Speaker 1: Chapter twenty nine. The will. The activities of the will
comprise the third great class of mental processes. Psychologists always
have differed greatly in their conception of just what constitutes
these activities. Even to day, it is difficult to obtain
a dictionary definition of the will that agrees with the
best opinion on the subject. The dictionaries adhere to the
old classification and conception, which regarded the will as that
faculty of the mind or soul by which it chooses
or decides. But with the growth of the idea that
the will acts according to the strongest motive, and that
the motive is supplied by the average struck between the
desires of the moment under the supervision of the intellect,
the conception of will as the choosing and deciding faculty
is passing from favor. In place of the older conception
has come the newer one, which holds the will is
primarily concerned with action. It is difficult to place the
will in a category of mental processes, but it is
generally agreed that it abides in the very center of
the mental being and is closely associated with what is
called the ego or self. The will seems to have
at least three general phases. Those are one the phase
of action, two the phase of deliberation or choice, and
three the phase of expression in action. In order to
understand the will, it is necessary to consider each of
these three phases of its activities. One. Desire. The first
phase of will, which is called desire, is in itself
somewhat complex. On its lower side, it touches and in
fact blends into feeling and emotion. Its center consists of
a state of tension akin to that of a coiled
spring or a cat crouching ready for a spring. On
its higher side, it touches, penetrates, and blends in to
the other phases of the will which we have mentioned.
Desire is defined as a feeling, emotion, or excitement of
the mind directed toward the attainment, enjoyment, or possession of
some object from which pleasure, profit, or gratification is expected.
Hallick gives us the following excellent conception of the moving
spirit of desire. Desire has for its object something which
will bring pleasure or get rid of pain, immediate or
remote for the individual or for some one in whom
he is interested. Aversion or a striving away from something
is merely the negative aspect of desire. In Halleck's statement
above quoted, we have the explanation of the part played
by the intellect in the activities of will. The intellect
is able to perceive the relations between present action and
future results, and is able to point the way toward
the suppression of some desires in order that other and
better ones may be manifested. It also serves its purposes
in regulating the striking of the average between conflicting desires.
Without the intervention of the intellect, the temporary desire of
the moment would be invariably acted upon without regard to
future results or consequences to one's self and others. It
also serves to point out the course of action calculated
to give the most satisfactory expression of the desire. While
it is a fact that the action of will depends
almost entirely upon the motive force of desire, it is
likewise true that desire may be created, regulated, suppressed, or
even by the action of the will. The will, by
giving or refusing attention to a certain class of desires,
may either cause them to grow and wax strong, or
else die and fade away. It must be remembered, however,
that this use of the will itself springs from another
set of desires or feelings. Desire is aroused by feelings
or emotions rising from the subconscious planes of the mind
and seeking expression and manifestation. We have considered the nature
of the feelings and emotions in previous chapters, which should
be read in connection with the present one. It should
be remembered that the feeling or emotional side of desire
arises from either inherited race memories existing as instincts, or
from a memory of the past experiences of the individual.
In some cases, the feeling first manifests in a vague
unrest cause by subconscious promptings and excitement. Then the imagination
pictures the object of the feeling or certain memory images
connected with it, and the desire thus manifests on the
plane of consciousness. The entrance of the desire feeling into
consciousness is accompanied by that peculiar tension which marks the
second phase of desire. This tension, when sufficiently strong, passes
into the third phase of desire, or that in which
desire blends into will action. Desire in this stage makes
a demand upon will for expression and action from mere
feeling and tension of feeling. It becomes a call to action.
But before expression and action are given to it, the
second phase of will must manifest, at least for a moment.
This second phase is that known as deliberation or the
weighing and balancing of desire two deliberation. The second phase
of will, known as deliberation, is more than the purely
intellectual process which the term would indicate. The intellect plays
an important part, it is true, but there is also
an almost instinctive and automatic weighing and balancing of desires.
There is seldom only one desire presenting its claims upon
the will at any particular moment. It is true that
occasionally there arises an emotional desire of such dominant power
and strength that it crowds out every other claimant of
the bar of deliberation, But such instances are rare, and
as a rule there are a host of rival claimants,
each insisting upon its rights in the matter at issue.
In the amount of weak or undeveloped and untrained intellect,
the struggle is usually little more than a brief combat
between several desires in which the strongest of the moment wins,
but with the development of intellect, new factors arise and
new forces are felt. Moreover, the more complex one's emotional nature,
and the greater the development of the higher forms of feeling,
the more intense is the struggle of deliberation, or the
fight of the desires. We see in Halleck's definition that
desire has not only the object of bringing pleasure or
getting rid of pain for the individual, but that the
additional element of the welfare of someone in whom he
is interested is added, which element is often the deciding factor.
This element, of course, arises from the development and cultivation
of one's emotional nature. In the same way, we also
see that it is not merely the intermediate welfare of
one's self or those in whom one is interested that
speaks before the bar, but also the more oute welfare.
This consideration of future welfare depends upon the intellect and
cultivated imagination under its control. Moreover, the trained intellect is
able to discover possible greater satisfaction in some course of
action other than in the one prompted by the clamoring
desire of the moment. This explains why the judgment and
action of an intelligent man, as a rule are far
different from those of the unintelligent one, and also why
a man of culture tends toward different action from that
of the uncultured, and likewise by the man of broad
sympathies and high ideals acts in a different way from
one of the opposite type. But the principle is ever
the same. The feelings manifest in desire, the greatest ultimate
satisfaction apparent at the moment is sought, and the strongest
set of desires wins the day. Comment on this point
is interesting. He says, desire is not always proportional to
the idea of one's own selfish pleasure. Many persons, after
forming an idea of the vast amount of earthly distress,
desire to relieve it, and the desire goes out in action.
As the benevolent societies in every city testify here, the
individual pleasure is none the less, but it is secondary,
coming from the pleasure of others. The desire of the
near often raises a stronger desire than the remote. A
child frequently prefers a thing immediately if it is only
one tenth as good as something he might have a year.
Hence a student often desires more the leisure of to
day than the success of future years. Though admonished to study,
he wastes his time and thus loses incomparably greater pleasure
when he is tossed to the rear in a struggle
for existence. The result of this weighing and balancing of
the desire is or should be, decision and a choice,
which then passes into action. But many persons seem unable
to make up their own mind and require a push
or urge from without before they will act. Others decide
without proper use of the intellect, upon what they call impulse,
but which is merely impatience. Some are like the fabled donkey,
which starve to death when placed at an equal distance
between two equally attractive haystacks, and was unable to decide
towards which to move. Others follow the example of Chep
in the comedy, who, when given a coin with which
to buy a piece of soap for his wife, stood
on the corner deliberating whether to obey orders or to
buy a drink with the money. He wants the drink,
but realizes that his wife will beat him if he
returns without the soap. My stomach says, drink my back,
says soap, says jep. But finally, he remarks, is not
a man's stomach more to him than his back? Yes,
says I. The final decision depends upon the striking a
balance between the desires, the wig of desire for and
desire against desire for this or desire for something else.
The strength of the several desires depends upon nearness and
present interest arising from attention as applied to the feelings
and emotions arising from heredity, environment, experience, and education, which
constitute character, and also upon the degree of intellectual clearness
and power in forming correct judgments between the desires. It
must be remembered, however, that the intellect appears not as
an opponent of the principle of the satisfaction of desire,
but merely as an instrument of the ego into eeminy,
which course of action will result in the greatest ultimate
satisfaction direct or indirect, present or future. Four. At the last,
every individual acts so as to bring himself the greatest
satisfaction immediate or future, direct or indirect, either personal or
through the welfare of others, as this may appear to
him at the particular moment of deliberation. We always act
in the direction of that which will greater content our spirit.
This will be found to be the spirit of all decisions.
Although the motive is often hidden and difficult to find,
even by the individual himself, many of the strongest motives
having their origin in the subconscious planes of mentality. Three. Action,
The third and final phase of will is that known
as action, the act of eolition, by which the desire
idea is expressed in physical or mental activis. The old
conception of the will held that the decisive phase of
the will was its characteristic and final phase, ignoring the
fact that the very essence or spirit of will is
bound up with action. Even those familiar with a newer
conception frequently assume that the act of decision is the
final phase of will, ignoring the fact that we frequently
decide to do a thing and yet may never carry
out the intention and decision. The active willing is not
complete unless action is expressed. There must be the manifestation
of the motor element or phase of will, else the
will process is incomplete. A weakness of this last phase
of will affects the entire will and renders its processes ineffective.
The world is filled with persons who are able to
decide what is best to do and what should be done,
but who never actually act upon the decision. The few
persons who promptly follow up the desa decision with vigorous
action of those who accomplish the world's work. Without the
full manifestation of this third phase of will, the other
two phases are useless types of will. So far, we
have considered merely the highest type of will, that which
is accompanied by conscious deliberation, in which the intellect takes
an active part in this process. Not only do the
conflicting feelings push themselves forward with opposing claims for recognition,
but the intellect is active in examining the case and
offering valuable testimony as to the comparative merits of the
various claimants and the effect of certain courses of action
upon the individual. There are, however, several lower forms of
will manifestation which we should briefly consider. In passing reflex action,
the will is moved to action by the reflex activities
of the nervous system, which have been mentioned in the
earlier chapters of this book. In this general type, we
find unconscious reflex action such as that manifested when a
sleeper is touched and moves away, or when a frog's
leg twitches when the nerve end is excited. We also
find conscious reflex action, such as that manifested by the
winking of the eye, or the performance of habitual physical motion,
such as the movement in walking, operating the sewing machine,
or typewriter, playing the piano, et cetera impulse of action.
The will is often moved to action by a dim
idea or vague perception of purpose or impulse. The action
is almost instinctive, although there is a vague perception of purpose.
For instance, we feel an impulse to turn toward the
source of a strange sound or sight, or other source
of interest or curiosity. Or we may feel an impulse
rising from the subconscious plane of our mind, causing a
dimly conscious idea of movement or action to relieve the tension.
For instance, one may feel a desire to exercise or
to seek fresh air or green fields, although he had
not been thinking of these things at the time. These
impulses arise from a subconscious feeling fatigue or desire for change, which,
added to a fleeting idea, produces the impulse. Unless an
impulse is inhibited by the will activities inspired by other desires, habits, ideas,
or ideals, we act upon it in precisely the same
way that a young child or animal does. Hofting says
of this type of action, the psychological condition of the
impulse is that with a momentary feeling and sensation should
be combined a more or less clear idea of something
which may augment the pleasure or diminish the pain of
the moment instinctive action. The will is frequently moved to
action by an instinctive stimulus. This form of will activity
closely resembles the last mentioned form, and often it is
impossible to distinguish between the two. The activities of the
bee in building its comb and storing its honey, the
work of the silkworm and caterpillar in building their resting
places are examples of this form of action. Indeed, even
the building of the nest of the bird may be
so classed. In these cases, there is an intelligent action
toward a definite end, but the animal is unconscious of
that end. The experiences of the remote ancestors of these
creatures recorded their impressions upon the subconscious mind of the species,
and they are transmitted in some way to all of
that species. The nervous system of every living thing is
a record cylinder of the experiences of its early ancestors,
and these cylinders tend to reproduce these impressions upon appropriate occasions.
In preceding chapters, we have shown that even man is
under the influence of instinct to a greater extent than
he imagines himself to be.