces they retained on their books or through

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the kinds of instruments that you just referenced at AIG

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and others. Yeah, yeah, pretty amazing.

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Speaker 4: So do you think that we can have another crash

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like we did before because we don't have liars loans,

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you know, we they have done a number of things

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to stop it from half opening. There's frank which which

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the FED has showed that they won't enforce unless it's

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against a small bank, not against a big bank. Right,

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all these things.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, So, I mean, look, we have learned some lessons.

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I think the regulators did learn some lessons in that respect,

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and maybe more importantly, the lenders learned some lessons in

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this respect. I mean, we now know we can have

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a national housing bubble and that prices nationally, you know,

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can decline by twenty twenty five percent like they did

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after the bubble collapsed. So there is less recklessness on

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the lending side of things. But I think because we

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didn't draw the proper lessons from the last from the

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housing bubble and the financial crisis. You know, we now

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have different problems, so we followed all of that up.

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I mean, the first phase of the housing bubble was

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created by Fanny Maine Freddie Mack, as I talked about

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in the book, from ninety eight through two thousand and one,

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But from two thousand and two to two thousand and

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five the bubble was really driven by easy money, low

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interest rate policies of the Federal Reserve. When they lower

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interest rates after the tech bubble collapsed in two thousand

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to try and protect the economy, they did not realize

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that they were making the historic mistake of pushing short

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term interest rates down below the rate of housing appreciation,

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which caused an incredible sense of opportunity to make money

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quickly by borrowing it on adjustable rate mortgages and buying

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a home that was appreciating it let's say five six

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seven percent, and for financing it with a loan that

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was on a variable rate short term basis, maybe had

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a three to four percent interest rate kind of thing.

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So because of all that and failing to learn the

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proper lessons we came out of the crisis with the

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FED continuing to gauge engage in very easy money, low

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interest rate policies through out the period of time after that,

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and we've kind of gone through another round of asset inflation,

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so housing prices are very high. Again, getting back to

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your question, I don't think we're necessarily poised for another

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collapse because of the change in the lending markets that

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you alluded to, but we have a massive affordability issue

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right now and that I think played a big role

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in this past election, and it's also a part of

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you know, this bout of inflation that frustrated so many

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people in the last four years as well. It wasn't

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just in consumer prices for a period of time, but

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it also came in housing prices and priced a lot

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of people out of the marketplace. So it doesn't have

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to necessarily have the same end, but we have, you know,

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a kind of a different.

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Speaker 2: Set of problems that have arisen this time.

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Speaker 4: So you know, the crash, if there is a crash

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in housing, it's not going to be because of fraud

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and liars loans as they called it. It's going to

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be from something more structural and less intentional if you will.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I think that's that's likely. I mean, if we

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and we don't have to have a crash.

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Speaker 1: I mean, the other option is that we go through

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what sometimes gets called lost a lost decade or a

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lost two decades of return. So people come in and

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buy a home at these very high prices that we

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now have as a result of all of this, but

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instead of getting the kind of predictable, you know, three

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four percent growth in the value of the home over time,

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the home values just stagnate for ten or fifteen years.

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And so you know that if people are aware of that,

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then maybe that gets them to look a little bit

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more closely at our rent versus by decision and think

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more about whether, well, do I really want to take

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on home ownership and all of that if I don't

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think I'm going to make much money out of the

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home over the next ten to fifteen years.

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Speaker 4: So yes, yes, And that really is the problem is.

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You know, we've seen home prices escalate so so far,

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so fast, even faster than the rate of inflation, whatever

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that actual rate might be, And we don't really know

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what that rate is. We only know the government numbers,

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which we know from past experience we should accept with

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the grain of salt. Right, So even if they don't

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go up, many people who are buying, who've bought into

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American dream, buy your home, hold on to it, get

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another blah blah blah, watch the price go up. They

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might be in for a disappointment.

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Speaker 1: How yeah, for a disappointment in the case of like

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we just talked about, a lost decade of appreciation. But

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also the risk that they should be aware of is

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you had to be very careful about how much leverage

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you would buy a home at at these point, at

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this point in time, or if you're thinking, you know,

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you already own a home that's appreciated a lot, and

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maybe you're thinking about taking out an equity loan or

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a reverse mortgage or something like that, people should be

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very cautious about the use of debt against these current

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home values because there is a risk, like we've talked

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about in one scenario, of failure to appreciate, but there's

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also a risk of another downturn in housing prices, which

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you know obviously is going to hurt the people with

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the most leverage most quickly. So all these things to

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be aware of. All right, Well, we really appreciate you

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coming on the show. Todd sounding the alarm here because

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I think better safe than sorry.

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Speaker 2: Forewarned is Forearmed.

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Speaker 4: The name of the book two thousand and eight What

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Really Happened, written by Todd Sheets, who's on with us now,

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and you can find it on Amazon. There's a link

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to the Amazon purchase page in the show notes to

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this interview on Financial Survival Network dot com. We ask

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while you're there, you please sign up for our newsletter,

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like over sixty thousand FSN members have already done so Todd,

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we'll be looking at what happens and if there's any

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major signs reverberations in the market, we'll be sure to

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have you back on. Good luck with the book and

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we'll talk to you soon.

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Speaker 2: That sounds so great, Thanks so much for having.

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Speaker 3: Me, Thanks for listening to Carrie Letz's Financial Survival Network,

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your solution to today's trying times. For the latest, go

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to Financial Survivalnetwork dot com. Financial Survival Network now more

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than ever